of the NPP or RNP.6 So far, however, the role of Paul’s letter to the Philippians for reformatory theology has not been studied systematically.7 This applies despite the fact that reformatory exegesis has – based on Pauline exegesis – produced fresh ideas about Paul and his life course as the discussion about the interpretation of Phil 4:3 most impressively shows.8

In this contribution, I shall provide some observations on Philip Melanchthon’s approach to Philippians. Beside a rather “Lutheran”-inspired reference to Philippians in his Loci Communes (see 2.), Melanchthon shows multiple hermeneutical interests when reading and interpreting Paul’s letter to the Philippians. Melanchthon’s multi-faceted interest in Philippians becomes evident especially in his “Oratio in funere reverendi viri D. Martini Lutheri” from 1546 (see 3.).

2. Melanchthon’s interpretation of Philippians in the Loci Communes (1521)

Protestant theology in the first half of the 16th century emerged in a specific historical context, where its theological pragmatics (justification of the believer) and hermeneutical principles (“Schriftprinzip”) had socio-political relevance (critical attitude towards religious authorities).9 In this context, the theologoumenon of justification played an important role. Gerhard Ebeling once has pointed out that Luther’s idea on the justification sola fide cannot be seen as an arbitrary preference of a favorite teaching ..., but rather as a declaration of what the inner structure of all theological assertions are about.10

Ebeling’s statement, however, also implies that biblical theology and Pauline exegesis in particular is the material center of Lutheran hermeneutics. In a

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7 See, however, B. Weiss, Der Philipper-Brief, who continuously takes in protestant theology when depicting the reception history of Philippians.
8 Clement of Alexandria identified a female character behind the expression: γνήσιε σύζυγε – in fact: Paul’s wife (strom 3.448B; see B. Weiß, Philipper-Brief, 299) – an interpretation that was already (with reference to 1 Cor 7:8) heavily debated in Patristic exegesis. In reformatory exegesis, however, that interpretation was reestablished (see Erasmus, Bugenhagen, Bullinger; B. Weiß, ibid.).
9 See H. Scheible, Melanchthon, 168ff.
10 G. Ebeling, Dogmatik I, 32: “Aber ebenso ist der Hinweis auf die Rechtfertigung allein aus Glauben nicht etwa als willkürliche Bevorzugung einer Lieblingslehre vor anderen gemeint, sondern als Angabe dessen, was die innere Struktur sämtlicher theologischer Aussagen ausmacht. Dasselbe gilt von der dem Rechtfertigungsthema korrespondierenden Unterscheidung zwischen Gesetz und Evangelium ...” See also G. Ebeling, Luther, 121.
similar way and inspired by Luther’s hermeneutics, Melanchthon makes use of the theologoumenon of justification. His interpretation of Paul’s letter-writing is widely informed by a Lutheran theological hermeneutics.

2.1. Melanchthon’s approach to Philippians in the Loci

Melanchthon’s approach becomes evident in his most prominent writing, his “Hauptwerk,” which at the same time is commonly known as the first “protestant dogmatic”: the Loci Communes (1521). Melanchthon formulates one of the central theological statements already in the introduction (0.13):

Nam ex his (= vis peccati, lex, gratia [0.12]) proprie Christus cognoscitur, siquidem hoc est Christum cognoscere beneficia eius cognoscere, non, quod isti docent, eius naturas, modos incarnationis contueri.

In his comment to this Locus, Horst Georg Pöhlmann emphasizes how Melanchthon partly has based this thesis of protestant theology on his reading of Paul (see “Declamatiuncula in Divi Pauli Doctrinam”, 1520). Melanchthon partly refers to Luther’s “Heidelberger Disputation” (1518) and Luther’s Operationes in Psalmos (1519-1521). How can we best describe the potential of “protestant” – or, more specifically: Lutheran – hermeneutics as articulated here?

There are two hermeneutical insights implied in Melanchthon’s proposition – one is critical or analytical, the other one is constructive: The critical or analytical dimension leads to a substantial deconstruction of a theologia gloriae, as represented by Scholastic theologians like Thomas of Aquinas (... non, quod isti docent, eius naturas, modos incarnationis contueri). It leads, at the same time, to a disclosure of what beneficium actually contradicts (vis peccati, lex, gratia).

In a constructive sense, Melanchthon shows how the perception of Christ is defined (... hoc est Christum cognoscere beneficia eius cognoscere ...) and what “beneficium” ex positivo means and presupposes (vis peccati, lex, gratia). The “constructive potential” of Melanchthon’s theological proposition becomes most evident in the way in which he later on in the Loci explicitly refers to Paul and his letter to the Philippians (7.34; 7.90f.):

11 See H. Scheible, Melanchthon, 170.
12 See H. Scheible, Melanchthon, 172.
13 P. Melanchthon, Loci, 22.
14 P. Melanchthon, Loci, 22f. (n. 27).
15 Melanchthon would according to Neh 4:11 describe this phenomenon as follows: Jerusalem was rebuilt in that people did building-work with one hand and had their sword in the other – s. reference to this in his funeral tale on Luther below.
16 P. Melanchthon, Loci, 22f. (n. 27).
(a) In 7.33f., Melanchthon discusses the fact that justification is not yet reached completely. He refers to Luther as well as to Augustine, Cyprian and Paul (Rom 7:23; 12:2). Melanchthon claims: “... quatenus credimus, liberi sumus, quatenus diffidimus, sub lege sumus.” In that context, he adds a reference – not a direct quotation – to Phil 3:12 in order to show that Paul himself was conscious about the continuous need of aiming for “perfection.” I cannot discuss here in detail how Melanchthon interprets the meaning of “law.” More importantly, the basic idea here is to shape in a noetic sense an “Existenzbeschreibung” that follows up the distinction between credimus = liberi sumus, and diffidimus = sub lege sumus.

In other words, Melanchthon develops a type of a Christ-believing Existenzbeschreibung in which the “law” has a constitutive function for the believer’s self-understanding. From this point of view, Melanchthon also approaches Phil 3:12 – a text that can be read differently from a modern exegetical perspective. When Paul talks about his imperfection in Phil 3, he points to his eschatological hope (Phil 3:14) as well as to his current personal situation: the biographical context in prison (Phil 1:7 etc.). Paul does not necessarily develop an anthropological statement but rather reaches an interpretation of his personal fortune, which might be of relevance for his “imitators” (see Phil 3:17) who are like himself emulators of Christ.

(b) Another example of how Melanchthon approaches Philippians via the hermeneutical key of iustitia ex lege, can be found in his interpretation of Phil 3:8f. The Pauline passage is still framed by Paul’s autobiographical narratio (Phil 3:4bff.). Herein, it refers to Paul’s self-understanding as a personal example to his readers. In his interpretation of that passage in the Loci (7.90f.), however, Melanchthon reads the Pauline statement in light of the theologoumenon of the iustitia ex deo est (per fidem est Christi). We, thus, get the impression that Melanchthon, again, narrows Paul’s thinking, such as in his letter to the Philippians, in that he makes it first of all to be a contribution to the theological discourse about iustitia and lex.

Is Melanchthon’s approach to Phil 3 legitimate in terms of hermeneutics? In a motific sense it is: In Phil 3:9 Paul talks about πίστις, νόμος, and δικαιοσύνη. However, in the argumentative frame of Phil 3 it becomes evident that the theologoumenon of justification does not really stand in the center of the Pauline argument but only supports Paul’s conceptualization of his own personal exemplum that he provides for his readers. In his interpretation of Phil 3 in the

17 P. Melanchthon, Loci, 300.
18 The Vulgata-text (Phil 3:12) is: ... non quod iam acceperim aut iam perfectus sim sequor autem si comprehendam in quo et comprehensus sum a Christo Iesu.
2. Melanchthon’s interpretation of Philippians in the *Loci Communes* (1521)

*Loci* Melanchthon thus narrows or even misconceives Paul’s crucial argument of apostolic self-reflection.

I shall add here a philological remark to Phil 3:9, where Melanchthon quotes the Pauline text, while he only alludes to it in the cases of Phil 3:8 and 3:12 (see above). In the case of Phil 3:9 the Pauline text obviously is of specific theological importance. It seems as if Melanchthon does not have the Vulgata-text in mind but that he himself translates the Greek text: Melanchthon’s Latin text is much closer to the Greek than contemporary Latin translations, especially when it comes to the complicated interpretation of the prepositions that are used here:

The Vulgata-text says: ... sed illam quae *ex* fide est Christi quae *ex* Deo est iustitia in fide.

The Greek text, however, says: ... ἀλλὰ τὴν διὰ πίστεως Χριστοῦ, τὴν ἐκ θεοῦ δικαιοσύνην ἐπὶ τῇ πίστει – a phrase that is much better expressed in Melanchthon’s translation in his *Loci*: ... sed eam, quae *per* fidem est Christi, quae iustitia *ex* deo est¹⁹ – *per* fidem equals διὰ πίστεως.

The art of Greek philology finally leads Melanchthon to a significant concept of “faith”: Melanchthon’s translation – even though it might reflect reformatory theology here – is much more than the Vulgata-tradition close to the Pauline Greek in a philological sense. Melanchthon’s expertise as a Greek philologist is an important contribution to the reformatory movement since it attests to the reformatory movement in humanism.²⁰

2.2. Melanchthon’s exegetical principles in his *Loci* in light of the “New Perspective”

In his interpretation of Pauline texts, such as Phil 3, Melanchthon is in his *Loci* strongly influenced by a “Lutheran hermeneutics.” Melanchthon approaches his reading of Phil 3 through the lenses of the *theologoumenon* of justification by focusing his interpretation on *lex, gratia* and *iustificatio* as key terms. Even if Melanchthon is concise regarding matters of Greek philology, he tends to narrow Pauline thinking to the concept of justification. The suspicion regarding the paradigmatic of a “Lutheran reading of Paul,” raised by the representatives of the “New Perspective,” seem to be legitimate – it even applies to Melanchthon’s exegesis of Pauline texts.

Nevertheless, the NPP-critique of a “Lutheran Paul” that was dominating Protestant exegesis and its preunderstanding of Pauline texts in the sense of a “Western reading” falls much too short. This becomes evident in two points:

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(1) The critique of the “Lutheran Paul” as articulated by the representatives of the NPP is not new. It is rather typical of protestant theology – in line with Lutheran tradition – to question its dogmatic and hermeneutical framework constantly. One of these self-critical debates took place in 1916 between Wilhelm Bousset (1865-1920) and Paul Wernle (1872-1939). Bousset – in his refutation of Wernle’s critical remarks about Bousset’s monograph “Kyrios Christos” – raised the issue of to what extent protestant theology as a hermeneutical key can legitimately lead Pauline exegesis. As Bousset and Wernle, as well as all subsequent protestant theologians, are diverse interpreters of Paul and Luther, the history of (protestant self-)critique still continues. Likewise, Ed P. Sanders and Krister Stendahl have formulated their critique of previous Lutheran theologians and their approaches to Pauline exegesis.

Today we have to continuously work out how we can further develop our research perspective on Paul and Pauline reception history up to the reformation period and its impact on modern Paulinism. The task of interpreting Luther and Paul is per definitionem infinite. Rudolf Bultmann, who was himself frequently under suspicion as a representative of the so-called “Lutheran Paul,” was quite sensitive of the various dilemmas of the Paul-and-Luther-reception. Bultmann himself pointed out how Luther’s interpretation of Pauline texts does not only provide helpful insights into the interpretation of Paul’s letter-writing but also tends to narrow or even conceal Pauline thinking: Before judging about Luther’s reading of Paul, we have to work on an appropriate understanding of Luther. The “Lutheran Paul,” in other words, cannot be restricted to a fixed paradigm or a concise hermeneutical concept – Luther as an exegete of Paul is himself part of a dynamic process of reception history. We thus have to prepare for a careful understanding of Luther and Luther’s exegesis of Pauline texts first.

(2) At the same time, we cannot take all protestant theologians or all protestant writings with the same brush: We have to distinguish between Luther and Melanchthon as we have to distinguish between the Loci Communes and

22 Cf. M. Zetterholm, Paul, e.g. 75.
23 In 1928, Rudolf Bultmann says: “The academic research is infinite, because our terminology develops infinitely and therefore each generation is given the task of interpretation. Luther’s exegesis of Paul may be based on a real understanding of Paul; but we cannot settle for it, since we first of all need to interpret Luther,” R. Bultmann, “Bedeutung,” 114-133, 123.