Forum Modernes Theater
fmth
0930-5874
Narr Verlag Tübingen
10.2357/FMTh-2021-0016
Es handelt sich um einen Open-Access-Artikel, der unter den Bedingungen der Lizenz CC by 4.0 veröffentlicht wurde.http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/91
2021
322
BalmeAll rise! Jurisdiction as Performance/Performative Language
91
2021
Steff Nellis
When “All rise!” is being exclaimed in a courtroom, the attendees know they are supposed to
stand up for the judges to enter. When these judges have made a decision at the end, the
defendant becomes either guilty or not guilty. Yet, in a theatre hall, language lacks the specific coercive and punitive power to change reality directly. Nevertheless, lots of contemporary theatre and performance artists are implementing the stage to explore the relationship between law and theatre. This article seeks to examine the intricate role of language in both court cases and their fictional counterparts. Therefore, I will rely on Derrida’s reassessment of Austin’s Speech Act Theory (1962). To illustrate the argument, the importance of language in today’s tribunal genre is being discussed for two performances that deal with alternative forms of jurisdiction: Milo Rau’s The Congo Tribunal (2015) and Maria Lucia Cruz Correia’s Voice of Nature: The Trial (2019).
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All rise! Jurisdiction as Performance/ Performative Language Steff Nellis (Ghent) When “ All rise! ” is being exclaimed in a courtroom, the attendees know they are supposed to stand up for the judges to enter. When these judges have made a decision at the end, the defendant becomes either guilty or not guilty. Yet, in a theatre hall, language lacks the specific coercive and punitive power to change reality directly. Nevertheless, lots of contemporary theatre and performance artists are implementing the stage to explore the relationship between law and theatre. This article seeks to examine the intricate role of language in both court cases and their fictional counterparts. Therefore, I will rely on Derrida ’ s reassessment of Austin ’ s Speech Act Theory (1962). To illustrate the argument, the importance of language in today ’ s tribunal genre is being discussed for two performances that deal with alternative forms of jurisdiction: Milo Rau ’ sThe Congo Tribunal (2015) and Maria Lucia Cruz Correia ’ sVoice of Nature: The Trial (2019). Preface You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can be used against you in court. You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions. You have the right to have a lawyer with you during questioning. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before any questioning if you wish. If you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you have the right to stop answering at any time. — A variation of the US Miranda warning 1 In the United States of America, police officers are obliged to offer criminal suspects the Miranda warning, a specific type of notification advising defendants of their right to silence. This warning is derived from the U. S. Supreme Court case Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966) which dealt with the rights of the defendant, Ernesto Arturo Miranda, that had been violated during his interrogation. Miranda was arrested for armed robbery, kidnapping, and rape. At in the police station, Miranda confessed whilst unaware of his right to remain silent or to speak to a lawyer first. This resulted in a ‘ petition for certiorari ’ , eventually leading to the decision of the Supreme Court to hear Miranda ’ s case again. The final verdict was in favour of the defendant: the Supreme Court set aside Miranda ’ s conviction, which was consequently not introduced into evidence at the second trial. This particular court case exemplifies the importance of language in law. As a defendant, it is of great importance to know that anything you say during an arrest can and will be used against you in court. After all, the words you use, those your lawyer uses to defend you and the verdict of the judge all have a pragmatic effect on your life. Language in general can act performatively, as stated by John Langshaw Austin ’ s Speech Act Theory. 2 But language in court is, in essence, highly performative because of its immediate influence on the lives of those present in the courtroom. For example, when the sentence “ All rise! ” is exclaimed in a courtroom, those present know that they are supposed to stand up for the judges to enter. All the evidence, hearings, testimonies and Forum Modernes Theater, 32/ 2 (2021), 159 - 177. Gunter Narr Verlag Tübingen DOI 10.2357/ FMTh-2021-0016 speeches by the lawyers of both the prosecution and the defence will lead to a concrete verdict. This decision made by a judge or the jury at the end of the trial results in the accused being declared either guilty or not guilty. Therefore, in the courtroom, language is performative, whilst in a theatre, on the contrary, language lacks this specific coercive power to change reality directly. However, many contemporary artists use the stage to explore the complex relationship between the courtroom and theatre. Although it is not the intention of this article to demonstrate the increasing popularity of the courtroom on the stage, I do want to point out several preeminent artists who have begun relying on structures of the court in their performances, especially in West European theatre: Action Zoo Humain, Lara Staal and Yoonis Osman Nuur, Rebekka de Wit and Anoek Nuyens, Christophe Meierhans, Agency, Milo Rau, Maria Lucia Cruz Correia, Rosella Biscotti, and others. To that end, this article seeks to examine the close connection between the courtroom and the stage by means of a comparative study of the role of language in both court cases and their fictional counterparts: theatrical court case performances. I will attempt to characterize and analyse the difference between language in real court cases and language in contemporary court case performances. I will discuss the importance of language in today ’ s tribunal genre within the performing arts by way of two performances which dealt with alternative forms of jurisdiction on stage: Milo Rau ’ s The Congo Tribunal (2015) and Maria Lucia Cruz Correia ’ s Voice of Nature: The Trial (2019). In doing so, I intend to reveal a theatrical paradox in which artists strive for a reality-effect by staging fictitious lawsuits, Fig. 1: Stage-set during preparations for the theatre project The Congo Tribunal in the theatre hall at Collège Alfajiri in Bukavu, Eastern Congo, where “ The Congo Tribunal ” was held in late May 2015. © 2015 Fruitmarket, Langfilm & IIPM/ Mirjam Knapp. 160 Steff Nellis although their performances lack the power to enforce a real verdict. Within these performances, language is used in several ways, ranging from testimonies and interviews to wordless notions of body language and embodied knowledge. As in court, I argue that language in these theatrical tribunals attempts to be not mere performance language, but performative language in its own way. Spectacular law According to Marett Leiboff the nature of law is particularly theatrical: “ Law ’ s reasoning, doctrines and principles, the tests it deploys, and the writing and structure of judgement and law reports: drama embeds a spectral normativity into law. ” 3 In her recent study, Towards a Theatrical Jurisprudence (2019), Leiboff draws on the founding father of postdrama, Hans-Thies Lehmann, and his Tragedy and Dramatic Theatre (2013): The theatre affords the exemplary site [. . .] for subjecting to interrogation the social energies that circulate - instead of reinforcing them with image-laden storytelling. Therefore, the theatre has the task of presenting revenge within the law, the failure of the law, what proves unjustifiable in its foundations, and the exclusions and acts of deception that constitute it - over and over, for such work can never be done once and for all. It is to be repeated, remembered and performed anew day by day and moment by moment. 4 (Leiboff ’ s emphases) Leiboff explains that the same task is assigned to law itself: “ to remind, through repetition and renewal, the instances of injustice and of failure of law, and their circumstances. This means finding the means through which it can notice how injustice manifests. ” 5 In other words, Leiboff sees the theatre as an important training space for law. This is remarkable because although several researchers (e. g. Arjomand 2018; Read, 2016; Tindemans, 2019; and Vanhaesebrouck, 2015) already posited law as highly theatrical, these positive approaches have remained rare. 6 By highlighting the qualities of what she calls ‘ theatrical jurisprudence ’ , Leiboff attempts to see the possibilities of theatricality in the social sphere in a new light. After all, theatricality as a feature has been evaded ever since Plato ’ s allegory of the cave, which damned theatre to be merely a reflection of a reflection and therefore repulsive. Michael Fried added to this in his 1976 Absorption and theatricality, renewing the aversion to theatricality, which, to him, consists of a selfconsciousness of viewing that compromises a virtuous absorption into the work of art. 7 Yet Leiboff argues that this self-consciousness on the part of the spectator can make a claim for the importance of both aesthetic and legal judgments. Reflecting upon a fictional narrative in a performance, for example a fictitious court case, prompts the spectator to question state apparatuses such as the courtroom in general, not least if the performance embodies the courtroom itself, as is the case in both historical and contemporary court case performances. Consequently, law is not only spectacular in essence, but can be made into an independent, promising trial performance as well. Especially in the German research scene, several publications of varying scope and character have been published in recent years on the tense relationship between the stage and the courtroom. In 2019, Laura Münkler and Julia Stenzel co-edited an anthology on the staging of law: Inszenierung von Recht. Operating from within both Law Studies and Performance Studies, Münkler and Stenzel collect essays on the “ Zusammenhängen zwischen Ästhetik und Recht sowie nach der Performativität von 161 All rise! Jurisdiction as Performance/ Performative Language Recht ” that stress the intrinsically theatrical aspects of the law. 8 Earlier research conducted by Paula Diehl is also worth mentioning here. In her study Performanz des Rechts (2006), Diehl already characterizes the performativity of law in terms of a wide range of enactments: its ‘ actors ’ , knowledgeproduction, and the enforcement of the verdict. 9 Accordingly, Alan Read suggests in Theatre & Law (2016), law should be seen as part of a distinct way of imagining the real and can thereby provide visions of a community, not only echoes of it. 10 Moreover, law provides a model for how society can or should be. Read indicates, like Leiboff, an inherent anthropological and ontological connection between theatre and law, 11 referring to the influential Homo Juridicus (2006) by Alain Supiot, whom he calls the ‘ French ethnographer of law ’ : It is precisely the law, Supiot suggests, that connects our infinite mental universe, all life ’ s possibilities in the radical heteronomy of all possible actions, with our finite, limited, actual physical existence, and in so doing fulfils the anthropological function of instituting us as rational beings. In this sense we are recognizable as human beings, precisely because we are legal beings first. 12 Read endorses Supiot ’ s view of humankind as homines juridicae instead of homines ludentes. However, he demonstrates that the courtroom, and law in general, remains a place where something is enacted: “ It operates through action, not just a mental operation. It is made up of performing and spectating. ” 13 In other words, the courtroom can be seen as a theatre in which the attendees - lawyers, judges, jury, witnesses, prosecutor, defendant, bailiff, and others - try to collect evidence by reenacting the crime that has been committed. Each participant in this complex course of events plays a specific role and tries to convince the other parties. Hereby, it is striking to see the importance of language in both real lawsuits and in courtroom dramas. Yet, as was already stated by Kent Lerch in 2004, it is almost astonishing to see there has not yet been any systematic empirical research that draws on linguistic and jurisprudential expertise in order to arrive at fundamental statements about the relationship between law and language. 14 In her recent study, Staged: Show Trials, Political Theater, and the Aesthetics of Judgement (2018), Minou Arjomand has mapped the most important theatrical stagings of court cases from the period between the Second World War and 1968. 15 She also argues that it is language that binds the historical court cases and their fictional counterparts together, since the latter rely on dramaturgical techniques from documentary theatre: court proceedings, reports, witnesses ’ testimonies, court transcripts and recordings are fully adopted on stage. 16 Thus, when brought to the stage, these documentary materials, or ‘ the language of law ’ , are reiterated and remain entirely the same. However, the effects change radically, since in the courtroom, language has the pragmatic impact of declaring a binding verdict, whilst in a theatre, on the contrary, language lacks this specific power of enforcement. In this article, I intend to focus on the linguistic and discursive aspects of contemporary court case performances. Force de loi If I say at the conclusion of a performance, ‘ You are free to go ’ , it is meaningless in anything but theatrical effect. Because I have no authority to say this, but also because no ‘ serious ’ time, or rather not the right ‘ real ’ time, has been spent on providing the con- 162 Steff Nellis ditions for such a statement, despite the theatrical time it has passed. If a judge says it, then ‘ you go free ’ , but only after an acknowledged time of appropriate conduct has been committed to it. 17 (Read ’ s emphases) In explaining the difference between a verdict in the courtroom and its counterpart in theatre, Read refers to time as a crucial aspect of jurisprudence: a theatrical performance does not take as long as a real courtroom hearing and is therefore less meaningful. I, however, would like to outline another remarkable, yet hidden difference in Read ’ s quotation, which seems so obvious that we might almost overlook it. The mere fact that Read highlights the difference between his own ‘ You are free to go ’ in a performance, and a judge ’ s ‘ you go free ’ in court, suggests the importance of language regarding the power of enforceability and the court ’ s ruling. To understand the punitive power of law, one should start by considering the punitive power of language. In How to Do Things with Words (1962), J. L. Austin explains the different types of utterances humans can make. In a reaction to the ruling, positivist view that sentences should always contain a truthvalue, he shows that utterances can be performative too. Besides locutionary acts (the literal sentences one speaks), he distinguishes the illocutionary aspects and the perlocutionary aspects of language, respectively the underlying message the speaker expresses and the potential effect this message will have on the listener. 18 Therefore, Austin argues, language is performative. He denotes utterances as ‘ speech acts ’ , not only presenting information, but performing an action, and thus causing a specific effect as well. In addition to indirect speech acts, such as a request or being asked for one ’ s name, Austin also classifies explicit cases of performative sentences, which he calls ‘ performative speech acts ’ 19 . To the examples Austin enumerates, including marriage vows, making a promise, and firing someone, we may add courtroom proceedings, as mentioned above. 20 But how can this particular enforcement in law be explained? Why is it that a court ’ s verdict is more decisive than a theatrical one? The Algerian-born French philosopher Jacques Derrida, best known for his challenge to the assumptions of Western culture which he called ‘ deconstruction ’ , asked himself the same question. Problematically, Austin excludes dramatic speech from the performative utterances mentioned above. As noted by Michiel Leezenberg, Derrida therefore criticizes Austin ’ s account of speech acts because he thinks that Austin ’ s distinction between serious and pretended or fictional speech acts is rather strict. 21 After all, for Derrida, all speech acts can be reiterated in new contexts: Every sign, linguistic or nonlinguistic, spoken or written (in the current sense of this opposition), in a small or large unit, can be cited, put between quotation marks; in so doing it can break with every given context, engendering an infinity of new contexts in a manner which is absolutely illimitable . . . This citationality, this duplication or duplicity, this iterability of the mark is neither an accident nor an anomaly, it is that (normal/ abnormal) without which a mark could not even have a function called “ normal ” . What would a mark be that could not be cited? 22 (Derrida ’ s emphases) Moreover, Derrida claims “ Austin had to free the analysis of the performative [speech acts] from the authority of the value of truth [. . .] substituting for it the value of force ” 23 . This performative force of both the illocutionary and the perlocutionary utterances cannot be perceived as a natural effect of language produced by the will in or on others, but instead as convention, as Raoul Moati demonstrates: “ This efficacy of pragmatic force 163 All rise! Jurisdiction as Performance/ Performative Language has nothing natural about it; it is tied to the artificiality of rules that define the uses of language. ” 24 In the courtroom, for example, “ All rise! ” indicates that those present should stand up for the entrance of the judges. When the same sentence is heard in another public space, without the widespread convention specific to the courthouse, people will not be as likely to stand up. This example shows the importance of convention, and thereby the artificiality of linguistic signs. But how does this work in theatre? As we know, the ‘ willing suspension of disbelief ’ in theatre causes the spectator to believe what is depicted for the sake of enjoyment and absorption, as Fried would say. Therefore, when a performer in the role of a bailiff asks the crowd to rise, a highly theatrical confusing, and even disturbing, tension occurs. The spectators might look at each other, wondering whether they should follow this command and who will be the first to stand up. Here, absorption and theatricality merge into one: a familiar convention, the suspension of disbelief specific to the theatrical space, and a self-conscious convention together cause the attendees to stand up when the utterance “ All rise! ” is heard. Yet, in the end, the performance language in theatre will not achieve a similar effect to that of the performative language in court. Forasmuch as at the end of a performance everything goes back to normal, as the poet Wislawa Szymborska metaphorically indicates in her Theatre Impressions 25 : The dead raise from the stage ’ s battlegrounds Straightening their wigs and fancy gowns Removing knives from stricken breasts Taking nooses from lifeless necks Lining up among the living To face the audience. In Force de loi (1990), Derrida deepens his conception of law to describe its particular enforcement. He calls into question the transcendency of truth in general, especially in the context of justice, human rights and the rule of law. For Derrida, there is no such thing as transcendent truth, certainly not regarding justice in law. Instead, he suggests that a ‘ Mystical Foundation of Authority ’ characterizes jurisdiction: “ The justice of law, justice as law is not justice. Laws are not just as laws. One obeys them not because they are just but because they have authority. ” 26 In other words, we humans obey the rules of law not because of its value of truth, not because justice has to be done, but because of its coercive and punitive power. One might say that therein exactly lies the difference to theatre, as mentioned earlier. Although “ the very architecture proscenium stage and theater buildings offer a frame to reflect on the principles and machinery of inclusion and exclusion [. . .] theaters do not have the coercive power of law ” 27 . If a theatrical performance lacks state legitimacy and hence the power to declare a verdict, then its enforceability cannot be guaranteed by theatrical language. However, according to Cornelia Vismann, the court will always be determined by its theatrical set-up: Courts are stages not laboratories, albeit the ongoing phantasm of gaining an absolute certainty, the legal resistance to supposedly objective methods of truth-finding defends not only the existence of judges but in the end the theatrical dimension of courtroom-procedures as such. 28 Referring to Pierre Legendre, Vismann defines the trial as a “ ritual where a crime is given a place in language. ” Pointing at the courtroom as a stage where the crime is being re-enacted in a kind of theatre of justice, she argues that drama and trial are allies. 29 Furthermore, as set forth by Maxine Kamaria Clarke, the possibility of achieving justice implies the exercise of performance. 30 Clark argues that Derrida ’ s notion of false justice can be understood as a 164 Steff Nellis way to underline the idea that seemingly secular formations, like the courthouse, celebrating the absence of former more religious moralities are themselves mystical constructions, and thus social fictions. 31 Therefore, it can be useful to examine the artistic practices of contemporary artists who bring fictitious lawsuits to the stage. After all, if the courtroom, like theatre, creates nothing but social fictions, why then is a court ’ s verdict still more decisive than a theatrical one? Jurisdiction as performance language What happens when the two disciplines mentioned above merge? What happens when the theatre develops its own jurisdiction as performance language? Many contemporary artists are interested in these questions. Along the lines of the twentieth century documentary dramatists, contemporary directors especially focus on the use of documentary sources relating to jurisdiction, law procedures, and court proceedings. However, as much as these artists base their work on tradition, there are also significant differences. Current court case performances usually no longer rely on earlier subject matter from previous lawsuits as their predecessors did. Instead, they prosecute injustices committed by political institutions, companies or governments, which would have no place in our regular legal system. They also represent non-human entities on stage to lend a voice to the voiceless. So doing, stage directors move from a re-enacting principle to a pre-enacting method, as I have argued elsewhere. 32 According to an article by Francesca Laura Cavallo, these kinds of pre-enactments “ operate at the border between reality and fiction: creating fictionalized scenarios that toy with real fear, uncertainty and trust to invalidate strategies of governance and shift the wider population ’ s perception of risk. ” 33 Elaborating further on this definition, the ‘ rehearsal ’ of real court proceedings in theatrical tribunals might transcend the boundaries of the strictly staged reality. By reorienting the public ’ s perception of risk or their confidence about the future, they might even have direct implications in the social and political arena. 34 In other words, these alternative courts no longer focus on the past to draw lessons for the present, but rather on the present itself, the future or the imagination of their audience. What could the specific format and context of a theatrical performance concerning judicial matter add to the regular legal profession? Could the conventions of law, when translated to theatre and despite all differences, inspire the underlying legal system? After all, as Read argues, “ it is law that has to make a difference, while performance, despite any higher aspirations [. . .] has no responsibility whatsoever to change anything ” 35 . Although theatre lacks the coercive and punitive power inherent to law, legal speech acts may be iterated, as illustrated by Derrida 36 , and thus cited in other contexts without losing their performative aspects. Since the efficacy of pragmatic force is contextually bound, it is the conventions of a specific chronotope rather than its truth value that cause the performative outcome. Therefore, when contemporary artists present court proceedings and judicial topics in their performances, the conventions of the courtroom are inserted into a new, highly theatrical context, and yet they may not lose their performative impact on the spectators. However, because of theatre ’ s inability to declare a real verdict, stage directors look for new possibilities to expand the judicial into the theatrical sphere. In what follows, I shall introduce two performances that engage in this renewed tribunal trend in the performing arts in completely different ways. 165 All rise! Jurisdiction as Performance/ Performative Language 1. The Congo Tribunal 37 “ Je déclare ouvert le première session du Tribunal sur le Congo ” , declaims Jean-Louis Gilissen, lawyer at Den Haag Criminal Court and chairman of The Congo Tribunal, when he opens the court session. Before, the initiator, Milo Rau himself, speaks directly to the audience. He asks for silence, tells them the filming of the trial will start in a few moments, and sends a young man on to the stage to clap the filmsticks of a clapperboard together. So doing, Rau not only starts the three-day tribunal in Bukavu, but also stresses the theatrical character of the trial. In his gesture lies a theatrical paradox in which Rau, amongst others, strive for a reality effect by implementing court proceedings on stage whilst continuously stressing their fictitious character. However, the issues that are on trial are real, namely the examination of the economic, identitarian, governmental and geostrategic reasons for the war, the insecurity and the poverty in Eastern Congo. The conflict in Congo is one of the greatest economic wars of our time, but most European citizens are unaware of it. Triggered by the Rwandan genocide in 1994, the Congo War has already claimed over six million lives. What started as a civil war based on ethnic differences between peoples and nations has grown into a fight about political predominance in Central Africa and the export of minerals and raw materials for technology that are essential for twentyfirst century Europe. This conflict thus not only belongs to the Congolese citizens, but also to the international community, namely the European, American and Asian countries that are importing Congolese commodities. Although globalization and the interests of the great national economies can be seen as one of the main offenders in the crisis in Eastern Congo, the international community has refused to make an active response to the systematic attacks against the civil population. 38 In The Congo Tribunal, Milo Rau therefore aims to counteract the decades of impunity in the region of Eastern Congo by examining the causes and background of the conflict. So doing, he focuses on three different topics: the Banro case, an examination of the responsibility of multinational corporations and the World Bank for the relocation of local Congolese villagers by the mining companies, and the subsequent tribal war; the Bisie case, a questioning of the responsibility of the European Union and its member states for their problematic export of raw ‘ conflict ’ materials from Eastern Congo; and the Mutarule case, an investigation into the renunciation of responsibility by both the Congolese army and the United Nations troops in the 2014 massacre in Mutarule, a village close to the Rwandan and Burundi border, which left 35 people, including several young children, dead. 39 Rau ’ s transmedia art project consists of two three-day hearings in Bukavu and Berlin, a book, a documentary film (2017), an illustrated, interactive point-of-view narration given by one of the victims of the Mutarule massacre by means of virtual reality, and an educational website. Rau had previously already covered themes such as racism, social abuse and colonialism. In 2013, he staged two fictitious lawsuits in Zurich (The Zurich Trials) and Moscow (The Moscow Trials), respectively condemning a right-wing populist Swiss magazine, Die Weltwoche, of racism and discrimination, and the Russian government of significantly limiting artists ’ and curators ’ universal right to freedom of speech. When Rau again reached for the tribunal genre for The Congo Tribunal in 2015, he thus was well prepared. The three-day Bukavu Hearings form the heart of The Congo Tribunal. As a real courtroom session, its content is highly discursive: several testimonies from the various parties, including the government, the 166 Steff Nellis opposition, victims, witnesses, (former) rebels, farmers and miners, are heard; documentary videos of preliminary research visits by Rau himself and interviews with locals are shown; and, at the end of every day, the judges provide the audience with the chance to intervene or respond to what was discussed during the trial that day. The jury consisted of six members: Séverin Mugangu, Professor of Law at the Catholic University of Bukavu and the cabinet director for the governor of the province of South Kivu; Gilbert Kalinda, deputy of the province of North Kivu and a representative of the national and international mining companies, a firm believer in the efficiency of the mining industry; Colette Braeckman, Africa correspondent for the Belgian newspaper Le Soir, and an expert on the Congo War; Vénantie Bisimwa Nabintu, a Congolese human rights activist, born in Bukavu; Prince Kihangi, an attorney and expert on the management of natural resources in Congo; and Jean Ziegler, advisor to the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council. With the exception of Ziegler, all the members of the jury took part in the crossexamination of the speakers. Ziegler was not permitted to attend the tribunal by the UN because of the fictitious nature of the trial and the assumption that the UN itself would be accused. Fig. 3: Juror Séverin Mugangu questions an anonymous witness (The Bukavu Hearings). © 2015 Fruitmarket, Langfilm & IIPM/ Mirjam Knapp. Before taking a seat, every speaker had to take the oath, swearing to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. As in court, each witness had the right to speak in a Fig. 2: Milo Rau at an explorative film-shoot for The Congo Tribunal in a gold mine in Eastern Congo. © 2015 Fruitmarket, Langfilm & IIPM/ Eva-Maria Bertschy. 167 All rise! Jurisdiction as Performance/ Performative Language preferred language in order to be able to present a nuanced report. Therefore, two translators were employed to facilitate the conversation. Again, the importance of language is stressed: even in this fictitious court case the significance of nuance and accuracy cannot be underestimated because of the highly sensitive content under discussion. The diligence and prudence with which language was treated also stands out in Berlin where the performance was re-staged with another jury, mostly consisting of new members, that re-examined both the existing documentary materials and a recording of The Bukavu Hearings themselves. Yet the most promising discursive characteristic of a court session is lacking in both The Bukavu Hearings and The Berlin Hearings: the lawyer who advocates his*her client ’ s interests. This absence of defence arguments can be explained by the nature of The Congo Tribunal ’ s court proceedings. Its strategy resembles that of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), a court-like enterprise that focuses on restorative justice. The original TRC was established in 1996 and invited witnesses, victims, and their descendants, but also perpetrators who wanted to request amnesty for the attacks of violence and to give statements about their experiences relating to human rights violations. 40 The TRC hence offered reparation and rehabilitation to both victims and perpetrators by means of court sessions that focussed on the future instead of the past. This alternative form of jurisprudence stresses the importance of reconciliation in contrast to the normal, punitive legal system that seeks retribution. At the same time, one sees a theatrical attempt at rapprochement with the legal system by means of the appropriation of court proceedings on stage, but also a removal of its rigorous, punitive, and defined legal procedures. As already mentioned, language plays a decisive role in this: following the example of the TRC, Rau tries to keep the future in mind by highlighting the possibilities for reconciliation and affiliation between the different parties. In his tribunals, which can be seen as performances of dialogue and discussion, all parties and even the audience are involved in the debate. In this respect, the discursive aspect of these court case performances extends even further than the courtroom proceedings themselves: the non-binding, accessible character of Rau ’ s Congo Tribunal ensures all voices are heard. By stressing the importance of audience participation at the end of each day, Rau ensures that not only the witnesses, but also the opinions of the voiceless audience are incorporated into the debate. Yet, at the end of the interrogations, when Rau stresses the fictitious nature of his court session again, the question arises once more: In what way can theatre actually help to improve society? Fig. 4: Audience member in the open-mic discussion following the Bisie mine case (Bukavu Hearings). © 2015 Fruitmarket, Langfilm & IIPM/ Mirjam Knapp. 2. Voice of Nature: The Trial Maria Lucia Cruz Correia answers this question on a highly personal level. In the court case performance Voice of Nature: The Trial, Correia tries to restore the troubling relationship between Planet Earth and its inhabitants. Although she stresses several times that Nature does not want to be in court, she seems to feel the urge to use a state apparatus to stress the importance of the 168 Steff Nellis endeavour. In this particular performance, Correia prosecutes ecocide, a term referring to the crime of damaging, destructing or annihilating ecosystems by human agency. 41 By representing Nature in court as a victim of ecocide, she hopes to awaken the public and to make them aware of their own responsibility regarding climate change. After all, Correia seeks to show that our role in protecting the planet goes beyond the use of a ‘ Please consider the environment before printing this e-mail ’ disclaimer. Correia is a Belgian-Portuguese performance artist. Her work is characterized by a rigorous attention to the ecological challenges in contemporary society. According to Lieze Roels, “ Correia always seeks the most effective strategies to involve her spectators in environmental issues and encourage them to take action ” 42 . Besides many other works on climate issues, such as Boxes of Transciency #2 (2009), Children must not play on this site (2011), From Nature to Nature (2012), Urban Action Clinic (2015), We are sea Protecting itself (2016), and Vigil Earth (2017), all mainly artistic performances in which she acts as a climate activist herself, Correia had previously enacted a fictitious lawsuit. In The Age of Anthropocene: Evolutionary perspective on future law regarding climate change (2016), she sought to explore the possibilities of creating a new legislation for humans to adapt to the anthropocene, the age in which humankind has permanently changed the planet. This site-specific court case performance, in which Correia worked with climate experts, environmental criminologists and activists, was held in the conference room of the Ljubljana City Municipality and can therefore be seen as the ultimate prototype of Voice of Nature: The Trial. In order to represent nature in court, Correia proposes to approach ecocide and Fig. 5: Caroline Daish performing sound effects with natural elements in Voice of Nature: The Trial. © Mark Pozlep. 169 All rise! Jurisdiction as Performance/ Performative Language the way in which the spectators, as a collective, deal with climate justice, through seven ‘ attempts to represent nature ’ : Understanding law; Finding the accused; Connecting the crime in court; Witnesses of ecocide; Guardian of Nature; Dialoging with Nature; and finally, the draft of a restorative contract. These seven acts navigate between different forms of knowledge transfer. Two internationally renowned lawyers explain how ecosystems have been recognized as legal entities with their own rights in legislation and court decisions in other countries, such as New Zealand, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, India, Mexico City, Uganda, and even some councils, formed by two indigenous minority governments, the Ponca Tribe of Nebraska and The Ho-Chunk Nation, in the United States of America. Besides experts, documentary footage of a preliminary research stay shows testimonials of indigenous peoples who act as witnesses to ecocide. Moreover, Nature itself is present in court by means of representatives, which are, besides the attendees themselves, earth, water, a tree, vegetables, dead animals and other paraphernalia. Because of the use of these rather unconventional attributes, the setting of the courtroom is itself in transition: Instead of a defined number of rows, facing the defendant bench and the court, the seats form a large circle in which the spectators sit uncomfortably close to one another. Performer Caroline Daish presents herself as the host of the evening and welcomes all attendees by reading out their names. This simple act of calling out names instils a particular sense of awareness and involvement in the spectator. Thereby, the classic roles of the courtroom Fig. 6: Caroline Daish playing with a shell in a water tank in Voice of Nature: The Trial. © Mark Pozlep. 170 Steff Nellis are redistributed so that everyone is either judge, defendant, lawyer or guardian of Nature. In addition, Daish invites all spectators to participate in this court case performance and to rethink the judicial system together for the benefit of Nature. The community that is formed in this specific performance will have to search for solutions together without pointing the finger at a clear defendant. This results in a participatory performance in which spectators get in touch with each other, nature, and pollution, and finally, draw up a restorative contract in which every spectator lists what s/ he can do to restore the relationship between nature and nurture. Like Rau, Correia approaches the legal system in an unconventional way. On the one hand, again she uses courtroom proceedings in a theatrical performance in order to approximate real jurisdiction as closely as possible. As in The Congo Tribunal, lawyers and experts were consulted, and a long research process preceded the performance. Yet the play ’ s location is most exemplary: situated in the former Courthouse of Ghent, a bell rings to formally convene the court, inspectors write down the names of all attendees and the spectators have to open their purse or backpack before entering the building. Thereby, a deliberate tension is created. Moreover, when led into the courtroom itself through a side entrance, the spectators pass the cell in which the defendant usually waits for the trial to start. One cannot but wonder: Who is actually on trial today? On the other hand, Correia uses specific rituals, suggests applying restorative justice and paves the way for a non-Western perspective on enacting law. She focuses specifically on embodied knowledge by bringing the spectator into close contact with pollution, using earth, oil, vegetables and dead animals. Through this highly visceral Fig. 7: The performance ’ setting in the former courthouse of Ghent. Voice of Nature: The Trial © Mark Pozlep. 171 All rise! Jurisdiction as Performance/ Performative Language encounter with nature, the artist succeeds in representing the abstract ecocide in the concrete courtroom. Hence, if we acknowledge Jonas Bens ’ theory of the courtroom as the ‘ theatre of power ’ or an ‘ affective arrangement or atmosphere ’ in which the actors involved experience a specific affective relationality caused by the surroundings, Correia ’ s embodied approach might establish very ‘ affective dynamics ’ with regard to the spectators. 43 After all, it is important to note that Correia is not aiming for an immediate political effect of the climate case, but for an impulsive reaction on the part of the spectator: in her vision, the affective feelings of the spectator will indirectly influence the long-term effect of the performance. This method is characteristic of the artist, as stated by Christel Stalpaert: Instead of putting forward one solution, Correia negotiates the ever-ongoing constitution or composition of the world and calls upon a critical and wider view of environmental thinking [. . .]. [S]he calls upon an ethics of accountability and response-ability, rejecting dictated moral conduct. 44 As Stalpaert argues, Correia triggers in the spectator the ability to respond to the highly influential results of ecocide. Like Rau, she therefore presents interviews with inhabitants of places in which ecocide has a tremendous influence on their peoples, and asks experts to testify about these forms of injustice. However, where Rau depends especially on the power of jurisdiction itself, the mere act of cross-examination and testimonials, and thus court language, Correia adopts body language as a central aspect in the settlement of restorative justice. Jurisdiction as performative language According to Klaas Tindemans, “ theatre as an artistic genre is fascinated by law because the legal event [. . .] is never non-binding, in contrast to the performing arts. The courthouse changes lives, the theatre can at most wish for that ” 45 . As mentioned above, this argument is broadly drawn upon to describe the troubling relationship between law and theatre by a variety of scholars (e. g. Arjomand 2018; Read, 2016; Tindemans, 2019; and Vanhaesebrouck, 2015) 46 . Therefore, in this renewed tribunal trend within the performing arts lies a theatrical paradox. Theatre and performance artists strive for a reality-effect by presenting fictitious lawsuits, even though they lack the coercive and punitive power to enforce a real verdict. Jurisdiction as performance language can therefore be seen as a gratuitous gesture. After all, as the aforementioned poem by Szymborska states: “ The dead raise from the stage ’ s battleground ” and everything goes back to normal. In terms of J. L. Austin ’ s Speech Act Theory, performative speech acts such as the verdict in a courtroom lose their enforceability when transferred to the stage. Yet, Jacques Derrida rightfully claims that Austin loses sight of the dramatic sphere within his theory. According to Derrida, performative utterances can be reiterated in another realm without losing force. Derrida therefore defends a less strict dichotomy between serious and pretended or fictional utterances. Forasmuch as he believes the pragmatic force of speech acts are tied to artificiality, it is a courtroom ’ s statutory framework, “ a mystical foundation of authority ” and thus convention, rather than its natural force, which causes people to take laws, prohibitions and court rulings more seriously than theatre. 47 Thereby Derrida seems to suggest all speech acts, whether real or fictitious, can be seen as artificial linguistic signs, some of which are justified by an institutional system while others are not. However, this does not mean that fictitious lawsuits, such as the performances 172 Steff Nellis by Rau and Correia, cannot influence the wide-ranging public debates in which they are engaging. Although theatrical performances lack state legitimacy and hence the power to declare a verdict, their performative effect on the spectator can still cause a deliberate change, thus helping to improve society. But, as has been frequently discussed in this article, what could the specific format and context of a court case performance actually add to the legal profession? Milo Rau ’ s Congo Tribunal effectively illustrates the impact of a theatrical performance on reality. During the three-day trial in Bukavu, Rau himself expresses a great desire for the collected material to be taken seriously. He even mentions the possibility that his initiative might trigger real court hearings in the future. However fictitious his endeavour, Rau did manage to effect some changes in the province of South Kivu, albeit indirectly. In the absence of a real lawsuit that should have been set up by the international community, Rau brought together politicians, experts and witnesses in a quasiformal gathering. The Bukavu Hearings ended with a judgement against the Congolese government and the multinational raw material conglomerates operating in the region. The United Nations, however, were absolved of any direct complicity in the Mutarule massacre by the members of the Bukavu jury. Nevertheless, Rau ’ s intervention received a lot of attention in both national and international media. Thereby, international pressure eventually led to the resignation of the Interior Minister and the Minister of Mining of the South Kivu Province, who both featured in The Bukavu Hearings. Shortly after Rau ’ s performance, they were relieved of their duties. The Berlin Hearings convicted the World Bank and the EU in a second verdict, and in the aftermath of the trial, the chief investigator of The Congo Tribunal and lawyer at the International Court of Justice in Den Haag, Sylvestre Bisimwa, was involved in the establishment of a permanent court, modelled on the performance, to address the crimes committed in Eastern Congo to this day. Although Maria Lucia Cruz Correia ’ s Voice of Nature: The Trial had a great influence on the audience, the impact on reality seems less obvious. Indeed, the performance did not have the same outcome as Rau ’ s tribunal: no ministers were fired, no climate law was added to the constitution, and no permanent change in the treatment of non-human entities in the courtroom made it into parliament. This notwithstanding, the public was in awe of Correia ’ s strategy. A review of the performance is exemplary: Correia ’ s court case performance stuck in my mind, as the oil that stuck to my fingers when leaving the courthouse. Still, I got back in my car and, on the way home, I stopped at the gas station along the highway asking myself: “ Who actually is the murderer of Nature? ” 48 The very nature of Correia ’ s performance causes the spectators to question their daily routines, such as refuelling the car, eating meat or travelling abroad by plane. By means of embodied knowledge Voice of Nature: The Trial asks its spectators to question themselves. One ’ s presence is confirmed by one ’ s name being read out in the Fig. 8: The spectators get oil on their hands in Voice of Nature: The Trial. © Mark Pozlep. 173 All rise! Jurisdiction as Performance/ Performative Language court session; one participates in the performance by holding earth, oil, vegetables, and other organisms; one inscribes oneself into the outline of a restorative contract to become a ‘ guardian of Nature ’ ; and one speaks to fellow audience members during a post-performance drink. The performative outcome of the body language Correia deploys in this performance may not have the same consequences as Rau ’ s focus on testimonials, but both ways of dealing with injustices on stage seem equally useful. After all, no script is imposed on the witnesses, as was the case in most of the twentieth century courtroom dramas. This causes contemporary performers, and potential spectators-as-participants, to be more trustworthy, as is endorsed by Amanda Stuart Fischer who distinguishes between verbatim and testimonial theatre: Instead of being tied to a chronological retelling of what happened by way of an interview or court transcript, testimonial theatre enables a more mediative reflection on the magnitude of an event that has been lived through. Unlike verbatim theatre, which assumes the communicability and the transparency of the traumatic event, testimonial theatre can acknowledge its opacity and allow for the subject ’ s unknowingness and the fragmentary way the testimonial subject encounters an event. 49 Therefore, the enforcement of fictitious practices of court sessions lies in imagining new ways of dealing with injustices within the safe environment of the theatre. However non-binding, the performative outcomes of these court cases are never gratuitous. However entertaining, they have the ability to galvanize audiences, accuse state institutions, and incite dissatisfaction among the spectators, as Nicole Rogers argues: “ In this sense, the utterances in such theatrical performances are neither ‘ infelicitous ’ nor ‘ hollow ’” 50 . Jurisdiction used as performance language is therefore by no means less performative than a courtroom verdict; instead it is differently performative in its own theatrical way. Conclusion In the introduction to this article, I referred to the Miranda warning to stress the importance of language in court proceedings and the investigation that often precedes them. It is important for defendants to know their rights, but it is also important for you and me to know our rights. After all, besides COVID-19, the spring of 2020 brought global distress because of several cases of police brutality and violations of human rights. Protests that first arose in the United States in the wake of the death of two African Americans, Breonna Taylor and George Floyd, caused by American police officers, soon spread internationally in support of the Black Lives Matter movement. The images of the arrest, and subsequently the murder of George Floyd, show several bystanders asking the officers on what basis they are subduing their suspect. Moments later, their questioning become a pleading, while they try to stop the officer from kneeling on Floyd ’ s neck. Unfortunately, neither Floyd nor the bystanders were able to stand up for their rights. Therefore, it is time for all of us, the whole global community, to know our rights and to speak up when we face injustice. Let ’ s all rise! The theatrical endeavours depicted in this article show that performances can act as a facilitator for the circulation and visibility of unheard voices, practices, and knowledge. In troubling times of social distress and complex societal and political realities, judiciary language in theatre serves to enhance communication between people who may not always be willing to open up their gaze. Theatre thereby offers new ways 174 Steff Nellis to leverage justice, not least because of the ways in which the language of jurisdiction is adopted on stage. Whether it is used straightforwardly by means of testimonials and discussion or by alternative forms such as body language and a post-performance drink, language remains omnipresent on the stage in the postdramatic era, especially in court case performances. Textual archives and embodied repertoires strengthen each other in The Congo Tribunal and Voice of Nature: The Trial: respectively the horrifying images of a murdered baby from the Mutarule massacre, accompanied by his mother ’ s heart-wrenching testimonial, and the complex argumentation of Caroline Daish, followed by the spectator ’ s astonishment when viscous black oil and a range of organisms - including herbs, fruit and plants and even dead fish and an octopus - are placed in his/ her bare hands. The artistic format of the theatrical courtroom still raises questions to what extent the performing arts can actually contribute to the improvement of society. As I sought to explain, theatre may not have the same coercive and punitive power as law, but its capacity to bring to the stage contemporary issues and to imagine new ways of dealing with injustices by means of an alternative jurisdiction goes far beyond the capability of our general legal system which will always act within a limited regulatory framework. The specific genre of court case performances central to this article clearly shows that theatre can influence reality, whether directly or indirectly, or the way in which individual audience members approach this reality. This is one of the enchanting characteristics of the performing arts in general. As Hans-Thies Lehmann argues, the “ theatre affords the exemplary site for subjecting to interrogation the social energies that circulate ” 51 . From now on, enacting law will no longer be limited to the courthouse. The performing arts will also play a role in safeguarding justice, and jurisdiction will function both as performance and performative language. After all, the theatrical paradox frequently mentioned in this article also applies to the law. Theatre and performance artists use the language of jurisdiction to approach court proceedings, hoping to denounce injustice whilst knowing they will never reach the same degree of performativity. But jurisdiction as a specific type of language also falls short in real court sessions. While law is highly dependent on a specific discourse, the final purpose of a court hearing is to reenact the extra-linguistic truth that is, in fact, intangible. Like theatre, law thus also strives for an elusive outcome. The main difference, as pointed out by Derrida, lies only in convention: the arbitrary establishment of the institute whose verdict is considered legally binding. Theatre, however, consists precisely of that which law aspires to reach: the power of imagination. Approaching judicial matter from an artistic point of view may offer our legal system new ways of dealing with injustices and jurisprudence in general. In this way, the performing arts propose an alternative form of jurisdiction which hopefully causes its spectators not only to stand up for the judge ’ s entrance during a court case performance, but also to speak up when facing injustice. I repeat: Let ’ s all rise! Acknowledgments This article would not have been possible without Prof. Dr. Kurt Vanhoutte who was the supervisor of my master ’ s dissertation from which this article resulted. Thanks to the editors, the anonymous reviewers, as well as Liesje Baltussen and Sofie Moors for feedback on various parts. Discussions with Prof. Dr. Marett Leiboff and Prof. Dr. Karel 175 All rise! Jurisdiction as Performance/ Performative Language Vanhaesebrouck helped to shape and sharpen the argument. Notes 1 See Google Scholar, “ United States v. Plugh, 648 F.3 d 118, 127 (2 d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S.Ct. 1610 (2012) ” [accessed 17 May 2021]. 2 John Langshaw Austin, How to Do Things with Words, Oxford 1962. 3 Marett Leiboff, Towards a Theatrical Jurisprudence, New York 2020, ch. 2, par. 2. 4 Hans-Thies Lehmann, Tragedy and Dramatic Theatre, trans. Erik Butler, Abingdon 2016, p. 109 cited in: Leiboff, Towards a Theatrical Jurisprudence, ch. 7, par. 1. 5 Leiboff, Towards a Theatrical Jurisprudence, ch. 7, par. 10. 6 Minou Arjomand, Staged: Show Trials, Political Theater, and the Aesthetics of Judgment, New York 2018, p. 16; Alan Read, Theatre & Law, London 2016, pp. 36 - 37; Klaas Tindemans, Recht en tragedie: de scene van de wet in de antieke polis, PhD diss., Leuven 1995; Karel Vanhaesebrouck, “ Het onmogelijke theater van justitie ” , in: Karel Vanhaesebrouck, Christine Guillain and Yves Cartuyvels (eds.), De rechtbank een schouwtoneel: Het spektakel van het strafrecht in België, Tielt 2015, pp. 19 - 19. 7 Michael Fried, Absorption and Theatricality: Painting & Beholder in the Age of Diderot, Berkeley 1976, p. 104. 8 Laura Münkler and Julia Stenzel, “ Einleitung: Inszenierung und Recht - Funktionen, Modi und Interaktionen ” , in: id. (eds.), Inszenierung von Recht, Weilerswist-Metternich 2019, pp. 8 - 18, here: p. 8. 9 Paula Diehl, Performanz des Rechts, Berlin 2006. 10 Read, Theatre & Law, pp. 36 - 37. 11 Ibid., p. 50. 12 Ibid., p. 39. 13 Ibid., p. 12. 14 Kent D. Lerch, “ Vorwort ” , in: id. (ed.), Die Sprache des Rechts, Bd. 1, Berlin 2004, pp. V - VI, here: p. V. 15 In this study, Arjomand discusses the state of research on tribunals in theatre. She focuses mainly on the most important historical predecessors of today ’ s court case performances, as well as the differences between activist tribunals such as the people ’ s tribunals by Russell and Sartre. 16 Arjomand, Staged, p. 16. 17 Read, Theatre & Law, p. 15. 18 Austin, How to Do Things with Words, pp. 98 - 99. 19 Ibid., p. 6. 20 Ibid., p. 5. 21 Michiel Leezenberg, “ Power in Speech Actions ” , in: Ken Turner and Marina Sbisà (eds.), Pragmatics of Speech Actions, Boston 2013, pp. 287 - 312, here: p. 297. 22 Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bas, Chicago 1982, p. 320. 23 Ibid., p. 322. 24 Raoul Moati, Derrida/ Searle: Deconstruction and Ordinary Language, trans. Timothy Attanucci and Maureen Chun, New York 2014, p. 61. 25 Wislawa Szymborska, “ Theatre Impressions ” , in: Wislawa Szymborska, Stanislaw Baranczak and Clare Cavanagh (eds.), View with a Grain of Sand, New York 1995, pp. 67 - 68. 26 Jacques Derrida, “ Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority ” , in: Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld and David Gray Carlson (eds.), Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, London, 1992, pp. 3 - 67, here: p. 12. 27 Arjomand, Staged, pp. 20 - 21. 28 Cornelia Vismann, “‘ Rejouer les crimes. ’ - Theater vs. Video ” , in: Cardozo Studies in Law and Literature 11/ 2 (1999), pp. 161 - 177, here: p. 171. 29 Ibid., p. 166. For more information about Vismann ’ s Legal Theory and Drama, see Peter Goodrich et al. (eds.), Derrida and Legal Philosophy, London 2008. 30 Maxine Kamaria Clarke, Fictions of Justice: The International Criminal Court and the Challenge of Legal Pluralism in Sub-Saharan Africa, Cambridge 2009, p. 147. 31 Ibid., p. 9. 176 Steff Nellis 32 Steff Nellis, “ Enacting Law: The Dramaturgy of the Courtroom on the Contemporary Stage ” , Lateral 10/ 1 (Spring 2021), https: / / csalateral.org/ ? p=8957&preview=1&_ppp=8 c0d554cd2 [accessed 17 May 2021]. 33 Francesca Laura Cavallo, “ Rehearsing Disaster. Pre-Enactment Between Reality and Fiction ” , in: Adam Czirak et al. (eds.), Performance zwischen den Zeiten. Reenactments und Preenactments in Kunst und Wissenschaft, Bielefeld, 2019, pp. 179 - 198, here: p. 193. 34 Ibid., p. 180. 35 Read, Theatre & Law, p. 32. 36 Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, p. 320. 37 For more information on Milo Rau ’ s theatrical tribunals, see: Robert Walter-Jochum, “ (P)Reenacting Justice: Milo Raus Tribunale als Theater der Empörung ” , in: Adam Czirak et al. (eds.), Performance zwischen den Zeiten, Berlin, 2019; Benjamin Wihstutz, “ Zur Dramaturgie von Milo Raus Theatertribunalen ” , in: Laura Münkler and Julia Stenzel (eds.), Inszenierung von Recht, Weilerswist-Metternich 2019, pp. 164 - 186; Sylvia Sasse, “ When the Director becomes a Spectator ” , in: Florian Malzacher (ed.), Not Just A Mirror: Looking for the Political Theatre of Today, Berlin 2015, pp. 151 - 155. 38 Milo Rau, The Congo Tribunal, http: / / www. the-congo-tribunal.com/ project.html# description [accessed 17 July 2020]. 39 For more information about the exact content of the hearings, visit http: / / www.thecongo-tribunal.com/ hearings.html [accessed 17 July 2020]. 40 Annelies Verdoolaege, Reconciliation Discourse: The Case of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Amsterdam 2008, pp. 1 - 2. 41 Maria Lucia Cruz Correia, Voice of Nature: The Trial, in: All Works, http: / / www.mluciacruzcorreia.com/ works/ the-voice-of-natu [accessed 13 July 2020]. 42 Lieze Roels, “ De natuur aan zet: Een ontstaansgeschiedenis van Maria Lucia Cruz Correia ’ s performance Voice of Nature: The Trial ” , in: Forum + 5/ 3 (2019), http: / / www. forum-online.be/ nummers/ herfst-2019/ denatuur-aan-zet [accessed 14 July 2020]. 43 Jonas Bens, “ The courtroom as an affective arrangement: analysing atmospheres in courtroom ethnography ” , in: The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 50/ 3 (2018), pp. 336 - 355, here: p. 343. 44 Christel Stalpaert, “ Cultivating Survival with Maria Lucia Cruz Correia: Towards an ecology of agential realism ” , in: Performance research 23/ 3 (2018), pp. 48 - 55, here: p. 48. 45 Klaas Tindemans, “ De theatraliteit van het recht: Over aansprakelijkheid en consequenties in het hedendaagse ‘ gerechtstheater ’” , in: EtCetera 35/ 150 (2017), pp. 38 - 45, here: p. 39. 46 Arjomand, Staged, p. 16; Read, Theatre & Law, pp. 36 - 37; Tindemans, Recht en tragedie, Vanhaesebrouck, “ Het onmogelijke theater van justitie ” , pp. 19 - 19. 47 Derrida, “ Force of Law ” , p. 10. 48 Steff Nellis, “ The Voice of Nature: The Trial - Maria Lucia Cruz Correia. Een tragedie in acht bedrijven ” , in: Etcetera, 6 March 2019, https: / / e-tcetera.be/ voice-of-nature-the-trialmaria-lucia-cruz-correia/ / [accessed 17 May 2021]. 49 Amanda Stuart Fisher, “ Trauma, Authenticity and the Limits of Verbatim ” , in: Performance Research 16/ 1 (2011), pp. 118 - 119. 50 Nicole Rogers, “ The Play of Law: Comparing Performances in Law and Theatre ” , in: Queensland University of Technology Law and Justice Journal 8/ 2 (2008), pp. 429 - 443, here: p. 438, https: / / doi.org/ 10.5204/ qutlr.v8i2.52 [accessed 17 May 2021]. 51 Lehmann, Tragedy and Dramatic Theatre, ch. 7, par. 1. 177 All rise! Jurisdiction as Performance/ Performative Language
