PFSCL XLVI, 90 (2019) DOI 10.2357/ PFSCL-2019-0005 Some Observations on La Rochefoucauld’s Mémoires III-VI J OHN P HILLIPS (G LEN C OVE , NY) Mémoires 1 III-VI 2 are La Rochefoucauld’s 3 narration of many of the events of the Fronde from after the Paix de Rueil, April 1649, until Condé’s departure from Paris to join the Spanish in October 1652. Lar. was himself a significant participant in many of these events although he never acknowledges it. The work in large part is a defense of C., and although many of his weaknesses, limitations, mistakes and confusions are not concealed, his rebellion is presented as essentially caused by his entirely unexpected, and according to the text, entirely unjustified imprisonment by Mazarin and Anne. This paper is not a defense of C. and is not intended to be an analysis of what the historical C. said and did, nor is it a consideration of whether Lar.’s version is the best or most accurate one. It is rather an attempt to show that Lar. presented C.’s rebellion as consistent with many earlier noble rebellions against the État. For this it will be helpful to utilise a pattern of noble rebellions between 1562 and 1661 as analysed by A. Jouanna in Le Devoir de révolte 4 , especially her consideration of these 1 This paper would not have been possible without the contributions of Georgette S. Kagan. 2 All citations are from the Pléiade edition. For Mémoires I-II see Phillips 2012. 3 In order to save space the following abbreviations are used: C.=Condé, Lar.=La Rochefoucauld, M.=Mazarin. 4 In her study Jouanna (1989) (9) cites as motives frequently claimed by révoltés during the period 1559-1661: (a) a defense of the grandeur of their lignage; (b) a souci de l’honneur; (c) the lutte to gain the faveur royale necessary to maintain a large clientèle; and (d) a desire to protect the privileges of their ordre. The nobles were generally not motivated by unrestrained selfishness and Machiavellan cynicism. They often claimed their actions were on behalf of the bien publique, which indicated they thought the new form of government, l’absolutisme, severely disturbed the French tradition. In acting thus (10) they thought they were John Phillips PFSCL XLVI, 90 (2019) DOI 10.2357/ PFSCL-2019-0005 68 events in the 17 th century. Her analysis is supported by the work of K. Béguin, cited below. In Jouanna’s analysis the evolution of the État toward a more “absolute” centralised form posed a significant threat to the nobility, whose condition was simultaneously changing. The Grands, an integral part of the État, had certain essential material and emotional needs upon which their identity, and in their view, their very existence rested. The basis for the satisfaction of these needs could only be a predictable sécurité, a stability in the monarchy which would allow them to maintain and enhance their honneur, their grandeur and their lignage, as well as their clientèles, by having an adult roi provide a steady flow of bienfaits, etc. in return for their services to the État 5 . The greatest threat 6 to the nobility came from a monarch who was too weak to provide for their sécurité or to prevent the monopolising of royal faveurs by a favori, a situation common during a regency. This royal weakness led to fierce, savage fighting among the rival noble families (for example, the Condé-Vendôme rivalry) to maintain the grandeur of their lignages, since royal weakness deprived them of the stability essential for their status, prestige and power 7 . Because the number of places fortes, gouvernements, charges etc. necessary for political survival was limited, during threatening times nobles felt the need to resort to fulfilling a devoir, expressing political opposition, which might involve violence and even alliances with l'étranger, and in part they were brought to this way of thinking because of the absence of institutions to address their concerns. By the later 17 th century (236-237) it is not the case that the revolts have no ideological content but that, unlike the earlier 17 th century revolts, the old themes (e.g. le bien public) are less emphatic and occur mostly among the noblesse moyenne. The Grands were primarily concerned with the grandeur de leur lignage, and they were also moved by a sense of honneur blessée, the feeling that they were hurt in their dignité personnelle and thus feared losing the estime collective d'autrui which very much affected their sentiment intérieur de valeur plus que commun. All this was experienced by them as a real souffrance. The nobles' needs (222) were emotional, political and material and could only be met by a strong adult roi, who alone could assure their lignages, clientèles, and identity. When these reassurances failed, during a regency for example, they often felt the need to revolt so as to secure themselves against insecurité, as this was a way to regain royal support. For a similar analysis see for example Pernot, 46-48, 60-62, 137-139, 144. 5 And it was necessary (Jouanna (1989) 222) for the familles of the Grands to display their grandeur. 6 See Jouanna (1989) 390. 7 Pillorget, 471-472, describes the rivalry among the three Bourbon clans “comme une meute de loups avides”. Some Observations on La Rochefoucauld’s Mémoires III-VI PFSCL XLVI, 90 (2019) DOI 10.2357/ PFSCL-2019-0005 69 violence to eliminate rivals 8 . Thus at certain times driven by this lack of sécurité (as well as by other motives) some powerful nobles rebelled against the État, which because it was in the weakened form of a regency, was compelled to reassure them and alleviate their insecurity by conceding to them various, sometimes extraordinary, bienfaits and powers in order to reintegrate them so that the État could function, thereby sometimes weakening the État even further. Insecurity therefore 9 was a much more important motivation for the Grands than égoïsme or avidité, however outrageous their égoïsme or avidité appeared to be or in fact was. This paper will examine how this pattern applied to C. In contrast to the analyses of Jouanna and Béguin, some commentators on the Fronde have seen the participants as primarily motivated by selfish interests; thus this paper will also briefly look at the way in which Lar. presented the motivations, the intérêts, the goals etc. of those deciding whether or not to join C. When Louis XIV ultimately fully assumed his role he succeeded in part because he gave the nobility the sécurité it needed, he had no favori to monopolise bienfaits and he was firm in his devoir d’arbitrage 10 . Hence 11 C.'s willingness after 1660 to return to his place in the nobility and to obey the crown 12 . 8 See Jouanna (2014) 125-126 for the great difficulties facing nobles trying to get and keep royal favors. In revolting one had to avoid two difficulties. A too violent break could lead to the loss of clients; a too timid break could lead to not getting sufficient rewards. This accounts in part for the alternations of rebellion and submission. 9 See Jouanna (1989) 220. 10 For M. not acting as a neutral arbitre see Pernot, 130-131, 149 and 310, where the absence of such a figure plays a part in the fatal duel between Beaufort and Nemours in their quarrel over préséance. 11 See Jouanna (1989) 244. 12 Jean Lafond in the Préface to his edition (2006) of Lar.’s Mémoires I-VI presents an analysis similar to Jouanna’s analysis of the general situation of the nobility in relation to the État during this period. He agrees that the nobles at times needed to revolt in order to be récompensés so as to have their identities and their societal position validated. He agrees with the thesis of this paper that C. is central to books III-VI but he does not say that C.’s actions are presented as almost exclusively motivated by the typical noble anxiety about sécurité, an anxiety in C.’s case exacerbated by M.’s decision to imprison him. So Lafond is led to misinterpret certain actions, for example C.’s refusal, on the very last page, of M.’s final offer, passed on through Langlade, even though it was exactly what C. had demanded. Lafond says that Lar.’s statement that C.’s destinée led him to leave France is Lar.’s way of explaining (as he says the word fortune is used in the Maximes) something which is not rational and so can not be understood and articulated. But leaving aside whatever Lar. meant by destinée, in that same last section Lar. states explicitly that C. rejected this offer because it was not clear whether M. honestly John Phillips PFSCL XLVI, 90 (2019) DOI 10.2357/ PFSCL-2019-0005 70 Jouanna traces 13 these threats to noble sécurité, all of which were prominent just before the Fronde, from the reign of Henri II to that of Louis XIV. There were approximately a dozen noble revolts against the État between 1610 and 1661, during some of which participants in the Fronde or members of their immediate families (e.g., C. père and Gaston) played a significant part. After Henri IV’s assassination, a child Louis XIII became roi under a weak régente, Marie de Médicis, who had favoris (Concini, Galigai) who monopolised royal faveurs and amassed great wealth and power. Louis XIII once legally roi authorised the assassination of Concini but had his own favoris, Luynes and later Cinq-Mars, both of whom also monopolised royal faveurs. When Richelieu was Louis XIII’s principal ministre he too accumulated many royal bienfaits and both he and Louis XIII carried out a number of spectacular noble executions which were obviously unsettling for the nobility 14 . There was hope for stability when Louis XIV was born (1638) but it did not last long since Louis XIII died in 1643 15 . The events considered here take place during Anne’s regency for a minor Louis XIV and with a non-French, hated and mistrusted principal minister, M. The Paix de Rueil had ended hostilities, which had come to a head in 1648, between the Cour and the Parlement and the other sovereign courts. Because the État was at war with Spain it was in constant need of money, had already used up current and future tax revenues, and was continually looking for new ways to raise money. Fiscal measures, enacted in 1648 and earlier, and found threatening by the Parlement and the other courts, unintentionally unified these courts and led to a revolt of the judges and their passing declarations limiting royal authority, which Anne and M. were forced to accept though only temporarily 16 . Anne and M. used the celebration of C.’s signal victory over the Spanish in August 1648 to arrest several of the judges who had led the revolt, which in turn caused a revolt of the Parisians and their raising of barricades throughout the city. The wanted to make a deal so he could return to France, or whether he was seeking some avantage in appearing to want peace. In other words C.’s doubt here about M.’s intentions and trustworthiness had been amply demonstrated, from the end (if not the beginning) of III, where C. was liberated, down to the very last page. 13 Jouanna (1989) 212 ff. 14 See Jouanna (2014) 94. 15 Note that Anne and M. themselves are quite generous in giving bienfaits to their opponents when they are in weak positions, after the Paix de Rueil (Kossmann 115-116) and after the arrest of C. (Kossmann 149-150). See also Pernot, 161, 170, 174, 175. 16 Pillorget, 486, says that in effect the Parlement claimed for itself “le pouvoir législatif et le contrôle de l’exécutif.” Some Observations on La Rochefoucauld’s Mémoires III-VI PFSCL XLVI, 90 (2019) DOI 10.2357/ PFSCL-2019-0005 71 Cour was forced to back down but in January 1649 key members of the Cour fled Paris, and a blocade and military operations led by C. were begun against Paris. A complete military defeat of the city was not possible nor desirable and when Spanish troops neared Paris in March 1649 a peace was agreed to, but the Cour did not return to Paris until August 1649, when Mémoires III-VI begin. The situation was very tense. The power relations between the regency (Anne and M.), the Parlement, and C., Gaston, their clientèles and others had been disrupted. The Cour had ceded power it would inevitably have to take back, and M., already widely hated, became even more unpopular especially, but not only, because he was held responsible for the Parisians’ sufferings during the blocade. C., although also held responsible for the blocade, was a Prince du Sang, and though young, fabulously successful and at the height of his gloire because of his extraordinary military victories on behalf of the État. This enhanced his already considerable power in the État and allowed him to increase his demands on the weakened regency and on M. for what he thought was his due recompense for his own achievements and for those of his gens de guerre 17 . The pattern discussed by Jouanna can usefully be applied here but with one significant alteration. Whereas in her model the noble rebellion or plans for rebellion against the État occured first, after which the État acted and at times arrested the nobles (an example would be C.'s father), here we have a reversal: it was only after the État was forced to liberate the arrested C. and the other Princes that C. found himself in a position resembling that of the earlier actually rebellious nobles, namely, forced to consider rebellion against the État. C. was imprisoned before he rebelled and in fact nowhere does Lar. indicate he was considering rebellion 18 . The typical noble anxiety about sécurité was for C. exacerbated by having had his actual sécurité violently and unexpectedly taken away from him before he had rebelled. He is presented in III as never explicitly desiring or planning to revolt before his arrest despite his increasingly aggressive demands on the Crown and his open hatred of and contempt for M. Nor is he shown to have similar hostile feelings toward Anne, toward Louis XIV or toward the État. In fact he had lent the État money, he had fought for Anne, for M., for Louis XIV against 17 For many instances of C.’s unhappiness with M.’s failure to adequately reward his gens du guerre see Pujo, 75, 79, 88-89, 96, 123-124, 129, 137, 156, 189. 18 See Kossmann 198: “Condé…tout en voyant combien la situation devenait dangereuse pour lui…ne faisait rien pour éviter les complications auxquelles il pouvait s’attendre. Il ne se préparait surement pas à la guerre civile. Tous ses contemporains s’étonnent de ses imprudences et de ses brusqueries, mais ils savent qu’il ne désirait aucunement une lutte à la main armée.” John Phillips PFSCL XLVI, 90 (2019) DOI 10.2357/ PFSCL-2019-0005 72 the Parisian rebels, including members of his own family, and he was largely responsible for “saving” the État 19 . Perhaps M. anticipated that C. was going to rebel but he then acted before any rebellion and so in effect “altered” the pattern analysed by Jouanna. In Lar.’s narration this forced C. (IV 131-152, V 153-154) to conclude that rebellion was the only way to reestablish his sécurité, since after his arrest he could no longer reasonably trust M., nor Anne either, for her highest priority, to protect the kingdom for her son, required her to keep M. in the government. Earlier in French history other nobles anxious about their sécurité, revolted and were reconcilied to the État, reassured by the rewards they received, but C. after his arrest could never be sufficiently reassured about his sécurité while M. continued to have power. C. was arrested before any rebellion and this is why Lar. stresses C.’s innocence and why in part C., after he was liberated, was so continually uncertain about what to do. It was only after much hesitation and uncertainty, and after learning of several apparent attempts to rearrest or kill him, that he finally broke with the État (V 154-176, VI 177-213) by not attending the king’s majorité; he was then in the position of rebelling against an adult king and so was open to the charge of lèse-majesté. In deciding whether he had to go to war against the État, the question of which nobles had the motives, the intérêts and the goals to ally with him became much more complicated, as allies would also be in revolt against a legally recognised king. Because C. had this course of action forced on him and had not himself planned or wished for it, those considering joining or staying with him saw C. as a person who could not seem to make up his mind, so deeply had his imprisonment unsettled him. He was so unsettled by this loss of sécurité that it contributed (in IV-VI) to a situation where he could not always discern his own véritables intérêts and where the confused and complex motives, intérêts and goals of those around him, including members of his own family, could not easily be unravelled and clarified. After much hesitation he ultimately chose rebellion, and reluctantly went to war, where he was defeated and had to go into exile. The situation was no longer what it had been for earlier nobles, such as C. père, because the political and structural nature of the État had been so changed by Richelieu and M. that rebellion was no longer an effective noble strategy 20 . 19 See Pernot, 150, for C. as the “sauveur de la régence”. 20 Béguin’s analysis of the Condé family supplements and reinforces Jouann’'s analysis. Condé Père, a ready rebel, was imprisoned after what was his last rebellion and then became the bras armé of the État against subsequent revolts because he had been richly recompensed by Richelieu (Daniel Roche, Béguin, 10). In this way the family had become quite rich and powerful and the victories of Enghien brought the maison to an unprecedented height. In addition the family Some Observations on La Rochefoucauld’s Mémoires III-VI PFSCL XLVI, 90 (2019) DOI 10.2357/ PFSCL-2019-0005 73 To support this analysis of books III-VI, without discussing its at times bewildering number of elements, it is useful to divide III-VI into three parts. The first part A (III.90-130) narrates the events from the return of the Cour to Paris in 1649 to C.’s arrest in January 1650. C. was more and more aggressively contemptuous of M., and though it was clear he hated him, he exhibited no explicit intention to revolt against or overthrow the government. M. and Anne, having decided finally that C., Conti and Longueville were too dangerous, imprisoned them in January 1650 but soon were forced to liberate them (February 1651). The second part B (IV.131-152 to V.153-154) depicts the events from the liberation of the princes to Louis XIV’s majority (September 1651) which C. did not attend. The third part C (V.154-176 to VI.177-213) depicts C., now in revolt, wavering between war and peace, but ultimately choosing what seemed his only option, war. Unable to win sufficient military or political support, he left France, defeated, to join France’s enemies, the Spanish. Part A, Book III (90-130), in setting the scene for IV-VI, prepares the reader to understand how and why C. acted the way he did in the later recuperated the substantial Montmorency clientèle (54-57). C. was then in the typical role of the (de facto) leader of the most powerful important noble family, but unlike his father, who prioritized increasing the family wealth (89-90), C.’s highest value was honneur, which meant he was especially concerned about rewarding and protecting (sometimes against la justice royale) his gens de guerre (74). C. therefore had somewhat contradictory obligations, to his clientèle and to the État. When the Fronde began he was the protector of royal power but he also defended the rebellious parlement in Guyenne and opposed its governor D’Épernon (79-80). He protected his people even when they were duellists or libertins, but without exception all had to servir le pouvoir (81-84). When Anne and M. refused C. the recompense he thought his people had earned after his victories, it placed him in an impasse revealed by the Fronde, namely that he could not be both the patron des siens and the soutien de la régence (86). And the tensions between C. and M. were those typical of situations where a favori or ministre tout puissant intruded into areas reserved for the grande aristocratie (110). The Condé family by their enrichissement, their élévation, their place in the Conseil du Roi, etc., were on the side of the ordre établi and collaborated in maintaining it, while M., because needing to elevate his own lignage, had to upset the expected division des bienfaits. Therefore M. could not use the strongest families to do this but needed to ally with those who were out of power (i.e. les Vendôme, les Elbœuf, etc.) and who were opponents of les Condé. The position of les Condé was based on unfailing loyalty to its amis, clients, confédérés, etc. and les Condé assumed they were entitled to recompense for them, but M. could not grant this without compromising his own plans (111). John Phillips PFSCL XLVI, 90 (2019) DOI 10.2357/ PFSCL-2019-0005 74 books 21 . One sees the honnête, naïve, etc. but flawed C. systematically and coldly deceived and manipulated by the dishonest scheming M., who was so aveuglé by his arrogance he arrested the three Princes and even claimed for himself the military gloire for defeating Turenne 22 . By the end of III, M.’s aveuglement prevented him from seeing how he had turned so many against him that he was forced to liberate the Princes and go into exile. It ends with C.’s liberation and a very emphatic statement of C.’s innocence and his mérite along with a denunciation of the unprecedented nature of the injustice of Anne and M. imprisoning him. It had opened with C.’s expectations for what he had come to believe he had justly earned and deserved for having “saved” Louis XIV, Anne, M., and the État during the events of 1648-49. Part A (III) itself can reasonably be divided into three sections. The first (90-105) narrates events from the Cour’s return to Paris after the Paix de Rueil to the arrest of the Princes. The second (105-120) narrates Lar.’s escape from Paris, the war in Bordeaux and the end of that war. The third (120-130) narrates the military manoeuvres around Paris, the transfer of the Princes to Le Havre, the Frondeurs’ abandonment of M., his victory at Rethel, the release of the Princes and M.’s exile. These second and third parts therefore will only be considered in passing. The first section (90- 105), most relevant to the analysis presented here, opens with C.’s concerns about whether he would be fairly rewarded (90) with what he believed he deserved for helping the Cour in 1648-49. His estimate of what he was owed was reinforced by (90-91) M.’s promises and Anne’s statement that he had reestablished the Roi’s authority by keeping his word in providing exemplary, incalculably valuable services. These statements to C., who was universally recognized as not by nature easily satisfied 23 , to say the very least, increased his sense of what he was owed 24 . Because (91) he hated and despised M. he continually opposed him and (characteristically) mercilessly 21 Book III alone might also be viewed in part as a conventional morality tale wherein M.’s hybris led to his near “destruction”, his exile at the end of III. 22 Whose defeat, according to Lar., was really due to Deliponty’s failure (III 121- 122). 23 See Kossmann 196: “L'ambition de Condé, si démesurée qu’elle fut, était une donne tout à fait fixée et stable dont personne n’ignorait le caractère…Mais ce qui manquait complètement à C. c’était une politique. Il voulait du pouvoir, de l’argent, du prestige, mais ne savait que faire de toutes ces richesses. Il demandait et exigeait hautement toute sorte de grâces, mais il n’avait nulle envie de donner une base solide à un pouvoir toujours très discuté…nous verrons Mazarin se servir de la maladdresse du prince et l’entraîner dans une guerre qu’il n’avait pas cherchée…” 24 From 1619 on the Condé family had followed a politique of collaborating with the men in power, hence his support of Anne and M. See Jouanna (1989) 242. Some Observations on La Rochefoucauld’s Mémoires III-VI PFSCL XLVI, 90 (2019) DOI 10.2357/ PFSCL-2019-0005 75 mocked him 25 , thought him unworthy of his position, and expressed regret at having saved him 26 . Necessarily, like all nobles, he was exceptionally attentive to anything having to do with his reputation and he feared M. wanted to transfer all the haine des peuples, directed against M. (91) because of the siege of Paris, onto him; therefore C. needed to recover the people’s positive opinion, which he lost when he saved M. from exile. Remembering the crainte and abattement M. had displayed during the désordres, he wanted to maintain M. in this position of dependence while hoping to oust him from Anne’s favor and gain this for himself. To achieve this (91-93) he first reconciled with the Frondeurs. His relations with his family had broken down (his brother and sister had rebelled while he protected the roi and M.), and to reconcile with them he broke publicly with M., but he soon reconciled with M. and as a result the Frondeurs publicly denounced him. Persuaded by his sister that it was inimical to the C. family’s intérêts, he suddenly and duplicitously opposed what he had previously condoned, the Mercœur-Mancini marriage, an important event in the Condé-Vendôme family rivalry but, equally, a crucial, reasonable and necessary attempt by M. to solidify his own situation in France through marriage to a Bourbon. This convinced M. it was time to throw off C.’s joug in order not to remain dependent on him and not to have to honor the rewards promised for C.’s services. M. had decided to se venger. M. (93-94) had already begun to forget his obligations to C. and to remember his mécontentements. Under the guise of reconciliation he constantly tried to take advantage of C.’s confiance. Knowing C. wanted him to be afraid, he played along in order both to prevent C. from resorting to violence and to further his projet of depriving C. of his liberté. He spoke of abandoning government affairs and leaving France, he dishonestly offered not only C., but his amis, la carte blanche in regard to the distribution of governments, provinces, etc., and he even informed them about the realm’s finances, all of which was meant to éblouir C. Everyone wanted to maintain in office this weak and dependent minister 27 . After the cancellation of the Mercœur-Mancini marriage, which was crucial for solidifying his position, and after his decision to se venger (96), M. carefully set out to remove all the obstacles to imprisoning C. He 25 Pillorget, 510, claims that C. had a “caractère execrable”. 26 C. saw M. as simply another Concini (Jouanna (1989) 243). 27 This appears to be part of the reason C. asked for the avantages de rang for Lar., i.e. the tabouret, etc., already granted to some. M., since he had no intention of granting these things, used the assemblée de noblesse to oppose this grant, and preferred taking back the honors he had granted other nobles rather than supporting what he had promised C. John Phillips PFSCL XLVI, 90 (2019) DOI 10.2357/ PFSCL-2019-0005 76 invented a crime imaginaire (97) to separate Gaston from C., and he used an alleged assassination attempt on Joly to place someone covertly on the scene to kill C. if the occasion arose. In order to make the Frondeurs seem responsible (98) for an alleged assassination attempt on C., M., through an intermediary, told C. of another “plot” by them to kill him (98), “proved” this plot was real, and then deceived C. into believing that he, M., was more concerned for C.’s well-being than even his own family and friends. With C. aidant à se tromper M.’s plan worked. He convinced C. (100) to seek justice by going to the Parlement but this was really a way to mortifier him, because the haughty C. found that he, like others before the court, was reduced to being a suppliant at the judges’ feet. M., to get back his own liberté by depriving C. of his, then decided to win over the Frondeurs by using C.’s authorization of the marriage of the Duc de Richelieu to Mme de Pons as evidence that C., by gaining control of the crucial Le Havre, was trying to increase his powers, which was seen as a grave threat to the Frondeurs. Mme de Chevreuse (101-102) was brought in and was able to alienate Gaston from his confidant, La Rivière, because of his supposed betrayal of Gaston and so she won Gaston over to M.’s side. Finally M. used C.’s alleged desire to become connétable (102-103) (an offer C. had already refused in order to spare the jealous Gaston) to convince Gaston that C. was working against Gaston’s intérêts. Everyone necessary to support M. had now been won over and C. and the other princes (105) were imprisoned in January 1650. The text then narrates (105-120) the inconclusive war between the Crown and the rebels. Last is the narration of events (120-130) in and around Paris, the exile of M. and the liberation of the Princes. The actions of C. and M. in this first section (90-105) are clarified by Jouanna’s analysis. Both were engaged in the traditional and predictable activities to secure their powers and status. M., neither French nor a noble was, as much as C. and all other French nobles, very concerned with establishing himself, especially because his original supporter, Richelieu, was dead, and as a foreigner he had not had the opportunities to build support through family ties. He was completely dependent on Anne, a régente, and like C. and the other nobles, he had to try to take advantage of the various family and clan rivalries and other social dynamics to secure his power. C., a Prince du Sang, already a fabulously successful military hero, is presented as actively exploring how to enhance his considerable power. He was concerned with winning over public opinion as well as with deciding whether to ally with the Frondeurs and how best to use his family. Here at the beginning of III are the manoeuvres one would expect, and C., though uncertain about many things, did not yet have reason to doubt the support of the État. That would only happen when, to C.’s and most others’ greatest Some Observations on La Rochefoucauld’s Mémoires III-VI PFSCL XLVI, 90 (2019) DOI 10.2357/ PFSCL-2019-0005 77 surprise 28 , M. had him arrested (105). From the point of view of M. and of the État, C. had performed at least several threatening actions. By reneging on support for the Mercœur-Mancini marriage he both broke his promise and seriously jeopardized a significant source of support for M., as well as interfering with the royal prerogative in regards to significant marriages, though M.’s attempt to join his family to a C. family rival (the Vendôme) was itself threatening to C. and to his lignage 29 . And C.’s support for the marriage of the Duc de Richelieu and Mme de Pons seemed to be a clear attempt to gain control of perhaps the most important place forte in France, a threat to M., the Frondeurs and the État. C.’s defense of Jarzé’s 30 “love” for Anne and his insistence that Jarzé be given a public apology and be accepted back at Cour was a humiliating insult to the Cour and especially to Anne, the régente. Though it is clearly stated that C. did not respect but despised M. and actively worked to diminish his power, M. is presented (102-103) as being almost diabolical in his manoeuvring behind the scenes not only to reduce C.’s power but to actually humiliate and imprison him 31 . No mention is made in this narration of C.’s thoughts while in prison 32 . Imprisoned for more than a year and undoubtedly kept abreast of outside events 33 , he must have given thought to the threat to his sécurité the État not only had in fact been but could be again. Beaufort had been imprisoned for five years before his escape (1648) and C. could not know how long he would be locked up. While he was imprisoned his mother had died, and 28 See Jouanna (2017), 458, about Condé père: “L’imprisonnement d'un prince du sang est en effet un acte aux consequences politiques considérables, puisqu'il représente une atteinte à la sacralité du sang de France et au droit revendiqué par ceux dans les veines desquels coule ce précieux liquide d'assister le roi de leurs conseils.” 29 See Dulong, 139-140, for C.’s feeling threatened by the Mancini-Mercœur marriage and feeling not recompensed for his many services to the État. 30 See Pernot, 160. 31 It has often been noted how much M. was disliked by his contemporaries and how his positive achievements, such as the Treaty of Westphalia, were overlooked. Lar. at times seems to present M. as having no governmental, military, political, economic etc. matters to be concerned with but as being solely concerned with securing his place in government and containing and humiliating C. 32 See Pujo, 165-180. C. apparently never lost his sense of humor, unlike his brother: “Quand son frère, cherchant dans la prière un dérivatif à son découragement, demande qu’on lui apporte L’Imitation de Jésus-Christ, Condé lança aussitôt ‘Pour moi, ça sera l’Imitation de Beaufort.’” 33 And of course he was not liberated by the treaty ending hostilities in Bordeaux in October 1650. See Lenet, II 93ff. for the disappointment of his followers that their efforts to free him had failed. John Phillips PFSCL XLVI, 90 (2019) DOI 10.2357/ PFSCL-2019-0005 78 now his wife and his son, his only heir, that is to say the Condé lignage, were under extreme duress and a war was underway in Bordeaux which could have had dire consequences for him. Though by the end of III M. was in exile, Anne’s continued loyalty to him could only mean that the threats to C.’s sécurité were not over, even after he was freed, as the narrator often emphasizes. Throughout all of Part B (IV.131-152 to V.153-154) 34 the consequences of M.’s arrest of C. are of the highest importance for understanding C., since his fears for his sécurité constantly affected his thinking and actions and prevented any accommodation. Part B opens (IV.131ff.) with C.’s near triumphant welcome back to Paris after his liberation when, according to many observers, he and Gaston had the opportunity to take over the government, though, significantly, they did not. It closes with C. virtually having been forced, quite reluctantly, to choose rebellion. He had never rebelled against the État and never wanted to but he was unable to find another way to protect himself from perceived threats to his sécurité, including a second imprisonment and even an assassination. The many and various motives, intérêts and goals of the different nobles and groups as they formed and dissolved various, sometimes secret, alliances created an atmosphere of confusion. Anne was in charge of the government herself but in consultation with the exiled M., whom she wanted to bring back as soon as possible. Lar., the unidentified narrator, played a very important role as a loyal and brave ami and ally of C. and as an astute negotiator trusted by all. Book IV ends with two scenes 35 discussed below which reveal how fragile were the forces suppressing the murderous passions existing in France just before the war fully broke out and C. abandoned Paris. One learns that C. (IV.135), fresh from prison and probably more uncertain than ever about his sécurité, could not recognize his véritables intérêts, and though willing to conclude an alliance, particularly with Anne, found none which seemed reliable. Anne generally is not portrayed as negatively as M. is. This is partly due to the fact that as régente and mother of Louis XIV she was not in position similar to that of M., but she was single-minded in her attempts to secure his return, as soon as possible and at almost any cost, and making C. hated was an integral part of her plans. Though he knew Anne wanted the people to feel bitterness (133) toward him, for a time C. thought a secret alliance with her was possible (133-134), but he realized he could have no sécurité with her because she wanted to 34 All of IV down to his missing Louis XIV’s majorité at V 153-154. 35 At IV 150-152, the near fatal conflict in the Parlement between Retz and his followers and Lar. and the followers of C., and the surprisingly decorous chance meeting in the street of the deadly enemies Retz and C. and Lar. Some Observations on La Rochefoucauld’s Mémoires III-VI PFSCL XLVI, 90 (2019) DOI 10.2357/ PFSCL-2019-0005 79 reduce him to his premières disgrâces (i.e. his imprisonment). Anne’s introduction of Chavigny and others into the Conseil (138-140) ultimately increased the bitterness between Anne and C. and resulted in his breaking his understanding with Anne. The split between Chevreuse and Conti (that is, with the Condé family) due to the breaking of the marriage agreement between Conti and Mlle de Chevreuse, as well as the dishonorable way in which it was done, added to the hatred of C. At the same time C. tried to find out what protection (140) he could get from Spain if he chose war. These events among others increased C.’s uncertainty and anxiety about his sécurité and confirmed his fears that he could never find it with Anne and M. At the same time (141-142) unbeknownst at first to C., Anne and Retz, because of their shared haine for C., formed a new liaison to assure the sécurité of Anne and the Frondeurs, in the course of which a plan was proposed whereby C. could be either rearrested or killed. One can imagine the effect on C. when he was later informed of a new plan to arrest him yet again. Anne rejected the idea of assassination but accepted that of arrest. It was however right after finding this out that C. failed to respectfully greet Louis XIV at their chance encounter at the Cours-la-Reine. No explicit justification is given for this serious failure, but since this occurred immediately after C. learned of the planned attempts against him, this may explain why C. was said to have feared acting otherwise would have perdre him (141) 36 . His anxiety about his sécurité unsettled him so much that twice (142) in a short time he was so frightened by fausses nouvelles about horsemen heard in the night, whom he feared were sent to arrest him, that he fled Paris, even though this might have jeopardized his justly earned reputation for great personal fearlessness. As it became clearer that C. would have no choice but to leave Paris, Anne saw that this would further her goal (143) of hastening M.'s return; but because he was still in exile she (144) could not quickly enough form and execute any plans. Most significantly C. (143) still would have been willing to s'accommoder with the Cour if he had been able to trust M., but his horreur de la prison was too great for him to overcome. He had been shown (144) that his innocence (i.e. that he had not been plotting rebellion against the État) had been no protection against his injuste prison, and he could never tolerate such a situation again. It is emphasized that those who withdrew with him to Saint-Maur, whatever their motives might have been, in fact were seen by C. as a necessary protection against any possible attack on him by the Cour. 36 If this action was due to the reports he had just received that he might be arrested or killed, it could in part clarify why the narrator does not criticize C., an omission which A. Brunn (810) in his edition, finds a significant, revealing omission in Lar.’s narrative. John Phillips PFSCL XLVI, 90 (2019) DOI 10.2357/ PFSCL-2019-0005 80 Nevertheless he still (145) had not made up his mind to rebel. It is also possible that attacks on Lar.’s carriage (146) were seen by C. as a further reminder of the dangers he faced. And the scene in Parlement (148-149), discussed below, would have been threatening not only because C. had to be accompanied by an armed escort for his safety but also because Anne had provided Retz with an armed escort made up of royal forces, showing which side she favored. The confrontation there could easily have led to one or more murders. The last two events of Book IV dramatically depict the truly dangerous and bizarre state of affairs confronting C. in Paris in August 1651. First (150-152) the Parlement itself just escaped being the scene of murder when a prelat, nobles and others let their anger reach the point where guns and swords were drawn in preparation for assassination and mayhem. Second when Retz and C. and Lar. soon after met by chance in the street, all the appropriate reciprocal greetings, ritually required by bienséance, etc. were very precisely and scrupulously observed. But the fact that the cohesion of the social order was breaking down or already had broken down was indicated by the foule, whose murderous anger was barely contained as it followed C. No violence occurred but despite the observation of propriety, these were deadly enemies who had just barely escaped killing each other and others in the Parlement. It seemed inevitable that the destructive, murderous passions temporarily suppressed would soon break through the apparent stability, as in fact they did. And these scenes emphasize for the reader the precarious nature of any sécurité C. might have attained in these circumstances, and perhaps show why C. might have thought attending Louis XIV’s majorité might resemble, if not an actual trap, still a very risky endeavor. Part B's last section (V.153-154) makes it clear that C.'s avoidance of LXIV’s majorité was directly caused by the fear (craindre) and mistrust (défiance, soupçon) which M.’s imprisonment had caused him. Any hope that he could obtain sécurité was impossible given the situation: the majorité would make absolue Louis XIV’s autorité, and because of Anne’s aigreur toward him and because she saw him as the seul obstacle to M.’s return, she and the new roi would do all possible to either perdre C. or l'éloigner. Gaston was too weak and unreliable, and too much under the influence of C.’s enemy Retz, to be of help. Although all this prevented C. from attending the majorité, it would not have been enough to have made him break with the Cour and withdraw to his gouvernements if things had remained where they had been before his imprisonment and if there had still been any espérance of further négotiations. Anne however would accept no further delays and looked upon all negotations for a traité as (153) d’artifices pour faire durer Some Observations on La Rochefoucauld’s Mémoires III-VI PFSCL XLVI, 90 (2019) DOI 10.2357/ PFSCL-2019-0005 81 l’éloignement du Cardinal. Thus she chose as ministers three ennemis particuliers of C. in order to remove any hope of an accommodement, which had the effect she desired, since it made C. realize he had rien à ménager avec la cour, which forced him to make résolutions he had not been able to make himself. And so he left for Trie after writing to Louis XIV to explain why he was prevented from attending the majorité (154). The final part C (V.154-176, VI.177-213) takes place after C. did not attend the majorité 37 . At first he was still in the Paris area, but he left for Bordeaux (V.156-157, September 1651). The narrator describes how the too numerous factions there led to the beginning of the ruine of his parti (V.170) and so he was forced to seek help from Spain. Book VI sees C. return to the Paris area (187-188) after having been militarily defeated by royal forces in the southwest. He gives one last demonstration (201-207) of his exceptional bravery and leadership in the battle at the Porte Saint-Antoine, but he then oversees the disastrous, violent deadly meetings at the Hôtel de Ville (206- 209) as the result of his attempt to install a new more favorable administration in Paris. Book VI ends with C. and Gaston, defeated, leaving Paris after M.’s self imposed exile and before Louis XIV's triumphant return. M. has “won” and C. has “lost”. Much in this final part concerns war preparations, hostile encounters, battles, sieges, etc. during which things did not go well for C. At times his troops were of poor quality, situations were not favorable, C. was outnumbered, some on his side were militarily ineffective or unreliable, some allies deserted him. The royal side also had difficulties and did not win any battle sufficient to end the war, yet it was clear throughout that C. did not have the military strength to wage a more extensive war. But C., motivated by fear for his sécurité, unable to discern the motivations, intérêts, etc. and loyalty of allies, and unable to recognize offers of accommodement which he might have found acceptable, could only see himself as being vulnerable to another arrest or worse if he did not ultimately leave France altogether. And so Lar.’s narration ends. In analysing the Fronde some historians have seen, as an essential cause, the Frondeurs’ pursuit of their intérêts as an almost entirely negative motivation for action, a self-centeredness devoid of any concerns for any larger good (e.g. Dieu, le bien de l'État, etc.). E. Kossmann helpfully gives an account of such a view (12-14) of the Frondeurs’ pursuit of their intérêts as deserving of condemnation because harmful to the État, and he finds 37 Pernot, 270, claims that after leaving Paris in September 1651 C. could either accept defeat and the elevation of his enemies, or start a war and assert his rights. The first choice was impossible for him because of his orgueil and his haute naissance, but, because of his profonde défiance of the government, his followers could push for war. John Phillips PFSCL XLVI, 90 (2019) DOI 10.2357/ PFSCL-2019-0005 82 support for this in some of their contemporaries 38 . He cites as typical 39 one speaker in a 1647 meeting of the États provinciaux who claimed that people, because “Leur raison est affaiblie par la première corruption de la nature” are unable to live their lives by following their intérêts because, blinded by them, they at times produce grands désordres harmful to the État. The power of amour-propre is such that people can not recognize anything beyond their vaines pensées and Kossmann claims this pessimisme is found in many XVII e century writings. Man is faible and méchant and can only think about his own intérêts and so his pitiful projects all fail as society only becomes viable once Dieu intervenes to translate chaos into order. Kossmann cites, as supporting a view similar to this, both Mme de Motteville, who does 40 to an 38 Jouanna (2014) 175-176 (and as stated above) claims that it is reductive to see the noble Fronde as only a pitiless battle of rival ambitions fighting M. who was their obstacle. Many involved still believed in l'utopie guerrière inherited from their ancestors, that is, noble mérite, brave in combat, and recompensed by the roi for risking its life. And the recompense was much more than material. Nobles received a supplément d'être and it authenticated publicly their vaillance and justified the social hierarchy. Of course it was recognised that they were not living in a utopie and that the recompense had become une pratique politique. C.’s behavior shows traces of this utopie. At first he followed his father and fought for the pouvoir in place, but he slowly came to feel that his honneur was blessée by M. And there was also a conflit des clientèles as M. was establishing himself. C. saw his own gens de guerre not being recompensed while others, clearly incompetent, were rewarded. “Jamais le récompense n'avait autant manifestée son caractère politique.” C. revolts to defend his honneur as a chef de guerre and as a Prince du Sang. 39 For other similar contemporary sentiments see for example: Rohou, 318, 319, 320, 322, 326, 327ff., 331, 333, 334, 335, 337, 338, 369, 416, 419ff., 505; Lorris, 91, 199, 234, 325; Dulong (Mazarin), 70-71 (perhaps), 73, 75, 127-128, 131, 158, 186; Krailsheimer, 72, 73, 74, 78, 87, 89, 94, 211, 212-213; Lafond (1977) 78-81; Methivier, 17 (perhaps), 19, 20. 40 Kossmann presents Motteville as more consistently and emphatically reducing many of the Frondeurs’ motivations to self-interest, greed, etc. than she did. She does stress how intérêts, etc. can corrupt people, lead them to fail in their duties and to choose self-interest over le bien public, etc. In general she often seems to explain these actions by her religious view: the world is a fallen place, man’s nature is essentially corrupted thus it is not surprising that he is deeply influenced by his ambition, his self-interest, his amour-propre, etc. So for example (Riaux II 295-296) the “loi de Dieu fait voir que la passion et l’intérêt étouffent presque toujours la raison et que ceux qui font les lois et en paraissent les protecteurs sont souvent eux-mêmes dans l’aveuglement et l’erreur, quand Dieu, le sole juste juge, les abandonne à leur propre sens, et les humilie par leur propre iniquité.” So too concerning C. (IV 25) after the fiasco of the Hôtel de Ville: “Dieu qui voulait Some Observations on La Rochefoucauld’s Mémoires III-VI PFSCL XLVI, 90 (2019) DOI 10.2357/ PFSCL-2019-0005 83 extent seem to share this view and Lenet who generally does not 41 . Kossmann (151ff.) claims that during this period there was a significant regarder la France en pitié fit perdre à M. le Prince par cette voie tous les avantages que la bataille de Saint-Antoine lui avait donnés.” (see also I 25-26, 79- 80, and I 135 “…la providence de Dieu…veut le bien et permet le mal, soit pour notre récompense soit pour notre punition.”) But there are many long passages in books II and III for example without any comments on the participants selfserving, cynical etc. motives. It is also perhaps her religious perspective which makes it difficult for her to understand the different motivations of the révoltés. She is clear enough about the wealth and power accumulated by Richelieu and M. to see how this could constitute a threat to the nobles (whether or not they were excessively self-interested because living in a fallen world etc.) but she does not come to this conclusion. She can not see how clan and family rivalries (II, 48, III, 49) could be threatening, and she even condemns (II 152) the parlementaires because they wanted their own money back. For her, C., Lar. and others cannot have a rational reason to oppose the État because nobles can not act for the “intérêts du bien public” (II 405) and are motivated by a “demon” (II 309, 405, 418, III 5, 49). Their fallen nature explains in part why they can not be subordinate to a monarchy, even one such as this one led by the unimpeachably pious Anne, who, though not without faults, always acts for the good of her son the roi and for the good of France. 41 Kossmann (151, n.1) cites Lenet (tome I, book 2, 147-148) (“J’ai observé que l'intérêt est presque toujours la raison principale qui fait entrer les gens de qualité dans les partis.”) as one of those who supports the view that the Frondeurs were mainly motivated by “le seul intérêt” etc. Lenet uses intérêt(s) at least 160 times in his Mémoires but Kossmann’s point is not supported by Lenet’s usual use of this term. Lenet does not seem to have a consistent view of acting on one’s intérêts, and he certainly is not simply critical of those doing so. Furetière gives several definitions and Lenet’s usage seems to fit these: “ce qu’on a affection de conserver ou d’acquérir, ce qui nous importe soit dans notre personne soit dans nos biens…se dit généralement de tout ce qui regarde le bien, la gloire, le repos tant de l’État que de particulières…se dit aussi pour la part qu’on prend en quelque chose, de sa défense qu’on entreprend, de la protection qu’on lui donne…on dit proverbialement: l’intérêt nous aveugle, chacun est aveuglé dans ses intérêts, pour dire que notre amour-propre nous flatte, ne nous fait pas connaître nos défauts.” Kossmann’s quote occurs in a passage about the chagrin of someone who did not have his land elevated to a duché, was upset with the cour and so “…l’obligeait de se jeter dans tout les partis qu'on formerait contre le cardinal; car j'ai observé, pendant près de dix ans que nos mouvements ont durés, que l’intérêt est presque toujours la raison principale qui fait entrer les gens de qualité dans les partis, ou les gens d’ambition; et c’est ce qui fait que plusieurs grands seigneurs y entrent et que peu y demeurent; car comme la cour a plus de quoi les intéresser que les princes qui les forment, on trouve moyen de les en retirer par le même principe qui les oblige à s’y jeter.” If one looks at one of Lenet’s statements of his own John Phillips PFSCL XLVI, 90 (2019) DOI 10.2357/ PFSCL-2019-0005 84 change in the use of the notion of intérêts. Usually the term politique de l'intérêt was applied to the politique extérieure of countries where each country had discernible intérêts which other countries could accept or oppose; thus French intérêts were similar to those of certain other countries and different from those of the Habsburgs. The Frondeurs (154) took this term from the area of politique extérieure and applied it, mistakenly, inside France to the intérêts of a maison noble ou d'une personne. In this way the notion intérêts, Kossmann claims, though correctly first applied to a stable concept (politique extérieure) then was applied in an area where it created confusion. For the Frondeurs the result was that they ended up with an ideal of “cynisme intéressé et de machiavélisme raffiné” as may be seen in many of their mémoires, where their actions are described as not due to loyalty to a leader or to any “illusion politique” but to “le seul intérêt”. He claims that Retz typifies this while Lar. is a more complicated example because of the importance he gives to both amour-propre and intérêt 42 . For reason for writing his Mémoires (473-474) as well as his professed undying loyalty to the Condé family (32ff.) it is clear he does not think all the participants in the Fronde were so easily moved to change sides to suit their intérêts and he insists he is certainly not one so easily moved. And Lar. and Bouillon for example are, according to Lenet, nothing if not exemplary in their dedication to the Princes. There are some comments (tome 2, ch. vi, 158-159) about those who follow their intérêts without any regard for loyalty or other values. But there are a very large number of examples where intérêts is used in a neutral way to indicate what people thought were their benefits or advantages or what they thought were important reasons for acting (for example: tome I, 56, 95, 103, 106, 115, 130, 134, 151, 162, 165, 209, 217, 263, 271, 277, 296, 318, 320, 360, 380, 396, 400, 406, etc.). And it is often used in relation to those who acted on behalf of the Condé family (for example: tome I, 56, 58, 80, 83, 108, 161, 320, 366, 416, 466, 515, etc.). Thus it is not clear that Lenet supports the view that the actors here were following a “cynisme intéressé” nor a “machiavélisme raffiné” etc.; they seem to act as most nobles had to act to protect themselves against what they construed as threats to their existence. 42 Kossmann claims that Lar.’s use of these two concepts is so broad and so inexact that it is not a useful analytical tool. Without citing any evidence or making any argument he must be assuming that amour-propre and intérêt are used identically in the Maximes and the Mémoires though apparently the term amour-propre does not occur in III-VI. He must be thinking that the Maximes and the Mémoires are concerned with the same things and that the Mémoires are directly and perhaps most easily understood and interpreted through an analysis of the Maximes, which analysis he does not supply. No attention is given to the different subject matters, to the different dates of publication, nor to the different literary forms. No acknowledgement is made of the substantial complexity of the Maximes and to the Some Observations on La Rochefoucauld’s Mémoires III-VI PFSCL XLVI, 90 (2019) DOI 10.2357/ PFSCL-2019-0005 85 M., who made the same mistake, the result was a view that, inside France, there were different groups, including the Frondeurs, with their own propres intérêts in competition with those of the roi; M. therefore tried to accommodate these groups as much as possible, or, if they were hostile to the roi, to support the group which would strengthen the roi’s side; but he never treated them as subjects of the roi nor as compatriots. This was dangerous because external things (faits) were more or less stable and fixed (one could count the different États and know their claims) but inside an État things were more complicated and less stable. When (155) M. allied with the weaker Frondeurs to oppose C. he ended up making them stronger and so produced for himself a long battle against a group he had in effect created 43 . Jouanna, as discussed above, while not denying the various, perhaps less than admirable, motives of the nobles, has a non-moralising view which is focussed more on how larger, impersonal social forces affected the behavior of individuals and groups as the structures changed and as the centralising of the État proceeded and the nobles and the magistrates and officers were forced to adapt to their new situations. This seems a more useful approach, because it allows for a more complex view of, and (one hopes) a more accurate description of, the forces operating on and within the individuals in these changing and confusing circumstances produced by the Fronde, and it avoids simply blaming or praising individuals on moral grounds. Béguin (111-112) reinforces this by analysing the radical change which took place when C. went from relying on his clientèle to being forced to form a parti 44 . The arrest of the Princes ended a fight for supremacy which M. was about to lose, but it then provoked a civil war. For les Condé this was a real shock because now they found themselves in opposition to the roi. Whatever the differences between the C. and M., earlier C. had named his son (1643) Henri-Jules (after M.), and M. had rewarded C.’s fidelity (e.g. in 1648) by granting him Clermontois with C. as souverain and with droits royaux. All the partis in the Fronde were essentially (Béguin, 113) ephémères because their general objectives (the libération des Princes, the removal of M. from the Conseil, etc.) only briefly united them, which made them difficulties of interpreting either or both of the works as if they were identical in thought. 43 Pernot, 164, agrees with Kossmann that the vieille Fronde henceforth got force from the autorité royale. 44 Jouanna (2014) 174 claims that the Fronde des Princes really was actually a guerre de partis (C., Gondi, Gaston) and the pouvoir absolu was not the real enemy. The enjeu essentiel was the conquête des charges…honneurs et autres avantages which the pouvoir absolu could obtain and whose distribution was monopolised by M. John Phillips PFSCL XLVI, 90 (2019) DOI 10.2357/ PFSCL-2019-0005 86 completely dissimilar to the ties, in part emotional, which bound a clientèle. To go from having a clientèle to having a parti required rearranging traditional alliances, and this required written documents which substituted for the often unstated intérêt commun of client relations. The particular claims in the written documents thus became the general objectives agreed to by all. In effect (Béguin, 115-122) to set up a parti was to find a substitute for the attachements véritables in client relations. The parti des Princes (129) never had an overarching positive cause lastingly uniting its members, who were, in large part: mécontents who were former opponents of Richelieu (e.g. Bouillon); opponents of M. (e.g. Houdancourt); impenitent conspirators (e.g. Montresor, Saint-Ibar); and various ambitieux malcontents hoping to gain from a civil war. There were of course others, for example, Lar., who requested permission from C. to withdraw because of his wounds, and for example, those who stayed with C. during his years of exile. Looking at Lar.’s presentation of C.’s behavior against this background makes it possible both to see C.’s actions as (at least in some ways) reasonable, and also to avoid a less helpful evaluation of his behaviour as “good” (i.e. selfless, “patriotic”, etc.) or “bad” (selfish, “unpatriotic”, etc.). It also allows us to see how Lar. presented, against the same background, the motivations, intérêts, etc. of the other participants as they decided whether or not to join C. Although the word intérêt(s) occurs at least 91 times in Books III-VI it is nowhere defined nor would one expect it to be. Perhaps surprisingly Lar. does not make any explicit general comment, positive or condemnatory, about acting on one's intérêts, though he does present individual actions in such a way as to allow the reader to draw his or her own conclusions 45 . Lar. has many examples of C. and others acting to further their own different intérêts and goals, but he seems, with some specific exceptions, not to explicitly present such behavior as providing in and of itself a criterion for moral judgment 46 . There are several passages which list what individuals sought in negotiations and treaties, which allow one to see what presumably were their intérêts and goals, even if the word intérêts was not used. These include many items, some of which one would have expected, for example: the removal and ruin of M.; the marriage of Conti and Mlle de Chevreuse; the position of principal ministre; the gouvernement of Guyenne; argent (III 123-124); the gouvernement of 45 Consider for example (VI 197-198) the case of Mme de Chatillon, the lover of C. and Nemours, whose concerns and motivations are her beauté, her ambition, her desire for a new conquête and to triompher over other women, and her intérêt de vanité et de vengeance etc. 46 See for example III 123-124, IV 139-140, 146. In one example (V 157-158) although C. does criticise Bouillon, the narrator (V 159) does not do so. Some Observations on La Rochefoucauld’s Mémoires III-VI PFSCL XLVI, 90 (2019) DOI 10.2357/ PFSCL-2019-0005 87 Provence; gratifications; the gouvernement of Blaye (IV 133-134); the power to make peace with Spain; the reestablishment of amis in their biens and charges; the restoration of their rangs to troupes and officiers of the Princes du Sang (VI 193-195). Despite such specificity here it is also clear, as one might expect from the inherent difficulty of the matter, that it is often hard for the participants to discern their own or others’ true intérêts (III 125-126, 127; IV 135, 147; V 146; perhaps IV 131). C., like others, often acted to further his own intérêts, and like others he did not always recognise his (IV 135) véritables intérêts. Though concerned, as were all nobles, with taking care of his amis and clients, on occasion he looked out only for himself. He let the Frondeurs, for example (IV 136) blame Lar. and Mme de Longueville for the failure of the Conti-Chevreuse marriage, which was not their fault. He agreed to a traité (IV 136) which omitted the provisions for his amis including Lar. It is emphasised however (IV 197) that C., although at least five times (IV 192, 197, 200, 201, 209) combattu by the intérêts of those near him who wanted war, was unwilling to give up on the hope of making peace and avoiding war. Lar. reserves his main criticism of acting to further one’s own intérêts for, on the one hand, the “bad guys”, especially for M., the “enemy” 47 , for Retz, for Chavigny 48 and some minor figures; and also, on the other hand, for those previously loyal supporters of C. who ultimately put their intérêts ahead of those of C. and his parti. Perhaps not surprisingly, Lar., the narrator, never presents La Rochefoucauld, the historical person, as ever forgetting his loyalty to C. Conti and Mme de Longueville, C.’s siblings, had become important supports of C. and his parti, but ended up (V 170) creating factions in Bordeaux when they separated their intérêts from his and so did his cause much harm. They (VI 181-182) are said to have sacrificed the avantages of the parti to their own passions and aigreur 49 . So too Nemours and Beaufort, who had been important leaders in C.’s cause (VI 178, 176) let their querelles particulières take precedence over the intérêts of the parti thereby 47 At one point (V 168) M. is specifically said to prefer his own intérêts to the intérêts d'État. 48 Chavigny often manipulated C. and others for his own advantage; his ambition (IV 137) was démesurée; he (VI 177-179) schemed against Gaston, C., and M. because he wanted to benefit from all sides; he put (VI 190-193) his own intérêts before those of the parti. 49 Mme de Longueville (IV 139) wanted a guerre because she did not want to return to her mari; Conti (IV 139) wanted a guerre because he wanted to avoid the État ecclésiastique; Nemours (IV 139-140) wanted a guerre in order to remove his rival because he was jealous of C. and Mme de Chatillon. John Phillips PFSCL XLVI, 90 (2019) DOI 10.2357/ PFSCL-2019-0005 88 seriously weakening C.’s military position. And their fatal duel (VI 209) is carried out in the interest of quelques dames. The case of the brothers Bouillon and Turenne 50 , both friends of Lar., represent one useful example (but not the most extreme) of the complexity of forming and maintaining of common intérêts 51 . Both are potentially important leaders of the side they join, but both have their own intérêts to look after, separate from those of the Fronde and separate from each one's individually. Bouillon had already rebelled against the État several times and as a result had Sedan, essentially important both for his identity as a noble and for his lignage, taken from him by M. Turenne, the only French general comparable to C., became alienated from M. because he felt insufficiently recognized and recompensed for his services to the État and because of M.’s treatment of his brother in the matter of Sedan. After C.’s liberation both moved away from C. The narrator is more favorable to Turenne’s separation than to that of Bouillon. Turenne’s reason was (IV 147- 148) that he had fulfilled his obligations by contributing to the C.’s liberation, but that C. had subsequently done nothing for him, and had not even supported the troops who had fought for C., with the result that Turenne felt justifiably free to follow his own intérêts. And he later made clear (V 165) that after his separation he knew nothing of, and was not obligated by, any plans and commitments made by Bouillon. C.’s fears for his sécurité were increased by the behavior of Bouillon. As matters became more complicated after the liberation of the Princes (IV 140) Bouillon tried to combine his intérêts with the intérêt publique and to satisfy them both together. This meant he had separated his intérêts from those of C., which C. noticed (IV 143) and which made C. mistrust him. But C. (IV 147-148) still wanted and needed the alliances with Turenne 52 and Bouillon. Bouillon however had become worried and uncertain about his 50 Pernot, 267, observes that, according to the mentalité aristocratique, Turenne would have viewed M. as having committed two denials of justice which would have required revenge and the taking up of arms. Because of raison d'État he had refused the legitimate right of the maison de Bouillon to be compensated for Sedan (he had promised to return it and had not (130)) and he had arrested a Prince du Sang in contempt of équité and in defiance of the declaration of Parlement of October 1648. 51 See for example (V 166-167) the case of Marchin, who, it is said, could be judged to be infidèle or honnête, coupable or innocent, depending on how one interpreted his two devoirs, to the roi and to C. Lar. devotes one and one-half pages to this but it is not clear how it applies to others since Marchin was a citizen of Liège, not France. See Pernot, 275. 52 His break from C. was not yet known to C. and he would in December 1651 again command the royal troops. Some Observations on La Rochefoucauld’s Mémoires III-VI PFSCL XLVI, 90 (2019) DOI 10.2357/ PFSCL-2019-0005 89 own sécurité and avantages, and since he did not entirely trust C. or M., he wanted to see what would happen before he committed himself, but because he was embarrassé by this he did not want to have to personally explain himself to C. Bouillon did finally commit to C., but while C. consulted others before finalizing Bouillon’s terms, a minor misunderstanding (les moindres circonstances 156) prevented C. from reaching an understanding with the Cour. Gaston got Anne to offer satisfaction to C. with respect to the ministres she appointed who were ennemis of C., but Gaston failed to inform C. of this quickly enough. As a result, the welcome C. received from the peuples and noblesse at Bourges increased his hopes that the entire royaume was about to take his side, which would have increased his chances of obtaining a reliable sécurité. He therefore (156) committed himself to war and planned for an agreement with Spain, but only after this other promising opportunity to avoid war was lost. The hesitating Bouillon was told (157- 158) that his demands would be met, but by then he was trying to profit from both the Cour and C. by playing the mediateur between them. He was thereby able to offer C. terms from the Cour which would have prevented M.’s return. Unfortunately (pour le malheur de la France et pour celui de Monsieur le Prince, 158) though the Cour seemed to be acting de bonne foi, its grandes et considérables offres, because they were delivered by the suspect Bouillon, were rejected by C. It was essential that Bouillon and Turenne, for his military abilities, together commit to C.’s side if he were to stand a chance against the royal forces, but his lack of confidence in Bouillon led him to mistrust and reject these offers, and C.’s neglect of Turenne had alienated him. To C. all of this was just another attempt to prevent him from declaring war, since he believed much of France was ready to support him, in which case any news of his being in new negotiations with the Cour would have discouraged those ready to join him. Thus C. could not see the positive potential in this offer because the messenger, Bouillon, apparently had not honored an earlier commitment to him. As stated above, this inability to trust was primarily due to the actions taken by M. and Anne, especially C.’s imprisonment, and was due as well to the shifting motivations of the various nobles and groups which created confusion as to the reliability of their commitments. 53 The object of this paper has been to place C.’s rebellion in a framework derived from the analyses of Jouanna and Béguin. Doing so allows one to see that Lar. presents C.’s behavior as very similar to the behavior of other 53 See, for example, V 158-159: Gaston was allied to Retz who was allied to the Cour in order to obtain the cardinalat. John Phillips PFSCL XLVI, 90 (2019) DOI 10.2357/ PFSCL-2019-0005 90 high nobles in comparable circumstances in both the XVI th and XVII th centuries. It also allows one to understand that the actions taken by C. were not simply for selfish motives worthy of condemnation but originated from a predictable response, based on complex personal, emotional and political needs, to substantive structural changes occuring in society. A crucial factor during the relevant previous noble revolts was that they occurred during a regency. During the earlier regencies, weak by definition because without an adult roi, and with rival favoris, twice in the form of a principal minister, nobles’ fears about insécurité were heightened because so much depended on the bienfaits etc., received from the État both for a validation of their sense of themselves, their dignity etc., for the maintenance of their lignage and their clientèles, and for their sécurité. The unusual element in C.’s case was that Anne and M. chose to arrest a Prince du Sang before he rebelled or ever considered rebellion. Admittedly the situation of the État was precarious in that it had just faced a rebellion of the judges and was in the middle of a war with Spain. This arrest, however, at least in one sense, was a failed response, as Anne and M. were soon forced to free C. and the arrest greatly complicated the situation for the État, for C., and for all those who would have to choose between C. and État. Because his ability and willingness to any longer see the État as a source of sécurité had been virtually destroyed by his arrest and the subsequent actions of the État, C. had much difficulty in discerning his own véritables intérêts in deciding whether in fact he had to rebel. He was forced to change from having a clientèle to leading a parti, two very dissimilar arrangements. Those around him who might ally with him also were forced to face similar difficulties in making their choices, especially as allying with him was now a matter of lèse-majesté. Adding to these difficulties was the fact that, as in all human affairs, chance and fortune (for ex. Gaston not notifying C. of favorable terms from the court, or the stubbornness of M. and C.) had their part to play 54 . 54 S. Bertière states that she has little empathy for C. and is writing to counterbalance the views of C. found in earlier scholarship and recent biographies by Pujo and Béguin who she says wrote detailed accounts which were perhaps overly influenced by the C. archives (sanitised after his death) and by views of the regency and M. which are now outdated. Bertière's work is detailed and useful because of her intention to provide a complete portrait of C. She claims that the usual picture of C. as the great capitaine, a nearly fabulous military hero, is quite one-sided and incomplete, because although the well-known feats did occur they were not necessarily all they seemed to be and in other military activities he was involved in were not successes or were not undertaken for proper military reasons. This was primarily due to his personality, upon which C. père generally had a negative influence, because of the education he chose for his son and because of Some Observations on La Rochefoucauld’s Mémoires III-VI PFSCL XLVI, 90 (2019) DOI 10.2357/ PFSCL-2019-0005 91 Works Cited Aron, Mélanie. Les Mémoires de Madame de Motteville: du dévouement à la dévotion. Nancy: Presse Universitaire de Nancy, 2003. Béguin, Katia. Les Princes de Condé: rebelles, courtisans, et mécènes dans la France du Grand siècle. Seyssel: Champ Vallon, 1999. Bertière, Simone. Condé. Le héros fourvoyé. Paris: Éditions de Fallois, 2011. Dulong, Claude. Mazarin. Paris: Perrin, 1999. Jouanna, Arlette. Le Devoir de Révolte: la noblesse française et la gestation de l'État moderne. 1559-1661. Paris: Fayard, 1989. -----. Le Prince Absolu. Apogée et déclin de l'imaginaire monarchique. Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 2014. his own avidity and constant striving for more power for the family. She portrays C. as exceptionally self-centered and without much sympathy for others and often arrogant, cruel, ungrateful, headstrong and as a needlessly mindless, almost reckless, breaker of conventions. This led him at times to choose more difficult, rather than more reasonable and prudent, military objectives because of his continuing need to win gloire and maintain his image as a héros; it also led him to fail to support other generals and to never tolerate being second in command. Bertière like Jouanna and Béguin discussed many of the large structural changes the society and the État were undergoing and the impact these had on the nobility. Unlike Jouanna and Béguin, however, and unlike this paper’s interpretation of Lar.’s presentation of C., she does not see these elements as having much effect on C.’s thinking or actions. She is more inclined to explain C.’s behavior as due to the negative elements she has highlighted in his character, even though she does not seem to do this as much for Anne or for M. and she mostly treats them as acting primarily for the good of France but without any significant admixture of vanity, anger, cruelty, avidity, selfishness, or desire for gloire. It seems as if C. is expected to have understood himself, Anne, M. and the events around him as if he should have had a different, non-contemporary perspective on things. So, for example, while Lar. emphasises C.’s need for sureté, especially after his arrest and the resulting fear, and Jouanna and Béguin discuss common problems for nobles resulting from having a weak regency, no strong adult roi and a powerful favori, Bertière discusses these matters but claims that C. should not have feared for his sureté because he should have realised Anne and M. would never have arrested him a second time. At least for the period covered by III-VI, whatever biases Lar. may have had, his view of C.’s need for sureté and his shock and fear after his emprisonment make more sense for someone in C.’s position. And if C. was as flawed and limited as Bertière suggests, it does not seem plausible that she could expect him to have had the insights and clarity she thinks he should have had; if he had been capable of that, he would not have been so flawed and limited. At times it seems she wants him to have been someone else. 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Paris: Livre de Poche/ Classiques Garnier, 2001. -----. Mémoires précédés de L'Apologie de M. le prince de Marcillac. Édition présentée, établie et annotée par Jean Lafond. Paris: Gallimard, 2006. Lorris, Pierre-Georges. La Fronde. Paris: Éditions Albin Michel, 1961. Methivier, Hubert. La Fronde. Paris: PUF, 1984. Motteville, Mme de. Mémoires de Madame de Motteville. Nouvelle édition d'apres le manuscrit de Conrart avec une annotation, extraits de Montglat, Omer Talon, des éclaircissements et un index par M. F. Riaux, et une notice sur Mme de Motteville par Sainte-Beuve. Paris: Charpentier, 1855 4 vol. (Réimpression 1869). Pernot, Michel. La Fronde. Paris: Éditions de Fallois, 1994. Phillips, John. “Some Observations on La Rochefoucauld's Mémoires I-II.” PFSCL XXXIX, 76 (2012). Pujo, Bernard. Le Grand Condé. Paris: Albin Michel, 1995. Pillorget, René et Suzanne Pillorget. France Baroque France Classique 1589-1715. I. Récit. Paris: Éditions Robert Laffont, 1995. Rohou, Jean. Le XVII e siècle, une révolution de la condition humaine. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2002.