BIBLIO 17 Politics and Scepticism in La Mothe Le Vayer The Two-Faced Philosopher? Ioana Manea Politics and Scepticism in La Mothe Le Vayer BIBLIO 17 Volume 218 ∙ 2019 Suppléments aux Papers on French Seventeenth Century Literature Biblio 17 est une série évaluée par un comité de lecture. Biblio 17 is a peer-reviewed series. Collection fondée par Wolfgang Leiner Directeur: Rainer Zaiser Ioana Manea litic nd ce tici in t e e er The Two-Faced Philosopher? © 2019 · Narr Francke Attempto Verlag GmbH + Co. KG Dischingerweg 5 · D-72070 Tübingen Das Werk einschließlich aller seiner Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist ohne Zustimmung des Verlages unzulässig und strafbar. Das gilt insbesondere für Vervielfältigungen, Übersetzungen, Mikroverfilmungen und die Einspeicherung und Verarbeitung in elektronischen Systemen. Printed in Germany Internet: www.narr.de E-Mail: info@narr.de ISSN 1434-6397 ISBN 978-3-8233-8283-6 Cover image: Guillaume de La Perrière, Le Théâtre des bons engins, auquel sont contenus cent emblèmes, I Emblème. 2 nd edition. Paris: D. Janot, 1539. (gallica.bnf.fr / Bibliothèque nationale de France) Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http: / / dnb.dnb.de abrufbar. For my family and my friends 9 15 1.1 15 1.2 20 1.3 27 1.4 37 1.5 43 1.6 50 1.7 57 62 2.1 62 2.2 67 2.3 74 2.4 79 2.5 85 2.6 89 96 3.1 96 3.2 101 3.3 107 3.4 110 Contents Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 1. The Philosopher La Mothe Le Vayer: Incurable Sceptic . . . . . . . . . . . The Philosopher La Mothe Le Vayer: Philosopher with an Insatiable Appetite for Books . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Supporter of Curiosity that Leads to Admiration . . . . . . . . . . . Adversary of Curiosity for the Causes behind the Show Offered by the World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fervent Admirer of Sextus Empiricus’ “Decalogue” . . . . . . . . The Contradictions: Instrument against Stubbornness . . . . . . The Sceptic who Merges Pyrrhonism with the New Academy Follower of Flexible Thought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 2. La Mothe Le Vayer against Political Power and its Practices . . . . . . . Politicians: Ordinary Individuals who Rely on Ostentation for Their Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Deceit and Violence: Common Practices of Power . . . . . . . . . Political Science: Theory Deprived of Influence on Practice . Political Science face-to-face with Scepticism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Politics: A Practice that Does not Seem to be Governed by Science, but by Fortune . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Pyrrhonian Contradictions: Annihilating Instrument against Political Science? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 3. The Political Science Taught by La Mothe Le Vayer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Politics, a Fundamentally Practical Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Magical Arts, Pseudo-Sciences Unworthy of Study . . . . . The Relationship between Power and Altar: Halfway between Indifference and Fanaticism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Power Facing the Religious Difference: Toleration Based on the Separation of Church and State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 116 3.6 121 3.7 129 137 4.1 137 4.2 144 4.3 151 4.4 158 4.5 166 4.6 170 4.7 178 186 195 The War against the Spanish and the Alliances with the Protestants: Pragmatism Based on Secular Considerations . . . The Reason of State or the “Politics of the Lesser Evil” . . . . . . The Contents of Political Science: from the War against the Common Enemy to Economic Prosperity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter 4. La Mothe Le Vayer’s Attitude towards Politics: Irreducible Contradiction? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Philosopher Away from the Political World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Philosopher who Considers Himself Duty Bound to Share the Fruits of his Wakefulness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . At the Service of Power or at a Distance from it? . . . . . . . . . . Intertextuality I: The Boundaries of Royal Omnipotence . . . . Intertextuality II: The Foundations of Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Prudence of the Prince: Necessary, but Difficult . . . . . . . The Philosophers: Prudent Ministers and Counselors of the Prince . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Works cited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Contents 1 Charles Perrault, Les Hommes illustres qui ont paru en France pendant ce siècle avec leurs portraits au naturel (Paris: A. Dezallier, 1697-1700), vol. 2, 59. Unless otherwise indicated, all the translations from French into English are mine. In so doing, especially in the quotations from La Mothe Le Vayer, I have modernised the use of capital letters. 2 See, for example, D’Olivet, Histoire de l’Académie française, vol. 2. Depuis 1652 jusqu’à 1700, 2 nd ed. (Paris: J.-B. Coignard, 1730), 136-137 ; and Pierre Bayle, Dictionnaire his‐ torique et critique, 5 th ed. (Amsterdam: P. Brunel, 1740), vol. 4, entry “Vayer,” 408. See also Florence Wickelgren, La Mothe Le Vayer. Sa Vie et son œuvre (Paris: Droz, 1934), 8-16. 3 Vigneul-Marville, Mélanges d’histoire et de littérature (Rotterdam: E. Yvans, 1700), vol. 2, 300. 4 Marc Fumaroli, L’Âge de l’éloquence. Rhétorique et ‘res literaria’ de la Renaissance au seuil de l’époque classique, 3 rd ed. (Genève: Droz, 2002), 607-608. Introduction The “Plutarch of [his] century”, whose works, in a “prodigious number” (“d’un nombre prodigieux”), were “in everyone’s hands” (“dans les mains de tout le monde”), 1 La Mothe Le Vayer possessed great learning, which in addition to underlying a prolific literary career, gave him access to the most exclusive power circles of his time. Born in a family belonging to the noblesse de robe, he inherited the office of assistant attorney-general of the Paris Parliament, which he nev‐ ertheless abandoned in order to dedicate himself to writing. Besides the place within the French Academy (1639), his books also earned him other offices. He was the tutor of the Duc d’Anjou, the younger brother of Louis XIV, who would later become the Duc d’Orléans. In addition he was the tutor of the future Louis XIV himself, albeit for a shorter period. He also held the office of State Coun‐ cillor. 2 While being generally acknowledged, the learning that nourished his books and made his great reputation did not always meet unanimous praise. For instance, according to Vigneul-Marville, La Mothe Le Vayer’s writings are “centos” (“rhapsodies”) that “are no longer to our taste” (“ne sont plus de notre goût”), since they can be reduced to “an accumulation of everything that he has found best throughout his readings” (“un amas de ce qu’il avait trouvé de meil‐ leur dans le cours de ses lectures”). 3 Vigneul-Marville voices the opinion of the mondains of the time who, while advocating a literature in the French language, disapproved of the “rhetoric of quotations” (“rhétorique des citations”) 4 to which adhered La Mothe Le Vayer, in keeping with the humanist tradition. 5 Made famous by Erich Auerbach’s classical essay, this expression is used with respect to La Mothe Le Vayer by Perrault, Les Hommes illustres qui ont paru en France pendant ce siècle avec leurs portraits au naturel, 59. 6 Bayle, Dictionnaire historique et critique, entry “Vayer,” 408. On La Mothe Le Vayer’s Pyrrhonism, see also D’Olivet, Histoire de l’Académie française de 1652 à 1700, 138-140. On the definition of libertinism, see Furetière, Dictionnaire universel, 2 nd ed. (La Haye, Rotterdam: A. and R. Leers, 1701), vol. 2, entries libertinage: “debauchery, disorder, dis‐ solute customs; libertine life or behaviour” (“débauche, désordre, dérèglement dans les mœurs; vie ou conduite libertine”) and “it is also said about the little respect shown for the mysteries of religion” (“se dit aussi du peu de respect que l’on a pour les mystères de la religion”). 7 Bayle, Dictionnaire historique et critique, footnote (K), 413. 8 See Lorenzo Bianchi, “L’Instruction des Princes dans l’Europe du XVIIe siècle: la tra‐ duction italienne (1677) des écrits pour le Prince de La Mothe Le Vayer,” in Le Masque de l’écriture. Philosophie et traduction de la Renaissance aux Lumières, ed. Charles Le Blanc and Luisa Simonutti (Droz: Genève, 2015), 359-362, 373-374. Whether appreciated or considered out of fashion, La Mothe Le Vayer was certainly a writer who enjoyed a great reputation à la Cour et à la ville.  5 The rich erudition on which were based his numerous works represented the ma‐ terial that allowed him to defend a Pyrrhonism that found its acme in the Dia‐ logues faits à l’imitation des Anciens which, according to Bayle, contained “a lot of libertinism” (“beaucoup de libertinage”), 6 a term that following Furetière’s Dictionnaire universel referred to an irreverent attitude towards religion or ethics. Unlike the Dialogues faits à l’imitation des Anciens, the treatise De l’In‐ struction de Monseigneur le Dauphin drew Bayle’s attention because of its quality. Indeed, the work on the education of the prince was considered by the author of the Dictionnaire historique et critique as one of the best that La Mothe Le Vayer ever wrote. 7 Bayle’s high opinion of the treatise addressed by La Mothe Le Vayer to the Dauphin seems to confirm, among others, its relative success in Italy. Indeed, in 1647, seven years after its publication in France, De l’Instruction de Monseigneur le Dauphin was published in Venice, under the title of Istruttione de’ Prencipi. Furthermore, the seven treatises written for the prince by La Mothe Le Vayer between 1651 and 1658 were published several times under the title of Scuola de’ Prencipi, e de’ Cavalieri, twice in Bologna, in 1676 and 1677, and seven times in Venice between 1677 and 1737. As it results from the article by Lorenzo Bianchi, in his letter to the readers, the translator of Scuola de’ Prencipi, e de’ Cavalieri explained his translation as an attempt to make La Mothe Le Vayer’s didactic work accessible to a wider public, which did not include only princes. 8 Unlike the 17 th century readers, recent scholarship usually mentions the trea‐ tises that La Mothe Le Vayer wrote for the education of the future king in order 10 Introduction 9 René Pintard, Le Libertinage érudit dans la première moitié du XVIIe siècle. Nouvelle éd‐ ition augmentée d’un avant-propos et de notes et réflexions sur les problèmes de l’histoire du libertinage, 2 nd ed. (Genève-Paris: Slatkine, 1983), 541-542. On La Mothe Le Vayer’s “betrayal of his philosophical ideal” (“trahison de son idéal de philosophe”), see also Pintard, Le Libertinage érudit dans la première moitié du XVIIe siècle, 302-303. 10 Jean-Pierre Cavaillé, Dis/ simulations. Jules-César Vanini, François La Mothe Le Vayer, Gabriel Naudé, Louis Machon et Torquato Accetto. Religion, morale et politique au XVIIe siècle (Paris: Champion, 2002), 175. 11 Sophie Gouverneur, Prudence et subversion libertines. La critique de la raison d’État chez François de La Mothe Le Vayer, Gabriel Naudé et Samuel Sorbière (Paris: Champion, 2005), 457. to point out the duplicity that seems to lie at the core of his work. In so doing, the scholars rely on what they consider to be the contradiction between the books for the prince, which are obviously written in an attempt to collaborate with the powerful and the Dialogues faits à l’imitation des Anciens, which are said to be targeted at any type of political power and especially at the monar‐ chical absolutism from the France of the time. This dual interpretation finds its sharpest expression in the founding study of René Pintard, Le Libertinage érudit dans la première moitié du XVIIe siècle. In the view of Pintard, La Mothe Le Vayer betrays several times the philosophical ideal of the intellectual freedom and rest (“repos”), which is defended by Orontes, his spokesperson in the Dialogues faits à l’imitation des Anciens. One of these times is when publishing the treatises for the future king, since “in a sense the dogmatic Politique du Prince will disown the Pyrrhonian politics of Orasius Tubero” (“en un sens la dogmatique Politique du Prince reniera la pyrrhonienne politique d’Orasius Tubero”). 9 Going beyond the ethical judgements, Jean-Pierre Cavaillé argues that La Mothe Le Vayer’s career as a tutor - and, implicitly, we can add, the treatises that he wrote when holding or trying to reach this office - prevented the scholars from “paying attention to Le Vayer’s boldness in the Dialogue traitant de la politique scepti‐ quement” (“prêter attention aux audaces de Le Vayer dans le Dialogue traitant de la politique sceptiquement”).  10 Enlarging on Cavaillé’s thesis of a La Mothe Le Vayer who dissimulates his aim of undermining power, Sophie Gouverneur ar‐ gues against his “schizophrenia” (“schizophrénie”) and holds that he develops a “prudence”, which “far from amounting to a hypocritical attitude” (“loin de se réduire chez lui à une attitude hypocrite”), enables him, among other things, to “communicate subversive thoughts in the field of politics and ethics” (“commu‐ niquer des pensées subversives en matière de politique comme de morale”). 11 The scholars’ broad defence of the idea that La Mothe Le Vayer aims at the “devaluation of politics, but in fact especially of the men in power and of those who pride themselves on the science of power” (“dépréciation de la politique, 11 Introduction 12 Cavaillé, Dis/ simulations, 193. 13 Pintard, Le Libertinage érudit dans la première moitié du XVIIe siècle, 529. 14 Françoise Charles-Daubert, “Le ‘Libertinage érudit’ et le problème du conservatisme politique,” in L’État baroque. Regards sur la pensée politique de la France du premier XVIIe siècle, ed. Henry Méchoulan (Paris: Vrin, 1985), 189. 15 See Gouverneur, Prudence et subversion libertines, 373-378; and Sophie Gouverneur, “La prudence politique et l’écriture sous contrainte: vers une redéfinition du libertinage,” in Libertinage et philosophie au XVIIe siècle, n o 11. Le Libertinage et l’éthique à l’Âge classique (Publications de l’Université de Saint-Étienne, 2009), 149-169. 16 Gouverneur, Prudence et subversion libertines, 455-456. mais en fait d’abord des hommes de pouvoir, et de ceux qui prétendent à la science du pouvoir”), 12 has mostly resulted in an emphasis on the study of the Dialogues faits à l’imitation des Anciens, perceived as the climax of a libertinism and a decrease in the interest for the treatises written for the education of the prince. For instance, placing them in the context of a moment of “golden servi‐ tude” (“servitude dorée”), which alternates with the moments of “philosophical freedom” (“liberté philosophique”), Pintard describes the seven treatises written by La Mothe Le Vayer for the prince between 1651 and 1658 as “dogmatic works, of a dogmatism of circumstance” (“œuvres dogmatiques, d’un dogmatisme de circonstance ”). 13 Building on the idea of the clear separation between the private and the public spaces, associated either with the freedom of thought, or with the exterior submission to authority, Françoise Charles-Daubert considers that La Politique du Prince, one of the works that belongs to the series mentioned above, is a “school account, essentially inspired by Aristotle and, broadly con‐ sidering everything, quite less original” (“exposé scolaire, essentiellement in‐ spiré d’Aristote et à tout prendre bien peu original”). 14 The idea of the sharp division between what is being said in private and in public has recently been challenged mostly because La Mothe Le Vayer chose to publish his works. 15 Despite agreeing with previous scholarship on the fact that, when writing for the prince, La Mothe Le Vayer argues for “moderation” against “excess”, Gouverneur holds that, in fact, he aims to become involved in the political field in a “much more global and radical manner, through the lib‐ ertine use of scepticism and the aesthetics of prudence” (“de manière bien plus globale et radicale, par l’usage libertin du scepticisme et de l’esthétique pru‐ dentielle”). 16 Following this remark, it would have certainly been interesting to see what is the form taken by the aspiration for a complete action in the political field in the treatises for the future king, which are obviously privileged instru‐ ments for acting on politics. Nevertheless, when studying La Mothe Le Vayer’s works of princely education, Gouverneur seems to focus more on topics that are either related to the traditional knowledge that the king is supposed to acquire 12 Introduction 17 Ibid., 210-214, 324-325. 18 Cavaillé, Dis/ simulations, 194. 19 Ibid., 147. and that concerns its hierarchical structure, or to a certain moderation that con‐ cerns the limitation of the abuses to which the reason of State is likely to open the way. 17 Although he is not interested in taking part in the political action, La Mothe Le Vayer, as perceived by Cavaillé, needs the “show” (“spectacle”) offered by politics in order to practise his “strength” (“fermeté”) and “singularity” (“sin‐ gularité”) through the profit he makes of looking critically at it. 18 Yet the idea of the critical look at a power that tolerates opposition as long as it is expressed through “dis/ simulation” 19 may have gained deeper insights into La Mothe Le Vayer’s elusive thought through the analysis of the relationship between dissi‐ dence and the teaching books for the Dauphin, which needless to say had a special connection with political authority. Despite being questioned, as we have already seen, the distinction between what is meant by La Mothe Le Vayer for the two spheres, the public and the private, still influences the attention enjoyed by the books that he wrote in order to support or, apparently, to undermine the powerful. In studying this dichotomy that seems to be more alleged than actually studied, my book will deal with the apparent ambivalence of the intellectual La Mothe Le Vayer, who built his career on writing at the same time for and against power. Therefore, my study will not only examine the books that he is said to have written against the powerful, but also those that he wrote for the powerful. The element that will underlie my approach to his works will be scepticism, which La Mothe Le Vayer acknowl‐ edges as his distinctive feature as a writer. For this purpose, my first chapter studies, on the one hand, his relationship to the two sceptical traditions inherited from Antiquity, Pyrrhonism and the New Academy and, on the other hand, the influence exerted by scepticism on his writing, his view of the world and the explanation it was given by science, which at the time was making great pro‐ gress. The following chapter will go more thoroughly into the analysis of scep‐ ticism, by analysing what is usually considered to be its subversive role in the works by La Mothe Le Vayer that seem to aim at weakening the political regime and its representatives. As a counterpart to the chapter dealing with the works that apparently sap the power, the third chapter is about the treatises that La Mothe Le Vayer wrote in order to serve the power and especially in order to educate the prince. In so doing, this chapter will focus on bringing out the knowledge that the author aimed to transmit to the king about concepts like the reason of State, which were highly debated by the political literature of the moment. 13 Introduction 20 See chapters “4. 4 Intertextuality I: The Boundaries of Royal omnipotence” and “4. 5 Intertextuality II: The Foundations of Power”. After having examined La Mothe Le Vayer’s apparently ambivalent argu‐ mentation on power, the book ends with a chapter built around a question that is still relevant nowadays: should an intellectual who perceives the shortcom‐ ings of the politicians and of the regime they represent withdraw from public life or be actively involved in it in order to contribute to the diminishing of its faulty aspects? In order to answer this question, my research will compare the two apparently contradictory types of texts written by La Mothe Le Vayer by relying on concepts like intertextuality, 20 which makes possible the analysis of the elements that are common to several texts. Further, the aspects revealed by the comparison between the two types of works will be studied from the per‐ spective of prudence, which was a key-concept in the political treatises of the time. Concepts belonging to fields like literary studies, political or moral phi‐ losophy will be used for bringing out the attitude towards the involvement in politics of the two-faced philosopher that La Mothe Le Vayer seems to be at first glance. 14 Introduction 1 La Mothe Le Vayer, Discours pour montrer, que les doutes de la philosophie sceptique sont de grand usage dans les sciences, in Œuvres, V/ II, 14. Here and afterwards, reference is made to the edition of La Mothe Le Vayer’s Œuvres published in 7 volumes, each volume being divided into 2 parts, at Dresden, by Michel Groell, between 1756-1759. The first number indicates the number of the volume, the second one the part of the volume. 2 La Mothe Le Vayer, Petit traité sceptique sur cette commune façon de parler, n’avoir pas le sens commun, in Œuvres, V/ II, p. 177. 3 Ibid., 175. Chapter 1. The Philosopher La Mothe Le Vayer: Incurable Sceptic 1.1 The Philosopher La Mothe Le Vayer: Philosopher with an Insatiable Appetite for Books When speaking of one of his favourite activities, which consists in writing books, La Mothe Le Vayer does not deprive himself of using irony: his passion for writing is sometimes so strong that it is comparable to the “bite of a tarantula, which is said to irrepressibly make those that it bit once dance every year” (“morsure de la tarentule, qui fait danser tous les ans, dit-on, ceux qui en ont été piqués une fois, sans qu’il s’en puissent empêcher ”). 1 Similar to an incurable disease, the passion for writing transforms the individuals that it seizes, among whom the author himself, into some puppets who, incapable of controlling themselves, may provoke the amusement of those who are observing them. The deviance that results from the irresistible thirst for writing acquires pathological dimensions when it is associated with lunacy. Within the vast lunatic asylum that is the world, where “everyone enjoys their favourite pet project” (“chacun se plaît à jouer de sa marotte”), 2 writing is not preserved from connections with madness: “To which I have to add, that among the lunatic activities of men, it seems to me that we can add that of writing so many books, which are being printed every day” (“Sur quoi il faut que j’ajoute, qu’entre les folles occupations des hommes on peut bien mettre, ce me semble, celle de composer tant de livres qui s’impriment tous les jours”). 3 When it comes to his particular case, La Mothe Le Vayer weighs the advan‐ tages and disadvantages of writing in order to show how pointless it is to engage in it: 4 Ibid. 5 On the “mirror-like” character of the Erasmian work, see Patrick Dandrey, L’Éloge par‐ adoxal de Gorgias à Molière (Paris: PUF, 1997), 52-53. 6 René Pintard, La Mothe Le Vayer. Gassendi-Guy Patin. Études de bibliographie et de cri‐ tique suivies de textes inédits de Guy Patin (Paris : Boivin, 1943), 25. 7 La Mothe Le Vayer, La Promenade. I Dialogue, in Œuvres, IV/ I, 50. for, if I were really wise, perhaps I would not be having fun by putting down, as I am doing right now, my little daydreams, regardless of the such sweet entertainment that they provide me. Since for one or two people who could be grateful to me for it, isn’t it certain that a hundred others will probably wish me harm? que si j’étais bien sage, je ne m’amuserais peut-être pas à coucher par écrit, comme je fais présentement, mes petites rêveries, quoiqu’elles me fournissent un si doux diver‐ tissement. Car pour une personne ou deux qui m’en pourront savoir quelque gré, n’est-il pas certain que cent autres m’en voudront vraisemblablement du mal ? 4 At the same time that, following the Erasmian tradition, he immerses himself in a paradoxical eulogy of folly, aimed at denouncing the corruption that reigns over the world, La Mothe Le Vayer does not hesitate to include in the eulogy the very action that allows him to accomplish it, namely writing. 5 The exaggeration of the uselessness of composing books results in an occa‐ sional irony, which should, however, not lead to the conclusion that he does not devote himself to writing as seriously as possible. Addressed to Tubertus Ocella, La Mothe Le Vayer’s alter ego in the first dialogue from the series La Promenade. Dialogues (1662), the words of Marcus Bibulus who, according to René Pintard, is, in fact, Samuel Sorbière, 6 prove the extent to which writing is likely to envelop him: “Given what has entertained us throughout our whole life, neither you, nor I, can find a better ending for our life than a death quill in hand, like the soldier who dies keeping the sword in his hand, the pilot holding the helm, and the speaker speaking” (“C’est que nous ne pouvons mieux finir vous et moi, vu ce qui nous a divertis toute notre vie, qu’en mourant la plume à la main, comme le soldat l’épée au poing, le pilote tenant le timon, et l’orateur en discourant”). 7 Despite being less visible in the public space than the individuals who have more practical jobs, a writer like La Mothe Le Vayer is not different from them when he identifies himself with writing to the point of being inseparable from it until the last moments of his life. This is all the more so since, by applying to writing the reflections on the authority exerted by custom over the individuals’ behav‐ iour, the author imagines that he will continue to write even after his death: “In case it is right that we preserve in the afterlife some of the habits that we strongly acquired in this life; […] you should not have the least doubt that you will see 16 Chapter 1. The Philosopher La Mothe Le Vayer: Incurable Sceptic 8 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre CXXIII. Du Mérite d’un livre, in Œuvres, VII/ I, 380. 9 Ibid., 374. 10 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre CIII. De Quelques compositions, in Œuvres, VII/ I, 132. me one day with a book and a rather badly sharpened quill in hand” (“Tant y a que s’il est vrai, que l’on conserve en l’autre monde quelques-unes des habitudes qu’on a puissamment contractées en celui-ci ; […] ne doutez point que vous ne m’y voyez aussi quelque jour un livre au poing, et une plume assez mal taillée à la main”). 8 By taking advantage of the belief in custom, which thanks to its force, is meant to survive in the hereafter, the author emphasises his identity as a man of letters who engages simultaneously in reading and writing. To his mind, the two activities are inseparable and nourish each other reciprocally. Keen on scholarship, La Mothe Le Vayer thinks that, in order to be prolific, a writer must continuously feed on other writers’ works: In order to be fertile, the mind has to be carefully sustained by means of studying because without that all it could give birth to is flawed, and its creations would be nothing more than a poor aborted matter instead of something animated, which would be capable of perpetuating its good name. Il faut que l’esprit, qui doit produire soit soigneusement alimenté par le moyen de l’étude, parce que sans cela il ne saurait rien enfanter que d’imparfait, et l’on ne verra sortir de lui que de chétives môles destituées de vie, au lieu de quelque chose d’animé, et qui fût capable de perpétuer un beau nom. 9 Using as a starting point the metaphor of conception, the author contrasts two types of creation among which one leads to the birth of a child while the other leads to the appearance of a mass that is amorphous and lacks life. In order to avoid writing a work that would be condemned to sink into oblivion, an author must fit into the tradition that the men of letters have been building ever since antiquity. Therefore, in order to be able to write books that would be able to outlive him, he has to act as part of this tradition and to express himself by relying on the works of the writers who preceded him. Far from defending pla‐ giarism, which he considers the work of a “thief ” (“voleur”), who makes more use of his hands than of his brain, La Mothe Le Vayer holds that building on other’s works in fact amounts to “contributing something which belongs to us and seasoning what we take from the others in such a way that we provide it with a charm that has some aspect of novelty” (“contribuer quelque chose du sien, et assaisonner ce qu’on tient d’autrui de telle sorte, qu’on lui donne une grâce, qui ait quelque air de la nouveauté”). 10 Hence, using other writers’ works should not result into simply copying them, but into inserting them into works 17 1.1 The Philosopher La Mothe Le Vayer: Philosopher with an Insatiable Appetite for Books 11 La Mothe Le Vayer, Prose chagrine, in Œuvres, III/ I, 287: “Even a good thought, wherever it comes from, will always be worthier than a stupid remark of one’s own intention, despite the annoyance of those who boast about finding everything in themselves and not holding anything from anyone” (“Une bonne pensée même, de quelque endroit qu’elle parte, vaudra toujours mieux qu’une sottise de son cru, n’en déplaise à ceux qui se vantent de trouver tout chez eux, et de ne tenir rien de personne”). 12 La Mothe Le Vayer, Considérations sur l’éloquence française de ce temps, in Oeuvres, II/ I, 282. See also La Mothe Le Vayer, Vingt-deuxième Homilie académique. Des Auteurs, in Œuvres, III/ II, 352. 13 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre XIII. Du Moyen de dresser une bibliothèque d’une centaine de livres seulement, in Œuvres, VI/ I, 131-132. 14 La Mothe Le Vayer, La Promenade. II Dialogue, in Œuvres, IV/ I, 77. capable of highlighting the new meaning that has been added to them after a previous reflection. The taste for quotation 11 does not stop him from disap‐ proving of the cento which, according to him, errs by a lack of moderation that leads to the creation of a work based on the simple collection of excerpts from other works: Indeed, if he [the orator] composed a discourse which resembled those that the Latins called centos and that were only texts taken from different authors and put together, like Lipsius did in his six books of the Politics, I acknowledge that such a work could not be thought of to be a piece of eloquence. À la vérité, s’il [l’Orateur] en composait un discours de la façon de ceux que les Latins ont nommé centons, et que ce ne fussent que des textes de différents auteurs attachés les uns aux autres, comme Lipse les a mis dans ses six livres de la Politique, j’avoue qu’un tel travail ne pourrait pas passer pour une pièce d’éloquence. 12 Obviously, La Mothe Le Vayer is a great book-lover. When thinking about the writers he holds indispensable for a library reduced to its essential aspects, in addition to names like Gassendi, Francis Bacon and William Gilbert, he is not afraid of mentioning authors like Galileo Galilei, Giordano Bruno or Tommaso Campanella, whose relationships with the Holy See were at least strained. 13 In so doing, he does not hide his admiration for the recent authors whom he con‐ siders worthy of being called rather “founders” (“instaurateurs / fondateurs”) than “innovators” (“novateurs”) because they managed to take the philosophy out of the simple verbiage. 14 Nevertheless, his reading preferences concern es‐ pecially the writers of the classical antiquity: “Honestly speaking, the books of the ancients have a certain je ne sais quoi that attracts me more than the new ones […]”(“À parler franchement, les livres des anciens ont je ne sais quoi qui 18 Chapter 1. The Philosopher La Mothe Le Vayer: Incurable Sceptic 15 La Mothe Le Vayer, IX. Observations diverses sur la composition, et sur la lecture des livres, in Œuvres, II/ I, 354. 16 La Mothe Le Vayer, Doute sceptique. Si l’étude des belles lettres est préférable à toute autre occupation, in Œuvres, V/ II, 371. 17 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dixième Homilie académique. De la Philosophie, in Œuvres, III/ II, 157-158. 18 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue traitant de la philosophie sceptique, in Dialogues faits à l’imitation des Anciens, ed. Bruno Roche (Paris: Champion, 2015), 61. me charme tout autrement que les nouveaux […]”) 15 Moreover, despite his regard for the inventors of his time, he does not play down what, to his mind, they owe to the authors of the classical antiquity: “Scholars must also openly admit that five or six Greek and Latin authors, with a special emphasis on the former ones, are the masters of everything they possess in the field of knowledge […] ” (“Les savants doivent aussi reconnaître ingénument, que cinq ou six auteurs grecs ou latins, et surtout les premiers, sont les maîtres de ce qu’ils possèdent de con‐ naissance […]”) 16 Despite the appearances, the library is not the only space that allows La Mothe Le Vayer to satisfy his insatiable passion for books. However fond he may be of closed spaces like the library or the reading room, essential to the work of the man of letters, he does not neglect to educate himself by means of another book, the “book of the world”: What must be said in this respect, is that a philosophical mind knows how to profit from everything that can be seen in the world, which he examines with a completely different pleasure than the ordinary people and which he could call, following St. Anthony the Hermit, his library which he finds everywhere, and which never aban‐ dons him. Ce qui se doit dire à ce propos, c’est qu’un esprit philosophique sait faire son profit de tout ce qui se voit dans le monde, qu’il considère avec un bien autre plaisir que le commun des hommes, le pouvant appeler après saint Antoine l’Hermite, sa biblio‐ thèque qu’il trouve partout, et qui ne l’abandonne jamais. 17 Despite his alleged debt to saint Anthony, he turns the study of the world into the attribute of a spirit who defines himself more through his connections with philosophy than with theology. According to Éphestion, a character of the Dia‐ logue traitant de la philosophie sceptique, the “reading” (“la lecture”) of “this beautiful book of the world” (“de ce beau livre du monde”) “serves as a lesson for the true, pure, and essential philosophy” (“sert de leçon à la vraie, pure, et essentielle philosophie ”). 18 Developed by the Stoics in reaction to the followers of atomism, the metaphor of the “book of the world” is, according to the thought 19 1.1 The Philosopher La Mothe Le Vayer: Philosopher with an Insatiable Appetite for Books 19 See Fernand Hallyn, “Pour une poétique des idées: le Livre du monde, ou les ramifica‐ tions d’une métaphore,” Bibliothèque d’Humanisme et Renaissance LXVII, no 2 (2005) : 225-245. 20 Furetière, Dictionnaire universel, vol. 3, entries “philosopher” (“philosophe”). 21 St. Augustine, Les Confessions, III, 8, trans. Arnauld d’Andilly, 3 rd ed. (Paris: J. Camusat, P. le Petit, 1651), 93: “Voilà les sources des péchés des hommes, qui naissent tous de ces trois concupiscences marquées par l’Écriture, de l’élévement de l’orgueil, de la curiosité des spectacles, et des plaisirs bas et sensuels; soit qu’un homme soit possedé seulement de l’une de ces passions, ou de deux, ou de toutes les trois ensemble”. Augustine, Confessions, ed. and trans. Carolyn J. B. Hammond, vol. 1, book III, 8 (16) (Loeb Classical Library 26): “These are the principal types of wrongdoing that spring from the desire to control, and observe, and experience sensually, either one of these three, or a pair, or all three together”. of St. Augustine, opposed to the Bible. As the bishop of Hippo sees it, while the Bible is reserved for those who know how to read, the “book of the world” is accessible to everyone. 19 Unlike St. Augustine, La Mothe Le Vayer holds that the study the “book of the world” is specific to the philosophers. Following its def‐ initions given by Furetière’s Dictionnaire universel, philosopher is “a strong mind that rises above the others” (“un esprit ferme, élevé au-dessus des autres ”) and who “searches for the natural causes, and studies the science of customs” (“qui recherche les causes naturelles, et étudie la science des mœurs ”). 20 As far as he is concerned, when speaking about the philosophers, La Mothe Le Vayer seems to refer mainly to individuals who distinguish themselves from others through the activity of thinking. One of the objects of their thinking is a nature whose causes, contrary to Furetière’s view, they do not try to make out. 1.2 Supporter of Curiosity that Leads to Admiration It goes without saying that, in order to be able to immerse oneself in the reading of the “book of the world”, one must beforehand show some curiosity for it. Consequently, it is not at all surprising to see that La Mothe Le Vayer defends curiosity against the disciples of the school of Port-Royal who, in the wake of St. Augustine, condemn it. Relying on the First Epistle of St. John, the bishop of Hippo argues that the actions of the man who is fallen and devoid of grace are brought about by three main causes, libido sciendi, libido dominandi and libido sentiendi. 21 These three causes which, as it is shown for instance in Pascal’s 20 Chapter 1. The Philosopher La Mothe Le Vayer: Incurable Sceptic 22 Pascal, Pensées, ed. Philippe Sellier and Gérard Ferreyrolles (Paris: Librairie générale française, 2000), fr. 460. On the three concupiscences, see Philippe Sellier, Pascal et saint Augustin, 2 nd ed. (Paris: Albin Michel, 1995), 169-171. 23 La Mothe Le Vayer, “Preuves des citations”, in De la Vertu des païens, 2 nd ed. (Paris: A. Courbé, 1647), 362: “I do not ignore that all these thoughts can receive a pious explan‐ ation and have been written while being in a very devout state of mind: But I report them in order to show that they should be understood neither ad litteram, nor too rigidly”. (“Je n’ignore pas que toutes ces pensées se peuvent expliquer pieusement, et qu’elles ont été écrites dans des sentiments de grande dévotion : Mais je les rapporte pour faire voir que comme elles ne doivent pas être prises à la lettre, ni à la rigueur”). 24 Ibid., 361-362. La Mothe Le Vayer refers to Cornelius Jansen, De la Réformation de l’homme intérieur, trans. Robert d’Arnauld d’Andilly (Paris: J. Camusat, 1642), 45-50. For an analysis of the arguments that La Mothe Le Vayer opposes to the rejection of curiosity carried out by Jansen in De la Réformation de l’homme intérieur, see my article “La Mothe Le Vayer et la curiosité,” in Littérature et appétit des savoirs, ed. François Géal and Blanca Acinas (Universidad de Burgos, 2014), 48. 25 See Plutarch, Moralia, trans. Harold Cherniss, vol. XIII, part 2, On Stoic Self-Contradic‐ tions, 1-47 (Loeb Classical Library 470). Pensées, are also called concupiscences, make reference to pride, sensual pleasure and curiosity. 22 In order to oppose the Port-Royal refusal of curiosity, La Mothe Le Vayer combines rhetorical and theological arguments. From a rhetorical perspective, although he does not deny the fact that the Port-Royal position on curiosity springs from highly pious feelings, he considers it so unreasonable that he holds it should not be taken literally. 23 The Port-Royal rejection of curiosity deserves to be ridiculed because of its excess, which derives from the paradoxes it defends. According to La Mothe Le Vayer, by condemning, for instance, the curiosity for the most natural things and events like a spider that is about to catch its prey or the latest developments in one’s own country, the followers of Port-Royal argue for paradoxes that, ironically, bring them closer to the Stoics. 24 Famous for their taste for paradox, 25 the Stoics were blamed by Port-Royal because of their pride. Leaving aside his own practice of paradox as a way of questioning the well established opinions, the writer uses it in this case in order to stress that the Port-Royal opposition to curiosity is impossible to be reasonably justi‐ fied and therefore accepted. Since the school of Port-Royal refuses to admit curiosity motivated by theo‐ logical reasons, in his polemic against it, La Mothe Le Vayer uses, in addition to the rhetorical arguments, theological arguments. Through an implicit reference to Thomas Aquinas’ Summa theologica (IaIIae, q. 57, a. 1 and 2), which is inspired by Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (VI. 3), our writer argues that “The desire to 21 1.2 Supporter of Curiosity that Leads to Admiration 26 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre XVI. De la Curiosité, in Œuvres, VI/ I, 150. 27 See Gianni Paganini, Skepsis. Le débat des Modernes sur le scepticisme (Paris: Vrin, 2008), 62: “[…] [La Mothe Le Vayer’s] insatiable curiosity, open to the conquests of modern knowledge and to the unusual horizons of the recently discovered new civilisations. But still, by examining the thought of the libertine, we should avoid falling back into the prejudice, typical of a certain kind of historiography a little bit out-of-date, ac‐ cording to which there would be a fundamental opposition between scholarship and the scientific spirit” (“[…] curiosité insatiable [de La Mothe Le Vayer], ouverte aux con‐ quêtes du savoir moderne et aux horizons insolites des civilisations nouvelles récem‐ ment découvertes. Mais encore faut-il, en examinant la pensée du libertin, éviter de retomber dans le préjugé, typique d’une certaine historiographie un peu datée, selon lequel il y aurait une opposition foncière entre l’érudition et l’esprit scientifique”). 28 La Mothe Le Vayer, V. Des Voyages, et de la découverte des nouveaux pays, in Œuvres, II/ II, 83-84. know is so natural, that it would be too unjust to condemn it thoroughly, and to turn into a vice what serves as foundation for the three intellectual virtues, science, wisdom and understanding” (“L’envie de savoir est si naturelle, qu’il y aurait trop d’injustice de la condamner absolument, et de faire un vice de ce qui sert de fondement aux vertus intellectuelles, la science, la sagesse, et l’intelli‐ gence”). 26 Hence La Mothe Le Vayer legitimises curiosity by using it as a pre‐ amble to the three intellectual virtues, supposedly unanimously accepted. Hardly random, the reference to Aquinas allows him to adopt a polemical strategy which consists in opposing to Port-Royal an authority whose weight is comparable to that of St. Augustine. The curiosity that La Mothe Le Vayer aims at rehabilitating against Port-Royal is, as it has previously been shown, a compulsory starting point for the activity of the man of letters and does not concern only the written books, but also the big “book of the world”. In order to satisfy his curiosity for the latter, La Mothe Le Vayer is, for instance, interested in travel accounts and the scientific discov‐ eries made during his time. 27 So as to please his taste for the travel accounts, he does not content himself with those about the regions that have already been visited, but tries to find solutions for filling the gaps about the regions that have not at all or hardly been explored. For the purpose of obtaining accounts of Muscovy, Iceland or Greenland, he thinks about the contribution that could be made by the French diplomats and ambassadors sent to countries like Sweden, Denmark, Poland and the Netherlands, which are already in contact with the countries of the Great North. 28 Regarding the lands even more remote and ignored like the “Australian lands”, he thinks of a solution, which despite being allegedly inspired by “what has always been practised, when people wanted to explore new countries” (“ce qui a toujours été pratiqué, lorsqu’on a voulu faire descente en de nouveaux 22 Chapter 1. The Philosopher La Mothe Le Vayer: Incurable Sceptic 29 Ibid., 87. 30 Ibid., 88. 31 Ibid., 90-91. 32 La Mothe Le Vayer, La Promenade. I Dialogue, 29-30. pays”), 29 nowadays seems baffling. The solution is about the advantage that can be taken from the convicts whose sentence would be proportionate to the dan‐ gers to which they would have to cope with in the regions where they would be exiled: “According to the sentence that has been inflicted upon them, some can be exposed in places which will seem uninhabited, others among savages who are often very inhuman, and sometimes even cannibalistic” (“Selon la peine qu’ils doivent souffrir, on en peut exposer les uns en des lieux qui paraîtront inhabités, les autres parmi des sauvages qui sont souvent très inhumains, et même parfois anthropophages”). 30 In case they managed to survive, the convicts could collect information that would allow them to get the relief or even the forgiveness of their crimes. Restricted to the places that were entirely ignored, this solution emphasises the acquisition of knowledge, at the expense of the sufferings that it would impose on the individuals who would actually have to put it into practice. According to La Mothe Le Vayer, in the case of distant re‐ gions, which have never been explored before, the accounts of the convicts are likely to represent a second best strategy for meeting the curiosity of their scholarly contemporaries. However, in the case of the places, which have been partially explored and may attract more visitors, the scholars are entitled to ask more from the accounts that describe them. More precisely, these accounts should be written by authors who speak the language of the country that they visit, have a certain knowledge of astronomy and know how to draw in order to be able to understand and to represent the position and the appearance of the places they depict. 31 The reading of the “book of the world” goes through the mediation of the travel accounts for reasons that, at first glance, seem pragmatic. According to the terms used by La Mothe Le Vayer, the books that tell the story of journeys to regions that are totally unknown or only little known enable men of letters to “cross the sees without losing ground” (“travers [er] les mers sans perdre terre”) or to avoid “running the risks of long journeys” (“courir les fortunes des voyages de long cours”) . 32 Undoubtedly, the travel accounts have the advantage of preserving the scholars from danger and of giving them access to a multi‐ plicity of places that they would be unable to see during their lifetime. Besides that, the accumulation of information about the world thanks to the recent geo‐ graphic discoveries contributes to the revision or the completion of the knowl‐ edge inherited from antiquity: “the accounts […] that let us know the effects of 23 1.2 Supporter of Curiosity that Leads to Admiration 33 Ibid., 28. The complementarity between the knowledge accumulated in the books and the contribution of the travel accounts is also emphasised by Isabelle Moreau in ‘ Guérir du sot’. Les stratégies d’écriture des libertins à l’âge classique (Paris: Champion, 2007), 704: “The scholars and the curious have at their disposal at the same time more or less ancient knowledge acquired from books and the recent contributions of the travellers and the men in the field” (“Les érudits et les curieux ont à leur disposition à la fois un savoir livresque plus ou moins ancien et les apports récents des voyageurs et des hommes de terrain”). On the relationship between the Ancients and the Moderns in La Mothe Le Vayer’s “La Géographie du Prince”, see Marie-Christine Pioffet, “Repenser le monde au XVIIe siècle: l’exemple de La Géographie du Prince de La Mothe Le Vayer,” in Origines. Actes du 39 e congres annuel de la North American Society for Seventeenth-Century French Litera‐ ture, ed. Russell Ganim and Thomas M. Carr Jr. (Tübingen: Narr Francke Attempto, 2009), 120-123. 34 La Mothe Le Vayer, Neuxième Homilie académique. IX. Réflexions sceptiques, in Œuvres, III/ II, 130. 35 La Mothe Le Vayer, IX. Observations diverses sur la composition, et sur la lecture des livres, 373. See also Furetière, Dictionnaire universel, vol. 3, second entry “novel” (“roman”): “today signifies imaginary books, which contain histories, or love and knighthood adventures, invented in order to entertain and pleasantly amuse readers” (“aujourd’hui signifie les livres fabuleux, qui contiennent des histoires, ou des aventures d’amour, et de chevalerie, inventées pour divertir, et amuser agréablement les lecteurs”). 36 La Mothe Le Vayer, IX. Observations diverses sur la composition, et sur la lecture des livres, 371-372. nature either in the ancient, or in the new world, so surprising, that it seems the Ancients only knew half of it and it has well appeared to us only during the last century” (“les relations […] qui nous font connaître les effets de la nature, soit dans l’ancien, soit dans le nouveau monde, si surprenants, qu’il semble que les Anciens ne l’eussent connue qu’à demi, et qu’elle ne se soit bien manifestée à nous que depuis un siècle”). 33 Far from being purely informative, La Mothe Le Vayer’s interest in the travel accounts also derives from his view of them as the “novels of philosophers as well as of people of some learning” (“romans des philosophes aussi bien que des hommes de quelque étude”). 34 Inspired by the way in which the novel is perceived in his time, the author argues that it only “aims at pleasing” (“ne vise qu’à plaire”). 35 Applied to the travel accounts, this reflection means that they are at the origin of an entertainment, which is specific to scholars. Certainly, the entertainment that the travel accounts afford to the scholars is different from the one that the novels afford to their readers. The novels are a source of entertainment because they animate passions like, for instance, love, which dominate the ignorant and idle minds. 36 As for the travel accounts, they are behind an enjoyment that pertains to wonder: 24 Chapter 1. The Philosopher La Mothe Le Vayer: Incurable Sceptic 37 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre LXXXIX. Remarques géographiques, in Œuvres, VI/ II, 354. 38 See the entries “merveille”, “(s’)émerveiller” and “étrange” in Furetière, Dictionnaire universel. Among others, “(s’)’émerveiller” is defined as “to be in admiration” (“être en admiration”) and “étrange” as what is “surprising, rare, extraordinary […]” (“ce qui est surprenant, rare, extraordinaire […]”). 39 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue sur le sujet de la vie privée, in Dialogues faits à l’imitation des Anciens, 194. But since we find many fictitious tales while reading these books, we have to admit, that there is no other reading that is more instructive or more worthy of us, because we are in this world only in order to contemplate its wonders, which cannot be seen anywhere in such great numbers or so well explained as in these travel accounts […] Mais comme l’on trouve beaucoup de contes fabuleux dans cette sorte de lecture, aussi faut-il avouer, qu’il n’y en a point de plus instructive, ni de plus digne de nous, puisque nous ne sommes au monde, que pour en contempler les merveilles, qui ne se voient nulle part ni en si grand nombre, ni si bien expliquées que dans ces livres de voyages […] 37 The reason why the travel accounts are a major source of wonder comes from the change of scenery that they bring about. This is the result of the fact that, even if they are genuine and not invented, they depict phenomena, which their readers, who are unaccustomed to them, find outstanding or strange (“étrange”). Synonymous with the extraordinary, the strange is related to the incomprehen‐ sible which is an essential part of “wonder” (“merveille”), as it is defined by Furetière’s Dictionnaire universel: “a rare, extraordinary, surprising thing, which can hardly be understood” (“chose rare, extraordinaire, surprenante, qu’on ne peut guère comprendre”). 38 The strangeness of the phenomena described by the travel accounts may arouse the admiration that is connected to the fact of won‐ dering. Despite being accessible to everyone, the wonders are likely to provoke especially the philosophers’ interest. When talking about the philosophers’ role in the world, La Mothe Le Vayer argues, through the voice of his character Hesychius from the Dialogue sur le sujet de la vie privée, that “they prevent the wonders of the Almighty and of nature from remaining without witnesses, in‐ terpreters and admirers” (“Ils empêchent que les merveilles du Tout-puissant et de la Nature ne demeurent sans témoins, sans interprètes, et sans admira‐ teurs ”). 39 Thanks to their capacity for reflection, philosophers are gifted with a particular sensitivity to understand the extraordinary character of phenomena behind which, according to ordinary perception, the presence of the divinity can be guessed. Hence, the philosophers fulfil a triple mission, which consists in looking at the show of nature, distinguishing its prodigious aspects and treating 25 1.2 Supporter of Curiosity that Leads to Admiration 40 See Michael Edwards, “La thaumasie,” “S’émerveiller, connaître,” in De l’Émerveillement (Paris: Fayard, 2008). 41 La Mothe Le Vayer, La Promenade. V Dialogue, in Œuvres, IV/ I, 150-151. 42 Ibid., 151. them with the admiration that is convenient for them. Wonderment or the ability to seize and to admire what is out of the ordinary is the very attitude that pro‐ duces and nourishes philosophy. 40 The capacity to detect the otherness that is to be found within the world is inseparable from the knowledge, which is the field of philosophy. While the geographical discoveries and the travel accounts that they flesh out give rise to the admiration for the big universe of the globe, the anatomical discoveries are likely to give birth to the admiration for the small universe of the body. By taking advantage of a well-known correspondence, La Mothe Le Vayer argues, by means of his alter ego Tubertus Ocella, that the “microcosm” formed by the human body is at least as worthy of being the topic of philo‐ sophical meditations as the macrocosm or the earth globe, which supports the “theory of the big” (“la théorie du grand”). Acquired thanks to “so many exact and curious dissections of the human body” (“tant d’exactes et de curieuses dissections anatomiques du corps humain”), the “modern knowledge” (“con‐ naissances modernes”) in the field of medicine has no reason to be envious of the geographical discoveries, which moreover they exceed in utility. 41 Following the example of the geographical discoveries that improve the science on which the “map of the world” (“mappemonde”) is based, the anatomical discoveries improve humankind’s knowledge about the human body and, naturally, about itself. In the case of the anatomical discoveries, just like in the case of those made in the field of geography, La Mothe Le Vayer takes sides for the Moderns against the Ancients. For instance, the demonstration of the circulation of the blood, whose true source is the heart, reveals the vast number of blunders that have been made in the past and avoids similar mistakes in the future. 42 Starting from the newly acquired anatomical knowledge and its methods, La Mothe Le Vayer expresses, through the voice of his character Xilinus, hypoth‐ eses which lead to an admiration that may be close to the one raised by the phenomena depicted by the travel accounts: it has always seemed to me that if it could be well dissected, the smallest mite would be able to provide no less reasons for admiration than what we find in our human factory and maybe even more, if we take into account all the activities of nature con‐ tained in such a small place, which may be said to be a masterpiece of this same nature. 26 Chapter 1. The Philosopher La Mothe Le Vayer: Incurable Sceptic 43 Ibid., 147. On Xilinus’ identity, see Pintard, La Mothe Le Vayer. Gassendi-Guy Patin, 25. 44 See Sellier, Pascal et saint Augustin, 362-363. il m’a toujours semblé, que le moindre ciron, s’il se pouvait bien anatomiser, ne four‐ nirait guère moins de sujets d’admiration que nous en trouvons dans notre fabrique humaine, et peut-être davantage, considérant tous les mouvements de la nature, ren‐ fermés dans un si petit lieu, ce qui peut passer pour un chef-d’œuvre de cette même nature. 43 Despite the privileged place that it is said to hold in the Christian universe, humankind is not the only one who deserves admiration. By mentioning the structure of the mite (“ciron”), supposed to be admirable because of the concern for detail that it shows, La Mothe Le Vayer does not draw inspiration only from the concrete anatomical discoveries carried out at the time, but also from the Augustinian thought on the infinitely small and the infinitely great which, however, he does not mention openly. According to the bishop of Hippo, for those who are able to perceive it, the power of God can be admired at the level of both the vastness and the smallness of the universe. 44 As far as he is concerned, La Mothe Le Vayer also alludes to the author who is behind the construction implied by the meaning of the “factory” (“fabrique”). But beyond bearing witness to its creator, what matters is the structure of the mite which, for the philoso‐ pher’s sensible eye, is likely to question the way in which the individuals tend to rank beings. It is precisely because of the smallness that may make it seem insignificant but which actually makes the organisation of its organs even more remarkable that the mite is even worthier of admiration than humankind, who is usually placed at the top of the hierarchy. Filled out by imagination, the cu‐ riosity that animates philosophers does not meet the unfamiliarity which is in‐ trinsic to the distance causing admiration only in the accounts about the faraway regions, but also in the phenomena which belong to ordinary reality. 1.3 Adversary of Curiosity for the Causes behind the Show Offered by the World It is certainly natural to ask whether, as a convinced defender of curiosity, La Mothe Le Vayer also tries to grasp the causes of the phenomena that arouse his admiration. In this respect, he partly challenges the tendency of his time, which consists in going beyond the observation of natural phenomena in order to try to clarify their causes. As we have already seen, he is well aware of the latest scientific discoveries. Nonetheless, his rather dark view of the way in which God 27 1.3 Adversary of Curiosity for the Causes behind the Show Offered by the World 45 La Mothe Le Vayer, Discours pour montrer, que les doutes de la philosophie sceptique sont de grand usage dans les sciences, 47. 46 On the polemic between the Stoics and the atomists concerning the existence of an author of the world, see Hallyn, “Pour une poétique des idées: le Livre du monde, ou les ramifications d’une métaphore,” 228-230. regards the knowledge searched for by humankind stops him from entirely ac‐ cepting its results. Concerning the existence of an author of the universe, for instance, he takes up an argument which had been developed during the polemic that opposed the Stoics to the atomists: For Democritus who made fun of everything will allow us to make fun in our turn of his atoms, whose fortuitous meeting he held to have produced the world and every‐ thing it contains. Rather than that, I would believe that the alphabet letters shuffled in a bag and then thrown on a table could have composed by chance Homer’s Iliad or the most beautiful of Seneca’s tragedies. Car Démocrite qui riait de tout, nous permettra de rire à notre tour de ses atomes, dont il voulait, que la rencontre fortuite eût produit le monde, et tout ce qu’il contient. Je croirais aussitôt, que les lettres de l’alphabet brouillées dans un sac, et puis jetées sur une table, auraient pu hasardeusement composer l’Iliade d’Homère, ou la plus belle des tragédies de Sénèque. 45 In the view of the Greek atomists and of Lucretius, the relationship between the atoms and the body is similar to the one between the letters and the words. 46 Governed by chance, the atoms form bodies which either function or are mon‐ strous in the same way in which the letters form words that may be articulated or not. Although they manage to compose words and languages, the letters may not always succeed in forming a meaningful text. Comparable to languages, which result from the encounters of letters incapable of forming a text, the worlds composed of atoms are marred by failures. The latter invalidate the ex‐ istence of an author who is supposed to be behind the universe formed by dif‐ ferent worlds. By reacting against the atomists whom, however, they do not understand entirely, the Stoics refuse to acknowledge that the world stemming from the meetings of atoms governed by chance can be compared to a book. As it results, for instance, from Cicero’s De Natura deorum (II, xxxvii, 93-94), the followers of the Portico argue that the big book of the world implies the existence of an author. The argument for the existence of an author of nature can be implicitly con‐ nected to the plea for the limits that should circumscribe human curiosity. In 28 Chapter 1. The Philosopher La Mothe Le Vayer: Incurable Sceptic 47 La Mothe Le Vayer, VII. Des Monstres, in Œuvres, III/ I, 166. 48 Gianni Paganini, “Le jouet des dieux et le jeu des législateurs. Aux origines de quelques métaphores libertines,” Les Dossiers du GRIHL, Libertinage, athéisme, irréligion. Essais et bibliographie, II. Libertinages, 2007, https: / / dossiersgrihl.revues.org/ 2053 (accessed April 23, 2018). See also Paganini, Skepsis, 70. 49 See Paganini, “Le jouet des dieux et le jeu des législateurs. Aux origines de quelques métaphores libertines”; Plato, Laws, trans. R. G. Bury, vol. 1, Book I, 644 D - 645 C and vol. 2, VII 803 C - 804 B (Loeb Classical Library 187, 192). order to illustrate the necessity to impose restrictions on the knowledge that humankind is searching for, La Mothe Le Vayer uses, for instance, the metaphor of the world as a puppet show: If this is as enough philosophers imagined it; and that Aristotle was right to compare in his book On the Universe (supposing it belongs to him) the first engine to a puppet player, who holds hidden the subtle and deceptive cords on which the movement of his small characters depends; isn’t it right to say that for him it is an offence to go further than he wants and to try, although uselessly, to discover the devices of this divine game, which exposes to our sight all the operations of Nature? Si cela est ainsi, selon qu’assez de philosophes se le sont imaginé ; et qu’Aristote ait eu raison de comparer dans son livre Du Monde (présupposant qu’il soit de lui) le premier moteur à un joueur de marionnettes, qui tient cachées les cordes subtiles et artificieuses d’où dépend le mouvement de ses petits personnages ; Ne peut-on pas dire que c’est lui faire injure que de vouloir pénétrer plus avant qu’il ne désire, et de tâcher, quoiqu’inutilement, à découvrir les engins de ce jeu divin, qui expose à notre vue toutes les opérations de la nature ? 47 In this respect, Gianni Paganini proves that La Mothe Le Vayer’s approach, which consists in relating the Aristotelian first engine with the pseudo-Aristo‐ telian De mundo ad Alexandrum, does not lack soundness. 48 More precisely, ac‐ cording to the treatise falsely attributed to Aristotle all throughout the Middle Ages, since it would be dishonourable for God to deal directly with human or terrestrial life, divine “power” (“puissance”) shows itself through “communica‐ tion at a distance” (“communication à distance”). Nevertheless, according to Pa‐ ganini, La Mothe Le Vayer is not entirely faithful to De Mundo when he applies the metaphor of the “puppet players” to humankind. The metaphor that is used in the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise for illustrating God’s action at a distance does not concern humankind in particular, but the world in general. Additionally, in order to compare humankind and the world with a puppet show, La Mothe Le Vayer also relies on Plato’s Laws. 49 By taking up the point of the Greek philos‐ opher, the author holds that, despite its status of “masterpiece” of the divine 29 1.3 Adversary of Curiosity for the Causes behind the Show Offered by the World 50 La Mothe Le Vayer, “Lettre de l’auteur,” in Dialogues faits à l’imitation des Anciens, 43. 51 La Mothe Le Vayer, De l’Instruction de Monseigneur le Dauphin, in Œuvres, I/ I, 241. 52 La Mothe Le Vayer, “Préface,” Problèmes sceptiques, in Œuvres, V/ II, 211. 53 Sylvia Giocanti, Penser l’irrésolution. Montaigne, Pascal, La Mothe Le Vayer. Trois itinér‐ aires sceptiques (Paris: Champion, 2001), 663. See also La Mothe Le Vayer, IV. Du bon et du mauvais usage des récitations, in Œuvres, II/ II, 68-69: “And I know well that philosophy does not condemn the things that are are made out of pure leisure, because it contemplates this whole world more like a game than like the serious work of the Almighty”. (“Et je sais bien que la philosophie ne condamne pas les choses mêmes qui se font par pure récréation, puisqu’elle ne contemple tout ce monde que comme le jeu plutôt que l’ouvrage sérieux du Tout-puissant”). creation, humankind has “only been made by the hands of God only as if he were playing” (“[l’homme] n’a été fait des mains de Dieu que comme en jouant”) , 50 or “has only been produced by him [God] while frolicking ” (“n’a été fabriqué par lui [Dieu] qu’en s’ébattant”). 51 Besides that, the world itself is a “work that God has made by playing” (“était un ouvrage, que Dieu avait fait en se jouant”). 52 By means of these references, the author aims, on the one hand, to argue for the “playful status” (“statut ludique”) 53 of philosophy, which would be in harmony with the entertainment to which the divinity devoted itself while creating the world. On the other hand, the references to Plato’s work are also likely to be used by the writer because they highlight the balance of power that governs the relationship between people as creatures and God as Creator. On the whole, La Mothe Le Vayer compares the world with a puppet theatre in order to emphasise the illusion which is inherent in it and that humankind is condemned to be its victim. The trick responsible for the success of the show relies on the secret surrounding the strings that move the characters appearing on the stage. That is to say that the divinity does not use its power only in order to stage the magnificent show of the world, but also in order to carefully keep the secrets on which it establishes the performance. In so doing, the divinity is likely to adopt a similar attitude to that of any other puppet player who is, by definition, jealous of the secrets of the show that it stages in front of the public. It goes without saying that no director would like to see his show fail because of the unveiling of the strings he hides behind the curtain and uses in order to move his puppets: “It is certain that in the play wherein these small characters which we call puppets can be seen, the master who makes them move would feel offended if we lifted the cover whence come all their movements” (“Il est certain, qu’au jeu qui se voit de ces petites figures que nous appelons marion‐ 30 Chapter 1. The Philosopher La Mothe Le Vayer: Incurable Sceptic 54 La Mothe Le Vayer, Discours pour montrer, que les doutes de la philosophie sceptique sont de grand usage dans les sciences, 46-47. 55 On the fortune of this expression, see Carlo Ginzburg, “Le Haut et le bas. Le thème de la connaissance interdite aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles,” in Mythes, emblèmes, traces. Mor‐ phologie et histoire, trans. Monique Aymard et al. (Paris: Flammarion, 1989), 97-112. On the translation of Noli altum sapere, sed time, see Romans 11: 20 ESV: “So do not become proud, but fear”. nettes, le maître, qui les fait remuer, s’offenserait, si on levait le tapis, qui couvre les ressorts d’où viennent tous leurs mouvements”). 54 Furthermore, when he disapproves of human attempts to break through the illusions of the show staged by the divinity, La Mothe Le Vayer seems to be influenced by a conception of knowledge that has resulted from a mistake in the translation of an expression extracted from St. Paul’s First Epistle to the Romans, Noli altum sapere, sed time. 55 Unlike the interpretation given to this phrase by the Middle Ages, Lorenzo Valla has shown that it did not refer to an intellectual, but to a moral vice. Persisting even after the discovery of the Italian humanist, the error in the understanding of the Apostle’s words caused them to be interpreted as a prohibition on the attempts to decipher the secrets of the divinity, of political power and of nature. Likely to draw at least partly inspiration from this triple prohibition, La Mothe Le Vayer is worried about the results to which can lead the curiosity that seeks to unveil the secrets of theology, politics and physics. Concerning the former one, the attempt to go beyond the knowledge revealed by the divinity can pro‐ voke an outcome similar to that of Icarus who, counter to his rehabilitation carried out during the 17 th century, is seen as the symbol of the unavoidable 31 1.3 Adversary of Curiosity for the Causes behind the Show Offered by the World 56 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue sur le sujet de la divinité, in Dialogues faits à l’imitation des Anciens, 419: “But when going beyond these established limits, he engages in knowing the mysteries of the divinity, and by rising as though above nature, he wants to contemplate from the top of his philosophy and, so to speak, the peak of his thinking, what God wanted to be known only through a supernatural grace of Heaven, […] It is at that moment that this reckless Icarus, for having wanted to rise too high towards the sky, finds himself in a shameful and disastrous way hurled into a sea of confusion and of error, which is this huge ocean of the sciences”. (“Mais lorsqu’outrepassant ces limites établies, il entreprend de connaître les mystères de la divinité, et que s’élevant comme au-dessus de la nature, il veut contempler du sommet de sa philosophie, et s’il faut ainsi dire, des cimes de sa ratiocination, ce que Dieu n’a voulu être connu que par une grâce surnaturelle du Ciel, […] C’est lors que ce téméraire Icare, pour s’être voulu trop élever vers le Ciel, se trouve honteusement et calamiteusement précipité dans une mer de confusion et d’erreur, qui est cet océan immense des sciences”). According to Paganini in Skepsis. Le débat des Modernes sur le scepticisme, 90-92, the lack of curiosity for what is related to the divinity is likely to support an attitude that may be called “sceptical atheism”, a term used by Descartes in order to refer, most probably, to the libertines of his time. Inspired by Sextus Empiricus’ Outlines of Pyr‐ rhonism, Book III, which reverses the argument of the “infinite regress” (“régression à l’infini”), traditionally used by theologians and philosophers in order to prove the ex‐ istence of a primary cause of the universe, La Mothe Le Vayer’s “sceptical atheism” (“athéisme sceptique”) consists in the lack of any “intellectual interest in the research of a cause on which all the others depend” (“l’intérêt intellectuel pour la recherche d’une cause de laquelle toutes les autres dependent”). 57 La Mothe Le Vayer, Discours pour montrer, que les doutes de la philosophie sceptique sont de grand usage dans les sciences, 50. See Proverbs, 25: 3 ESV: “ As the heavens for height, and the earth for depth, / so the heart of kings is unsearchable”. failure to which the intellectual boldness is doomed. 56 Besides that, in the field of politics, the triple interdiction derived from the first Pauline epistle to the Romans means that the secrets of power should be kept away from the intrusive looks since, through a comparison borrowed from the proverbs of Solomon, the princes’ hearts are as impenetrable as “the heights of the sky” (“la hauteur du Ciel”) and the “depths of the earth” (“la profondeur de la Terre”). 57 Concerning physics, the obscurity of nature for the human mind makes La Mothe Le Vayer condemn the attempts which aim at shedding light on the causes and principles that flesh out the phenomena of the universe: “We do not make a negligible mistake when we want to submit it [nature] to the rules of mathe‐ matics, or to the subtle conclusions of logic, as has been uselessly attempted recently” (“nous ne commettons pas une petite faute quand nous la [Nature] voulons assujettir aux règles des mathématiques, ou aux fines conclusions de la 32 Chapter 1. The Philosopher La Mothe Le Vayer: Incurable Sceptic 58 La Mothe Le Vayer, Discours pour montrer, que les doutes de la philosophie sceptique sont de grand usage dans les sciences, 52. 59 See A. C. Crombie and M. A. Hoskin, “The Scientific Movement and Its Influence 1610-1650,” in The New Cambridge Modern History, ed. J. P. Cooper (Cambridge Uni‐ versity Press, 1970), vol. 4, 143-144. 60 La Mothe Le Vayer, Des Monstres, 184. logique, comme depuis peu l’on a tâché de faire inutilement”). 58 The writer ob‐ viously refers to the path followed by his contemporaries, who were using “sys‐ tematic and quantitative theoretical analysis and experimentation” in order to reveal what they considered to be the “mathematical and mechanical structure” of nature. 59 For the pioneers of this way of investigating the universe like Galileo Galilei in Il Saggiatore, the “book of the world” was written in a “mathematical language”, with geometric characters. The curiosity for the “book of the world” advocated by La Mothe Le Vayer did not involve the examination of the model followed by the letters that constructed it. Our author rejects the mathematical explanations provided by the science of his time because, in his view, the di‐ versity of the world is incommensurable with the uniformity of the mathematics invented by humankind: And relying on the fantasy of much more order that it [nature] can presumably ob‐ serve, although it is everywhere very ordered, we search for mathematical certainties and unchanging regularities in the material things, which only exist in those that are delivered from all matter, like the first of all the dogmatic philosophers is forced to acknowledge in the last chapter of the second book of the Metaphysics. Et sur l’imagination de beaucoup plus d’ordre qu’elle n’en veut vraisemblablement observer, encore qu’elle soit très ordonnée partout, nous cherchons des certitudes mathématiques, et des régularités invariables aux choses matérielles, qui ne se trou‐ vent jamais qu’en celles qui sont délivrées de toute matière, comme le premier de tous les dogmatiques est contraint de l’avouer au dernier chapitre du second livre de sa Métaphysique. 60 Without being necessarily unfamiliar to organisation, the variety that charac‐ terises the world is nevertheless irreducible to the order to which humankind’s mathematical theories aim at submitting it. Besides that, Aristotle, the dogmatic philosopher par excellence, who although exposed to the strong opposition of the innovators admired by La Mothe Le Vayer, still exerted a considerable au‐ thority over the philosophy of the time, admitted that a philosophy seeking to account for the world through mathematics would be inefficient because of its dogmatism. The passage that La Mothe Le Vayer uses for proving the discrep‐ ancy between the rigour of mathematics and the physical world is also the one 33 1.3 Adversary of Curiosity for the Causes behind the Show Offered by the World 61 See chapter “2. 3 Political Science: Theory Deprived of Influence on Practice”. 62 La Mothe Le Vayer, VII. Des Monstres, 184. See also La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre LXI. D’un Homme qui répondait, étant endormi, en toutes langues où on l’interrogeait, quoiqu’il ne les sût pas, in Œuvres, VI/ II, 97: “We want to appear learned everywhere, and we would hold, if it were possible for us, that nature does not have more extent in its effects than that of our little knowledge” (“Nous voulons paraître savants partout, et nous main‐ tiendrions, s’il nous était possible, que la nature n’a point de plus grande étendue en ses effets, qu’est celle de notre petite connaissance”). While analysing the fact that the diversity of the world is irreducible to the dogmatic philosophies, Paganini claims in Skepsis, 68, that the “nerve of sceptical argumentation shows the impossibility of closing the ‘stubborn variety’ of the world within abstract patterns, like the arguments of the dogmatic schools” (“le nerf de l’argumentation scep‐ tique montre l’impossibilité de renfermer l’‘obstinée variété’ du monde au dedans de schèmes abstraits, comme les arguments des écoles dogmatiques”). he uses, as we will see further on, for justifying the existence of political sci‐ ence. 61 In the attack he launches against mathematics, La Mothe Le Vayer does not target its capacity to make natural phenomena understandable to a certain ex‐ tent, but the arrogance of the dogmatic philosophy, which transforms it into a system that pretends to be able to explain the universe’s deepest secrets. By using abstract principles like those of mathematics, which are more related to intellectual invention than to the material world, philosophers try to impose on the universe a regularity that is foreign to it: “After having established certain rules that are more subtle than real, we want all its [nature’s] operations to come down to them, as if it would be impossible for it to exceed the boundaries that our mind has prescribed upon it” (“Après avoir établi de certaines maximes plus subtiles que réelles, nous voulons que toutes ses opérations s’y rapportent, comme s’il lui était impossible de passer les bornes que notre esprit lui a pre‐ scrites”). 62 The uniformity of the rules on which they base their theories does not allow philosophers to really clarify the functioning of the universe, but to give it a simplified explanation, which can be grasped by the human mind. As soon as they pretend to have reached results that are likely to allow them to make the world comprehensible, they are seized by an arrogance that stops them from acknowledging the existence of natural phenomena to which their systems cannot be applied. Therefore, instead of admitting their ignorance, they prefer to describe as monstrous the cases that remain untranslatable through the terms of their theories. 34 Chapter 1. The Philosopher La Mothe Le Vayer: Incurable Sceptic 63 See Furetière, Dictionnaire universel, vol. 2, first entry “monster” (“monstre”): “Wonder that is against the order of nature, which is admired or feared” (“Prodige qui est contre l’ordre de la nature, qu’on admire, ou qui fait peur ”). 64 La Mothe Le Vayer, VII. Des Monstres, 165. On the label of “monstrous” (“monstrueux”), which is brought about by habits of thinking, see also Giocanti, Penser l’irrésolution, 406: “the monstrous designates a prejudice against the potentialities of nature and nothing else, a prejudice which comes down to measuring the power of Nature against a reason dominated by its habits of conception, themselves connected with the ordinary of its representations, which are as many impressions relating to particular experiences” (“le monstrueux désigne un préjugé sur les potentialités de la nature et rien d’autre, un préjugé qui revient à mesurer la puissance de la Nature à l’aune d’une raison dominée par ses habitudes de conception, elles-mêmes liées à l’ordinaire de ses représentations qui sont autant d’impressions relatives à des expériences particulières”). Without doubt, the beings which are treated as monsters are “against the order of nature”, 63 but the order of nature that emerges from the principles in‐ vented by humankind. The rigidity of thought that results from arrogance is likely to encourage the individuals it dominates to depreciate phenomena whose conformity with nature they ignore: “Indeed we overestimate our knowledge and I am not at all beyond the suspicion that it is some sort of impiety to want to fix the same boundaries to the works of God and of nature that they have imposed on our knowledge” (“En vérité nous présumons trop de notre savoir, et je ne suis pas même hors de soupçon que ce ne soit quelque sorte d’impiété, de vouloir établir les mêmes bornes aux œuvres de Dieu et de la nature, qu’ils ont données à notre connaissance”). 64 Philosophers’ incapacity to understand the world is not visible only at a prac‐ tical level, like in the case of monsters, but also at a theoretical level. In the view of La Mothe Le Vayer, the philosophical systems that claim to clarify the struc‐ ture and the functioning of nature are discredited by the fierce disagreements which oppose them to one another: The principles of this natural science, its elements and everything that depends on it are differently considered by the ones than by the others; and the different sects of philosophers have fought more battles, with more violence and stubbornness about everything that concerns the world and its organisation; than all the conquerors have done in order to become its masters. Les principes de cette science naturelle, ses éléments, et tout ce qui en dépend, sont autrement envisagés par les uns que par les autres ; et les sectes différentes des phil‐ osophes ont donné plus de combats, et avec plus de violence et plus d’opiniâtreté, sur 35 1.3 Adversary of Curiosity for the Causes behind the Show Offered by the World 65 La Mothe Le Vayer, Discours pour montrer, que les doutes de la philosophie sceptique sont de grand usage dans les sciences, 55. 66 See Moreau in ‘Guérir du sot’, 579: “Far from being indifferent to the conditions of elaboration of the knowledge of his time, Le Vayer puts to the test of his doubt precisely these interpretive models which underlie our apprehension of the world, by releasing thus their fundamental relativity. In physics like in the field of humanities, no system of representation can call itself absolute and claim the universality of its values” (“Loin d’être indifférent aux conditions d’élaboration des savoirs de son temps, Le Vayer met précisément à l’épreuve de son doute ces modèles interprétatifs qui informent notre appréhension du monde, dégageant ainsi leur relativité foncière. En physique comme dans le domaine des sciences de l’homme, aucun système de représentation ne peut se dire absolu et prétendre à l’universalité de ses valeurs”). 67 La Mothe Le Vayer, Onzième Homilie académique. De l’Ignorance, in Œuvres, III/ II, 164. 68 Ibid. tout ce qui concerne le monde, et sa constitution ; que tous les conquérants n’ont fait pour s’en rendre les maîtres. 65 The polemics between the different philosophical systems are the obvious proof of the oppositions that separate them. The battles fought in the field of philos‐ ophy are inflamed by the pride that prompts philosophers to impose themselves to the detriment of their adversaries. Similarly to the war leaders who try to take hold of the physical world, the followers of the different philosophical trends aim at dominating the world of ideas. However, according to our author, phil‐ osophical quarrels are far from allowing their participants to show that they managed to clarify the questions that they debate. The absence of any consensus about the so-called science of nature compromises the pretentions to possess the absolute truth that are voiced by all the philosophical theories. 66 Although they are sharpened by the philosophers’ pride, the contradictions that divide the philosophical schools and that materialise in intense quarrels are far from being the consequence of a mere misunderstanding. In this respect, La Mothe Le Vayer does not ignore the tendency that aims at downplaying the dissensions between the different philosophical trends by restricting them es‐ pecially to the level of language: “I am well aware of the desire to reconcile all these party leaders and to prove that their terms and ways of speaking, as dis‐ similar as they seem, may mean the same thing in a favourable interpretation” (“Je sais bien qu’on a voulu concilier tous ces chefs de parti, et prouver, que leurs termes et leurs façons de parler, pour dissemblables qu’elles paraissent, peuvent signifier une même chose avec une favorable interprétation”). 67 In the view of La Mothe Le Vayer, to think that the conflict among the philosophical schools could be solved by the clarification of the terms that they use would be nothing else than a strategy to “deceive oneself ” (“se tromper soi-même”). 68 The contra‐ 36 Chapter 1. The Philosopher La Mothe Le Vayer: Incurable Sceptic 69 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue intitulé le banquet sceptique, in Dialogues faits à l’imitation des Anciens, 127. 70 La Mothe Le Vayer, La Promenade. II Dialogue, 72: “But concerning the school or Pyrrho, despite the unjust and calumnious slander of its name, it is specific to serene persons and who love this sweet rest, which is hoped for by the truly philosophical souls […]” (“Mais à l’égard de la secte de Pyrrhon, nonobstant l’injuste et calomnieuse diffamation de son nom, elle est le fait des personnes tranquilles, et qui aiment ce doux repos, que souhaitent les âmes véritablement philosophiques […]”) 71 Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes, The Modes of Scepticism (Cambridge University Press, 1985), 21. 72 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre LXXVII. De l’Emploi des personnes âgées, in Œuvres, VI/ II, 230. 73 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, trans. R. G. Bury, Book I, 14 [145] (Loeb Clas‐ sical Library 273). dictions among the philosophical trends are unquestionable and demonstrate humankind’s incapacity to make out the giant show that is the world. 1.4 Fervent Admirer of Sextus Empiricus’ “Decalogue” Within the works of La Mothe Le Vayer, the use of contradictions is not limited to the cases that reveal the failure of the different philosophical schools to de‐ cipher the world. The contradictions are constantly present in the writings of La Mothe Le Vayer and result from the application of Sextus Empiricus’ ten sceptical tropes. The almost religious importance that the author attributes to these tropes, by calling them “our Decalogue”, 69 does not come from their con‐ nection with some kind of transcendental reality, but from their capacity to contribute to the accomplishment of the life of the philosophers who practise them. Drawing inspiration from Sextus’ Adversos mathematicos, the writer in‐ terpretes in sceptical terms the emphasis laid by the ancient philosophy on the eudaimonia as the final goal (telos) of human action and holds that the tranquil‐ lity of mind, the purpose of genuine philosophers, can only be provided by a Pyrrhonism underlied by the ten tropes. 70 Used, in keeping with Sextus, as “patterns or schemata of argument”, 71 the ten modes appear numerous times in the works of La Mothe Le Vayer. While applying these modes, the author pays a special attention to the tenth, “that we will find everywhere matter to enrich” (“nous trouverons partout de quoi enri‐ chir”). 72 Dealing with “rules of conduct, habits, laws, legendary beliefs, and dog‐ matic conceptions”, the tenth mode “is mainly concerned with Ethics”. 73 Unlike Sextus Empiricus, who through ethics designates the analysis of a value more general than strictly moral, La Mothe Le Vayer approaches ethics especially 37 1.4 Fervent Admirer of Sextus Empiricus’ “Decalogue” 74 See Annas and Barnes, The Modes of Scepticism, 156-157. 75 La Mothe Le Vayer, La Promenade. VII Dialogue, in Œuvres, IV/ I, 209. On the Japanese, see also Lettre XCIV. De la Retraite de la Cour, in Œuvres, VII/ I, 7-9. 76 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre LXXXIX. Remarques géographiques, 363. On the sources of this example, see Pierre Pelleprat, Relation des missions des PP. de la Compagnie de Jésus dans les Îles, et dans la terre ferme de l’Amérique Méridionale (Paris: S. Cramoisy, 1655), II e partie, 64-65. 77 On the relationship between the Christian and the pagan ethics that results from the juxtaposition of contradictions, see my article “Morale sceptique contre morale paï‐ enne? Le dixième trope sceptique chez le libertin La Mothe Le Vayer,” Littératures clas‐ siques. Libertinage, athéisme et incrédulité 1, no 92 (2017), 159-170. 78 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue intitulé le banquet sceptique, 131-132. under its moral aspect. 74 In order to illustrate this mode, our writer uses examples of contradictions inspired from his encyclopaedic knowledge. Among others, the reading of the travel accounts proves that the geographical distance results in conflicting customs and ways of life. Thus, the contradictions between two places of the world increase with the distance that separates them. For instance, the Americans and the Japanese are not at the antipodes of Europe only from a geographical point of view, but also from the point of view of the norms that govern their existence. The Japanese take off their coat when they leave the house and put it back when they come back. 75 As for certain inhabitants of America, they dance in order to show their sadness and cry in order to show their joy. 76 Without limiting himself to the contradictions that may cause the amusement or the curiosity of the public, La Mothe Le Vayer inserts sometimes in his works contradictions that may shock his readers. In so doing, he mentions cases that, beneath the surface, seem to question the consensus around the precept “Do not do unto others what you would not want done to yourself ”, which the Christian ethics is supposed to share with the pagan ethics. 77 Thus, he chooses examples that pertain to what should be the respect for the other’s life and property. Despite being, apparently, indispensable for the birth and the preservation of human societies, the respect for another’s life is not unanimously approved. Being more appalling than the murder, to which it cannot be reduced, canni‐ balism is commonly practised by certain societies. In countries like China, where the “butcher’s shops” (“boucheries de la Chine”) are “stocked with human flesh” (“garnies de chair humaine”), 78 people do not seem to have qualms about feeding on other people’s flesh. Moreover, there are places on earth where the practice of cannibalism does not shrink back from family relationships or filial piety, which for most Europeans, are supposed to be sacred. On the one hand, “within the big kingdoms of Mexico and Peru, the husband would freely eat his wife, 38 Chapter 1. The Philosopher La Mothe Le Vayer: Incurable Sceptic 79 Ibid., 132. 80 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre XCIV. De la Retraite de la Cour, 12. On the sources of this example, see Pierre du Jarric, Histoire des choses plus mémorables advenues tant ès Indes Orientales, qu’aux autres pays de la découverte des Portugais (Bordeaux: S. Millanges, 1608), Book I, ch. XIV, 161. 81 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre XXXVI. Contre le Larcin, in Œuvres, VI/ I, 324-325. On the sources of this example, see Gérard Mercator, Atlas ou représentation du monde universel et des parties d’icelui, faite en tables et descriptions très amples. Édition nouvelle (Am‐ sterdam: H. Hondius, 1633), vol. 2, 520. 82 La Mothe Le Vayer, Neuvième Homilie académique. Réflexions sceptiques, 129. 83 See the first entry “barbaric” (“barbare”) in Furetière, Dictionnaire universel, vol. 1. 84 La Mothe Le Vayer, Discours pour montrer, que les doutes de la philosophie sceptique sont de grand usage dans les sciences, 67. the brother his sister, the father his son” (“Dans ces grands royaumes de Mexico et du Pérou, le mari mangeait librement sa femme, le frère sa sœur, le père son fils”). 79 On the other hand, in the Moluccas, whoever wants to offer a good meal to his friends is free to give them his neighbours’ father to eat, provided that he offers his own in return. 80 Similar to murder or to cannibalism, theft is not always condemned. Certainly, there are places like Carinthia, a duchy belonging to what is today Austria, where theft is so much loathed that those who are suspected of it are hanged first and judged afterwards. Therefore, the only comfort that is granted to those who are rehabilitated after the trial consists in being buried with dignity. 81 Nonetheless, unlike Carinthia, there are places where the thieves recognised as such and condemned increase the prestige of their descendants. This happens, for instance, in countries like the one “of the thieves” (“des lar‐ rons ”), “where it is held for such a high honour to have had family members hanged for the perpetrated thefts, that it is reproached as a sort of infamy not to have had anyone executed by the judiciary for such a nice cause” (“où l’on tient à si grand honneur d’avoir eu des parents pendus pour des vols commis, qu’on s’y reproche comme une espèce d’infamie, si l’on n’en a point eu d’exé‐ cutés en justice pour une si belle cause”). 82 Moreover, the distance from what, for most of the readers of La Mothe Le Vayer, should represent a generally admitted moral norm, is not encountered only in the case of the “barbarian” peoples. Far from being specific to the in‐ habitants of a “very remote, savage, unpolished, cruel country” (“un pays fort éloigné, sauvage, mal poli, cruel”), 83 the deviations from the moral prescriptions which are supposed to give birth to a general consensus have been practised even by peoples “who pretended, either in Greece, or in Italy, or in other regions, to respect philosophy” (“qui ont fait profession, soit en Grèce, soit en Italie, ou en quelque autre région, de respecter la philosophie”). 84 Philosophers themselves who, through their thoughts, should inspire the moral order of societies, have, 39 1.4 Fervent Admirer of Sextus Empiricus’ “Decalogue” 85 Ibid. See also Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, I, 14, [160]: “and we oppose it to dogmatic conception when Chrysippus says that intercourse with mothers or sisters is a thing indifferent, whereas the law forbids such things”. 86 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre LXXVII. De l’Éloignement de son pays, in Œuvres, VI/ II, 237. 87 Giocanti, Penser l’irrésolution, 674. on several occasions, adopted the most unexpected positions. For instance, La Mothe Le Vayer mentions the cases of Chrysippus and Zeno, who have defended incest. 85 By annihilating the frontiers between civilisation and barbarism, the examples that La Mothe Le Vayer uses in order to illustrate the tenth sceptical trope represent a virtual trip, meant to have the same result as the journey that he recommends to the addressee of one of his letters: Do not forget to cultivate this nice part of the sceptical philosophy, which highlights the different customs of peoples. […] The suspension of judgment that you will acquire on so many ways of doing and diverse opinions among which every nation holds its own to be the best will place you in this happy and glorious position among philos‐ ophers. N’oubliez pas de cultiver cette belle partie de la sceptique, qui fait remarquer les dif‐ férentes coutumes des peuples. […] La suspension d’esprit que vous acquerrez sur tant de façons de faire et d’opinions diverses, dont chaque nation tient la sienne pour la meilleure, vous placera dans cette heureuse et glorieuse assiette entre les philoso‐ phes. 86 Leading to the tranquillity of mind, which is the end of the intellectual journey made by the sceptical philosopher, the suspension of judgement or the épokhè results from the juxtaposition of contradictions that pertain to the tenth sceptical mode. Conspicuously more present than the other nine, this tenth mode forms together with them a “convenient reunion of topoi” (“Topique commode”) that serves to oppose “the appearances one to another incessantly and in all possible ways” (“incessamment et de toutes les façons possibles les apparences les unes aux autres”). 87 In the view of La Mothe Le Vayer, the contradictions in the per‐ ceptions of a certain phenomenon show that individuals should not try to grasp the reality that is beyond what is apparent or plausible, with which they are under the obligation to content themselves. In order to bring out the insur‐ mountable character of the constraints that delimit human knowledge, La Mothe Le Vayer derives them from the hostility of the divinity towards the attempts to go into its secrets: “the gods did not want our mind to extend its sphere of action beyond the apparent and the plausible, let us satisfy ourselves with the boun‐ daries that the divinity has imposed upon us, which we would to no avail try to 40 Chapter 1. The Philosopher La Mothe Le Vayer: Incurable Sceptic 88 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue sur l’opiniâtreté, in Dialogues faits à l’imitation des An‐ ciens, 456. 89 Giocanti, Penser l’irrésolution, 460. 90 La Mothe Le Vayer, Petit traité sceptique sur cette commune façon de parler, n’avoir pas le sens commun, in Œuvres, V/ II, 206. overstep” (“les dieux n’ont pas voulu que notre esprit étendît sa sphère d’activité plus loin que l’apparent et le vraisemblable, contentons-nous doucement des bornes que leur providence nous a prescrits, lesquelles, aussi bien, nous tâche‐ rions en vain d’outrepasser”). 88 In the course of the approach that consists in bringing together contrary conceptions of the same phenomenon, the author pretends not to be concerned about the differences between their different degrees of plausibility. Thus, without claiming to provide an exhaustive view of the different interpretations of the same phenomenon, he assumes that they are equally plausible and that, consequently, they represent arguments of equal force, also called isostheneia. The “simple game of shift between the for and against” (“simple jeu de bascule entre le pour et le contre”) used by La Mothe Le Vayer in order to fill out his works seems to be a “goal in itself ” (“une fin en soi”). 89 As a faithful heir of Sextus Empiricus, he concludes that the imperative solution is not the choice between apparently valid arguments, but the suspension of judgement. In order to illus‐ trate his incapacity to reconcile himself to agree with one of these arguments, he puts forward the example provided by Buridan’s ass: Since the sceptical philosopher is neither the enemy of mockery, nor angry that he is reproached for his asinine behaviour, he will well bear me to compare him with Bur‐ idan’s ass, talked about by our proverbs, which placed between two hay stacks, did not know towards which one to rush. The same thing happens to the sceptical phi‐ losopher in the middle of the equality of reasons that he sees and examines without prejudice, his mind remaining in such equilibrium that it does not lean towards one side or the other. Le sceptique n’étant pas ennemi de la raillerie, ni fâché qu’on lui reproche son ânerie, souffrira bien que je le compare ici à l’âne de Buridan, dont parle un de nos proverbes, lequel mis entre deux bottes de foin, ne savait sur laquelle se ruer. Car il lui en arrive de même dans l’égalité des raisons qu’il voit et examine sans prévention, son esprit demeurant dans un tel équilibre qu’il ne penche pas plus d’un côté que de l’autre. 90 In addition to the association with the name of a philosopher who, like the followers of scepticism, has broken away from most of the philosophers of his 41 1.4 Fervent Admirer of Sextus Empiricus’ “Decalogue” 91 See Louis Moreri, Le Grand Dictionnaire historique, ou le mélange curieux de l’histoire sacrée et profane, 3 rd ed. (Lyon: J. Girin, B. Rivière, 1683), vol. 1, entry “Buridan,” 709: “He was thought of as one of the brightest philosophers of his time, when philosophy consisted only in the discussion of vain and useless questions […] ” (“Il passa pour un des plus habiles philosophes de son temps, lorsque la philosophie ne consistait que dans la discussion des questions vaines et inutiles […]”) 92 Philippe-Joseph Salazar, ‘La Divine Sceptique’. Éthique et Rhétorique au XVIIe siècle. Au‐ tour de La Mothe Le Vayer (Tübingen: Gunter Narr, 2000), 14. 93 See Furetière, Dictionnaire universel, vol. 1, first and fourth entries “ass” (“âne”). In the literal sense, it designates an “ass, animal with four legs and long ears […], which is slow, patient, lazy, hardworking and foolish” (“baudet, animal à quatre pieds et à longues oreilles […], qui est lent, patient, paresseux, laborieux et stupide”). In the figurative sense, it refers to “an ignorant, coarse and foolish man” (“homme ignorant, grossier, stupide”). 94 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue traitant de la philosophie sceptique, 97. On ataraxy and metriopathy, see also La Mothe Le Vayer, La Promenade. II Dialogue, 72. La Mothe Le Vayer’s plea for the consequences of the épokhè is likely to contradict the position expressed by Giocanti in Penser l’irrésolution, 634: “[…] unlike the Greek sceptics, and Greek philosophers in general, the modern sceptics do not search for the ataraxy defined as a state deprived of mind troubles” (“[…] à la différence des sceptiques grecs, et des philosophes grecs en général, les sceptiques modernes ne recherchent pas l’ataraxie définie comme un état dépourvu de troubles de l’âme”). time, 91 the example that has just been mentioned exploits the connections be‐ tween the sceptics and the ass. “Topos of the anti-dogmatic humanism” (“topos de l’humanisme anti-dogmatique”), 92 the ass, which is repeated in the text through a word that is derived from it (asinine behaviour, “ânerie”), is related to the sceptical philosophers because of the ignorance that is usually attributed to it. 93 Suggested by the example of Buridan’s ass, irresolution is, in the case of the sceptical philosopher, the consequence of the ignorance that he fully ac‐ knowledges. The consequence of the irresolution, the épokhè or the suspension of judgement is instantaneously followed by the tranquillity of the mind and of the soul: For the shadow does not follow so inseparably the body as the épokhè is immediately reached by these two companions, the ἀταραξία concerning the opinions - which is a state or a posture of mind exempt from all the turmoil and agitation - and the μετριοπάθεια regarding the passions, which it moderates and governs according to the laws and prescriptions of the right reason. Car l’ombre ne suit point si inséparablement le corps que l’épokhè est aussitôt atteinte de ses deux divines compagnes l’ ἀταραξία en ce qui regarde les opinions - qui est un état ou assiette d’esprit hors de tout trouble et agitation - et la μετριοπάθεια aux pas‐ sions, qu’elle modère et régit selon les lois et prescriptions de la droite raison. 94 42 Chapter 1. The Philosopher La Mothe Le Vayer: Incurable Sceptic 95 La Mothe Le Vayer, Petit traité sur cette commune façon de parler, n’avoir pas le sens commun, 203. 96 See Furetière, Dictionnaire universel, vol. 3, entry “paradox” (“paradoxe”): “This word is Greek and refers to a sentence unheard of, surprising and difficult to believe, because it goes against the common and admitted opinions, although sometimes it does not fail to be true” (“Ce mot est grec et signifie, proposition inouïe, surprenante et difficile à croire, à cause qu’elle choque les opinions communes et reçues, quoiqu’elle ne laisse pas quelquefois d’être véritable”). By affording its followers not to give an absolute value to the results reached by the activity of their minds and souls, the épokhè preserves them from the disturbance that accompanies the stubbornness prompting the dogmatic phi‐ losophers to never abandon their opinions. The tranquillity that the suspension of judgement provides to the disciples of scepticism comes from a certain in‐ difference to the different opinions on the same phenomenon. The contradic‐ tions resulting from the practice of the “decalogue” formed by the ten tropes of Sextus bring about a peace of mind that materialises in a certain detachment from the different manners in which a phenomenon can be viewed. 1.5 The Contradictions: Instrument against Stubbornness The end of the intellectual road covered by the sceptical philosopher, the sus‐ pension of judgement is the consequence of the oppositions among the opinions considered as equally plausible. However, when he thinks about the theoretical mechanisms underlying his approach to the épokhè, La Mothe Le Vayer clearly reveals the out of the ordinary character of some of the arguments that he uses for the purpose of his argument: These doubts and paradoxical opinions are as useful to the sceptics as it is for the music masters to take the right key a little bit too high or too low in order to bring back those who are discordant; their new and strange feelings having the same effect for pulling us from the flow of the multitude, from which we cannot go far enough. Ces doutes et ces opinions paradoxiques sont utiles aux sceptiques, comme aux maîtres de musique de prendre un peu plus haut, ou plus bas que le juste ton, pour y ramener ceux qui ont discordé ; leurs sentiments nouveaux et étranges ayant le même effet pour nous tirer du courant de la multitude, dont nous ne pouvons trop nous écarter. 95 In other words, the “paradoxical” or surprising opinions (“opinions paradoxi‐ ques”) 96 are the basis of an approach that uses exaggeration in order to reach 43 1.5 The Contradictions: Instrument against Stubbornness 97 La Mothe Le Vayer, Petit traité sur cette commune façon de parler, n’avoir pas le sens commun, 137. 98 La Mothe Le Vayer, Doute sceptique. Si l’étude des belles lettres est préférable à toute autre occupation, 418. See also Furetière, Dictionnaire universel, vol. 1, first entry “beast” (“bête”): “Animal deprived of reason” (“Animal privé de raison”). 99 See Giocanti, Penser l’irrésolution, 318-319. moderation. The writer does not seek to advocate the sometimes utterly dis‐ concerting views of a phenomenon, which he includes in the juxtaposition of various opinions that underlies his works, but to weaken the absolute authority which is attributed by people to the beliefs that they usually hold. The reason why the “multitude” is the target of this approach comes from the fact that, according to La Mothe Le Vayer, there is “nothing more stupid than it” (“rien de plus sot”) and “there are no other opinions more certainly false, than those which are the most universally received” (“il n’y a guère d’opinions plus assurément fausses, que les plus universellement reçues”). 97 Despite the domination that they exert over the establishment of commonly held opinions, the people are defined as a “beast with so many different heads” (“bête à tant de têtes différ‐ entes”), 98 which highlights the irrational nature inherent in any of its numerous members. Consequently, the consensum gentium is not an element that argues for, but against an opinion. In order to fight against the authority of common opinions, La Mothe Le Vayer chooses to juxtapose them with contrary opinions. In so doing, he does not try to defeat the followers of the commonly accepted opinions, but to confuse them. 99 More precisely, the right key sought for by the author aims at encouraging stubborn people or dogmatic philosophers to ques‐ tion the absolute value that they attribute to their convictions. The contradic‐ tions cultivated by the writer must, through the shock that they are supposed to provoke, call into question the certainties of the individuals who, usually, do not abandon their opinions. Hence, the author uses the contradictions which abound in his works in order to attack, on the one hand, the opinions that belong to the common doxa and, on the other hand, the so-called knowledge of dogmatic philosophers. Further‐ more, when mentioning the individuals who form the “multitude”, he shows that they come from all the social categories, namely the most well-to-do, and apparently the most educated as well as the most humble and ignorant: […] the witless judgements of an ignorant people, which can be found wherever there is the multitude; which drapes itself in silk as well as in the rough woollen fabric; which wears the cassock as well as the porters’ hooks, which attends the gilt studies as well as the fairs, because the people that we are talking about are made up of all sorts of professions. 44 Chapter 1. The Philosopher La Mothe Le Vayer: Incurable Sceptic 100 La Mothe Le Vayer, Petit traité sur cette commune façon de parler, n’avoir pas le sens commun, 141. 101 See Giocanti, Penser l’irrésolution, 465-466. 102 La Mothe Le Vayer, Petit traité sur cette commune façon de parler, n’avoir pas le sens commun, 142. […] les sots jugements d’un peuple ignorant, lequel se trouve partout où est la multi‐ tude ; qui se pare de soie aussi bien que de bure ; qui porte la soutane aussi bien que les crochets, et qui hante les cabinets dorés, aussi bien que les foires, puisque toute sorte de professions composent le peuple dont nous parlons. 100 The clothes that they wear and the jobs that they do distinguish the individuals only apparently. Thus, the clergymen or politicians are far from constituting, as they pretend, an intellectual elite. As highly placed as they may be in the social hierarchy, the individuals can reason as trivially as the most insignificant of their subjects. Despite the mediocrity of its judgement, the “multitude” exerts, through its opinions generically called “common sense” (“sens commun”), a genuine tyr‐ anny. Launched whenever an opinion goes off the beaten track, the accusation of being deprived of common sense lowers the individuals to whom it is ad‐ dressed to a status which is inferior to that of the most insignificant animals, supposed to make the difference between the good and the evil instinctively. In order to demolish this accusation, La Mothe Le Vayer argues that, in spite of its completeness ambitions, common sense overlaps only with a reunion of singular positions, which for random reasons and for a fluctuating time span, are pro‐ moted as the current opinion. 101 Consequently, the author criticises the immod‐ erate pretences of common sense, which despite being itself a tiny fraction of the views of the same question, has no qualms about disparaging the opinions that distance themselves from it, by reproaching them precisely for their sin‐ gularity: it [the human mind] believes that people do not have common sense as soon as they deviate from its way of understanding things, as if its sphere of activity had no other limits than those of the intellectual globe, as if it had registered all the human opinions, of which it does not represent the thousandth part. il [l’esprit humain] croit qu’on n’a pas le sens commun, aussitôt qu’on s’écarte de sa façon de concevoir, comme si sa sphère d’activité n’avait point d’autres limites que celles du globe intellectuel, et qu’il eût tenu registre de toutes les opinions humaines, dont il ne fait pas la millième partie. 102 45 1.5 The Contradictions: Instrument against Stubbornness 103 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre CXLII. De la Coutume, in Œuvres, VII/ II, 171. The universality on which it pretends to rely enables common sense to replace critical reasoning. In this respect, it is useful to recall the functioning of the custom. As soon as it manages to win a large adhesion and to assert itself as custom, an opinion naturally enters the sphere of common sense. The wide support that an opinion which becomes custom succeeds in obtaining substi‐ tutes for the reflection on the real advantages that it is supposed to introduce in people’s life: “this bad use [managing one’s life more according to the example of the others than to what one’s own reason could prescribe] is one of the greatest evils of life, for there is no disorder which is not taken for good without being examined and which does not get established without causing any loathing ever since, by becoming fashionable, it becomes common ” (“ce mauvais usage fait un des plus grands maux de la vie, parce qu’il n’y a point de désordre, qui ne passe pour bon sans l’examiner, et qui ne s’établisse sans répugnance, depuis qu’étant devenu à la mode il s’est rendu commun”). 103 Consequently, the broad support that customs usually enjoy is, in fact, the best argument in favour of itself. Despite their so-called superiority, philosophers establish their theories on arguments that are slightly more rigorous than the ones put forward in favour of common sense by ordinary individuals who, in principle, make up the “mul‐ titude”. However bright they may be, philosophers are not an exception to the general rule according to which, as soon as an individual adopts an idea and starts to defend it, he uses his abilities only in order to strengthen the assent that he gives to it and to fight against what could undermine it. When they embrace an idea, philosophers go as far as relying on it in order to build their “separate system” or, in other terms, to explain the whole universe. This is the reason why, for instance, Pythagoras submitted all his philosophy to the mystery of his numbers; Aristotle himself to the rules of his logic; Plato to his ideas; Democritus and your Epicurus to their atoms or insectile bodies; chemists to their principles and their stoves; the caba‐ lists and the Rosicrucians to their traditions and enigmatic figures; Gilbertus to his magnetic virtue; Copernicus (following Philolaus and Hicetas, authors of this thought) to the mobility of the earth […] […] Pythagore assujettissait toute sa philosophie au mystère de ses nombres ; Aristote lui-même aux règles de sa Logique ; Platon à ses idées ; Démocrite et votre Épicure à leurs atomes ou corps insectiles ; les chimistes à leurs principes et fourneaux ; les kabbalistes et Rose-Croix à leurs traditions et figures énigmatiques ; Gilbertus à la 46 Chapter 1. The Philosopher La Mothe Le Vayer: Incurable Sceptic 104 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue sur l’opiniâtreté, 432. 105 Ibid., 433. 106 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre LXXXI. Des Contestations, in Œuvres, VI/ II, 268. vertu aimantée ; Copernic, après Philolaus et Hicetas, auteurs de cette pensée, à la mobilité de la terre ; […] 104 Through this accumulation of examples La Mothe Le Vayer aims at showing that the philosophers who belong to the most diverse schools have, always, designed theories which, despite being founded on a single idea, are supposed to be capable of making the world comprehensible in all its rich variety. The fierceness of the philosophers who develop theories, which from a sceptical point of view are depreciated by their irreconcilable differences, makes the au‐ thor share the vision expressed by Francis Bacon in the Novum Organum, ac‐ cording to which “man is a great idolater” (“l’homme est un grand idolâtre”). 105 Otherwise saying, philosophers and, more generally, individuals show a blind attachment towards the ideas that they invent and that only the divinity de‐ serves. Given their obstinacy while seeking to promote their ideas, philosophers prove that they are governed by the same stubbornness as ordinary individuals, from whom they claim to be different. The stubbornness, which stops people from abandoning or questioning their ideas, is the consequence of self-love: But hey! few persons are so fair as to get rid of this self-love, because of which we become stubborn concerning everything we have once proposed and we make a matter of honour of never abandoning either the affirmative or the negative of a position, ever since we declared ourselves for one or another. Mais quoi ! peu de personnes sont assez équitables, pour se dépouiller de cet amour-propre, qui nous rend opiniâtres en tout ce que nous avons une fois proposé, et qui nous fait mettre le point d’honneur à ne nous départir jamais, soit de l’affirma‐ tive, soit de la négative, depuis que nous nous sommes déclarés pour l’une ou pour l’autre. 106 47 1.5 The Contradictions: Instrument against Stubbornness 107 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue sur l’opiniâtreté, 438: “But hey! this love for ourselves and for everything that comes from us does not allow us to think like that at all; as soon as we have given our approval to a position, the philautia makes us defend it with so much passion, as we were saying earlier, that we fight against all those that are opposed to it” (“Mais quoi ! cet amour de nous-mêmes et de tout ce qui vient de nous, ne nous permet guère de raisonner de la sorte ; sitôt que nous avons donné notre suffrage en faveur d’une proposition, la philautie nous la fait défendre avec tant de passion, comme nous disions tantôt, que nous combattons toutes celles qui lui sont opposées”). See Giovanni Ruocco, “Images de la raison humaine dans le scepticisme de La Mothe Le Vayer,” in Révolution scientifique et libertinage, ed. Alain Mothu, with the collaboration of Antonella del Prete (Turnhout: Brepols, 2000), 124-125. 108 On the difference between the way in which the self-love is seen by the La Mothe Le Vayer and by the 17 th century French moralists highly influenced by the Augustinian tradition, see Gianni Paganini “Hobbes and the French Skeptics,” in Skepticism and Po‐ litical Thought in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, ed. John Christian Laursen and Gianni Paganini (University of Toronto Press with the help of the UCLA Center for 17 th and 18 th -Century Studies and the Williams Andrews Clark Memorial Library, 2015), 60-61. On the Port-Royalist view of self-love, see Sellier, Pascal et saint Augustin, 141-144. On the connections between the self-love of Port-Royal and the love for oneself of humanists, see Charles-Olivier Stiker-Métral, Narcisse contrarié. L’amour-propre dans le discours moral en France (1650-1715) (Paris: Champion, 2007), 67; and Jean Mesnard, “Sur le terme et la notion de ‘philautie’,” in La Culture du XVIIe siècle. Enquêtes et syn‐ thèses (Paris: PUF, 1992), 48-66. 109 La Mothe Le Vayer, Prose chagrine, 319. Hence, according to La Mothe Le Vayer, the self-love, which by means of a term borrowed from humanist thought, is also called philautia sometimes, 107 is re‐ sponsible for the blindness that prevents people from acknowledging that they are wrong and prompts them to say that the others are wrong. Distorting the inviduals’ relationship with one another and with what is thought to be rea‐ sonable, the self-love as perceived by La Mothe Le Vayer does not have the religious significance that it has for the school of Port-Royal. Indeed, relying on Corneille Jansen’s Augustinus, the disciples of Port-Royal accuse self-love of standing in the way of individuals’ spiritual life. 108 In the view of La Mothe Le Vayer, because of the fierceness that they use in order to try to impose their ideas, stubborn people are unable to have a conversation with others and retreat into their world: “We become almost unsociable and incapable of conversation because of this self-love, which dominates almost all the dogmatics” (“Nous de‐ venons presque insociables et incapables de conversation par cet amour-propre, qui maîtrise presque tous les dogmatiques”). 109 In addition to feeding the scathing polemics in which the dogmatic philosophers engage in the name of the truth, stubbornness is likely to damage life in society itself. Since it prompts the individuals whom it controls to impose themselves at all costs, it jeopardizes 48 Chapter 1. The Philosopher La Mothe Le Vayer: Incurable Sceptic 110 On the connections between the honnête homme and the conversation, see, for example, Jean Mesnard, “ ‘Honnête homme’ et ‘honnête femme’ dans la culture du XVIIe siècle,” in La Culture du XVIIe siècle, 142-159. See also Bruno Roche, Le Rire des libertins dans la première moitié du XVIIe siècle (Paris: Champion, 2011), 136: “Indeed, in front of the dogmatism which is imprudent and excessive in its relationship with knowledge, the sceptic puts forward his moral qualities: he represents the honnête homme freed from passions and always in pursuit of the happy medium” (“En effet, face au dogmatisme imprudent et intempérant dans son rapport au savoir, le sceptique fait valoir ses qualités morales: il représente l’honnête homme délivré des passions et toujours en quête du juste milieu”). 111 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre CXIII. D’une Dispute, in Œuvres, VII/ I, 257. 112 Ibid., 259. 113 On the stages of this quarrel and their connections with Aristotle’s Topics, see Phil‐ ippe-Joseph Salazar, “Pallas armée: polémique et littérature selon La Mothe Le Vayer,” in Ordre et contestation au temps des classiques, ed. Roger Duchêne and Pierre Ronzeaud (Paris-Seattle-Tübingen: Papers in French Seventeenth-Century Literature, 1992), vol. 2, 64. 114 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre CXIII. D’une Dispute, 259. conversation, one of the privileged occasions for the honnête homme, social and aesthetic ideal of the 17 th century, to show his knowledge and qualities. 110 In this respect, a significant example is provided by the dispute between Milon and his adversary, which is worthy of being mentioned because of its hyperbolic proportions, for in the eyes of a La Mothe Le Vayer who witnessed it with amusement, “there has never been a more stubborn fight of this kind” (“jamais combat de cette nature ne fut plus opiniâtre”). 111 Milon and his antagonist, “a fighter as bold as he was” (“aussi hardi champion que lui”), 112 take over a debate that has stopped because one of its previous protagonists, who defended a par‐ adoxical position, acknowledged his incapacity to answer his rival straight away. The entrance on the stage of Milon and of his opponent stands for the beginning of a new stage in the polemic, which consists in the passage from the “dialectic” (“dialectique”) to the “sophistry” (“sophistique”). 113 The two new actors of the polemic let themselves get carried away by the desire to shut the adversary’s mouth at all costs and end up by losing sight of the very issue that should be the subject of their replies: “For they were asking themselves questions that were so little related to the question that had been proposed and these questions were followed by so nonsensical answers, that it could be clearly seen that they no longer remembered the matter which had stirred them so much” (“Car ils se faisaient des demandes de si peu de rapport à la question proposée, et elles étaient suivies de réponses si absurdes, qu’on voyait manifestement, qu’ils ne se souvenaient plus du thème, qui les avaient mis si fort à l’essor”). 114 Boiling down either to insults, or to insignificant questions devoid of con‐ nection with the initial topic, the content of the discourse undergoes an obvious 49 1.5 The Contradictions: Instrument against Stubbornness 115 Ibid., 260. 116 Giocanti, Penser l’irrésolution, 214. 117 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre CXIII. D’une Dispute, 260. 118 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre LXXXI. Des Contestations, 268: “I confess to you that all our quarrels, if we used them well, should be similar to deliberations, through which truth would be carefully sought for, without worrying too much about victory” (“Je vous avoue, que toutes nos disputes, si nous en usions bien, devraient être comme des con‐ sultations, où l’on cherchât soigneusement la vérité, sans se soucier beaucoup de la victoire”). deterioration. Moreover, the tone of the replies exchanged by the participants in the collective polemic set off by Milon and his adversary rises gradually. One of the types of individuals involved in the polemic is represented by those who “were always the loudest to speak” (“parlaient toujours le plus haut”), despite being “the least based on reason” (“les plus mal fondés en raison”). 115 The con‐ clusion of this rudimentary tactic, which aims at substituting the elevation of the voice to the shallowness of the opinion, is summed up by Sylvia Giocanti, who holds that “the most stubborn are also the most aggressive in the conver‐ sation” (“les plus opiniâtres sont également les plus agressifs dans la conversa‐ tion”). 116 The aggressiveness goes from the level of words to the level of gestures when a “heated” person (“échauffé”) who tries to win over the conversation receives a “slap” (“un soufflet”). 117 The climax of the dispute between Milon and his antagonist, the slap is the proof of violence, which in a more or less obvious way, is intrinsic to every polemic and transforms it into a war. In the view of La Mothe Le Vayer, the fierceness that dogmatic people, whether philosophers or ordinary people, use for maintaining their opinions, does not come from their interest in the truth, but from their desire to be vic‐ torious. Led by the wish to make their opinions triumph, stubborn individuals go against the ideal that should fill out the discussions in which they take part 118 and transform them without fail into polemics. 1.6 The Sceptic who Merges Pyrrhonism with the New Academy Despite arousing the admiration that we have just seen, Sextus Empiricus is not the only sceptical philosopher whose philosophy attracts La Mothe Le Vayer. Although they have significantly less occurrences than the author of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism, the figures representative of the New Academy like Carneades and Arcesilas are not absent from the works of our author. As far as he is con‐ cerned, Arcesilas is mentioned with respect to his refusal to write books, which 50 Chapter 1. The Philosopher La Mothe Le Vayer: Incurable Sceptic 119 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue de l’ignorance louable, in Dialogues faits à l’imitation des Anciens, 361: “Thus Arcesilas never wanted to leave anything written, apologising on account of his suspension of judgement, which did not allow him to take sides” (“Ainsi Arcesilaus ne voulut jamais rien mettre par écrit, s’excusant sur sa suspension d’esprit, qui ne lui permettait pas de prendre parti”). See also La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre CXLV. Des Doutes raisonnés, in Œuvres, VII/ II, 200-201: “And I do not see anything that pleases me more in everything that Diogenes Lertius teaches us about these ancient philoso‐ phers than the moderation of Arcesilas, who never wanted to write a book […]” (“Et je ne vois rien de plus à mon gré dans tout ce que Diogène Laërce nous apprend de ces anciens philosophes, que la modération d’Arcesilaus, qui ne voulut jamais composer de livre, […]”) On the explanation which is provided today for Arcesilas’ refusal to write books, see Harald Thorsrud, “Arcesilaus and Carneades,” in The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism, ed. Richard Bett (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 61. 120 La Mothe Le Vayer, Onzième Homilie académique. De l’Ignorance, 162-163. See also La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre CXXIV. Du Prix de la sceptique, in Œuvres, VII/ I, 381: “What we know only by means of philosophy, when it leads alone our reasoning, is prone to a thousand doubts and, if I do not say that all things are then uncertain, at least I think that we can hold together with Carneades that they are incomprehensible to us” (“Ce que nous ne savons que par le moyen de la philosophie, lorsqu’elle conduit seule notre raisonnement, est sujet à mille doutes, et, si je ne dis pas que toutes choses sont alors incertaines, pour le moins crois-je qu’on peut soutenir avec Carnéade, qu’elles nous sont incompréhensibles”). is put down to the suspension of judgement and the moderation of the mind. 119 Regarding Carneades, he is mentioned especially because he does not deny in‐ dividuals the possibility to reach a certain degree of knowledge: Although we are on this natural slope towards its worse part, we do not cease to argue following Carneades the founder of this famous Academy that if all the things are incomprehensible to our spirit which is too limited to know them, it does not mean that all these things are absolutely uncertain […] Tant y a qu’encore que nous soyons dans cette pente naturelle vers la pire partie, nous ne laissons pas de soutenir après Carnéade le fondateur de cette renommée Académie, que si toutes choses sont incompréhensibles à notre esprit trop limité pour les con‐ naître, ce n’est pas à dire, que toutes ces mêmes choses soient absolument incertaines, […] 120 Obviously, by using the personal pronoun “we”, La Mothe Le Vayer includes himself among the followers of Carneades. Hence, he is less sensitive about the possible difference between Arcesilas and Carneades with respect to the incon‐ gruity between the suspension of judgement and the “incomprehensible”, than about the consequences deriving from the existence of the latter, which consist 51 1.6 The Sceptic who Merges Pyrrhonism with the New Academy 121 La Mothe Le Vayer does not quote his source about the position of Carneades, but he seems to rely on Eusebius, Praeparatio Evangelica, XIV, 7, 15 (trans. Édouard des Places, s. j. Paris: CERF, 1987). On the comparison between the way in which Carneades’ position is presented by Cicero in the Academica and by Eusebius in the Praeparatio Evangelica, see Carlos Lévy, Cicero Academicus. Recherches sur les ‘Académiques’ et sur la philosophie cicéronienne (Rome: École française de Rome, 1992), 266-268. 122 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Book I, 1, [1]-[4]. 123 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue sur l’opiniâtreté, 457. in the acceptance of the plausible. 121 In doing so, he seems to ignore that in the Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Sextus makes a clear distinction between, on the one hand, the followers of scepticism and, on the other hand, the followers of the New Academy. 122 Because of what has been considered as their “negative dog‐ matism”, which consists in defending the impenetrable character of the truth, but which leaves place for the acceptance of the plausible, the disciples of the Academic scepticism to which Carneades belongs are members of a philosoph‐ ical school which is neither that of the dogmatic philosophers, nor that of the sceptics. Unlike his master Sextus, La Mothe Le Vayer does not have scruples about reconciling Pyrrhonism and the New Academy within a philosophy that he calls simply sceptique. Despite being, at certain moments, compared to Buridan’s ass, the indecision is not cultivated by the sceptic up to the point where it would force him to give up appeasing his hunger: The sceptical philosopher pays attention to everything and examines all but without corrupting his taste and without persisting in anything, remaining an indifferent judge of so many dishes and so many diverse sauces, like the most prominent of the dinner guests, in the middle of a table that he finds equally well served everywhere. Le Sceptique porte sa considération et donne atteinte à tout, mais c’est sans pervertir son goût et sans s’opiniâtrer à rien, demeurant juge indifférent de tant de mets et de tant de sauces diverses, comme la plus notable personne du convive, au milieu d’une table qu’elle trouve également bien servie partout. 123 Therefore, the suspension of judgement does not prevent the sceptical philos‐ opher from looking into and, up to a certain point, appreciating the different theories that are meant to explain the phenomena of the world. It is even thanks to Pyrrhonian indifference that the sceptical philosopher, instead of persisting in the defence of a single idea, can consider them all as likely to offer a banquet for the mind, in reference to Plato’s eponymous work. For instance, in the Lettre CXXIV. Du Prix de la Sceptique, La Mothe Le Vayer argues both for the individ‐ 52 Chapter 1. The Philosopher La Mothe Le Vayer: Incurable Sceptic 124 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre CXXIV. Du Prix de la sceptique, 381. See also the second entry about opinion in Furetière, Dictionnaire universel, vol. 3: “Opinion means also a probable belief; a judgement of mind doubtful and uncertain” (“signifie aussi une croyance prob‐ able; un jugement de l’esprit douteux et incertain”). 125 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre CXXIV. Du Prix de la sceptique, 386-387. On the school “ephectic, zetetic or aporetic” (“la secte éphectique, zététique ou aporétique”), see also La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre CXXIV. Du Prix de la sceptique, 385-386; and Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, I, 3, [7]: “The Sceptic School, then, is also called “Zetetic” from its activity in investigation and inquiry, and “Ephectic” or Suspensive from the state of mind produced in the inquirer after his search, and “Aporetic” or Dubitative either from its habit of doubting or seeking, as some say, or from its indecision as regards assent and denial, and “Pyrrhonean” from the fact that Pyrrho appears to us to have applied himself to Scepticism more thoroughly and more conspicuously than his predecessors”. uals’ incapacity to reach truth, which pertains to the Academic tradition and the practice of an intellectual approach which, deriving from Pyrrhonism, consists in searching ceaselessly for the truth. On the one hand, by relying on the well-known distinction made by Plato between the two worlds, the sensitive and the intelligible, the writer reduces the knowledge attained by humankind to the opinion which, by definition, does not aspire to be true, but only acceptable: “The unchanging truth, according to Plato himself, is kept only for the intelligible world; while ours, which is the sensitive one, needs to content itself with the opinion, from which our mind cannot draw certain conclusions” (“La vérité constante, selon Platon même, est réservée pour le monde intelligible ; quant au nôtre, qui est le sensible, il faut, qu’il se contente de l’opinion, dont notre esprit ne peut tirer de certaines conclusions ”). 124 On the other hand, given the fallible and uncertain character of the knowledge that people can acquire, the philosophy which is the most suitable for their condition is the one that, in reference to the significance given to scepticism by Sextus, is called “zetetic, that is which enquires and informs itself about everything, without becoming inseparably attached to anything, unwilling to mistake phe‐ nomena for realities, or appearances for certainties” (“zététique, c’est-à-dire qui s’enquête et s’informe de tout, sans s’attacher inséparablement à rien, ne voulant pas prendre des phénomènes pour des réalités, ni des apparences pour des cer‐ titudes”). 125 Otherwise saying, La Mothe Le Vayer is not concerned about the incompat‐ ibility between the Academic philosophy which emphasises the inaccessible character of the truth and the Pyrrhonian or zetetic philosophy, which never stops searching for it. Moreover, by choosing the “rest” (“repos”) which comes from the épokhè as the purpose of a philosophical approach that he simply de‐ scribes as “sceptical”, La Mothe Le Vayer remains foreign to the fact that the pretence to lead to the tranquillity of mind is the main difference between the 53 1.6 The Sceptic who Merges Pyrrhonism with the New Academy 126 See Gisela Striker, “Academics versus Pyrrhonists, reconsidered,” in The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism, 195. 127 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue de l’ignorance louable, 281. 128 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre CXXIV. Du Prix de la sceptique, 384. See Paganini, Skepsis, 71: “the scepticism of La Mothe bends sometimes in the direction of probabilism, replacing the certain with the plausible” (“[…] le scepticisme de La Mothe s’infléchit parfois dans la direction du probabilisme, en remplaçant le certain par le vraisemblable”). Pyrrhonians and the Academics. 126 While the affinity for Pyrrhon’s philosophy opens the way for the tranquillity of mind, the affinity for Carneades’ school results in the practice of the plausible. As Orasius, the author’s spokesperson, explains it, the plausible of the scep‐ tical philosophers holds the place assigned to truth by the dogmatic philoso‐ phers: “But you have to know that when we call something plausible, we do not understand to make it resemble any truth positively established by us, but only what is regarded as true by others” (“Mais sachez que quand nous nommons quelque chose vraisemblable, nous n’entendons pas lui donner une ressem‐ blance avec aucune vérité positivement établie par nous, mais seulement avec ce qui est réputé vrai par les autres”). 127 This means that, far from having am‐ bitions that can be compared to those of the dogmatic philosophers, who are exclusively interested in the truth and certainty, the sceptical philosophers are satisfied, through the plausible, with the “appearances of a reasonable discourse” (“les apparences d’un discours raisonnable”). 128 Thus, according to La Mothe Le Vayer, they show themselves more lucid and more honest than the dogmatic philosophers who, by pledging access to truth, make promises that they are unable to keep: The philosophers’ most serious axioms only succeed and act on our soul (I am com‐ pelled to confess it) in a way which is similar to the recipes of the quack doctors on our bodies. It is a miracle and a pure chance when the latter work as we were promised; and everything that the subtlest philosophy can provide us is something somehow plausible, which it tries to make accepted as unchanging truths. Les plus sérieux axiomes des philosophes ne réussissent et n’agissent sur notre âme, (je suis contraint de le confesser) qu’à la façon des recettes des charlatans sur nos corps. C’est une merveille et un pur hasard quand celles-ci opèrent comme on se l’est 54 Chapter 1. The Philosopher La Mothe Le Vayer: Incurable Sceptic 129 La Mothe Le Vayer, Prose chagrine, 375-376. On the charlatanism of dogmatic philoso‐ phies, see also La Mothe Le Vayer, La Promenade. VII Dialogue, 221; and José Raimundo Maia Neto, “Le Probabilisme académicien dans le scepticisme français de Montaigne à Descartes,” Revue philosophique de la France et de l’étranger 138, no 4 (2013): 467-484. On the definition of the charlatan, see the first entry about it in Furetière, Dictionnaire universel, vol. 1: “[…] A fake doctor who gets on stage in the public square and who gathers people through tricks and pieces of buffoonery, in order to sell them remedies against poisons and certain pains as well as other medicines” (“[…] faux médecin qui monte sur le théâtre en place publique, pour vendre de la thériaque, ou d’autres drogues, et qui amasse le peuple par des tours de passe-passe, et des bouffonneries, pour en avoir plus facilement le débit”). 130 La Mothe Le Vayer, La Promenade. VII Dialogue, 223. On the “buffoons” (“bouffons”) that would be the dogmatic philosophers according to this fragment, see Giocanti, Penser l’irrésolution, 275-276. promis ; et tout ce que la plus subtile philosophie nous peut donner, c’est je ne sais quoi de vraisemblable qu’elle veut faire passer pour de constantes vérités. 129 Obviously, the common element that makes possible the comparison between the philosophers who pretend to look after the mind and the charlatans who pretend to take care of the body is the deceit. Just like the false medicines of the pseudo-healers, whose healing action is, in fact, submitted to the unforeseen turn of events, even the most solid of the philosophers’ theories succeed only randomly in reaching an explanation that has a certain connection with the substance of the phenomena. Additionally, the distance between the ambitions and the achievements of the dogmatic philosophies brings about a ludicrousness from which none of their adepts is spared. The character of Acamatius, “who was portrayed by Suidas and who, while being nothing but a fool from the town of Heliopolis, had himself called the philosopher par excellence” (“dont Suidas nous a donné le portrait, et qui n’étant qu’un idiot de la ville de Héliopolis s’y faisait nommer par excellence le philosophe”), is certainly emblematic of the disciples of the dogmatic schools, whose slightest follower is often neither “less boastful” (“moins fanfaron”), nor “less impertinent” (“moins impertinent”) 130 than he was. As far as he is concerned, thanks to the practice of the plausible, La Mothe Le Vayer is preserved from the unfortunate consequences of the dogmatic philos‐ ophies. The plausible that asserts itself against the background of the suspension of judgement allows the sceptical philosophers to remain halfway between the “self-assurance of the pendants” (“l’affirmation des pédants”) and the “rough and shameful ignorance of the fools” (“l’ignorance honteuse et brutale des 55 1.6 The Sceptic who Merges Pyrrhonism with the New Academy 131 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre CXXIV. Du Prix de la sceptique, 384. Despite the strong con‐ nection between the plausible and the suspension of judgement, it seems to me that Sylvia Giocanti goes further than La Mothe Le Vayer actually meant to do in her article “La Mothe Le Vayer et l’Académie sceptique,” in Academic Scepticism in the Development of Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Plinío Junqueira Smith and Sébastien Charles (Springer, 2017), 72: “Since the plausible, which itself supposes the epokhè, is made in a situation of acatalepsia, there is nothing left from the quest for the truth than the ludic and endless exploration of a natural variety irreducible to the unity (anomalia), as it appears inside and outside us” (“Comme la vraisemblance, qui elle-même suppose l’epokhè, se fait dans une situation d’acatalepsie, il ne reste plus de la quête de la vérité qu’une exploration ludique et infinite d’une variété naturelle irréductible à l’unité (anomalia), telle qu’elle se manifeste en nous et en dehors de nous”). 132 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre CXXIV. Du Prix de la sceptique, 386. See also La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue de l’ignorance louable, 288: “This is an inferred and reasonable ignorance that I do not want to call learned like the Cardinal Cusa, but which we can however reach only through the gate of sciences, that it leaves behind itself, by placing the sceptical philosopher a degree above all these conceited dogmatics, and all these well-read Thrasons” (“C’est une ignorance discourue et raisonnable, que je ne veux pas nommer docte, comme le Cardinal Cusan, mais à laquelle néanmoins on ne peut par‐ venir que par la porte des sciences, qu’elle laisse au-dessous de soi, mettant le sceptique un degré au-dessus de tous ces superbes dogmatiques et de tous ces Thrasons lettrés”). On the relationship between La Mothe Le Vayer’s “praiseworthy ignorance” and Cusa’s “learned ignorance”, see Sophie Feller “De l’ignorance des doctes à la docte ignorance: le savoir selon les libertins érudits,” in Sottise et ineptie, de la Renaissance aux Lumières. Discours du savoir et représentations romanesques. Littérales no 34/ 35, ed. Nicole Jac‐ ques-Lefèvre and Anne-Pascale Pouey-Mounou (Université Paris X-Nanterre, 2004), 88-91. idiots”). 131 Without being hostile to knowledge, La Mothe Le Vayer attacks the self-confidence of the dogmatic philosophers who, while pretending to reach the truth by means of their theories, conceal the uncertainty that is inseparable from philosophy. Consequently, the ignorance that our author claims does not come from the absence of all knowledge, but from the understanding of the limits that hinder the human access to knowledge. Through an implied reference to Nicholas of Cusa, La Mothe Le Vayer describes his ignorance as being “learned and praiseworthy” (“docte et louable”), which by “reflecting upon itself, can become aware of what prevents it from knowing” (“faisant réflexion sur elle-même, peut remarquer ce qui l’empêche de savoir”). 132 Proportionate to the capacities that individuals possess in order to reach science, the plausible spares the sceptics from falling into the extreme position that their adversaries re‐ proach them and that consists in denying the mind every ability to know: “And as regards the understanding, we do not leave it devoid of any light, when we substitute the true with the plausible” (“Et pour le regard de l’entendement, nous 56 Chapter 1. The Philosopher La Mothe Le Vayer: Incurable Sceptic 133 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue de l’ignorance louable, 282. 134 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue sur l’opiniâtreté, 438. 135 Furetière, Dictionnaire universel, vol. 2, the first entry “iron” (“fer”). 136 Ibid., the sixth entry “iron”. On human races, see Jean-Pierre Vernant, “1. Structures du mythe,” in Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs. Études de psychologie historique. Nouvelle éd‐ ition revue et augmentée, 4 th ed. (Paris: La Découverte, 1985), 17-106. ne le laissons pas non plus dépourvu de toute lumière, quand au lieu du vrai nous lui substituons le vraisemblable”). 133 1.7 Follower of Flexible Thought The assent to the plausible brings about a flexibility that plays the role of a borderline between minds: The case of the minds is almost similar to that of the metals, among which the most precious is the most flexible of all; these persons whom you see without any flexibility in their conversation […] and who do not yield to whoever it might be, have iron souls, all the more infamous since they display an insurmountable stiffness. Il est quasi des esprits comme des métaux, dont le plus noble est le plus flexible de tous ; ces personnes que vous voyez n’avoir aucune souplesse dans leur conversation […] et qui ne ploient pour qui que ce soit, ont des âmes ferrées, d’autant plus viles qu’elles sont d’une invincible dureté. 134 The comparison between iron and the stubborn who, because of their steeliness, never retract their opinions, is likely to be based on two main facts. On the one hand, at that time, iron is considered the “hardest, driest and the most difficult to melt of all the metals” (“le plus dur, le plus sec et le plus difficile à fondre de tous les métaux”). 135 On the other hand, it is also associated with a moral negative connotation, dating back to the myth of the human races from Hesiod’s The Works and Days: “Iron is figuratively said in ethics about something that has a great hardness. Hence the Ancients have called the iron century the one when men were harsh and cruel” (“Fer, se dit figurément en morale de ce qui a une grande dureté. Ainsi les Anciens ont appelé le siècle de fer, celui où les hommes étaient durs et cruels”). 136 Unlike rigidity, the flexibility that is specific to the superior minds material‐ ises in the capacity to easily change one’s mind or to abandon an opinion in favour of another one that is different from the initial one or even opposed to it. This means that, when adopting an opinion, the sceptic La Mothe Le Vayer does not commit himself to holding it forever, but only until the moment, more 57 1.7 Follower of Flexible Thought 137 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre LXXXI. Des Contestations, 269. 138 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre CXXIV. Du Prix de la sceptique, 384. 139 Furetière, Dictionnaire universel, vol. 1, entry “amphibian” (“amphibie”). or less distant in time, when he is likely to come across another one, which is more plausible: “I philosophise from one day to another; and if presently I am of an opinion, it is with the pledge that I will change my mind within an hour and whenever I will be shown that the contrary position has more plausibility” (“Je philosophe au jour la journée ; et si je suis présentement d’un avis, c’est avec protestation, que j’en changerai dans une heure, et toutes les fois, qu’on me fera paraître plus de vraisemblance dans l’opinion contraire”). 137 Allowing the scep‐ tics to move swiftly among the most diverse opinions, this theoretical position makes them comparable to those animals, which are called amphibians because they shift from one element to another without any inconvenience and without harming themselves. Similarly these indifferent people adopt on some occasions the opinions of some, on other occasions the opinions of others, according to the way in which they find them more or less plausible, although always without bias and without forcing themselves for the future to support one party more than another. ces animaux, qu’on nomme amphibies, parce qu’ils passent d’un élément à l’autre sans s’incommoder, et sans se faire aucun préjudice. Ces indifférents prennent de même les opinions tantôt des uns, tantôt des autres, selon qu’elles leur paraissent plus ou moins vraisemblables, quoique toujours sans partialité, et sans s’astreindre à l’égard de l’avenir plus à l’un qu’à l’autre partie. 138 Since they are aware of the fallible character of the opinions that they embrace, sceptics like La Mothe Le Vayer keep a certain detachment in respect to them. The inner detachment prompts them to adopt a behaviour that is different from that of the usual disciples of an idea who, in addition to never abandoning it, strive to impose it on others by all possible means. Similarly to the animals that live “sometimes in water and sometimes on land” (“tantôt dans l’eau, tantôt sur la terre”), 139 the sceptics can move among the most diverse opinions without being disturbed by remorse or reproaches coming from other individuals with whom they partly share, for a certain while, the adherence to the same idea. The key to the easiness with which they are capable of going from one opinion to another comes from the relative indifference inherent in the suspension of judgement that they keep permanently in the background of their intellectual activity: “Thanks to this reserve or sceptical suspension, we are never compelled to shamefully retract an opinion that we thought probable, because we are quits 58 Chapter 1. The Philosopher La Mothe Le Vayer: Incurable Sceptic 140 La Mothe Le Vayer, La Promenade. VII Dialogue, 218-219. 141 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre CXLV. Des Doutes raisonnés, 200. 142 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue sur le sujet la vie privée, 174. 143 See Diogenes Laertius, “I. Prologue,” in Lives of Eminent Philosophers, trans. R. D. Hicks, vol. 1, Book I, 21 (Loeb Classical Library 184). to say when leaving it that another one which has more plausibility forces us to embrace it” (“Avec cette réserve ou suspension sceptique l’on n’est jamais réduit à se rétracter avec honte d’une pensée que l’on a crue probable, parce qu’on en est quitte pour dire en la quittant, qu’une autre qui a plus de vraisem‐ blance oblige à l’embrasser”). 140 Prompted by the adherence to flexibility, in two works, Dialogue sur le sujet de la vie privée and La Promenade. VII Dialogue, La Mothe Le Vayer builds his own philosophical system, which from the point of view of the dogmatic phi‐ losophies is completely unsystematic. Despite being dependent on all the other philosophical systems, this system goes beyond them all and does not confine itself to any of them. Justifying his preference for the “sceptique”, he argues that “it has this advantage, that without becoming particularly attached to anything, it makes up its system from everything that seems apparently acceptable in all the other schools […] ” (“a cet avantage, que sans s’attacher déterminément à rien, elle compose son système de ce qui lui paraît apparemment recevable dans toutes les autres sectes […]”) 141 In so doing, La Mothe Le Vayer places himself in the continuation of the eclecticism established by Potamo of Alexandria: If I were to express my desire and to cast my vote for one [philosophical school], I would value above all the others the one that Potamo of Alexandria named ἐκλεκτική or elective, because it chose what it liked from all the others and composed of them its separate system, like a pleasant honey from the juice of a diversity of flowers. Que s’il fallait donner son vœu et son suffrage en faveur de quelqu’une [secte de philosophie], j’estimerais sur toutes celle à laquelle Potamon d’Alexandrie donna le nom de ἐκλεκτική ou élective, parce qu’elle faisait choix de ce qui lui plaisait en toutes les autres, dont elle composait son système à part comme un agréable miel du suc d’une diversité de fleurs. 142 The main source of information about the philosophy of Potamo of Alexandria, Diogenes Laertius stresses the singular character of his philosophy. 143 The dis‐ tinctive feature of the Alexandrian philosopher, the reason why he cannot fit into any of the traditional philosophical schools, comes from the fact that, without joining any of them, he develops his own philosophical theory by re‐ lying on a selection carried out among the ideas that they defend. Likely to be 59 1.7 Follower of Flexible Thought 144 See Myrto Hatzimichali, Potamo of Alexandria and the Emergence of Eclecticism in Late Hellenistic Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 2011), 67-90. 145 La Mothe Le Vayer, La Promenade. VII Dialogue, 218. 146 This approach is based on a tight mixture between Pyrrhonism and the New Academy which, in my opinion, contradicts the position expressed by Moreau in ‘Guérir du sot’, 550: “The plausible places us in the order of representation: several representations may coexist without any necessity to make a decision upon them. Such a use of sceptical reason opens the exercise of judgment to game, to entertainment. In no case does this scepticism (radical) lead to the New Academic scepticism” (“Le vraisemblable nous place dans l’ordre de la représentation: plusieurs représentations peuvent coexister sans qu’il soit nécessaire de trancher. Un tel usage de la raison sceptique ouvre l’exercice du juge‐ ment au jeu, au divertissement. En aucun cas, ce scepticisme (radical) ne conduit au scepticisme néo-académique”). 147 On the interpretation of this fragment and its later adaptations, see Ann Moss, Les Recueils des lieux communs. Méthode pour apprendre à penser à la Renaissance, trans. under the direction of Patricia Eichel-Lojkine (Genève: Droz, 2002), 34-36. attracted by the heterogeneous character specific to Potamo’s eclecticism, La Mothe Le Vayer is not too concerned about the fact that by founding his ap‐ proach to philosophy on “criteria of truth”, the Alexandrian philosopher is closer to the dogmatics than to the sceptics. 144 In the view of La Mothe Le Vayer, eclec‐ ticism materialises in a philosophy that allows the gathering of the plausible interpretations of a phenomenon, which are usually considered as rivals. Thanks to the metaphor of the honey, La Mothe Le Vayer insists on the mixture under‐ lying his philosophy, which is achieved according to criteria whose flexibility is not, however, synonymous with carelessness: “just like good honey is made of the juice collected from various flowers, the best philosophy is formed of expressions well chosen from diverse systems, without deciding that anything is certain, but only plausible” (“comme le bon miel se fait du suc recueilli de diverses fleurs, la meilleure philosophie se forme des sentences bien choisies de divers systèmes, sans rien déterminer opiniâtrement comme certain, mais seule‐ ment comme vraisemblable”). 145 By putting together the plausible conceptions of one and a single matter which can go as far as being contradictory, the author does not yearn to be exhaustive, but only to illustrate the richness of the world. 146 Additionally, he does not profit from the metaphor of the honey in order to refer only to his philosophy, but also to his writing. Associated especially with a fragment from Seneca’s Letters to Lucilius (LXXXIV), the metaphor of the bee that produces honey from different flowers has been related to the reflection on the manner in which an author is supposed to make use of the passages that he extracts from other authors. 147 Taken up by humanists like Petrarca or Erasmus, the metaphor of the bee is also used by La Mothe Le Vayer in order to refer to 60 Chapter 1. The Philosopher La Mothe Le Vayer: Incurable Sceptic 148 La Mothe Le Vayer, VII. De la Lecture des livres, et de leur composition, in Œuvres, II/ II, 518. 149 See Michel de Montaigne, Essays, trans. M. A. Screech, 3 rd ed. (London: Penguin Books, 2003), Book I: 26, 171: “Bees ransack flowers here and flowers there: but then they make their own honey, which is entirely theirs and no longer thyme or marjoram. Similarly the boy will transform his borrowings; he will confound their forms so that the end-product is entirely his: namely, his judgement, the forming of which is the only aim of his toil, his study and his education”. 150 Fumaroli, L’Âge de l’éloquence, 607-608. See also my article “Le rôle des citations chez La Mothe Le Vayer: érudition et éclectisme,” Cromohs, 15, 2010, http: / / www.fupress.ne t/ index.php/ cromohs/ article/ view/ 15469 (accessed April 23 2018). the use of the quotations. While mentioning the way in which an author is supposed to use his readings, our writer argues that “We should not imitate so much the florists who make flower bouquets and who content themselves with the fact of putting together the flowers that they find; as the bees, which take from these same flowers the matter that they turn into an agreeable food” (“Il ne faut pas tant imiter les bouquetières, qui se contentent de joindre ensemble les fleurs qu’elles trouvent; que les abeilles, qui prennent dessus ces mêmes fleurs la matière dont elles composent leur agréable nourriture”). 148 A great sup‐ porter of passages extracted from other authors, La Mothe Le Vayer holds, nev‐ ertheless, that their use must firstly rely on their assimilation. In other words, an author has to fill out his works with quotations only after having taken pos‐ session of them, following a work which, reminiscent of Montaigne’s innutri‐ tion, 149 allows him to provide them a new meaning. The “rhetoric of quota‐ tions” 150 is the expression of philosophical eclecticism, which results from the flexibility cultivated by a thought that, while keeping the suspension of judge‐ ment in the background, satisfies itself with the plausible. 61 1.7 Follower of Flexible Thought 1 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue traitant de la politique sceptiquement, in Dialogues faits à l’imitation des Anciens, 488. Chapter 2. La Mothe Le Vayer against Political Power and its Practices 2.1 Politicians: Ordinary Individuals who Rely on Ostentation for Their Power According to La Mothe Le Vayer, only weak minds let themselves be deceived by appearances that seek to make believe in the deep thought that supposedly underlies the decisions taken by politicians: But if there is a place where the weakness of man’s mind appears, that concerns, after careful consideration, the high regard that it has for everything that is related to the governments of the earth, by whose splendour and grandeur it is easily dazzled, imag‐ ining that all their movements are made with weights and measures and that the most insignificant things are arranged after extraordinary reasoning. Mais s’il y a lieu où la petitesse de l’esprit de l’homme paraisse, c’est, à le bien prendre, en l’estime qu’il fait de tout ce qui regarde les dominations de la terre, de l’éclat et grandeur desquelles il est aisément ébloui, s’imaginant que tous leurs mouvements se font avec poids et mesure, et que les moindres choses y sont concertées avec une extraordinaire ratiocination. 1 Political leaders surround themselves with splendour in order to try to conceal the true reasons that determine their choices. It is only in the eyes of the people who are incapable of distinguishing between the form and the content that the luxury displayed by the rulers stands in for the reflection that should be at the origin of political decisions. Expressed through a series of synonyms (weights and measures, reasoning), the thought of the powerful is supposed to be en‐ dowed with an extraordinary quality, which allows it to analyse even the most insignificant details of the situations to which it is applied. The luxury that dazzles most of the public when leaders show themselves in front of the people is a current practice of power, which as it is shown by Aristotle, dates back to Hippodamus of Miletus, the inventor of politics: 2 Ibid., 474. On Hippodamus of Miletus, see also Aristotle, Politics, trans. H. Rakham, II, v, 1-4 (Loeb Classical Library 264). 3 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue traitant de la politique sceptiquement, 475. 4 Ibid., 476. In this respect it reminds me of what Aristotle noticed in the second book of his Politics, that this Hippodamus of Miletus, the first to turn it [politics] into an art and to write about it, was otherwise a man so foolishly ambitious and so full of vain su‐ perfluities that he was wearing magnificently fur-lined coats in Greece, not only during what could have been the rigours of winter, but even during the most beautiful days of the summer solstice. Il me souvient à ce propos de ce qu’a observé Aristote au second [livre] de sa Polit‐ ique, que cet Hippodamos de Milet, qui fut le premier qui la réduisit en art et en écrivit, était un homme d’ailleurs si sottement ambitieux et si plein de vaines superfluités qu’il portait en Grèce des robes superbement fourrées, non seulement pendant ce qu’il peut y avoir là de rigueur de l’hiver, mais même aux plus beaux jours du solstice d’été. 2 For a clear-sighted viewer, Hippodamus was making a fool of himself because of the exaggerated and sometimes clearly inappropriate opulence of the clothes that he used in order to assert the pretended superiority on which he established his power. The ridicule of his governing methods is likely to extend to most politicians, including those who are contemporary with La Mothe Le Vayer. As a matter of fact, the experience of the political world enables the writer to con‐ clude that the exterior signs of distinction or wealth are, in most of the cases, in inverse proportion to the quality of the men who display them: “having never‐ theless noticed that a hundred times one […] the silk, the purple, the flashy, or the cordon bleu covered often nothing else than what is very base and popular” (“m’étant néanmoins aperçu que de cent fois l’une […] la soie, la pourpre, le clinquant, ni le cordon bleu, ne couvraient souvent rien que de fort vil et popu‐ laire”). 3 In politics, like in other fields, appearances are misleading or “The cowl does not make the monk” (“l’habit ne [fait] pas le moine”). 4 Besides the splendour of the clothes, the ritual of the rulers’ public appear‐ ances also involves the staging of the knowledge that is supposed to underlie their actions: And indeed there are few of this profession who disown their first founder in this exterior parade, which they know how to couple not only with sententious gravity, when they condescend to utter their political axioms, but also with mysterious taci‐ turnity, […] when they pretend to suppress by their silence the State misfortunes. 63 2.1 Politicians: Ordinary Individuals who Rely on Ostentation for Their Power 5 Ibid., 474-475. 6 Ibid., 490. 7 This idea is partly expressed by Gouverneur in Prudence et subversion libertines, 446-447. Et véritablement il y en a peu de cette profession qui démentent leur premier fondateur en cette parade extérieure, laquelle ils savent accompagner non seulement d’une gravité sentencieuse, quand ils daignent prononcer leurs axiomes politiques, mais encore d’une mystérieuse taciturnité, […] lorsqu’ils font mine de supprimer par leur silence les fatalités de l’État. 5 When they actually have to speak about the pretended science that underpins their exercise of power, self-important rulers either remain silent about it as if it were sacred and forbidden to the wide public, or utter its principles with a grandeur that is worthy of the greatest truths. Given the solemnity with which it is enacted, so-called political knowledge can be compared to the oracles that claim to transmit pieces of information, which are normally inaccessible to or‐ dinary individuals. Nonetheless, despite their pretences of being different from those they govern, leaders are far from being endowed with exceptional quali‐ ties. The intelligence that supposedly allows them to own and to put into practice knowledge of a superior level is usually nothing more than mere mediocrity: We believe that all these gentlemen possess the most beautiful minds of their century, or at least that those who are the first among them have a reasoning which is differ‐ ently excellent from the ordinary one of other people. On the contrary, it can often be seen that those who are the most successful in this type of affairs are the persons who reason the least highly in the rest of their life conduct. Nous croyons que tous ces messieurs-là possèdent les plus beaux esprits de leur siècle, ou pour le moins que ceux qui sont les premiers [d’] entre eux aient la ratiocination tout autrement excellente que le commun des autres hommes. Il se voit souvent au rebours que ceux à qui il réussit le mieux dans cette sorte d’affaires sont les personnes qui raisonnent le moins hautement dans le reste de la conduite de leur vie. 6 Actually, the success of political actions does not seem to be too dependent on the intelligence of the politicians who initiate them. Rulers with an average mind succeed in turning to good account some of the circumstances that they have to deal with precisely because, given their weak capacity for analysis, they are content with letting themselves go to the twists of fate. Unlike them, rulers endowed with intelligence act more prudently and may risk missing situations that could prove profitable. 7 In spite of the prestige that surrounds their prepa‐ ration, political actions are hardly the consequence of operations that put to work extraordinary intellectual capacities in order to obtain carefully elaborated 64 Chapter 2. La Mothe Le Vayer against Political Power and its Practices 8 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue traitant de la politique sceptiquement, 488. See also Gou‐ verneur, Prudence et subversion libertines, 438: “political theorists want to transmit the belief that there are founding secrets, while in fact the secret is that there is no secret” (“les théoriciens politiques veulent faire croire qu’il y a des secrets fondateurs, alors qu’en réalité le secret est qu’il n’y a pas de secret”); and Béatrice Guion, Du Bon usage de l’histoire. Histoire, morale et politique à l’âge classique (Paris: Champion, 2008), 365. 9 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue traitant de la politique sceptiquement, 489. reasoning. In contrast to the belief held by most people who have to submit to the decisions taken by the powerful, the secret that envelops them, in fact, covers their random character: We believe that everything that is being made with respect to the State is the result of councils that are easier to enforce than to fathom, and that all the things are led to an ending that has been planned a long time ago and that is almost infallible; while you can consider as very certain that just like the wave of a hat is capable of diverting the greatest stroke of lightening, often a reason of no importance, a very slight and peculiar interest, a moment that has been in no way premeditated, hastens or delays, does or undoes the most important actions of a Louvre; although in every case are being given as a pretext very high causes and very misleading motives. Nous croyons que rien ne se fait en matière d’État, que par des conseils plus aisés à respecter qu’à pénétrer, et que toutes choses y sont portées à leurs fins de long temps prévues, et quasi infaillibles ; là où vous pouvez tenir pour très sûr que, comme le vent d’un chapeau est capable de détourner le plus grand coup de foudre, souvent aussi un respect de nulle considération, un intérêt très léger et particulier, un moment nulle‐ ment prémédité hâte ou recule, fait ou défait les plus importantes actions d’un Louvre ; quoique toujours prétextées de causes très élevées et de motifs très spécieux. 8 The thoughts that give substance to the rulers’ judgements rely neither on subtle and long time nurtured reflections, nor on reasons that are at the height of their often major influence on people’s lives. Unlike the profound reasons that are attributed to them, political decisions are often taken on the spot and can derive from causes that are insignificant in comparison with the effects that they trigger. For instance, despite what the very young Louis XIII thought, his 1620 expedition to the Béarn, which “has been followed by the most remarkable changes that have been seen in France over the last five hundred years” (“a été suivi[e] des plus notables changements qui se soient vus en France depuis cinq cents ans”), was, in fact, brought about by the desire of the Duke of Luynes to remove from the Court the Marquis de Montpouillan, whose influence he feared. 9 Hence, the reasons that sometimes determine even the most extraordi‐ nary actions of rulers do not result from a rigorous examination of the situation, 65 2.1 Politicians: Ordinary Individuals who Rely on Ostentation for Their Power 10 Ibid., 489-490. For the analysis of this fragment, see Gouverneur, Prudence et subversion libertines, 448-449; and Béatrice Guion, Du bon usage de l’histoire, 347-348. 11 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue traitant de la politique sceptiquement, 475. See also Cavaillé, Dis/ simulations, 189: “Indeed: routine and chicanery, here is what the whole of this sublime art which pretends to preside over men’s destinies is reduced to. As a matter of fact, the major talent of politicians is to make this poor office routine, to which eventually every political secret amounts to, be considered as the celebration of pro‐ found mysteries” (“En effet: routine et chicane, voilà à quoi se ramène le tout de cet art sublime qui prétend présider aux destinées des hommes. En fait, le talent majeur des politiques est de faire passer cette médiocre routine de cabinet, à laquelle se réduit finalement le secret politique, pour la célébration de profonds mystères”). but from passions that are by definition irrational. Unlike the leaders, ordinary individuals, who are used to facing the hostility of fate or of their fellows know better the limits of their capacities to act and show themselves wiser in the preparation of their actions: “there being maybe none of us who, while running his small family, wanted to yield so much either to his passions, or to fortune, as are doing daily all these great State guardians while governing their king‐ doms” (“n’y ayant peut-être aucun de nous qui en la conduite de sa petite famille voulût avoir tant donné à ses passions ni à la fortune, comme font tous les jours ces grands tuteurs des États dans le gouvernement des seigneuries”). 10 Despite their arrogance and the exceptional qualities attributed to them by their subjects, rulers possess a knowledge that actually amounts to “I do not know what cabinet routine” (“je ne sais quelle routine de cabinets”) and “I do not know what State chicanery” (“je ne sais quelle chicane d’État”). 11 The polit‐ ical know-how, which is without doubt possessed by the leaders, is foreign to the theoretical thought that is appropriate to sciences and that is based on ac‐ curately elaborated principles: For it happens daily that in the context of a kingdom disarray excellent negotiations will be conducted by people who, except for a certain understanding of persons, and some negotiation routine that they have achieved in time, can only be said to be individuals of very poor talent and of small or no significance at all. Just like in the game of cards, wherein there are people who know tricks and ways of deceitfully shuffling them, although they do not have a good understanding of the game and are obviously witless with respect to it. Car il arrive tous les jours que des hommes négocieront excellemment parmi les con‐ fusions d’une Seigneurie, lesquels hors de certaines intelligences qu’ils ont des per‐ sonnes, et de quelque routine de négociation qu’ils ont acquise par le temps, ne peu‐ vent passer que pour personnes de très médiocre talent, et de petite ou nulle considération. De même qu’au jeu de cartes, il y en a qui y savent de piperies, et des 66 Chapter 2. La Mothe Le Vayer against Political Power and its Practices 12 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue traitant de la politique sceptiquement, 490. 13 Gouverneur, Prudence et subversion libertines, 450. 14 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre XCV. De la Fidélité romaine, in Œuvres, VII/ I, 28-29. 15 Ibid., 29. façons de les brouiller trompeusement, bien qu’ils n’entendent guère bien les jeux, et qu’ils y soient manifestement impertinents. 12 Far from being the result of a speculative intelligence, the supposedly noble knowledge thanks to which politicians exert their power consists in a habit acquired through practice and small-scale swindle. That is why political science can actually be considered a mere “resourcefulness” (“débrouillardise”), 13 unable to dominate the reality it claims to govern or to ensure the success of those who are using it. By covering in mystery the reasons of their actions, leaders act similarly to the divinity, which seems to be willing to keep the secret around the strings that it pulls in order to run the theatre of the world. Nevertheless, the only true mystery that the people in power possess is that they are unable to exert a deep influence on the political stage. Far from fulfilling the noble function of stage directors, they are simple actors in a play whose script they ignore and whose plot progress they find out almost at the same time as their subjects. 2.2 Deceit and Violence: Common Practices of Power The illusions that politicians maintain around their knowledge and their qual‐ ities perpetuate the lie that has contributed to the birth of the different political regimes. Trickery legitimises violence, which is in general at the origin of a new political order. The case of the military conquests, which usually end by im‐ posing a new political order, is relevant for the connection between deception and violence. Since it was the “rule” (“la domination”) “the most extensive of all those that came to our knowledge” (“la plus étendue de toutes celles, qui sont venues à notre connaissance”), 14 the Roman Empire is certainly an example worthy of being analysed. As far as they were concerned, the Romans used deception as a subterfuge in order to start the war: “Whoever was weak in com‐ parison to them sooner or later was wrong if he did not submit to their power […] ” (“Quiconque était faible auprès d’eux [Romains], tôt ou tard avait tort, s’il ne se soumettait à leur puissance […]”) 15 Thus, the Romans used the search for justice as a pretext for increasing their power. Despite having managed to build an empire, which at the time of La Mothe Le Vayer was still considered the 67 2.2 Deceit and Violence: Common Practices of Power 16 Ibid., 29-30. vastest of the whole history, the Romans did not use practices that were specific to them: But with what can they be imputed in this respect that they do not have in common with almost all the sovereigns of the world that have ever existed. When well con‐ sidered, what else is the greatness of a prince than the ruin and the decrease of those who neighbour him? And his force can it be otherwise understood than through the weakness of the others? Mais que leur peut-on imputer là-dessus, qui ne leur soit presque commun avec tout ce qu’il y a eu de souverains dans le monde. La grandeur d’un prince, à le bien prendre, qu’est-ce autre chose que la ruine ou la diminution de ceux, qui le confinent ? Et sa force peut-elle être comprise autrement, que par la faiblesse des autres ? 16 The conquests originate in an appetite for power that grows proportionally with the victories it wins. In fact, the politics of conquests runs counter to the justice that it pretends to defend: by seeking to satisfy their hunger for power especially to the detriment of their weakest counterparts, the conquerors violate the norms of justice, which consist precisely in protecting the weakest against the stron‐ gest. As a consequence of understanding that the conquests, which establish a new order of things, are based on a mixture of violence and deceit, La Mothe Le Vayer undermines the myth of the conquering heroes. Starting from the example about the conquest of the Gauls by the Romans, he suggests that what allows the victors to impose their power is not courage in the face of danger, but skill in deceiving their adversaries: As for our Gauls, into whose master Cesar turned himself, in case we had the com‐ mentaries of Ambiorix, or Induciomarus, Vercingentorix, or Divitiacus, just like we have those of Cesar, there should be no doubt about the fact that the former are highly contradictory with the latter and that the simplicity of our ancient Gauls obviously saw itself constrained to yield rather to the shrewdness than to the courage of Romans. In any case, according to Cesar’s own text, the practice used against the Gauls was often used elsewhere as well and consisted in dividing them and assisting the weakest side, in order to subdue both of them. Quant à nos Gaules, dont enfin César se rendit le maître, si nous avions des commen‐ taires d’Ambiorix, ou d’Induciomarus, de Vercingentorix, ou de Divitiacus, comme nous avons ceux de César, il ne faut point douter, que les premiers ne se trouvassent fort contraires à ceux-ci, et que la simplicité de nos vieux Gaulois ne s’y vit manifes‐ tement contrainte de céder plutôt à la finesse qu’à la valeur des Romains. Tant y a que 68 Chapter 2. La Mothe Le Vayer against Political Power and its Practices 17 Ibid., 21-22. 18 La Mothe Le Vayer, Du peu de certitude qu’il y a dans l’histoire, in Œuvres, V/ II, 462: “In whatever case, I hold for certain what I think having already written somewhere else, namely that if we had the Commentaries of Ambiorix, of Induciomarus, of Vercingen‐ torix, or of Divitiacus, the way we have those that we have just talked about, they would contain stories quite different from those of Caesar; and that these ancient Gauls and Germans would give of their wars against the Romans accounts really contrary from those of this first of the emperors [Caesar], whatever advantage the lot of guns gave him over them” (“Quoiqu’il en soit, je tiens pour certain, ce que je crois avoir déjà écrit ailleurs, que si nous avions des Commentaires d’Ambiorix, ou d’Induciomarus, de Ver‐ cingentorix, ou de Divitiacus, comme nous avons ceux dont nous venons de parler, il s’y trouverait des récits bien différents de ceux de César ; et que ces vieux Gaulois et Allemands donneraient à leurs guerres contre les Romains des jours bien contraires à ceux, où les a fait voir ce premier des Empereurs [César], quelque avantage que le sort des armes lui ait donné sur eux”). 19 See Lorenzo Bianchi, “Il tema dell’eroe nei libertini francesi tra Naudé e La Mothe Le Vayer,” Studi filosofici, XXII (1999), 99-123. 20 See Alexandre Kojève, La Notion de l’autorité (Paris: Gallimard, 2004), 70-73. par le propre texte de César l’on pratiqua contre eux ce qui l’a souvent été ailleurs, en les divisant, et assistant le plus faible partie, afin de les subjuguer tous deux. 17 Reminiscent of the sceptical view about historical knowledge that is developed in the treatise Du peu de certitude qu’il y a dans l’histoire (1668), 18 this interpre‐ tation of the Roman conquest of Gaul clearly challenges the prestige enjoyed by the great conquerors. Written by the winners, history is unfair to the defeated, whom it deprives not only of power, but also of speech. 19 According to La Mothe Le Vayer, what distinguishes the victors from the vanquished is not the courage that is necessary for confronting the dangers of war, but the ability to use cun‐ ning in order to mislead the enemy. Through this perception of the conquerors, the author opposes the theory which, conceived initially by Hegel and taken up by Kojève, compares the authority of the winner over the defeated to the au‐ thority of the master over the slave. In brief, the master imposes himself because, unlike the slave, he manages to control the fear of death. 20 By ruining the legend of the conquering heroes, La Mothe Le Vayer seems to suggest that, in case it really exists, the control over the fear of death does not belong only to the win‐ ners, but also to the vanquished. Moreover, when they succeed in conquering a country, the conquerors do not make use of actions or qualities that, from the point of view of the ordinary norms of justice, are worthy of appraisal. In fact, when conquering a new country, the so-called heroes take ownership of a ter‐ ritory that does not belong to them and, consequently, perpetrate a theft. Fol‐ lowing a pattern that seems surprising at the first glance, the bigger the theft, 69 2.2 Deceit and Violence: Common Practices of Power 21 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue traitant de la philosophie sceptique, 78. the more the one who commits it is worshipped by the individuals whom he harms through his actions: Invading the neighbour’s lands, and wanting to seize his heritage, is one of the most unjust abuses; stealing a whole State and turning oneself into the master of a kingdom by means of every possible violence or treachery, belongs to the glory of a conqueror and to the job of the demi-gods of our histories […] Entreprendre sur les terres de son voisin, et se vouloir approprier son héritage, c’est une violence des plus injustes ; enlever un État entier, et se faire maître d’un royaume avec quelque force ou perfidie que ce soit, c’est la gloire d’un conquérant, et le métier des demidieux de nos histoires […] 21 Hence, the glory in which the founding fathers cover themselves is in inverse proportion to the violence and the deception that they employ in order to take hold of power. Abundantly used, methods like brutality or cunning secure a success that leads to the oblivion of the misdeeds by means of which it was obtained. Furthermore, the cunning is not used only for seizing a foreign country, but also for governing it. In this respect, La Mothe Le Vayer does not have qualms about giving the example of the theory of the political purposes of religions: What made men think about the atheists is that just like Ptolemaeus or his predeces‐ sors invented the hypotheses of the epicycles, eccentrics or concentrics, and so many other imaginary machines, in order to explain the celestial appearances or phenomena, everybody being able to do the same thing at whim and in his own way like, for instance, to assume the mobility of the earth and the immobility of the sky, or some‐ thing similar, provided that he saves and explains methodically what falls on our senses from the things of the sky; in the same way everything we find out about gods and religions is nothing else than what the cleverest men have most reasonably con‐ ceived in terms of their discourse for the moral, economic and civil life, like for ex‐ plaining the phenomena of customs, actions and thoughts of the poor mortals, in order to provide them with certain living rules exempt, as far as possible, from all nonsense. Ce qui a fait penser humainement aux irréligieux, que comme Ptolémée ou ses de‐ vanciers inventèrent les hypothèses des épicycles, des excentriques ou concentriques, et de telles autres machines fantastiques, pour rendre raison des phénomènes ou ap‐ parences célestes, chacun pouvant faire capricieusement le même à sa mode, comme de supposer la mobilité de la terre et le repos du firmament, ou chose semblable, moyennant qu’il sauve et explique méthodiquement ce qui tombe sous nos sens des 70 Chapter 2. La Mothe Le Vayer against Political Power and its Practices 22 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue sur le sujet de la divinité, 397-398. 23 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue traitant de la philosophie sceptique, 78. choses du Ciel ; qu’aussi tout ce que nous apprenons des dieux et des religions n’est rien que ce que les plus habiles hommes ont conçu de plus raisonnable selon leur discours pour la vie morale et économique et civile, comme pour expliquer les phé‐ nomènes des mœurs, des actions et des pensées des pauvres mortels, afin de leur donner de certaines règles de vivre, exemptes, autant que faire se peut, de toute ab‐ surdité. 22 Influenced by Galileo’s discovery, which nonetheless he does not mention, La Mothe Le Vayer draws a parallel between the theories about the astronomical phenomena and the theories underlying the organisation of societies. In doing so, he uses the sceptical argumentation that consists in emphasising the differ‐ ences or the contradictions among the various theories, which aim at explaining either the sky phenomena or the laws that govern the people’s lives. Unlike the contradictions among the astronomical theories, which are obvious, the con‐ tradictions among the laws that are time and again illustrated in other texts are, in this case, only alluded to. Undermined by their oppositions, the astronomical theories are useful only because they provide a decent rational explanation for the phenomena whose causes they are actually unable to clarify. As extravagant as they may be, the various theories gain acceptance because they succeed in explaining the phenomena in a systematic way, which satisfies the desire for regularity of the human mind. By extending the example of the astronomical theories to the civil, moral and economic laws, La Mothe Le Vayer seems to suggest that, unlike what they pretend in order to enhance their authority, the latter are not worthy of being respected because they have been revealed by the divinity, but because they manage to establish a certain order in people’s lives. Invented by people for people, the laws are accepted because they are efficient in allowing individuals to reasonably organise their life. Although they are not devoid of utility, the precepts that govern human lives prove that deception is a constant practice of politicians. Since, in order to seize power and to keep it, they resort to a mixture of violence and deceit, the people in power seem foreign to the ethics that control their subjects’ actions. Indeed, as it results from the Dialogue traitant de la philosophie sceptique, which belongs to the same series as the Dialogue traitant de la politique sceptiquement, the rule that is likely to bring success in politics holds that the more an individual breaks the moral standards, the more he has chances to seize power: “There is no vice that through its extent does not degenerate thus into virtue […] ” (“Il n’y a vice qui par sa grandeur ne dégénère ainsi en vertu […]”) 23 Thus, the breach of norms 71 2.2 Deceit and Violence: Common Practices of Power 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid., 79. ensures success only if it reaches such an extreme point that it gives to its author the possibility to obey his own norms, after having previously placed him out‐ side those that govern the life of the ordinary individuals. This means that the rules that underlie the politicians’ behaviour are not incompatible with the violence and the lie which are usually excluded from the ordinary moral code. For instance, concerning the violence that can sometimes lead to murder, the difference between a murderer and a so-called superman pertains only to the number of people killed: “To assassinate a man is a vile homicide; to stab a hundred thousand men is a heroic action” (“Faire assassiner un homme, c’est être un infâme homicide; en faire égorger cent mille, c’est une action héroïque”). 24 Just like murder, deceit enables those who have recourse to it to seize power only if it is immoderate: To write stories pretending they are truths, to transmit tales to the posterity pre‐ tending they are true histories, is the thing of an impostor or of an author insignificant and of no importance; to write fantasies pretending they are divine revelations and ramblings pretending they are laws that came from the sky, is the thing of Minos, Numa, Muhammad, and their counterparts, it is to be great prophets, and the very sons of Jupiter. Écrire des fables pour des vérités, donner des contes à la postérité pour des histoires, c’est le fait d’un imposteur ou d’un auteur léger et de nulle considération ; écrire des caprices pour des révélations divines et des rêveries pour des lois venues du Ciel, c’est à Minos, à Numa, à Mahomet et à leurs semblables, être grands prophètes, et les propres fils de Jupiter. 25 The more the deceits cross the threshold of plausibility, the more they arouse support or even admiration. If they admit they are mere fictions and do not hide the identity of their author, they are either attributed to authors who can afford entertainment, but who do not deserve much attention, or to charlatans whose lies risk harming society. In exchange, if they pretend to be truths of a divine origin, they reach the status of laws and transform their authors into prophets who play the enviable role of intermediary between people and gods. Naturally, the name of Christ could be easily added to those of the three political and religious leaders for whom the name of “impostor” is much more suitable than for the authors whose inventions have more modest aims. In his Considérations sur les coups d’État (1639), Gabriel Naudé, who is the source of inspiration for the character of Telamon from the Dialogue traitant de 72 Chapter 2. La Mothe Le Vayer against Political Power and its Practices 26 Gabriel Naudé, Considérations politiques sur les coups d’État (Rome: 1639), 71. 27 On Machiavelli’s pragmatism, see Michel Senellart, Les Arts de gouverner. Du régimen médiéval au concept de gouvernement (Paris: Seuil, 1995), 227. For Machiavelli’s influence on Naudé, see Lorenzo Bianchi, “Renaissance et libertinage chez La Mothe Le Vayer,” in Libertinage et philosophie au XVIIe siècle, no. 2. La Mothe Le Vayer et Naudé (Publi‐ cations de l’Université de Saint-Étienne, 1997), 86-89. 28 Gabriel Naudé, Considérations politiques sur les coups d’État, 28. 29 Ibid., 65: “bold and extraordinary actions that the Princes are forced to take against the common law in the case of difficult and desperate looking affairs, without keeping either the order or the form of justice, jeopardizing the interest of the private individual for the good of the public” (“des actions hardies et extraordinaires, que les Princes sont contraints d’exécuter aux affaires difficiles et comme désespérées, contre le droit commun, sans garder même aucun ordre ni forme de justice, hasardant l’intérêt du particulier, pour le bien du public”). N. B. In italics in the original text. 30 Ibid., 91-93, 95-97. la politique sceptiquement, seems to share La Mothe Le Vayer’s opinion on the pervasiveness of the power practices that are irreconcilable with common ethics. Thus, Naudé denounces the hypocrisy of rulers, who take sanctions against books containing the same principles that they do not hesitate to apply: Yet these examples drawn from the history of only ten or twelve princes, being in such a great number, in my view could also be used as a very genuine proof for showing that although Machiavelli’s writings are forbidden, his doctrine nevertheless does not stop being practised by the very people who authorise its censorship and prohibition. Or ces exemples tirés de l’histoire de dix ou douze princes seulement, étant en si grand nombre, je crois qu’ils pourront aussi servir de preuve très véritable, pour montrer, qu’encore que les écrits de Machiavel soient défendus, sa doctrine toutefois ne laisse pas d’être pratiquée, par ceux mêmes qui en autorisent la censure et la défense. 26 When mentioning Machiavelli’s “doctrine”, the author is likely to refer to the pragmatism of the Florentine author, according to whom, in order to pursue success, politicians must abandon the concern with moral precepts. 27 Further on, Naudé approaches the issue of pragmatism characteristic of power practices especially from the perspective of the coups d’État, which he considers essential to politics. 28 Carried out in exceptional occasions and in the biggest secret, the coups d’État are, according to him, actions that in order to safeguard the public interest, deviate from the elementary standards of justice. 29 In his analyses of the coups d’État, which he does not hesitate to illustrate by means of examples that could arouse lively controversies, like the religion on which Muhammad founded his empire, or the conversion to Christianity that allowed Clovis to reunify Gaul, 30 Naudé focuses expecially on the mystery that underlies power. 73 2.2 Deceit and Violence: Common Practices of Power 31 Ibid., 108-117. 32 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue traitant de la politique sceptiquement, 499. The reason why he lets himself be seduced by the political secret is that he relates it to the rulers’ cleverness, which consists in identifying the right moment for making use of deceit or violence. In this respect, among others, he boldly men‐ tions the St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre. According to him, the only reproach that can be addressed to this action, usually fiercely criticised by Protestants and Catholics, comes from the fact that it was not fully accomplished. If it had been entirely successful, meaning that it would have succeded in eliminating all the Protestants, it would have deprived them of the opportunity to complain and would have allowed the Catholics to live peacefully. 31 On the contrary, according to La Mothe Le Vayer’s Dialogue traitant de la politique sceptiquement, the mystery in which the rulers cover their actions hides the unpredictable results of the transgression of moral rules. Placed in the con‐ text of the arguments that deal with the transmission of royal power, the ex‐ amples of Darius and of the Polish lord prove that it is only the fortune that determines the consequences of fraud. For instance, the trick that had consisted in making his horse neigh before all the others brought to Darius the Persian empire. However, a similar trick, responsible for the clandestine hammering of nails in the track for the horse race, led to the quartering by four horses of the Polish gentleman who resorted to it. 32 2.3 Political Science: Theory Deprived of Influence on Practice In the view of La Mothe Le Vayer, political actions depend on the unforeseen turn of events not only because their authors are often mediocre, but also be‐ cause they do not rely on any science. This results from the fact that in the field of politics there is no correlation between theory and practice. In this sense, Orontes, La Mothe Le Vayer’s alter ego, takes up the classical argumentation developed by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics. In so doing, he argues that politics is different from arts like painting or from sciences like medicine be‐ cause, in its case, the possession of abstract knowledge does not ensure success in the practical field of action. Those who speak the best about politics and who, consequently, pretend to know the most about it, are the sophists. Nevertheless, if they actually have the opportunity to apply their knowledge and to exert power, they are totally unable to do it. However - and in this respect La Mothe 74 Chapter 2. La Mothe Le Vayer against Political Power and its Practices 33 Ibid., 470. 34 Ibid., 469. 35 See Domenico Taranto, Pirronismo ed assolutismo nella Francia dell’ 600. Studi sul pen‐ siero politico dello scetticismo da Montaigne a Bayle (1580-1697) (Milano: FrancoAngeli, 1994), 117-118. Le Vayer goes further than Aristotle - those who are the most successful in politics are the least able to talk about it. This is proven by their incapacity to transmit their pretended knowledge to their children and to future generations. By deducing ignorance from the inability to speak, the writer consolidates his perception of political science as a simple “routine”, foreign to the “solid prin‐ ciples” and to the “universal principles, which serve as the foundation for sci‐ ences” (“conclusions universelles, qui servent de fondement aux sciences”). 33 Nonetheless, the fact that the rulers’ practice is based on know-how acquired through routine does not have to lead to the conclusion that theory is absent from politics. Theory is well and truly present in politics, but it does not have any influence on practice. The great political theories invented by bright minds are mere amusements. Because of their connections with the speculative world of the ideal, they are so abstract that they cannot be applied to concrete situa‐ tions, irreducibly singular: To what I will answer you, that I do not find it at all strange that so many great men amused themselves sometimes, as we were saying earlier, to form ideas about gov‐ ernments whose prototype can only be found in the sky, and enjoyed themselves through these general reflections, detached from all singularity, and if we were to put it like this, transcending all matter. À quoi je vous répondrai que je ne trouve point étrange que tant de grands hommes se soient divertis quelquefois à se former des idées de gouvernements tels que nous disions tantôt, dont le prototype ne se trouve que dans le Ciel, et se soient entretenus sur ces considérations générales, détachées de toute singularité, et s’il faut ainsi dire, abstraites de toute matière. 34 Consequently, politics is the field where, on the one hand, theory has no practical application and, on the other hand, the action is not based on any theory, which represents the fundamental aspect of science. 35 By highlighting the break be‐ tween political theory and political practice, Orontes reacts against his inter‐ locutor Telamon, Naudé’s spokesperson. Telamon argues in favour of a common opinion during the 17 th century, which defends the existence of political sci‐ 75 2.3 Political Science: Theory Deprived of Influence on Practice 36 On political science in general and the way in which it is understood by Naudé, see Étienne Thuau, Raison d’État et pensée politique à l’époque de Richelieu, 2 nd ed. (Paris: Albin Michel, 2000), 411-413, 322. 37 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue traitant de la politique sceptiquement, 466. 38 Ibid., 472. ence. 36 By means of a parallel between the evolution of knowledge about nature and of knowledge about politics, he expresses his faith in the progress of which the latter is capable: For if the most solidly established sciences still usefully receive every day some re‐ finement, how much more beneficially we can apply ourselves to this one, wherein, just like in astrology, and in other similar ones, the Moderns, through their last ob‐ servations, always have some sort of advantage […] Que si les sciences les plus solidement établies reçoivent encore tous les jours utile‐ ment quelque culture, combien plus avantageusement nous pouvons nous appliquer à celle-ci, en laquelle, aussi bien qu’en l’astrologie, et quelques autres semblables, les Modernes par leurs dernières observations ont toujours quelque sorte d’avantage […] 37 Positioning himself on the side of the Moderns without minimising the contri‐ bution of the Ancients, he argues that the latest discoveries in the field of po‐ litical thought, through which he is likely to allude to the theories about the reason of State, can prefigure future evolutions. In his view, the incapacity of politics to provide certainties that are comparable to those of mathematics does not deprive it of the status of a science. Relying on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, ac‐ cording to which the rigour of mathematical demonstrations is only appropriate to the sciences that are about immaterial objects, Telamon includes politics in the same category of sciences as physics. Despite having a lesser degree of cer‐ tainty because they “do not have this privilege of contemplating their objects exempt from all matter” (“n’ont pas ce privilège de contempler leurs objets ex‐ empts de toute matière”), 38 politics and physics are no less worthy than mathe‐ matics of being considered sciences. Moreover, politics distinguishes itself from other sciences because of its capacity to associate the word with thought: In the second place, I argue in front of you that there is no other science than this one which is based more on reason and good discourse, nor which has more noteworthy and important maxims; its witnesses are so many treatises published under the title of reasons of State, or maxims of State, which could, if nicely gathered and thought about, keep in the field of politics the place of Euclid’s Elements in geometry, or of Aristotle’s eight acroamatic books in physics. 76 Chapter 2. La Mothe Le Vayer against Political Power and its Practices 39 Ibid. 40 Taranto, Pirronismo ed assolutismo nella Francia dell’ 600, 117. 41 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue traitant de la politique sceptiquement, 483. Secondement, je vous soutiens qu’il n’y en a point qui se fonde davantage sur la raison et le bon discours, ni qui ait de plus notables et de plus importantes maximes que celle-ci; témoins tant de traités portant pour titres, raisons d’État ou maximes d’État, lesquels étant recueillis de bonne main et bien digérés, pourraient tenir lieu en la politique de ce que sont les Éléments d’Euclide en la géométrie, ou les huit livres acroamatiques d’Aristote en la physique. 39 In the eyes of Telamon, politics asserts itself in front of other sciences because, by combining rhetoric and thought, it succeeds in presenting solid content in a nice form. By mentioning the generic titles that political treatises are likely to have, he alludes to the compendia of political maxims whose publication was flourishing in his time. Expressions of a reason of State, which in this context is not a synonym of Machiavellianism, but of a way of governing according to rational principles, the maxims that make up these compendia prove that politics can put forward in its favour the logical principles that are specific to sciences. As far as he is concerned, La Mothe Le Vayer refuses to believe that, because of the “practical rationality” (“razionalità pratica”) 40 which is attributed to it, the so-called political science is able to offer suitable solutions for each and every one of the situations that the people in power have to manage. In his view, what pleads against political science pertains to the fact that history, the matter which is the basis for its principles, invalidates the law of cause and effect. During times of war and of peace, “histories” (“les histoires”) provide examples that prove either that the same causes can have different effects, or that different causes can have the same effects. Among the examples that may be edifying in this respect are the two episodes taken from the lives of Hugo of Moncada and of Ferdinando of Gonzaga. Although the two rulers acted differently in similar situations, their actions had the same consequences. Hugo of Moncada managed to defeat his French adversaries by abandoning the whole kingdom of Naples in order to better defend its major town. On the contrary, Ferdinando of Gonzaga succeeded in overcoming the French, but by fighting everywhere against them in order to divide and ruin their armies. 41 When he opposes the possibility to found political science on history, La Mothe Le Vayer reacts against an approach that is illustrated by Naudé in the Bibliographie politique (1642). According to the latter, the importance of history for politics comes from its capacity to nourish prudence. Meant to be the main source of prudence, the experience that politicians can acquire is confined to 77 2.3 Political Science: Theory Deprived of Influence on Practice 42 Gabriel Naudé, La Bibliographie politique du sieur Naudé (Paris: G. de Pélé, 1642), 147. On the relationship between history and prudence according to Naudé, see Guion, Du bon usage de l’histoire, 122-123. 43 Gabriel Naudé, La Bibliographie politique du sieur Naudé, 148. 44 Ibid., 151. On Naudés’s plea for a history that unveils the arcana imperii, see Guion, Du bon usage de l’histoire, 216-217. 45 Gabriel Naudé, La Bibliographie politique du sieur Naudé, 147. 46 Ibid., 148. the narrow limits of their life. Given the unavoidable gaps in human experience, it belongs to history, “which is not restricted by any time and any region, but which includes and encompasses everything that has been made by all nations and in all centuries” (“qui n’est bornée d’aucun temps ni d’aucune région, mais qui comprend et embrasse ce qui s’est fait en toutes les nations et en tous les siècles”), 42 to flesh out the prudence that must underlie political actions. In the view of Naudé, history is worthy of interest more as a “wisdom collected and composed of all the others” (“une sagesse et recueillie et composée de toutes les autres”) than as a “life’s teacher” (“maîtresse de la vie”). 43 Therefore, the histor‐ ians that most deserve to be read by rulers are not those that content themselves with telling what the princes did, but those who “infer the events’ secret causes, who reveal the decisions and who briefly and subtly pass judgement on every‐ thing” (“déduisent les causes secrètes des événements, qui déclarent les conseils, et qui succinctement et subtilement donnent leur jugement de chaque chose”). 44 In other words, in order to be truly profitable, history must give access to the understanding of the causes that trigger political events. The ability of history to provide matter for politics derives from its cyclical structure, which is not affected by the “great inconstancy” (“grande incon‐ stance”) and the “great variety” (“grande variété”) characteristic of “human af‐ fairs” (“choses humaines”). 45 Since, as a general rule, “similar things generate their similar counterparts” (“les choses semblables produisent leurs sembla‐ bles”), “there is no rule more certain for considering the outcome of a situation than to examine the end that the situations which resemble it have had most often in the past […]” (“il n’est point de règle plus assurée pour juger de l’issue d’une chose, que d’examiner quelle fin ont eue le plus souvent par le passé celles qui lui ressemblent […]”) 46 In conclusion, for Naudé, history is not useful be‐ cause, according to a well-known Ciceronian topos, it can be seen as magistra vitae, which has the function of repository of examples and models. Following a tendency inaugurated by the politiques who asserted themselves during the religious wars, Naudé argues that the usefulness of history comes from its ca‐ pacity to unveil the causes, which independently of their possible incompati‐ 78 Chapter 2. La Mothe Le Vayer against Political Power and its Practices 47 On the different perceptions of history in the 17 th century, see “Introduction générale,” in Traités sur l’histoire (1638-1677). La Mothe Le Vayer, Le Moyne, Saint-Réal, Rapin, ed. Gérard Ferreyrolles with the collaboration of Frédéric Charbonneau et al. (Paris: Cham‐ pion, 2013), 80-98. 48 Taranto, Pirronismo ed assolutismo nella Francia dell’ 600, 114-115. 49 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue traitant de la politique sceptiquement, 476. On this fragment, see also Béatrice Guion, Du bon usage de l’histoire, 447-448. bility with ethics and religion, have brought about the victory or the collapse of princes and their States. 47 Unlike Naudé, La Mothe Le Vayer rejects through the voice of Orontes the capacity of history to play the role of empirical foundation for political science. The singularity that is inherent in every event undermines the inference of po‐ litical principles from history. 48 The invalidation of the law of cause and effect proves that the rules deduced from history cannot make predictable the reality over which the rulers exert their power. Because of their general scope, the theories, on which the so-called political science relies, are incapable of solving all the particular cases that they have to face: “I would like to share with you the view that Politics has its general foundations and axioms, were it not for the diversity of times, circumstances and events, which have always something particular and individual that subverts the whole functioning of these general maxims […] ” (“je veux avec vous que la Politique ait ses axiomes et ses fonde‐ ments généraux, si est-ce qu’outre la diversité des temps, des occurrences et des affaires, qui ont toujours quelque chose d’individuel et de singulier, renverse tout l’usage de ces maxims générales […]”) 49 Therefore, in order to be truly ef‐ ficient, political science should possess a rule that would suit every case to which it would have to provide an answer. Besides being impossible, this situation would go against one of the fundamental principles of science, which consists precisely in the ability to explain through a well determined number of laws a great number of phenomena considered as belonging to the same relatively ho‐ mogeneous group. The consequence of the discrepancy between the uniformity of science and the diversity of concrete circumstances, the reflection on the inefficiency of political theories opens the way to an undermining of political science that relies on the sceptical technique of contradictions. 2.4 Political Science face-to-face with Scepticism According to Orontes, political science does not prove its weakness only when it is confronted with the reality that it pretends to grasp, but also with itself. In 79 2.4 Political Science face-to-face with Scepticism 50 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue traitant de la politique sceptiquement, 476. 51 See Taranto, Pirronismo ed assolutismo nella Francia dell’ 600, 118. 52 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue traitant de la politique sceptiquement, p. 480. 53 Ibid. On the sources of this example, see Joseph Acosta, Histoire naturelle et morale des Indes, tant Orientales qu’Occidentales, trans. R. Régnault Cauxois, 2 nd ed. (Paris: M. Orry, 1606), Book V, ch. XX, 231. addition to being unable to solve all the individual cases to which it is applied, political science is also sapped by its own contradictions: “you can also hold as very certain, that it [politics] has none of its reasons of State so certain, that it does not have its counter-reason, nor any of its maxims so well and widely considered that does not have its anti-maxim” (“vous pouvez tenir encore pour assuré qu’elle [la Politique] n’a aucune de ces raisons d’État si certaine qui n’ait sa contre-raison, ni maxime si bien prise et si étendue qui n’ait son anti‐ maxime”). 50 In order to highlight the contradictions that undermine the reason of State, the form taken by the political science of his time, La Mothe Le Vayer relies on the tenth sceptical mode. 51 In spite of its aim to establish political science on rational bases, the reason of State is itself deprived of solid foundations, since it is undermined by inner contradictions. The examples by means of which the writer chooses to illustrate these contradictions concern, among others, the laws used by the political power in order to regulate its own actions or to govern its subjects. For instance, these laws deal with the conquest of new countries or the distribution of punishments and rewards. When approaching the conquest of new territorries, the author starts by telling the current opinion upon it, according to which “It is believed that it is enough to extend the conquests and that the size of the lands of a State is also that of its felicity” (“On croit qu’il n’est que d’étendre ses conquêtes, et que la grandeur des terres d’un État soit encore celle de sa félicité”). 52 In order to show that, despite its diffusion, this opinion is not unanimously acknowl‐ edged, the writer cites, for instance, the case of the Aztec emperor Montezuma, depicted in Joseph Acosta’s Histoire naturelle et morale des Indes, tant Orientales qu’Occidentales. In answer to the question of the Marquis Della Valle, Monte‐ zuma admits that he could have seized a certain province called, at the time, Tlascala. Nevertheless, he argues for his preference not to gain control over it by the fact that it provided him both a means to keep awakened the youth of his country and a container of victims needed for the sacrifices to the gods. 53 Besides that, in the case of punishments and rewards, the common opinion cited by La Mothe Le Vayer holds that their correspondence with the “crimes” or the “services” is “the most powerful support for any type of government” (“le 80 Chapter 2. La Mothe Le Vayer against Political Power and its Practices 54 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue traitant de la politique sceptiquement, 482. 55 La Mothe Le Vayer, De l’Instruction de Monseigneur le Dauphin, 32. 56 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue traitant de la politique sceptiquement, 482. 57 Ibid., 498-506. plus puissant appui de toute sorte de gouvernement”). 54 Inspired by Plato’s theory which bases power on justice, the author takes up this opinion in the treatise written for the education of the prince: “In any case, the princes do not pertain to the divinity that they represent here by anything more than the ex‐ ercise of justice through the distribution of punishments and rewards” (“Quoi‐ qu’il en soit, les princes ne participent en rien tant de cette divinité qu’ils nous représentent ici pas [sic! ], qu’en l’exercice de la justice par la distribution des peines et des récompenses”). 55 Although it seems capable of strenghtening the connections between the rulers and their subjects, distributive justice is not acknowledged and practised everywhere in the world. For instance, “the Ot‐ toman sceptre reached its greatness only by these two means, of punishments and of recognitions or benefactions, both of them extreme and immoderate” (“le sceptre ottoman n’est venu à sa grandeur que par ces deux moyens, des peines et des reconnaissances ou bienfaits, tous deux extrêmes et sans aucune me‐ sure ”). 56 Contrary to the widely spread opinion on the relationship between justice and authority, the Turkish power owes its expansion precisely to the fact that it transcends the elementary rules about the distribution of the punishments and rewards. Deriving from the common place on the sultan’s tyranny, the ar‐ bitrariness that governs the handling of penalties and benefits by the Ottoman leader demonstrates that justice does not always ensure the success of power. Similarly to the principles that are supposed to be shared by the three forms of government, the standards that are specific to a single form of government are not spared from contradictions. Thus, La Mothe Le Vayer uses the sceptical technique of juxtaposing opposing arguments in order to question principles like the hereditary transfer of power, the Salic law, the law of the primogeniture, the presence of the king in battles, or the separation between the spiritual and the secular spheres of life. 57 Additionally, although he avoids calling them as such, the writer is not afraid of dealing with the excesses that can be brought about by the absolute monarchy. According to a widely disseminated view, princes are inculcated with the idea that “since they are above the laws, every‐ thing is allowed to them and they can, following the ancient proverb, civitates ludere, do with their State and everything it contains whatever they like” (“étant au-dessus des lois, tout leur est […] permis, et peuvent, suivant le proverbe an‐ cien, civitates ludere, et faire de leur État, et de tout ce qu’il comprend comme 81 2.4 Political Science face-to-face with Scepticism 58 Ibid., 491. 59 Ibid., 492. 60 See, for example, Jean-Claude Roberti, “L’Image de la Moscovie dans l’opinion française du XVIIe siècle,” in Une infinie brutalité. L’image de la Russie dans la France des XVIe et XVIIe siècles, ed. Michel Mervaud and Jean-Claude Roberti (Paris: Institut d’Études Slaves, 1991), 101-152. 61 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue traitant de la politique sceptiquement, 493. 62 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue sur le sujet la divinité, 385: “Thus Joseph Acosta depicts to us the mandarins who govern China and who hold the people in the religion of the country and who, he says, as far as they are concerned, do not believe in another God than nature, in another life than this one, in another hell than prison, nor in another paradise than that of having the position of mandarin” (“Ainsi Joseph Acosta nous représente les Mandarins qui gouvernent la Chine et contiennent le peuple dans la religion du pays, ne croyant, dit-il, quant à eux, point d’autre Dieu que la Nature, d’autre vie que celle-ci, d’autre enfer que la prison, ni d’autre paradis que d’avoir un office de mandarin”). bon leur semble”). 58 One of the examples that is quoted in order to illustrate this perception of the royal omnipotence concerns the supreme sacrifice to which any of the subjects of the Russian tsar seems ready at his slightest suggestion: “It is told that nowadays a Great Duke of Muscowy said to the first of his subjects that he met in the presence of an English ambassador, show to this stranger what you would like to do for me and this poor man stabbed himself on the spot” (“On conte qu’en nos jours un grand Duc de Moscovie disant au premier rencontré de ses sujets, en présence d’un ambassadeur anglais, montre à cet étranger ce que tu voudrais faire pour moi, ce pauvre homme se poignarda à l’instant”). 59 The suicide committed by a poor anonymous man in order to satisfy a whim of his ruler can be related to the tsar’s tyranny, common place of the works that, at the time, dealt with Russia. 60 Coherent with the practice of contradictions that gives substance to his thought, the author opposes the examples that emphasise the unlimited power of the sovereign to examples that highlight the boundaries containing the power of the monarchs. For this purpose, La Mothe Le Vayer mentions an example about China: “If the king of China, says Herrera, becomes such that his subjects can make complaints against him, he is tried by the great Chancellor of the country, assisted by his Senate” (“Si le roi de la Chine, dit Herrera, se rend tel que ses sujets puissent produire des plaintes contre lui, il est jugé par le grand Colao ou Chancelier du pays, assisté de son Sénat ”). 61 Hence, China is not only the country where the people are governed by means of a religion which is regarded by the ruling elites as a fiction with a practical purpose, 62 but also the country where the people can ask sanctions against the highest representative of these elites, the monarch himself. 82 Chapter 2. La Mothe Le Vayer against Political Power and its Practices 63 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue traitant de la politique sceptiquement, 496. 64 See Adrianna Bakos, “ ‘Qui nescit dissimulare, nescit regnare’: Louis XI and Raison d’État during the Reign of Louis XIII,” Journal of the History of Ideas LII, no 3 (1991): 399-416. 65 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue traitant de la politique sceptiquement, 496. On the sources of this example, see Camille Portio, Histoire des troubles advenus au royaume de Naples (Paris: C. Cramoisy, 1627), Book I, 80. Another example concerns the dissimulation, which is presented as a current practice of power, since it “has been considered so essential for governing well, that our Louis XI, who pushed his authority further than his predecessors, al‐ ways had this word in his mouth, qui nescit dissimulare, nescit regnare” (“on l’a estimée une partie si essentielle pour bien régner que notre Louis onzième, qui mit nos rois hors de page, avait toujours ce quolibet en bouche, qui nescit dis‐ simulare, nescit regnare”). 63 Attributed to a king rehabilitated and transformed into a sage by the étatiste movement, the formula that turns dissimulation into a fundamental condition for efficient government is recovered by the reason of State, which following Machiavelli and Tacitus, argues that political action should not be measured against its morality, but its success. 64 Nonetheless, de‐ spite being apparently considered indispensable to good government, dissimu‐ lation does not always ensure the success of the actions it inspires, as it is shown by a historical episode mentioned by Orontes: “And Camillo Portio notices in his history of Naples that nothing ruined as much the interests of Ferdinand I as the great dissimulation he used, which by making him be seen as a true im‐ postor, turned him and his main ministers into suspects in the eyes of the rest of the people ” (“Et Camillo Portio remarque en son histoire de Naples que rien ne ruina tant les intérêts de Ferdinand premier que la grande dissimulation dont il se servait, laquelle le faisant passer pour un vrai Halopante, l’avait rendu sus‐ pect et ses principaux ministres à tout le reste des hommes”). 65 According to La Mothe Le Vayer, the trap into which Ferdinand I of Naples fell because of his duplicity proves that, sometimes, the more the rulers use deceit, the more they arouse suspicions which cause the failure of their actions. Besides that, La Mothe Le Vayer suggests that the laws used by every political regime in order to govern its subjects are comparable to the theories of the dogmatic philosophers: similar to the dogmatic ideas, each law claims to be superior to all the others. Yet, just like in the case of the dogmatic theories, the prestige to which each law aspires because of the conceit of its inventor is un‐ dermined by the contradictions that oppose it to the other laws: “There has never been a lawmaker who did not believe to have found the finest of Politics, al‐ though each and everyone of them has his particular laws and one allows often 83 2.4 Political Science face-to-face with Scepticism 66 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue traitant de la politique sceptiquement, 490. 67 Ibid., 490-491. 68 Ibid., 508. 69 Ibid., 515. what is strictly defended by the other” (“Il n’y a point eu de législateur qui n’ait cru avoir trouvé le plus fin de la Politique, quoique chacun ait ses lois particu‐ lières, et que l’un permette souvent ce qui est très étroitement défendu par l’autre”). 66 The question of choosing among contradictory ideas, which arises in the case of the philosophical theories, is not relevant for the laws, which are validated by their practical results. For instance, the ancient towns of Athens and Sparta managed to survive despite respecting opposite laws: The legislation applying to children, to the military, to expenses or to marriage were all in Sparta contrary to those of Athens, and of the other towns of Greece, which admired - he [Xenophonus] says - these nice laws, although everyone was attached to their own and subsisted by means of them. L’institution des enfants, les constitutions militaires, les somptuaires, celles du ma‐ riage, y étaient toutes contraires à celles d’Athènes et des autres villes de la Grèce, qui admiraient, dit-il [Xénophon], ces belles lois, quoique chacun s’arrêtât aux siennes particulières, et subsistât par leur moyen. 67 In the end, independently of their pretences, the laws and the politicians possess an authority which contains its own justification: “We do not obey the Prince or the law because they are kind and just, but simply because it is the law, and because he is the Prince” (“Nous n’obéissons pas à la loi ni au Prince parce qu’ils sont bons et justes, mais simplement pour ce qu’elle est loi et qu’il est Prince”). 68 Through a vicious circle, the legitimacy of the power owned by the rulers and their laws derives from the fact that they possess it and exert it. The reflection on the contradictory laws is one of the arguments which leads to the conclusion that “this so-called science of the State, wherein many pretend to be skilled, […] has no thesis […] so unalterable that, after very little thought, cannot be shown to have a counter-thesis, and a maxim entirely opposite or contrary” (“cette prétendue science d’État, dans laquelle beaucoup font tant les suffisants, n’a […] aucune thèse […] si constante, sur laquelle avec une fort petite contention d’esprit on ne forme aisément une antithèse, et une sentence du tout opposée ou contraire”). 69 In the view of Orontes, it is not even necessary to think too deeply in order to go beyond the vanity of its self-proclaimed experts in order to understand that political science is based on precarious theoretical foundations. The multitude of contradictions among its theoretical principles 84 Chapter 2. La Mothe Le Vayer against Political Power and its Practices 70 Ibid. 71 Ibid., 486. “shakes” (“ébranle”) political science as much as the diversity of practical cir‐ cumstances to which it is unable to find a solution. 70 2.5 Politics: A Practice that Does not Seem to be Governed by Science, but by Fortune In order to make the argumentation on the fragility of the foundations under‐ lying political science more convincing, La Mothe Le Vayer focuses on the ex‐ ample of Spain. Despite his claims, he does not write about the Spanish only because at the time they are considered “the greatest statesmen, and the most refined politicians alive” (“les plus grands statistes et les plus raffinés politiques qui vivent”), 71 but also because they are the main political adversaries of the French. Indeed, La Mothe Le Vayer attacks Spanish politics several times, within works that feed on the polemic aroused by the rivalry between the countries of the Most Christian and Most Catholic kings. By studying the case of Spain, Orontes aims at ruining the common opinion, which attributes the extent of the Spanish Empire to the political know-how of the Most Catholic king and his subjects. For this purpose, he highlights the disproportion between the great advantages that have been provided to the Spanish by history and the little advantage that they have actually taken of it. On the one hand, Spain has bene‐ fited from a multitude of favourable circumstances: the great number of foreign countries that it won effortlessly, the fabulous treasures from the Western and Eastern Indies that filled its coffers, the weakness of the main European coun‐ tries that could have thwarted its hegemonic goals. On the other hand, Spain has not benefited from these occasions because it made great mistakes like, for instance: it wasted the treasures that it had seized in wars waged against its own subjects, it oppressed the minds and the bodies of the individuals whom it gov‐ erned, it chased away on the pretext of piety a quarter of its people although it sorely lacked men, it kept the kings in their palaces although it badly needed them at the head of the armies. Hence, the expansion of Spain is not the result of extraordinary skill and foresight in the field of politics, but of the fortune that favours alternately different countries: in brief, whoever will weigh, freely from every prejudice, the politics of the Spanish during the past hundred years, in all the circumstances of the affairs, will be con‐ strained to admit that in the little they achieved, there was more good fortune than 85 2.5 Politics: A Practice that Does not Seem to be Governed by Science, but by Fortune 72 Ibid., 488. good behaviour; although happy success has often contributed to interpret to the advantage of their prudence - as it is usually the custom - what was nothing more than the ordinary result of the unforeseen turn of the States events. bref, qui pèsera, exempte de toute prévention d’esprit, la politique des Espagnols depuis cent ans en çà, dans toutes les circonstances des affaires, il sera contraint d’avouer qu’en ce peu qui leur a réussi, il y a plus eu de bonne fortune que de bonne conduite ; quoique l’heureux succès ait souvent fait interpréter à l’avantage de leur prudence - comme c’est toujours la coutume - ce qui n’était qu’une suite ordinaire des révolutions des États. 72 Against the easy conclusion that deduces success from the qualities of the vic‐ tors, Orontes refuses to establish a connection between the growth of Spain and its political knowledge and capacities. According to him, the empire built by the Spanish is nothing else than the result of the phases of fortune, which succes‐ sively favour the various States. Had it been the true author of its political pros‐ perity, Spain would have known how to profit from the favourable circum‐ stances provided to it by the twists of fate. This means that it would have managed to bring together the “two worlds” in a “single monarchy” and to es‐ tablish an empire much vaster than it actually did. At a more general level, the example of Spain is meant to confirm that, despite the impression given by the political leaders, the fact that they manage to pre‐ serve their power and even to have some triumphs while exerting it comes nei‐ ther from their qualities, nor from their knowledge: And indeed, whoever will analyse the governments of their own time from the nec‐ essary perspective and will know how to gain insight into their true activities; who‐ ever will observe the extent to which fate and fortune contribute to it; how annoying is the expectation of success and of the periodic rotation of the affairs; how all these State interests and this political nonsense are fruitless things for a mind who knows solid things; what are and how weak are the springs that make function these great State machines; that one, without doubt, will feel more pity than envy towards those whom he will see in such a piteous job, if the splendour and the pomp that accompany it do not dazzle his judgement. Et à la vérité, qui considérera de l’œil qu’il faut les gouvernements du temps auquel il vit, et en saura pénétrer les mouvements véritables ; qui remarquera combien le sort et la fortune y ont de part ; combien est ennuyeuse l’attente du succès, et de la révo‐ lution périodique des affaires ; combien tous ces intérêts d’État et ces chansons po‐ 86 Chapter 2. La Mothe Le Vayer against Political Power and its Practices 73 Ibid., 468. 74 Ibid., 488. litiques sont choses vaines à un esprit qui connaît les choses solides ; quels et combien faibles sont les ressorts qui font agir ces grandes machines des États ; celui-là, sans doute, sera plus touché de pitié que d’envie sur ceux qu’il verra dans un si misérable emploi, si l’éclat et la pompe qui l’accompagnent ne lui éblouissent le jugement. 73 A subtle look, capable of going beyond the appearances, will not fail to grasp the discrepancy between the politicians’ pretences and their true power. In spite of their claims to be in control of the political stage thanks to their science and skills, the leaders have a role that consists greatly in the compliance with fortune. Certainly, they pretend to possess the knowledge that is necessary for ruling the country as if it were a mechanism which functions according to constant laws. However, the machinery of the State relies on cogwheels that could not be more fragile and that are far from ensuring it regular and predictable activity. The supposed science behind the presumptuous vocabulary used by the people in power (State interests) is mostly a deceit, which aims at concealing that the success or the failure of political actions is, in fact, determined by fortune. Furthermore, the precariousness that does not spare even the cogwheels es‐ sential to the functioning of the State is in inverse proportion to the influence of the so-called political machineries on men’s lives. The State mechanisms are not undermined only from the interior, by their weaknesses, but also from the exterior, by the instability of the people’s attachment to them, which is most often dependent on obscure reasons: “And yet it is certain that there is nothing so weak as the main springs that give the vital impulse to these great machines and there is nothing so foolish as the connections that keep the peoples by respect and ignorance connected to their destinies” (“Et cependant il est certain qu’il n’y a rien si faible que les principaux ressorts qui donnent le branle à ces grandes machines, et rien de si imbécile que les liens qui tiennent les peuples par respect et par ignorance attachés à leurs destinées”). 74 By bringing out the people’s unpredictable character, the letter CXL. Du Gouvernement politique shows the pointlessness of the political theories that seek to govern its behav‐ iour: This multitude of people who form it [the people] are like the ears of wheat, which only bend as long as they are driven by the winds’ inconstancy that makes them lean alternately towards one or the other side. And the political reasons, which can be used in this respect, resemble these transient colours that change at the slightest movement. 87 2.5 Politics: A Practice that Does not Seem to be Governed by Science, but by Fortune 75 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre CXL. Du Gouvernement politique, in Œuvres, VII/ II, 152. 76 Ibid., 153. Cette multitude d’hommes qui le [peuple] composent, sont comme des épis de blé, qui n’ont d’inclination, qu’autant que l’inconstance des vents les porte, et les fait pencher tantôt d’un côté, tantôt de l’autre. Et les raisons politiques, qu’on peut employer là-dessus, ressemblent à ces couleurs passagères, qui changent par le moindre mouve‐ ment. 75 Because of their random nature, the people’s reactions are impossible to sys‐ tematise and to control through the mechanisms of political science. In order to be truly efficient, political theories should accomplish an impossible task, which would consist in being capable to anticipate and to provide a solution to the infinite number of elements that can provoke the people’s responses to a par‐ ticular situation. In addition to their inability to preserve the power, political theories are also weakened by their failure to establish it. Indeed, the birth of a new political regime is independent from the know-how that may be put into practice by its founders: I am also asking you to consider as certain that where the matter is not entirely pre‐ pared to receive the political forms, neither the most subtle minds, nor the most ac‐ complished ones in the management of the State could ever introduce them; while, on the contrary, they become established by themselves and without difficulty when everything is ready to receive them. Je vous prie de tenir encore pour constant, qu’où la matière n’est pas entièrement bien disposée à recevoir les formes politiques, les plus subtils esprits, ni les plus consommés au maniement des États, ne les y pourront jamais introduire ; comme au contraire elles s’y établissent d’elles-mêmes et sans peine, quand tout est préparé à les recevoir. 76 As capable as they may be of applying a science that combines intelligence with experience, politicians are not comparable to the natural philosophers who, in their laboratories, succeed in making the “matter” (“matière”) yield to their de‐ signs. The political “matter” that the rulers are supposed to shape obeys its own rules, which do not let themselves be controlled by their pretended knowledge. However rare and worthy of esteem it may be, the rulers’ ability to join a the‐ oretical and a practical science is likely to remain without any effect if it is devoid of the complicity of fortune: “Indeed, there can be persons like Pericles, whom philosophy deprives neither of the talent, nor of the skill to manage political affairs well. But after all, fortune must contribute a lot, or otherwise all the lights they acquired will not be at all useful to them” (“À la vérité, il se peut trouver 88 Chapter 2. La Mothe Le Vayer against Political Power and its Practices 77 Ibid., 151-152. 78 Ibid., 150-151. N. B. In italics in the original text. 79 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue traitant de la politique sceptiquement, 476. des personnes, telles que Périclès, à qui la philosophie n’ôte pas le talent, ni l’industrie de bien manier les affaires politiques. Mais après tout, il faut que la fortune y contribue beaucoup du sien, autrement toutes leurs lumières acquises ne leur serviront guère”). 77 Despite embodying Plato’s ideal, in the absence of a combination of favourable circumstances, the philosopher-king does not possess true power over the course of political events. The lack of correlation between the possible knowledge of politics and the outcome of the activities it is said to underlie seems to make La Mothe Le Vayer share the opinion attributed to Ur‐ bain VIII, according to which “Che a dominare non bisognava altrimente tanto ingegno, perche il mondo si governa in certa maniera da se stesso”. 78 In brief, the results of political affairs seem to be to a large extent independent from the science that may be used by the rulers who initiate them. 2.6 The Pyrrhonian Contradictions: Annihilating Instrument against Political Science? The discredit of the theoretical knowledge that is supposed to underlie the ac‐ tions of the people in power is mostly the consequence of a Pyrrhonian ap‐ proach: La Mothe Le Vayer alias Orontes justifies his apparent lack of interest in politics by following the invitation of Telamon, who knowing his propensity for Pyrrhonism, asks him to share with him the results of his reflections that consist in “sceptically balancing the most important topics of this science of government” (“mettre à la balance sceptique les plus importants articles de cette science du gouvernement”). 79 In so doing, broadly speaking, Orontes cites a series of examples that are meant to give substance to the dual structure of his answer. For instance, these examples concern the hereditary transmission of power, which lies at the foundation of the French monarchy: It is greatly justified that we prefer the legitimate succession of our kings over the elections that are being practised elsewhere, not only because of the excellence of the royal blood but also because in order to avoid falling into the disorders of the inter‐ regnums and into the wrathful factions that are almost unavoidable during these pe‐ riodic interruptions of the sovereign power; Summus nempe locus nulla arte non petitus. 89 2.6 The Pyrrhonian Contradictions: Annihilating Instrument against Political Science? 80 Ibid., 498-499. Aristotle nevertheless thinks that the Carthaginians were wiser than the Spartans for having given themselves kings by election, instead of receiving them by birth, which he disapproves of in enough places, like when he notices that all the Scythian kings were nothing else than effeminate individuals, διὰ τὸ γένος, because of a vice con‐ nected to their blood. Pliny shows us the islanders of Taprobane, who were dethroning their elected king, as soon as he had descendants, for fear that he would plan to turn his crown into a hereditary one; which is a thought so natural that Aristotle guarantees that unless it has a heroic virtue, the human spirit cannot dismiss it. Machiavelli no‐ tices in this respect che tutti gli Imperatori che succederono al’imperio per heredità, eccetto Tito, furono cattivi, quelli che per adoptione, furono tutti buoni, comme furono quei cinque da Nerva a Marco. E come l’Imperio caddè nelli heredi, ei ritornò nella sua rovina. In consequence of such maxims, Pliny the Younger did not hesitate to utter in front of Trajan this daring aphorism, Imperaturus omnibus, elegi debet ex omnibus. Nous préférons avec grande raison la succession légitime de nos rois aux élections qui se pratiquent ailleurs, tant à cause de l’excellence du sang royal, que pour ne tomber aux confusions des interrègnes, et aux furieuses partialités qui sont quasi inévitables dans ces vacances périodiques du commandement souverain; Summus nempe locus nulla arte non petitus. Aristote pourtant trouve que ceux de Carthage étaient plus avisés que les Spartiates de s’être donnés des rois par élection, au lieu de les recevoir par leur naissance, qu’il improuve en assez de lieux, comme quand il observe que tous les rois des Scythes n’étaient que des efféminés, διὰ τὸ γένος , par un vice attaché à leur race. Pline nous fait voir les insulaires de Taprobane, qui déposaient leur roi électif dès sitôt qu’il avait lignée, de peur qu’il songeât à rendre sa couronne héréditaire; qui est une pensée si naturelle qu’Aristote assure qu’à moins d’une vertu héroïque l’esprit humain ne la peut pas congédier. Machiavel observe là-dessus, che tutti gli Imperatori che succe‐ derono al’imperio per heredità, eccetto Tito, furono cattivi, quelli che per adoptione, fu‐ rono tutti buoni, comme furono quei cinque da Nerva a Marco. E come l’Imperio caddè nelli heredi, ei ritornò nella sua rovina. Sur quoi Pline le Jeune ne fit pas difficulté, en conséquence de semblables maximes, de prononcer devant Trajan cette hardie sen‐ tence, Imperaturus omnibus, elegi debet ex omnibus.  80 Using an argument familiar to his contemporary readers, Orontes’ starting point for the discussion of the hereditary power is its practice adopted in the France of his time. Taking advantage of the prestige enjoyed by this type of power transfer, he contents himself with briefly arguing for it: in addition to the su‐ periority of the monarchical blood, he mentions a pragmatic argument, which 90 Chapter 2. La Mothe Le Vayer against Political Power and its Practices 81 Ibid., 501. 82 Ibid., 483. stresses the danger springing from the vacuum of power caused by the uncer‐ tainty about the succession to the throne. The weight carried at his time by the idea of the hereditary power is counterbalanced by an accumulation of examples in favour of the elective monarchy, which are taken from the Ancients as well as from the Moderns. In so doing, La Mothe Le Vayer is not afraid of citing, in addition to Aristotle and Pliny, whose authority was unquestionable, the much debated Machiavelli. However, the potentially controversial excerpt from the Discourses on the First Decade of Livy by the Italian political philosopher is di‐ minished by its insertion into a series of examples that seem to play more the role of historical testimony to the elective monarchy. Striking especially because of their number, these examples seem to suggest at first glance that the elective monarchy is at least as worthy of respect as the hereditary monarchy, if not even preferable to it. Should this mass of examples be a plea for a resolute behaviour similar to that of the islanders who deposed their ruler as soon as he was in the position to try to turn his power into a hereditary one? If, at a global level, La Mothe Le Vayer were arguing for the antitheses of the theses representing the opinion usually admitted at his time, in some cases his argumentation would only contribute to the strengthening of a kind of politics that is indeed to blame for the people’s griefs. For instance, in the case of the bond between the people and their king, he opposes the examples of Caligula and Tiberius to the view generally held by his contemporaries, according to which “It seems that a prince cannot do anything better than to make himself the most agreeable he can to his subjects ” (“Il semble qu’un prince ne puisse mieux faire que de se rendre le plus qu’il peut agréable à ses sujets”). 81 Thus, he uses quotations from Suetonius in order to remind his readers that Caligula strove to enhance the frightening expression of his features. Moreover, both Caligula and Tiberius have chosen mottos that stated their indifference to the hatred of people, provided that they did not object to their orders. Two general remarks may provide useful information for the understanding of the contradicting cases that underlie La Mothe Le Vayer’s writing. The first one concludes a series of examples about the behaviour to adopt towards war enemies: “The histories supply during times of peace and war countless such antitheses” (“Les histoires fournissent en temps de paix et en temps de guerre de telles antithèses sans nombre”). 82 Consequently, the infinite reservoir of ex‐ amples, which is history, seems to support the structure of Orontes’ argumen‐ tation, based on the opposition thesis-antithesis. The second remark ends a 91 2.6 The Pyrrhonian Contradictions: Annihilating Instrument against Political Science? 83 Ibid., 495. 84 Cavaillé, Dis/ simulations, 186. 85 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue traitant de la politique sceptiquement, 486. 86 Ibid., 504-505. series of examples running counter to the idea of the kings’ omnipotence: “Here are maxims that are quite different from the first ones and that I only told you - also acknowledging the extravagance of most of them - only because they could serve as the antitheses of the others” (“Voilà des maximes bien différentes des premières, et que je ne vous ai rapportées - reconnaissant aussi l’extravan‐ gance de la plupart - que pour servir d’antithèse aux autres”). 83 Therefore, in order to give substance to a pattern relying on contradictory arguments, La Mothe Le Vayer admits opposing to the prevalent idea among his contempora‐ ries views that can, sometimes, seem odd. The “audaciousness” (“audace”) of some of the opinions cited by La Mothe Le Vayer does not aim at discrediting the “pretended political science” (“la prétendue science politique”), the “practices of its actors” (“les pratiques des acteurs politiques”) and the “politics itself under all its forms” (“la chose politique elle-même sous toutes ses forms”), 84 but at fleshing out the “paradoxes” to which the writer is “no stranger” (“suivant mon naturel qui ne s’étrange pas des paradoxes”). 85 The writer’s attachment to par‐ adoxes derives from what, to his mind, represents their capacity to contribute to his global Pyrrhonian purpose. Generally speaking, as it has been previously shown, what may draw La Mothe Le Vayer to the “paradoxical opinions” is their ability to astonish the readers by contradicting the dominant opinions of the time. In so doing, he uses the excessive strangeness of some of the opinions that he cites in order to counterbalance the strength of the opinions usually held by his contemporaries. Far from advocating these excessive views, among which some, like the one about the kings’ intelligence and knowledge, may seem ut‐ terly outrageous, 86 he uses them in order to reach a state of equilibrium between two extreme views of the same question. This state of equilibrium materialises in the distance from the common opinions, which leads to questioning the ab‐ solute truth that they claim to possess. In the case of politics, the use of paradox, which comes on top of the suspen‐ sion of judgement resulting from the juxtaposition of contradictory opinions on the same topic, does not try to entirely deny the validity of political science, but 92 Chapter 2. La Mothe Le Vayer against Political Power and its Practices 87 Therefore, in my opinion, it cannot be said that La Mothe Le Vayer’s scepticism is the “negation of all objectivity and rationality of political science” (“négation de toute ob‐ jectivité et rationalité de la science politique”), as holds Gouverneur in Prudence et sub‐ version libertines, 442. On the “rejection of the rejection of political science”, which is the antithesis of the “rejection of political science”, see Daniel Brunstetter, “La Mothe Le Vayer and Political Skepticism”, in Skepticism and Political Thought in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, 43. 88 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue traitant de la politique sceptiquement, 472. See also Robert Damien, “Naudé chez La Mothe Le Vayer: le cas du personnage de Telamon ou le conseil entre douceur et erudition,” in Libertinage et philosophie au XVIIe siècle, no. 2. La Mothe Le Vayer et Naudé, 91-104. 89 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue traitant de la politique sceptiquement, 525. 90 See Brunstetter, “La Mothe Le Vayer and Political Skepticism,” 49. to undermine the arrogance of its followers. 87 This presumptuous view of politics finds a passionate defender in Telamon, who at the beginning of the dialogue does not hesitate to call out his interlocutor on his factitious reproaches to po‐ litical science: “For how can you, without flawed reasoning, accuse of vanity a science, which can be called the first and the noblest and the most profitable of all, thanks to its utility, which stretches over so many peoples that it makes live happily and teaches how to govern themselves” (“Car comment pouvez-vous sans cavillation accuser de vanité une science, laquelle par son utilité, qui s’étend sur tant de peuples qu’elle apprend à gouverner et fait vivre heureusement, peut être nommée la première, la plus noble et la plus profitable de toutes”). 88 Reacting against this pedestal on which political science is placed, Orontes alias La Mothe Le Vayer brings out its weaknesses, in an attempt to mitigate the confidence that it is given. Having as background the Pyrrhonian suspension of judgement about the capacities of political science to control the world, Orontes’ conclusion to his dialogue with Telamon does not exclude the possibility of acquiring a certain knowledge of politics: “Let us content ourselves, if we are forced to it, to witness, instead of what the others profess to have as certain sciences, to posess some light suspicions according to the reach of our humanity” (“Contentons-nous de ce dont les autres font profession d’avoir des sciences certaines, de témoigner, si nous y sommes contraints, d’en posséder quelques légères suspicions selon la portée de notre humanité”). 89 The “tamer political science” that relies on “light suspicions” holds the middle ground between the initial opinion of Telamon, who argued for the supremacy of politics over all the other sciences and its total disparagement by Orontes. 90 Having their meaning further moderated by the attribute “light”, the “suspicions”, which are partly related to uncertainty, refer to a form of knowledge that does not seek to attain the certainty of the dogmatics, but the plausible of the new Academy. Resulting from the gap between the complexity of the world and the capacities of the 93 2.6 The Pyrrhonian Contradictions: Annihilating Instrument against Political Science? 91 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue traitant de la politique sceptiquement, 491. 92 Brunstetter, “La Mothe Le Vayer and Political Skepticism”, 47. Here and in the subse‐ quent analyses of the eulogy of the king, my argumentation partly follows Brunstetter, 46-48. In so doing, my point goes against the idea of the “irony” (“l’ironie”) of the eulogy of Louis XIII, expressed by Cavaillé in Dis/ simulations, 191-193. 93 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue traitant de la politique sceptiquement, 491. human mind, the “suspicions” that, according to Orontes, are the only ones within the reach of the people, allude to a science that possesses only a reason‐ able grasp of political phenomena. The practice of this science that limits its scope to a plausible knowledge of the political world leads Orontes to approving up to a certain degree of the monarchy of his time. Certainly, this approval does not have the hyperbolic dimensions of his eulogy to the prince: But since we are in a monarchical State and that our happiness allows us to live under the greatest king that has ever handled the French sceptre, from whose only youth we can already draw enough heroic evidences for providing to posterity the figure of one of the greatest monarchs of the world, […] Mais puisque nous sommes en un État monarchique, et que notre bonheur veut que nous y vivions sous le plus grand roi qui ait jamais manié le sceptre français, de la seule jeunesse duquel on peut déjà tirer assez de traits héroïques pour en donner à la postérité la figure d’un des plus grands monarques du monde, […] 91 Despite the obvious exaggeration that underlies it and that may be seen as a concession to the conventions regulating its genre, this eulogy may be “more than mere flattery”, 92 since it also contains one of the pragmatic reasons that prompts La Mothe Le Vayer to accomplish it: “Which I will do [talking about royalty in his sceptical way] all the more gladly since having such a kind and just prince, we can talk freely about this topic and without the fear of a sinister interpretation ” (“Ce que je ferai d’autant plus volontiers qu’ayant un si bon et si juste prince, on peut parler librement sur ce sujet, et sans crainte d’aucune sinistre interprétation”). 93 In addition to justifying the eulogy of the king, the toleration may also be one of the causes that encourages the writer to assent to a certain degree to the political regime of his time. Hence, although it has in the background the indifference that is specific to the submission of the Pyrrhonian philosopher to the political regime under which he lives, his relative acceptance of the monarchical government also relies on some precise arguments, like the toleration of a discourse that does not hesitate to bring out the weaknesses and the failures of politics. Not entirely in tune with the hyperbolic eulogy of the king, La Mothe Le Vayer agrees to the monarchy of his time in a moderate way, 94 Chapter 2. La Mothe Le Vayer against Political Power and its Practices which results from his perception of political science as being based on plausible arguments. In so doing, he does not take into account only the limitations of his capacities for understanding the political world, but also the shortcomings from which the monarchy, just like the other political regimes, is not safe. 95 2.6 The Pyrrhonian Contradictions: Annihilating Instrument against Political Science? 1 La Mothe Le Vayer, La Politique du Prince, in Oeuvres, I/ II, 300: “Since the well-being of every individual and of the families depends absolutely on that of the State which in‐ cludes them, it should not be surprising that our natural inclination carries us towards the latter and makes us wish for it. The price and the dignity of politics are thus made obvious. For since all our happiness has nothing solid and cannot subsist in the absence of that of the State, we could not think highly enough of a science which teaches us to make it thrive by providing us with the rules of its government. Additionally it has this other advantage over all the other professions that they cannot fulfill their functions without its help; theology itself, which seems to hold the first rank among them needs to rely the peace of its contem‐ plations on the authority of the political laws”. (“Or le bien de chaque particulier, et celui des familles, dépendant absolument de celui de l’État qui comprend les deux autres, il ne faut pas s’étonner si notre pente naturelle nous porte vers ce dernier, et nous le fait désirer. Le prix, et la dignité de la politique, sont rendus manifestes par là. Car puisque toute notre félicité n’a rien de solide, et ne peut subsister sans celle de l’État, on ne saurait trop estimer une science qui nous apprend à le faire prospérer, en nous donnant les règles de sa conduite. Elle a d’ailleurs cet avantage sur toutes les autres professions, que leurs fonctions ne se peuvent faire sans son aide; la théologie même, qui semble tenir le premier rang entre elles, ayant besoin d’appuyer le repos de ses contemplations sur l’autorité des lois politiques”). 2 On politics as the “most architectonic science”, see Dorothea Frede, “The political char‐ acter of Aristotle’s ethics,” in The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics, ed. Mar‐ guerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée (Cambridge University Press, 2013), 14. Chapter 3. The Political Science Taught by La Mothe Le Vayer 3.1 Politics, a Fundamentally Practical Science From a typically Aristotelian perspective, La Mothe Le Vayer highlights the su‐ periority of politics over the other sciences. Starting from Aristotle’s topos on people’s natural sociability, La Mothe Le Vayer presents politics as the science which is the most capable of ensuring the general good that supports the par‐ ticular well-being of the individuals, of their families and of the other arts and sciences. 1 Since it is the foundation of the different organisational structures that govern human lives, politics underlies an architecture-like structure. 2 Consequently, the common good is the responsibility of the State, which is the subject of politics. The importance gained by the State, understood as a power which is exerted over a population and a territory geographically de‐ 3 Furetière, Dictionnaire universel, vol. 2, first entry “State” (“État”): “Empire, kingdom, provinces or area of country which are under the same rule” (“empire, royaume, prov‐ inces, ou étendue de pays qui sont sous une même domination”). 4 La Mothe Le Vayer, La Politique du Prince, 300. 5 On the politiques, see William Church, Richelieu and Reason of State (Princeton Univer‐ sity Press, 1972), 50-54. On the étatistes, see Étienne Thuau, Raison d’État et pensée politique à l’époque de Richelieu, 166-168. 6 La Mothe Le Vayer, La Politique du Prince, 301. 7 See Isabelle Flandrois, L’Institution du Prince au début du XVIIe siècle (Paris: PUF, 1992), 101. 8 La Mothe Le Vayer, La Politique du Prince, 330. 9 Ibid. 10 See Senellart, Les Arts de gouverner, 219. limited, 3 reveals the painful heritage left by the religious wars: “Indeed, there is neither science nor art which does not perish in the disorders of the State and religion itself needs it to survive in order to be able to preserve its altars” (“En effet, il n’y a art ni science qui ne périssent dans les désordres d’un État, et la religion même a besoin qu’il subsiste pour la conservation des autels”). 4 By em‐ phasising the connection between the State and the common good, La Mothe Le Vayer shows his agreement with the thought of the étatistes who, by con‐ tinuing with the direction developed by the politiques during the religious wars, submits religion to the political power in the case of every secular matter. 5 Given its influence over the good of the whole community, politics concerns everyone. Nevertheless, the knowledge of the science of politics is of particular interest to the king, who is supposed to rely on it the practice of his “job” (“mé‐ tier”). 6 Therefore, kingship is not only a first-rank status within society, but also a profession which, in order to be well practised, requires the acquisition of specific knowledge. 7 Beyond any doubt, there is a difference of degree between the job of a king and the job of the slightest craftsman. The king is all the more under the obligation to acquire the science that will enable him to fulfil his function well since even the most insignificant craftsman has to apply himself to learning his job. 8 This means that the king does not have to gain the knowl‐ edge of politics only in order to successfully perform his duty, but also in order to set an example for his people and to avoid their contempt. Since “everybody models himself on the example of his prince” (“chacun se moule sur l’exemple de son prince”), 9 the science that underlies the sovereign’s actions is bound to encourage his subjects to rigorously prepare themselves for their profession. Because of the key role he holds within a country governed according to the rules of a monarchical regime and following the medieval tradition of the “mir‐ rors for princes” literature, the prince is supposed to embody the “very principle of exemplarity” (“principe même de l’exemplarité”). 10 The knowledge of politics 97 3.1 Politics, a Fundamentally Practical Science 11 La Mothe Le Vayer, La Politique du Prince, 331. See also Machiavelli, “XIX. How Con‐ tempt and Hatred should be avoided,” in The Prince, ed. Quentin Skinner and Russell Price (Cambridge University Press, 1988). On the importance of the king’s reputation in the works directed against Machiavelli, see Robert Bireley, The Counter-Reformation Prince. Anti-Machiavellianism or Catholic Statecraft in Early Modern Europe (Chapel Hill, London: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), 223-224. 12 La Mothe Le Vayer, L’Oeconomique du Prince, in Œuvres, I/ II, 287-288. See Michel Fou‐ cault, “Lecture from 1 February 1978,” in Security, territory, population. Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-1978, ed. Michel Senellart, trans. Graham Burchell (London : Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) ; and my article “L’institution du prince dans la vision lib‐ ertine de La Mothe Le Vayer: l’opinion personnelle en marge de la tradition et de la pensée officielle,” in Eidôlon, n o 101. Actes du colloque Le Pouvoir et ses écritures, ed. Denis Lopez (Presses Universitaires de Bordeaux, 2012), 50-52. 13 La Mothe Le Vayer, La Morale du Prince, in Œuvres, I/ II, 239. See also C. D. C. Reeve, “Beginning and Ending with Eudaimonia,” in The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, ed. Ronald Polanski (Cambridge University Press, 2014), 14-33. does not allow the prince only to carry out his role model, but also to take care of his reputation. A recurrent theme of the political thought that appears, for instance, in both Machiavelli’s Prince and the writings directed against it, is that the concern for the king’s reputation is one of the elements which can prevent a civil war. 11 Nonetheless, in conformity with the tradition of the “mirrors for princes”, before starting to study real politics, the future king is expected to familiarise himself with ethics and economics. In order to learn how to govern his kingdom, the prince has to start by learning how to govern himself, which pertains to the field of ethics, and to govern both his family and his estate, which pertains to the field of economics. The “upward continuity” specific to the tripartite division of the sciences included in the education of the prince correlates with a “down‐ ward continuity”. Thanks to these two types of continuity, within a well-gov‐ erned State, the individuals know how to conduct themselves and the family fathers know how to govern their family and their properties. 12 Despite complying with the distribution and the hierarchy of the types of knowledge recommended for the prince, La Mothe Le Vayer deals more with ethics than with economy, which he mentions briefly. In terms that are remi‐ niscent of the Aristotelian ethics, which emphasises the quest for the eudaimonia and brings out the connection between reason and human action, the author defines ethics as the science which moderates our actions through reason and aims at “human bliss” (“félicité humaine”). 13 The ethics that, according to La Mothe Le Vayer, must be included in the royal education is centred on the ac‐ quisition of a virtue, which in the wake of Thomas Aquinas, represents “a habit, 98 Chapter 3. The Political Science Taught by La Mothe Le Vayer 14 La Mothe Le Vayer, La Morale du Prince, in Œuvres, I/ II, 264. See also St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Ia-IIae, q. 55. 15 See Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, vol. I. The Renais‐ sance (Cambridge University Press, 1978), 126-128. 16 La Mothe Le Vayer, De l’Instruction de Monseigneur le Dauphin, 38. 17 Ibid., 44, 53. 18 Richelieu, Testament politique, ed. Françoise Hildesheimer (Société de l’Histoire de France, 1995), 258. 19 La Mothe Le Vayer, La Morale du Prince, 260-261. On anger in Seneca, see David Konstan, “Senecan Emotions,” in The Cambridge Com‐ panion to Seneca, ed. Shadi Bartsch and Alessandro Schiesaro (Cambridge University Press, 2015), 176-179. a constant disposition that makes us act in accordance with reason” (“une hab‐ itude, ou une disposition constante, qui nous fait agir selon la raison”). 14 Besides the four cardinal virtues (“prudence, justice, force, tempérance”), the monarch is supposed to display virtues like liberality and clemency, which fol‐ lowing the humanistic tradition, are peculiar to princes. 15 In order to be worthy of its name, liberality must stick to an equilibrium, which consists in offering gifts by taking into account the “condition of the one who makes them” (“la condition de celui qui les fait”), the “quality of the service acknowledged” (“la qualité du service qu’on veut reconnaître ”) and the “status of the person who did it” (“l’état de celui qui l’a rendu”). 16 Intended to be halfway between “too great leniency” (“l’indulgence trop grande”) and “too great severity” (“la trop grande sévérité”), clemency turns into a “misdeed” (“crime”) when it ends up by “no longer punishing the offences that lead to the destruction of civil life” (“ne pas punir les fautes qui vont à la destruction de la société civile”). 17 When he warns the prince against the dangers associated with the leniency that forgives the offences against the State, the author is obviously close to Cardinal Richelieu, according to whom “one could not commit a greater crime against the public interests than by being lenient towards those who infringe them” (“on ne sçauroit faire un plus grand crime contre les intérêts publics qu’en se rendant indulgent envers ceux qui les violent”). 18 Additionally, La Mothe Le Vayer argues that, just like there are virtues to cultivate, there are passions to avoid, among which, following a tradition that dates back to Seneca’s De Ira, the most dan‐ gerous one is anger. 19 In the view of La Mothe Le Vayer, the education that enables the prince to learn politics is essentially pragmatic. The strong practical dimension of the royal education is emphasised by sciences like physics, geography, rhetoric and logic, which are meant to accompany the teaching of politics. By allowing the future king to achieve the “concrete observation” (“observation concrète”) of a 99 3.1 Politics, a Fundamentally Practical Science 20 Salazar, ‘La Divine Sceptique,’ 41-42. 21 La Mothe Le Vayer, De l’Instruction de Monseigneur le Dauphin, 165. 22 Ibid., 169-171. 23 Ibid.,165. 24 Salazar, ‘La Divine Sceptique,’ 43-44. 25 La Mothe Le Vayer, La Politique du Prince, 304. See also Dorothea Frede, “The political character of Aristotle’s Ethics,” 18. nature whose “abstract comprehension” (“compréhension abstraite”) is provided by physics, geography familiarises him with the place of his actio.  20 Additionally, La Mothe Le Vayer considers the “liberal arts” especially from the perspective of the direct influence that they may have over the government of the country. For instance, rhetoric and logic are worthier of being part of the royal education than the Latin grammar. Contrary to the “unworthiness of so many grammatical questions” (“la bassesse de tant de questions grammati‐ cales ”), 21 rhetoric, assisted by logic, allows the monarch to have a real action on his people. Playing a role that consists in strengthening the prince’s natural abilities, logic trains him to speak relevantly and to avoid the wrong rea‐ soning. 22 “Faculty so royal, that it allows those who possess it to exert a sovereign command over the people” (“Faculté si royale, qu’elle donne le commandement souverain parmi les hommes, à ceux qui la possèdent ”), 23 rhetoric plays the “role of a substitute for action” (“le rôle d’un substitut à l’action”). 24 The nice speaking taught by rhetoric replaces the violence of the political action and enables those who know how to use it either to gain or to preserve power. Concerning politics, in order to prove its practical character, La Mothe Le Vayer relies on classical arguments of political thought, which he probably bor‐ rows from the Nicomachean Ethics. Politics is different from the other “arts and sciences” like medicine and painting because the knowledge of its fundamental axioms does not necessarily guarantee the success of their application. Hence, on the one hand, the father is incapable of transmitting to his son his political know-how. On the other hand, the skill in talking eloquently about the different aspects that are related to politics - a possible reference to the sophists - does not always materialise in a good government of the State. 25 This leads to the conclusion that, in the case of politics, theoretical knowledge does not always exert an influence over practice. The pragmatic dimension of the political education means that the prince must learn how to govern his country by relying on the individual cases, which are discussed every day in the “State Councils” (“Conseils d’État”). Naturally, the practical learning of politics does not exclude a certain initiation into the theoretical tools that consist in the “arguments of politics” (“les raisonnements 100 Chapter 3. The Political Science Taught by La Mothe Le Vayer 26 La Mothe Le Vayer, La Politique du Prince, 305. 27 Ibid. 28 On the principles of the Erasmian education, see Flandrois, L’Institution du Prince dans la première moitié du XVIIe siècle, 63-64. 29 See Salazar, ‘La Divine Sceptique,’ 44. On the distinction between the judicial astrology and astronomy, see La Mothe Le Vayer, De l’Instruction de Monseigneur de Dauphin, 272-274. 30 Salazar, ‘La Divine Sceptique’, 45. de la politique”) and “the maxims which are specific to it” (“les maximes qui lui sont propres”). 26 In spite of seeking to achieve a certain combination between theory and practice, the education of the future prince must, according to La Mothe Le Vayer, favour the second one. It is by witnessing the way in which political decisions are taken daily that “the greatness of his genius [the prince’s] will complete its improvement” (“la grandeur de son génie [du prince] achèvera de se perfectionner”). 27 In this respect, La Mothe Le Vayer seems to be influenced by one of the essential precepts of the Erasmian education, following which the individual is equipped by nature with capacities whose fulfilment depends on education. 28 3.2 The Magical Arts, Pseudo-Sciences Unworthy of Study In spite of the emphasis that he lays on the pragmatic aspect of the royal edu‐ cation, La Mothe Le Vayer does not advise the prince to apply himself to the study of all the sciences that claim to have practical effects. In so doing, he refers especially to the three magical arts, namely astrology, chemistry - which cor‐ responds to what we call today alchemy - and magic. In his view, they are nothing else than dangerous impostures, which are far from being able to keep their promises that consist in allowing the sovereign to act effortlessly on na‐ ture. 29 Astrology, which is to be clearly distinguished from astronomy, lures by promising a vitiated power, based on fallacious premises. Relying on the prin‐ ciple according to which “understanding the world which is above the moon would assure an anticipated knowledge of the events in the world below the moon” (“comprendre le monde supra-lunaire assurerait d’une connaissance an‐ ticipée des événements sub-lunaires”), astrology pretends to be able to provide to its followers an “absolute power over their fellows” (“un pouvoir absolu sur leurs semblables”). 30 According to La Mothe Le Vayer, astrologists are successful in their predictions only by pure chance and promise a power whose essence, indifferent to moral precepts, is irremediably corrupt. Undoubtedly, La Mothe 101 3.2 The Magical Arts, Pseudo-Sciences Unworthy of Study 31 La Mothe Le Vayer, De l’Instruction de Monseigneur de Dauphin, 277-278. 32 Ibid., 278-279. Le Vayer acknowledges a certain influence of the sky over the earth, but restricts it to general phenomena. By pointing out the lack of continuity between uni‐ versal and particular causes on the basis of the Aristotelian theory of the prox‐ imate causes, he argues that: […] if we knew well this universal cause of the sky, we could predict through it the universal effects of its nature, like the different seasons of the year, the eclipses, and even the comets, admitting that the art of the Chaldeans went as far as that, as assures Diodorus of Sicily in two different places of his history. But concerning the singular things which are endless, and which depend on several causes that contribute to their production, the belief that we can read the event in the skies would be a serious self-deception. […] si on connaissait bien cette cause universelle du Ciel, on pourrait prédire par son moyen les effets universels et de sa nature, comme sont les différentes saisons de l’année, les éclipses, et même les comètes, si tant est que l’art des Chaldéens se soit étendu jusque-là, comme l’assure Diodore Sicilien en deux lieux différents de son histoire. Mais à l’égard des choses singulières qui sont infinies, et qui dépendent de plusieurs causes qui concourent en leur production, c’est s’abuser lourdement de croire que nous en puissions lire l’événement dans les cieux. 31 Besides being devoid of validity, the pretences of judicial astrology are ques‐ tionable from a double point of view, theological and philosophical. If the judicial astrology were really able to foretell exactly human actions, it would destroy free will. 32 To this theological reproach can be further added a sceptical approach, which stresses the contradictions between the principles that supposedly un‐ derlie astrology in order to undermine its scientific status: In the field of the real and authentic sciences, contradiction destroys their content. Yet, we do not see anything that is so contradictory than the axioms of the astrologists or so different than the principles they invented by following their whim. Therefore there is no reason to place astrology among the solid sciences, or to expect any cer‐ tainty from it. En matière de sciences réelles et véritables, la contrariété détruit la discipline. Or est-il qu’on ne voit rien de si différent que les principes que se sont donnés les astrologues chacun à sa fantaisie, ni de si contraire que leurs axiomes. Il n’y a donc point d’ap‐ 102 Chapter 3. The Political Science Taught by La Mothe Le Vayer 33 Ibid., 289. In emphasising the abundance of the contradictions that undermine astrology, the approach that the writer adopts in order to question its status of science comes closer to the one he uses in order to throw into doubt the pretences of politics. 34 Ibid., p. 257. 35 This idea is partly expressed by Salazar, ‘La Divine Sceptique,’ 44. 36 La Mothe Le Vayer, De l’Instruction de Monseigneur de Dauphin, 330. 37 See Salazar, ‘La Divine Sceptique,’ 47. parence de mettre l’astrologie au nombre des sciences solides, ni de s’en promettre rien de certain. 33 False science that provides to those who trust it a purely imaginary knowledge, judicial astrology is also reprehensible because of the effect it can have over the people in power. In this respect, it is enough to mention the example of Caracalla, “who is said to have had the horoscopes of all the great men in his State, which he used for determining their good or bad will towards him, for elevating some and lowering the others, and even for going as far as murdering many of them for this unfortunate reason” (“qu’on dit avoir eu les généthliaques de tous les Grands de son État, sur quoi il jugeait de leur bonne ou mauvaise volonté en son endroit, élevant les uns, et déprimant les autres, jusqu’à en faire mourir beau‐ coup sur ce malheureux fondement”). 34 The astrology does not go beyond the usual sphere of sciences only by pretending to reveal the future course of events that is normally opaque until it actually happens, but also by encouraging its adepts to act indifferently to the precepts of ethics. 35 Regarding chemistry, it deserves to be condemned only as long as it deals with the transmutation of metal and the research of the philosopher’s stone. When doing so, it may seduce the kings more than the ordinary individuals because it promises them the ressources that they need in order to accomplish their ambitious designs. 36 Similar to judicial astrology, it is blameworthy because it perverts the way in which the sovereigns exert their power. 37 In addition to the claim of accomplishing actions that disrupt the normal functioning of nature, it makes monarchs pay no attention to the moral considerations that should guide them. Fooled by the promises of an imposture that pretends to force nature to produce effects foreign to the laws that govern it, the rulers risk provoking their own loss as well as that of their empire. The example of Nero is telling in this respect: Nothing led Nero to the exorbitant expenses by means of which he thought he would ruin the empire more than the promise that he received from a Roman knight, that he would make him find in certain African caves the huge treasures that had been carried there in former times by Dido who was fleeing her brother’s persecution. 103 3.2 The Magical Arts, Pseudo-Sciences Unworthy of Study 38 La Mothe Le Vayer, De l’Instruction de Monseigneur de Dauphin, 333. 39 Ibid., 352-353. 40 Ibid., 345. 41 Ibid., 343-344. 42 Salazar, ‘La Divine Sceptique,’ 47. 43 La Mothe Le Vayer, De l’Instruction de Monseigneur de Dauphin, 354. Rien n’engagea tant Néron dans les furieuses dépenses dont il pensa ruiner l’empire, que la promesse qu’il reçut d’un chevalier romain, de lui faire trouver dans de certaines cavernes d’Afrique les richesses immenses, que Didon y avait autrefois transportées de Tyr, fuyant la persécution de son frère. 38 The deception that is inherent in alchemy is, according to La Mothe Le Vayer, clearly demonstrated by the pitiful condition of the individuals who generously offer their services to princes or to ordinary individuals in order to help them become rich. The writer brings out the contradiction which is at the heart of their behaviour and which consists in “promising mountains of goods” (“prom‐ ettre des montjoies de biens”), in order to obtain, instead, a “silver coin” (“une pièce d’argent”). 39 In the writer’s view, the success of alchemy does not come from the results that it pretends to achieve, but from a mechanism that is based on the reproduction of the lie. Indeed, the alchemists’ victims seek to compensate the fact that they have let themselves duped by attempting, in their turn, to cheat other persons: “For those who get involved in this job, after having been deceived by the others, usually enjoy perpetrating the same deceits as the ones that they suffered and are doing their best to reward themselves like that” (“Car ceux qui se mêlent de ce métier, après avoir été trompés par d’autres, prennent ordi‐ nairement plaisir à faire les mêmes fourberies qu’ils ont souffertes, et tâchent bien souvent à se récompenser par là”). 40 On the whole, without making any concession to the alchemists, La Mothe Le Vayer does not hesitate to call them “wretched smoke inebriated people” (“misérables enfumés”), whose only per‐ formance consists in transforming “all their possessions in charcoal” (“tout ce qu’ils ont de biens en des charbons ”). 41 Founded on “false physics” (“fausse physique”) 42 as well, magic is more ap‐ pealing and therefore more dangerous than alchemy or astrology, because it is an “art that boasts about supplying all by itself and without any trouble, every‐ thing that the others make hope for only after hard labour” (“art qui se vante de donner lui seul, et sans peine, tout ce que les autres ne font espérer qu’après de longs travaux”). 43 More than the two magical arts that have previously been mentioned, magic gives the illusion of being able to indulge all the passions. Just like in the case of alchemy and judicial astrology, La Mothe Le Vayer distin‐ guishes between a licit and an illicit magic. On the one hand, he makes no re‐ 104 Chapter 3. The Political Science Taught by La Mothe Le Vayer 44 Ibid., 355. 45 Ibid., 357-358. 46 Gabriel Naudé, Apologie pour tous les grands personnages qui ont été faussement soup‐ çonnés de magie, 2 nd ed. (La Haye: A. Vlac, 1653), 66. La Mothe Le Vayer refers to Naudé’s work in De l’Instruction de Monseigneur de Dauphin, 357. On the rehabilitation ap‐ proaches adopted by both La Mothe Le Vayer and Gabriel Naudé, see my article “La Mothe Le Vayer, membre d’une ‘cabale’? ,” in Littérature et politique. Factions et dissi‐ dences de la Ligue à la Fronde, ed. Malina Stefanovska and Adrien Paschoud (Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2015), 163-168. proach to the natural magic, which by succeeding in solving the mysteries of the natural world, produces effects that may seem supernatural. On the other hand, he could not warn enough his royal student against the magic practised by “necromancers” (“nécromanciens ”) and “wizards” (“enchanteurs”), which is based on a so-called cooperation of the evil forces and materialises in the “devils’ conspiracies” (“les conjurations des diables”) or the “sorcerers’ spells” (“les ma‐ léfices des sorciers”). 44 Besides distinguishing between two types of magic, the author does not hes‐ itate to condemn the false accusations of magic. Victims of a mixture of envy and ignorance, the individuals whose outstanding discoveries have exceeded their contemporaries’ understanding capacities have always been accused of witchcraft. La Mothe Le Vayer is not afraid of mentioning, in addition to Soc‐ rates, Pythagoras, or Galen, Christ himself, whose miracles, according to a ref‐ erence quietly extracted from the apocryphal Gospels, would have been put down by the Jews to the demons. 45 By showing the weakness of certain accu‐ sations of witchcraft, La Mothe Le Vayer draws inspiration from Gabriel Naudé, for whom “most of the philosophers, mathematicians and naturalists have been wrongly suspected of magic” (“la plupart des philosophes, mathématiciens et naturalistes ont aussi été faussement soupçonnés de magie”). 46 La Mothe Le Vayer adopts a more mitigated attitude towards magic not only because of the inconsistency of some accusations of witchcraft, but also for theological reasons. Indeed, because magic pretends to make use of supernatural entities, the complete denial of the miracles it claims to produce would amount to a rejection of the miracles that are essential to Christianity. Apparently in good faith, he justifies the miracles by the existence of the libertines, who are actually some of their greatest adversaries, because their faith and their belief in supernatural phenomena are at least doubtful: “God deliberately allows the existence of magicians in order to compel the libertine minds, who do not want to acknowledge another God than nature, to admit that there are other sub‐ stances than the material ones” (“Dieu permet exprès qu’il y ait des magiciens, afin que les esprits libertins, et qui ne veulent point reconnaître d’autre Dieu 105 3.2 The Magical Arts, Pseudo-Sciences Unworthy of Study 47 La Mothe Le Vayer, De l’Instruction de Monseigneur de Dauphin, 356. 48 Ibid., 360-361. 49 On physiognomy, see La Mothe Le Vayer, De l’Instruction de Monseigneur de Dauphin, 370. See also Salazar, ‘La Divine Sceptique,’ 44-45. que la nature, soient contraints d’avouer qu’il y a des substances autres que matérielles”). 47 Despite accepting the possibility of certain miracles produced by the wizards, La Mothe Le Vayer is not willing to accept them whenever he hears about them. By means of an obvious irony, he highlights the clash between, on the one hand, the insignificance of the sorcerers and of their practices and, on the other hand, the scope of their pretences: “How reasonable is it to believe that whenever an old lady would like to mutter two or three words taken from her book of magic spells and place a broom between her legs, Satan would be bound to transport her wherever she will want to go? ” (“Quelle apparence, qu’autant de fois qu’une vieille voudra marmoter deux ou trois mots du grimoire, et mettre un balai entre ses jambes, Satan soit tenu de la transporter par la cheminée où elle voudra ? ”) 48 Although the success of its actions is determined only by fortune, magic may encourage the sovereigns to carry out actions that are foreign to the moral principles deduced from a judicious relationship with nature. Once again, the example of Nero can be illustrative for the disorders and the failures that magic can provoke. This is so because Nero did not spare any means for allowing the necromancers who were considered the most skilful of their time to practise their pretended know-how. Furthermore, in order to ensure the success of his necromancy experiences, the Roman emperor also used human victims, for whom he even seemed to have had a special inclination. Nevertheless, Nero’s attempts never managed to allow him to establish any communication with the souls of the dead. Although it seems to belong to a distant past, the lure of Nero by the magicians’ promises is not devoid of any connection to the moment when La Mothe Le Vayer writes. As a matter of fact, the interest aroused in the time of our writer by physiognomy may prompt him to prevent the prince from falling under the deceptive charm of the so-called sorcerers. 49 Hence, La Mothe advises the future king against magic, just like he warned him previously against alchemy and judicial astrology. Practised by fraudsters, whose operations are successful only by chance, the three magical arts may seize the prince and 106 Chapter 3. The Political Science Taught by La Mothe Le Vayer 50 See Furetière, Dictionnaire universel, vol. 3, second entry “tyrant” (“tyran”): “Tyrant is called today only a prince who abuses his power; who oppresses the public liberty; who does not govern by following the laws; who uses violence and cruelty towards his subjects” (“Tyran, se dit aujourd’hui seulement d’un prince qui abuse de son pouvoir; qui opprime la liberté publique; qui ne gouverne pas selon les loix; qui use de violence, et de cruauté envers ses sujets”). 51 La Mothe Le Vayer, La Politique du Prince, 300. 52 See Senellart, Les Arts de gouverner, 211. transform him into a tyrant, who misuses his power by treating his subjects in a cruel and violent way. 50 3.3 The Relationship between Power and Altar: Halfway between Indifference and Fanaticism While excluding the occult sciences from the royal education, La Mothe Le Vayer pays special attention to the relationship between power and religion. In so doing, he emphasises the superiority of the political authority over the religious authority in every secular matter: “It [politics] has this advantage over all the other professions, that their functions cannot be fulfilled without its help; the‐ ology itself, which seems to hold the first rank among them, needs to rely for the rest of its contemplations on the authority of the political laws” (“Elle [la politique] a d’ailleurs cet avantage sur toutes les autres professions, que leurs fonctions ne se peuvent faire sans son aide ; la théologie même, qui semble tenir le premier rang entre elles, ayant besoin d’appuyer le repos de ses contempla‐ tions sur l’autorité des lois politiques ”). 51 The distinction between the practical dimension of politics and the speculative dimension of theology may strengthen the status of the State, which towards the end of the 16 th century, has asserted itself as the solution to the religious wars. 52 The superiority of the State over the Church materialises in the primacy of the civil laws, which are responsible for avoiding the chaos that results from the civil wars that can harm religion itself. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the prince, who embodies the State, must be entirely indifferent to everything that has a connection with the spiri‐ tual sphere. La Mothe Le Vayer argues against the excessive simplification of the separation between the secular and the spiritual areas: “Therefore we could not distance them [the princes] too much from these maxims full of impiety, which hold that the excessive care for the other world is not appropriate for those who are destined to command this world” (“On ne saurait donc […] trop les [princes] éloigner de ces maximes pleines d’impiété, qui portent que les soins excessifs de l’autre monde ne sont pas propres pour ceux qui sont destinés au 107 3.3 The Relationship between Power and Altar 53 La Mothe Le Vayer, De l’Instruction de Monseigneur de Dauphin, 28-29. 54 Ibid., 21-22. 55 Ibid., 25-26. On the divine right doctrine, see Jean Mesnard, “La monarchie de droit divin, concept anticlérical,” in Justice et force. Politiques au temps de Pascal, Actes du colloque “Droit et pensée politique autour de Pascal”, ed. Gérard Ferreyrolles (Paris: Klincksieck, 1996), 109-138 ; and Church, Richelieu and Reason of State, 24-44. commandement de celui-ci”). 53 In accordance with the conventional image of a king, the sovereign is supposed to make proof of devoutness in order to set an example for his subjects and to show his gratitude for the privileges given to him by the divinity. 54 In the view of a La Mothe Le Vayer who obviously supports the cause of the étatistes, despite the devoutness that he must show to the divinity, the prince must not submit in all circumstances to its representatives on Earth, the cler‐ gymen. In support of this point of view, the author puts forward the divine right doctrine, according to which the prince is not indebted for his power to the Church, but only to God: The true doctrine which must be taught to his Highness the Dauphin in this sense is that he is born the one he is by the grace of God, to whom alone he should be grateful for his kingdom, which has never depended on anybody ever since its happy foun‐ dation, the only homage for it being owed to the one on whom rely all the powers of the Earth. La véritable doctrine qui doit être enseignée à Monseigneur le Dauphin là-dessus, c’est qu’il est né tel par la grâce de Dieu, auquel seul il est obligé du royaume qui le regarde, et qui n’a jamais relevé de personne depuis son heureuse fondation, l’hommage n’en étant dû qu’à celui de qui toutes les puissances de la terre dépendent. 55 The doctrine of the divine right justifies the autonomy of the French sovereigns with respect to the members of the Church, and especially to the Pope. Founded on both the divine right and the separation between the secular and sacred spheres of life, the emancipation of the royal power from the Sovereign pontiff is strengthened by Gallicanism, which defends the freedom of the French Church against the Holy See: Concerning the moments when our kings are forced to oppose the pretences of the Roman court, he [the prince] should not ignore the independence of his crown in secular matters, the privileges attached to his sacred person and the freedom to which the Catholic Church has always held firm. Car pour ce qu’il se trouve des saisons où nos rois sont obligés de s’opposer aux prétentions de la Cour de Rome, il ne doit pas ignorer l’indépendance de sa couronne 108 Chapter 3. The Political Science Taught by La Mothe Le Vayer 56 La Mothe Le Vayer, De l’Instruction de Monseigneur de Dauphin, 24. 57 Ibid., 23-24. 58 Richelieu, Testament politique, 135. 59 Ibid., 241. pour ce qui est du temporel, les privilèges attachés à sa personne sacrée, ni les libertés dans lesquelles l’Église gallicane s’est toujours maintenue. 56 Despite his autonomy from the representatives of the Church in worldly affairs, the monarch has, according to La Mothe Le Vayer, the obligation to treat them with the respect they are worthy of: the prince has to make proof of esteem towards the clergy of his kingdom and of even a special consideration for the Pope. 57 La Mothe Le Vayer’s position on the relationship between the two powers, political and ecclesiastical, is likely to be better grasped if it is compared to the one adopted by Richelieu. The Cardinal is not only the person to whom La Mothe Le Vayer dedicates his work of royal education from 1640, but also the main defender of a State that, by governing itself according to its own reason, does not take into account any human or religious arguments. Within his Testament politique, Richelieu clearly highlights the separation between the spiritual and the secular areas that must shape the sovereigns’ actions. In so doing, he argues that the king must see to preserve the autonomy of his political power, but also give to the Sovereign Pontiff all the respect signs of which he is worthy: “Kings are not only bound to respect the tiara of the Sovereign pontiffs, but also to maintain the power of their crown” (“Si les roys sont obligés de respecter la thiare des souverains pontifes, ils le sont aussy de conserver la puissance de leur couronne”). 58 Despite supporting the pre-eminence of the secular over the sacred in all political matters, Richelieu does not play down the role of religion in the government of the State. Indeed, the Cardinal holds that the final purpose of politics is religious. Although it results in a pragmatic approach to politics, abiding by the divine precepts represents the true aim that the powerful should try to achieve: “The reign of God is the principle of the government of the States and, indeed, is such an absolutely necessary thing that, in its absence, there is neither prince who could well rule, nor State which could be happy” (“Le règne de Dieu est le principe du gouvernement des Estats et, en effet, c’est une chose si absolument nécessaire que, sans ce fondement, il n’y a point de prince qui puisse bien régner ny d’Estat qui puisse estre heureux”). 59 In spite of the con‐ tradictions that undermine Richelieu’s relationship with the spiritual sphere, religion is inseparable from his political thought. 109 3.3 The Relationship between Power and Altar 60 La Mothe Le Vayer, De l’Instruction de Monseigneur de Dauphin, 29. 61 Ibid., 29-30. 62 Ibid. As far as he is concerned, La Mothe Le Vayer is less explicit than Richelieu about the spiritual objective that the sovereign must have in mind while exerting his power. More precisely, La Mothe Le Vayer does not exclude devoutness from the prince’s education, but considers it especially under its practical aspects. Inexhaustible source of benefits, royal piety must keep away from the “excessive zeal” (“zèles indiscrets”). 60 Certainly, the king’s piety needs to be honest and not to merge with the hypocrisy which uses religion as an instrument for reaching goals indifferent to spirituality. Without any doubt, this is an allusion to Spain, whose so-called devoutness conceals imperialist politics. However, while staying authentic, royal devoutness must avoid becoming extreme. This means that the monarch’s piety must be confined within moderate limits that are able to preserve it from succumbing to actions whose carelessness may, like in the case of the religious wars, have catastrophic effects. The main consequence of this view of the royal piety concerns the attitude towards the Protestants, which was one of the thorniest issues that had to be coped with by the French domestic and foreign politics. 3.4 Power Facing the Religious Difference: Toleration Based on the Separation of Church and State When talking about the French Protestants, La Mothe Le Vayer stresses the serious questions that they raise from a double point of view, political and reli‐ gious. 61 The followers of Protestantism are harmful to both the king and the State: they are not only guilty of lese-majesty, because they dissent from the king’s religion, but also dangerous for the State, within which they provoke divisions. Moreover, they are responsible for the “wretched schism” (“misérable schisme”) which destroyed the cohesion of the Catholic community. However, according to La Mothe Le Vayer, despite their political consequences, the diffi‐ culties provoked by the Protestants do not have a political solution: “It is an effect of the God’s wrath and we have to wait for its main remedy to come from the same place, when the prayers and the good behaviour of the most virtuous ones will have obtained it” (“C’est un effet du courroux du Ciel, et nous devons attendre le principal remède du même lieu, quand les prières et les bonnes mœurs des plus vertueux l’auront obtenu”). 62 By taking advantage of the view of history as a manifestation of Providence, which rewards individuals for their 110 Chapter 3. The Political Science Taught by La Mothe Le Vayer 63 Ibid., 31. 64 Ibid., 29. 65 Ibid., 30. virtues or vices, La Mothe Le Vayer offers an additional argument for the sep‐ aration between the spiritual and the secular fields. Brought about by religious reasons, the disorders related to Protestantism can only be solved by religious means. Despite being provided by religion, the possible appeasement of the troubles associated with Protestants has an undeniable influence on politics. Consistent with his view of a kind of politics that prevails over everything else, La Mothe Le Vayer teaches the prince that “To be a very just and faithful king means not to harm his State, because the promise to preserve it that he made when taking its lead is the one that dominates all the others” (“C’est être roi très juste et très loyal, de ne point faire de tort à son État, puisque la promesse qu’il lui a faite de le conserver en prenant sa conduite, est celle qui règle toutes les autres”). 63 Validated by the edicts signed by the prince’s predecessors, the toleration of Protestants makes possible the survival of the State upon which depend all the other fields, including religion itself. As La Mothe Le Vayer sees it, the painful experience of the religious wars has shown that, in order to bring the sheep that have gone astray back to the fold of the Catholic faith, “it will be recommendable to always use the doctors rather than the executioners” (“il sera bien d’employer toujours plutôt les docteurs que les bourreaux”). 64 This means that the attempts to solve the theological dissen‐ sions, which gave birth to Protestantism, do not fall within the competence of political power, but of the theological authorities. In order to convince Protes‐ tants to return to the Catholic faith, it is necessary to try to act on their minds and not on their bodies. The force to which political power has access in order to compel its subjects to enforce the law must give way to the smoothness of the arguments that the theologians are able to put forward in favour of their camp. The methods of persuasion that are suggested by metonymy through terms like “iron” (“fer”) and “fire” (“feu”) and that are usually used by the pow‐ erful against dissidents risk to set in motion a spiral of violence 65 . Concerned with the well-being of the State, Richelieu is also opposed to a violent fight against Protestantism. In his view, if they had applied other methods than smoothness in order to convert the Protestants to Catholicism, the sovereigns may have caused a great harm to their State, which would have been seriously weakened, if not entirely destroyed by it. By using a well-known metaphor, the Cardinal compares the results of a violent action against the Protestant faith to the fact of “uprooting the good wheat while trying to eradi‐ 111 3.4 Power Facing the Religious Difference 66 Richelieu, Testament politique, 243. 67 See Thuau, Raison d’État et pensée politique à l’époque de Richelieu, 206-207. 68 La Mothe Le Vayer, Discours de la contrariété d’humeurs, in Œuvres, IV/ II, 340-341. 69 Ibid., 343. cate discord” (“déraciner le bon bled en voulant déraciner la zizanie”). 66 Although he does not specify in what the smoothness of the means to be used in order to bring back to Catholicism those who went astray consists, Richelieu’s view ob‐ viously converges with that of La Mothe Le Vayer when he rejects the recourse to violent measures. Without any doubt, it is worth mentioning that the toler‐ ation of Protestants for which both La Mothe Le Vayer and Richelieu argue is nothing more than a stopgap. 67 Based on practical reasons related to the well-being of the State and not on the open-mindedness towards the various religious beliefs, toleration is seen as a temporary solution, applied in the ex‐ pectancy of the Protestants’ return to Catholicism. Broadly speaking, the educational treatise De l’Instruction de Monseigneur le Dauphin (1640) deals with the issue of the religious difference from a perspective which is especially theoretical and prescriptive. On the contrary, the Discours sur la contrariété d’humeurs (1636), which is written against the Spanish politics, handles at times the same issue from the point of view of a special case, that of Spain. Targeting the so-called devoutness on which the Spanish build their pol‐ itics, the Discours denounces the brutal treatment that they inflict upon the in‐ dividuals who are not Catholic. Inside Spain, this treatment led to the expulsion of Jews and Muslims and to the creation of the Inquisition, which focuses, through means whose harshness is sadly famous, on the repression of the fol‐ lowers of Islam and Judaism who, despite the official prohibition, did not abandon their original faith. 68 Legitimised by reasons which, despite the dis‐ course held by the political power, pertain more to the secular than to the spi‐ ritual fields, these measures, singular within the Christian world because of their scale and their inflexibility, are actually far from being as efficient as they pre‐ tend to be. The Jews and the Muslims whom the Spanish tried to force to give up their religion continue, at least partly, to practise their religion in secret. Moreover, the simulation of the fidelity to Catholicism is likely to be accompa‐ nied by the simulation of the fidelity to the political power: “everybody knows that in Spain there are no less Marranos, Alumbrados, Jews and secret Muslims, than Huguenots in France who are recognised and therefore less to be feared” (“chacun sait, qu’il n’y a pas moins de Maranes, d’Alumbrados, de Juifs, et de Mahométans secrets en Espagne, qu’il peut y avoir de Huguenots reconnus, et par conséquent moins à craindre dans la France”). 69 Ceaselessly confronted with the example of Spain by the followers of a Catholicism without concession, the 112 Chapter 3. The Political Science Taught by La Mothe Le Vayer 70 Ibid., 347-348. 71 Ibid., 348. decision of France to tolerate Protestants turns out, in the end, to be wiser and more strategic. By refusing to use force against the Protestants who live inside its borders, the French political power secures their loyalty and creates the premises for their genuine conversion to the Catholic faith. According to La Mothe Le Vayer, in their pretended attempt to strive for the Catholic faith, the Most Catholic Kings adopt measures that are equally harsh inside and outside Spain. Used everywhere the Spanish exert their power, these methods have led to consequences that are particularly tragic in the New World: as it is shown by Spanish sources like Bartolomé de Las Casas that are quoted by La Mothe Le Vayer, the evangelization of America has had devastating effects on the Indians who were submitted to it. The abuses committed on behalf of Christianity have not only tragically harmed the life of the Amerindians in this world, but have also ruined their hope to redeem themselves in the hereafter. False apostles, the Spanish distribute “glass rosaries” (“chapelets de verre”) to the inhabitants of America only in order to take in exchange “golden grains” (“grains d’or ”). Through a distortion of the meaning of the conversion to Ca‐ tholicism, “the only Christian mystery that was taught to the neophytes of the New World was to bring all their goods to the feet of these new Apostles, who resorted to every type of barbarity in order to rob them of everything they possessed, including their life, although it was useless” (“le seul mystère du christianisme qu’on enseignait aux néophytes du Nouveau Monde, c’était de leur faire apporter tous leurs biens aux pieds de ces nouveaux apôtres, qui les en dépouillaient avec toute sorte de barbarie, et de la vie même, encore qu’ils n’eussent rien retenu ”). 70 In addition to compelling the Amerindians to a life of misery, the so-called Christianisation carried out by the Spanish deprives them of every means to save themselves. La Mothe Le Vayer argues that, far from bringing the Native Americans closer to Christianity, the savage methods used by the subjects of the Most Catholic King makes them become estranged from it or, even worse, fall into apostasy. Therefore, the chances for the salvation of the American Indians, who could have saved themselves by following the nat‐ ural law, are compromised. In order to increase the weight of this position, La Mothe Le Vayer, who is not a theologian, mentions the authority of “the fairest scholastics” (“les plus équitables scolastiques”). 71 The theological and political issue, the evangelization of America and its consequences for the salvation of the Indians comes back several times under the quill of La Mothe Le Vayer. Hence, it does not appear only in other works 113 3.4 Power Facing the Religious Difference 72 La Mothe Le Vayer, Discours de l’histoire, in Œuvres, IV/ I, 324-326 and Dialogue sur l’opiniâtreté, 442-443. 73 La Mothe Le Vayer, Discours de l’histoire, 292. On the illustration of the uses given to the example by Montaigne, see John Lyons, Exemplum. The Rhetoric of Example in Early Modern France and Italy (Princeton University Press, 1989), 153. 74 See Jean Orcibal, Jansénius d’Ypres (1585-1638) (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1989), 235-242; and Church, Richelieu and Reason of State, 385. 75 La Mothe Le Vayer, “Preuves des citations,” in De la Vertu des païens, 361, 367. directed against the Spanish politics, like the Dicours de l’histoire (1636), but also in a work like Dialogue sur l’opiniâtreté which, like the other Dialogues faits à l’imitation des Anciens, was published anonymously. 72 Subsumed under the more general theme of the relationship between nature and grace, the salvation of the pagans is treated at length in the treatise De la Vertu des païens (1641-1642), which has a stronger theological dimension. On the whole, for La Mothe Le Vayer, the Spanish politics towards the American pagans, the Jews and the Spanish Muslims represents a negative example. Certainly, it can have an edu‐ cational value, but only to the extent that it is considered an example to avoid and not to follow. According to the terms of La Mothe Le Vayer who, by accusing of partiality Sandoval’s history, refers to the two educational uses of the word “example” (“exemple”), there are “two ways of teaching, among which one pro‐ vides examples that have to be imitated, and the other shows what has to be avoided” (“deux façons d’enseigner, dont l’une donne les exemples de ce qu’il faut imiter, et l’autre fait voir ce qui est à fuir”). 73 Arguably, La Mothe Le Vayer’s view of the French and the Spanish behaviour towards the individuals who are not Catholic can be better understood if it is compared to the one defended by Jansen in the Mars gallicus. Contrary to La Mothe Le Vayer, who is the follower of the politiques, Jansen is close to the camp of their adversaries, the dévots. Published in 1635 under the pseudonym of Alex‐ andre Patricius Armacanus and translated into French in 1637 by Charles Her‐ sent, Mars gallicus has aroused numerous replies and has benefited from a large diffusion in France, England, the United Provinces, or even Rome. 74 Admittedly, La Mothe Le Vayer refers openly to Jansen only in De la Vertu des païens. 75 However, in the works which deal with the education of the prince or the Spanish politics, La Mothe Le Vayer is, at least partly, likely to target certain arguments from the Mars gallicus. A Spanish subject, Jansen writes the Mars gallicus as a reaction to the Questions décidées sur la justice des armes des rois de France, sur les alliances avec les hérétiques ou infidèles, et sur la conduite de la conscience des gens de guerre (1634), belonging to Arroy Bessian, a doctor of Sorbonne. Among the main objectives of Bessian’s work, there is the justifica‐ tion of the privileged status held by the French kings in Europe and of their 114 Chapter 3. The Political Science Taught by La Mothe Le Vayer 76 A. P. Armacanus, Le Mars français ou la guerre de France (1637), 380-381. 77 See Gérard Ferreyrolles, “Jansénius politique: le Mars Gallicus,” in Justice et force, 99-100. alliances with the Protestants. Unlike Bessian, Jansen condemns the politics of the French kings and opposes it to that of the Spanish kings, which favours the spiritual over the secular field. Having as its main purpose the consolidation of the Catholic faith, the Spanish monarch has eliminated the religious difference wherever he rules: Let the most envious and jealous of the glory of this great monarch have a look at all the kingdoms that he possesses in the East and the West and they will discover that there has been neither pagan, nor Jew, nor heretic who could enjoy the public freedom for practising his superstition by means of prayers or offerings; moreover, that ev‐ erywhere the synagogues are being pulled down, that the idols’ temples are being shut and the illegitimate reunions of the heretic clergymen are no longer admitted. Que les plus envieux et les plus jaloux de la gloire de ce grand monarque jettent les yeux par tous les royaumes, qu’il tient en l’Orient et l’Occident, ils trouveront, que jamais païen, ni Juif, ni hérétique, n’y a pu avoir de liberté publique de sa superstition, par prières, ni par offres ; que les synagogues y sont abbatues, que les temples des idoles y sont fermés, et que les conciliabules des hérétiques n’y paraissent plus. 76 Hence, the prestige of the Most Catholic King comes more from the unity of faith that he has established within his empire than from the huge territory that he governs. By accumulating the examples about the annihilation of the freedom of worship and of the places where it can be practised, the author of Mars gallicus tries to prove the firmness of the actions taken by the Spanish power in favour of the Catholic faith. Obviously, the violence of these measures is seen as an efficient way of diverting from their faith the totality of the pagans, the Jews and the Protestants and not only the ones who are directly affected by it. Despite the original aspects of his thought, 77 Jansen illustrates perfectly the position of the dévots who, by subordinating politics to religion, attribute to the former one a crucial role in the suppression of the religions that are different from Cathol‐ icism. On the contrary, as we have already seen, by following the politiques, La Mothe Le Vayer argues for the separation between the spiritual and the secular areas, which results in the toleration of the French Protestants. 115 3.4 Power Facing the Religious Difference 78 La Mothe Le Vayer, Discours de la contrariété d’humeurs, 334. 79 Ibid., 377. 3.5 The War against the Spanish and the Alliances with the Protestants: Pragmatism Based on Secular Considerations Simultaneously with the toleration of the Protestants living within its frontiers, the France of Cardinal Richelieu makes an alliance with the German, Dutch and Swedish Protestants in order to wage war against Catholic Spain during the Thirty Years’ War. In the eyes of the dévots supporting the idea of a Christian community that transcends the State borders, French foreign politics is at least as scandalous as its domestic politics. In order to justify the choice made by his country in the field of international relationships, La Mothe Le Vayer starts from the argument of the balance of forces: “Everybody knows that the two powers of France and Spain are the ones which today keep in balance the forces of Europe and maintain in equilibrium the whole of Christianity” (“Chacun sait, comme les deux puissances de France et d’Espagne sont celles aujourd’hui qui balancent les forces de l’Europe, et qui tiennent en équilibre tout le christian‐ isme”). 78 Forces of equal power, which exert their influence over all the other European countries, France and Spain are the two elements that decide on the order or the disorder that reign over Europe. Yet the Spanish, who are driven by expansionist ambitions, are about to break the European order: “holding under their feet Italy and Germany, they want the rest of Europe to bend their knee in front of them; and once they will have conquered this part of the world, they will have succeeded in accomplishing their aim of universal monarchy” (“ayant sous leurs pieds l’Italie et l’Allemagne, il faut que le reste de l’Europe plie le genou; et cette partie du monde conquise, voilà le grand dessein de la monarchie universelle réussi ”). 79 Since it is the only one who is able to stand up to Spain, France is also the only one who is able to restore the European order. The im‐ portance achieved by the national State is accompanied by the acknowledge‐ ment of the other States and of their aspirations for freedom: In addition to being expected to help Italy against the Spanish invasions, France is also asked to help Germany, which can no longer put up with the hard yoke of these foreigners who, on the pretext of representing the eldest branch of the Habsburgs, bury German freedom under the ruin of other much older families. Si l’Italie attend son secours de la France contre les invasions espagnoles, l’Allemagne lui tend les bras d’un autre côté, ne pouvant plus souffrir le rude joug de ces étrangers, 116 Chapter 3. The Political Science Taught by La Mothe Le Vayer 80 Ibid., 374. On the idea of balance of forces in Europe and the order that France has to maintain within it by freeing the other European States from the Spanish threat, see Thuau, Raison d’État et pensée politique à l’époque de Richelieu, 298, 307. 81 La Mothe Le Vayer, De l’Instruction de Monseigneur de Dauphin, 94: “And if a word has to be said about the war that we are currently waging against the Spanish, who doubts that the actions they took a long time before the breach of peace which we do not think necessary to enumerate here and the need to oppose ourselves to their goals of universal monarchy have not made our guns defensive, although the generosity of our king has been the cause of the fact that he has been the first to send messengers announcing the war to our enemies” (“Et s’il faut dire un mot de celle où nous sommes présentement contre les Espagnols, qui doute que leurs actions d’un long temps avant la rupture de paix, dont nous ne croyons pas devoir faire ici l’énumération, et la nécessité de nous opposer à leurs desseins d’une monarchie universelle, n’aient rendu nos armes défen‐ sives, encore que la générosité du roi ait été cause qu’il a le premier envoyé dénoncer la guerre par ses hérauts à nos ennemis ”). 82 Ibid., 91. 83 See Michel Senellart, Machiavélisme et raison d’État XIIe-XVIIIe siècles. Suivi d’un choix de textes (Paris: PUF, 1989), 33. qui pour représenter les aînés de la Maison d’Habsbourg, ensevelissent sous la ruine des autres familles beaucoup plus anciennes, la liberté germanique. 80 Furthermore, by destroying the European order and the balance of forces that underlies it, Spain becomes a threat for France itself. Consequently, the aim of the war declared by France against Spain is not only the liberation of other countries, but also its legitimate defence 81 . The general reason why, in the hos‐ tilities that it opened against Spain, France only reacted against an aggression, is that the aggressor which triggers the war is not always easy to identify: But sometimes it is quite difficult to recognise the wars that are truly defensive. For it is not always true that the one who is the first to start the campaign is indeed the aggressor; and it has often been seen that the one who seemed to be attacked was in fact the author of the violence. Mais il se trouve parfois bien de la difficulté à reconnaître les guerres qui sont véri‐ tablement défensives. Car il n’arrive pas toujours que celui qui se met le premier en campagne, soit en effet l’agresseur ; et l’on a vu souvent, que tel qui semblait être attaqué était l’auteur de la violence. 82 The need for security that is put forward by La Mothe Le Vayer in order to legitimise the war against Spain pertains to the way in which the 17 th century appropriates an idea dating back to the Middle Ages. The idea is the medieval notion of defence which, subordinated to the necessitas, could justify the re‐ course to guns not only in order to protect oneself, but also in order to attack the enemy on the pretext of defending oneself against him. 83 117 3.5 The War against the Spanish and the Alliances with the Protestants 84 La Mothe Le Vayer, Discours de la contrariété d’humeurs, 366-367. On the issues discussed during the polemic against the Catholic Spain, see Thuau, Raison d’État et pensée polit‐ ique à l’époque de Richelieu, 198-199, 296-298. 85 La Mothe Le Vayer, Discours de la contrariété d’humeurs, 370-372. 86 Ibid., 362-364. 87 Ibid., 361. The fight of the French against the Spanish does not take place only on the battleground, but also in the field of propaganda, a case in which the participants do not cross their swords, but their quills. By engaging in a conflict against Spain, France does not only break the dream of the Res publica christiana, but also attacks a country that presents itself as the champion of the Catholic faith. As a matter of fact, the Spanish pretend that the “extent of their empire is nothing else than the reward for their piety and that only the zeal for the Gospel turned Madrid into the capital of the world” (“l’étendue de leur empire n’est que le [sic ! ] récompense de leur piété, et que le seul zèle de l’Évangile a fait Madrid la capitale du monde ”). 84 Hence, they pretend that they managed to extend their power all over the world like no other country because of the unique services that they did for the Catholic faith. Yet, according to writers like La Mothe Le Vayer, religion is, in fact, nothing else than a pretext used by the Most Catholic Kings in order to dissimulate their ambition of dominating the whole world. This re‐ sults from the fact that in addition to having failed in its evangelization attempts, Spain has no scruples about damaging religion whenever it is opposed to its purely secular interests. For instance, Spain has not hesitated to harm even the Sovereign Pontiffs when they have not agreed to favour its goals. 85 Indifferent to religion, the Spanish power does not avoid putting it forward whenever it may use it as an unbeatable argument. Among others, it condemns the alliances of the French with the Protestants or the Muslims, but it has formed alliances with the Indian princes or the English, Danish and German Protestants. 86 By condemning the others for what it practises itself, it has two weights, two meas‐ ures and confirms its duplicity. Unlike the Spanish who justify their secular interests through spiritual in‐ terests, the French found the defence of their secular interests on secular argu‐ ments. Independently from religion, the French politics materialises, among others, in alliances with the Turks or the Protestants, which have exclusively temporal interests. In support of the alliances by means of which they seek to ensure their survival, the French use the argument of the natural right, which “legitimises all the means on which our preservation depends” (“rendait […] légitimes tous les moyens desquels dépend notre conservation”). 87 The recourse to natural right derives from a certain secularisation of politics, which is carried 118 Chapter 3. The Political Science Taught by La Mothe Le Vayer 88 La Mothe Le Vayer, La Morale du Prince, 275. 89 See Thuau, Raison d’État et pensée politique à l’époque de Richelieu, 204-205, 367. On the possible bending of the natural right because of its “vast application” towards the “pre‐ cept of the end justifying the means” (“le précepte de la fin justifiant les moyens”), see Moreau, ‘Guérir du sot,’ 594. 90 La Mothe Le Vayer, Discours de la contrariété d’humeurs, 349. 91 Armacanus, Le Mars français ou la guerre de France, 303-304. out by the writers called étatistes. Reacting partly against the Spanish tendency to mix politics with religion, the étatistes rely for their argumentation on inter‐ national politics more on natural right than on ecclesiastical law. Work written for a didactic purpose, the Morale du Prince defines conven‐ tionally the natural right as the very essence of justice: “The foundation of the civil and international right is the natural right. So that in case men go astray and are opposed to the natural equity and honesty, they must be corrected ac‐ cording to this primitive right, which is in accordance with divine will” (“Le fondement du droit civil, et de celui des gens, est le droit de nature. De sorte que si les premiers s’en éloignent, et qu’ils soient contraires à l’équité et à l’honnêteté naturelle, ils doivent être corrigés sur ce droit primitif, qui est conforme à la volonté divine”). 88 As a consequence of this perception of it, the natural right becomes a major argument in favour of the international relationships that are governed by State interests and not by the ancient dream of the Res publica christiana. 89 Without doubt, the State whose defence is at stake is not entirely secular and its interests are not entirely irreconcilable with those of the Church. Unable to avoid a certain amount of confusion, La Mothe Le Vayer is very careful to show that by pursuing secular aims, the French power does not entirely ne‐ glect the spiritual aims. For instance, the alliances with the Turks, which “besides commerce, aim at the preservation of the Holy Places and the general well-being of all Christianity” (“[ont] pour fondement, outre le commerce, la conservation des Lieux Saints, et le bien général de toute la chrétienté”), 90 obviously rely on a series of reasons whose enumeration does not succeed in minimising their heterogeneous character, or even their contradictions. Nonetheless, on the whole, the French politics during the Thirty Years’ War, which treats as an enemy a Catholic country and makes allies among the Prot‐ estant countries, certainly favours the State at the expense of religion. Unsur‐ prisingly, this view of the connections between politics and religion, which is specific to the camp of the étatistes, has attracted the wrath of dévots like Jansen. According to the latter, it is in the “natural order” (“l’ordre naturel”) of things that the “kingdom of men” (“royaume des hommes”) serves that of God or that the State has the Church as its goal. 91 Deprived of the knowledge about the 119 3.5 The War against the Spanish and the Alliances with the Protestants 92 Ibid., 308, 293. On the “widespread use of Machiavelli’s name” (“emploi généralisé du nom de Machiavel”) in the polemics, see Thuau, Raison d’État et pensée politique à l’époque de Richelieu, 60. 93 Armacanus, Le Mars français ou la guerre de France, 321. 94 Ibid., 239. 95 Ibid., 243. 96 See Ferreyrolles, “Jansénius politique: le Mars Gallicus,” 98. spiritual field and of its influence over the secular field, the pagans are the only ones who can afford to think exclusively about the salvation of their State. It goes without saying that the Christian sovereigns, who like pagans, transform their State into a false divinity by privileging it instead of religion, disrupt the order of the universe. Dependent on the common places used in the polemic against the étatistes, Jansen blames on Machiavelli the political thought which according to him car‐ ries inside the “germs of atheism” (“le germe de l’athéisme”), because it is based on the “interest” (“l’intérêt”) of the State. 92 In spite of being present all over the world, the politiques who overturn the hierarchy between the spiritual and the temporal spheres have been active especially in France: “one might say that because of some whim of fate, in France this custom of preferring the interests of the State to those of the Church is passed on through heritage from father to son” (“on dirait, que par quelque fatalité, cette coutume de préférer les intérêts de l’État à ceux de l’Église, est passée aux Français par héritage, de père à fils”). 93 In this respect, Jansen seems to be referring especially to the French alliances with the Protestants. Besides violating the natural right, by supporting the rebels against the legitimate power, 94 the French alliances with the Protes‐ tants provoke the ruin of the Catholic faith. Although it only undermines Ca‐ tholicism indirectly, the coalition of the French with the Protestants is no less responsible for it: “ […] for despite every reason of State which may seem to compel us to it, the help to the enemies of faith, either by advice, or by the armed forces, certainly means to destroy religion through the hand of the other, who is known to have sworn to annihilate it ” (“Car secourir les ennemis de la foi, ou de conseil, ou de forces, quelque raison d’État, qui nous y semble obliger, c’est absolument détruire la religion par la main d’autrui, qu’on sait avoir juré sa ruine”). 95 Indeed, in the Thomistic theology, an action is reduced to a sin if the evil that it provokes indirectly derives, in a plausible way, from the good that it searches for directly. 96 This means that the French are bringing about the col‐ lapse of the Catholic faith by transforming the State into an idol and by serving it in a way of which God alone is worthy. In doing so, they turn the universal 120 Chapter 3. The Political Science Taught by La Mothe Le Vayer 97 On the connections that exist according to the Christian thought between the “divine malediction” and the disruption of the order established by God, see Thuau, Raison d’État et pensée politique à l’époque de Richelieu, 147. 98 Armacanus, Le Mars français ou la guerre de France, 448. 99 Thuau, Raison d’État et pensée politique à l’époque de Richelieu, 385, 361. 100 Gouverneur, Prudence et subversion libertines, 211: “politique du moindre mal”. order upside down and will end up by having to put up with the consequences of the divine wrath. 97 In order to be more eloquent when predicting the failure of the politics prac‐ tised by the étatistes, Jansen goes as far as adopting their vocabulary: “And it is a little thing if it [the big machine of the State] comes apart, being so weak and so badly run; but it would be surprising if it did not overwhelm under its rubble these great workers who erected it” (“Et c’est peu de chose, si elle [la grande machine de l’État] se démonte, étant si faible et si mal menée; mais il y aurait de quoi s’étonner, si elle n’accablait de ses débris, ces grands ouvriers qui l’ont élevée”). 98 Drawing inspiration from the mechanics, for which nature is a “great machine which functions, not in keeping with a goal, but with concatenations translated into mathematical ratios” (“grande machine qui fonctionne, non d’après un but, mais selon des enchaînements traduits en rapports mathéma‐ tiques ”), the étatistes see the State as a “scholarly machine” (“machine savante ”), “born from men’s calculations and cleverness” (“né[e] du calcul et de l’astuce des hommes ”). 99 For the purpose of predicting the fiasco of the politics practised by the étatistes, Jansen alludes to what, in his view, is an obvious gap between the organisation that is specific to every machine and the faults that undermine the activity of the State mechanism. Whether denounced or privileged beyond anything else, the State is a major part of the polemic that opposes the politiques like La Mothe Le Vayer to the dévots like Jansen. 3.6 The Reason of State or the “Politics of the Lesser Evil” 100 In order to defend the controversial French politics towards the Protestants or Catholic Spain, La Mothe Le Vayer relies on the reason of State. Connected to the “politics of the new State” (“la politique de l’État nouveau”), the reason of State is based on the “natural reason” (“la raison naturelle”) and is less concerned 121 3.6 The Reason of State or the “Politics of the Lesser Evil” 101 Thuau Raison d’État et pensée politique à l’époque de Richelieu, 401. In the next lines I continue to follow the analyses of Thuau, Raison d’État et pensée politique à l’époque de Richelieu, 250, 402, 404-408. See also Domenico Taranto, “Le dis‐ cours de la raison d’État,” in Histoire raisonnée de la philosophie morale et politique, ed. A. Caillé, M. Senellart, Ch. Lazzeri, 2 nd ed. (Paris: Flammarion, 2007), vol. 1. 102 See Dorothea Frede, “Stoic Determinism,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics, ed. Brad Inwood (Cambridge University Press, 2003), 201-202. See also Richelieu, Testament politique, 245: “The natural light allows everyone to know that, since man has been made reasonable, he must not do anything other than by means of his reason, because otherwise he would act against his nature and, consequently, against the very one who is his author” (“La lumière naturelle fait connoistre à un chacun que, l’homme ayant esté fait raisonnable, il ne doit rien faire que par raison, puisqu’autrement il ferait contre sa nature, et, par conséquent, contre celuy mesme qui en est l’autheur”). 103 Richelieu, Testament politique, p. 245. about religion or ethics. 101 Associated with the name of Richelieu, the reason of State has been celebrated as “divine reason” (“raison divine”) by the writers faithful to the Cardinal and decried as “reason of Hell” (“raison d’enfer”) by his adversaries. The controversies aroused by the reason of State are the result of the ambiguity that is an integral part of it: while aiming at the organisation of the political community according to new rational principles, the reason of State legitimises a political behaviour that transgresses the precepts of ordinary ethics. Since it asserts itself as an entity whose salvation matters more than anything else, the State lets itself be guided by its own reason, which does not reject practices like lying and violence, whose use is forbidden to ordinary people. Under the influence of the Stoic view which argues that the human reason allows individuals to live in harmony with the force that runs the universe, 102 Richelieu holds that reason should lay the foundations of all the actions taken by the powerful: “From these two principles it clearly results that man must make reason utterly reign, which does not require only that he does nothing without it, but obliges him, furthermore, to act in such a way that all those who are under his authority religiously revere and follow it” (“De ces deux principes il s’ensuit clairement que l’homme doit souverainement faire régner la raison, ce qui ne requiert pas seulement qu’il ne fasse rien sans elle, mais l’oblige, de plus, à faire que tous ceux qui sont sous son authorité la révèrent et la suivent religieusement”). 103 Materialising in the wish for what is “reasonable and just”, the reason whose practice should be enforced by power is supposed to flesh out the actions of all the individuals who belong to the different levels of the social hierarchy. The emphasis on the justice that derives from reason does not prevent Richelieu from defending the death penalty even for those who are suspected, without clear proofs, of having sought to harm the State: “On such occasions, it 122 Chapter 3. The Political Science Taught by La Mothe Le Vayer 104 Ibid., 261. 105 La Mothe Le Vayer, Discours de la contrariété d’humeurs, 340. 106 La Mothe Le Vayer, La Géographie du Prince, in Œuvres, I/ II, 145. is sometimes necessary to start with the execution, while in all the other cases, the clarification according to the law by means of witnesses or irrefutable proofs is preliminary to all the other actions” (“Il faut, en telles occasions, commencer quelquefois par l’exécution, au lieu qu’en toutes autres, l’éclaircissement du droit par tesmoins ou par pieces irréprochables est préallable à toutes choses”). 104 Justified by the need for public salvation and the difficulty of bringing conclusive proofs, the drastic dimension of such a measure cannot exclude its arbitrariness. As we will see further on, despite his efforts, La Mothe Le Vayer does not succeed in entirely eliminating the arbitrariness which is inherent in the concept of reason of State. From a concrete point of view, he inserts the expression “reason of State” in the treatises that he writes against Spanish politics or for the education of the prince. For instance, in the Discours de la contrariété d’hu‐ meurs, he echoes the arguments that the French oppose to the Spanish and at‐ tributes to the reason of State some of the debatable decisions taken by the latter: “They [the French] add that when in the year 1610 the Spanish chased 900,000 Muslims [Morisques] out of Spain, where their predecessors had been living continuously for more than nine hundred years, they showed more fear, greed, inhumanity and reason of State than religion” (“Ils [les Français] ajoutent, que quand en l’année mil six cent dix les Espagnols chassèrent neuf cent mille Mor‐ isques d’Espagne, où leurs prédécesseurs avaient habité plus de neuf cents ans continuellement, ils firent paraître plus de crainte, d’avarice, d’inhumanité et de raison d’État, que de religion”). 105 In De l’Instruction de Monseigneur le Dau‐ phin, he illustrates the disorders provoked by a reason of State which is bad and hints at the existence of another one which is good: “While the Ottoman princes kill in the name of a bad reason of State their closest relatives, this one [the king of Ethiopia] locks his own up on the Amara mountain, as we have already men‐ tioned” (“Au lieu que les princes ottomans font mourir par une mauvaise raison d’État leurs plus proches parents, celui-ci [le roi d’Éthiopie] renferme les siens sur la montagne Amara, comme nous l’avons déjà dit”). 106 Far from only being the source of reprehensible actions, the reason of State is also presented as a superior principle, which is, for instance, capable of obliging the king to abandon his traditional function of warrior: “And who is the prince who would not blush to be a stay-at-home after this [the example of the warrior queen Zenobia]; if he had not been sometimes forced by the reason of State to stop in places where his presence would be more necessary than in the armies? ” (“Et qui est le prince 123 3.6 The Reason of State or the “Politics of the Lesser Evil” 107 La Mothe Le Vayer, De l’Instruction de Monseigneur le Dauphin, 118. 108 La Mothe Le Vayer, La Politique du Prince, 353. 109 Ibid., 354. qui ne rougirait d’être casanier après cela [l’exemple de la reine guerrière Zén‐ obie]; si ce n’est que la raison d’État le force parfois de s’arrêter aux lieux où sa présence est plus nécessaire que dans les armées? ”) 107 On the whole, in the works that have just been mentioned, La Mothe Le Vayer does not necessarily blacken the reason of State, but highlights the sacrifices that it may require from the ordinary men, as well as from the prince himself. For reasons easily understandable, he seems to avoid either connecting it with French politics, or recommending it to the future king. Despite refraining from using the actual expression “reason of State”, La Mothe Le Vayer is not afraid of including its practices in the pieces of advice that he gives to the future prince. For instance, since the private good must always yield to the general good, “there are cases when the princes are entitled to use what the private individuals own, against their intention like, among others, when they judge it necessary to burn the suburbs of a town, or to damage a province, so that the enemies who want to invade it cannot take advantage of it” (“il y a des cas où les princes ont le droit d’user de ce que possèdent les particuliers, contre leur intention, comme quand ils jugent nécessaire de brûler les faubourgs d’une ville, ou de faire le dégât dans une province, afin que les ennemis qui la veulent envahir ne s’en puissent prév‐ aloir ”). 108 Nevertheless, by resorting to these measures that harm the properties or even the life of the individuals they govern, the sovereigns must make sure that they do not become tyrants. In other words, they must not follow the ex‐ ample of the Oriental despots, Turks or Tartars, who manage as they please the goods and the lives of their subjects, whom they reduce to the condition of “serfs” or even “slaves” (“esclaves”). 109 Although, in the view of La Mothe Le Vayer, it is a legitimate aspect of the exercise of power, the injustice that proceeds from the breach of the generally admitted moral norms must be restricted to excep‐ tional situations. The relationship between the injustice of the measures that pertain to the reason of State and the out-of-the-ordinary status of the situations to which they have to be applied is analysed more deeply by two letters, the Lettre XCV. De la Fidélité romaine and the Lettre LIII. Du Commandement souverain. Since they were not written for an official purpose, the two letters are less careful about upsetting the sensitivity of the adversaries of the reason of State. In the educa‐ tional treatises written for the future monarch, La Mothe Le Vayer stresses the autonomy of politics with respect to other fields, but seems to prefer to speak rather about the interest than about the reason of State: “The interest of State is 124 Chapter 3. The Political Science Taught by La Mothe Le Vayer 110 Ibid., p. 315-316. See also La Mothe Le Vayer, “Digression sur le sujet du feu roi de Suède,” in De l’Instruction de Monseigneur de Dauphin, 140. 111 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre XCV. De la Fidélité romaine, 14. 112 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre LIII. Du Commandement souverain, in Œuvres, VI/ I, 489. 113 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre XCV. De la Fidélité romaine, 28-29. the point around which all sorts of governments turn; the utility forms their sphere of activity, outside which they do not take any action” (“L’intérêt d’État est le point sur lequel tournent toutes sortes de gouvernements; l’utilité fait leur sphère d’activité, hors de laquelle ils n’agissent point”). 110 Less disputed than the reason of State, the interest allows the author to present politics as a domain governed by the useful (“l’utile”), which is not concerned about the honest (“l’honnête”). The connection between the reason of State and the interest comes clearly out from the Lettre XCV. De la Fidélité romaine: “It has never happened that the reason of State, which is synonymous with the interest, did not prevail over all sorts of other considerations” (“Il ne fut jamais que la raison d’État, qui est celle de l’intérêt, ne l’emportât sur toute sorte d’autres considérations ”). 111 The reason of State, which coincides with the interest, submits only to its own rules and remains indifferent to the ethical norms that govern the lives of ordi‐ nary people. The Lettre LIII. Du Commandement souverain casts further light on the injustice that is inherent in the reason of State. In the case of domestic pol‐ itics, the reason of State argues for the sacrifice of the individual in favour of the community to which he belongs: “All we can say is that although in the ethics of the ordinary individuals it is not allowed to do an evil, in order to obtain a good, the reason of State acts the other way around and ill-treats the individual in favour of a community” (“Tout ce qu’on peut dire, c’est qu’encore que dans celle des particuliers il ne soit pas permis de faire un mal, pour en retirer un bien, la raison d’État en use souvent tout au rebours, et maltraite le particulier en faveur d’une communauté”). 112 In the field of the foreign politics, the reason of State materialises in the attempt to increase power through the conquest of other States: “We can even argue, that since the Roman domination has been the most extended of all those that have come to our knowledge, there has never been another one, which has afforded itself to act more immorally in this respect, by the unjust oppression of all its neighbours” (“L’on peut même soutenir, que comme la domination romaine a été la plus étendue de toutes celles, qui sont venues à notre connaissance, aussi n’y en a-t-il point eu, qui se soit donné plus de licence qu’elle à cet égard, par l’oppression injuste de tous ses voisins”). 113 Regardless of writing a treatise that is supposed to address the education of the prince in conventional terms, in La Politique du Prince (1654) the author is not afraid to expose the inexhaustible desire to increase power, which is a 125 3.6 The Reason of State or the “Politics of the Lesser Evil” 114 La Mothe Le Vayer, La Politique du Prince, 314. 115 On the connections between interest and the “politics of power” (“politique de puis‐ sance”) of the European States, see Thuau, Raison d’État et pensée politique à l’époque de Richelieu, 317. 116 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre XCV. De la Fidélité romaine, 14. 117 Ibid., 30-31. common aspiration of all the States: “The claims of the States stretch almost to infinity. If the emperors of today were believed, all the powers from Europe, Asia and Africa would pertain to them, as being nothing more than the dis‐ memberment of their predecessors’ domination” (“Les prétentions des États s’étendent presque à l’infini. Si les empereurs d’aujourd’hui en étaient crus, toutes les puissances de l’Europe, de l’Asie et de l’Afrique relèveraient d’eux, comme n’étant que des démembrements de la domination de leurs prédéces‐ seurs”). 114 For instance, France claims to be the heir of Charlemagne’s empire, while the Ottoman Empire claims to be the heir of the Roman Empire. Implicitly, the thirst for power is likely to be checked by interest, which is the rational element of politics, prompting to a balance between the advantages and the disadvantages that may result from certain conquests. 115 If in the field of domestic politics, the reason of State leads to the minimisation of the individual good in favour of the general good, in the field of foreign politics it leads to the submission of the weakest to the strongest. In spite of realising that the reason of State is guilty of immoral practices, La Mothe Le Vayer does not ignore its pervasiveness in the sphere of politics: “The nations in general have undoubtedly agreed on this political principle [the reason of State] and if there has been any difference among them in this respect, it has only concerned its being more or less applied” (“Les nations en général ont sans doute convenu de ce principe politique [la raison d’État], et s’il y a eu quelque différence entre elles à cet égard, ce n’a été que selon le plus et le moins”). 116 Furthermore, Chris‐ tianity itself has not succeeded in eliminating the ways of thinking and of acting that result from a reason of State that has behind it a long historical tradition: “Nevertheless, trying to find within Christianity authorities that never sur‐ render to the State maxims which have been practised by the Romans and before them by the Greeks, the Persians, and the Macedonians, would be like searching for Plato’s Republic” (“Cependant n’est-ce pas chercher dans le christianisme même une République de Platon, que d’y vouloir trouver des souverainetés, qui ne se laissent jamais aller aux maximes d’État, que pratiquaient les Romains, et avant eux les Grecs, les Perses, et les Macédoniens”). 117 126 Chapter 3. The Political Science Taught by La Mothe Le Vayer 118 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre LIII. Du Commandement souverain, 489-490. 119 On the comparison between the kingdom and the body, see David George Hale, The Body Politic. A Political Metaphor in Renaissance English Literature (The Hague, Paris : Mouton, 1971), 18-32 ; and Senellart, Machiavélisme et raison d’État XIIe-XVIIIe siècles, 20-22. In spite of acknowledging that the reason of State is unavoidable, La Mothe Le Vayer pleads for its application to a number of situations that is as limited as possible: But the Italians themselves, who attach such great importance to this reason of State, although in fact it is nothing else than a mere consideration of interest, confess that it must be used only in situations of extreme necessity, wherein the usual ways would have no result; similarly to the doctors who use poisons as medicines only in the case of incurables diseases, in which any other remedy would most likely be useless. Mais les Italiens mêmes, qui font tant de cas de cette raison d’État, quoiqu’elle ne soit rien au fond qu’une pure considération d’intérêt, avouent, qu’elle ne doit jamais être employée que dans d’extrêmes nécessités, et où les voies ordinaires ne peuvent avoir lieu ; comme les médecins ne se servent de poisons pour médicament, qu’aux maladies incurables, et lorsque tout autre remède serait vraisemblablement inutile. 118 Inseparable from politics, the reason of State is far from having been invented by the Italians, who probably pretend to be specialists in it because of works like that of Giovanni Botero, from which it holds its name. From the height of the status that they claim, even the Italians confirm what, according to La Mothe Le Vayer, must be intrinsic to every discourse on the reason of State and concerns the exceptional character of the situations which justify its application. In order to be legitimate, the reason of State must be used like the poisons-remedies which, in order to succeed in saving the patient instead of being fatal to him, must be strictly measured out and prescribed in out-of-the-ordinary situations. Implicitly, the comparison between the reason of State and the poisons-remedies relies on the well-known analogy between the kingdom and the body. 119 There‐ fore, the king is supposed to see to the well-being of a State from the perspective of its relationship with nature and not with spirituality. The prince, as he is depicted in one of the treatises written for his education, is bound to play a role comparable to that of the doctor: All we can say about their concordance [of kingship and surgery] consists in that just like the great number of cuts and the duration of wounds are often shameful for a surgeon; the multitude of tortures, and the long diseases of a State are no less detri‐ mental to a sovereign’s reputation. 127 3.6 The Reason of State or the “Politics of the Lesser Evil” 120 La Mothe Le Vayer, De l’Instruction de Monseigneur le Dauphin, 206. 121 La Mothe Le Vayer, “XIV. Problème. Peut-on trop respecter les lois, et être trop rigoureux justicier? ,” in Problèmes sceptiques, 255. On the analogy between the “discourse of the lesser evil” (“le discours du moindre mal”) and the “medical discourse” (“discours méd‐ ical”) which is performed by La Mothe Le Vayer, see Gouverneur, Prudence et subversion libertines, 212-213. 122 La Mothe Le Vayer, La Physique du Prince, in Oeuvres, II/ I, 176. Tout ce qu’on peut dire qu’il y a de convenance entre elles [la royauté et la chirurgie], consiste en ce que comme le grand nombre d’incisions, et la durée des plaies, sont souvent honteuses à un chirurgien ; la multitude des supplices, et les longues maladies d’un État, ne sont pas moins préjudiciables à la réputation d’un souverain. 120 The job of the king can be compared to that of the surgeon because, metaphor‐ ically, it consists in acting resolutely by means of operations whose therapeutic purpose does not exclude suffering. As it results from a work that is not partic‐ ularly concerned with the royal education, namely the “XIV. Problème. Peut-on trop respecter les Loix, et être trop rigoureux Justicier? ” from Problèmes scep‐ tiques (1666), in medicine, like in politics, the recovery sometimes goes through the recourse to painful remedies, which entail the sacrifice of a part of the body for the salvation of another one: “in politics, just like in medicine, what is most useful is also the most just. In the case of the latter a limb is cut in order to save another one, or the arm is bled in order to cure the head” (“dans la politique, aussi bien que dans la médecine, ce qui est le plus utile est encore le plus juste. Dans celle-ci l’on coupe un membre pour en sauver un autre, ou l’on saigne le bras pour guérir la tête”). 121 A solution adopted in necessity cases, the amputa‐ tion of a limb of the human or of the political bodies is justified by the fact that it represents only the lesser evil. In spite of being bound to take care of the health of his State, according to La Mothe Le Vayer, the monarch must be aware of the disastrous consequences to which can lead the attempts to completely heal the political body through treat‐ ments that are inseparable from atrocious sufferings. Like the surgeons, sover‐ eigns are supposed to take into account the fact that the illness is inherent in the life of State and individuals. Far from being able to completely heal the illnesses, medicine limits itself time and again to soothe the pain: “The medicine whose job is to cure all sorts of illnesses contents itself often with the fact of pruning instead of uprooting these wild plants, which grow back instantly” (“La médecine qui fait profession de guérir toute sorte de maux, se contente souvent d’émonder au lieu de déraciner ces plantes sauvages qui repoussent aussitôt”). 122 Similarly, in the field of politics, the attempts that aim at completely suppressing the diseases that undermine the health of the State risk ending up by destroying 128 Chapter 3. The Political Science Taught by La Mothe Le Vayer 123 On the distinction between “reform” (“réformation”) and “renewal” (“rénovation”), see Thuau, Raison d’État et pensée politique à l’époque de Richelieu, 383-384. 124 La Mothe Le Vayer, La Politique du Prince, 317. 125 Ibid., 300. it. In this respect, La Mothe Le Vayer shares once again the view of the éta‐ tistes, according to which the State disorder is synonymous with a sort of order, which cannot be swiftly settled. If they are not hostile to any type of “renewal” (“rénovation”) of the State, the étatistes reject firmly its “reform” (“réformation”), which they associate with the regrettable effects of Protestantism. 123 This is why, in the view of our author, the radical attempts to reform the State, for which the responsibility belongs often to a people who is by definition prone to error, are doomed to failure: Often the peoples let themselves get carried away by the persuasion of certain scrap papers, which by holding that they will reform the State by suppressing the abuses that can be found within it, destroy it pitifully by means of internal factions that either divide it, or destroy it entirely instead of renewing it. Souvent les peuples se laissent emporter à la persuasion de certains brouillons, qui sur le prétexte de réformer l’État en retranchant les abus, qui s’y trouvent, le perdent misérablement par des factions intestines, qui le divisent ou le détruisent tout à fait au lieu de le renouveler. 124 The daring operations that seek to cut the evil from the root run the risk of being fatal to the political order that they try to restore. In order to avoid revolutions likely to provoke catastrophic consequences, the reason of State that trans‐ gresses the norms of the ordinary ethics and inflicts great suffering on the po‐ litical body should only be a palliative remedy, used as a last resort and after the evaluation of the lesser evil. 3.7 The Contents of Political Science: from the War against the Common Enemy to Economic Prosperity Delimited with respect to the “magical arts” (“arts magiques”), religion or the exceptional situations that ask for exceptional remedies, the knowledge on which the prince is expected to rely for the exercise of his power still remains to be studied. What are the precise contents of this science that is worthy of admiration because it gives access to the “government rules” (“règles de sa con‐ duite”) 125 of a State on which the blossoming of the other spheres of life depends? 129 3.7 The Contents of Political Science 126 Senellart, Les Arts de gouverner, 59. 127 See Senellart, Machiavélisme et raison d’État XIIe-XVIIIe siècles, 56. 128 Bireley, The Counter-Reformation Prince, 45-46, 50. 129 On the war as a social bond, see Senellart, Machiavélisme et raison d’État XIIe-XVIIIe siècles, 63-67. 130 Giovanni Botero, The Reason of State, ed. Robert Bireley (Cambridge University Press, 2017), 75. Generally speaking, it concerns the “big machine” (“la grande machine d’État ”) of the State, which the prince, who is nothing else than “one of its pieces” (“l’ une des pièces”), “can control only by submitting himself to the overall mecha‐ nism” (“ne peut commander qu’en s’assujettissant au mécanisme d’en‐ semble”). 126 More precisely, it can be synonymous with the reason of State de‐ signed by Giovanni Botero in reaction against the governing art which, inspired by Tacitus and Machiavelli, was not concerned about the norms of ethics or justice. 127 A best-seller of the political literature, Botero’s work was conceived for the purpose of serving as a “handbook for Christian government”, 128 by building a reason of State that is in accordance with the precepts of Christianity. As we are going to see further on, although it is not quoted by La Mothe Le Vayer, Botero’s Della Ragion’ di Stato (1589) may be one of the sources of the treatises that he devotes to the education of the prince. The main objective of politics, the survival of the State relies firstly on the mastery of the violence that is an integral part of the community of individuals that has to be governed. 129 Obviously, this pessimism about the possibilities offered by life in a community is opposed to the idea of the classical philosophy that will be taken up by the Enlightenment, according to which the society governed by politics is able to improve the individuals. Consequently, the cohesion of the society is no longer based on connections similar to those among the members of the same family, but is built around a common enemy. This is why the Augustinian vision of war needs deeper nuances: certainly, it is necessary to wage war in order to obtain peace, yet the peace sought after is not among States, but among the members of the same community. Therefore, civil wars are being avoided by fighting against an adversary who is outside the country. While considering the war against a common enemy as necessary, La Mothe Le Vayer seems to be influenced by Botero’s thought according to which “there does not remain in the souls of the subjects any room for revolts so much are all taken up in deed and in thought by the enterprise [of the war]”. 130 By taking up the metaphor of the political body, La Mothe Le Vayer regards the fight against an exterior adversary as a way to purge the organism of the State of the impurities that are likely to spoil its health: 130 Chapter 3. The Political Science Taught by La Mothe Le Vayer 131 La Mothe Le Vayer, De l’Instruction de Monseigneur le Dauphin, 83. 132 See Senellart, Machiavélisme et raison d’État XIIe-XVIIIe siècles, 53. 133 La Mothe Le Vayer, “Digression sur le sujet du feu roi de Suède”, 146. 134 See Senellart, Machiavélisme et raison d’État XIIe-XVIIIe siècles, 53; and Robert Bireley, The Counter-Reformation Prince, 52. the big States are also subject to dangerous illnesses which come from their inside, if they are not made to work themselves by means of the guns at the outside and if the profitable heat of a foreign war does not consume the bad humours, of which the feverish emotions of the civil wars are usually born. les grands États sont aussi sujets à de périlleuses maladies qui leur viennent du dedans, si on ne les exerce par les armes au dehors, et si la chaleur profitable d’une guerre étrangère ne consomme les mauvaises humeurs, d’où naissent ordinairement les émo‐ tions fiévreuses des guerres civiles. 131 Meant to preserve the balance of humours that is essential for health, the treat‐ ment which consists in the fight against a common enemy prevents the political body from becoming its own enemy. Additionally, the therapeutic capacities of the war may take advantage of the fact that, at the time, it is a constant presence on the political stage. Starting from a conception that pertains to Machiavellism, the war is not launched by the enemy, but by the interest of State. 132 Conse‐ quently, the peace among States is not the aim, but the preamble to the war: it belongs to the wisdom of a sovereign to disarm only in convenient circumstances, to remain always on safe ground, and to hold for a doubtless truth that no matter how many articles of peace he concludes with his neighbours, there will always be an implied clause on their side that will make them enforce them only as long as they will be allowed to do it by the well-being of their State. il est de la sagesse du souverain de ne désarmer que de bonne sorte, de demeurer toujours dans ses sûretés, et de tenir pour indubitable, que quelques articles de paix qu’il conclut avec ses voisins, il y aura toujours une clause sous-entendue de leur part, de ne les observer, qu’aussi longtemps que le bien de leur État le permettra. 133 Stronger than all the possible peace treaties, self-interest transforms States into potential enemies. Unlike the role that has usually been attributed to it, an enemy is no longer the one who brings about war, but the one against whom it is decided to be waged. 134 Despite its latent state and curative virtues, war must not, in the view of La Mothe Le Vayer, lead to a policy of uncontrolled conquests. This means that conquests and wars are useful to the political body only to the extent up to which they provide it with more advantages than disadvantages: 131 3.7 The Contents of Political Science 135 La Mothe Le Vayer, La Politique du Prince, 310-311. 136 Botero, The Reason of State, “Appendix B,” 209. 137 Senellart, Machiavélisme et raison d’État XIIe-XVIIIe siècles, 67-70. 138 Ibid., 71-75. Just like our stoutness and our forces increase more by digesting well than by eating a lot; those of the political body rather wither away than augment because of the excessive conquests whose extent is only conserved with too much expenditure and other difficulties. Par effet comme notre embonpoint et nos forces n’augmentent pas tant en mangeant beaucoup qu’en bien digérant ; celles d’un corps politique dépérissent plutôt qu’elles ne s’accroissent par d’excessives conquêtes dont l’étendue ne se conserve qu’avec trop de dépense et d’autres difficultés. 135 In this respect, La Mothe Le Vayer shares again the view of Botero, who insists on the fact that, in order to be worth being pursued, conquests must bring about a profit that outweighs the harm that they cause: “a campaign, for which you have to spend without measure of your own funds, is not a campaign of acquis‐ ition but of damage and loss because all those enterprises ought to be considered foolish which are not able to maintain and sustain themselves”. 136 For La Mothe Le Vayer, just like for Botero, political power must worry more about the preservation than about the expansion of the State. According to Bo‐ tero, the means that are able to ensure cohesion to the community, which is essential for the survival of the State, do not pertain only to the war against an enemy living outside the country, but also to the individuals’ material prosperity. Hence, the solidarity that comes from the participation in the economic increase of the State adds to the solidarity in front of a common adversary. Invented in reaction to the reason of State that is associated with the Machiavellism sepa‐ rating politics from ethics, the reason of State designed by Botero relies on the cooperation to the economic development of the State by means of the quest of the individual “well-being” (“bien-être”). 137 Certainly, despite its pretences, Bo‐ tero’s reason of State is not entirely dissimilar to Machiavellism, as it results, for instance, from the way in which one considers a war against an external enemy as a means of avoiding a civil war. Nonetheless, by arguing for a close connection between the power of the State and the wealth of its subjects, it aims at showing, against Machiavellism and in accordance with the Counter-Reformation prin‐ ciples, that politics and morality are not irreconcilable. The doctrine that seeks to involve the individuals in the enrichment of the State pertains to mercan‐ tilism. 138 A theory that is essentially political despite its economic dimension, mercantilism holds that the State can increase its power through economic 132 Chapter 3. The Political Science Taught by La Mothe Le Vayer 139 La Mothe Le Vayer, De l’Instruction de Monseigneur le Dauphin, 66-67. 140 Richelieu, Testament politique, 343. 141 See Senellart, Machiavélisme et raison d’État XIIe-XVIIIe siècles, 20-27. growth materialising especially in the accumulation of precious metals. Hence, mercantilism argues for the development of two main elements, coin and pop‐ ulation, which are several times approached by La Mothe Le Vayer. Without clearly bringing out the connection between the power of a State and the money that it owns, La Mothe Le Vayer uses the metaphor of the body in order to emphasise the major role of money for the health of the political community: “And indeed it is not more usual for the physical body to become lame or paralysed when a nerve withdraws or shrinks; than for the political body to suffer from significant inconveniences or from dangerous failures when its income and its finances diminish” (“Et véritablement il n’est point plus ordinaire au corps physique de devenir boiteux ou perclus, quand un nerf se retire et s’accourcit ; qu’au corps politique de souffrir de notables incommodités, ou de périlleuses défaillances, lorsque son revenu et ses finances diminuent”). 139 Sim‐ ilarly to the nerves, which by spreading all over the body allow it to work nor‐ mally, the money that is indispensable to the good course of all the activities is vital for the functioning of the State. In spite of stressing the importance of “finances”, La Mothe Le Vayer does not go as far as Richelieu, who highlights the excesses which sometimes lead to the necessity to acquire the money that is endowed with an arbitrary power: “Silver and gold are the tyrants of the world and, although their domination is in itself unjust, it is sometimes so reasonable that its domination must be suffered and sometimes it is so disrupted that it is impossible not to loathe its yoke as entirely unbearable” (“L’or et l’argent sont les tyrans du monde et, bien que leur empire soit de soy-même injuste, il est quelquefois si raisonable qu’il en faut souffrir la domination, et quelquefois il est si déréglé qu’il est impossible de n’en détester pas le joug comme du tout insupportable”). 140 According to La Mothe Le Vayer, despite its influence over the health of the political body, the acquisition of money does not justify all the means. Since they are rich only as long as their subjects are rich, the powerful must not seek to become rich by impoverishing the people they govern. By mentioning the sol‐ idarity among the parts of the political body that derives from a metaphor de‐ veloped by John of Salisbury, 141 La Mothe Le Vayer brings out the natural con‐ nection between the wealth of the powerful and the wealth of their subjects: “Since the head cannot perform well its duties if the limbs are too debilitated, the kings have forces only as long as their subjects have stoutness” (“Tant s’en faut, les rois n’ont de forces qu’autant que leurs sujets ont d’embonpoint, la tête 133 3.7 The Contents of Political Science 142 La Mothe Le Vayer, De l’Instruction de Monseigneur le Dauphin, 72. On the connections that existed in the mercantilist thought between the wealth of the prince and the wealth of the people, see Nannerl O. Keohane, Philosophy and the State in France. The Renais‐ sance to the Enlightenment (Princeton University Press, 1980), 158-159. 143 La Mothe Le Vayer, De l’Instruction de Monseigneur le Dauphin, 73. 144 Ibid., 74. 145 Botero, The Reason of State, 151. See also Richelieu, Testament politique, 334: “France alone, because of possessing so much wealth of its own, has so far neglected trade, although it is able to do it as easily as its neighbours and to deprive itself thus of the assistance that they provide to it only at its own expense” (“La seule France, pour estre trop abondante en elle-mesme, a jusqu’à présent négligé le commerce, bien qu’elle le puisse faire aussy commodément que ses voisins et se priver par ce moyen de l’assist‐ ance qu’ils ne luy donnent qu’à ses propres despens”). ne saurait bien faire ses fonctions, si les membres sont trop débilités”). 142 The main consequence of the organic relationship between the prosperity of the State and the prosperity of its citizens concerns the manner in which taxes are levied. Hence, the author argues for a fair tax system: It is also necessary that they [the sovereigns] see to it that taxes are raised in a pro‐ portion which is rather geometrical than arithmetrical so that all the parts of the State contribute to it, each one according to its capacities and according to what is allowed by the reason of good judgement, which is so much talked about by the Italians. Il est aussi besoin qu’ils [les Souverains] prennent garde que les impositions se fassent avec une proportion plutôt de géométrie, que d’arithmétique, en telle façon que toutes les parties de l’État y contribuent, chacune selon ses forces, et selon la raison du bon gouvernement, dont parlent tant les Italiens, le peut souffrir. 143 By putting forward the “reason of good government” (“la raison du bon gou‐ vernement”) or, in other words, the “good reason of State” (“la bonne raison d’État”), La Mothe Le Vayer stresses the necessity to collect taxes in a way that is proportional to the economical power of the different social categories. Be‐ cause of the permanent benefits which they draw from commerce, the mer‐ chants are amongst the most able to contribute to the taxes that are supposed to provide for the needs of the State. Constant source of income because of the gains that it is able to bring, the commerce, “about which we could not be careful enough” (“on ne saurait avoir trop de soin”), 144 should be constantly encouraged by the monarch. Despite highlighting the relationship between commerce and the enrichment of the State, La Mothe Le Vayer does not seem to worry, like mercantilists such as Botero, about the cold war among the States that is pro‐ voked by trade: “The most common way to grow rich from that which belongs to others is commerce […]” 145 134 Chapter 3. The Political Science Taught by La Mothe Le Vayer 146 La Mothe Le Vayer, La Politique du Prince, 338. 147 Botero, The Reason of State, 136. 148 On the interest that insures social cohesion, see Senellart, Machiavélisme et raison d’État XIIe-XVIIIe siècles, 75-77. On the economic connotation of the interest, see Albert Hirschman, “ ‘Interest’ and ‘Interests’ as Tamers of the Passions,” in The Passions and the Interests. Political Arguments for Capitalism before its Triumph (1 st ed. 1977; Princeton University Press, 2013). In addition to the way in which the taxes should be levied, the discussion of the relationship between the enrichment of the State and the people also in‐ cludes the thoughts of La Mothe Le Vayer on the elements that can ensure social order. The writer argues for a society wherein everybody finds their place thanks to work that corresponds to their capacities: “It would be desirable that things could be ordered in such a way that nobody remains without some occupation, for Vopiscus assures that the order from the old days Alexandria was such that it allowed the blind and the gouty to work and to earn their life” (“Qu’il serait à désirer que les choses pussent être réglées de telle sorte que personne ne de‐ meurât sans quelque occupation, puisque Vopiscus assure que l’ordre était tel autrefois dans Alexandrie, que les gouteux et les aveugles y trouvaient à trav‐ ailler et à y gagner leur vie”). 146 In spite of the reference to the Latin historian, the author seems actually to draw once more inspiration from Botero who, in order to justify the necessity of work, relies on the example of China, “an ex‐ cellently regulated province”, where begging is not permitted. All are employed to the extent that their ability allows: the blind, if they have of themselves no means to live, are employed turning mills by hand; the maimed, as much as they are able, to do something else. Only those are allowed to enter the public hospitals who are altogether helpless. 147 Far from being the punishment for the original sin like in the Middle Ages, work acquires a role of such an importance that every member of the society is forced to practise it in a way which is in accordance with their abilities. By applying themselves to it, individuals grow rich while contributing to the prosperity of the State. It is by means of the remunerated work that individuals serve the common interest at the same time that they see to their own interest. Fulfilled by work, the private interest replaces war and becomes the new social bond. 148 An admirer of the politics practised in China, as we will see further on, La Mothe Le Vayer extracts from the travel accounts about it some examples that, among others, refer to the treatment of the poor. Belonging to the vast number of cases that underlie the Pyrrhonian contradictions, these examples bring out the assistance that the Chinese refuse to offer to the poor, but provide to the 135 3.7 The Contents of Political Science 149 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue traitant de la philosophie sceptique, 75: “Chinese ethics talks about it [the charity towards the poor] in a totally different way, their country being full of hospitals for the animals, which we tread upon here, without having a single hospital for men, for this reason that if they suffer and are in need, it can come either from their carelessness and their cowardice, since they possess the same understanding and functions like the other humans, or from a just judgement and punishment of the sky, which makes it necessary to acquiesce to and to enjoy the troubles of such persons instead of providing for them by compassion” (“La morale des Chinois en discourt bien d’une autre façon, leur pays étant plein d’hôpitaux pour les bêtes, que nous foulons ici au pied, sans qu’il y en ait un seul pour les hommes, avec cette raison que s’ils souffrent et sont en nécessité, cela ne peut venir qu’ou de leur négligence et poltronnerie, ayant le même entendement et les mêmes fonctions des autres, ou d’un juste jugement et punition du Ciel, auquel il faut acquiescer, et se réjouir des misères de telles personnes au lieu de leur subvenir par compassion”). The same idea is more briefly mentioned by II. Des Richesses, et de la pauvreté, in Oeuvres, II/ II, 254, and Lettre CXLIX. Qu’il y a une pauvreté préférable aux richesses, in Oeuvres, VII/ II, 243. On the relationship between Christian charity and the Chinese rejection of the poor relief, see Claude Bourqui, “La Mothe Le Vayer et le modèle chinois de la bienfaisance,” in Représentations de l’individu en Chine et en Europe francophone. Écritures en miroir, ed. Michel Viegnes and Jean Rime (Neuchâtel: Éditions Alphil-Presses Universitaires Suisses, 2015), 43-52. 150 La Mothe Le Vayer, La Politique du Prince, 312: “For it is a permanent thing that a powerful State often needs certain dumps as were the Greek and the Roman colonies in order to be relieved of what bothers it inside either through the quantity, or through the quality” (“Car c’est une chose constante, qu’un puissant État a besoin souvent de certaines décharges, telles qu’étaient celles des colonies grecques et romaines, pour être soulagé de ce qui l’incommode au dedans, soit en quantité, soit en qualité”). On the exclusion or the forced labour, which according to Botero are the two forms taken by the struggle against the poor who are considered dangerous, see Senellart, Machiavélisme et raison d’État XIIe-XVIIIe siècles, 80-83. animals. In so doing, the Chinese hold that, unlike animals, men are mostly considered responsible for their life because they possess reason. 149 The recur‐ rence of these examples in the work of La Mothe Le Vayer could be an argument for the emphasis that he lays on work. Although he does not establish a clear relationship between work and private interest, he is likely to share Botero’s position on the role of work as social glue and, consequently, the fight against poverty. Indeed, La Mothe Le Vayer seems to suggest that the integration into society through work is complementary to the exclusion, which can lead to the creation of colonies. 150 This is why, in addition to the war against an external enemy, individual well-being which is the result of work and which contributes to the economic growth of the State makes place for itself in the political science that he teaches to the prince. 136 Chapter 3. The Political Science Taught by La Mothe Le Vayer 1 La Mothe Le Vayer, II. De l’Action, et du Repos, in Œuvres, II/ II, 169-170. See also La Mothe Le Vayer, La Promenade. VIII Dialogue, in Œuvres, IV/ I, 232-233. On the preference for the tranquil life over both the active life and the life that combines action and contem‐ plation, see La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue sur le sujet de la vie privée, 174-175. 2 La Mothe Le Vayer, II. De l’Action, et du Repos, 173. 3 Ibid., 173-177. Chapter 4. La Mothe Le Vayer’s Attitude towards Politics: Irreducible Contradiction? 4.1 Philosopher Away from the Political World Despite being aware of the great number of actions that he must resign himself to carry out, La Mothe Le Vayer shows clearly his preference for a life of inac‐ tivity: “without disapproving of others’ active life, I always offer myself the rest as the greatest happiness to which I can aspire; and [I avoid] activities as much as I can, as entirely opposed to my mood ” (“sans blâmer la vie active des autres, je me propose toujours le repos pour le plus grand bonheur où je puisse aspirer; et [j’évite] les occupations autant que je pourrai, comme du tout contraires à mon humeur ”). 1 Faithful to the moderation that comes from his practice of scepticism, the author does not minimise the active life in comparison with the life of rest for which he yearns. The taste for the two types of life derives from everybody’s temper and, obviously, the tranquil life is the most suited for La Mothe Le Vayer. In spite of the search for a peaceful life, he does not delude himself that he could entirely escape action. In his view, the life of “philosophical and scholarly leisure” (“loisir studieux et philosophique”) that is his aim is as irreconcilable with the “private affairs” (“affaires particulières”) and the “do‐ mestic care” (“soins domestiques”) necessary for the organisation of the house‐ keeping as with the “public activities” (“occupations publiques”) 2 related to the organisation of society. Therefore, he seems to be the adept of a life that distances itself from the public life and reduces as much as possible the involvement in the management of the household. 3 In doing so, he obviously goes against the life ideal pursued by the “civic humanists”, who aimed at reconciling the par‐ 4 On this ideal of the XV th century humanists, see Maurizio Viroli, From Politics to Reason of State. The Acquisition and Transformation of the Language of Politics (1250-1600) (Cambridge University Press, 1992), 87. 5 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue traitant de la politique sceptiquement, 468: “however he himself [Plato], in the fifth book of his perfect Republic, apologises for having made it so metaphysical, that it does not receive any example down here; holding that it does not make his book less worthy of being esteemed than the work of a renowned painter, for having represented through the effort of an excellent imagination a man so hand‐ some and so accomplished, that among us there can be seen none who is so absolutely perfect as him; and in the tenth book he confesses that this Republic cannot be found anywhere on earth, and that its model can only be seen in the sky” (“[…] si est-ce que lui-même [Platon], au cinquième livre de sa parfaite République, s’excuse de l’avoir rendue si métaphysique qu’elle ne reçoive point d’exemple ici-bas; soutenant que son ouvrage n’en est pas moins à priser pour cela, non plus que le travail d’un peintre renommé, pour avoir représenté par un effort d’excellente imagination un homme si beau et si accompli qu’il ne s’en voie aucun si absolument parfait parmi nous ; et au livre dixième il avoue que cette République ne se trouve nulle part en terre, et que le modèle n’en peut être vu qu’au Ciel ”). La Mothe Le Vayer refers to Plato, Republic, trans. Chris Emlyn-Jones and William Preddy, vol. 1, V, 472 d-e and vol. 2, IX 592 b (Loeb Classical Library 237, 276 ). According to Donald R. Morrison, “The Utopian Character of Plato’s Ideal City,” in The Cambridge Companion to Plato’s Republic, ed. G. R. F. Ferrari (Cambridge University Press, 2007), 232, one of the most accepted readings of the surface layer of the text of the Republic argues that the society presented within it by Plato is a utopia which is, however, not entirely unachievable. ticipation in political life, domestic activity and the interest in the studia hu‐ manitatis. 4 The preference for the withdrawn life that is shown in II. De l’Action, et du Repos (1644) turns in the Dialogues faits à l’imitation des Anciens into a sharp refusal of the active life, which mainly consists in political action. In this respect, Orontes alias La Mothe Le Vayer makes use of an argument borrowed from Plato’s Republic. Relying on a classical reading of the books V and X of the Platonic work, he argues that, in the eyes of the philosopher who created it, the society it depicts is condemned to remain a pure fiction, which cannot find its fulfilment in the world of humans. 5 The first of a series of works that comprises Thomas More’s Utopia, Tomaso Campanella’s La Città del Sole and Francis Ba‐ con’s New Atlantis, the book of the Greek philosopher would actually come down to a mere philosophical amusement: “It was therefore more like a pastime for Plato, who wanted to try everything that could be philosophically said on this topic, than like a serious political occupation, in which field he never really wanted to receive a genuine job” (“C’était donc plutôt un passe-temps à Platon, qui voulut essayer ce qui se pouvait philosophiquement dire sur ce sujet, qu’une sérieuse occupation politique, où il n’a jamais voulu recevoir de véritable em‐ 138 Chapter 4. La Mothe Le Vayer’s Attitude towards Politics: Irreducible Contradiction? 6 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue traitant de la politique sceptiquement, 468. 7 Ibid. La Mothe Le Vayer refers to Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, vol. 1, Book III, 23-24. 8 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue traitant de la politique sceptiquement, 469. ploi”) . 6 Hence, the Republic does not seek to lay the foundations of actual po‐ litical action, but can be reduced to a meditation that allowed Plato to enjoy himself by seeing the results of his thoughts on politics. The best confirmation of the fact that the Republic was, ever since the beginning, doomed to remain a mere fiction, comes from the behaviour of Plato himself: the Greek philosopher has never accepted the invitation of the Arcadians and the Thebans who, by offering him to be their lawmaker, were giving him the opportunity to apply his ideas. In the view of La Mothe Le Vayer, Plato did not seize the possibility offered to him because he was convinced that the equality underlying the Republic was nothing but a myth, comparable to the “poets’ golden century, the Patriarchs’ state of innocence and the Jerusalem delivered of the saint Prophets” (“[…] siècle d’or des poètes, à l’état d’innocence des patriarches ou à la Jérusalem délivrée des saints prophètes”). 7 It is worth mentioning that Plato is only the starting point of a reflection, which by putting forward the founding figures of the Western philosophy, en‐ ables Orontes to legitimise a life away from politics. Thus, La Mothe Le Vayer’s character opposes to his interlocutor, defender of the involvement in the public life, the Greek thinkers who, through their works, have founded political phi‐ losophy. In so doing, he does not only mention in support of his position Epi‐ curus, whose indifference to politics is well known, but also Stoics like Cleanthes, Chrysippus, Zeno, or even Aristotle himself, who is usually cited in favour of the participation in public life. According to La Mothe Le Vayer, through their “meditations and writings on civil life” (“leurs méditations et leurs écrits sur la vie civile ”), such as The Laws, On the Republic, The Politics, philos‐ ophers like Plato, Chrysippus and Aristotle have only enjoyed themselves some‐ times by “forming ideas of governments as we were saying earlier, whose model can only be found in the sky and have talked about these general observations, detached from all singularity and, to put it like this, separated from all matter” (“[…] à se former des idées de gouvernements tels que nous disions tantôt, dont le prototype ne se trouve que dans le Ciel, et se soient entretenus sur ces con‐ sidérations générales, détachées de toute singularité, et s’il faut ainsi dire, ab‐ straites de toute matière ”). 8 Consequently, the types of government described by the classical works of the ancient Greeks have been only philosophical ex‐ ercises, invented by minds accustomed to entertaining themselves through thought. Results of theoretical speculation, the political models created by the 139 4.1 Philosopher Away from the Political World 9 Ibid. 10 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue sur le sujet de la vie privée, 194. On Diogenes, see Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, trans. R. D. Hicks, vol. 2, Book VI, ch. 2, 63 (Loeb Classical Library 185). Greek philosophers belonged to the abstract world of ideas and were not con‐ ceived for being put into practice. As a matter of fact, there have been only “very few” (“fort peu”) philosophers who “have been willing to stoop to the particular observation of the government of their time and much less to the handling of public affairs” (“se soient voulus abaisser jusqu’aux considérations particulières des polices de leur temps, et beaucoup moins jusqu’au maniement des affaires publiques”). 9 Aware of the irreducibly abstract nature of their political ideas, most of the philosophers have not been interested in contributing to making them live in a concrete space and time. Therefore, they have tried neither to analyse the politics of their time, in order to see whether it can be adjusted to their ideas nor, even less, to take a direct part in the actions that provide it with the shape under which it appears. While in the Dialogue traitant de la politique sceptiquement La Mothe Le Vayer justifies his distance from politics through his favourite activity, philosophy, in the Dialogue sur le sujet de la vie privée he legitimises his retirement from public life through his relationship with the community to which he belongs. For this purpose, Hesychius, the author’s alter ego, deals with the philosophers’ pre‐ tended belonging to the country whose citizens they are. According to Hesy‐ chius, philosophers like him are not members of “the body of particular States” (“corps des États particuliers”), but through an allusion to Diogenes the Cynic, are “cosmopolitan” (“cosmopolites”) or “citizens of the world” (“citoyens du monde”). 10 Since they belong to a universal community that transcends national frontiers, philosophers are not forced to make proof of altruism towards the other individuals who inhabit the same country as them. In order to undermine the theme of altruism, La Mothe Le Vayer inserts into his dialogue references extracted from two of the main philosophical trends to which it is usually attributed, namely Aristotelianism and Stoicism. Concerning Aristotelianism, the author mentions a fragment which is part of the third book of Politics, where the Stagirite writes about the relationship between the State and the individuals endowed with extraordinary virtue, which distinguishes 140 Chapter 4. La Mothe Le Vayer’s Attitude towards Politics: Irreducible Contradiction? 11 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue sur le sujet de la vie privée, 193: “Such persons, said he [Aristotle], do not belong to the Republic, which is an association of all those who live in freedom, because their excellence makes them outstanding and distinguishes them too much; the laws do not concern them at all, because they are themselves living and animated laws, which rule and govern all the others; no one has the right to command them because they are the kings and the perpetual dictators, to whom it is willed by reason that everybody obeys. Therefore if you wanted to be so reckless as to prescribe for them statutes and regulations, know that it would be like wanting to impose them on Jupiter himself ” (“Telles personnes, dit-il [Aristote], ne font pas partie de la Répub‐ lique, qui est une assemblée de ceux qui vivent en égalité, parce que leur éminence les met hors du pair, et les distingue par trop; les lois ne les regardent point parce qu’ils sont eux-mêmes les lois vivantes et animées, qui règlent et gouvernent tous les autres; personne n’a droit de leur commander parce qu’ils sont les rois et dictateurs perpétuels, auxquels la raison veut que tout le monde obéisse. Si donc vous vouliez être si téméraire que de leur prescrire des statuts et ordonnances, sachez que c’est les vouloir imposer à Jupiter même”). 12 See Andrés Rosler, “Civic virtue: citizenship, ostracism, and war,” in The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics, 153-157. 13 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue sur le sujet de la vie privée, 193. On the source of La Mothe Le Vayer’s reference, see Cicero, Academica, in On the Nature of Gods. Academics, trans. H. Rakham, II, XLIV, (136) (Loeb Classical Library 268). them from other people and makes them comparable to gods. 11 Unlike Aristotle, in whose opinion these individuals must be excluded from society through os‐ tracism in order to preserve the harmony of interests inside the political com‐ munity, 12 La Mothe Le Vayer seems to suggest that these individuals isolate themselves willingly from the community inside which they are supposed to live. To the partly Aristotelian arguments in favour of the solitary life, La Mothe Le Vayer adds Stoic arguments, which he extracts, among others, from Cicero’s abstract in the Academica: “And Cicero’s Stoic, within the fourth chapter of his Academic Questions, makes fun of the laws of Lycurgus, Solon and the twelve tables, arguing that there is no genuine law except for that of his time” (“Et le Stoïcien de Cicéron, au quatrième [livre] de ses Questions Académiques, se moque des lois de Lycurgue, de Solon et des douze tables, protestant qu’il n’y a de loi véritable que celle de son âge”). 13 By reporting the position attributed to the Stoics by the Ciceronian text, Hesychius does not seem to realise that he cites an argument that may oversimplify the thought of the Portico because it was developed in a polemical context. The two references that we have just seen allow La Mothe Le Vayer’s char‐ acter to fight against the intellectual tradition that dates back to the founding philosophies of Antiquity the necessity to get involved in the life of the com‐ munity. According to this tradition, the Aristotelians and the Stoics would have held that people are naturally carried towards life in society. Since it is in their 141 4.1 Philosopher Away from the Political World 14 See Malcolm Schofield, “Justice, oikeiōsis and the cosmic city,” in The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, ed. Keimpe Algra et al. (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 761-763. 15 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue sur le sujet de la vie privée, 194. 16 On the connections that exist within the universal community formed by the sages and the gods through “virtue”, “wisdom”, the “right reason” and “law”, see Schofield, “Justice, oikeiōsis and the cosmic city,” 768. nature to take care of others, individuals are supposed to willingly take part in the government of the community to which they belong. 14 By contrast, La Mothe Le Vayer relies on the works of Cicero and Aristotle in order to conclude, by means of another reference to Stoicism, in favour to the belonging of a com‐ munity of philosophers that the Universe alone is big enough to contain: Because of their disproportionate greatness, they cannot be part of the body of dis‐ tinctive States, like we have just said; but by being regarded in this great city of the universe, terminos civitatis suae in sole metientes, they represent its most beautiful, most important and most noteworthy member, after the gods, if you really want to understand them, like Epictetus and the other philosophers of his family did. Ils ne peuvent, à cause de leur grandeur disproportionnée, faire partie du corps des États particuliers, comme nous venons de dire, mais les considérant dans cette grande cité de l’univers, terminos civitatis suae in sole metientes, ils en font le plus beau, le plus important et considérable membre, après les dieux, si vous les y voulez comprendre, ainsi que faisait Épictète et les autres philosophes de sa famille. 15 Despite his plea for a retired life, Hesychius is not entirely deprived of connec‐ tions with other people, which only involve other philosophers. Thus, the writer may suggest that what holds the philosophers’ society together is the intellectual activity. By bringing them metaphorically closer to the gods, the reflections allow the philosophers to get out of the limited framework of the space and time wherein they live and which finds an embodiment in the laws in charge of the government of the different political entities. Made up of other philosophers who do not need the civil laws for conducting their lives, the community to which the philosopher La Mother Le Vayer feels truly attached is not political, but universal. Despite his concern with emphasising the universal and essen‐ tially apolitical character of the community to which he belongs, he does not deal with the “right reason”, which is considered by the Stoics who inspire him the only law capable of governing the philosophers’ city state. 16 Although he tries to avoid the active life, in the Lettre CV. Des Hommes de lettres, he shows that, even in the midst of it, he is not incapable of reaching the solitude that usually makes him retreat: 142 Chapter 4. La Mothe Le Vayer’s Attitude towards Politics: Irreducible Contradiction? 17 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre CV. Des Hommes de lettres, in Œuvres, VII/ I, 152. On Timon also called a misanthrope, see Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, vol. 1, Book I, ch. 9, 108, and vol. 2, Book IX, ch. 12. On the significances of the hermitage, see the two entries about it in Furetière, Dictionnaire universel, vol. 2. 18 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue sur le sujet de la vie privée, 170. On the humanists’ view of the active life, to which they attributed the role of joining the honest to the useful, see Domenico Taranto, “Le renouveau humaniste italien: vie active ou vie contemplative? ,” in Histoire raisonnée de la philosophie morale et politique, vol. 1. As far as I am concerned, wherever the Court goes, I find within it my Timonium, or my small solitude, and in the worst case, the curtains together with the sky of my bed form a hermitage, which pleases me all the more since, not being known by anyone, is not envied to me by anyone. Pour moi, en quelque lieu que la Cour aille, et en quelque lieu que je me rencontre, j’y trouve toujours mon Timonium, ou ma petite solitude, et au pis aller, les rideaux avec le ciel de mon lit me forment un hermitage, qui me contente d’autant plus, que n’étant connu de personne, personne aussi ne me l’envie. 17 In order to avoid letting himself be distracted by the Court, the author creates inside it his own universe by relying on means as modest as the bed and its curtains. Through the etymology of a word like Timonium or the polysemy of a word like hermitage, the writer connects himself with a tradition which, through philosophers of Antiquity like Timon and followers of the Christian devotion like hermits, values the retreat to the detriment of the active life. This long Christian and philosophical tradition confirms La Mothe Le Vayer in his taste for loneliness, which is so strong that he is able to acquire it even when he cannot avoid civic obligations. Because of its small dimensions, the space that makes the solitude possible in the middle of the Court is likely to be more mental than geographical. Additionally, it is worth pointing out the contrast between the bed, space of retreat reduced to the minimum, and the Court, vast space associated to the agitation and the fascination that surround the political life. Although he knows how to find seclusion in the middle of the places that lend themselves the least to it, La Mothe Le Vayer opts resolutely for a life of retreat. By opposing a tradition which, in the wake of “civic humanism”, pleads for the active life, he argues that the solitary life is the most capable of satisfying “these three powerful demons of human life” (“ces trois puissants démons de la vie humaine”), 18 represented by the categories of the “honest”, (“l’honnête”) the “useful” (“l’utile”) and the “delectable” (“le délectable”). Adding to the classical distinction between the “useful” and the “honest” inherited from Cicero’s On Duties (II. III. 9) the delectable which governed the fashionable society of his time, the author legitimises his defence of the solitude by means of a rhetorical 143 4.1 Philosopher Away from the Political World 19 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue sur le sujet de la vie privée, 170. question fleshed out by a hyperbole: “And what would you say if I told you that I receive from them [the three demons] more favours in a day than in their whole life those of you that you think the most advanced in their good graces? ” (“Et que diriez-vous si je vous fais voir que je reçois d’eux [trois démons] plus de faveurs en un jour que n’en ont en toute leur vie ceux d’entre vous que vous croyez les plus avancés en leurs bonnes grâces ? ”) 19 4.2 Philosopher who Considers Himself Duty Bound to Share the Fruits of his Wakefulness Without doubt, La Mothe Le Vayer’s interest in the existence away from the political life derives, to a great extent, from the leisure it is meant to provide. Contrary to the hasty conclusions that could be drawn by the individuals who are not familiar with the philosophers’ universe, the rest that the author searches for is not synonymous with laziness. As a matter of fact, La Mothe Le Vayer seizes every occasion for distancing himself from a leisure that would come down to an indolence, which he sees as bringing people closer to the state of wild animals or even to death: And hold it for certain that my hours of leisure will never be abandoned to a pure idleness. Our Minerva cherishes deeply the rest and the holidays; this is why it was called the Vacuna goddess by the Romans; but it has a loathing that cannot be ex‐ pressed for these shameful and blameworthy instances of idleness, which it calls the bliss of the people who sleep, the pleasure of a bear confined to his cave and the happiness that all the cemeteries give. Et tenez pour certain, que mes heures de loisir ne seront jamais abandonnées à une pure fainéantise. Notre Minerve chérit fort le repos et les vacations ; elle fut pour cela nommée la déesse Vacuna par les Romains ; mais elle a une aversion, qui ne se peut exprimer de ces oisivetés honteuses et reprochables, qu’elle nomme la félicité de gens 144 Chapter 4. La Mothe Le Vayer’s Attitude towards Politics: Irreducible Contradiction? 20 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre CVII. Des Compositions studieuses, in Œuvres, VII/ I, 202. On other cases where La Mothe Le Vayer shows his hostility towards a rest that would amount to nonchalance, see II. De l’Action, et du Repos, 170-171, Prose chagrine, 357-359, Troisième Homilie académique. Du Repos, in Œuvres, III/ II, 32-33, La Promenade. VIII. Dialogue, 231, La Promenade. IX. Dialogue, 250. On the rest that is supposed to lead neither to idleness, nor to total solitude, see La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre LXII. De la Méd‐ itation, in Œuvres, VI/ II, 101. The idea that, for La Mothe Le Vayer, the retreat “is not the condition of an abandonment to idleness and selfishness” (“est la condition non pas d’un abandon à la paresse et à l’égoïsme”), is also defended by Laurence Tricoche-Rauline in Identité(s) libertine(s). L’écriture personnelle ou la création de soi (Paris: Champion, 2009), 669. 21 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue sur le sujet de la vie privée, 191: “Hence because every thing is naturally carried to its good, all the men have an inclination and a physical desire to know. Yet the science is only acquired through contemplation, oportet intelligentem speculari phantasmata, and can only be possessed in a great rest and tranquillity, quie‐ visse ac stetisse dianeam, id vocamus scire ad prudentem esse, says the master of the School” (“Aussi pour ce que chaque chose est naturellement portée à son bien, tous les hommes ont une inclination et un désir physique de connaître et de savoir. Or la science ne s’acquiert que par la contemplation, oportet intelligentem speculari phantasmata, et ne peut être possédée que dans un grand repos et tranquillité, quievisse ac stetisse dia‐ neam, id vocamus scire ad prudentem esse, dit le maître de l’École”). qui dorment, le plaisir d’un ours, confiné dans sa caverne, et le bonheur, que donnent tous les cimetières. 20 Through a literary convention that consists in placing himself under the guard‐ ianship of the traditional patron of intellectuals, La Mothe Le Vayer blames the rest that limits itself to the satisfaction of the essential needs of the body like sleeping. In his view, an individual who uses the rest only in order to fulfil the indispensable actions for life is bereft of the status of man to the point where he resembles the beasts deprived of reasoning or is even annihilated as a human being. As invisible as they may seem at first glance, the actions accomplished by philosophers during their rest are well and truly present and materialise in the contemplation that leads to science. Since knowledge is presented as the ulti‐ mate goal of individuals, only the philosophers are fully capable of accom‐ plishing the mission with which they are invested as human beings. 21 Without being entirely incompatible with the most animated places, as we have already seen it, the philosophers’ leisure is, nevertheless, “equally enemy of action and 145 4.2 Philosopher who Considers Himself Duty Bound to Share the Fruits of his Wakefulness 22 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre CI. De la Vie solitaire, in Œuvres, VII/ I, 110. See also La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre XCIV. De la Retraite de la Cour, 3: “Although, through abstraction of mind, one could solitarily converse with himself at the core of a crowd, and in the middle of the greatest gatherings; nevertheless it is true that this inner discussion is much more convenient and more profitable for the souls that enjoy it in a place of rest, which receives no distraction” (“Bien qu’on puisse par abstraction d’esprit converser soli‐ tairement avec soi-même dans le fort d’une presse, et au milieu des plus grandes as‐ semblées; si est-il vrai pourtant, que cet entretien intérieur est bien plus commode et plus avantageux aux âmes, qui s’y plaisent, dans un lieu de repos et qui ne reçoit point de distraction”). 23 La Mothe Le Vayer, II. De l’Action, et du Repos, 173. of servitude” (“aussi ennemi de l’action que de la servitude”). 22 This means that, ideally, rest is exclusive of the political actions that deprive those who practise them of the time and the mental space necessary for the philosophical reflection. In order to be able to take full advantage of the periods of leisure by developing their meditations, philosophers need books. Men of letters, who found their meditations on other writers’ works, philosophers practise a “philosophical and scholarly leisure” (“loisir studieux et philosophique”). 23 Citizens of a Republic of Letters to which every member is supposed to bring his own contribution, they are bound to give back to their successors what they have taken from their predecessors. This means that the philosophers should make the results of their contemplations available for the wide public, in order to give rise to other med‐ itations: As far as I am concerned, I hold, together with one of the ancients, that those who never communicate in this way what they know bear some resemblance to the wild fig trees, which are born among the ruins, or on inaccessible cliffs, and whose figs only feed the jays and the ravens. If possible, we should give back to posterity the same benefit that we received from our precursors, oportet invicem lampada tradere, like when the torch is passed on and it would be ungrateful from you to wish to keep hidden your lights, after having been so usefully enlightened by those who preceded you. Pour moi je tiens avec un ancien, que ceux, qui ne communiquent ainsi jamais ce qu’ils savent, ressemblent aux figuiers sauvages, qui naissent parmi des ruines, ou sur des rochers inaccessibles, dont les figues ne servent de pâture qu’aux geais et aux cor‐ beaux. Il faut rendre, quand on le peut, à la postérité le même bienfait qu’on a reçu de ses devanciers, oportet invicem lampada tradere, comme au branle de la torche, et il y 146 Chapter 4. La Mothe Le Vayer’s Attitude towards Politics: Irreducible Contradiction? 24 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre CVII. Des Compositions studieuses, 199. See also La Mothe Le Vayer, II. De l’Action, et du Repos, 171, VII. De la Lecture des livres, et de leur composi‐ tion, 504, Prose chagrine, 359. 25 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, vol. 2, Book VI, ch. 2, 60: “Libertines he compared to fig-trees growing upon a cliff: whose fruit is not enjoyed by any man, but is eaten by ravens and vultures.” 26 See Andrei Pleşu, Parabolele lui Isus. Adevărul ca poveste (București: Humanitas, 2012), 58-71. a de l’ingratitude à vouloir tenir sous le boisseau vos lumières, après avoir été si utile‐ ment éclairé par ceux, qui vous ont précédé. 24 Despite the presence of the wild figs in the Gospel of Luke (Luke 13, 6-9), the “one of the ancients” from whom La Mothe Le Vayer seems to draw the reference to them is Diogenes the Cynic. 25 Although he is not entirely faithful to the orig‐ inal context of his reference - Diogenes compares the wild fig trees to spend‐ thrifts - La Mothe Le Vayer preserves its global meaning, which stresses the necessity to share with the others one’s possessions and to not waste them by making a strictly personal use of them. Although he does not mention the Gos‐ pels, the author seems to be inspired by the connection that their readers can make between the parable of the wild fig trees and that of the lamp under a bushel (Matt. 5: 15-16, Mark 4: 21, Luke 8: 16, 11: 33). 26 Symbol of knowledge, the light that the philosophers are able to get by at least partly basing themselves on what their predecessors managed to acquire is valuable only if it is made accessible to the generations to come. The logic of the relative balance between what we take and what we have to give back in exchange goes against the hasty conclusions that can be drawn from the seclusion that is necessary for the philosophical reflection. Although they must cut themselves off from society in order to be able to immerse them‐ selves in their intellectual activities, philosophers have to integrate into it through the diffusion of their meditations. Without doubt, when they make public their thoughts, they address in the first place their counterparts, philos‐ ophers and scholars who, theoretically, are the most capable of taking advantage of them. Obtained after hours of work that do not comply with the ordinary schedule hours, the knowledge acquired by men of letters takes part in the elab‐ oration of a science that, after every stage, accumulates and improves: The science from a day or a night, for both of them are to be taken into account in this case, are communicated to the others who come afterwards and who benefit from it, discipulus est prioris posterior dies, and besides that the second thoughts, which are thought of as the wisest, almost always correct the first ones. 147 4.2 Philosopher who Considers Himself Duty Bound to Share the Fruits of his Wakefulness 27 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre CXXXVI. D’un Homme de grande lecture, in Œuvres, VII/ II, 107. 28 La Mothe Le Vayer, Considérations sur l’éloquence française de ce temps, 271. La science d’un jour ou d’une nuit, car l’un et l’autre entrent dans ce compte, se com‐ muniquent aux autres qui suivent, et qui en profitent, discipulus est prioris posterior dies, et d’ailleurs les secondes pensées, qui passent pour les plus sages, rectifient pre‐ sque toujours les premières. 27 By disseminating the knowledge that they obtain during their retirement from the world, philosophers do not aim only at the individuals who have the same intellectual activities, but also at a wider public, which includes different types of individuals, more or less scholarly and learned, or even more or less contem‐ porary. Given La Mothe Le Vayer’s disenchantment with the masses and with the different categories that form them, it is certainly not surprising to see his lack of illusions concerning the value of the works that are retained by posterity: “And since a multitude can do a lot mainly when it joins deceit to force, it should not be surprising if the cabal of fools and the monopoly of men of little talent prevails over those whose merit they cannot bear” (“Et comme une multitude peut beaucoup principalement quand elle joint l’artifice à la force, il ne faut pas s’étonner si la cabale des ignorants, et le monopole des hommes de petit talent, l’emportent sur ceux dont ils ne peuvent souffrir le mérite”). 28 Hence, the quality works do not always have many chances of survival throughout the centuries, among others because of the mediocre writers who scheme against them. Every author is responsible for the quality of the works that he decides to show to the public, but does not exert a significant influence over the elements that deter‐ mine their fate and that are often random. In the Lettre CXVIII. De ceux qui font beaucoup de livres, La Mothe Le Vayer does not indicate the way in which the abyss that separates the present from posterity could be crossed, but tones down the disillusionment that he has ex‐ pressed in the Considérations sur l’éloquence française de ce temps and shows himself more optimistic about the justice that the future, unlike the present, may do to the merit of a book. In so doing, he invites the writers capable of writing a good book from the point of view of the content and the form to “not fear anything, especially from posterity, usually more fair than the time which runs away, and which for being without envy as well as without interest, passes more reasonable judgements” (“ne rien craindre, surtout de la postérité, ordinairement 148 Chapter 4. La Mothe Le Vayer’s Attitude towards Politics: Irreducible Contradiction? 29 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre CXVIII. De ceux qui font beaucoup de livres, in Oeuvres, VII/ I, 320. 30 La Mothe Le Vayer, II. De l’Action, et du Repos, 167. Contrary to La Mothe Le Vayer’s precisions, (L. de vita beat. cap. ult.), Seneca’s phrase that he reports does not belong to De Vita beata, but to On Leisure, 6, 4-5 in Moral Essays, trans. John W. Basore, vol. 2 (Loeb Classical Library 254). 31 See Furetière, Dictionnaire universel, vol. 3, first entry sage: “Philosopher who through the study of himself, of men, of nature and of the events of the past, has learnt to know himself and to well manage his actions” (“Philosophe qui par l’étude de lui-même, des hommes, de la nature, et des événements passés, a appris à se connaître, et à bien con‐ duire ses actions”). plus équitable que le temps qui court, et qui pour être sans envie, aussi bien que sans intérêt, donne des jugements plus raisonnables”). 29 When they make their thoughts available for a wide community, despite the whims of fortune that they may have to put up with, the philosophers justify their apparent laziness and assert themselves as individuals who bring their contribution to the general well-being. Thus, La Mothe Le Vayer emphasises the benefits that philosophers could bring to the world thanks to their scholarly leisure: Seneca argues that Zeno and Chrysippus were more helpful to their [Republic] by resting than if they had been great army generals. And indeed the more the sage belongs to himself, the more the public benefits from it, because from his retreat he provides it with the examples and pieces of advice necessary for life. The sweat of the rest of the men provoked by their laborious jobs can be at the most favourable to their country; the tranquil state of the one about whom we are talking is useful for the whole human race, who could not receive its education from a better place. Sénèque soutient que Zénon et Chrysippe rendirent plus de service à la leur [Répub‐ lique] en se reposant, que s’ils eussent été de grands généraux d’armée. Et par effet plus le sage est à lui, plus le public en retire de profit, parce qu’il lui fournit dans sa retraite les exemples et les conseils nécessaires à la vie. La sueur du reste des hommes qu’excitent leurs emplois laborieux, ne peut être avantageuse pour le plus qu’à leur pays ; l’assiette tranquille de celui dont nous parlons est utile à tout le genre humain, qui ne saurait recevoir son instruction de meilleur lieu. 30 Accomplished philosopher, 31 the sage referred to by La Mothe Le Vayer fol‐ lowing Seneca does not at all have less effect over the people’s lives than, for instance, the war leaders, who may embody at the greatest extent the prototype of the man of action. As arduous as it may seem, the work fulfilled by the men of action has consequences only within clearly delimited boundaries. Although its mechanisms and its dynamics are definitely less visible, the philosophers’ 149 4.2 Philosopher who Considers Himself Duty Bound to Share the Fruits of his Wakefulness 32 Seneca, On Providence, I, 5, in Moral Essays, trans. John W. Basore, vol. 1 (Loeb Classical Library 214): “between good men and the gods there exists a friendship brought about by virtue”. The theme of the friendship between the sage and the gods is also present in Diogenes. See Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, vol. 2, Book VI, ch. 2, 37: “‘All things belong to the gods. The wise are friends of the gods, and friends hold things in common. Therefore all things belong to the wise’”. 33 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue sur le sujet de la vie privée, 180. 34 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre LXXVI. De l’Emploi des personnes âgées, 224. 35 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre LXII. De la Méditation, 101-102. On the significances of the honour (“honneur”), see the third entry about it in Furetière, Dictionnaire universel, vol. 2, according to which “it is thought to be virtue and the probity itself: the meticulousness in keeping the given word” (“se prend aussi pour la vertu, et la probité même: l’exactitude à tenir sa parole”). work leads to consequences that are not restricted by time and space. Despite acting in an infinitely less brutal way than war and spreading in a way that is sometimes almost imperceptible, the results of the philosophers’ meditations influence individuals who live in the most different times and regions, by pro‐ viding them with the frameworks that they need in order to organise their ex‐ istence. By adapting the Stoic theme of the friendship between the sage and the gods, 32 La Mothe Le Vayer leaves aside the issue of virtue and argues that the thoughts they develop enable the philosophers to become friends of the gods: during their scholarly leisure, philosophers rise to intellectual spaces which are inaccessible to ordinary individuals and where, metaphorically, they have the “Gods of the sky” (“les dieux du ciel”) as “closest and most trustworthy friends” (“plus affidés et particuliers amis”). 33 Therefore, by making their thoughts public, philosophers allow the majority of the people to reach pieces of knowledge that they would have never attained by themselves. Since, thanks to this knowledge, the individuals succeed in ordering their daily life, the philosopher who makes it available for everybody plays the role of a “guide” and of “tutor of the human race” (“précepteur du genre humain”). 34 Hence, it is precisely because he isolates himself from a multitude from which he distinguishes himself through his “honour” (“honneur”), synonymous with moral and intellectual virtues, that the philosopher pursues activities that are beneficial to all of humankind: “When a man of honour separates himself from the crowd, it is at that moment that he becomes much more useful to the entire human race” (“Quand un homme d’honneur se sépare de la presse, c’est alors qu’il devient beaucoup plus utile à tout le genre humain ”). 35 The philosopher does not have to abide by the same constraints as the other professions over which he has the advantage of doing work that seems to merge with leisure. The constraints by which, however, he has to abide consist in performing an 150 Chapter 4. La Mothe Le Vayer’s Attitude towards Politics: Irreducible Contradiction? 36 La Mothe Le Vayer, Prose chagrine, 359. 37 La Mothe Le Vayer, De la Vertu des païens, “Confucius,” 233. On the diffusion of Plato’s idea about the philosopher-king at the beginning of the 17 th century, see Flandrois, L’Institution du Prince dans la première moitié du XVIIe siècle, 101-104. 38 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dixième Homilie académique. De la Philosophie, 152. 39 La Mothe Le Vayer, De la Vertu des païens, “Confucius,” 233. activity whose results are meant to serve as much as possible the community to which they need to be communicated: “As privileged as they are in their rest and their retreat, the contemplations even philosophical are blameworthy if they do not intend to come out and to appear to the advantage of the public” (“Les contemplations même philosophiques, toute privilégiées qu’elles sont dans leur repos, et dans leur retraite, sont condamnables si elles ne se proposent de par‐ aître, et de se produire à l’avantage du public”). 36 4.3 At the Service of Power or at a Distance from it? The importance given by La Mothe Le Vayer to the philosophers’ reflections asks for the analysis of the way in which he deals with the ideal of the philos‐ opher-king that dates back to Plato’s Republic (V, 475 c-e). In a rather traditional manner, our author understands Plato’s dream as the influence gently exerted by “reason” (“raison”) over “force” 37 or violence. According to La Mothe Le Vayer, only the Chinese have “shown that Plato’s important wish was successful and could be fulfilled, when he held that a State would never be perfectly happy, unless the sovereigns philosophised or the philosophers held the absolute power” (“ont montré que l’important souhait de Platon était réussible et pouvait être réalisé, quand il soutenait, que jamais un État ne serait parfaitement heureux, que les souverains ne philosophassent, ou les philosophes n’y eussent l’absolu pouvoir ”). 38 China has succeeded in making the “Kings philosophise” (“les rois philosopher”) or the “Philosophers reign” (“les philosophes régner”) by attributing all the jobs of “law officers” (“magistrats”) and “crown officers” (“officiers de la couronne”) to the Mandarins, who are the disciples of Confu‐ cius. 39 Because of the status acquired by Confucius, his disciples have the reputation of possessing to such an extent the knowledge and the practical science also known as “prudence” that the laws of the State reserve for them all the jobs related to the government of the country, except for that of the king. Confucius designed a book that comprises five volumes, out of which the first four collect 151 4.3 At the Service of Power or at a Distance from it? 40 On the worship of the Chinese for Confucius and his disciples, see La Mothe Le Vayer, De la Vertu des païens, “Confucius,” 233 and Dialogue de l’ignorance louable, 297. On the exclusive study of the ethics practised by Confucius, see La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue de l’ignorance louable, 332. On the composition of Confucius’ book, see also La Mothe Le Vayer, La Promenade. I Dialogue, 34. On the sources of these information on China, see Matthieu Riccius, Histoire de l’expé‐ dition chrétienne au royaume de la Chine, trans. D.-F. de Riquebourg-Trigault ( Lyon: H. Cardon, 1616), Book I, ch. 5, 38-39, 44-45, 49-50 and ch. 6, 72. 41 La Mothe Le Vayer, De la Vertu des païens, “Confucius,” 233. 42 Ibid., 233-234. On the sources of the example of the mandarins who are ready to sacrifice themselves for the king and the country, see Matthieu Riccius, Histoire de l’expédition chrétienne au royaume de la Chine, Book I, ch. 6, 92-93. the best maxims of his predecessors and the last one is based on his own thoughts. In so doing, he enhanced so much ethics in comparison with the other fields of philosophy, that ever since his time, in China, the extensive studies, after which the degrees of bachelor or doctor are issued, focus exclusively on it. 40 Recalling the threefold partition of knowledge referred by La Mothe Le Vayer in the educational treatises that we have already seen, Confucius’ phi‐ losophy is, globally speaking, divided into three parts, which concern the obli‐ gations towards oneself, towards family and towards society. 41 The history of China proves that Confucius’ philosophy is able to make its followers either strive for their country to the point of protecting it at the cost of their life, or to neglect it to the point of leaving it in the grip of invaders. On the one hand, the practice of the Confucian philosophy may prompt the Man‐ darins to active participation in social life. In this case, the altruism that is at the origin of the involvement in the civil life is developed to such an extent that it encourages the followers of the Chinese philosopher to be ready to sacrifice their life if needed. Relying on the work of Trigault, La Mothe Le Vayer holds that whenever it was necessary to put their life in jeopardy for the State or the sovereign, the disciples of Confucius have surpassed in audaciousness even the warriors, who are supposed to distinguish themselves through their bravery. 42 On the other hand, despite having led to what, from the point of view of a Western philosopher like La Mothe Le Vayer, represents the fulfilment of Plato’s dream, the Confucian philosophy may also have provoked the fall of the Chinese Empire, for it can also make the individuals who practise it lose any interest in action. In this respect, it is enough to recall the conquest of China which, at the time of La Mothe Le Vayer, was recent. Referring to a Dutch narration, the author holds that the defeat by what we know today as the Manchu “comes from too much study of these very Chinese whom their Mandarin philosophy has too much weakened, causing them to scorn weapons and to care only about rest” 152 Chapter 4. La Mothe Le Vayer’s Attitude towards Politics: Irreducible Contradiction? 43 La Mothe Le Vayer, Vingtième Homilie académique. XX. Des Sciences, in Œuvres, III/ II, 316-317. La Mothe Le Vayer mentions another episode connected to the victory of the Manchu over the Chinese in the Lettre CXXI. Des Abstractions spirituelles, in Œuvres, VII/ I, 350. 44 La Mothe Le Vayer, Vingtième Homilie académique. XX. Des Sciences, 317. 45 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue traitant de la politique sceptiquement, 474. (“vient du trop d’étude de ces mêmes Chinois, que leur philosophie mandarine avait trop amollis, leur faisant mépriser les armes, et ne tenir compte que du repos”). 43 Obviously, the two contradictory attitudes towards the involvement in political life come from the way in which Confucianism is understood. If it is regarded as a philosophy that must materialise in a certain way of life, it teaches its disciples to play an active role in the government and the preservation of the society. On the contrary, if it is interpreted as a philosophy that only cares about the intellectual practice, it abandons philanthropy and leads to a retreat that is indifferent even to the essential needs of society. The example of the Mandarins who have let themselves be absorbed by the study of Confucianism to such an extent that they have ended up by no longer performing their duties towards the State is used by La Mothe Le Vayer as an argument against the faulty practice of philosophy and science. As desirable as it may be, the practise of philosophy becomes harmful if it is excessive and crosses the limits of moderation by ne‐ glecting any other activity. 44 If the example of the Mandarins who have completely abandoned political life is mitigated by the condemnation of their immoderate practice of philos‐ ophy, there are other examples that seem to plea openly for the indifference to politics. In this respect, it is enough to remind the apparently irrevocable con‐ demnation of the political order which is performed by Orontes in the Dialogue traitant de la politique sceptiquement. Pretending to consider politics as the germ of the misfortunes from which men suffer, La Mothe Le Vayer’s spokesperson is far from sparing it, “estimating that no other thing has been so harmful to the human race as these beautiful policies, which have caused the wars, the tyran‐ nies, the plagues, the starvations, and generally almost all the evils that we have to endure” (“n’estimant pas qu’autre chose ait jamais été si préjudiciable au genre humain que ces belles polices, qui ont causé les guerres, les tyrannies, les pestes, les famines, et généralement quasi tous les maux que nous souffrons”). 45 In an obvious search for eloquence, the author uses a bitter irony in order to attack the political power (“policies”). Firstly, in an obvious contradiction with what they are actually worth, he qualifies them as “beautiful” (“belles”). Sec‐ ondly, he designates them through a hyperbole, as the exclusive source of the miseries that afflict men. The nostalgia for a state of nature, prior to any political 153 4.3 At the Service of Power or at a Distance from it? 46 Ibid. 47 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre CXXVII. De la Paix, in Œuvres, VII/ II, 14. 48 On this anti-humanistic topos in Charron, see Taranto, Pirronismo ed assolutismo nella Francia dell’ 600, 76-77. order, seems to be strengthened by the fact that “they threw the irons to the legs of this beautiful natural freedom, whose loss cannot receive any compensation” (“ont jeté les fers aux pieds à cette liberté naturelle, dont la perte ne peut recevoir de compensation”). 46 The order established by politics has apparently deprived individuals of a freedom to which philosophers like La Mothe Le Vayer are par‐ ticularly attached and has given them in exchange nothing but pains. However, if analysed in the light of other fragments belonging to La Mothe Le Vayer, the objections that have just been mentioned appear less destructive towards political power and its practice. For instance, the state of nature whose loss seems to arouse bitterness is much less seductive when it is put to the test of the author’s perception of human nature. More precisely, the cruelty towards other individuals of the same species is a feature specific to humankind, which distinguishes it from animals: Some base it [bellum à belluis] on the fact that the first wars were waged against animals; others consider it from the perspective of the fact that it is enjoyed only by men with a coarse and brutal mind and my feeling is that by seeing how men tear each other to pieces, the word will still be found too soft and of too little a significance, since there are no animals that strive so cruelly against one another like us, nor who persecute so mercilessly those of their species, like we do. Quelques-uns le [bellum à belluis] fondent sur ce que les premières guerres ont été contre les bêtes ; d’autres le prennent de ce qu’il n’y a guère que des gens d’esprit grossier et brutal, qui s’y plaisent, et je pense qu’à voir comme les hommes s’y entre‐ déchirent, l’on en trouvera le mot encore trop doux, et trop peu significatif, n’y ayant point d’animaux qui s’acharnent si cruellement, que nous, les uns contre les autres, ni qui persécutent impitoyablement ceux de leur espèce, comme nous faisons. 47 Far from being an isolated historical phenomenon, restricted to a primitive pe‐ riod of humanity and to certain backward individuals, war against individuals belonging to the same race represents the permanent state of humankind. De‐ spite being associated with savage beasts, brutality seems, in fact, a label that is more convenient for people. The parallel between humans and animals is an anti-humanistic topos, 48 which broadly speaking may be derived from the au‐ thor’s scepticism about humankind’s pretences to superiority. In order to em‐ phasise the argument of homo homini lupus, in the Dialogue traitant de la phi‐ 154 Chapter 4. La Mothe Le Vayer’s Attitude towards Politics: Irreducible Contradiction? 49 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue traitant de la philosophie sceptique, 88: “For, indeed, neither the wolves, nor the tigers or the lions ever use their ferocity towards those of their own species, the man being the only one who persecutes his fellow to such an extent that there is more for him to fear in the best and most polished town of Europe than in the middle of the darkest and the most loathsome woods of Hircania” (“Car, à la vérité, les loups, les tigres ni les lions n’usent jamais de leur férocité envers ceux de leur espèce, l’homme étant seul qui persécute son semblable, jusqu’à tel point qu’il y a plus à craindre pour lui dans la meilleure ville, et la mieux policée de l’Europe, qu’au milieu des bois les plus sombres et les plus infâmes de l’Hyrcanie ”). 50 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre LII. Des Poisons, in Œuvres, VI/ I, 485. 51 See A. John Simmons, “Theories of the State,” in The Cambridge Companion to Early Modern Philosophy, ed. Donald Rutherford (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 250-273. 52 See Alan Ryan, “Hobbes’s political philosophy,” in The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes, ed. Tom Sorell, 2 nd ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 208-245. losophie sceptique the writer has recourse to a new paradox, according to which the most civilised cities would be more dangerous for people than the most savage and the most remote forests. 49 Although they pretend to refine the rela‐ tionships between their residents and to provide them a safe space for living, the towns represent a peril that is directly proportional to their pretended degree of development which, among others, materialises in the number of individuals whom they shelter. Besides that, the cruelty towards the individuals belonging to the same species is much more widespread than it seems to be, for it does not always need to openly show itself: “Isn’t it an amazing thing, that besides the open force, which man uses every day for the destruction of his fellow man, homo homini lupus, he invented such foul means, for such an abominable ending? ” (“N’est-ce pas une chose merveilleuse, qu’outre la force ouverte, que l’homme emploie tous les jours à la destruction de son semblable, homo homini lupus, il ait encore inventé tant de détestables moyens, pour une si abominable fin? ”) 50 The astonishment, which is likely to be expressed by the “amazing thing”, certainly has a negative connotation, since it is provoked by the inventiveness that people use in order to harm other people. Whether they use open or dis‐ simulated violence, humans prove to be a more fearsome adversary of their species than predators, by confirming thus a common place that dates back to Horace. Against the Aristotelian view of people’s inclination to the political and social life, La Mothe Le Vayer argues for a view that pertains to the “political antina‐ turalism”, according to which the “natural condition of mankind is non-polit‐ ical”. 51 The establishment of a political order is justified by a state of nature that can reappear at any time, since it was not restricted to the dawn of humanity, before history and that can, in Hobbesian terms, be defined as the “war of all against all”. 52 The political order that is implicitly supposed to limit the harm 155 4.3 At the Service of Power or at a Distance from it? 53 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue traitant de la politique sceptiquement, 473. 54 La Mothe Le Vayer, Petit traité sceptique sur cette commune façon de parler, n’avoir pas le sens commun, 162. that people can cause to each other could never entirely eliminate violence and lying. Nevertheless, the political order aimed at by La Mothe Le Vayer following certain arguments of the political literature of his time relates the fulfilment of a State to the well-being of his subjects and limits the breach of the norms of common ethics to exceptional situations, which are the result of necessity. The apparent ambivalence towards the order established by politics is mir‐ rored by what, at first glance, seems to be an equivocal attitude towards the philosophers’ participation in politics. The attack on politics that is hyperboli‐ cally held responsible for all the human misfortunes is naturally followed by the rejection of the stereotype about the unconditional love that people are supposed to show towards the country whose citizens they are : “And trust me that when closely examined, the mori pro patria can be well understood only about imag‐ inary Republics like that of Plato” (“Et croyez qu’à l’examiner de près, le mori pro patria ne peut être bien entendu que pour des républiques imaginaires comme celle de Platon”). 53 Pursuing the argument that he had previously de‐ veloped and that tried to prove the utopian character of the society projects designed by philosophers, the writer’s alter ego stresses the insurmountable gap that divides political theory from political practice in order to fight the idea of the sacrifices that individuals are expected to be ready to make for their country. Alluding to the balance that should exist between what is received and what should be given back, he holds that only a State which is as perfect as those depicted by the philosophers of the ancient Greeks and Romans is worthy of the supreme sacrifice of its citizens. By pushing to its extreme consequences the discrepancy between the un‐ avoidable failures of the State and the sacrifices that it requires, La Mothe Le Vayer does not fear, in the Petit traité sceptique sur cette commune façon de parler, n’avoir pas le sens commun (1646), to quote the opinion of “some philosophers” (“quelques philosophes”), according to which “the love for the fatherland” (“l’amour de la patrie”) “is a useful error and a necessary fraud, in the absence of which no empire would subsist” (“est une erreur utile, et une fraude nécess‐ aire, sans laquelle nul empire ne subsisterait”). 54 Guaranteed by the intellectual authority that is attributed to the philosophers whose identity is, however, not unveiled, this opinion destroys the rightfulness of the attachment that the in‐ dividuals are supposed to have for their country. Far from being based on solid arguments, the devotion to the homeland that every individual is expected to be ready to prove comes down to a mere shrewdness invented for cheating the 156 Chapter 4. La Mothe Le Vayer’s Attitude towards Politics: Irreducible Contradiction? 55 Ibid., 163. La Mothe Le Vayer draws his reference from Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, vol. 1, Book II, ch. 8, 98. It is worth being mentioned that, although it appears in the chapter on Aristippus, the position cited by La Mothe Le Vayer has actually been expressed by Theodorus and reported by Antisthenes. 56 La Mothe Le Vayer, Petit traité sceptique sur cette commune façon de parler, n’avoir pas le sens commun, 162. multitude and making it strive for the State. Hence, the different political re‐ gimes do not survive because they are really worthy of their citizens’ love, but because the latter believe them to be worthy of it. It is because of their cosmopolitanism that certain philosophers disclose the illusion that is behind the pretended obligation of showing attachment to a par‐ ticular country. In addition to hampering their freedom by enslaving them to a piece of land, the love for the fatherland imposes on them duties towards a country and a government that they consider as marred by vices. In order to illustrate this topic, the author quotes some words that he attributes to Aris‐ tippus of Cyrene, in accordance to which “It was reasonable, as he thought, for the good man not to risk his life in the defence of his country, for he would never throw wisdom away to benefit the unwise” (“la prudence était de trop haut prix, pour souffrir qu’un honnête homme l’allât mal à propos hasarder en faveur des fous, sous ce prétexte de combattre pour son pays”). 55 Expressed through the category of the honest man, which was fashionable at the time of La Mothe Le Vayer, the thought of the ancient philosopher emphasises what is supposed to be the absurdity of the sacrifice that a man who would adopt a prudent behaviour in accordance with reason would make for the individuals who are deprived of it. Recalling La Mothe Le Vayer’s contempt for the multitude, this reflection shows the practical effects of the abstract concept of sacrificing one’s life for one’s country. Indeed, this results in giving up a life that has the great merit of being governed by the rules of the “right reason” in favour of the people who, because of their folly, are unable to appreciate its value. Nonetheless, the analysis of La Mothe Le Vayer’s attack against the common place of mori pro patria must take into account its context. The opposition to the love that everyone should feel for their country is only the reverse side of the “coin” (“médaille”), 56 which is a sceptical argumentation around the concepts that seem to give rise to the unanimity around the ideas giving substance to ethics. Thus, the reasons against the devotion to one’s country find their place within a device that, by juxta‐ posing two contradictory views of the same issue, tries to prompt a reflection on principles like “common sense” on which individuals usually base their judgements. Certainly, a certain distrust of the love for the homeland like of any other stereotype is undeniable from La Mothe Le Vayer. Nevertheless, the total 157 4.3 At the Service of Power or at a Distance from it? 57 La Mothe Le Vayer, Vingt-troisième Homilie académique. Contre les Plagiaires, in Œu‐ vres, III/ II, 363. hostility to the involvement in the politics of one’s own country to which the arguments that have just been mentioned seem to lead should be received with caution. If the philosopher is not bound to go as far as sacrificing his life for the State where he lives, he does not have to reject any involvement in its govern‐ ment. 4.4 Intertextuality I: The Boundaries of Royal Omnipotence Apparently, the contradiction between participation and indifference, the two possible attitudes of the philosophers towards political life, is mirrored by the two types of works written by La Mothe Le Vayer. On the one hand, his works are about the detachment from a kind of politics whose mechanisms he is not afraid of dismantling. On the other hand, the works that he writes aim at edu‐ cating the future king and, consequently, at taking part indirectly in the gov‐ ernment of the society. Certainly, a middle ground between the two categories of books should not be searched for at all costs. Fearless of contradicting himself, La Mothe Le Vayer acknowledges that he is not interested in developing a school of thought that would be characterised by coherence. However, in the two types of works that have just been mentioned, La Mothe Le Vayer is not always as contradictory as he seems to be at the first sight. A careful reading shows that in the books wherein he seems to unmask the tricks of power as well as in the books wherein he tries to educate the prince he uses the same passages several times. The use of the same passages in the two cate‐ gories of works may go unnoticed simply because he does not indicate it. Cer‐ tainly, his taste for the quotation is not to be mistaken for plagiarism, which he plainly considers as “theft” (“larcin”). 57 Indisputable when it consists in using without quotation marks passages taken from the authors of the present or the past, the theft implied by plagiarism is more serious when it affects contempo‐ raries: “To take from the Ancients, and to make one’s advantage of what they have written, is like pirating beyond the line; but to steal from one’s contem‐ poraries, by appropriating their thoughts and productions, is like pulling the wool at the corner of the streets, it’s removing coats on the Pont-Neuf ” (“Prendre des Anciens, et faire son profit de ce qu’ils ont écrit, c’est comme pirater au delà de la ligne ; mais voler ceux de son siècle, en s’appropriant leurs pensées et leurs 158 Chapter 4. La Mothe Le Vayer’s Attitude towards Politics: Irreducible Contradiction? 58 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre CXXXIX. Des Scrupules de grammaire, in Œuvres, VII/ II, 142. For a slightly different form of this quotation, see La Mothe Le Vayer, Vingt-troisième Homilie académique. Contre les Plagiaires, 362-363. This quotation will be taken up by Pierre Bayle in his Dictionnaire historique et critique (vol. 2, entry “Éphore”), quoted in the entry plagiarisme of the Encyclopédie, ed. Diderot and D’Alembert. On the offence represented by the theft of coats belonging to the passers-by on the Pont-Neuf, see Joan DeJean, How Paris Became Paris. The Invention of the Modern City (New York: Blooms‐ bury, 2014), 37-41. For a slightly different interpretation of La Mothe Le Vayer’s attitude towards plagia‐ rism, see Laurence Tricoche-Rauline, Identité(s) libertine(s), 170, footnote 174. 59 Gérard Genette, Palimpsests. Literature in the Second Degree, trans. Channa Newman and Claude Doubinsky (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 1-2. productions, c’est tirer la laine au coin des rues, c’est ôter les manteaux sur le Pont-Neuf ”). 58 The concern for intellectual theft and the distinctions it entails does not prompt La Mothe Le Vayer to think about a practice which is, to a certain extent, related to it and which, as we shall see, he uses on several occasions. This practice consists in inserting in his works fragments that he extracts more or less rigor‐ ously from other works that belong to him, but that he does not mention. Fol‐ lowing Gérard Genette, this practice may pertain to intertextuality, a term which he borrows from Julia Kristeva and which he defines “in a more restrictive sense, as a relationship of copresence between two texts or among several texts: that is to say, eidetically and typically as the actual presence of one text within an‐ other”. 59 In the case of La Mothe Le Vayer, intertextuality is used in reference to texts that have all been written by him and among which a text either includes or recalls fragments from previous texts. Among others, the intertextuality that refers to a text into which pieces from other texts have been inserted may concern the omnipotence that at the time was usually attributed to kings. In this respect, one of the cases worthy of being studied is the one that emphasises the reciprocity of the duties of the king and of the people towards one another. In support of the correlation which should exist between the “obedience” (“obéissance”) that a people owes to its sovereign and the “protection” that the sovereign owes to his people, in the Dialogue trai‐ tant de la politique sceptiquement, Orontes holds that “when carefully consid‐ ered, says Seneca, the Cesars belong to the Republic, and not the Republic to the Cesars” (“à le bien prendre, dit Sénèque, les Césars appartiennent à la Répub‐ 159 4.4 Intertextuality I: The Boundaries of Royal Omnipotence 60 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue traitant de la politique sceptiquement, 493. For the inter‐ pretation of this fragment in the sense of the “reciprocity of the duties between the people and its sovereign” (“réciprocité des devoirs entre le peuple et son souverain”), see Gouverneur, Prudence et subversion libertines, 454. See also La Mothe Le Vayer, De la Liberté, et de la Servitude, in Œuvres, III/ I, 200: “and the mutual obligation of kings towards their peoples is so strict, that according to the good philosophy if the Republic belongs to Cesar, Cesar belongs much more to the Republic” (“et l’obligation réciproque des rois à leurs peuples est si étroite, qu’en bonne philosophie si la République appa‐ rtient à César, César appartient beaucoup plus à la République”). 61 La Mothe Le Vayer, La Politique du Prince, 336. 62 Ibid., 352-354. 63 Ibid., 356. lique, et non pas la République aux Césars”). 60 In the plea for the knowledge of the prince that he carries out in the treatise La Politique du Prince, La Mothe Le Vayer argues, without however referring to Seneca, that “Indeed, the good Ce‐ sars have always believed that they belonged more to the State, than the State belonged to them” (“En effet, les bons Césars ont toujours cru qu’ils étaient plus à l’État, que l’État n’était à eux ”). 61 Despite the slight variations at the level of the terms that are being used, the examples stress both the balance that should exist between the submission of the people to its king and the authority of the king over his people. In the case of the sovereign, the power that he possesses provides him with advantages, but also creates duties for him. It is precisely because of the extent of his power that the sovereign has to use it in a way that is not profitable only for himself, but also for the whole people. More concretely, this comes to saying that the monarch has the obligation to preserve the lives and the goods of his subjects. Indeed, he is bound to use his absolute power for taking care of the individuals’ possessions as if they were his own. 62 The illustration of the intertextuality by the fragments that overlap up to a certain point with respect to the royal power also concerns the reasons on which a monarch should base his actions in order to deserve public esteem. In this context, it is useful to remember the example of the Greek prince who did not accept being belittled in comparison with a Persian prince only because of the size of his kingdom: “Why would the king of Persia be a greater king than me, was saying this small sovereign of Greece, if he is not more virtuous than me and if he does not fulfil his duty better than me? ” (“Pourquoi le roi de Perse sera-t-il plus grand roi que moi, disait ce petit souverain de Grèce, s’il n’est encore plus vertueux, et s’il ne s’acquitte mieux de sa charge que je ne fais de la mienne? ”) 63 Quoted from the Politique du Prince, this example appears also in the treatise De l’Instruction de Monseigneur le Dauphin and the Dialogue traitant de la politique sceptiquement, wherein the qualities of the Persian sovereign be‐ 160 Chapter 4. La Mothe Le Vayer’s Attitude towards Politics: Irreducible Contradiction? 64 La Mothe Le Vayer, De l’Instruction de Monseigneur le Dauphin, 64 and Dialogue traitant de la politique sceptiquement, 495. For the same example in a slightly different form, see La Mothe Le Vayer, La Promenade. IX Dialogue, in Œuvres, IV/ I, 256. 65 The quotations are extracted from La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue traitant de la politique sceptiquement, 495, De l’Instruction de Monseigneur le Dauphin, 64 and La Politique du Prince, 356. 66 La Mothe Le Vayer, La Politique du Prince, 335: “They [the monarchs] cannot maintain for a long time the peoples submitted to their will unless they themselves submit to reason” (“Ils [les monarques] ne peuvent tenir longtemps les peuples soumis à leurs volontés, s’ils ne se soumettent eux-mêmes à la raison”). On the connections between reason and virtue for the Stoics, see Jean-Baptiste Gourinat, Le Stoïcisme, 3 rd ed. (Paris: PUF, 2011), 47-48. 67 La Mothe Le Vayer, La Politique du Prince, 349. On Roman law, see, for example, Viroli, From Politics to Reason of State, 72. fore which the Greek king was ready to bow consisted, slightly differently, in being “better” (“meilleur ”) and “more just” (“plus juste”). 64 While in the previ‐ ously mentioned dialogue the example of the small Greek sovereign belongs to the arguments gathered against royal omnipotence, in De l’Instruction de Mon‐ seigneur le Dauphin and La Politique du Prince it is inserted in the chapters en‐ titled “De la Justice” and, respectively, “De la Puissance”. On the whole, in the two works written for the prince, just like in the dialogue published under the pseudonym of Orasius Tubero, the words of the Greek sovereign are meant to prove that the reputation of a monarch does not pertain to the exterior signs of his power, but to the internal principles on which he founds his government. The boundaries that the king is the only one to fix with regard to his power derive, as shown in the three works mentioned above, from the “distributive justice of punishments and rewards” (“justice distributive des peines et des réc‐ ompenses”), from the “fairness” (“équité”) and from “the moderate use of this same power which, if it is not reasonable, instead of making them [the kings] worthy of being esteemed, makes them hateful” (“l’ usage modéré de cette même puissance, qui les rend odieux au lieu de les faire estimer, si elle n’est raison‐ nable”). 65 The outlines that shape the exercise of royal power are set by reason with respect to the king and by justice with respect to his subjects. This is why the king has to obey a reason whose perfection, according to the Stoic tradition, is synonymous with virtue. 66 As for the king’s subjects, the practice of reason leads to a justice that consists in sharing gratifications and corrections in a way that is proportional to the services or the prejudices brought about by their authors. In keeping with a view of justice that goes back to Roman law, this results in “returning to everyone what belongs to him” (“rendre à chacun ce qui lui appartient”). 67 161 4.4 Intertextuality I: The Boundaries of Royal Omnipotence 68 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue traitant de la politique sceptiquement, 494-495. 69 La Mothe Le Vayer, De l’Instruction de Monseigneur le Dauphin, 61-62. Although he pleads for an application of royal power that is based on justice, La Mothe Le Vayer does not ignore the existence of the cases when the prince is forced to infringe the law. Despite the fact that he does not mention it openly, the writer is likely to think about the violations of the ethics contained in the theories of the reason of State. In this respect, one of the pieces that is recurrent in his works and that could belong to the practice of intertextuality is the ar‐ gument against an exercise of power that is constantly unjust. For example, in the Dialogue traitant de la politique sceptiquement, Orontes argues that a sover‐ eign must avoid crossing the boundaries of law all the more since the divinity itself barely does it: “That is what has made many people say that rather wise kings should not evade the laws of their State any more than Jupiter does with those of nature, nor should they use the prerogatives of their power in a different way than the one in which God makes miracles, which is very rarely” (“C’est ce qui a fait dire à beaucoup que les rois bien sensés ne se doivent non plus dispenser des lois de leur État, que Jupiter fait celles de la nature, ni user des prérogatives de leur toute-puissance autrement que Dieu fait des miracles, c’est-à-dire très rarement”). 68 Obviously, the great number of people to whom La Mothe Le Vayer refers without, however, mentioning their identity, form an argument that is meant to strengthen the opinion attributed to them. It goes almost without saying that the possibility to breach the law, which is afforded to the monarch by royal omnipotence, should only take concrete shape in isolated cases. Additionally, the fragment that has just been quoted is used by La Mothe Le Vayer in the treatise De l’Instruction de Monseigneur le Dauphin in a form that is only slightly different. Inserted in the chapter which is precisely called “De la Justice”, the fragment is part of an argumentation wherein, while acknowledging the king’s privilege of not respecting the law, the author invites him to respect it in order to enhance it in the eyes of his subjects and to encourage them to follow his example. 69 In so doing, the author does not content himself with re‐ porting positions which he puts down to somebody else, but pleads explicitly for the kings’ duty to comply with the law: “The greatest powerful men must imitate him [God] in this respect and break the laws of their State as rarely as God does with those of nature; using the prerogatives of their omnipotence in the same way in which he does miracles, which is very rarely, and on very important occasions” (“Les plus grands potentats le [Dieu] doivent imiter en cela, et se dispenser aussi rarement des lois mêmes de leur État, que Dieu de celles de la nature ; n’usant des prérogatives de leur toute-puissance, que comme 162 Chapter 4. La Mothe Le Vayer’s Attitude towards Politics: Irreducible Contradiction? 70 Ibid., 63. 71 La Mothe Le Vayer, La Politique du Prince, 337. il fait des miracles, c’est à dire fort rarement, et en de très importantes occa‐ sions”). 70 As powerful as they can be, the monarchs are not exempt from obeying the law. Certainly, La Mothe Le Vayer compares the violation of law to the divine miracles in order to underline the necessity of its exceptional character. This is why he seems to suggest that, if he transformed the violation of laws into a habit, the sovereign would risk trivialising an element which is essential for the good functioning of his kingdom. Therefore, the prince appears worthy of the om‐ nipotence that he possesses only if, capable of measuring the dangers implied by putting it into practice, he pushes it to its maximal limits only in extraordinary situations. The boundaries of the royal omnipotence do not always derive from the principles that are established by the king. Sometimes, they are unpredictable and result from the turn of the events, which can never be entirely anticipated. Present in both the works addressed to the future monarch and the Dialogues faits à l’imitation des Anciens, the pieces that highlight the influence of elements that cannot be anticipated on the most important political actions may be related to the practice of intertextuality. Thus, in the treatise La Politique du Prince, La Mothe Le Vayer does not hesitate to warn the monarch about the fact that, despite the appearances, he can never exert full power on the sequence of events that he chooses to initiate: There are other circumstances when the actions of the highest consequence are pre‐ vented by things so slight, that their effect can be compared to the wave of the hat, which sometimes diverts the strike of the lightening, or to the ability that is attributed to these small remoras to stop the greatest ships. Qu’il se trouve d’autres rencontres où les actions de la plus haute conséquence sont empêchées par des choses si légères, qu’on peut comparer leur effet au vent du chapeau qui détourne parfois le coup de la foudre, ou à la faculté qu’on donne à ce petites remores d’arrêter les plus grands vaisseaux. 71 In order to show the limits of the effects that can be produced by royal power, La Mothe Le Vayer makes use of examples that bring out the contrast between the apparent invulnerability of certain projects and the insignificance of the element that can provoke their failure. For instance, the minor wave of a hat may deviate the lightening whose violence and speed are, at the first glance, unbeatable. Besides that, in spite of its small size, the remora succeeds in getting 163 4.4 Intertextuality I: The Boundaries of Royal Omnipotence 72 Also present in Montaigne’s Essays (II: 12), the case of the remora that is capable of stopping the big vessels from pursuing their journey dates back to Pliny’s Natural His‐ tory (XXXII. I). The example of the remora proves that La Mothe Le Vayer is more indebted to the culture acquired from the books inherited from the Ancients than to the practical knowledge accumulated by the Moderns. On the “remora” (“remore”), see Furetière’s Dictionnaire universel, vol. 3: “[…] the Moderns argue that [the history of the remora which is able to stop great ships] is a fable, since they have never met one, although they have sailed much more frequently across all the seas” (“[…] les Modernes tiennent que c’est une fable [l’histoire de la remore qui arrête les bateaux], n’en ayant rencontré aucun, quoiqu’ils aient fait des navigations bien plus fréquentes par toutes les mers”). 73 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue traitant de la politique sceptiquement, 488. in the way of the ships whose dimensions are infinitely superior to its own. 72 Obviously, the arguments of the wave of the hat and of the remora are brought together by La Mothe Le Vayer in order to warn the prince about the unexpected obstacles that may hinder his projects. In spite of his theoretical omnipotence, the monarch never exerts full control over the evolution of the actions that he starts. Hindrances that are all the more difficult to anticipate since they seem trifling at the beginning may intervene at every moment and change even the course of the events of the highest consequence. The argument of the wave of the hat that is able to move away the lightening is also inserted into the Dialogue traitant de la politique sceptiquement, where it is further developed than in the book of princely education: in which matter you can consider as very certain that, just like the wave of a hat is capable of diverting the greatest strike of lightening, often a cause of no consideration, an interest very light and specific, a moment not in the least premeditated, hastens or delays, does or undoes the most important actions of a Louvre. là où vous pouvez tenir pour très sûr que, comme le vent d’un chapeau est capable de détourner le plus grand coup de foudre, souvent aussi un respect de nulle considéra‐ tion, un intérêt très léger et particulier, un moment nullement prémédité hâte ou re‐ cule, fait ou défait les plus importantes actions d’un Louvre. 73 Hence, the unexpected and apparently insignificant element that may some‐ times play a crucial role in the course of the greatest political events is partic‐ ularised with respect to circumstances and people. Even when it involves a cer‐ tain rational calculation, which is implicit in the meaning of the term “interest”, this element still seems apparently negligible in comparison with the scope of the events that it contributes to shape. Whether they are determined by the king himself or by the context, the boundaries that delimit royal omnipotence represent a repetitive theme in the 164 Chapter 4. La Mothe Le Vayer’s Attitude towards Politics: Irreducible Contradiction? 74 On the idea of the limits imposed on royal omnipotence by La Mothe Le Vayer in La Politique du Prince, see Guido Canziani “‘Politiques’ pour le Prince. Traités et manuels au début du règne de Louis XIV,” in L’État classique (1652-1715). Regards sur la pensée politique de la France dans le second XVIIe siècle, ed. Henry Méchoulan and Joël Cornette, (Paris: Vrin, 1996), 95: “These principles [derived from La Politique du Prince] belong to a political and moral pedagogy, which without making the slightest allusion to the institutional restrictions on absolute authority, seeks to moderate its exercise by ap‐ pealing to the moral and historical consciousness of the sovereign” (“Ces principes appartiennent à une pédagogie politique et morale qui, sans faire la moindre allusion à des restrictions institutionnelles de l’autorité absolue, se propose d’en modérer l’exer‐ cice en faisant appel à la conscience morale et historique du souverain”). See also Charles-Daubert, “Le ‘Libertinage érudit’ et le problème du conservatisme politique,” 189. 75 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue traitant de la politique sceptiquement, 491, 493. work of La Mothe Le Vayer. 74 In so doing, for instance, they take the form of almost identical passages, which are part of works that seem to have a different political aim and which may be generally said to belong to the practice of in‐ tertextuality. Certainly, in the Dialogue traitant de la politique sceptiquement, the reasons that are supposed to define the power of the kings may be lessened by their belonging to a sceptical writing which gathers contrary arguments. This type of writing consists in bringing together arguments that give substance to two opposite positions, out of which one says that “kings do not understand at all any other lesson, than the one that teaches them their omnipotence” (“les rois n’entendent guère d’autre leçon que celle qui leur apprend leur toute-puis‐ sance”) and the other one that “there are maxims for the monarchy very different from the former” (“Aussi y a-t-il des maximes pour la royauté bien différentes de celle-là”). 75 On the contrary, the reasons against arbitrary power from the treatises of royal education are strengthened by their belonging to an argumen‐ tation clearly displayed in favour of the restrictions that should circumscribe the omnipotence of the monarch. For instance, in a fragment from La Politique du Prince, La Mothe Le Vayer warns his royal student against the excesses that can originate in the possible wrong interpretations of the doctrine surrounding royal omnipotence: It is true that the power of Your highness depends only on God and the sword, not acknowledging here in this world another superior; But we cannot conclude from that that it is limitless and that we could not, without offending God’s omnipotence, which is the only one to be infinite, grant such as ample jurisdiction as his to any sovereign […] Il est vrai que le pouvoir de Votre Majesté ne relève que de Dieu et de l’épée, ne reconnaissant point ici-bas de supérieur ; Mais on ne peut pas conclure de là qu’il soit 165 4.4 Intertextuality I: The Boundaries of Royal Omnipotence 76 La Mothe Le Vayer, La Politique du Prince, 349. 77 Ibid., 356. sans bornes, et l’on ne saurait sans offenser la toute-puissance de Dieu qui seule est infinie, attribuer une aussi ample juridiction qu’est la sienne, à quelque souverain que ce puisse être. 76 Without any subterfuge that could undermine the frankness of his discourse, La Mothe Le Vayer addresses himself directly to the prince in order to indicate to him that, despite his unquestionable primacy over the people and the Church, if he claimed for himself absolute power, he would appropriate a privilege to which God alone is entitled and would, therefore, risk perpetrating a sacrilege. 4.5 Intertextuality II: The Foundations of Power As has been previously shown, the examples that can be related to the practice of intertextuality prove that the rejection of the boundless royal omnipotence is a common denominator of the books that La Mothe Le Vayer has apparently written in order to support or to corrode power. At a broader level, the fragments that may underlie the practice of intertextuality are likely to give substance to a reflection on the elements that are at the origin of every political order. Rather than identical, the pieces of writing that could illustrate this type of intertex‐ tuality are more likely to be reminiscent of one another. In this sense, a useful starting point is represented by a fragment from La Politique du Prince, which aims at questioning the hierarchy that is usually es‐ tablished among the different forms of power: Indeed, if the great authority of a prince is often based only on the ruin or the dimin‐ ishing of his neighbours; and if his force, when carefully considered, is nothing else than the weakness of the other; could we not argue that a power, although of less extent, which has as its foundation the virtue and the nice use of reason, must be in many ways preferred to it ? En effet, si la grande autorité d’un prince n’est souvent établie que sur la ruine ou la diminution de ses voisins ; et si sa force, à la bien considérer, n’est presque autre chose que la faiblesse d’autrui ; ne peut-on pas soutenir qu’une puissance, quoique de moindre étendue, qui a pour fondement la vertu et le bel usage de la raison, lui doit être en beaucoup de façons préférée ? 77 166 Chapter 4. La Mothe Le Vayer’s Attitude towards Politics: Irreducible Contradiction? 78 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre XCV. De la Fidélité romaine, 28-29. 79 See Furetière, Dictionnaire universel, vol. 1, entry “pike” (“brochet”). In order to be able to have a clear-sighted look at the rulers’ achievements, one should avoid relying on the dimensions of their territory that are usually con‐ sidered the most obvious expression of the power they possess. Against a gen‐ erally spread view, La Mothe Le Vayer does not consider the vastness of the country governed by the political leaders as a sign of their power, but as a sign of their possible lack of scruples. Most rulers have usually managed to increase their territory by taking advantage of the weakness of their neighbours. Con‐ sequently, the admiration aroused by the leaders of a far-reaching country seems to ignore that they acquired it in defiance of the elementary moral rules, ac‐ cording to which the weakest must benefit from the protection of the strongest. The reflection on the relationship between the strengthening of the strongest and the weakening of the weakest may recall the disclosure of the mechanisms underlying the great empires which is carried out in the Lettre XCV. De la Fidélité romaine: We can even argue that just like the Roman dominion has been the widest of all those that have come to our knowledge, there has never been one that has given itself more freedom in this respect, through the unjust oppression of all its neighbours; just like we can assure that the greatest pike is without doubt the one that has devoured most of the tiny fish. L’on peut même soutenir, que comme la domination romaine a été la plus étendue de toutes celles, qui sont venues à notre connaissance, aussi n’y en a-t-il point eu, qui se soit donné plus de licence qu’elle à cet égard, par l’oppression injuste de tous ses voisins ; de même qu’on peut assurer, que le plus grand brochet est sans doute celui, qui a le plus dévoré de menus poissons. 78 A “very greedy” (“fort goulu”) fish, which feeds on other fish, as it is shown, for instance, in Furetière’s Dictionnaire universel, 79 the pike (“le brochet”) proves concretely, through the proportions taken by its body after having swallowed other fish, that the strongest grows to the detriment of the weakest. By ignoring the objections to the connections between politics and history that he raises in the Dialogue traitant de la politique sceptiquement, La Mothe Le Vayer applies the moral of the pike to the historical case of the Roman Empire in order to demonstrate that the countries that managed to hold an apparently impressive power achieved it by usually undermining the adjoining countries, which they could reach more easily. 167 4.5 Intertextuality II: The Foundations of Power 80 La Mothe Le Vayer, De l’Instruction de Monseigneur le Dauphin, 64. 81 St. Augustine, De la Cité de Dieu, trans. sieur de Cériziers, livre IV, chapitre 4 (Paris: P. le Petit, 1655), 103. 82 See Paul Weithman, “Augustine’s political philosophy,” in The Cambridge Companion to Augustine, ed. Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 244. Going more thoroughly into the reflection on the connection between the injustice and the origins of power, the pieces that may pertain to intertextuality do not hesitate to call by their generally acknowledged name the breaches of law that are sometimes the sources of political regimes. As a consequence of the emphasis that he lays on the relationship between power and justice, in the chapter De la Justice from De l’Instruction de Monseigneur le Dauphin, La Mothe Le Vayer plainly designates the practices of power that transgress the laws by means of terms that belong to the sphere of stealing: “This is why it is very obvious, that in its absence kingdoms and every other power on earth would be nothing else than glorious piracies and famous thefts; because, as it is said by St. Augustine, the dens of thieves can be called small kingdoms without justice” (“Aussi est-il tout évident, que sans elle les royaumes, et ce qu’il y a de puissance sur la terre, ne seraient que de glorieuses pirateries, et de fameux larcins ; puisque, comme parle saint Augustin, les brigandages peuvent être nommés de petites royautés sans justice”). 80 In so doing, La Mothe Le Vayer seems to be paraphrasing two of the rhetorical questions that open a chapter from the City of God and that, in the translation of Cériziers, is called precisely “The kingdoms without justice resemble the dens of thieves” (“Les Royaumes sans justice ressemblent à des brigandages”): “What are empires without fairness, other than controlled dens of thieves? and what are the thefts other than confused little kingdoms? ” (“Que sont les empires sans équité, que des brigandages réglés ? et que sont les voleries que de petits roy‐ aumes confus? ”) 81 In the view of St. Augustine, the communities, “empires” or “kingdoms”, which for Furetière are both synonyms with monarchy, do not need to be based on justice in order to be able to subsist. Their cohesion is ensured by the fact that their members are animated by the same object of love, which does not have to comply with the laws of justice. 82 By alluding to the authority that St. Augustine enjoys at the time in order to mitigate the possible brutality of his argument, La Mothe Le Vayer reduces the States that violate the rules of justice to crude acts of pillaging. The oxymorons “glorious piracies” (“glorieuses pirateries”) and “famous thefts” (“fameux larcins”) through which he names the iniquity of the practices on which States are established could remind one of his 168 Chapter 4. La Mothe Le Vayer’s Attitude towards Politics: Irreducible Contradiction? 83 See Furetière, Dictionnaire universel, vol. 3, second entry “piracy” (“piraterie”): “it is said about illegitimate actions which are being perpetrated in any place” (“se dit aussi des indues exactions qui se font en quelque lieu que ce soit ”). 84 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue traitant de la philosophie sceptique, 78. 85 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre XXXV. Du Larcin Secret, in Œuvres, VI/ I, 319. 86 Lost, the text of the third book of On the Republic to which La Mothe Le Vayer refers can be known thanks to its being paraphrased by Lactantius, Book V, ch. 16, 362-363 in The Divine Institutes (Books I-VII, trans. Sister Mary Francis MacDonald, Washington D. C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1964). paradoxical reflections on the success to which leads the excessive use of in‐ justice. The connection between power and piracy, understood, through extension, as a theft perpetrated by violent means, 83 comes close to the cases mentioned in two other works. For instance, in the Dialogue traitant de la philosophie scep‐ tique, the disclosure of the relationship between the acquisition of power and the theft perpetrated by force allows La Mothe Le Vayer to break the myth of Alexander the Great: “It is glorious and admirable to be a great pirate, provided that one is Alexander the Great” (“Il est glorieux et admirable d’être grand pirate, pourvu qu’on soit Alexandre le Grand”). 84 The eye-opening reflection on the true sources of power of the great invaders acquires, in the Lettre XXXVI. Du Larcin Secret, a more general significance: “And don’t we know that, when care‐ fully considered, the greatest conquerors have been nothing but powerful pi‐ rates? ” (“Et ne sait-on pas, qu’à le bien prendre, les plus grands conquérants n’ont été que de puissants pirates? ”) 85 By using a rhetorical question, La Mothe Le Vayer acts as if he were referring to a generally accepted fact, which estab‐ lishes a firm relationship between the power of the great warriors and the ac‐ tions of willful damage that they perpetrate. Yet, in so doing, he runs counter to the common opinion, which considers the actions of the great conquerors as worthy of the highest esteem. When choosing to reduce the exploits for which invaders like Alexander the Great are usually admired to cruel acts of plunder, the author may be reliant on a tradition of political thought which dates back to Carneades and is taken up, among others, by Cicero’s On the Republic and St. Augustine’s On the City of God (IV. IV). 86 While Carneades and Cicero use the lessening of Alexander’s status to a pirate as an argument for the conventional character of justice, St. Augustine uses it in order to prove that justice is not indispensable to the good functioning of societies, on condition that they channel their love into the same object. As far as he is concerned, in the Dialogue traitant de la philosophie sceptique and the Lettre XXXVI. Du Larcin Secret, La Mothe Le Vayer consolidates the argumentation on the conventional character of the crime to which the theft is 169 4.5 Intertextuality II: The Foundations of Power 87 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre XXXV. Du Larcin Secret, 320. associated by a reflection on the imbalance between the dimensions of the of‐ fence and the harshness of its sanction. More precisely, in the dialogue, this imbalance is approached from the perspective of the vice which, when being excessively practised, paradoxically turns into virtue. The letter deals with the reverse and mentions the imbalance provoked by the fact that the punishment is not inflicted on the guiltiest, but on those who, because they are weaker, have to submit to the stronger and their laws: “Well, the gallows are more for the unfortunate, than for the guilty” (“Mais quoi, le gibet est plus pour les mal‐ heureux, que pour les coupables”). 87 Unlike the aforementioned works, the trea‐ tise for the prince does not present the connection between power and plunder as an ineluctable state, but as a situation which should be avoided. Thus, in La Politique du Prince La Mothe Le Vayer argues that, despite its modest dimensions, a power of small proportions, but respectful of the laws that derive from reason, is superior to a power of great proportions, but without any restraint whenever it can increase its size. In support of this theoretical thought, the author uses the example of the Greek sovereign who refuses to be considered inferior to the Persian monarch only because he governs a small country and not a great em‐ pire. The analysis of the previously mentioned examples shows that the reflection on the connection between the birth of the political regimes and the theft or, more generally, the injustice, is developed by La Mothe Le Vayer in works that, at first glance, seem to adopt contradictory attitudes towards power. Whether they are about the unjust sources of power or the limits of royal omnipotence, the examples fleshing out an intertextuality founded on fragments that are ei‐ ther mostly similar, or merely reminiscent of one another, prove that La Mothe Le Vayer does not hesitate to approach the thorniest issues in both the treatises written for the education of the prince and the books that apparently aim at undermining power. 4.6 The Prudence of the Prince: Necessary, but Difficult The possible influence of the most trivial elements on the projects of the greatest consequence does not contribute to bringing out only the boundaries of royal omnipotence, but also the need to anticipate as much as possible the develop‐ ment of the circumstances adjacent to the political actions which are being pre‐ pared: 170 Chapter 4. La Mothe Le Vayer’s Attitude towards Politics: Irreducible Contradiction? 88 La Mothe Le Vayer, La Politique du Prince, 314. There are certain situations or moments of the affairs, of which it is essential to take advantage, even by anticipation; magnis conatibus opportuni sunt transitus rerum; the refracting and long-sight telescopes are absolutely necessary in these imperceptible transformations; and there is no other occasion when the human mind needs more its fire and all its activity than in similar encounters […] Il y a de certaines conjonctures ou moments d’affaires, dont il est besoin de se prévaloir, même par anticipation ; magnis conatibus opportuni sunt transitus rerum ; les lunettes d’approche et à longue vue sont du tout nécessaires dans ces mutations insensibles ; et il n’y a rien où l’esprit humain ait plus besoin de son feu, et de toute son activité, qu’en de semblables rencontres, […] 88 Hence, the planning of political actions should seek to rigorously take into ac‐ count the possible effects of all the elements with which they may interact and which may, for instance, favour them. Tacitus, the author of the Latin quotation to which La Mothe Le Vayer turns in order to enhance his argument, has played a major role in the promotion of a pragmatic view of politics and of the ethics that corresponds to it. However, the anticipation of the real circumstances of an event, which may in certain cases be beneficial to it, is as difficult as it is im‐ portant, when measured against the individuals’ intellectual abilities. Synchro‐ nising political thinking with the developments of natural philosophy, the met‐ aphorical use of instruments like the telescope emphasises the need for an accuracy that goes beyond the usual capacities of humans. The science that allows the rulers to anticipate the aspects contributing to the outcome of political situations is related neither to the mathematics used for making research upon nature, nor to an occultism that can, for instance, take the shape of astrology. The Lettre XXIX. Du temps et de l’occasion is likely to provide precious explanations for the philosophical sources and concepts that underlie La Mothe Le Vayer’s thought on the importance of anticipating the circumstances that sourround an event. One of the authors whom he quotes in order to justify the necessity of recognising the contexts that are likely to sup‐ port the success of a project is the founding figure of Academic scepticism: “Isn’t it also what Arcesilas wanted to say, when he assured us that philosophy had nothing that was more specific to it, than the exact knowledge of the time ap‐ propriate for all the things” (“N’est-ce pas aussi ce que voulait dire Arcésilas, quand il assurait, que la philosophie n’avait rien, qui lui fût plus particulier, que 171 4.6 The Prudence of the Prince: Necessary, but Difficult 89 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre XXIX. Du Temps et de l’occasion, in Oeuvres, VI/ I, 264-265. La Mothe Le Vayer refers to Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, vol. 1, Book IV, ch. 6, 42: “There he [Arcesilas] had always shunned discussion over the wine; and when Aridices, proposing a certain question, requested him to speak upon it, he replied, ‘The peculiar province of philosophy is just this, to know that there is a time for all things’”. 90 See Lévy, Cicero Academicus, 279-281. On Arcesilas, see Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, I, [33], 220, Against the Logicians, trans. R. G. Bury, Book I, 158 (Loeb Clas‐ sical Library 291); and Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, vol. 1, Book IV, 6. See also Victor Brochard, Les Sceptiques grecs ( Paris: Librarie générale française, 2002), 123-125; and Harald Thorsrud, “Arcesilaus and Carneades,” 69; John Christian Laursen, The Politics of Skepticism in the Ancients, Montaigne, Hume and Kant (Leiden, New York, Köln: Brill, 1992), 54-56. 91 La Mothe Le Vayer, La Morale du Prince, 270. l’exacte connaissance du temps propre à toutes choses”). 89 An elusive figure, Arcesilas reconciled the emphasis on the precise acknowledgement of the mo‐ ment when action has to be taken with the defence of a criterion for practical life that is not based on the truth, but on the “reasonable” (εὔλογον). The rea‐ sonable that Arcesilas promoted as the theoretical precept of human action did not seek to ensure “moral perfection”, but was the result of the uncertainty about the course of the events. 90 Following Arcesilas, La Mothe Le Vayer is likely to admit the reasonable as the criterion of every concrete action, including a political one. The acceptance of the reasonable that aims to found actions on satisfactory explanations may result from what the author considers to be the fragile concordance between the theories of the human mind and the world. As has already been shown in the first chapter, La Mothe Le Vayer argues that the abstract systems elaborated by people are unable to provide an exhaustive explanation for a world whose di‐ versity is infinite. Influenced by scepticism, the writer stresses the disproportion between the pretence of holding the absolute truth and the weaknesses of the theories that claim to bring to light the causes that govern the natural, moral and political phenomena. The analyses of the Dialogue traitant de la politique sceptiquement have shown the fragile correspondence between the “diversity of times, circumstances and events, which always have something particular and individual” and the political theories that aim at its mastery. Tightly connected to ethics, like it has been shown in the chapter about the education of the prince, politics relies on prudence in order to find the decisions suitable to every situation. Traditionally included among virtues, prudence is presented by La Mothe Le Vayer as a virtue of transition, which “seems to hold the middle ground between the moral and the intellectual virtues” (“semble tenir le milieu entre les vertus morales et les intellectuelles”). 91 However, in keeping 172 Chapter 4. La Mothe Le Vayer’s Attitude towards Politics: Irreducible Contradiction? 92 On the evolution that led from the intellectual and theological foundation of virtue accomplished by Aristotle and Aquinas to the understanding of virtue as an “instru‐ ment” (“strumento”) and a “technique” (“tecnica”), see Vittorio Dini, Il Governo della prudenza. Virtù dei privati e disciplina dei custodi (Milano: FrancoAngeli, 2000), 25-27, 66. 93 La Mothe Le Vayer, La Morale du Prince, 270. 94 Ibid., 271. On the difference between the wisdom that is universal and the prudence that is specific, see La Mothe Le Vayer, Vingt-cinquième Homilie académique. De la Pru‐ dence, in Œuvres, III/ II, 399-400; and La Promenade. VI Dialogue, in Œuvres, IV/ I, 181-182. 95 Gouverneur, Prudence et subversion libertines, 443-444: “Prudence is an illusion whose victims are the political theorists who do not see that they miss their object and its control; what they attribute to this so-called clearsightedness or rational anticipation depends in fact on mere coincidence, on the happy encounter between the desires of a sovereign and the events, the natural course of things” (“La prudence est une illusion dont sont victimes les théoriciens politiques qui ne voient pas que leur objet et sa maît‐ rise leur échappent; ce qu’ils attribuent à cette soi-disant clairvoyance ou anticipation rationnelle relève en fait de la simple coïncidence, de la rencontre heureuse entre les désirs d’un souverain et les événements, le cours naturel des choses”). On the fortune that ruins prudence, see also Guion, Du bon usage de l’histoire, 437-438. with the developments of the political thought of his time, which have been brought out by Vittorio Dini, the author seems to describe a prudence that is more a “technique” than an “instrument”. 92 Although its moral dimension should not be ignored, prudence is, according to its first rule mentioned by La Mothe Le Vayer, responsible for the optimisation of the means and the goals: “Never to do anything without intending to achieve a good goal with this nice word cui bono? And to look for the shortest and the easiest ways to attain it” (“Ne faire jamais rien sans se proposer une bonne fin avec ce beau mot, cui bono ? Et chercher les moyens les plus courts, et les plus faciles pour y parvenir”). 93 In addition to the analysis of the elements belonging to the exterior world, pru‐ dence should also include itself in the reflection upon its own limits: “To hold steadfast that one can be mistaken and not to rely too much on the first rea‐ soning” (“Tenir pour constant qu’on se peut tromper, et ne s’assurer pas trop sur son premier raisonnement”). 94 Hence, the awareness of its fallibility may limit up to a certain extent the errors that prudence is prone to make by en‐ couraging it to be cautious about its first analysis of a situation. The under‐ standing of the fact that prudence is prone to error does not prompt La Mothe Le Vayer to reduce it to an “illusion”, 95 but to argue for an approach to it, which relies on the caution about its results, based on the philosophical criterion of the reasonable. In stressing the difficulty of a prudence that has to find solutions to situations whose particularity cannot be lessened by human theories, La Mothe Le Vayer continues the tradition of the authors of the late Renaissance like Pierre Charron. 173 4.6 The Prudence of the Prince: Necessary, but Difficult 96 Naudé, La Bibliographie politique du sieur Naudé, 17. 97 Pierre Charron, De la Sagesse (Rouen: R. Valentin, 1634), Book III, ch. I, 482. 98 Ibid., 482-483. 99 Ibid., p. 483: “Very obscure, because the causes and the springs of things are unknown, the seeds and the roots are hidden, which human nature cannot find and neither has to search for” (“Très obscure, pource que les causes et ressorts des choses sont inconnues, les semences et racines sont cachées, lesquelles l’humaine nature ne peut trouver ni ne doit rechercher”). 100 On the relationship between prudence and doubt, see, for example, the concluding paragraph of Domenico Taranto’s chapter “Sistema del dubbio e sistema dello Stato in Charron,” in Pirronismo ed assolutismo nella Francia dell’ 600, 105. In De la Sagesse, which enjoyed wide success in the seventeenth century and which, for instance, according to Naudé, “contains in itself something more di‐ vine than all the ancients and all the moderns had before it” (“il [le livre de Charron] contient en soi quelque chose de plus divin, qu’avant lui n’ont eu tous les anciens et tous les modernes”), 96 Charron explains the high difficulty of pru‐ dence through both the material that it has to use and the type of action that it has to perform on it. On the one hand, the “uncertainty” (“l’incertitude”) and the “inconstancy” (“inconstance”) of the “human matters” (“choses humaines”) is so great that the “change of a single and the slightest circumstance changes the whole situation” (“au changement d’une seule et de la moindre circonstance toute la chose se change”). 97 On the other hand, its function consists in “com‐ bining and moderating contrary things” (“l’assemblage et tempérament des choses contraires”). 98 This means that the task of prudence is difficult not only because it is constrained to work with a variety of elements that are ceaselessly changing, but also because it has to find a way to make them contribute to the achievement of the same goal, despite the fact that in many cases they are hardly convergent. Although he does not think particularly about the way in which the elements of the political situations have to be dealt with, La Mothe Le Vayer obviously shares with Charron the reflection on their variety and mutability, whose greatest confirmation is the fact that the most insignificant detail can ruin the most important designs. Additionally, similarly to Charron, La Mothe Le Vayer combines the reasoning on the constant change of the political circumstances with the reasoning on their opacity for humankind. 99 Certainly, Charron is not impervious to scepticism. However, in the case of La Mothe Le Vayer, the re‐ flection on the disequilibrium between people’s intellectual capacities and the complexity of political situations is likely to be based on the arguments about the fallibility of the human mind, from which the recurrent theme of his work, which is scepticism, springs. 100 174 Chapter 4. La Mothe Le Vayer’s Attitude towards Politics: Irreducible Contradiction? 101 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre CXXXIII. De la Contrainte d’agir, in Œuvres, VII/ II, 70-71. In accordance with the theoretical foundations of his scepticism, La Mothe Le Vayer pleads for a prudence that relies on flexibility, which does not result only in the reasonable as a criterion of action, but also in a way of acting that adapts iself to the concrete circumstances of a particular situation. In critical cases, the adaptation to the individual conditions characteristic of every situa‐ tion can sometimes lead to steps that may be morally problematic: True and natural prudence consists in yielding very often to the time and always to necessity. […] And when we see ourselves in this worst position, we must imitate these good blades, bend without breaking, and put up with what is absolutely neces‐ sary without losing courage and make our mind supple in order to be able to gently do what we could not avoid doing. La vraie et naturelle prudence est de céder fort souvent au temps, et toujours à la nécessité. […] Et quand l’on se voit dans ce dernier accessoire, il faut imiter les bonnes lames, ployer sans rompre, s’accommoder à ce qui est absolument nécessaire sans perdre courage, et rendre son esprit souple à faire doucement ce qu’on ne saurait éviter de faire. 101 The argumentation for a prudence that tries to adjust to circumstances in order to benefit as much as possible from them may recall the comparison between the metals and the minds that aimed to highlight the equivalence between high-quality and flexibility. Besides that, the comparison with the blade is also likely to suggest that prudence, which is the instrument that people have in order to achieve their goals in an environment that can be unfavourable or even hostile to their goals, should make them open to diversions that are not always morally right. Developped about the case of a private individual, this thought on the submission of prudence to a necessity that it cannot shape as it pleases can all the more apply to the violations of the ordinary ethics that were con‐ sidered a privilege of the politicians acting for the common good. Although, as we have seen, he admits that on certain occasions, the interest, which he tends to use instead of the reason of State, can justify actions that infringe the moral rules, La Mothe Le Vayer does not deduce it explicitly from the flexibility of the prudence. In so doing, he obviously elucidates much less than Charron the re‐ lationship between necessity and political prudence: “That the prudent and wise prince should know not only how to govern according the laws, but also how to govern the laws themselves, if necessity calls for it: the laws must be made to want when they cannot do what they want” (“Que le prudent et sage prince non seulement doit savoir commander les lois, mais encore aux lois mêmes, si 175 4.6 The Prudence of the Prince: Necessary, but Difficult 102 Charron, De la Sagesse, Book III, ch. II, 498-499. 103 La Mothe Le Vayer, La Morale du Prince, 272. 104 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre CXLII. De la Coutume, 171. 105 Ibid., 171-172. 106 La Mothe Le Vayer, La Politique du Prince, 306. la nécessité le requiert; et faut faire vouloir aux lois, quand elles ne peuvent ce qu’elles veulent”). 102 In addition to the particular actions like those when it leads to obedience to necessity, the prudence discussed by La Mothe Le Vayer also concerns decisions that are supposed to have long-term consequences. The general precept con‐ cerning the adaptation to the “time, the place and the persons” results, among others, in the fact that it is recommended to “Never undertake to change the world, nor to fight against the century, […]” (“N’entreprendre jamais de réformer le monde, ni de combattre contre le siècle, […]”) 103 The argument for the acqui‐ escence to a state of the matter that is flawed is one of the main effects of the reflection on the force of the custom. The customs “established from time im‐ memorial and that we call ingrained” (“établies de temps immémorial, et que l’on appellee invétérées”) are so strong that the wise man “leaves to the fools the plan to reform the whole world” (“laiss[e] aux fous le dessein de réformer tout le monde”). 104 “Human prudence” (“la prudence humaine”), which he em‐ bodies, is supposed to restrict itself to always struggling, as much as it can, against the “introduction of irrational customs, which good sense could not ap‐ prove of ” (“l’introduction des coutumes déraisonnables, et que le bon sens ne saurait approuver”). 105 Therefore, the attitude adopted towards the customs by prudence is based on the acknowledgement of the fact that the longer a custom is practised, the more powerful and difficult to eradicate or to change it becomes. In political terms, the awareness of the power of custom leads to the argumen‐ tation for the reconciliation between the people that need to be governed and the political theories that play the role of models: “Since we choose neither the people nor the subjects that we must rule, it is necessary to accept them as we find them and to govern them according to their nature, in the best and the most politically possible way” (“L’on ne choisit pas non plus le peuple ni les sujets qu’il faut conduire, il est besoin de les prendre tels qu’on les trouve, et de les gouverner selon leur tempérament, le mieux et le plus politiquement qu’il est possible”). 106 Hence, prudence requires the prince to rule his people, with all its particularities and shortcomings, in a way that is as close as possible to an ideal view of politics. One of the main effects of the reflection on the need to adjust the abstract political theories to particular circumstances concerns justice. Having in mind 176 Chapter 4. La Mothe Le Vayer’s Attitude towards Politics: Irreducible Contradiction? 107 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. H. Rakham, V, x (Loeb Classical Library 73). See also La Mothe Le Vayer, Dix-septième Homilie académique. De la Justice, in Œu‐ vres, III/ II, 259: “Justice concerns the written law, equity lies in the law of nature which, being the oldest and the wisest, has to regulate and to temper the first one” (“La justice regarde la loi écrite, l’équité gît en la loi de nature, qui comme la plus ancienne, et la plus sage, doit régler et tempérer la première”). 108 La Mothe Le Vayer, La Politique du Prince, 305. On the necessity of conceiving consti‐ tutions adapted to the different types of States and of peoples who inhabit them which are dealt with by Aristotle’s Politics (IV. I), see Fred D. Miller, “The Rule of reason,” in The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics, 54. 109 See Frank Lestringant, “Europe et théorie des climats dans la seconde moitié du XVIe siècle,” in La Conscience européenne au XVe et au XVIe siècle (Paris: École Normale Su‐ périeure des Jeunes Filles 1982), 206-226. the Aristotelian distinction between the law that is general and the equity that represents its adaptation to particular circumstances 107 , La Mothe Le Vayer ar‐ gues for a juridical system which is not designed for an ideal State, but which is tailored for tangible situations: All the politicians agree with Aristotle on this issue, that the laws should be adapted to the Republic or to the State, which is the nature of the subjects, by paying attention to the country where they live, whose position has a lot of power on their minds and by additionally paying attention to the various moments, which ask for behaviours and consequently different orders. Tous les politiques conviennent avec Aristote en ce point, qu’on doit accommoder les lois à la République ou à l’État, c’est-à-dire au naturel des sujets, en considérant le pays qu’ils habitent, dont la position a beaucoup de pouvoir sur leurs esprits ayant égard d’ailleurs aux divers temps, qui demandent des conduites, et par conséquent des ordonnances différentes. 108 Adding the argument of the politicians’ consensus to Aristotle’s authority, La Mothe Le Vayer pleads for laws that are designed by taking into account the character of the people, which is said to be greatly influenced by the climate theory, 109 and the specificity of the moments when they have to be applied. Belonging to the long-term strategies that in politics are complementary to the necessity to know how to handle particular situations, the creation of laws con‐ firms the importance of a prudence that is able to deal with an infinite variety of cases. Proceeding from a sceptical view that adheres to the plausible as a result of the weak correspondence between the philosophical theories and the multi‐ plicity of situations they try to control, prudence contents itself with the crite‐ rion of the reasonable, which consists in providing passable reasons for its de‐ cisions. 177 4.6 The Prudence of the Prince: Necessary, but Difficult 110 La Mothe Le Vayer, La Morale du Prince, 269. 111 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre LIII. Du Commandement souverain, 495. When mentioning Alfonso of Aragon, La Mothe Le Vayer is likely to refer to the character who, according to Moreri, in the Grand Dictionnaire historique ou le mélange curieux de l’histoire sacrée et profane, vol. 1, 177 was called “the sage and the astrologer” (“le sage et l’astrologue”). 4.7 The Philosophers: Prudent Ministers and Counselors of the Prince Meant to give answers to a vast number of concrete situations, the prudence that must underlie political actions has undoubtedly a strong practical dimen‐ sion. The practical characteristics of prudence are enhanced by the elements that are supposed to contribute to obtaining it: “This moral prudence is acquired in time and through diverse means, which depend partly on study and much more on experience” (“Cette prudence morale s’acquiert avec le temps, et par divers moyens, qui dépendent en partie de l’étude, et bien plus de l’expér‐ ience”). 110 The experience that plays a major role in the acquisition of prudence is obviously supposed to provide a panorama as broad as possible of the variety of situations that have to be faced and of their possible solutions. In the case of politics, the prudence relies to a great extent on the practical knowledge that the future king is expected to acquire by attending the State Councils, which decide on a regular basis upon the most diverse political affairs. Despite the fact that they hold a key role in determining the course of the political actions, which in order to be successful have to be founded on prudence, the sovereigns are not supposed to make their decisions entirely by themselves. Certainly, through a paraphrase of Alfonso of Aragon, La Mothe Le Vayer em‐ phasises the extent up to which the princes have to care about both acquiring a deep knowledge of politics and developing the capacity to distinguish good from evil and right from wrong, which are implicitly indispensable for appropriate decisions. Nonetheless, following the example of Jupiter, who always has Pallas by his side, the princes have themselves assisted by these old men, who wear long sighted spectacles with respect to the State affairs and who are all necessarily judicial astrologers in the kingdom of China in order to better predict the future. Car bien qu’à l’exemple de Jupiter, qui a toujours Pallas à ses côtés, les princes se fassent assister de ces vieillards, qui portent des lunettes à longue vue aux affaires d’État, et qui sont tous nécessairement astrologues judiciaires au royaume de la Chine pour mieux prévoir l’avenir. 111 178 Chapter 4. La Mothe Le Vayer’s Attitude towards Politics: Irreducible Contradiction? 112 See Furetière, Dictionnaire universel, vol. 3, entry “old man” (“vieillard”): “[…] Roboam found himself in a bad state for not having followed the advice of the old men; that is of sage and experienced men” (“Roboam se trouva mal de n’avoir pas suivi le conseil des vieillards; c’est-à-dire, des gens sages et expérimentés”). 113 See Furetière, Dictionnaire universel, vol. 2, first entry “spectacles” (“lunettes”): “Spec‐ tacles, in the plural, are two glasses set in horn, or another matter, which are placed on the nose and in front of the eyes, in order to help old men and those who are short sighted, to read and to write, or to better discover objects” (“Lunettes, au pluriel, sont deux verres enchâssés dans de la corne, ou autre matière, qu’on applique sur le nez et devant les yeux, pour aider aux vieillards, et à ceux qui ont la vue courte, à lire et à écrire, ou à découvrir mieux les objets”). 114 La Mothe Le Vayer, La Promenade. IX Dialogue, 257-258. Citing the model of the mythological couple that relied on the collaboration between power and wisdom, La Mothe Le Vayer is obviously in favour of the monarchs’ association with the “old men” (“vieillards”), whose main attributes include wisdom. 112 Allowing the prediction of future events, their wisdom has nothing in common with the astrology severely criticised in the treatise De l’In‐ struction de Monseigneur le Dauphin. Indeed, the metaphorical instruments that they are expected to use in order to support the sovereign are not related to the occult pseudo-sciences, but to the latest scientific discoveries of the time. The spectacles that are usually associated with old men because of the infirmities provoked by age 113 are, in this context, linked with the most recent scientific inventions and become an instrument that brings the political events closer in the same way in which the optical instruments bring the natural events closer. In an excerpt from La Promenade. Dialogues, La Mothe Le Vayer is more spe‐ cific about the institutional role that the individuals who back up the king by means of the newly invented equipments are supposed to play: “It is true that sovereigns are usually assisted by perceptive and faithful ministers, who by means of the long-sighted telescopes and of their political spectacles detect and measure with certainty the most remote things of which others do not catch glimpse” (“Il est vrai, que les souverains sont ordinairement assistés de ministres clairvoyants et fidèles, qui par le moyen des lunettes à longue vue, et de leur dioptre politique, discernent et mesurent avec certitude les choses les plus éloignées, que d’autres qu’eux n’aperçoivent pas”). 114 Thus, the individuals who perform the function of ministers of the king distinguish themselves by two main attributes, loyalty and insight. The instruments that are supposed to met‐ aphorically underlie the insight perform a function that, according to the latest evolution of the science of the time, consists in making up for the weaknesses of the senses, which are the original sources of human knowledge. Having as symbol the telescope since the discoveries of Galileo about the Moon and the 179 4.7 The Philosophers: Prudent Ministers and Counselors of the Prince 115 Hooke, “Preface,” Micrographia, quoted by A. C. Crombie, M. A. Hoskin, “The Scientific Movement and its Influence 1610-1650,” 149. 116 A. C. Crombie, M. A. Hoskin, “The Scientific Movement and its Influence 1610-1650,” 149-150. 117 La Mothe Le Vayer, La Morale du Prince, 271. See also Cicero, On Invention, II. LIII, 160, in On Invention. The Best Kind of Orator. Topics, trans. H. M. Hubbell (Loeb Classical Library 386). 118 See Furetière, Dictionnaire universel, vol. 3, entry spéculatif, considered as a noun. Milky Way, the instruments that act as “‘artificial Organs’ ” 115 are meant to col‐ laborate with the “natural” ones in the quest for knowledge and pertain to the “increasing emphasis on precision” specific to the new science that has started to assert itself towards the end of the 16 th century and the beginning of the 17 th century. 116 While remaining indifferent to the mathematical operations on which this new science was based, La Mothe Le Vayer obviously acknowledges the utility of the results that can be reached by the recently found optical equipment. The bringing closer of the future events, whether good or bad, that these pieces of equipment are metaphorically expected to achieve, similarly to the way in which they manage to magnify distant or tiny natural phenomena, corre‐ sponds to the last of the three parts of prudence, inspired by Cicero’s On Inven‐ tion: “Before every decision remember the past, examine the present and predict the future. For prudence knows how to take advantage of all the three parts of time” (“Devant toute résolution se souvenir du passé, considérer le présent, et prévoir le futur. Car la prudence sait se prévaloir de toutes les trois parties du temps”). 117 Therefore, prudence is supposed to adopt a holistic approach to time, which consists in using the information about the past in order to try to under‐ stand the present and in employing the knowledge about both the present and the past in order to try to foresee the future. Despite its fundamentally pragmatic dimension, in the attempt to achieve a certain foresight of the future, prudence needs to speculate or to put a certain distance between itself and the concrete elements on which it founds its reasoning. This happens because, in order to try to compensate for its inability to know all the elements that may contribute to the development of a situation, prudence has to expand the scope of the few hard facts that it possesses with respect to the case it studies. Confirming the connection between speculation and politics, Furetière attributes a meaning to the term “speculative” (“spéculatif ”) especially adapted to the field of politics, defining it, among others, as a “politician who thinks about present or future events” (“politique qui raisonne sur les événements présents, ou futurs”). 118 Despite mentioning the optical instruments that represent the observation method specific to the natural sciences of his time, La Mothe Le Vayer remains faithful to the speculation, which in the 17 th century will gradually be seen as 180 Chapter 4. La Mothe Le Vayer’s Attitude towards Politics: Irreducible Contradiction? 119 On the opposition between natural science and philosophy that asserts itself towards the end of the seventeenth century, see Donald Rutherford, “Innovation and orthodoxy in early modern philosophy,” in The Cambridge Companion to Early Modern Philos‐ ophy, 11-38. 120 See Furetière, Dictionnaire universel, vol. 3, first entry “to speculate” (“spéculer”): “to meditate carefully; to examine the natural or spiritual causes; to reason on the principles of sciences” (“méditer avec attention; examiner les causes naturelles, ou spirituelles; raisonner sur les principes des sciences”); and vol. 2, first entry “meditate” (“méditer”): “to apply oneself carefully to the study of something; to make reflections; to think deeply about something” (“s’attacher attentivement à la considération de quelque chose; faire des réflexions; penser profondément à quelque chose”). 121 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue sur le sujet de la vie privée, 200 and Lettre CXXI. Des Ab‐ stractions spirituelles, 351-353. the distinctive feature of philosophy. 119 The activity of speculating that may be understood as the careful thought on a particular topic, can be seen, broadly speaking, as a synonym of the meditation, which as it has been previously shown, is the main action of the philosophers. 120 The meditations enable the philosophers to leave behind the knowledge or the common opinions that are shared by most of the people and to reach thoughts that are inaccessible to ordinary inviduals: “But when in this spiritual ocean there are heroic souls like Typhis or Columbus, they take entirely new roads, and arrive in unknown countries, full of rarities and reasons to be admired” (“Mais quand il se trouve des âmes héroïques, comme des Typhis ou des Colomb, dans cet océan spirituel, ils suivent des routes toutes nouvelles, et font descente en des pays inconnus, pleins de raretés et d’admiration ”). 121 Although perhaps less spectacular because less tangible, the reflections that the philosophers are able to develop may lead to effects as revolutionary as the geographical discoveries, which have reshaped the map of the Earth. For instance, the philosophers’ capacity to attain thoughts that are off the beaten track may materialise in the understanding of the crucial role which may be played in the universe by apparently trifling or even loath‐ some elements: It is the advantage that those that you are talking about [the philosophers] have over the common people and that consists in not coming across anything so contemptible from which they do not draw important reflections; […] often also the most neglected things of this world are those that reveal to these beautiful souls the greatest mysteries of nature and that teach to them the most fruitful lessons. C’est l’avantage qu’ont ceux dont vous parlez sur les hommes vulgaires, de ne ren‐ contrer rien de si vil dont ils ne tirent d’importantes considérations; […] souvent aussi 181 4.7 The Philosophers: Prudent Ministers and Counselors of the Prince 122 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue de l’ignorance louable, 294. 123 La Mothe Le Vayer, “Polybe,” Jugements sur les principaux historiens grecs et latins, in Oeuvres, IV/ II, 44. les choses les plus négligées de ce monde sont celles qui révèlent à ces belles âmes les plus hauts mystères de la nature, et dont ils reçoivent les plus fructueuses leçons. 122 Resulting from the philosophers’ general opposition to the opinions that enjoy the wide support of the masses, the rehabilitation of the phenomena that are usually disregarded or despised belongs to a reflection that aims at the restora‐ tion of the global dignity of nature. Illustrated by the interest in the natural realities that in general are despised or do not attract much attention, the ability to develop analyses so thorough that they reach details usually ignored, may be obviously of the greatest use in politics, where the most insignificant detail can have an incalculable influence on the most considerable projects. In the case of politics, the learning that nourishes the philosophers’ medita‐ tions is likely to be, to a certain extent, represented by history. Among the his‐ torians, it is Polybius who wrote the works that “can teach us the most in the field of government and civil prudence” (“[…] l’on puisse plus apprendre en matière de gouvernement et de prudence civile”). 123 Certainly, the Greek his‐ torian is worthy of being praised for having written a history that can perform the function of pratical moral philosophy, or of “philosophy filled with exam‐ ples”, expression that translates the Ciceronian magistra vitae. But beyond this moral scope, Polybius’ history seems to be held in high esteem by La Mothe Le Vayer because it reveals the hidden causes of the historical events, which can certainly be related to the pragmatic view of politics defended by the followers of the reason of State theories. In his attempt to write a “universal” (“univer‐ selle”) history, the Greek historian focused on the “affairs of the Roman Empire” (“les affaires de l’Empire romain”), but depicted at the same time the “interests” 182 Chapter 4. La Mothe Le Vayer’s Attitude towards Politics: Irreducible Contradiction? 124 Ibid., 34. On the sources of La Mothe Le Vayer’s position on Polybius, see Béatrice Guion, Du bon usage de l’histoire, 307. It is worth mentioning that, when relying on Polybius, La Mothe Le Vayer specifies the meaning of the “interest” especially with respect to religion. Hence, in paraphrasing Polybius, he holds that: “since there are no States whose people is not, as we see it, prone to all sorts of dissolute and wicked actions, in order to suppress it we need the imaginary fears that our religion inspires and the groundless terrors of the other world, which the Ancients have so wisely introduced for this purpose […]” (“puisqu’il n’y a point d’États dont le peuple ne soit, tel que nous le voyons, sujet à toute sorte de dé‐ règlement et de méchantes actions, il faut se servir pour le réprimer des craintes imag‐ inaires qu’imprime notre religion, et des terreurs paniques de l’autre monde, que les Anciens ont si prudemment introduites pour cela […]”) (La Mothe Le Vayer, Jugements sur les principaux historiens grecs et latins, “Polybe”, 42). La Mothe Le Vayer’s attempt to minimise the disturbing dimension of this position by arguing that, as a Christian avant la lettre, Polybius disregarded the pagan religions of his time, does not entirely eliminate the possibility of the political manipulation of religions. Besides that, it is not surprising to notice that, at least partly given Tacitus’ bad repu‐ tation, La Mothe Le Vayer does not openly suggest his works as a useful ressource for the field of politics. However, in the context of a wider defence of Tacitus’ writings, La Mothe Le Vayer uses arguments that are similar to those of the étatistes like Naudé: “Moreover you do not find out from him only the event of the past things. He almost always unveils the causes and decisions that preceded them” (“Au surplus vous n’ap‐ prenez pas de lui simplement l’évènement des choses passées. Il en découvre presque toujours les causes, et les conseils precedents”) (“Tacite,” Jugements sur les principaux historiens grecs et latins, 246). On La Mothe Le Vayer’s attitude towards Tacitus, see Béatrice Guion, Du bon usage de l’histoire, 171-172, 259-260. 125 La Mothe Le Vayer, De l’Instruction de Monseigneur le Dauphin, 159. (“intérêts”) of the kings of the rest of the “powers of the Earth” (“puissances de la Terre”). 124 Yet, the practice of the philosophy that underlies the speculative prudence necessary for anticipating the course of the political events can hardly be con‐ comitant with the actual practice of politics: “Concerning philosophy, it is a thing more to wish than to hope for, to see it wear the crown” (“Quant à la philosophie, c’est une chose plutôt à souhaiter qu’à espérer, de lui voir porter le diadème”). 125 Constrained to limit himself to the acquisition of a knowledge of philosophy that teaches him how to reason well, the prince has to respect the 183 4.7 The Philosophers: Prudent Ministers and Counselors of the Prince 126 La Mothe Le Vayer, La Politique du Prince, 335: “Nevertheless, except for the excess which must be condemned everywhere, there is nothing that is more necessary or more honourable for a sovereign, than the nice use of reason, which is taught by philosophy” (“Cependant, hors l’excès qui doit être condamné partout, il n’y a rien qui soit ni plus nécessaire, ni de plus grand ornement à un souverain, que le bel usage de la raison qu’enseigne la philosophie”). See also La Mothe Le Vayer, De l’Instruction de Monseigneur le Dauphin, 161: “These are examples to be imitated by the princes who have some concern for their good renown, being certain that they cannot show too much love and respect for those who develop the sciences with this high reputation and who hold the first ranks in all sorts of honest professions” (“Ce sont des exemples à imiter par les princes, qui ont quelque soin de leur bonne renommée, étant certain qu’ils ne peuvent faire paraître trop d’amour ni de respect envers ceux, qui cultivent les sciences avec cette haute réputation, et qui tien‐ nent les premiers rangs en toutes sortes d’honnêtes professions”). 127 Pierre Charron, De la Sagesse, Book III, ch. I, 485-486. 128 Ibid., 486. 129 Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, 216. individuals who make outstanding contributions to their field 126 and, in certain cases, to take them as collaborators, ministers or counselors. Condemned to be more a utopia than a reality, the ideal of the philosopher-king can be relatively fulfilled by the collaboration between the princes and the ministers who assist them through their prudence. Complementing the practical knowledge acquired by the future king during the State Councils, the philosophers’ speculative pru‐ dence may recall Charron’s “borrowed prudence” (“empruntée”), attributed to those who “know how to take, follow and benefit from the good pieces of advice of others” (“savent prendre, suivre et se prévaloir des bons avis d’autrui”). 127 It is considered absolutely necessary, since the personal prudence, belonging to those who “see clearly everywhere and know how to find by themselves rem‐ edies and expedients” (“voient clair partout, et savent d’eux-mêmes trouver les remèdes et expedients”) is a “rare and singular thing” (“chose rare et singu‐ lière”), 128 namely almost impossible to find. Although he was not one of the actual ministers of the monarch, La Mothe Le Vayer sought to shape his overall behaviour by influencing his political de‐ cisions in a more general and less punctual way than the ministers. In so doing, he acted more like the humanist philosophers who, as “political advisers” of the people in power, have sometimes applied themselves to help them through their “advice-books”. 129 The reflection on the vices of power is accompanied by the attempt to assist it and does not aim at the “theoretical and practical subversion of the foundations of absolutism and of its apologetic discourses” (“subversion théorique et pratique des fondements de l’absolutisme et de ses discours apol‐ 184 Chapter 4. La Mothe Le Vayer’s Attitude towards Politics: Irreducible Contradiction? 130 Gouverneur, Prudence et subversion libertines, 460. The approach adopted by Sophie Gouverneur continues that of Cavaillé who, in Dis/ simulations, 194 holds that: “The libertine dissimulation feeds in a mirror-like way on the political simulation; it is through the critical exploitation of this show that the strong mind tests his firmness, his singularity and his tenacity” (“La dissimulation libertine se nourrit spéculairement de la simulation politique: c’est dans l’exploitation critique de ce spectacle que l’esprit fort éprouve sa fermeté, sa singularité et son irréductibilité”). ogétiques”). 130 In addition to pleading for the circumscription of the unavoidable sacrifices inflicted by the politicians upon their subjects to exceptional cases, La Mothe Le Vayer argues for an exercise of power that cares about the well-being of the people it rules. Moreover, in accordance with his practice of scepticism, he gives to the prince a support whose guiding principles consist in teaching him the limits of his power, which should depend on the royal abilities, on the obligations towards his subjects and on the unpredictable turn of events. Con‐ sequence of the adherence to scepticism, La Mothe Le Vayer’s taste for eclecti‐ cism influences the elements that shape the relationship between the prince and his counselors. Thus, the humanist emphasis on the role of learned philosophers as “political advisers” is combined with the interest in the reason of State theories and the new discoveries in the field of natural philosophy. 185 4.7 The Philosophers: Prudent Ministers and Counselors of the Prince 1 La Mothe Le Vayer, La Promenade. IX Dialogue, 253. Conclusion La Mothe Le Vayer’s apparent lack of interest in political discourse could have hardly been expressed in a sharper way than in the IX Dialogue from the series La Promenade. Dialogues: In any case, of all the suggestions that you could have made to me, you have presented the one for which I have the most aversion. Talking about the political government, as I have learnt from the Italians, should be as indifferent to us as the good or the bad days of the year, to which we cannot contribute in any way and about which we should consequently never legitimately worry, del tempo, ne della Signoria, non darsi malin‐ conia. Quoiqu’il en soit, de toutes les propositions, que vous pouviez me faire, vous avez avancé celle pour laquelle j’ai le plus d’aversion. Parler du gouvernement politique, comme j’ai appris des Italiens nous devait être aussi indifférent, que les bons ou les mauvais jours de l’année, où nous ne pouvons rien contribuer, et dont par conséquent l’on ne peut jamais avec raison s’inquiéter, del tempo, ne della Signoria, non darsi ma‐ linconia . 1 In slight contrast to the relaxed context of a conversation with a close friend within which it is pronounced, the rather harsh hostility to all discussion of politics is justified by its incapacity to have any concrete effects. For so doing, Tubertus Ocella alias La Mothe Le Vayer refers to the Italians’ authority in the field of political thought, which they may have nevertheless achieved especially through their reason of State theories that were meant to provide a grasp of politics as rational as possible. Instead of the attempt to get involved in the course of the political events, which he sees as implicit in any talk about politics, La Mothe Le Vayer’s character prefers the detachment that is usually recom‐ mended with respect to the phenomena that can only be suffered and not con‐ trolled. The lack of interest in any reasoning on politics reminds one of the disapproval of the too great curiosity for the secrets of the men in power, which as we have already seen, he compares to a sacrilege and expresses in the Discours pour montrer que les doutes de la Philosophie Sceptique sont de grand usage dans les sciences. Although the Discours and the IX Dialogue differ from the point of view of the reasons that underlie their argumentation and their general aim, 2 La Mothe Le Vayer, De l’Instruction de Monseigneur le Dauphin, 16-17. On La Mothe Le Vayer’s preamble to De l’Instruction de Monseigneur le Dauphin, see also Alexander Roose, “Les Bottines de François de La Mothe Le Vayer,” in Quintilien ancien et mod‐ erne, ed. Perrine Galand et al. (Turnhout: Brepols, 2010), 507-508. they both represent examples of his plea against the application of intellectual activity to politics. However resolute he may seem in rejecting political reflection on occasions like the two that have just been mentioned, La Mothe Le Vayer is not always consistent with it. For instance, in the dedication to Cardinal Richelieu, which is the preamble to De l’Instruction de Monseigneur le Dauphin, he clearly shows his desire to make use of his quill, his thoughts and his knowledge in order to write a work that serves a political purpose: And nevertheless, Your Eminence, the zeal that I have for my prince does not allow me to keep silent on a topic on which I believe having developed some thoughts that may be useful to him. The desire also, as I have already said, to deal with the things that must be agreeable to Your Eminence, urges me to it. Et néanmoins, Monseigneur, le zèle que j’ai pour mon prince ne me permet pas de me taire, sur un sujet où je crois avoir fait quelque réflexions qui lui peuvent être utiles. Le désir aussi, comme j’ai déjà dit, de m’occuper aux choses qui doivent plaire à Votre Éminence, m’y convie. 2 In writing the lines quoted above, La Mothe Le Vayer apparently provides the reasons that prompted him to neglect the difficulties that, as a loyal subject and a conscientious homme de lettres, he sees as inherent in the task of writing a treatise for the prince. Hence, on the one hand, he is likely to place himself under the protection of Richelieu, which he may expect to reach by defending ideas in tune with those of the Cardinal. On the other hand, the convention of the zeal for the prince is allegedly responsible for the fact that, by abandoning the mod‐ esty, which is de rigueur in a work addressed to such a prestigious audience, he shares his thoughts with the future king. Although it is justified by the potential benefit that it can bring to the Dauphin, the treatise for the royal education shows that, actually, La Mothe Le Vayer aims at exerting a certain influence on political action through his thoughts. Additionally, the mention of the thoughts that flesh out the book written for the prince also contains an allusion to the condition of the learned man, whose main activity consists in thinking and writing which, as intellectual activities, are implicitly nourished by reading. However, in order to be able to immerse himself in the contemplation that gives substance to his works, he needs a 187 Conclusion 3 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue sur le sujet de la vie privée, 199. freedom and a tranquillity of mind that he can only reach by keeping himself out of the domestic and political affairs. Although the quest for the freedom and the mental tranquillity prerequisite to reflection makes him inclined to a with‐ drawn life, his capacity of concentration materialises in an indifference to the outer world that allows him to find everywhere the solitude on which he relies for the development of his thoughts: It is not because of that that we leave the towns in order to inhabit the woods and the wild mountains, our mind finds its hermitage everywhere and in the most numerous gatherings of men of the greatest towns I often find myself in the desert, magna civitas magna mihi solitudo, and in the midst of it I find myself as lonely as could be Orpheus in sylvis, inter Delphinas Arion. Ce n’est pas pour cela que nous quittions les villes pour habiter les bois et les mon‐ tagnes sauvages, notre esprit trouve son ermitage partout, et dans les plus nombreuses assemblées d’hommes des plus grandes villes, je m’y trouve souvent au desert, magna civitas magna mihi solitudo, et j’y suis ordinairement aussi seul que pouvait être Orpheus in sylvis, inter Delphinas Arion. 3 Hence, the remoteness from the world that is specific to the hermitage refers to a mental space, which stretches far beyond the geographical delimitation of the countryside to which it is usually associated. La Mothe Le Vayer seems to be all the more interested in solitude, since it allows him to stay away from a politics to which he would be entitled by his social status, but which he apparently sees as based on violence and deceit. A second-rate show that convinces only the individuals who are gullible, politics seems to be made by people who conceal their intellectual weakness and the mediocrity of their knowledge behind os‐ tentatious clothes and behaviours. Moreover, despite the pretences of its adepts, who referring to Aristotle, consider it the first among sciences, the pretended science that underlies the politicians’ actions seems to fail the test of scepticism. Indeed, when confronted with the method that underlies La Mothe Le Vayer’s scepticism and that is based on the display of contradictory views of the same phenomenon, political science reveals a vast number of internal contradictions. By opposing to one another the rules of political science, these contradictions discredit them and apparently lead to the devaluation of political science as a whole. Counter to what the politicians claim, the origin and the outcome of their actions do not seem to be determined by a rigorous science, but by fortune. In addition to these flaws, which are inherent in every political regime, La Mothe Le Vayer does not ignore the dangers that are inherent in the political 188 Conclusion 4 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre LIII. Du Commandement souverain, 491-492. 5 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue traitant de la politique sceptiquement, 491. 6 Ibid., 493. See also Furetière, Dictionnaire universel, vol. 2, first entry “idolatry” (“idol‐ âtrie”): “Cult, worship of false gods” (“Culte, adoration des faux dieux”). discourse that is built around the political regime of his time. Thus, he is well aware of the fact that the omnipotence enjoyed by the French kings runs the risk of sinking into tyranny. Since it is the government of a tyrant, the tyranny refers to a political rule characterised by the abuse of power, which can take different forms such as the defiance of the laws or the cruel and violent behav‐ iour towards the subjects. Disapproving of the excesses that may turn the king into a tyrant and that may result from a lax understanding of royal omnipotence, La Mothe Le Vayer quotes the answer given by Diogenes to Alexander when he was asked about the “precepts of a good rule” (“des préceptes pour bien régner”): “It is impossible, he told him, to do badly such a job and consequently to be a bad prince, all the more since the moment one starts handling it in the wrong way, one loses the status of a king and tyrannises instead of reigning” (“Il est impossible, lui dit-il, de mal faire un tel métier, ni par conséquent d’être mauvais prince, d’autant que dès l’heure, qu’on s’y prend mal, on en perd la qualité, et au lieu de régner on tyrannise”). 4 Even if, further on, it is mitigated in a Christian sense, which holds that the king’s authority is inviolable independently of its practical effects, the quotation from Diogenes shows that there is no common denominator between the monarchy and the tyranny, which is understood as a flawed monarchy, failing to fulfil its task of carrying out a good government. In consistency with his taste for paradox, the Cynic philosopher argues that the slightest improper action lowers the king to the hateful position of a tyrant. Although, when writing in a sceptical manner about royal omnipotence in the Dialogue traitant de la politique sceptiquement, he does not pronounce the word “tyranny” as such, La Mothe Le Vayer alludes to it when mentioning the kings who think that they are allowed to do everything and to behave towards their State and everything it contains as it pleases them. 5 The case of the Russian tsar, which has already been discussed, belongs to a whole series of examples that by referring to incest, frightening sacrifices inflicted upon the subjects or immoderate claims to the possession of the basic elements of a country illustrate the injustices in which the erroneous understanding of monarchical omnipo‐ tence results. When used for legitimising any form of abuse, the omnipotence underlies regimes that are comparable to “shameful idolatries” (“infâmes idolâ‐ tries”), 6 since they give to kings privileges that are suitable only for gods. In addition to royal omnipotence, La Mothe Le Vayer brings out another danger, which does not concern the king himself, but the political entity he is 189 Conclusion 7 See Thuau, Raison d’État et pensée politique à l’époque de Richelieu, 275. 8 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre LIII. Du Commandement souverain, 488. supposed to embody, namely the State. Privileging the State over the people, the developments in the political literature that were relatively new at the time of La Mothe Le Vayer, materialised in the reason of State, which legitimised the gap between the ethics of the politicians and the ethics of their subjects. As it is proven, among others, by his reflections on the connection between the reason of State and the interest from the Lettre XCV. De la Fidélité romaine, the writer is well aware of the fact that although the reason of State seems to be recently coined in the political vocabulary, its basic principle, the double standard of ethics separating the people in power from private individuals, has always ex‐ isted in politics. Certainly, La Mothe Le Vayer knows that the breach of the ordinary ethical norms is justified as an evil necessary for the good of the com‐ munity, as he seems to show by the reference to Louis XI, one of the model figures for the adepts of the reason of State, who was said to equate the dissim‐ ulation with the political rule 7 : “which could well concern the cleverness and the dissimulation that a king like our Louis XI has sometimes been forced to use for the good of his State, by deceiving his peoples in their best interest, according to the opinion of the greateast philosophers themselves” (“ce qui pourrait re‐ garder l’adresse d’esprit, et la dissimulation, dont un prince tel que notre Louis XI a été quelquefois obligé d’user pour le bien de son État, trompant ses peuples à leur avantage, par l’avis même des plus grands philosophes”). 8 Nonetheless, La Mothe Le Vayer understands that behind the respectable argument of working for the people’s good, the reason of State makes the evil that results from the violation of ethical rules acceptable and consequently opens the way for the abuse against the individuals’ possessions and even lives. Despite his love of retreat and his understanding of the failings and potential threats that are intrinsic to the political order of his day, the author does not live in complete isolation. Indeed, although he needs to cut himself off from the others in order to be able to attend to his reflections, he considers that it belongs to his duty to share the results of his leisure with the rest of the world. In order to illustrate the necessity of making public the reflections that are the outcome of his solitary work, he uses, among others, a fable: “Certainly it is necessary to imitate rather the bees, since they make honey and wax that are useful to them‐ selves and to the entire human race; than the ants, which we see accumulate seeds and stock up on food only for themselves” (“Certes il faut imiter plutôt les abeilles, en ce qu’elles font du miel et de la cire qui sont utiles et à elles, et à tout le genre humain; que les fourmis, qu’on voit n’amasser du grain, ni faire toutes 190 Conclusion 9 La Mothe Le Vayer, II. De l’Action, et du Repos, 171-172. 10 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue de l’ignorance louable, 278, 295. 11 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue traitant de la philosophie sceptique, 63. 12 La Mothe Le Vayer, Dialogue de l’ignorance louable, 282. 13 Ibid., 287. leurs provisions, que pour elles seules”). 9 Hence, following the example provided by the generous bees, the learned men who immerse themselves in contempla‐ tions are supposed to make the reserves of knowledge that they amass during their hours of solitude available for a wide audience. As far as he is concerned, over the periods of time when he withdraws from the public activities, La Mothe Le Vayer develops thoughts that rely on a phil‐ osophical approach, which he calls his “dear scepticism” (“ma / notre chère sceptique”). 10 This approach is based on the “rare and precious chapter of the ten modes of the épochè, as they are explained by Sextus” (“ce rare et précieux chapitre des dix moyens de l’épokhè, ainsi que les explique notre Sextus”). 11 The illustration of Sextus’ tropes, which significantly favours the tenth one, mate‐ rialises in the juxtaposition of different or even opposed opinions of the same phenomenon, among which some are plainly shocking. The contradictions that result from the collection of these diverse opinions lead to the suspension of judgement or épokhè. La Mothe Le Vayer alias Orasius proves that he is well aware of the accusations which reduce scepticism to an “absurd and ridiculous heresy of understanding” (“hérésie d’entendement absurde et ridicule”), 12 namely a very serious error by analogy with the religious field, since one of the most striking consequences of the suspension of judgement consists in the in‐ capacity to choose among opinions that, despite their opposition, are perceived as equally plausible. Against these accusations, the author’s alter ego argues that the sceptics do not use the suspension of judgement in order to disapprove of the knowledge of letters and sciences, but in order to moderate the “stubborn‐ ness” (“opiniâtreté”) of their dogmatic adepts by fighting against their arro‐ gance. 13 According to La Mothe Le Vayer, the “stubbornness” shown by the dogmatic individuals, ordinary men as well as philosophers, does not spring from their interest in truth, but from a self-love that stops them from abandoning an opinion once they have started to embrace it. Unlike the rigidity of thought that he reproaches to the dogmatic people, he practises a flexibility that springs from the indifference resulting from the sus‐ pension of judgement. Indeed, despite his admiration for Sextus Empiricus’ works, La Mothe Le Vayer’s scepticism is not limited to the Pyrrhonism whose main source they are. The suspension of judgement, which is a constant pres‐ ence in the background of our writer’s intellectual activities, is the source of a 191 Conclusion 14 See Thuau, Raison d’État et pensée politique à l’époque de Richelieu, 411-413, 385-386. 15 La Mothe Le Vayer, Petit traité sceptique sur cette commune façon de parler, n’avoir pas le sens commun, 187. detachment that enables him to combine the Pyrrhonism with the scepticism of the New Academy, whose main feature is the agreement to the plausible. Holding the place given to the truth by the dogmatic philosophers, the plausible, corresponding to the modest sceptical aspirations in the field of knowledge, is understood by La Mothe Le Vayer as what has merely the appearance of being reasonable. Since the opinions to which it is applied are considered as essentially fallible, the plausible allows the author to adopt a flexibility of thought that influences the ways in which he agrees to a point of view on a particular issue and builds his own philosophical system. Hence, on the one hand, he is ready to abandon an opinion that he thinks plausible whenever he finds another one that seems to him more plausible. On the other hand, without any ambition to be exhaustive, he forms his own philosophical system, which is totally asyste‐ matic and which relies on the collection of the plausible views of a single matter whose diversity can go as far as including contradiction. When analysing political science, which was a rather common expression during the 17 th century and whose evolution was relatively concurrent with that of natural philosophy, 14 La Mothe Le Vayer does not have difficulty in identifying the contradictions that give substance to his Pyrrhonism. For instance, after mentioning the division in the Roman Senate about the preservation or the de‐ struction of Carthage, he concludes that “All the maxims of politics are as un‐ certain as this one and the reasons that the Italians call of good government always have two different faces” (“Toutes les maximes de la politique sont aussi problématiques que celle-là, et les raisons que les Italiens nomment de bon gou‐ vernement; ont toujours deux visages différents”). 15 Referring to the reason of State that shaped the political science of the time and whose development, as we have already seen, was usually attributed to the Italians, this categorical statement seems to seriously harm the science of politics. However, the appa‐ rently irrevocable character of the statements among which this one is just an example is to be understood as a reaction to the pretences of the adepts of po‐ litical science who, like Telamon in the Dialogue traitant de la politique scepti‐ quement, praise it to the skies. By widely bringing out the contradictions among the rules that sometimes may seem utterly shocking and that concern the same political phenomenon, La Mothe Le Vayer does not aim to entirely ruin political science, but to moderate the arrogance of its supporters, who attribute to it the capacity to exert total control over the world. The “light suspicions” of knowl‐ edge to which political science is entitled to aspire correspond to the way in 192 Conclusion 16 La Mothe Le Vayer, Lettre CXL. Du Gouvernement politique, 153. which La Mothe Le Vayer perceives the science, as the expression of the “plau‐ sible” of the New Academy and not of the truth defended by the dogmatics. Although they are more visible in the pieces of advice that La Mothe Le Vayer gives to the future king, the mediocre expectations concerning political science do not remain without impact on the way in which he agrees to the political regime of his time. Indeed, in accepting the absolute monarchy, he complies with the criterion of reasonable that consists mostly in trying to temper its potentially most dangerous aspects. This attitude results from his awareness of the fact that, although people are the actors of politics, they have only a limited control over it. For instance, since political beginnings are impossible “where the matter is not entirely prepared to receive the political forms” (“où la matière n’est pas entièrement bien disposée à recevoir les forms politiques”), 16 an event of the greatest importance, like the establishment of a new form of government, is to a certain extent independent of the potential knowledge and skills of the poli‐ ticians who may try to generate it. Applying these general thoughts to the mon‐ archy of his time, La Mothe Le Vayer approves of it, although he does not ignore the weaknesses from which, like any other system of government, it is not spared. In so doing, not only does he see the positive sides of the contemporary monarchical regime, like the very fact of allowing criticism, but he also attempts to contain its possible deviations, which may arise from the doctrines of the royal omnipotence and the reason of State. Hence, in the treatises that he writes for the education of the Dauphin, he tries to acquaint him with the fact that, despite the theoretically absolute power he possesses, the course of his actions is not spared from constraints. These constraints spring either from causes like fortune, which are out of the control of the king, or from causes like reason and justice, on which the king is supposed to found his actions. Although they are inserted into works that seem to be written for entirely different purposes, like the support or the subversion of power, the passages about the limitations on monarchical power are in many cases mostly similar and can be said to belong to a writing technique that can be designated as intertextuality, following its definition by Gérard Genette. In keeping with his argumentation against the arbitrary use of power, La Mothe Le Vayer pleads for a reason of State, which aims at both minimising the sacri‐ fices required from the subjects and at increasing their well-being. Replaced, because of its controversial connotations, by expressions like the “interest of State”, the reason of State for which La Mothe Le Vayer argues restricts the sacrifices imposed on the individuals to exceptional situations and seeks to as‐ 193 Conclusion 17 See chapter “4. 7 The Philosophers: Prudent Ministers and Counselors of the Prince”. sure their well-being by making them take part through work in the economic prosperity of the country. In addition to the limitations on the course of the political events, La Mothe Le Vayer is not afraid of mentioning in the treatises for the Dauphin the limi‐ tations of the ruling capacities of the king himself. In so doing, he seeks to make the princes aware of the incompatibility between the practical side of their job and the practice of the philosophy, which ever since Plato was a fundamental attribute of monarchy. Hence, the sovereign is supposed to surround himself by ministers chosen among the philosophers, who are expected to make use of their learning and meditation abilities in order to practise a prudence that consists in the attempt to anticipate the course of the political events or, more precisely, to discern the good to seek and the evil to avoid. As far as he is concerned, La Mothe Le Vayer aspires to play a role that is not that of the minister but, following the tradition of the humanist philosophers, that of the “political advisers” who sometimes assist the politicians by addressing to them “advice-books”. 17 The two-faced philosopher that he seems to be towards politics uses the moments of leisure in order to develop meditations that allow him to get involved in political action through the intermediary of the thoughts that are meant to shape it. 194 Conclusion Works cited I. Primary sources a. Works by La Mothe Le Vayer La Mothe Le Vayer. Dialogues faits à l’imitation des Anciens. Edited by Bruno Roche. Paris: Champion, 2015. ________________. De la Vertu des païens. 2 nd ed. Paris: A. Courbé, 1647. ________________. Œuvres. 7 volumes, each volume divided into 2 parts. Dresden: Michel Groell, 1756-1759. b. Other works Acosta, Joseph. Histoire naturelle et morale des Indes, tant Orientales qu’Occidentales. Translated by R. Régnault Cauxois. 2 nd ed. Paris: M. Orry, 1606. Aristotle. Politics. Translated by H. Rakham. Loeb Classical Library 264. _______. Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by H. Rackham. Loeb Classical Library 73. Armacanus, A. P. Le Mars français ou la guerre de France. 1637. Augustine. Confessions. Vol. 1. Edited and translated by Carolyn J. B. Hammond. Loeb Classical Library 26. ______. Les Confessions. Translated by Arnauld d’Andilly. 3 rd ed. Paris: J. Camusat, P. Le Petit, 1651. ______. De la Cité de Dieu. Translated by sieur de Cériziers. Paris: P. le Petit, 1655. Bayle, Pierre. Dictionnaire historique et critique. 5 th ed. Vols 2, 4. Amsterdam: P. Brunel, 1740. Botero, Giovanni. The Reason of State. 1589. Translated by Robert Bireley. Cambridge University Press, 2017. Charron, Pierre. De la Sagesse. 1601. Rouen: R. Valentin, 1634. Cicero. Academica. In On the Nature of Gods. Academics. Translated by H. Rakham. Loeb Classical Library 268. ______. On Invention. In On Invention. The Best Kind of Orator. Topics. Translated by H. M. Hubbell. Loeb Classical Library 386. Empiricus, Sextus. Outlines of Pyrrhonism. Translated by R. G. Bury. Loeb Classical Li‐ brary 273. ______________. Against the Logicians. Translated by R. G. Bury. Loeb Classical Library 291. Eusebius. La Préparation évangélique Livres XIV-XV. Translated by Édouard des Places, s. j. Paris: CERF, 1987. Furetière, Dictionnaire universel. 2 nd ed. 3 Vols. La Haye, Rotterdam: A. and R. Leers, 1701. Jansen, Cornelius. De la Réformation de l’homme intérieur. Translated by Robert d’Ar‐ nauld d’Andilly. Paris: J. Camusat, 1642. Du Jarric, Pierre. Histoire des choses plus mémorables advenues tant ès Indes Orientales, qu’aux autres pays de la découverte des Portugais. Bordeaux: S. Millanges, 1608. Lactantius. The Divine Institutes. Books I-VII. Translated by Sister Mary Francis Mac‐ Donald. Washington D. C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1964. Laertius, Diogenes. Lives of Eminent Philosophers. Vols 1-2. Translated by R. D. Hicks. Loeb Classical Library 184, 185. Machiavelli. The Prince. Edited by Quentin Skinner and Russell Price. Cambridge Uni‐ versity Press, 1988. Mercator, Gérard. Atlas ou représentation du monde universel et des parties d’icelui, faite en tables et descriptions très amples. Édition nouvelle. Amsterdam: H. Hondius, 1633. Montaigne, Michel de. Essays. 3 rd ed. Translated by M. A. Screech. London: Penguin Books, 2003. Moreri, Louis. Le Grand Dictionnaire historique, ou le mélange curieux de l’histoire sacrée et profane. 3 rd ed. Vol. 1. Lyon: J. Girin, B. Rivière, 1683. Naudé, Gabriel. La Bibliographie politique du sieur Naudé. Paris: G. de Pélé, 1642. ____________. Considérations politiques sur les coups d’État. Rome: 1639. ____________. Apologie pour tous les grands personnages qui ont été faussement soupçonnés de magie. 2 nd ed. La Haye: A. Vlac, 1653. D’Olivet. Histoire de l’Académie française, vol. 2 : Depuis 1652 jusqu’à 1700. 2 nd ed. Paris: J.-B. Coignard, 1730. Pascal, Blaise. Pensées. Edited by Philippe Sellier and Gérard Ferreyrolles. Paris: Librairie générale française, 2000. Pelleprat, Pierre. Relation des missions des PP. de la Compagnie de Jésus dans les Îles, et dans la terre ferme de l’Amérique Méridionale. Paris: S. Cramoisy, 1655. Perrault, Charles. Les Hommes illustres qui ont paru en France pendant ce siècle avec leurs portraits au naturel. Vol. 2. Paris: A. Dezallier, 1697-1700. Plato. Laws. Vols 1-2. Translated by R. G. Bury. Loeb Classical Library 187, 192. ____. Republic. Vols 1-2. Edited and translated by Chris Emlyn-Jones and William Preddy. Loeb Classical Library 237, 276. Plutarch. Moralia. Vol. XIII / II. Translated by Harold Cherniss. Loeb Classical Library 470. Portio, Camille. Histoire des troubles advenus au royaume de Naples. Paris: C. Cramoisy, 1627. 196 Works cited Riccius, Matthieu. Histoire de l’expédition chrétienne au royaume de la Chine. Translated by D.-F. de Riquebourg-Trigault . Lyon: H. Cardon, 1616. Richelieu. Testament politique. Edited by Françoise Hildesheimer. Paris : Société de l’His‐ toire de France, 1995. Seneca. On Providence. In Moral Essays. Vol. 1. Translated by by John W. Basore. Loeb Classical Library 214. ____________. On Leisure. In Moral Essays. Vol. 2. Translated by John W. Basore. Loeb Classical Library 254. Vigneul-Marville. Mélanges d’histoire et de littérature. Vol. 2. Rotterdam: E. Yvans, 1700. II. Secondary sources Annas, Julia, and Jonathan Barnes. The Modes of Scepticism. Cambridge University Press, 1985. Bakos, Adrianna. “ ‘Qui nescit dissimulare, nescit regnare’: Louis XI and Raison d’État during the Reign of Louis XIII.” Journal of the History of Ideas LII, no 3 (1991): 399-416. Bett, Richard, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism. Cambridge University Press, 2010. Bianchi, Lorenzo. “L’Instruction des Princes dans l’Europe du XVIIe siècle: la traduction italienne (1677) des écrits pour le Prince de La Mothe Le Vayer.” In Le Masque de l’écriture. Philosophie et traduction de la Renaissance aux Lumières, edited by Charles Le Blanc and Luisa Simonutti, 355-374. Droz: Genève, 2015. _____________. “Il tema dell’eroe nei libertini francesi tra Naudé e La Mothe Le Vayer.” Studi filosofici, XXII (1999) : 99-123. _____________. “Renaissance et libertinage chez La Mothe Le Vayer.” In Libertinage et philosophie au XVIIe siècle, no. 2. La Mothe Le Vayer et Naudé, 75-90. Publications de l’Université de Saint-Étienne, 1997. Bireley, Robert. The Counter-Reformation Prince. Anti-Machiavellianism or Catholic State‐ craft in Early Modern Europe. Chapel Hill, London: University of North Carolina Press, 1990. Bourqui, Claude. “La Mothe Le Vayer et le modèle chinois de la bienfaisance.” In Repré‐ sentations de l’individu en Chine et en Europe francophone. Écritures en miroir, edited by Michel Viegnes and Jean Rime, 43-52. Neuchâtel: Éditions Alphil-Presses Univer‐ sitaires Suisses, 2015. Brochard, Victor. Les Sceptiques grecs. 1887. Paris: Librarie générale française, 2002. Brunstetter, Daniel. “La Mothe Le Vayer and Political Skepticism.” In Skepticism and Po‐ litical Thought in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, edited by John Christian Laursen and Gianni Paganini, 36-54. University of Toronto Press with the help of the UCLA Center for 17 th and 18 th -Century Studies and the Williams Andrews Clark Me‐ morial Library, 2015. 197 Works cited Canziani, Guido. “‘Politiques’ pour le Prince. Traités et manuels au début du règne de Louis XIV.” In L’État classique (1652-1715). Regards sur la pensée politique de la France dans le second XVIIe siècle, edited by Henry Méchoulan and Joël Cornette, 93-112. Paris: Vrin, 1996. Cavaillé, Jean-Pierre. Dis/ simulations. Jules-César Vanini, François La Mothe Le Vayer, Ga‐ briel Naudé, Louis Machon et Torquato Accetto. Religion, morale et politique au XVIIe siècle. Paris: Champion, 2002. Charles-Daubert, Françoise. “Le ‘Libertinage érudit’ et le problème du conservatisme politique.” In L’État baroque. Regards sur la pensée politique de la France du premier XVIIe siècle, edited by Henry Méchoulan, 179-202. Paris: Vrin, 1985. Church, William. Richelieu and Reason of State. Princeton University Press, 1972. Crombie, A. C and M. A. Hoskin. “The Scientific Movement and Its Influence 1610-1650.” In The New Cambridge Modern History, ed. by J. P. Cooper, 132-168. Cambridge Uni‐ versity Press, 1970. Vol. 4. Damien, Robert. “Naudé chez La Mothe Le Vayer: le cas du personnage de Telamon ou le conseil entre douceur et érudition.” In Libertinage et philosophie au XVIIe siècle, no. 2. La Mothe Le Vayer et Naudé (see above), 91-104. Dandrey, Patrick. L’Éloge paradoxal de Gorgias à Molière. Paris: PUF, 1997. DeJean, Joan. How Paris Became Paris. The Invention of the Modern City. New York: Bloomsbury, 2014. Dini, Vittorio. Il Governo della prudenza. Virtù dei privati e disciplina dei custodi. Milano: FrancoAngeli, 2000. Edwards, Michael. De l’Émerveillement. Paris: Fayard, 2008. Feller, Sophie. “De l’ignorance des doctes à la docte ignorance: le savoir selon les libertins érudits.” In Sottise et ineptie, de la Renaissance aux Lumières. Discours du savoir et rep‐ résentations romanesques. Littérales no 34/ 35, edited by Nicole Jacques-Lefèvre and Anne-Pascale Pouey-Mounou, 75-93. Université Paris X-Nanterre, 2004. Ferreyrolles, Gérard. “Introduction générale.” In Traités sur l’histoire (1638-1677). La Mothe Le Vayer, Le Moyne, Saint-Réal, Rapin, edited by Gérard Ferreyrolles with the collab‐ oration of Frédéric Charbonneau, Marie-Aude de Langenhagen, Béatrice Guion, Anne Mantero, Christian Meurillon and Hélène Michon. Paris: Champion, 2013. _______________. “Jansénius politique: le Mars Gallicus.” In Justice et force. Politiques au temps de Pascal. Actes du colloque “Droit et pensée politique autour de Pascal”, edited by Gérard Ferreyrolles, 95-108. Paris: Klincksieck, 1996. Flandrois, Isabelle. L’Institution du Prince au début du XVIIe siècle. Paris: PUF, 1992. Foucault, Michel, Security, territory, population. Lectures at the Collège de France 1977-1978. Edited by Michel Senellart. Translated by Graham Burchell. London : Pal‐ grave Macmillan, 2007. 198 Works cited Frede, Dorothea. “The political character of Aristotle’s ethics.” In The Cambridge Com‐ panion to Aristotle’s Politics, edited by Marguerite Deslauriers and Pierre Destrée, 14-37. Cambridge University Press, 2013. ______________. “Stoic Determinism.” In The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics. Edited by Brad Inwood, 179-205. Cambridge University Press, 2003. Fumaroli, Marc. L’Âge de l’éloquence. Rhétorique et ‘res literaria’ de la Renaissance au seuil de l’époque classique. 3 rd ed. Genève: Droz, 2002. Genette, Gérard. Palimpsests. Literature in the Second Degree. Trans. by Channa Newman and Claude Doubinsky. Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1997. Ginzburg, Carlo. “Le Haut et le bas. Le thème de la connaissance interdite aux XVIe et XVIIe siècles.” In Mythes, emblèmes, traces. Morphologie et histoire. Translated by Mon‐ ique Aymard, Christian Paoloni, Eisa Bonan, Martine Sancini-Vignet, 97-112. Paris: Flammarion, 1989. Giocanti, Sylvia. Penser l’irrésolution. Montaigne, Pascal, La Mothe Le Vayer. Trois itinér‐ aires sceptiques. Paris: Champion, 2001. ______________. “La Mothe Le Vayer et l’Académie sceptique.” In Academic Scepticism in the Development of Early Modern Philosophy, edited by Plinío Junqueira Smith and Sébastien Charles, 65-80. Springer, 2017. Gourinat, Jean-Baptiste. Le Stoïcisme. 3 rd ed. Paris: PUF, 2011. Gouverneur, Sophie. Prudence et subversion libertines. La critique de la raison d’État chez François de La Mothe Le Vayer, Gabriel Naudé et Samuel Sorbière. Paris: Champion, 2005. ________________. “La prudence politique et l’écriture sous contrainte: vers une redé‐ finition du libertinage.” In Libertinage et philosophie au XVIIe siècle, no 11. Le Liber‐ tinage et l’éthique à l’Âge classique, 149-169. Publications de l’Université de Saint-Éti‐ enne, 2009. Guion, Béatrice. Du bon usage de l’histoire. Histoire, morale et politique à l’âge classique. Paris: Champion, 2008. Hale, David George. The Body Politic. A Political Metaphor in Renaissance English Litera‐ ture. The Hague, Paris : Mouton, 1971. Hallyn, Fernand. “Pour une poétique des idées: le Livre du monde, ou les ramifications d’une métaphore.” Bibliothèque d’Humanisme et Renaissance LXVII, no 2 (2005) : 225-245. Hatzimichali, Myrto. Potamo of Alexandria and the Emergence of Eclecticism in Late Hel‐ lenistic Philosophy. Cambridge University Press, 2011. Hirschman, Albert. “ ‘Interest’ and ‘Interests’ as Tamers of the Passions.” In The Passions and the Interests. Political Arguments for Capitalism before its Triumph. 1977. Princeton University Press, 2013. 199 Works cited Keohane, Nannerl O. Philosophy and the State in France. The Renaissance to the Enlight‐ enment. Princeton University Press, 1980. Kojève, Alexandre. La Notion de l’autorité. Paris: Gallimard, 2004. Konstan, David. “Senecan Emotions.” In The Cambridge Companion to Seneca, edited by Shadi Bartsch and Alessandro Schiessaro, 174-184. Cambridge University Press, 2015. Laursen, John Christian. The Politics of Skepticism in the Ancients, Montaigne, Hume and Kant. Leiden, New York, Köln: Brill, 1992. Lestringant, Frank. “Europe et théorie des climats dans la seconde moitié du XVIe siècle.” In La Conscience européenne au XVe et au XVIe siècle, 206-226. Paris: École Normale Supérieure des Jeunes Filles, 1982. Lévy, Carlos. Cicero Academicus. Recherches sur les ‘Académiques’ et sur la philosophie cicéronienne. Rome: École française de Rome, 1992. Lyons, John. Exemplum. The Rhetoric of Example in Early Modern France and Italy. Princeton University Press, 1989. Maia Neto, José Raimundo. “Le Probabilisme académicien dans le scepticisme français de Montaigne à Descartes.” Revue philosophique de la France et de l’étranger 138, no 4 (2013): 467-484. Manea, Ioana. “Morale sceptique contre morale païenne? Le dixième trope sceptique chez le libertin La Mothe Le Vayer.” Littératures classiques. Libertinage, athéisme et incréd‐ ulité 1, no 92 (2017) : 159-170. ___________. “La Mothe Le Vayer, membre d’une ‘cabale’? ” In Littérature et politique. Factions et dissidences de la Ligue à la Fronde, edited by Malina Stefanovska and Adrien Paschoud, 159-172. Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2015. ___________. “La Mothe Le Vayer et la curiosité.” In Littérature et appétit des savoirs, edited by François Géal and Blanca Acinas, 45-56. Universidad de Burgos, 2014. ___________.“L’institution du prince dans la vision libertine de La Mothe Le Vayer: l’opinion personnelle en marge de la tradition et de la pensée officielle.” In Eidôlon, n o 101. Actes du colloque Le Pouvoir et ses écritures, edited by Denis Lopez, 49-58. Presses Universitaires de Bordeaux, 2012. ____________. “Le rôle des citations chez La Mothe Le Vayer: érudition et éclectisme.” Cromohs, 15, 2010, http: / / www.fupress.net/ index.php/ cromohs/ article/ view/ 15469 (accessed April 23 2018). Mesnard, Jean. “La monarchie de droit divin, concept anticlérical.” In Ferreyrolles, Justice et force. Politiques au temps de Pascal (see above), 109-138. ____________. “Sur le terme et la notion de ‘philautie’.” ‘Honnête homme’ et ‘honnête femme’ dans la culture du XVIIe siècle.” In La Culture du XVIIe siècle. Enquêtes et synthèses. Paris: PUF, 1992. Miller, Fred D. “The Rule of reason.” In The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Politics (see above), 38-66. 200 Works cited Moreau, Isabelle. ‘ Guérir du sot’. Les stratégies d’écriture des libertins à l’âge classique. Paris: Champion, 2007. Morrison, Donald R. “The Utopian Character of Plato’s Ideal City.” In The Cambridge Companion to Plato’s Republic, edited by G. R. F. Ferrari, 232-255. Cambridge University Press, 2007. Moss, Ann. Les Recueils des lieux communs. Méthode pour apprendre à penser à la Renais‐ sance. Translated under the direction of Patricia Eichel-Lojkine. Genève: Droz, 2002. Orcibal, Jean. Jansénius d’Ypres (1585-1638). Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1989. Paganini, Gianni. “Hobbes and the French Skeptics.” In Laursen and Paganini, Skepticism and Political Thought in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (see above), 55-82. _____________. Skepsis. Le débat des Modernes sur le scepticisme. Paris: Vrin, 2008. _____________. “Le jouet des dieux et le jeu des législateurs. Aux origines de quelques métaphores libertines.” Les Dossiers du GRIHL, Libertinage, athéisme, irréligion. Essais et bibliographie, II. Libertinages, 2007. https: / / dossiersgrihl.revues.org/ 2053 (accessed April 23, 2018). Pintard, René. Le Libertinage érudit dans la première moitié du XVIIe siècle. Nouvelle édition augmentée d’un avant-propos et de notes et réflexions sur les problèmes de l’histoire du libertinage. 2 nd ed. Genève-Paris: Slatkine, 1983. ___________. La Mothe Le Vayer. Gassendi-Guy Patin. Études de bibliographie et de critique suivies de textes inédits de Guy Patin. Paris : Boivin, 1943. Pioffet, Marie-Christine. “Repenser le monde au XVIIe siècle: l’exemple de La Géographie du Prince de La Mothe Le Vayer.” In Origines. Actes du 39e congres annuel de la North American Society for Seventeenth-Century French Literature, edited by Russell Ganim and Thomas M. Carr Jr., 117-128. Tübingen: Narr Francke Attempto, 2009. Pleşu, Andrei. Parabolele lui Isus. Adevărul ca poveste. București: Humanitas, 2012. Reeve, C. D. C. “Beginning and Ending with Eudaimonia.” In The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, edited by Ronald Polanski, 14-33. Cambridge Uni‐ versity Press, 2014. Roberti, Jean-Claude. “L’Image de la Moscovie dans l’opinion française du XVIIe siècle.” In Une infinie brutalité. L’image de la Russie dans la France des XVIe et XVIIe siècles, edited by Michel Mervaud and Jean-Claude Roberti, 101-152. Paris: Institut d’Études Slaves, 1991. Roche, Bruno. Le Rire des libertins dans la première moitié du XVIIe siècle. Paris: Champion, 2011. Roose, Alexander. “Les bottines de François de La Mothe Le Vayer.” In Quintilien ancien et moderne, edited by Perrine Galand, Fernand Hallyn, Carlos Lévy and Wim Verbaal, 501-514. Turnhout: Brepols, 2010. Rosler, Andrés. “Civic virtue: citizenship, ostracism, and war.” In The Cambridge Com‐ panion to Aristotle’s Politics (see above), 144-175. 201 Works cited Ryan, Alan. “Hobbes’s political philosophy.” In The Cambridge Companion to Hobbes. 2 nd ed. Edited by Tom Sorell, 208-245. Cambridge University Press, 1999. Ruocco, Giovanni. “Images de la raison humaine dans le scepticisme de La Mothe Le Vayer.” In Révolution scientifique et libertinage, edited by Alain Mothu, with the col‐ laboration of Antonella del Prete, 117-145. Turnhout: Brepols, 2000. Rutherford, Donald. “Innovation and orthodoxy in early modern philosophy.” In Ruth‐ erford, The Cambridge Companion to Early Modern Philosophy (see above), 11-38. Salazar, Philippe-Joseph. ‘La Divine Sceptique’. Éthique et Rhétorique au XVIIe siècle. Au‐ tour de La Mothe Le Vayer. Tübingen: Gunter Narr, 2000. ____________________. “Pallas armée: polémique et littérature selon La Mothe Le Vayer.” In Ordre et contestation au temps des classiques, edited by Roger Duchêne and Pierre Ronzeaud, vol. 2, 63-73. Paris-Seattle-Tübingen: Papers in French Seventeenth-Cen‐ tury Literature, 1992. Schofield, Malcolm. “Justice, oikeiōsis and the cosmic city.” In The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, edited by Keimpe Algra, Jonathan Barnes, Jaap Mansfeld, Mal‐ colm Schofield, 760-768. Cambridge University Press, 1999. Sellier, Philippe. Pascal et saint Augustin. 2 nd ed. Paris: Albin Michel, 1995. Senellart, Michel. Les Arts de gouverner. Du régimen médiéval au concept de gouverne‐ ment. Paris: Seuil, 1995. ______________. Machiavélisme et raison d’État XIIe-XVIIIe siècles. Suivi d’un choix de textes. Paris: PUF, 1989. Simmons, John A. “Theories of the State.” In The Cambridge Companion to Early Modern Philosophy, edited by Donald Rutherford, 250-273. Cambridge University Press, 2006. Skinner, Quentin. The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, vol. 1. The Renaissance. Cambridge University Press, 1978. Stiker-Métral, Charles-Olivier. Narcisse contrarié. L’amour-propre dans le discours moral en France (1650-1715). Paris: Champion, 2007. Taranto, Domenico. “Le discours de la raison d’État.” “Le renouveau humaniste italien: vie active ou vie contemplative? ” In Histoire raisonnée de la philosophie morale et po‐ litique, vol. 1. De l’Antiquité aux Lumières, 2 nd ed., edited by Alain Caillé, Michel Sen‐ ellart and Ch. Lazzeri. Paris: Flammarion, 2007. ________________. Pirronismo ed assolutismo nella Francia dell’ 600. Studi sul pensiero politico dello scetticismo da Montaigne a Bayle (1580-1697). Milano: FrancoAngeli, 1994. Thuau, Étienne. Raison d’État et pensée politique à l’époque de Richelieu. 2 nd ed. Paris: Albin Michel, 2000. Tricoche-Rauline, Laurence. Identité(s) libertine(s). L’écriture personnelle ou la création de soi. Paris: Champion, 2009. 202 Works cited Vernant, Jean-Pierre. “1. Structures du mythe.” In Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs. Études de psychologie historique. Nouvelle édition revue et augmentée. 4 th ed. Paris: La Décou‐ verte, 1985. Viroli, Maurizio. From Politics to Reason of State. The Acquisition and Transformation of the Language of Politics (1250-1600). Cambridge University Press, 1992. Weithman, Paul. “Augustine’s political philosophy.” In The Cambridge Companion to Au‐ gustine, edited by Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann, 234-252. Cambridge Uni‐ versity Press, 2006. Wickelgren, Florence. La Mothe Le Vayer. Sa Vie et son œuvre. Paris: Droz, 1934. 203 Works cited Biblio 17 Suppléments aux Papers on French Seventeenth Century Literature herausgegeben von Rainer Zaiser Aktuelle Bände: Frühere Bände finden Sie unter: www.narr-shop.de/ reihen/ b/ biblio-17.html Band 190 Christian Zonza (éd.) L’île au XVII e siècle Actes du X e Colloque du Centre International de Rencontres sur le XVII e siècle , Ajaccio, 3-5 avril 2008 2010, 312 Seiten €[D] 68,- ISBN 978-3-8233-6578-5 Band 191 Andrew Wallis Traits d’union: L’anti-roman et ses espaces 2011, 142 Seiten €[D] 49,- ISBN 978-3-8233-6605-8 Band 192 Annika Charlotte Krüger Lecture sartrienne de Racine Visions existentielles de l’homme tragique 2011, 275 Seiten €[D] 74,- ISBN 978-3-8233-6620-1 Band 193 Marie-Bernadette Dufourcet / Charles Mazouer / Anne Surgers (éds.) Spectacles et pouvoirs dans l’Europe de l’Ancien Régime (XVI e - XVIII e siècle) Actes du colloque commun du Centre de recherches sur l ’ Europe classique et du Centre ARTES, Université Michel de Montaigne- Bordeaux 3, 17-19 novembre 2009 2011, 288 Seiten €[D] 68,- ISBN 978-3-8233-6645-4 Band 194 Benoît Bolduc / Henriette Goldwyn (éds.) Concordia Discors I Choix de communications présentées lors du 41 e congrès annuel de la North American Society for Seventeenth-Century French Literature New York University, 20-23 May 2009 2011, 252 Seiten €[D] 64,- ISBN 978-3-8233-6650-8 Band 195 Benoît Bolduc / Henriette Goldwyn (éds.) Concordia Discors II Choix de communications présentées lors du 41 e congrès annuel de la North American Society for Seventeenth-Century French Literature New York University, 20-23 May 2009 2011, 245 Seiten €[D] 64,- ISBN 978-3-8233-6651-5 Band 196 Jean Garapon / Christian Zonza (éds.) Nouveaux regards sur les Mémoires du Cardinal de Retz Actes du colloque organisé par l’Université de Nantes, Château des Ducs de Bretagne, 17 et 18 janvier 2008 2011, 213 Seiten €[D] 58,- ISBN 978-3-8233-6659-1 Band 197 Charlotte Trinquet Le conte de fées français (1690-1700) Traditions italiennes et origines aristocratiques 2012, 244 Seiten €[D] 58,- ISBN 978-3-8233-6692-8 Band 198 Francis Assaf (éd.) Antoine Houdar de La Motte: Les Originaux, ou L’Italien 2012, 76 Seiten €[D] 39,- ISBN 978-3-8233-6717-8 Band 199 Francis Mathieu L’Art d’esthétiser le précepte: L’Exemplarité rhétorique dans le roman d’Ancien Régime 2012, 233 Seiten €[D] 58,- ISBN 978-3-8233-6718-5 Band 200 François Lasserre Nicolas Gougenot, dramaturge, à l’aube du théâtre classique Etude biographique et littéraire, nouvel examen de l’attribution du ‹‹Discours à Cliton›› 2012, 200 Seiten €[D] 52,- ISBN 978-3-8233-6719-2 Band 201 Bernard J. Bourque (éd.) Abbé d’Aubignac: Pièces en prose Edition critique 2012, 333 Seiten €[D] 78,- ISBN 978-3-8233-6748-2 Band 202 Constant Venesoen Madame de Maintenon, sans retouches 2012, 122 Seiten €[D] 49,00 ISBN 978-3-8233-6749-9 Band 203 J.H. Mazaheri Lecture socio-politique de l’épicurisme chez Molière et La Fontaine 2012, 178 Seiten €[D] 58,- ISBN 978-3-8233-6766-6 Band 204 Stephanie Bung Spiele und Ziele Französische Salonkulturen des 17. Jahrhunderts zwischen Elitendistinktion und belles lettres 2013, 419 Seiten €[D] 88,- ISBN 978-3-8233-6723-9 Band 205 Florence Boulerie (éd.) La médiatisation du littéraire dans l’Europe des XVII e et XVIII e siècles 2013, 305 Seiten €[D] 58,- ISBN 978-3-8233-6794-9 Band 206 Eric Turcat La Rochefoucauld par quatre chemins Les Maximes et leurs ambivalences 2013, 221 Seiten €[D] 58,- ISBN 978-3-8233-6803-8 Band 207 Raymond Baustert (éd.) Un Roi à Luxembourg Édition commentée du Journal du Voyage de sa Majesté à Luxembourg, Mercure Galant , Juin 1687, II (Seconde partie) 2015, 522 Seiten €[D] 98,- ISBN 978-3-8233-6874-8 Band 208 Bernard J. Bourque (éd.) Jean Donneau de Visé et la querelle de Sophonisbe. Écrits contre l’abbé d’Aubignac Édition critique 2014, 188 Seiten €[D] 58,- ISBN 978-3-8233-6894-6 Band 209 Bernard J. Bourque All the Abbé’s Women Power and Misogyny in Seventeenth-Century France, through the Writings of Abbé d’Aubignac 2015, 224 Seiten €[D] 68,- ISBN 978-3-8233-6974-5 Band 210 Ellen R. Welch / Michèle Longino (eds.) Networks, Interconnection, Connectivity Selected Essays from the 44th North American Society for Seventeenth-Century French Literature Conference University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill & Duke University, May 15-17, 2014 2015, 214 Seiten €[D] 64,- ISBN 978-3-8233-6970-7 Band 211 Sylvie Requemora-Gros Voyages, rencontres, échanges au XVII e siècle Marseille carrefour 2017, 578 Seiten €[D] 98,- ISBN 978-3-8233-6966-0 Band 212 Marie-Christine Pioffet / Anne-Élisabeth Spica (éd.) S’exprimer autrement : poétique et enjeux de l’allégorie à l’âge classique 2016, XIX, 301 Seiten €[D] 68,- ISBN 978-3-8233-6935-6 Band 213 Stephen Fleck L‘ultime Molière Vers un théâtre éclaté 2016, 141 Seiten €[D] 48,- ISBN 978-3-8233-8006-1 Band 214 Richard Maber (éd.) La France et l’Europe du Nord au XVII e siècle Actes du 12e colloque du CIR 17 (Durham Castle, Université de Durham, 27 - 29 mars 2012) 2017, 242 Seiten €[D] 64,- ISBN 978-3-8233-8054-2 Band 215 Stefan Wasserbäch Machtästhetik in Molières Ballettkomödien 2017, 332 Seiten €[D] 68,- ISBN 978-3-8233-8115-0 Band 216 Lucie Desjardins, Professor Marie-Christine Pioffet, Roxanne Roy (éd.) L’errance au XVIIe siècle 45e Congrès de la North American Society for Seventeenth-Century French Literature, Québec, 4 au 6 juin 2015 2017, 472 Seiten €[D] 78,- ISBN 978-3-8233-8044-3 Band 217 Francis B. Assaf Quand les rois meurent Les journaux de Jacques Antoine et de Jean et François Antoine et autres documents sur la maladie et la mort de Louis XIII et de Louis XIV 2018, XII, 310 Seiten €[D] 68,- ISBN 978-3-8233-8253-9 Band 218 Ioana Manea Politics and Scepticism in La Mothe Le Vayer The Two-Faced Philosopher? 2019, 203 Seiten €[D] 58,- ISBN 978-3-8233-8283-6 The book aims at bringing a significant contribution to the study of a prestigious figure of the French 17 th century who, thanks to his intellectual achievements, became involved with the leading politicians of the time, including Cardinal Richelieu and the future Louis XIV. Unlike the previous critical studies about La Mothe Le Vayer, the book does not study exclusively the works in which he seemed to undermine the political order, but also takes into account the series of educational treatises that he wrote for the prince between 1640-1658. Adopting an interdisciplinary approach, which involves philosophical and literary concepts, the book is likely to deal with a question that could not be more relevant nowadays: should an intellectual who perceives the failings of the political order withdraw into the solitude of his library or get involved in politics in order to try to improve it? BIBLIO 17 Suppléments aux Papers on French Seventeenth Century Literature Directeur de la publication: Rainer Zaiser www.narr.de ISBN 978-3-8233-8283-6