<?page no="0"?> Although the past decades have seen a great diversity of approaches to the history of generative linguistics, there has been no systematic analysis of the state of the art. The aim of the book is to fill this gap. Part I provides an unbiased, balanced and impartial overview of numerous approaches to the history of generative linguistics. In addition, it evaluates the approaches thus discussed against a set of evaluation criteria. Part II demonstrates in a case study the workability of a model of plausible argumentation that goes beyond the limits of current historiographical approaches. Due to the comprehensive analysis of the state of the art, the book may be useful for graduate and undergraduate students. However, since it is also intended to enrich the historiography of linguistics in a novel way, the book may also attract the attention of both linguists interested in the history of science, and historians of science interested in linguistics. ISBN 978-3-8233-8156-3 Kertész The Historiography of Generative Linguistics András Kertész The Historiography of Generative Linguistics <?page no="1"?> The Historiography of Generative Linguistics <?page no="3"?> András Kertész The Historiography of Generative Linguistics <?page no="4"?> Umschlagabbildung: A (meta)historiographical tree. Zeichnung von Katinka Halász. Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http: / / dnb.dnb.de abrufbar. © 2017 · Narr Francke Attempto Verlag GmbH + Co. KG Dischingerweg 5 · D-72070 Tübingen Das Werk einschließlich aller seiner Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist ohne Zustimmung des Verlages unzulässig und strafbar. Das gilt insbesondere für Vervielfältigungen, Übersetzungen, Mikroverfilmungen und die Einspeicherung und Verarbeitung in elektronischen Systemen. Gedruckt auf säurefreiem und alterungsbeständigem Werkdruckpapier. Satz: pagina GmbH, Tübingen Internet: www.narr.de E-Mail: info@narr.de Printed in Germany ISBN 978-3-8233-8156-3 <?page no="5"?> 1 13 1.1 13 1.2 14 1.3 15 21 2 23 2.0 23 2.1 25 2.1.0 25 2.1.1 27 2.1.2 39 2.2 58 2.2.0 58 2.2.1 61 2.2.2 62 2.3 68 2.3.0 68 2.3.1 68 2.4 69 2.4.0 69 2.4.1 71 2.4.2 74 2.5 76 2.5.0 76 2.5.1 77 2.5.2 82 2.6 86 Contents Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The problem (P) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The structure of the book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Background information: The Kuhnian approach to ›scientific revolution‹ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Part 1: Metahistoriographical overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . From ›scientific revolution‹ to ›unscientific revolution‹ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ›Syntactic Structures‹ (Chomsky 1957) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Background information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Revolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . No revolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ›Aspects of the Theory of Syntax‹ (Chomsky 1965) . . . . . . . . . Background information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kuhnian revolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . No revolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ›The Sound Pattern of English‹ (Chomsky & Halle 1968) . . . . Background information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Kuhnian revolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ›Lectures on Government and Binding‹ (Chomsky 1981) . . . . Background information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Revolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . No revolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ›The Minimalist Program‹ (Chomsky 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Background information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Revolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . No revolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Digression: Chomsky’s self-assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <?page no="6"?> 2.7 88 2.7.1 88 2.7.2 98 2.7.3 100 3 104 3.0 104 3.1 106 3.1.1 106 3.1.2 114 3.2 117 119 4 121 4.0 121 4.1 122 4.2 125 4.2.1 125 4.2.2 127 4.3 136 5 138 5.0 138 5.0.1 138 5.0.2 139 5.0.3 139 5.1 140 5.2 146 5.2.0 146 5.2.1 147 5.2.2 152 5.2.3 157 5.2.4 161 5.3 162 5.4 165 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Relevant correlations among the approaches . . . . . . . . Relevant differences among the approaches . . . . . . . . . Metahistoriographical evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Factors weakening the credibility of (MP1)-(MP22) . . . . . . . . . Bias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Part 2: Toward a new historiography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Historiography and plausible argumentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A possible solution to (P): (SP23) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The p-model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The main features of the p-model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . An outline of the p-model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Case study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The structure of the chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The starting and the final p-context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . First example: What is a ›language‹? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Second example: What sort of grammar is needed? . . . . . . . . . The p-problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . English is not a finite state language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Phrase structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Transformations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The solution of the p-problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Third example: the introduction of the evaluation procedure Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Contents 6 <?page no="7"?> 6 167 6.0 167 6.1 168 6.1.1 168 6.1.2 170 6.1.3 171 6.1.4 172 6.2 174 6.2.1 174 6.2.2 177 6.3 180 7 182 7.0 182 7.1 182 7.2 183 7.3 185 186 20 1 20 5 20 9 2 10 Open questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Historical stages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . What kind of relationship is there between the problem solutions of a particular historical stage and the more effective problem solutions of the next stage immediately following it? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . How should (SP23) treat cases in which in particular stages of generative linguistics problem solutions emerge that have previously been rejected in some earlier stage? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . How should (SP23) treat cases in which an earlier stage raised and tried to solve problems that a later stage could not cope with? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . What are the constant elements that are present in every developmental stage of generative linguistics? . Rivals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . What is the relationship between Chomskyan generative linguistics and its alternatives within theoretical linguistics? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . What is the relationship between the cognitivism of generative linguistics and behaviorism? . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The contribution of (SP23) to linguistic historiography . . . . . The contribution of (SP23) to linguistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Summary: Why should linguists get out of bed in the morning? References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Index of Names . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Index of Subjects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Contents 7 <?page no="8"?> »[…] controversy is the breath of science and when we all agree it will be only because our science is dead.« (Emmon Bach 1965: 128) <?page no="9"?> 1 Right at the outset, a few terminological remarks should be made. First, terms used pre-explicatively or as part of object language will be enclosed in single quotation marks in contexts in which this feature is of particular importance. Second, in the literature, ›history of science‹ and ›historiography of science‹ are often used as synonyms (see for example the quotation in footnote 2). However, for the sake of clarity, we will distinguish between the terms ›history‹ and ›historiography‹. By ›his‐ toriography‹ we mean a field of study whose object of investigation is ›history‹. Third, we will not restrict the term ›science‹ to the natural sciences, but use it to refer to the social sciences as well. Proponents of generative linguistics consider it a natural science, while its opponents do not. At this point this issue need not be decided. Irre‐ spective of whether one categorizes generative linguistics as a natural or a social sci‐ ence, nothing speaks against calling it a ›science‹. Preface Over the past decades, the historiography of linguistics has progressed from being a peripheral, understated discipline practiced by only a few to becoming a prospering and recognized subfield of linguistics producing an extensive aca‐ demic literature. 1 A literature which has many prominent authors and receives international institutional support: renowned publishing houses publish jour‐ nals, book series and monographs related to the history of linguistics. Societies of linguistic historiography have been established and a large number of con‐ ferences are regularly organized. What has motivated this dynamic development of linguistic historiography? Two factors seem to be of relevance: (a) A cardinal motivation behind the boost in linguistic historiography re‐ search has been the revival of a general interest in the history of science. In the second half of the twentieth century the central claims of the analytical philos‐ ophy of science - involving both logical positivism and critical rationalism - were drastically shaken (not exclusively but decisively) as a result of Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. It has been in the work of Kuhn (1970) [1962], and later Lakatos (1970a), (1970b) that among others, the view that there is a close interaction between the philosophy and the historiography of science, <?page no="10"?> 2 It has become an adage in Lakatos’ formulation: »Philosophy of science without history of science is empty; history of science without philosophy of science is blind« (Lakatos 1970a: 91). The precise nature of this relation has been a debated issue during the past decades. For overviews see Schikore (2011), Arabatzis & Schikore (2012), and Scholl & Räz (2016). 3 Against this background, from the seventies of the past century on, trends in the soci‐ ology of knowledge have entered the scene and have attracted a great deal of public comment. The approach that has generated the greatest public interest is the so-called Strong Program in the Sociology of Knowledge developed by the Edinburgh School whose best known representative is David Bloor (see Bloor 1976, 1983, Barnes et al. 1996). For its application in linguistics, see Kertész (2004a), (2004b), (2013). 4 It is worth considering what a great impact the innovations introduced in linguistics have had on other disciplines, such as psychology or computer science, as subdisciplines of cognitive science, to the development of which Chomsky undoubtedly contributed; or even on literary studies, including literary structuralism, generative poetics and cognitive poetics, which is rooted in cognitive metaphor theory. has been put forward, 2 and that, accordingly, the foundational problems of sci‐ entific inquiry are related to the processes of the history of science. 3 (b) The other factor that has motivated the emergence of linguistic histori‐ ography has been the successful development of linguistics throughout the twen‐ tieth century. One of the reasons why linguistic historiography might have at‐ tracted increasing interest is that the most successful trends in linguistics - Saussure’s structuralism, the Prague Linguistic Circle, American descriptivism, generative linguistics and others - influenced trends in twentieth century sci‐ ence even outside linguistics, thereby contributing to the re-organization of particular disciplines, and fostering the integration of the findings produced in a range of fields. 4 Generative linguistics stands out in this process as the most fiercely debated but still most influential school in linguistics in the second half of the twentieth century. Not only has it triggered substantial changes in lin‐ guistics, it has also contributed to the debates of other disciplines, especially the subdisciplines of cognitive science, the philosophy of language and the philos‐ ophy of science. One consequence of the interplay between the growing general interest in the historiography of science and the controversial reception of generative lin‐ guistics is that besides the field of generative linguistics itself, the history of the field has also moved into the center of attention. Another consequence is that there is an extreme diversity of historiographical approaches to generative lin‐ guistics competing with each other, and, as is quite well known, most of them are spectacularly biased. This state of affairs greatly deepens the divided nature of linguistics, as is witnessed by the harsh criticism and at times extremely bitter debates among the different branches of linguistics. The third consequence con‐ Preface 10 <?page no="11"?> cerns the fact that not only is the historiography of generative linguistics a metascientific enterprise aiming at the investigation of its object, namely, the history of generative linguistics, but what is more - as we will see later -, his‐ toriography is at the same time also used as the tool of linguistic argumentation, which can effectively be applied in arguing either for or against generative lin‐ guistics. Therefore, it has an impact on its own object of investigation, namely, on certain processes of the development of generative linguistics and its relation to rival trends. However, despite the factors mentioned above and their consequences, so far no systematic analysis of the historiographical approaches to the history of gen‐ erative linguistics has been available. In the present monograph we attempt to fill this gap. The book has - within the limits of a short monograph - a threefold aim: (A) (a) Our first aim is to provide an unbiased, balanced and impartial over‐ view of the pluralism of the approaches documented in historio‐ graphical literature. (b) The second aim of the book is to reveal the factors which may weaken the credibility of the historiographical positions to be discussed. (c) Our third aim is to demonstrate in a case study the workability of a new historiographical approach which goes beyond the limits of current approaches and which may shed fresh light on the history of generative linguistics. We will join neither the proponents nor the opponents of generative linguistics. We confine the overview and the systematic analysis of the state of the art to approaches which explicitly define themselves as historiographical. The lin‐ guistic debates raised by Chomsky’s works are outside the scope of the present study. In accordance with aims (A)(b) and (A)(c), the book is intended to enrich the historiography of linguistics. Therefore, it may attract the attention of both lin‐ guists interested in the history of science, and historians of science interested in linguistics. However, the book presupposes only a basic knowledge of lin‐ guistics. It does not assume research skills or detailed knowledge of linguistic theorizing, the history of linguistics, nor the philosophy of science. The back‐ ground information necessary for the understanding of our line of reasoning will be concisely introduced. Thus, due to the systematic overview of the state of the art in accord with aim (A)(a) mentioned above, the monograph can also be useful for graduate and undergraduate students of linguistics. Preface 11 <?page no="12"?> I am grateful to the referees as well as to Ferenc Kiefer, Edith A. Moravcsik, Frederick J. Newmeyer and Csilla Rákosi for helpful comments on earlier drafts. My special thanks are due to Katinka Halász for her insightful contribution to the improvement of my work and the cover design. Any remaining shortcom‐ ings are entirely my own responsibility. I also thank Elsevier and John Benjamins for permission to include in the present volume excerpts from the following publications: »From ›scientific revolution‹ to ›unscientific revolution‹. An anal‐ ysis of approaches to the history of generative linguistics.« Language Sciences 32 (2010), 507-527; »Two notions of ›research program‹ and the historiography of generative linguistics.« Historiographia Linguistica 37 (2010), 165-191. Preface 12 <?page no="13"?> 1 Nevertheless, there is a difference between the way historians and generativists them‐ selves evaluate the history of generative linguistics. On the one hand, as we will see, each of the relevant stages of the history of generative linguistics has been considered to be revolutionary by some historian. On the other hand, very few generative linguists believe that the history of generative linguistics consists of a series of revolutions. Rather, they assume that there has been a unidirectional development, which gradually diminished the role and the machinery of the syntactic component. 1 Introduction 1.1 The problem (P) John E. Joseph (1995) describes linguists in his seminal review article entitled The Structure of Linguistic Revolutions - the title of which alludes to Thomas S. Kuhn’s famous book - in the following way: Rare is the linguist who does not consider himself part of a linguistic revolution accomplished in recent memory, or in progress, or both. […] Revolution […] is the master plot for linguistic history, what gives sense to our work and careers, what makes it worth getting out of bed in the morning ( Joseph 1995: 379; emphasis added). He characterizes the Department of Linguistics and Philosophy at the Massa‐ chusetts Institute of Technology as follows: The department is unique in having fostered over the last forty years not one, but easily a dozen large-scale or small-scale linguistic revolutions. Most of them have been revolutions against earlier revolutions spawned there as well. More amazingly still, many of them have been led by the same man, revolting against his own program of a few years before: Noam Chomsky, Serial Revolutionary ( Joseph 1995: 380; emphasis added). 1 Noam Chomsky is not the only outstanding staff member of the above men‐ tioned department: another was Thomas S. Kuhn (1922-1996), author of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, who brought about a fundamental change concerning previous ideas about the development of science, and who - like Chomsky himself - became one of the most quoted, the most frequently praised, and at the same time the most harshly criticized authors of the twentieth century. While according to Joseph (1995: 380), there was no professional cooperation documented between Chomsky and Kuhn, their works are linked in a peculiar <?page no="14"?> way by the term ›scientific revolution‹. Kuhn proposed an approach to the historiography of science the fundamental idea of which is that the development of the natural sciences is not of a cumulative nature, but, rather, is made up of paradigm shifts that are the results of crises and revolutions questioning the previous scientific worldview (Kuhn 1962 [1970]). Against the background of these ideas, Chomsky’s activity has been termed ›Chomsky’s revolution‹. Nevertheless, the association of the term ›revolution‹ with the history of generative linguistics raised heated debates. Some of the historiographical ap‐ proaches to generative linguistics do not doubt the thesis claiming its revolu‐ tionary nature, along with the applicability of Kuhn’s framework to the history of linguistics. Others reject this term, this thesis and this framework, and use significantly different labels, ranging from ›revolution‹ in a non-Kuhnian sense through, for example, ›evolution‹, ›coup‹, ›erosion‹, ›spurious science‹ to ›un‐ scientific revolution‹. Thus, the history of generative linguistics poses a chal‐ lenge for the historiography of linguistics. It poses a challenge because, first, the historiography of generative linguistics, similarly to that of all sciences, needs to find a framework - including its central hypothesis and its basic terms - which might be used to investigate its object of investigation, namely, the description of the rise, the internal development and the significance of generative linguis‐ tics, as well as its relation to other linguistic trends. Second, the heated debates mentioned above, and the, at times, radical ap‐ proaches to the topic, make this task a very difficult enterprise primarily because the literature is considered to be extremely biased in nature. In order to meet this challenge in the present book, we will raise the main problem of the historiography of generative linguistics as follows: (P) What historiographical framework, central hypothesis and basic terms can ac‐ count for the history of generative linguistics? 1.2 The structure of the book Our line of reasoning consists of two parts, in accordance with our problem, marked (P) and our aims (A)(a)-(c), sketched in the Preface. In Part 1, we will examine 22 different approaches to the historiography of generative linguistics which offer alternative solutions to the problem in (P). We do not wish to analyze and evaluate the achievements of generative linguistics; instead, we will focus on how historiographers of linguistics analyze and evaluate 1 Introduction 14 <?page no="15"?> its history. Accordingly, the first part of the book is of a metahistoriographical nature. Within this part, in Chapter 2 - following aim (A)(a) mentioned in the Preface - we will reconstruct the alternative solutions to (P) as proposed in the relevant literature, and thereby highlight their diversity. In order to meet the philological requirements of historiography, we will document our claims by making extensive use of quotations and citations. As the next step in our reasoning - in line with aim (A)(b) -, in Chapter 3 we will give a metahistoriographical evaluation of the historiographical approaches surveyed in Chapter 2. We will examine to what extent and in what way they meet a set of criteria that historiographical approaches are expected to meet. Part 2 of the monograph contributes to the field of historiography: in accord‐ ance with aim (A)(c), we will outline a possible novel approach to the histori‐ ography of generative linguistics. Within Part 2, Chapter 4 proposes a histor‐ iographical extension of Kertész & Rákosi’s (2012) p-model of linguistic theorizing. Chapter 5 is a case study, with which we wish to illustrate that the historio‐ graphical application of this model conforms to the criteria discussed in Chapter 3. Chapter 6 tackles the open questions which have to be faced by any approach to the historiography of generative linguistics, and consequently, by our own as well, the detailed discussion of which, however, would go beyond the scope of the book. Finally, in Chapter 7 we will summarize our major findings. Before we take the first step of the investigation we have just sketched out, let us give a brief overview of Kuhn’s ideas about scientific revolutions, which constitute the main point of departure for approaches to the historiography of generative linguistics, as well as the present monograph. 1.3 Background information: The Kuhnian approach to ›scientific revolution‹ In order to highlight Kuhn’s impact on our understanding of how science works, let us start with remarking that in the first half of the twentieth century, it was the standard view of the analytical philosophy of science that determined the norms of scientific inquiry. This view subsumes two dominant trends: one is logical positivism focusing on the inductive method and striving for the verifi‐ cation of empirical claims (associated with the work of Rudolf Carnap), the other 1.3 Background information: The Kuhnian approach to ›scientific revolution‹ 15 <?page no="16"?> 2 For example, a recent textbook characterizes the standard view of the analytical phi‐ losophy of science as follows: »The two philosophies, logical positivism and Popper’s falsificationism, are usually taken together as forming what is known as the classical tradition. Sometimes the term ›positivism‹ is used. At other times, it is called the standard or the orthodox view. These latter expressions are apt.« (Hung 2014: 311; emphasis added) is critical rationalism centering on the hypothetico-deductive structure of the‐ ories and characterizing empirical claims as being falsifiable (whose main figure was Karl Popper). 2 Some of the main tenets of the standard view of the analytical philosophy of science, with respect to Kuhn’s ideas, which challenged it, are as follows: • Only theories conforming to the norms of rationality can be regarded as scientific. • Rationality is governed by principles that do not depend on communities and do not change in time. • The ›context of discovery‹ and the ›context of justification‹ should be distinguished. The reason why this distinction was introduced is the con‐ viction that ›the context of discovery‹ - that is cognitive factors such as scientific creativity and intuition, as well as the historical and social fac‐ tors that may influence the process of theory formation - can neither be revealed nor controlled. Therefore, rational reconstruction deems them irrelevant. It is solely certain characteristics of the final product of the discovery process - i.e. the static logical structure and the empirical foun‐ dation of closed scientific theories - which can be assigned significance during the justification of theories. Consequently, the philosophy of sci‐ ence aims at the posterior justification of well-developed scientific theo‐ ries with the help of their rational reconstruction. • Empirical scientific theories are deductive (axiomatic) systems. Kuhn challenged this view by arguing that the nature of scientific knowledge is very different from what the standard view of the philosophy of science assumed. He argued that the ways in which scientific inquiry works cannot be derived from allegedly predetermined, unchanging and absolute principles of rationality; instead, the patterns which scientific inquiry follows are changeable and therefore are to be examined within their social and historical context. The result of the historical development of scientific knowledge and the historical process itself are closely interwoven. Therefore, the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification must be given up, and, in 1 Introduction 16 <?page no="17"?> 3 »[…] I mean to suggest that some accepted examples of actual scientific practice - examples which include law, theory, application, and instrumentation together - pro‐ vide models from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research. […] Men whose research is based on shared paradigms are committed to the same rules and standards for scientific practice. Acquisition of a paradigm and of the more esoteric type of research it permits is a sign of maturity in the development of any given scientific field.« (Kuhn 1970 [1962]: 10-11) turn, the nature of science can be better understood by revealing the historical processes shaping it. According to Kuhn, the development of disciplines should be divided into two major stages (Kuhn 1970 [1962]: 11 ff). In the immature stage each scholar builds up the particular discipline from its basics. Accordingly, at that stage there are many rival views on the subject, aim and methodology of the research; therefore, research in the immature stage is pluralistic, and lacks integrity in terms of ontology, methodology and the foundations of science. In the mature stage, however, one of the rival views emerges as the dominant one, and becomes the model to be followed in research in the particular field (Kuhn 1970 [1962]: 16 f.). Kuhn termed such a pattern a paradigm. It is the emergence of the first paradigm that makes a discipline mature. 3 The research carried out within a particular paradigm is called normal sci‐ ence. Kuhn compares normal scientific research to ›puzzle-solving‹, the essence of which is that the range of problems, the methods of their solution and the boundaries of the acceptable solutions are defined by patterns codified in the research community. Scholars should refrain from significantly diverging from these patterns. This kind of normal science is practiced by scholars working in the well-developed natural sciences. However, social sciences have been stuck in a state of pluralism with a great variety of possible scientific methods, basic hypotheses and views on the foundational questions of the particular discipline 1.3 Background information: The Kuhnian approach to ›scientific revolution‹ 17 <?page no="18"?> 4 Kuhn, however, is well known for having used the term ›paradigm‹ in various senses (for details, see Masterman 1970). Kuhn refined some of his terms and statements in the postscript of the second edition of his book, published in 1970. Among others, he weak‐ ened his statement that within a discipline there are no rival paradigms, admitting that occasionally more than one view of the discipline may coexist in the paradigmatic stage: »Consider, for example, the reiterated emphasis, above, on the absence or, as I should now say, on the relative scarcity of competing schools in the developed sci‐ ences« (Kuhn 1970 [1962]: 209; emphasis added). He recommended the use of the term ›disciplinary matrix‹ instead of ›paradigm‹, which, however, has never become a generally accepted point of reference in linguistic historiography. Linguistic histori‐ ography keeps using the terminology and hypotheses of the first edition published in 1962 (among the approaches discussed in the present book an exception is Kornmesser 2014a and 2014b; see Section 2.4.1.2), and these refinements of Kuhn’s views do not seem to have affected it. 5 »As the source of authority, I have in mind principally textbooks of science together with both the popularizations and the philosophical works modeled on them. All three of these categories - until recently no other significant sources of information about science have been available except through the practice of research - have one thing in common. They address themselves to an already articulated body of problems, data, and theory, most often to the particular set of paradigms to which the scientific community is committed at the time they are written. Textbooks themselves aim to communicate the vocabulary and syntax of a contemporary scientific language. Popu‐ larizations attempt to describe these same applications in a language closer to that of everyday life.« (Kuhn 1970 [1962]: 136-137) 6 »The normal-scientific tradition that emerges from a scientific revolution is not only incompatible but often actually incommensurable with that which has gone be‐ fore.« (Kuhn 1970 [1962]: 103) »In a sense that I am unable to explicate further, the proponents of competing paradigms practice their trades in different worlds.« (Kuhn 1970 [1962]: 150) (Kuhn 1970 [1962]: 15, 20, 37, 160). They have not yet created their first para‐ digm, hence they are immature. 4 During research in the mature stage, however, anomalies tend to accumulate. Sooner or later such anomalies lead to a crisis (Kuhn 1970 [1962]: 66 ff.). Anoma‐ lies are problems that cannot be solved by conforming to the previously accepted patterns. They suggest the need for the modification or rejection of those pat‐ terns, as well as the need for the extension of the acceptable set of problem solutions. As a result of the crisis, rival views to the paradigm appear, one of which will emerge and spark a scientific revolution. As a result of the scientific revolution, the new system of views becomes firmer, and a new paradigm re‐ places the previous one. Both an outstanding personality and textbooks that communicate the new patterns to the younger generation contribute to the vic‐ tory of the new paradigm. 5 The views advocated by representatives of the old and the new paradigm are incommensurable, which means that their followers act in ›different worlds‹ and they do not even understand each other. 6 Since the 1 Introduction 18 <?page no="19"?> generation supporting the new paradigm is not able to change the views of the older generation backing the old one, the paradigm shift takes place only after the representatives of the old paradigm have died out (Kuhn 1970 (1962]: 150). Kuhn’s work generated extraordinary responses among historians and phi‐ losophers of science. Not only because of the originality of his thought, which questioned the long approved views on science, but also because he presented his arguments in an essayistic manner, with ambiguous wording and vague ter‐ minology. For instance, he did not define precisely the term ›paradigm‹ and the criteria of a paradigm shift. However, for the purpose of later references in the following chapters, we summarize the above-mentioned terms in the following list: • The difference between mature and immature stages in the history of a discipline; • Paradigm as a coherent research tradition; • Normal science as puzzle-solving; • The dominance of a single paradigm in a discipline; • The emergence of anomalies within normal science; • The crisis of the old paradigm; • Textbooks and outstanding individuals central to the dominance of the paradigm; • Scientific revolution; • The incommensurability of the old and the new paradigm; • The disappearance of the followers of the old paradigm. 1.3 Background information: The Kuhnian approach to ›scientific revolution‹ 19 <?page no="21"?> Part 1: Metahistoriographical overview <?page no="23"?> 1 Certain historiographical contributions use the term ›generative linguistics‹ in a broader sense, which may also include the work by Zellig S. Harris that precedes the appearance of Chomsky’s Syntactic Structures (see e.g. Seuren 1998), or other theories which are related but not identical to the trend Chomsky represents (see e.g. ten Hacken 2007). 2 We know, of course, that completely value-free presentations of the thoughts of others are illusory. For example, the information we will summarize was selected in order to make the overview and analysis of the historiographical approaches more easily un‐ derstandable, and even this decision is evaluative. 2 From ›scientific revolution‹ to ›unscientific revolution‹ 2.0 Introduction The systematization of the approaches surveyed in this chapter is based on the following three criteria: First of all, we will restrict the term ›generative linguistics‹ to Chomsky’s work and use it in the sense of ›Chomsky’s generative linguistics‹. 1 The sections discuss diverse solutions to (P) with respect to Chomsky’s publications that have been regarded as milestones and are substantially referred to in the historio‐ graphical literature: Syntactic Structures (2.1), Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (2.2.), The Sound Pattern of English (2.3), Lectures on Government and Binding (2.4) and finally, the Minimalist Program (2.5). Each section devoted to the diverse historiographical approaches to these works will start with an introductory subsection which sketches basic features of Chomsky’s work at issue. These sketches serve as background information for those readers who are less familiar with generative linguistics and thus they prepare the understanding of the his‐ toriographical approaches, which presuppose this knowledge; nevertheless, they are not intended as a comprehensive introduction to the theory and practice of generative linguistics. By doing this, we will try to present these pieces of information in as value-free a manner as possible 2 - in order to do so, the very concise summaries of basic tenets will be illustrated by numerous quotations from Chomsky’s works at issue, so that we let him speak, rather than present the interpretations of the present author. Later, we will see how the historio‐ graphical literature, in many different ways, enriches them by its evaluations, its intellectual and social preferences, and its legitimizing attitudes. <?page no="24"?> Chomsky’s work revolution Kuhnian revolution other kinds of revolution Figure 1 … … … … … … … … … no revolution Figure 1 Second, it is Kuhn’s term ›scientific revolution‹ that provides the point of de‐ parture for the systematization. Figure 1 shows the main categories of the sys‐ tematization with respect to this term. The categories, however, are to be un‐ derstood in a more refined manner than the figure shows, because in the literature not all main categories are represented with respect to all Chomskyan publications mentioned in the previous paragraph. Moreover, the analysis of the literature will show that in the particular historiographical approaches the main categories should be subdivided into subcategories in different ways. Finally, the terminology is vague in many of the historiographical approaches (see also Section 3.1.3.4 on this). The third criterion is that in the various sections we will discuss the different solutions to (P) by reconstructing their basic terms, their central hypotheses and the historiographical frameworks they apply. The order in which we present the set of approaches that discuss the role of Chomsky’s different works in the context of the history of linguistics will be systematic, rather than chronological. The sections presenting the different sol‐ utions to (P) vary in length and detail, because the approaches are highly het‐ erogeneous in terms of their genre, historiographical foundation, scope, and significance. We will provide a more extensive discussion of those approaches 2 From ›scientific revolution‹ to ›unscientific revolution‹ 24 <?page no="25"?> 3 See Chomsky (1975), which is an abridged version of the manuscript supplemented by an Introduction reflecting on later developments. 4 »This study deals with syntactic structure both in the broad sense (as opposed to se‐ mantics) and the narrow sense (as opposed to phonemics and morphology).« (Chomsky 1957: 5). 5 »Syntactic investigation of a given language has as its goal the construction of a grammar that can be viewed as a device of some sort for producing the sentences of the language under analysis.« (Chomsky 1957: 11) »The grammar of L will thus be a device that generates all of the grammatical sequences of L and none of the ungrammatical ones.« (Chomsky 1957: 13) »[…] we ask what sort of grammar is necessary to generate all the sequences of mor‐ phemes (or words) that constitute grammatical English sentences, and only these.« (Chomsky 1957: 18) 6 »The fundamental aim in the linguistic analysis of a language L is to separate the grammatical sequences which are the sentences of L from the ungrammatical se‐ quences.« (Chomsky 1957: 13) that present a sophisticated and refined description of the applied historio‐ graphical framework, or that have been widely debated. 2.1 ›Syntactic Structures‹ (Chomsky 1957) 2.1.0 Background information Basically, it is Chomsky’s (1957) Syntactic Structures that is considered to be the first seminal contribution to generative linguistics (but see footnote 1), although its text is rooted in his manuscript of 1955 entitled The Logical Structure of Lin‐ guistic Theory as well as in talks and papers. 3 The main features of this work, which will be referred to in the next sections are as follows: • While Bloomfieldian and neo-Bloomfieldian linguistics focused on pho‐ nology (in their terminology: phonemics) and morphology, Chomsky’s approach centers on syntax. 4 • While for Bloomfieldian and neo-Bloomfieldian linguists the main task was to reveal morpheme classes based on distributional properties, ac‐ cording to Syntactic Structures the goal of syntactic research is to con‐ struct a grammar of a given language that is capable of producing all the grammatically well-formed sentences, and only the grammatically well-formed ones. 5 • Chomsky introduces the distinction between ›grammatical‹ and ›un‐ grammatical‹ sentences. 6 2.1 ›Syntactic Structures‹ (Chomsky 1957) 25 <?page no="26"?> 7 »From now on I will consider language to be a set (finite or infinite) of sentences, each finite in length and constructed out of a finite set of elements.« (Chomsky 1957: 13; emphasis as in the original) 8 »A grammar of the language L is essentially a theory of L. Any scientific theory is based on a finite number of observations, and it seeks to relate the observed phenomena and to predict new phenomena by constructing general laws in terms of hypothetical con‐ structs such as (in physics, for example) ›mass‹ and ›electron‹. Similarly, a grammar of English is based on a finite corpus of utterances (observations), and it will contain certain grammatical rules (laws) stated in terms of the particular phonemes, phrases, etc., of English (hypothetical constructs). These rules express structural relations among the sentences of the corpus and the indefinite number of sentences generated by the grammar beyond the corpus (predictions). Our problem is to develop and clarify the criteria for selecting the correct grammar for each language, that is, the correct theory of this language.« (Chomsky 1957: 49; emphasis added) Let us remark that the terms highlighted are basic terms of the philosophy of science. The overall picture of theories drawn in this quotation corresponds to the basic as‐ sumptions of the analytical philosophy of science on deductive theories that were gen‐ erally accepted in the 1950s, although Chomsky does not cite his sources in this context. 9 »Notice that this theory may not tell us, in any practical way, how to actually go about constructing the grammar of a given language from a corpus. But it must tell us how to evaluate such a grammar; it must thus enable us to choose between two proposed grammars.« (Chomsky 1957: 54) »Notice that simplicity is a systematic measure; the only ultimate criterion in evaluation is the simplicity of the whole system.« (Chomsky 1957: 55-56; emphasis as in the orig‐ inal). »In short, we shall never consider the question of how one might have arrived at the grammar whose simplicity is being determined […].« (Chomsky 1957: 56) • The grammar is capable of generating an infinite number of sentences from a finite set of elements. 7 • In accordance with the Popperian trend of the analytical philosophy of science, basically, grammars are to be conceived of as deductive theories characteristic of the natural sciences, primarily physics. 8 • As opposed to Bloomfieldian and neo-Bloomfieldian linguistics, Syntactic Structures assumes that there is no inductive procedure that facilitates the discovery of the correct grammar. Instead, an evaluation procedure is needed, the application of which may lead to the selection of the best grammar from possible candidates irrespective of how they were arrived at. 9 From two alternative grammars the simpler one should be chosen. 2 From ›scientific revolution‹ to ›unscientific revolution‹ 26 <?page no="27"?> 10 »We consequently view grammars as having a tripartite structure. A grammar has a sequence of rules from which phrase structure can be reconstructed and a sequence of morphophonemic rules that convert strings of morphemes into strings of phonemes. Connecting these sequences, there is a sequence of transformational rules that carry strings with phrase structure into new strings to which the morphophonemic rules can apply. The phrase structure and morphophonemic rules are elementary in a sense in which the transformational rules are not. To apply a transformation to a string, we must know some of the history of derivation of this string; but to apply non-transformational rules, it is sufficient to know the shape of the string to which the rule ap‐ plies.« (Chomsky 1957: 107). 11 »This study […] forms part of an attempt to construct a formalized general theory of linguistic structure and to explore the foundations of such a theory.« (Chomsky 1957: 5) 12 »I think that we are forced to conclude that grammar is autonomous and independent of meaning […].« (Chomsky 1957: 17) 13 See Chomsky (1953) for his early interpretation of neo-Bloomfieldian linguistics. • The grammar consists of three levels: phrase structure, transformations and morphosyntax. 10 • The grammar rests on a mathematical foundation consisting of an algo‐ rithmic formalism. 11 • Syntax is autonomous insofar as its rules are not determined by seman‐ tics. 12 As we will demonstrate in the next sections, these features of Syntactic Structures have been interpreted and evaluated very differently by particular historio‐ graphical approaches. 13 2.1.1 Revolution 2.1.1.1 Kuhnian revolution 2.1.1.1.1 Kuhnian revolution and the climate of opinion Since the second half of the 1960s, numerous works have been published which call Syntactic Structures ›revolutionary‹ in Kuhn’s sense (Thorne 1965; Leiber 1975; Yergin 1994 [1972]; Sklar 1994 [1968]; Searle 1972; Koerner 1978 [1972]; Newmeyer 1986a; Vidanovič 2006 and others). To our knowledge, Thorne (1965: 74) was the first to claim explicitly that »[…] a revolution of the kind Kuhn describes has recently taken place in linguistics - dating from the publication of Chomsky’s Syntactic Structures in 1957«. Searle - drawing public attention to Chomsky’s personality and the significance of his early work - states in his famous article, which appeared in The New York Review of Books, that Chomsky’s 2.1 ›Syntactic Structures‹ (Chomsky 1957) 27 <?page no="28"?> 14 The article was published quite late - during the ›linguistics wars‹ between interpretive and generative semantics - and its appearance was followed by a heated debate between George Lakoff and Chomsky, also in The New York Review of Books. Lakoff doubted the revolutionary nature of Chomsky’s achievement. Chomsky published his response, in which he attacked Lakoff (Harris 1993a: 156). Three decades later, Searle (2002a) revised his previous opinion and questioned the Chomskyan revolution in the very same journal. This article by Searle also sparked a debate, on which Chomsky commented, too (see Chomsky 2000b, Searle 2002a, 2002b, 2002c, Bromberger 2000). See also Section 2.5.2.1. 15 Nevertheless, this argument is a fallacy called ›argumentum ad verecundiam‹ (›appeal to authority‹) 16 »The work of all three scholars fully meets Kuhn’s (1970 [1962]: 10) twin criteria for a paradigm: ›Their achievement was sufficiently unprecedented to attract an enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of scientific activity. Simultaneously, it was sufficiently open-ended to leave all sorts of problems for the redefined group of practitioners to resolve‹.« (Koerner 1978: 45-46, emphasis added). revolution followed fairly closely the general pattern described in Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: the accepted model or ›paradigm‹ of linguistics was confronted, largely by Chomsky’s work, with increasing numbers of nagging counterexamples and recalcitrant data which the paradigm could not deal with. Even‐ tually the counter-examples led Chomsky to break the old model altogether and to create a completely new one (Searle 1972: 16). Searle’s article deserves special attention. 14 If a widely-acclaimed scholar such as Searle who, as is well-known, represents significantly different views from those of Chomsky, acknowledges Chomsky’s work as revolutionary and does so in a journal that is so widely read, then the public may consider his judgment reliable and this will effectively shape the reception of his work. 15 In order to demonstrate an important circumstance for developing possible solutions to (P), now we will focus on Koerner (1978) among the numerous contributions which claim that Syntactic Structures led to a new Kuhnian para‐ digm in linguistics. The reason why it is instructive to review Koerner’s ap‐ proach is that later it went through numerous changes insofar as in several further papers Koerner considered other possibilities as well; therefore, his con‐ tribution to the discussions illustrates the plasticity and the vagueness of the term ›Chomsky’s revolution‹, as well as the complexity of the problems that it raises (see e.g. Koerner 2004: 2). After analyzing the work of Schleicher, Saussure and Chomsky, Koerner (1978) concludes that the conditions that enable us to talk about a Kuhnian paradigm are met in all three cases. 16 Koerner’s thesis can be summarized as follows: 2 From ›scientific revolution‹ to ›unscientific revolution‹ 28 <?page no="29"?> 17 The term ›climate of opinion‹ refers to phenomena that are important for the public, policymakers, and legislators, and are conveyed through a wide range of channels, including the mass media. See below for Koerner’s description of the climate of opinion in which Syntactic Structures was published. 18 An implicit background assumption in Koerner’s reasoning is that if a new linguistic school diverges from its predecessors, then it is the result of a Kuhnian revolution. (T1) As a result of the ›climate of opinion‹, Syntactic Structures triggered a scientific revolution in linguistics in Kuhn’s sense and led to a new paradigm. 17 Koerner supports this claim with two considerations: First, he argues that while Chomsky’s generative linguistics and Saussure’s structuralism share common features, the theory that was introduced in Syn‐ tactic Structures has features which also differ from those of Saussure. Koerner highlights three elements of Saussure’s view that are, in his opinion, to be found in Chomsky’s work: Saussure’s keen interest in mathematics, his rationalism and his psychologism. At the same time, he also analyses the differences which, in his view, support the revolutionary nature of Chomsky’s theory. He points out that in the works Chomsky published a few years after the appearance of Syntactic Structures, Chomsky emphasizes the dynamic nature of synchrony by referring to Humboldt and stressing the creativity of grammar. Koerner believes that it is due to this dynamism that in a short timeframe Chomsky’s theory had made a great impact, not only on linguistics, but also on sociology and psy‐ chology, and this impact led to what Kuhn would describe as the redefinition of the discipline. In addition, Chomsky further developed Saussure’s categories - above all, later in Aspects he reinterpreted the Saussurean term of ›langue‹ as ›competence‹. Finally, Chomsky adopted terms from symbolic logic (following primarily Quine, Carnap and Reichenbach) and mathematics (Russell, Whitehead, Shannon and Weaver). Of course, these terms were not at Saussure’s disposal at the beginning of the 20th century. Koerner’s second argument is that although Syntactic Structures could not remain unaffected by American structuralism, it reflected the ›climate of opinion‹ which was characteristic of the natural sciences in the 1950s, but which American structuralism was not ready to embrace (Koerner 1978 [1972]: 42; for further discussion, see Otero 1994). This climate of opinion had the following characteristics: 18 • as mentioned, the application of the formal methods of mathematics and symbolic logic to linguistic theorizing; • the primacy of theory over data; 2.1 ›Syntactic Structures‹ (Chomsky 1957) 29 <?page no="30"?> 19 Koerner’s historiographical approach that, among others, assumes that there have been Kuhnian revolutions in linguistics triggered by Schleicher, Saussure and Chomsky - also mentioned in Koerner (1973) - was fiercely criticized, for example, in Aarsleff (1973), Hymes & Fought (1981 [1975]: 241, 245-6) and Percival (1976a), (1977). • following the example of physical theories, the development of a deduc‐ tive theory in linguistics, and the rejection of the methodology which is restricted to inductive data collection and classification; • the simplicity and the elegance of theorizing as methodological guiding principles; • the pursuit of scientific explanations based on general laws; and • the rejection of the kind of empiricism represented in American struc‐ turalism. Accordingly, Koerner claims that the reason why Syntactic Structures was of a revolutionary nature and resulted in a new paradigm is not that Chomsky cre‐ ated something »ex nihilo« (Koerner 1978: 44), but rather, that he understood and adapted the ›climate of opinion‹ in a creative and genuine manner; that he was able to apply to linguistics the methodological model of physics, which was considered the peak of scientific rigor; and that from all these he developed an unprecedented theoretical construct immediately taken up by its adherents. 19 Thus Koerner (1978 [1972]) provides the following solution to the problem (P): (SP1) The basic terms of the historiography of generative linguistics are ›scientific revolution‹ and ›paradigm‹, supplemented by ›climate of opinion‹ with re‐ spect to Syntactic Structures, while its central hypothesis is (T1) and its frame‐ work is Kuhn (1970)[1962]. 2.1.1.1.2 Kuhnian revolution and linguistic metatheory Keith Allan’s (2003), (2007) contribution to the historiography of generative lin‐ guistics belongs to those which explicitly combine the historical and the philo‐ sophical perspective. He takes the Kuhnian revolutionary nature of Syntactic Structures for granted, and combines it with the analysis of the relationship between neo-Bloomfieldian inductivism and Chomsky’s deductivism. We re‐ construct his main claim as follows: (T2) (a) Syntactic Structures led to a paradigm shift in the Kuhnian sense, from an inductivist paradigm to a hypothetico-deductivist one whereby the core of Chomsky’s revolution is the replacement of discovering grammars by their justification and evaluation. 2 From ›scientific revolution‹ to ›unscientific revolution‹ 30 <?page no="31"?> 20 See e.g. Bloomfield’s (1935: 20) often quoted claim: »The only useful generalizations about language are inductive generalizations.« (b) Although a theory of language must be a hypothetico-deductive theory, it also needs inductive data gathering. As regards (T2)(a), Allan (2003: 134 ff., 2007: 269 ff.) starts his train of thought by reflecting on how the classification of natural objects works. By relying on considerations based both on philosophical insights and the natural sciences, he concludes that • reality can be perceived only through the constraints and distortions of the physical and cognitive structures of human beings, • classifications are based on group-internal conventions, and • scientific theories work along the same lines. Therefore, there are many possible classifications of natural phenomena and there are no rational grounds to claim that only one of these is the ›truth‹. The same applies to the study of language. So, there must be criteria by which one can choose among the possible models of language. In doing so, two macro-paradigms have developed in the course of the history of linguistics, namely, phenomenological inductivism and hypothetico-deduc‐ tivism. In revealing the relationship between these two models, Allan (2003: 538) uses the term ›paradigm‹ in the sense of Kuhn: In the middle of the twentieth century there was a shift from a phenomenological inductivist paradigm in American linguistics to a hypothetico-deductivist paradigm; a shift known as ›the Chomsky revolution‹ because it came about through Chomsky’s work. (Allan 2003: 538; 2007: 284) As we know, inductivism follows a bottom-up method of reasoning by inferring generalizations from the observation of individual data. Bloomfieldian and neo-Bloomfieldian linguistics typically applied inductive reasoning. 20 Bloom‐ fieldian and neo-Bloomfieldian analyses assumed a hierarchy of levels on the basis of which they proceeded from phones to phonemes, from phonemes to morphs, from morphs to morphemes, and from morphemes to syntactic units. Hypothetico-deductivism is the inverse of the inductive model and follows a top-down reasoning. The latter postulates an abstract theory consisting of gen‐ eral hypotheses and infers from the latter the properties of the individual phe‐ nomena it investigates. Thereby, Syntactic Structures introduced a hypo‐ thetico-deductive model of language. Chomsky rejected not only induction, but 2.1 ›Syntactic Structures‹ (Chomsky 1957) 31 <?page no="32"?> 21 See also Section 5.3 of the present book for discussion. 22 »In the history of science, flaws in a paradigm do not in themselves lead to a rejection of the paradigm; rejection is always preceded by last-ditch attempts to modify the theory in order to preserve it. Chomsky’s attempts to make the inductivism of Bloomfield and Harris achieve his end, his admitted discomfort with and disparagement of his linguistic enterprise as ›not real scientific linguistics‹, and the reported lack of interest by other linguists in his novel work, all demonstrate the typical reaction of those who have ac‐ cepted the tenets of one paradigm and see it being abandoned and replaced by another (cf. Kuhn 1970 [1962]). A shift from one paradigm to another always meets with initial resistance and uncertainty of this kind, because adherence to a particular paradigm is not primarily a matter of reason, but a rationalization based on belief in the validity of the paradigm (cf. Kuhn 1970 [1962]: 151).« (Allan 2003: 547; emphasis added) the discovery of grammars as practiced by Zellig S. Harris and others as well, and replaced it by the justification and evaluation of grammars. 21 It is the latter that Allan (2003: 547; 2007: 286) calls »[t]he true revolution that Chomsky be‐ queathed«. Allan (2003: 547) also assumes that neo-Bloomfieldian linguists resisted Chomsky’s early views, and this resistance is one of the indications of Kuhnian revolutions. 22 In this respect, Allan maintains the opposite of Newmeyer’s (1986a), Harris’ (1993a) and Murray’s (1994) claim, according to which the young Chomsky was supported by the most prominent personalities of American lin‐ guistics (see Sections 2.1.1.2.2, 2.1.2.6.1, 2.1.2.6.2) With respect to (T2)(b), Allan (2003: 558) emphasizes that although Chomsky’s early work rests on a hypothetico-deductive basis, it cannot dispense with inductive data gathering. On the one hand, Chomsky and his followers assume that since language universals are assumed to be biologically given, and are thus represented in the mind of all humans whatever their particular mother tongue is, it is sufficient to investigate one language in order to reveal these universals. On the other hand, »even this project requires an adequate data base from the one language that is the object of analysis; and that data base presup‐ poses inductive investigation« (Allan 2003: 558). So, Allan concludes: Linguistic theorizing needs both macro-paradigms of linguistics in order to achieve its proper end. The bottom-up data-gathering and preliminary classification from phenomenological inductivism, and the top-down hypothesis construction from hy‐ pothetico-deductivism cannot be related in neat temporal sequence: experience tells us that the linguistic researcher must expect to go to and fro between them, reviewing the data to intuit hypotheses, and then checking the hypotheses against the data using the evaluative procedures […] We are into a chicken and egg argument if we try to rigidly determine which is prior. The significant lesson is that the two paradigms are complementary, and both are essential to the advancement of linguistic science. They 2 From ›scientific revolution‹ to ›unscientific revolution‹ 32 <?page no="33"?> are as tightly integrated as the double helix of DNA (Allan 2003: 558; see also Allan 2007: 294-296). In sum, Allan’s solution to (P) is: (SP2) The basic terms of the historiography of generative linguistics with respect to Syntactic Structures are ›scientific revolution‹, ›paradigm‹, ›inducti‐ vism‹ and ›hypothetico-deductivism‹, its central thesis is (T2) and its frame‐ work is Kuhn (1970) [1962]. 2.1.1.2 Other kinds of revolution 2.1.1.2.1 Intellectual revolution Ten Hacken (2007) introduces a new definition of ›research program‹ and ›rev‐ olution‹. His claim is: (T3) Syntactic Structures triggered an ›intellectual revolution‹ because it led to a new ›research program‹. Ten Hacken’s starting point is the ›empirical cycle‹, which represents scientific inquiry as a cyclical procedure. In this procedure, observations lead to empirical laws which, in turn, are the basis of a theory; from the theory further laws are then predicted which feed back to guide the observations. However, as the au‐ thor shows, the empirical cycle raises a series of problems which different ap‐ proaches to the history and philosophy of science have tried to solve. Among these, the most promising one is Kuhn (1970) [1962]. Although ten Hacken ad‐ mits that Kuhn’s paradigms have both social and intellectual aspects, he suggests we replace ›paradigm‹ by ›research program‹, which focuses on the intellectual aspects and disregards the social ones: »A research programme is the set of assumptions, tacit or explicit, which make research along the lines of the em‐ pirical cycle possible« (ten Hacken 2007: 18). The author emphasizes that this term is different from Lakatos’ (1970b) term ›scientific research program‹. He does not intend to develop a general approach to the philosophy of science and restricts the scope of the term ›research program‹ to generative linguistics. There are consequences here for the methodological foundation on which his analyses are built, because research programs in this sense include several em‐ pirical cycles. Since theories are - as mentioned above - elements of empirical cycles, this means that a research program may include more than one theory. Within a research program, theories can be compared, because they share the standards that are valid for the whole research program. They are diachronically 2.1 ›Syntactic Structures‹ (Chomsky 1957) 33 <?page no="34"?> 23 See also ten Hacken (2007: 230, 244, 268). This claim can be contrasted with Tomalin’s (2008); see Section 2.1.2.2. ordered or, from a synchronic point of view, tackle different issues. Therefore, the term ›research program‹ seems to provide a framework for capturing the unity and the diversity of generative linguistics, both diachronically and syn‐ chronically. Ten Hacken introduces the term ›progress in a research program‹ as well: a theory T2 represents progress with respect to a theory T1 if the former covers more data and offers a deeper explanation of the data than the latter (ten Hacken 2007: 23). Another crucial suggestion is a new definition of ›scientific revolution‹: »A revolution is a change of research programme« (ten Hacken 2007: 25). Since in this definition the definiens includes the term ›research program‹ in the above sense, ›scientific revolution‹ focuses on the intellectual aspects of scientific in‐ quiry by eliminating the social ones from Kuhn’s original idea. The result of ten Hacken’s analysis, which the application of his methodo‐ logical framework yields, can be summarized in the form of two theses. The first is the author’s solution to the problem of the extent to which it is justified to assume the unity of Chomskyan linguistics from a historical point of view. In particular, in the literature its unity has been questioned because radical differ‐ ences have been assumed between the Standard Theory, Government-Binding Theory, and the Minimalist Program. The author solves the problem by arguing that although these are different theories and there were important changes in their theoretical framework, they belong to the same research program and are not divided by revolutionary breaks (ten Hacken 2007: 123). On the one hand, »[…] there can be no doubt […] that the research programme of Chomskyan linguistics was fully in place in 1960 at the latest« (ten Hacken 2007: 104) and that »[…] its development takes the form of a gradual specification rather than a substitution of older assumptions by new ones« (ten Hacken 2007: 40). For instance, ten Hacken quotes passages from Chomsky’s early writings which show that the native speaker’s competence has been one of Chomsky’s key issues from the late 1950s on. 23 On the other hand, he does not see a dividing line between Government and Binding Theory and the Minimalist Pro‐ gram: »The entire model adopted in GB -theory […] is still valid in the MP « (ten Hacken 2007: 121). The Minimalist Program addresses two additional topics which indicate that it differs from Government and Binding Theory, but which do not turn it into a new research program: the evolution of the language faculty and its realization in the brain. Thus, the unity of Chomskyan linguistics is ex‐ 2 From ›scientific revolution‹ to ›unscientific revolution‹ 34 <?page no="35"?> 24 It is worth remarking that in this sense the Minimalist Program is treated as a theory, too. As we will see in Section 2.5.1.2, Boeckx (and many others), in contrast, makes a sharp distinction between ›theory‹ and ›program‹ maintaining that the Minimalist Program is not a ›theory‹ but only an immature ›program‹. 25 For a critical analysis of ten Hacken’s historiographical approach, see Kertész (2010b). Müller (2016: 494 ff) critizes ten Hacken’s account of (HPSG). plained by the claim that right from the very beginning it has been a coherent research program, whereas its diversity is attributed to the fact that this research program consists of a chronologically ordered series of theories. 24 So, the em‐ phasis is on the coherence of the research program and the inconsistencies be‐ tween Chomsky’s views are not touched on. Ten Hacken’s second main claim is his answer to the question of whether the transition from Post-Bloomfieldian structuralism to generative transforma‐ tional grammar corresponds to a scientific revolution. He discusses the basic issues of post-Bloomfieldian linguistics and then analyses both the latter’s con‐ tinuities with and differences from early generative linguistics. He argues that Post-Bloomfieldian and Chomskyan linguistics are incommensurable, and there‐ fore they constitute two different research programs. Applying the new defini‐ tion of ›revolution‹ (i.e. ›revolution‹ as a change of research program), he rea‐ ches the following conclusion, which we have already anticipated in (T2): The emergence of Chomskyan linguistics was a revolution because it is based on a different research programme from Post-Bloomfieldian linguistics and gradually re‐ placed the latter. The Chomskyan revolution can be seen as progress because it replaced the emphasis on procedures applied to the set of data by a productive interaction of hypotheses and tests in the empirical cycle (ten Hacken 2007: 179; emphasis added). In addition to his historical analyses, ten Hacken also discusses the synchronic relations of Chomskyan linguistics to further trends which the literature often considers as belonging to the generative movement (Sells 1985, Newmeyer 1998). Ten Hacken’s considerations reveal both the common components and the differences between Chomskyan linguistics and four further theories: Lex‐ ical-Functional Grammar ( LFG ), Generalized Phrase Structure Grammar ( GPSG ), Head-driven Phrase Structure Grammar ( HPSG ), and Jackendoff’s lin‐ guistics. Showing that these four frameworks are different research programs and that they must not be simply subsumed under what Newmeyer (1998: 7) calls ›the generativist orientation‹, is an interesting claim (see also Section 6.2.1). In summary: 25 2.1 ›Syntactic Structures‹ (Chomsky 1957) 35 <?page no="36"?> (SP3) The basic terms of the historiography of generative linguistics are ›research program‹ and ›scientific revolution‹ in the intellectual sense with respect to Syntactic Structures; its central hypothesis is (T3) and its framework is the methodology of scientific inquiry as put forward in ten Hacken (2007). 2.1.1.2.2 Laudanian revolution That there is enormous uncertainty regarding the application of the Kuhnian term ›scientific revolution‹ to linguistics is well illustrated not only by the change in Koerner’s views already mentioned and to be discussed later in the present work, but also by the way Newmeyer revised his own views. Newmeyer has been in argument with Koerner for decades, and while the views of both of them have taken various turns, Newmeyer typically argues against Koerner’s opinions. The changes in Newmeyer’s views are especially interesting because many consider him the ›official historian‹ of generative linguistics, who effec‐ tively represents Chomsky’s interests (see e.g. Matthews 1993: 208, Tomalin 2008: 13, 16; Lakoff 1989, Murray 1994, Harris 1993a etc.). Although Newmeyer used the term ›Chomsky’s revolution‹ in the first edition of his book Linguistic Theory in America, he did not clarify in what sense Chomsky’s appearance has in fact been revolutionary (Newmeyer 1980). However, he did cite Kuhn (1970) [1962] in the second edition (Newmeyer 1986a: 36-37). Subsequently, New‐ meyer modified his approach in the paper in which he responded to Koerner (1983) and in which he rejected the term ›scientific revolution‹ in the Kuhnian sense (Newmeyer 1986b; for more on this, see also Section 3.1.1.1). He argues for the following thesis: (T4) Syntactic Structures triggered a scientific revolution in the sense of Laudan (1977) rather than in the Kuhnian (1970) sense and thus led to a new ›research tradition‹. Newmeyer’s first argument supporting (T4) is that Chomsky’s Syntactic Struc‐ tures has brought intellectual innovation into linguistics. When attempting to justify the intellectually revolutionary nature of Syntactic Structures, Newmeyer partly relies on the same factors as Koerner (1978) (see Section 2.1.1.1) without, however, referring to the ›climate of opinion‹. As further factors he mentions • the revolutionary importance of the central role of syntax; • related to the central role of syntax, the interdisciplinary nature of the ›revolution‹, which has brought - first and foremost - psychology and philosophy within its scope; as well as 2 From ›scientific revolution‹ to ›unscientific revolution‹ 36 <?page no="37"?> 26 See also Newmeyer’s book: »If American linguistics was in a state of crisis in the mid-1950s, few of its practitioners seemed aware of it. […] There was a widespread feeling among American linguists in the 1950s that the fundamental problems of linguistic analysis had been solved and that all that was left was to fill in the details.« (Newmeyer 1986a: 1, emphasis added.) In different contexts and with different arguments, similar claims were made in Harris (1993a), Koerner (1989), (2002), (2004), and Murray (1980), (1994). See also section 2.1.2. • the successful adaptation and synthesis of the progressive elements of American structuralism. According to his second argument, Syntactic Structures was revolutionary from a sociological perspective as well, but it is problematic that historiographers use conflicting criteria to separate revolutionary from non-revolutionary achieve‐ ments and that »[p]aradoxiocally, however, the sociological transformation of the field has not been accompanied by a corresponding success on the part of generative grammarians in achieving institutional power« (Newmeyer 1986b: 2). Newmeyer admits that generative linguistics does not meet two necessary requirements of Kuhnian revolutions. First, he approvingly quotes Percival (1976a: 289), according to whom generative linguistics has not been generally accepted within the discipline. He concludes »if Kuhn is correct, no (scientific) revolutions have occurred in linguistics. […] the ›Chomskyan revolution‹, if there was one, was not a ›Kuhnian revolution‹.« (Newmeyer 1986b: 6, emphasis added). Second, the appearance of Syntactic Structures had not been preceded by a crisis: The Chomskyan revolution failed to meet Kuhnian conditions in another respect. For Kuhn (74-5), a revolution is in part a response to ›crisis‹ - to a situation in which, in the ›typical‹ case, there is ›a profound failure in the normal problem-solving activity‹. Yet far from being in a state of crisis, post-Bloomfieldian structuralism in 1957 was enjoying a period of unprecedented optimism, in which it was believed that the fun‐ damental questions of linguistic analysis had all been solved (see Newmeyer 1980: 1-3). It is rather puzzling, then, that so many commentators, generativist and non-gen‐ erativist alike, have taken the Chomskyan revolution to exemplify Kuhn’s conception of a scientific revolution […] (Newmeyer 1986b: 7, footnote 6; emphasis added). 26 Based on these factors, however, Newmeyer’s conclusion is not that Syntactic Structures did not trigger a revolution, but that it did, although in a non-Kuhnian 2.1 ›Syntactic Structures‹ (Chomsky 1957) 37 <?page no="38"?> 27 Nevertheless, Newmeyer (1986b: 5; emphasis as in the original) confines the revolu‐ tionary nature of Chomsky’s achievement to structural linguistics: »Chomsky’s revolution was a revolution within structural linguistics - one which pro‐ foundly altered our conceptions of the nature of linguistic structure, and opened the way to an understanding of how its nature bears on the workings of the human mind.« 28 For the criticism of Newmeyer’s historiographical approach, see Koerner (1989), (2002), (2004); Murray (1981), (1982), (1989), (1999a); Tomalin (2008); Lakoff (1989); Huck & Goldsmith (1995). sense. 27 In answer to the question of what criteria scientific revolutions are based on, he claims Laudan (1977: 137-138) provided the correct criterion. Laudan uses the term ›research tradition‹, which is analogous to the Kuhnian term ›para‐ digm‹. In Laudan’s view, it is not at the point at which the entire discipline - or at least a definitive part of it - accepts a certain research tradition that a scientific revolution takes place. Rather, a revolution takes place when a research tradition attracts enough attention to make scholars within the field take it seriously, in the sense that they either accept it or consider it a rival. With reference to Hymes (1964: 25), Newmeyer points out that transformational generative grammar had become the reference point of research within linguistics by the beginning of the 1960s, and thus it completely conforms to Laudan’s criterion. It has become an accepted routine to explicitly reject Chomsky’s theory when alternative ap‐ proaches are introduced. Therefore, if Laudan’s view is correct, then the Chomskyan revolution has taken place in linguistics in the Laudanian sense (Newmeyer, 1986b: 7-8): We know that there was a Chomskyan revolution - but not because every linguist in the world was at one time, or is now, a generative grammarian. There was a Chomskyan revolution because anyone who hopes to win general acceptance for a new theory of language is obliged to show how the theory is better than Chomsky’s. Indeed, the perceived need to outdo Chomsky has led him to be the most attacked linguist in history (Newmeyer 1986b: 8). Newmeyer’s third argument is that the number of Chomsky’s followers radically increased and these followers gained significant positions at an increasing rate. He maintains, however, that contrary to appearances, Chomsky and his fol‐ lowers did not have real influence, since: 28 • there are numerous opportunities for students at American universities to continue their studies within non-generative linguistics; • generative linguists receive only a modest amount of funding; 2 From ›scientific revolution‹ to ›unscientific revolution‹ 38 <?page no="39"?> 29 Only two presidents of the Linguistic Society of America have been developers of the latest program from MIT and neither of them was actually an MIT Ph. D. (New‐ meyer, personal communication, February 20, 2017). 30 However, Koerner does not provide evidence that generativists at MIT were better funded than representatives of other trends in linguistics at other institutions. • the Linguistic Society of America was not controlled by the generati‐ vists. 29 In sum, Newmeyer (1986b) offers the following solution to (P): (SP4) The basic terms of the historiography of generative linguistics with respect to Syntactic Structures are ›scientific revolution‹ and ›research tradition‹, its central hypothesis is (T4) and its framework is Laudan (1977). 2.1.2 No revolution 2.1.2.1 Evolution Koerner (1995: 8) maintains that as a result of Percival’s (1976a) devastating arguments, the debate about the applicability of Kuhnian terms to linguistics became pointless. Modifying his earlier account which we summarized in sec‐ tion 2.1.1.1, and opposing Newmeyer’s (1986b) view, in his later publications Koerner himself questions the revolutionary nature of Syntactic Structures in the Kuhnian or in any other sense. He argues for the following thesis (Koerner 1989: 124, 2004: 51): (T5) The movement initiated by Syntactic Structures was not a revolution in any sense; rather, it was the evolution of the American linguistics of the 1950s. Koerner (1989) argues for (T5) by scrutinizing those factors that, according to him, support his claim that generative linguistics could not have become as strong as it did by the 1960s if factors other than its intellectual innovations had not played a part in this process. First, while making reference to Maher (1982), Koerner points out that the impact of Syntactic Structures may have been influenced by fashion. However, he is not in full agreement with Maher, because in his opinion there were other relevant factors, too. Second, the considerable amount of financial support which, in Koerner’s view, Chomsky and his circle received, also contributed to the success of gen‐ erative linguistics. 30 Therefore, Koerner’s standpoint is the opposite of New‐ 2.1 ›Syntactic Structures‹ (Chomsky 1957) 39 <?page no="40"?> 31 For details, see Sections 2.1.2.6.1, 2.1.2.6.2, 2.2.2.2. meyer’s (1986b) which we summarized in the previous section, claiming that Chomsky’s research projects only received a small amount of funding. Koerner (1989: 108) cites McCawley’s summary, according to which the peculiarities of American university administration favor situations where smaller groups in‐ crease the number of their followers through funding while their intellectual achievements do not justify this. Consequently, several universities in the 1950s and 1960s launched linguistics programs that could not have been funded solely on the basis of their intellectual credibility. Thus, according to Koerner, owing to the propaganda activity carried out by Chomsky and his adherents, administrative leaders - without expertise in linguistics - considered generative grammar to be a modern science, one that was to be followed, and thus its rep‐ resentatives won university positions and research funds much more easily than those of other linguistic approaches. McCawley’s statement leads Koerner to conclude that the rapid growth of Chomsky’s influence could not be attributed exclusively to the content of Syntactic Structures, but »it may have had some‐ thing to do with a fad«, too (Koerner 1989: 109, 2002: 161, 12). Third, Koerner (1989: 111) stresses that the representation of Chomsky’s in‐ itiative as a revolution is basically not rooted in the innovative nature of the content of Syntactic Structures but is of an ideological nature, stemming from the strong belief in its revolutionary impact. This claim is in agreement with Murray (1994); see also Section 2.1.2.6.1. Fourth, according to Koerner, the revolutionary rhetoric and the intensive propaganda activity that highlighted the radical, innovative nature of generative grammar also played a role in the circumstance that Chomsky’s early work became known as revolutionary. This propaganda was related to the constant, aggressive, rude, and often ad hominem attacks against both the arguments and the representatives of neo-Bloomfieldian structuralism. Koerner presents com‐ pelling examples of this (1989: 120-121). In this respect, Koerner seems to have similar views to those of Murray (1994), Harris (1993a, 1993b) and Lakoff (1989), according to whom there was no scientific revolution in linguistics in the 1950s and 1960s. Rather, it was the application of revolutionary rhetoric that provided a false image of the impact of generative linguistics on the history of linguistics as a whole. 31 Fifth, since the claims summarized in the previous paragraphs suggest that the above mentioned circumstances surrounding the appearance of Syntactic Structures - fashion, funding, ideology, propaganda and fierce attacks - may have made it seem revolutionary, Koerner examines to what extent the views 2 From ›scientific revolution‹ to ›unscientific revolution‹ 40 <?page no="41"?> 32 To distinguish references to Randy Allen Harris from those to Zellig S. Harris, we will mention the latter’s first name, while we will refer to Randy Allen Harris without using his first name. 33 »[…] what is frequently described as a ›revolution‹ in linguistics looks, upon closer inspection of the evidence, much more like a natural outgrowth, an ›evolution‹, of the‐ oretical discussions and methodological commitments characteristic of the period im‐ mediately following the end of World War II. True, neither Harris nor Hockett carried through on several of their proposals, but the further development of certain aspects of their theoretical statements by someone else, and especially by someone who grew up within their tradition, does not make that person’s theory revolutionary - and it cer‐ tainly was not seen that way by the generation of Harris (b. 1909) and Hockett (b. 1916), neither during the 1950s, nor the early 1960s.« (Koerner 1989: 129; emphasis added) 34 See also Jäger (1993a), Harris (1993a) and Murray (1994) on the same issue in different contexts. 35 According to Koerner, these examples provide evidence for »the attempt of adherents of the TGG school to rewrite and eventually cement a history of American linguistics corresponding to the advantages they see in it for their own current position« (Koerner 2004: 40). 36 According to the historian Henry Butterfield, ›Whig history‹ is a »system of immediate reference to the present day, [in] which historical personages can easily be classed into the men who furthered progress and the men who tried to hinder it« (Butterfield 1931: 11; also quoted in Koerner 1989: 102). elaborated in the book were innovative in comparison to the findings of neo-Bloomfieldian structuralism. He enumerates and analyses the factors which he claims prove that the appearance of Syntactic Structures - contrary to the propaganda surrounding it - did not represent a radical break with the latter. Rather, it was deeply rooted in the findings, methods and perspective of neo-Bloomfieldian structuralism, with special regard to the impact Hockett and Zellig S. Harris directly had on the linguistic theory and methodology put for‐ ward in Syntactic Structures. 32 Therefore, transformational generative grammar »is basically post-Saussurean structuralism« (Koerner 1989: 110, 2002: 163, 2004: 15). As such, it is the result of the evolution of American linguistics, after World War II and is devoid of any revolutionary breaks. 33 Sixth, Koerner claims that from the sixties onwards the proponents of gen‐ erativism strove to rewrite the history of linguistics in accordance with their interests. 34 Let us illustrate this with two examples. 35 As a first example, we mention Chomsky’s Cartesian Linguistics (1966). In Koerner’s (1989: 102, 131; 2004: 37-40) opinion, Chomsky’s (1966) work is an instance of ›partisan his‐ toriography‹ or ›Whig history‹, implying that its aim is to represent the interests of the generative camp and to legitimize generative linguistics. 36 Koerner does not stand alone in such a view since Chomsky’s historiographical works were generally not taken seriously by historiographers, as they were considered 2.1 ›Syntactic Structures‹ (Chomsky 1957) 41 <?page no="42"?> 37 »[…] it will have accomplished a Copernican revolution.« (Voegelin 1958: 229; cited in Newmeyer 1980: 19) In the context of the original text: »I would not accept the strategy of criticism adopted by Chomsky and his explicator [i.e., Robert Lees in his ›review‹ of Syntactic Structures: EFKK] - putting the burden of justification on anyone who would maintain the validity of pre-transform grammar. Some would (almost) accept this; thus, one of my western friends says that Chomsky (almost) convinced him that morphemics was a poor old dead dog. And if transform grammar also persuades linguists to relegate phonemics to a preliminary stage of anal‐ ysis (called ›discovery‹), and to operate in final analysis (called ›description‹) exclu‐ sively with morphophonemics, it will have accomplished a Copernican revolu‐ tion.« (Voegelin 1958: 230; quoted in Koerner 1989: 130, 2002: 186-187, 2004: 39) 38 Newmeyer (1986b: 9-10) rejected this charge. 39 »The historiographer’s ideal may be called ›broad positivism‹, an approach to the sub‐ ject which is committed to analyze, describe, and present historical events […] In the present context I would like to refer in particular to Ranke’s frequently quoted affir‐ mation […] that history is neither supposed to judge the past nor instruct the present how to act for the benefit of the future, but to depict how things really hap‐ pened.« (Koerner 1989: 103) ideological propaganda (Tomalin 2008: 6). For instance, Cartesian Linguistics (Chomsky 1966) is »not history but phantasy« (Aarsleff 1971: 11). Moreover, it […] is fundamentally false from beginning to end - because the scholarship is poor, because the texts have not been read, because the arguments have not been under‐ stood, because the secondary literature that might have been helpful has been left aside or unread, even when referred to (Aarsleff 1970: 583-584; see also Koerner 1999: 10-12, 178, 210-214). The second example is that Koerner (1989: 102, 131; 2004: 37-40) considers Newmeyer’s work to be ›partisan historiography‹, too, implying that it gives a one-sided account of the facts while disregarding the methodology of histori‐ ography. Newmeyer (1986a) cites Voegelin’s review of Syntactic Structures (Voe‐ gelin 1958) and claims that Voegelin evaluated the appearance of Chomsky’s work as a Copernican revolution. However, as Koerner maintains, the expres‐ sion cited in Voegelin’s review occurs in a context in which the author evaluates Syntactic Structures negatively (Voegelin 1958: 230; cited in Koerner 1989: 130, 2004: 40). 37 That is, Voegelin, in fact, stated the opposite of what Newmeyer attributes to him and therefore, Koerner concludes, Newmeyer’s method is ex‐ tremely biased historiography. 38 The historiographical framework of the above statements is the methodology that was summarized in Koerner (1989, 1995, 2002). According to Koerner (1989), historiography must consciously strive for impartiality, objectivity and must avoid ›partisan historiography‹. 39 However, in his later publications he differ‐ 2 From ›scientific revolution‹ to ›unscientific revolution‹ 42 <?page no="43"?> entiates this stance insofar as since there are no ›facts‹ without background assumptions, preferences might influence the interpretation of data. A wide range of documents must be consulted. As opposed to Newmeyer’s historiog‐ raphy, personal memories and oral narratives cannot be viewed as reliable data resources (see Koerner 2002: 153-7). In accordance with this view, Koerner strongly opposes Newmeyer’s methodology, which exclusively relied on com‐ munication with the supporters of generative linguistics and Chomsky’s fol‐ lowers (Koerner 2002: 157). A historiographer of linguistics must be familiar not only with the linguistic theory at issue, but, when necessary, give consideration to extra-linguistic factors such as the intellectual, sociological, ideological and political aspects of an issue (Koerner 2002: 155). We can reconstruct Koerner’s proposal for the solution of (P) as follows: (SP5) The basic term associated with the historiography of generative linguistics with respect to Syntactic Structures is ›evolution‹; its central hypothesis is (T5) and its framework is the methodology discussed e.g. in Koerner (1989), (1995) and (2002). 2.1.2.2 The impact of the formal sciences Tomalin (2008) motivates his investigations with the criticism of historiograph‐ ical approaches to generative linguistics. In his view, they are contradictory, with respect to their treatment of the relationship between the ›formal sci‐ ences‹ and generative linguistics. On the one hand - as was emphasized as early as 1957 in Lees’ famous review of Syntactic Structures, a review which played a decisive role in the latter’s reception - there is no doubt that generative lin‐ guistics has been under the influence of the ›formal sciences‹ from the very beginning. Therefore, it has been claimed that it »was a superior linguistic theory primarily because it was more ›scientific‹ than the syntactic theories that pre‐ ceded it« (Tomalin 2008: 1; emphasis added). On the other hand, the state of the art in the historiography of generative linguistics does not reveal this relation‐ ship properly. Tomalin’s aim is to resolve this contradiction. His thesis - as the title of his book suggests - is the following (Tomalin 2008: 4, 183, 186): (T6) Syntactic Structures originates in the formal sciences. By ›formal sciences‹ Tomalin means disciplines which take their methods from mathematics and formal logic, with special emphasis on the application of the axiomatic-deductive method. In this respect, they rest on a common scientific 2.1 ›Syntactic Structures‹ (Chomsky 1957) 43 <?page no="44"?> 40 »The conclusion offered in this book is that the formal sciences and post-Bloomfieldian linguistics appeared to approach their different tasks in a similar fashion partly because the methodologies used in both disciplines were directly influenced by Formalism during the first half of the twentieth century.« (Tomalin 2008: 18) basis (Tomalin 2008: 2-3). Tomalin investigates the development of generative linguistics up to 1957, the publication year of Syntactic Structures, focusing on the impact of the ›formal sciences‹ on generative linguistics. Tomalin supports his central claim - i.e. (T6) - with two complementary lines of reasoning. Within his first line of reasoning, he carries out precise comparative analyses of the mathematical and logical literature of the first half of the twentieth cen‐ tury, the literature of Bloomfieldian and neo-Bloomfieldian structuralism, and Chomsky’s writings before the publication of Syntactic Structures. As a result, he obtains three new findings that support (T6) (see Tomalin 2008: 183-186 for their summary). One concerns Bloomfield’s attitude to the formal sciences. Based on previously unanalyzed documents, he concludes that Bloomfield’s mistrust of semantic considerations was rooted in Hilbert’s proof-theoretical techniques, a key component of which is that in metamathematics semantic considerations should be avoided, while syntactic proofs are to be preferred. Radically diverging from mainstream opinion, Tomalin characterizes Bloomfield as an early (perhaps even the earliest) proponent of the axiomatic-deductive method in linguistics, and claims he has »rehabilitated« the mathematical as‐ pects of Bloomfield’s linguistics (Tomalin 2008: 184). 40 He argues that although post-Bloomfieldian linguistics and the formal sciences of the time took on dif‐ ferent tasks, they proceeded in a similar fashion, partly because the methodol‐ ogies used in both disciplines were influenced by the formal sciences which had prevailed during the first half of the twentieth century. Still within Tomalin’s first line of reasoning, a further finding is the re-eval‐ uation of Bar-Hillel’s role. He ›rehabilitates‹ Bar-Hillel, too, by pointing out the close and continuous interplay between Chomsky’s and Bar-Hillel’s views, something which has so far been neglected in the historiographical literature. Finally, Tomalin reaches similar conclusions with respect to Goodman’s and Quine’s influence on Chomsky, which proved to be much more complex and effective than the historiographical literature has assumed (see also Tomalin 2003). For example, the way Chomsky made use of the criterion of simplicity in his early writings was a result of Goodman’s influence. Tomalin’s second line of reasoning focuses on the claim that those compo‐ nents of generative grammar which are rooted in the formal sciences have re‐ mained constant through the whole history of generative linguistics and are still present in the Minimalist Program (Tomalin 2008: 188-200). He concludes that 2 From ›scientific revolution‹ to ›unscientific revolution‹ 44 <?page no="45"?> 41 Tomalin (2008: 188-200). Tomalin’s view here differs significantly from ten Hacken’s (2007), who considers mentalism / cognitivism, rather than formalism, as the constant component. 42 We remark that Seuren (2009) sharply criticizes Tomalin’s analyses for their one-sided and unbalanced nature, as a result of which they overemphasize the impact of the formal sciences on the rise of generativism. See Nevin’s (2009) evaluation of both Tomalin’s stance and Seuren’s criticism. See also Scholz and Pullum’s (2007) review article. despite the seemingly different nature of the developmental stages of generative linguistics, a significant proportion of its constitutive features remained spec‐ tacularly constant and are rooted in the impact of the formal sciences on gen‐ erativism. One such constant component is the axiomatic-deductive character of Chomsky’s theory. 41 For example, derivations in the Minimalist Program start with primitive elements such as lexical and formal features and result in pho‐ nological form and logical form pairings (Tomalin 2008: 188). Another example is that, as is well known, recursion is one of the pillars of minimalism. Fi‐ nally, ›economy‹ (›simplicity‹, ›elegance‹, ›compactness‹) is a crucial aspect of minimalism, closely related to Goodman’s influence. By highlighting these con‐ stant components, Tomalin seems to suggest that the ›scientific superiority‹ of generative linguistics remained the same throughout its history, despite other kinds of changes in the theoretical apparatus. 42 In summary: (SP6) The basic term of the historiography of generative linguistics with respect to Syntactic Structures is ›the formal sciences‹, its central hypothesis is (T6) and its framework is the comparison of the mathematical and logical literature with the literature of American linguistics prior to literature before 1957. 2.1.2.3 One of the neo-Bloomfieldian trends Hymes and Fought (1981) [1975] is one of the historiographical approaches questioning the kind of historical account which attributes revolutionary rele‐ vance to Syntactic Structures, and instead interprets the latter as an organic part of neo-Bloomfieldian structuralism. Hymes and Fought (1981 [1975]: 155-156) argue for the following thesis, which Tomalin (2008: 11) calls »provocative«: (T7) (a) Neo-Bloomfieldian structuralism was not a coherent school, but con‐ sisted of a variety of alternative trends and individual initiatives. (b) Within neo-Bloomfieldian structuralism, Syntactic Structures con‐ tributed to the victory of Zellig S. Harris’s approach over that of Trager and Smith’s (1957). 2.1 ›Syntactic Structures‹ (Chomsky 1957) 45 <?page no="46"?> 43 They use the term ›climate of opinion‹ pre-explicatively, and not exactly in the same sense as Koerner (1978). The authors emphasize that the ›climate of opinion‹ did not change immediately after 1957 under the influence of the appearance of Syntactic Structures. 43 Chomsky’s work was evaluated as one of the standpoints within neo-Bloom‐ fieldianism. It was not considered as a challenge that might lead to the redefi‐ nition of the discipline (Hymes & Fought 1981 [1975]: 154). In their book on American structuralism - in which Chomsky’s activity is only one episode - the authors devote much space to the methodology of lin‐ guistic historiography. They suggest the simultaneous consideration of a series of factors. Among others, referring to Percival (1976a) they reject the application of Kuhn’s approach to linguistics (Hymes & Fought 1981: 24-25, 239-241, 245-246) and criticize Koerner (1978). They also reject an approach which builds linguistic historiography on one basic term such as ›paradigm‹ and claim that »a single term will not suffice« (Hymes & Fought 1981 [1975]: 25). Much more complex and differentiated terms are needed in order to capture »the rich range of materials actually forming the data to be explained« which every »serious historiography« is expected to use (Hymes & Fought 1981: 25). These materials also include personal and institutional dynamics as well as unpublished docu‐ ments. The authors discuss the range of data which they believe to be potentially relevant for historiographical research. Naturally, these principles apply to the historiography of linguistics in general and to that of generative linguistics in particular. (SP7) The historiography of generative linguistics does not rely on a single basic term; rather, with respect to Syntactic Structures, it requires a network of terms which is able to grasp the differentiated and complex nature of the history of linguistics; its central hypothesis is (T7); and its framework is the sophisticated combination of the terms, sources and analytical aspects of historiographical research. 2.1.2.4 The improvement of distributionalism On the first pages of his book about American structuralism, Peter Matthews, with heavy irony, criticizes the unreflected, mechanical applications of Kuhnian terms in oversimplifying didactic chronicles of the history of linguistics. He believes that »[…] the Worst Thing that has happened to the historiography of twentieth century linguistics« is the publication of Thomas S. Kuhn’s The Struc‐ ture of Scientific Revolutions because »it led so many of Chomsky’s supporters 2 From ›scientific revolution‹ to ›unscientific revolution‹ 46 <?page no="47"?> 44 See also section 5.3. to make events fit Kuhn’s model« (Matthews 1993: 28). As a result of this, the application of Kuhn’s historiographical model to generative linguistics »partly obscured its real origins« (ibid). Matthews does not divide neo-Bloomfieldianism into trends as Hymes and Fought do. He scrutinizes Bloomfield’s texts and those of the neo-Bloomfiel‐ dians, and compares them to Syntactic Structures and other texts that Chomsky published before or right after it. He does not go into details about the Theory of Government and Binding, and the Minimalist Program was established only after the publication of Matthews’ book. His main thesis is the following: (T8) Syntactic Structures is the direct continuation and the improvement of the distributionalism of Bloomfieldian and neo-Bloomfieldian linguistics. Matthews does not make his methodology explicit. Nevertheless, it is clear for the readers of his book that, in accordance with this thesis, he focuses on the role of distribution both in neo-Bloomfieldian approaches and in Syntactic Structures. In his opinion, Chomsky […] did not abandon the essential goal of distributionalism, or […] the empiricism that pervaded it. […] In abandoning the requirement that linguistic theory should provide what he called a ›discovery procedure‹ he liberated distributionalism from a constraint that was inessential. But what replaced it was the requirement that alternative sets of distributional rules should be evaluated by a measure of simplicity. This was an at‐ tempt to rescue the programme, not to destroy it (Matthews 1993: 141; emphasis added). 44 Matthews’ (1993), (2001) method centers on philology and the history of ideas. Based on a careful, many-sided and differentiated philological analysis and comparison of texts written in different periods by different authors, it outlines the history of the ideas shaping American structuralism. Thus: (SP8) The basic term of the historiography of generative linguistics with respect to Syntactic Structures is ›distribution‹, its central hypothesis is (T8) and its framework is the careful philological comparison of a wide range of written sources. 2.1 ›Syntactic Structures‹ (Chomsky 1957) 47 <?page no="48"?> 45 For an evaluation of Seuren’s historiographical approach, see, e.g. Droste (1999) and Falk (1999). 2.1.2.5 Chomsky as a metalinguist Seuren (1998) overviews the history of Western linguistics from the point of view of the philosophy of science. According to Seuren (1998: 250, 252), the main achievement of Chomsky’s work is the following: (T9) (a) Syntactic Structures is original insofar as it systematized and critically evaluated the theses, terms and methods of neo-Bloomfieldian struc‐ turalism. (b) In comparison to neo-Bloomfieldianism, the novelty of Syntactic Structures is of a metatheoretical, rather than of a linguistic nature. Seuren does not consider Chomsky’s achievements revolutionary. He argues that generative linguistics is basically rooted in the work of Zellig S. Harris, while Chomsky synthesized and improved his findings. They were thinking along the same lines and continuity can be observed between their works. Seuren believes that besides Chomsky’s synthesizing work, his greatest ach‐ ievement is that by raising and answering pivotal metatheoretical questions, he applied the terms and principles of the philosophy of science to linguistics. Thus his greatest achievement is to have placed linguistics in the context of the phi‐ losophy of science. In Seuren’s view, »most of Chomsky’s work in theoretical linguistics deals with metatheoretical questions, which makes Chomsky a met‐ alinguist rather than a linguist« (Seuren 1998: 252; emphasis added). He called attention to issues which had fallen outside the scope of neo-Bloomfieldianism: the nature of linguistic data, realism vs. nominalism, the criteria of adequacy, formalization, explanation, causality etc. (Seuren 1998: 252 ff.). According to Seuren, in the course of his metatheoretically oriented activity, Chomsky suggested a host of general principles and constraints. However, the analysis of the data was carried out by others, who regularly found that Chom‐ sky’s suggestions did not work (Seuren 1998: 252, footnote 27). Seuren’s (1998) approach focuses on the close interplay between aspects of the historiography of linguistics and those of the philosophy of science. Never‐ theless, he does not specify the details of the metascientific background as‐ sumptions he takes for granted as his point of departure. 45 Seuren’s (1998) sol‐ ution to the problem (P) can be reconstructed as follows: 2 From ›scientific revolution‹ to ›unscientific revolution‹ 48 <?page no="49"?> (SP9) The basic term of the historiography of generative linguistics with respect to Syntactic Structures is ›metatheory‹, its central thesis is (T9) and its framework is the association of historiography with the perspective of the philosophy of science. 2.1.2.6 Rhetoric 2.1.2.6.1 Revolutionary rhetoric and coup According to one of the most spectacular stances, Chomsky’s appearance did not set off a revolution; rather, Chomsky and his ›militant group‹ of linguists carried out a palace coup in order to gain power (Anttila 1975: 171; Gray 1976: 49; Murray 1980, 1989, 1994, 1999a, b). It was Stephen O. Murray who elaborated this stance very thoroughly and clearly over several decades of systematic data collection. He claims: (T10) After the publication of Syntactic Structures, Chomsky and his ›militant group‹ did not set off a scientific revolution, but rather, carried out a ›palace coup‹ followed by revolutionary rhetoric. We will illustrate (T10) by discussing Murray’s arguments in a relatively detailed way. In order to understand them properly, we need to briefly summarize his historiographical framework. Murray adapts a sociological approach to the his‐ toriography of linguistics which is, on the one hand, based on a significant modification of Kuhn’s theory, and on the other hand, on the direct application of the sociological framework of Griffith and Mullins (1972) and Griffith and Miller (1970). Murray assumes two complementary models within his theory: the ›functionalist‹ model and the ›conflict‹ model. The central claim of the functionalist model identifies the prerequisites of the formation of scientific groups (Murray 1994: 22-23). There are three essential conditions for the formation of a coherent scientific group: • good ideas • intellectual leadership • organizational leadership. In Murray’s view, it is obvious that all three prerequisites are met in the history of generative linguistics. Although good ideas can be detected in Syntactic Structures, they were not sufficient in themselves to bring about significant changes in the field. Murray stresses that the latter are never brought about by 2.1 ›Syntactic Structures‹ (Chomsky 1957) 49 <?page no="50"?> solitary scholars, but always by well-organized groups, the formation and main‐ tenance of which depends on two sociological factors: there is a need for intel‐ lectual and organizational leadership. In the case of generative linguistics, the intellectual leader was, of course, Chomsky and the organizational leader was, besides Chomsky, Morris Halle in the 1950s and 1960s. In the functional model the prerequisites of group formation apply equally to every scientific group. However, the conflict model differentiates between two types of groups. It takes into consideration those factors on the basis of which the group decides whether it chooses revolutionary rhetoric or a discourse style that emphasizes continuity with a preceding group (Murray 1994: 23-25). Mur‐ ray’s starting point in this respect is the assumption that there is always intel‐ lectual continuity between the consecutive ›paradigms‹. Therefore, the term ›revolution‹ does not apply to innovations with respect to content, new scientific findings, methods, or theses, but is narrowed down exclusively to rhet‐ oric, in the sense that the terminology of the given group stresses the revolu‐ tionary nature of innovations as opposed to their continuity. Thus, in this re‐ spect, »the notion of scientific revolution has been relativized here to consideration of ›revolutionary rhetoric‹« (Murray 1994: 23). According to the conflict model, the distinction between the above-men‐ tioned two types of rhetoric is subject to three factors: • The group members have to belong to the ›elite‹, which, according to the American hierarchy, means training at one of the five most prestigious universities. • They have to perceive themselves as being suppressed. In this respect, what is important is their perception that their access to recognition - i.e. getting access to publications, positions, funding etc. - is blocked, and not whether it really is so. • They have to belong to a younger generation than those scholars who hold academic positions i.e. primarily those who are responsible for pub‐ lications platforms and funding resources. As long as these conditions are met, the group rhetoric is revolutionary; if not, it emphasizes continuity. The first condition was obviously met in the case of Chomsky and his group. As regards the second, Murray shows, through detailed analyses, that the Chomskyan camp’s legendarily aggressive attacks against neo-Bloomfieldian linguists were motivated by this perceived blocked access to recognition (Murray 1994: 225-248). The generation gap that has been men‐ tioned as the third condition was clearly present between early generative lin‐ guists and neo-Bloomfieldians (but, as is shown below, in a completely different 2 From ›scientific revolution‹ to ›unscientific revolution‹ 50 <?page no="51"?> 46 In another context, see also Koerner (2004: 23). 47 »Whatever continuity Chomsky claims runs through his oeuvre, in 1957 he appeared to be developing Zellig Harris’s transformational syntax, importing ideas from philos‐ ophy and mathematics like his teacher, not inventing a revolutionary new approach requiring jettisoning structural / descriptive linguistics.« (Murray 1994: 240; emphasis added) We note that continuity is also emphasized not only by other historiographers of lin‐ guistics - such as Koerner (1989), (2002), (2004), Matthews (1993), and Hymes & Fought (1981) [1975] - but even by adherents of Chomskyan generative linguistics. For in‐ stance, not so long after the publication of Aspects Bierwisch (1966: 43) claims that with the appearance of Syntactic Structures a new level of development within structuralism came into existence. Boeckx (2006: 46, 51) represents a similar stance in his retrospective evaluation of the current situation from a minimalist point of view. 48 »Without demonstrating the perception of a crisis during the 1950s by linguists other than Noam Chomsky, the ›Chomskyan revolution‹ does not fit Kuhn’s model of sci‐ entific revolution. Reading the linguistic literature of the mid-1950-s, one does not find evidence of a sense of crisis.« (Murray 1989: 160; emphasis added) way from what the Kuhnian approach would suggest). It follows from this that Murray may see Chomsky’s and his circle’s activity not as a ›real‹ revolution but as revolutionary rhetoric, which manifests itself only in its use of terminology. Murray’s analysis of the history of generative linguistics in the framework of the functionalist and the conflict model supports (T10) in the following way. 46 First, the generativists’ rhetoric of revolution - in contrast to Newmeyer’s (1986b) view discussed above - was not associated with revolutionary innova‐ tions either intellectually or methodologically. Murray argues that there is a crystal clear continuity between the content of Syntactic Structures and neo-Bloomfieldian structuralism. Therefore, at the level of the content of the theory, we cannot assume a ›real‹ revolution. 47 Thus, Syntactic Structures did not contain significant scientific innovations; the appearance of Chomsky and his circle can only be described through the exploration of sociological factors surfacing at the level of rhetoric. Murray ironically remarks: If SS [Syntactic Structures] made a revolution, the overthrown regime failed to rec‐ ognize it. Certainly no revolution in linguistics was ignited by the publication of SS or by frustration at hostile and uncomprehending reaction of neo-Bloomfieldians to it (Murray 1994: 239, emphasis added). Second, Murray (1989: 160, 1994: 237) stresses - and in this respect he shares Newmeyer’s (1986a: 1, 1986b: 7., footnote 6) as well as Koerner’s (1989: 124, 2002: 185, 2004: 51) views - that in the 1950s the neo-Bloomfieldian school did not undergo a scientific crisis in the Kuhnian sense. 48 Consequently, no revolution 2.1 ›Syntactic Structures‹ (Chomsky 1957) 51 <?page no="52"?> 49 »[…] the neo-Bloomfieldian reviewers who weighed in later treated Syntactic Structures as an extension of structural analysis into the relatively unpacified ›level‹ of syntax rather than as an attempt to overthrow distributionalist / structuralist linguistics, par‐ ticularly phonemics.« (Murray 1999: 343) 50 »Several informants pinpointed a palace coup in 1962. The International Congress of Linguists was held in Cambridge, on TGG home territory. Chomskians, Morris Halle, in particular, are said to have carefully planned a strategy to sever TGG from its neo-Bloomfieldian forerunners. Halle was secretary of the congress’s executive com‐ mittee. William Locke, chairman of the MIT Modern Language Department, was Sec‐ retary General. Locke, his wife Anne, Halle, Horace Lunt and Edward Klima were also on the local organizing committee […]. How his local backers managed to secure a plenary slot for Chomsky, who was a generation younger than the other four plenary speakers, deserves study.« (Murray 1994: 239-240) Following this paragraph, Murray cites Koerner, who stresses that the proceedings of the congress provided unlimited opportunity for Chomsky to express his views and respond to every objection that was raised during the discussion and which he found relevant (Koerner 1989: 117). 51 For a contrary interpretation of these circumstances see Newmeyer (1986a: 37-38, 1986b: 8-9). could break out since in Kuhn’s view a crisis is a necessary prerequisite of a scientific revolution. Right at the outset, it was not the case that anomalies emerged which neo-Bloomfieldians were trying in vain to resolve, while Chomsky offered a solution to them. On the contrary, the neo-Bloomfieldian linguists and Chomsky dealt with fundamentally different problems. Whereas Syntactic Structures centered on syntax, neo-Bloomfieldian linguists did not share a common view of syntax. 49 Indeed, a common view was not even possible because what they considered to be the primary subject of their research was not syntax but ›phonemics‹ (Murray 1989: 160). Besides the factors mentioned above, this circumstance, too, suggests that there could be no scientific revolu‐ tion, because there was no crisis. In Murray’s view, rather than a revolution, it was a coup d’état, as a result of which Chomsky and his group captured power. The coup had been thoroughly prepared and then organized by Halle and others at the 1962 international linguistics conference held in Cambridge (Murray 1994: 239-240). 50 In Murray’s view, the intellectual and organizational leader em‐ bodied in Chomsky’s personality played a significant role in capturing and re‐ taining power as, under Chomsky’s leadership, the group was able to dominate and alter the institutional, organizational, and financial structure of linguistics (Murray 1994: 445). 51 Third, one of the tenets of the Kuhnian approach to scientific revolutions is that the representatives of the ›old paradigm‹ reject new ideas. Seemingly, in accordance with this, Chomsky stated in several interviews, memoirs, and let‐ ters that his early attempts to be published were received adversely and his 2 From ›scientific revolution‹ to ›unscientific revolution‹ 52 <?page no="53"?> 52 Using a sociological term, Bloch was a ›gatekeeper‹. Gatekeepers are individuals who decide whether or not one can join scientific forums, primarily participation at publi‐ cations platforms and conferences. Gatekeepers include editors and reviewers of jour‐ nals, publisher’s referees and conference organizers who decide on invited speakers, reviewers of conference abstracts, etc. 53 See Chomsky (2014: 561) for new evidence that two publishers were ready to accept The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory for publication. 54 The book was published only later in a significantly abridged version, cf. Chomsky (1975). works were constantly rejected by established linguistic forums (for quotes, see Murray 1994: 230-234). Murray (1980, 1994, 1999) proves the opposite of this by making reference to original documents that he thoroughly described and ex‐ plored: • In the 1950s the most influential person in the Linguistic Society of America was Bernard Bloch, who worked, amongst other things, as the ed‐ itor-in-chief of Language. 52 Bloch’s correspondence with Chomsky docu‐ ments that Bloch supported all the four papers that Chomsky submitted to Language and he paid special attention to Chomsky even when no one else did (Murray 1994: 230-234, 1999a: 343-44). • Only one of Chomsky’s papers was rejected. Chomsky submitted it to Word, whose editor-in-chief was André Martinet at that time. However, Martinet did not belong to the neo-Bloomfieldian school. Therefore, it is not the case that the emergence of Chomsky’s views was hindered by a member of the old paradigm which was to be replaced by the new (Murray 1994: 229-230, 1999a: 348-351). • The documents explored by Murray are in sharp contrast with Chomsky’s claim that the publication of The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory was rejected. The manuscript was not rejected but accepted by Mouton, and two other Dutch publishers also expressed their interest in it. 53 As Murray shows, it was not because the book had been rejected that it was not published in the 1950s‒1960s, but because Chomsky did not send back the contract, which had already been prepared, to the publisher (Murray 1994: 230; 1999a: 350-351; 1999b). 54 • Lees’ (1957) review, which appeared under rather unusual circum‐ stances - all of which significantly helped to accelerate Chomsky’s ca‐ reer - played a significant role in the positive professional reception of Syntactic Structures in three respects. The first of these circumstances is that Lees was Chomsky’s student and thus he was not an unbiased, ex‐ ternal expert. Second, Lees’ review was published prior to the appearance 2.1 ›Syntactic Structures‹ (Chomsky 1957) 53 <?page no="54"?> 55 Syntactic Structures appeared in November‒December 1957, whereas Lees’ review was published in the July‒September issue of Language in 1957 (Murray 1999a: 345). 56 One of the books was Fundamentals of Language by Jakobson and Halle, and the other was a volume comprising Whorf ’s papers and edited by John B. Carrol (Murray 1999a: 345). of the book to be reviewed, namely Syntactic Structures. 55 Third, it was unusual that Bloch placed the review of a book by a then unknown author above the reviews of the books of two other linguists. 56 Consequently, according to Murray (1994: 244; 486-487), what occurred is the opposite of the Kuhnian process of revolutions, because it was not the supporters of the old system who attacked the supporters of the new theory, but the other way round. Accordingly, the reception of generative linguistics in the 1950s and 1960s is in sharp contrast with Kuhn’s model: […] a major anomaly is that the conflict between generations was not instigated by the older generation rejecting the younger generation’s innovation. Chomskian work was published, sought out and taken seriously by major neo-Bloomfieldians. The most central of them actively fostered Chomsky’s and Lees’ careers. In terms of aggression, the Chomskians struck first. Their revolutionary rhetoric was not a reaction to the incomprehension of the ›establishment‹, nor a defense against neophobia or perse‐ cution by angry elders (Murray 1994: 244; emphasis added). Murray also claims: […] it bears stressing that the Kuhnian expectations fostered by Chomsky, Lees and their followers is rejection by the ancient régime pushing people to become revolu‐ tionaries. The evidence for such rejection by the neo-Bloomfieldian regime of linguists during the 1950s is not merely lacking, but the evidence (points) in the opposite direction, i.e., rather than rejection there was encouragement - and even solicitation from those controlling the means of linguistic publication (Murray 1999: 351; bold emphasis added). Thus, Murray argues that, contrary to Chomsky’s reports and Newmeyer’s (in Murray’s view) »propagandistic« claims, the young Chomsky was not the soli‐ tary hero fighting against the incomprehension and the attacks of the conser‐ vative elder generation, but that he enjoyed the support of the latter. In his review of Murray’s book, Joseph (1995: 382) evaluates this as an »unparal‐ leled« finding, which was »a big bombshell« ( Joseph 1995: 388). Newmeyer (1986a: 36), in contrast, calls these conclusions, also discussed in Murray (1980), into question. 2 From ›scientific revolution‹ to ›unscientific revolution‹ 54 <?page no="55"?> Based on the analysis summarized above, Murray’s dual model makes the following crucial generalization: Changes in science are made by groups, not by the automatic breeding of ideas by other ideas, nor by single individuals, however brilliant their thoughts and re‐ search. […] There does not seem to be any relationship between the novelty of ideas and the claims to novelty. Major changes in assumptions may be made by groups wrapped in the mantle of tradition […], while minor changes may be heralded as epoch-making breakthroughs after ›dark ages‹. […] Finally, the causal direction pos‐ ited by Kuhn to explain scientific revolution - viz. that rejection of new ideas leads to a counter-community - needs to be reconsidered. In the case of transformational grammar, the younger generation attacked elders who had been facilitating the dif‐ fusion of TGG work, rather than the elders attacking those daring to put forth new ideas (Murray 1994: 486; emphasis added). Murray’s solution to (P) is (the following): (SP10) The basic terms of the historiography of generative linguistics, with respect to Syntactic Structures are ›revolutionary rhetoric‹ and ›coup‹, its central hy‐ pothesis is (T10) and its framework is the sociological theory based on Griffith and Miller (1970) and Griffith and Mullins (1972), rooted in the critique of Kuhn (1970) [1962]. 2.1.2.6.2 Revolutionary rhetoric and linguistics wars Randy Allan Harris’ book (1993a) provides an unvarnished account of the cru‐ elty of the ›linguistics wars‹. It gives a detailed analysis of the wars triggered by the generativists against neo-Bloomfieldian linguists, the competition be‐ tween interpretive and generative semanticists, the pragmatic turn related to generative semantics in the 1970s and the unfolding of the Theory of Govern‐ ment and Binding. Nonetheless, the manuscript was finished before the publi‐ cation of the Minimalist Program. The impact of the book exceeded the tight boundaries of both linguistics and the historiography of linguistics. On the one hand, it instilled the term ›linguistics wars‹ in the public mind by reaching a relatively wide range of readers due to its style (which Joseph 1995: 397 called »jaunty«). On the other hand, several of its main characters were active at the time of its publication, and many of them, the heroes of the battles between interpretive and generative semantics as well as members of the younger gen‐ eration of the generativists, are still active. Chomsky, for instance, completely rejects the picture Harris paints of the history of generative linguistics in the 2.1 ›Syntactic Structures‹ (Chomsky 1957) 55 <?page no="56"?> 57 »Turning to Harris’s book, I’m afraid it is largely fantasy, of a currently fashionable kind. Harris constructs a breathless account of a great war, in which I’m supposed to have led one of the contending armies, fighting a great battle to maintain my iron control of the discipline - a construction based on the needs of the ›text‹, if I have the terminology straight. Unfortunately for the story, I had little interest in the ›war‹ and took no part in it. At the time (late ’60s and early ’70s), I was much engaged in a war, but it was a different and rather more significant one; the games he is describing struck me as largely childish, and I kept to what seemed to me more serious pursuits.« (Gre‐ wendorf 1994: 301) 58 Joseph (1995) discusses the similarities and the differences between the two views. interview given to Grewendorf. 57 He expresses a similar view when interviewed by Barsky in that he describes Harris’ story as belonging to the world of fantasy (Barsky 1998: 56, 151). Barsky (1998: 56) evaluates Harris’ work as Foucaultian historiography (in agreement with Chomsky, cf. Grewendorf 1994: 301), which provides a psycho-social explanation for the changes surfacing in the research while emphasizing the power struggle between the participants. According to Tomalin (2008: 14), Harris’ work, because of its popular style, cannot be taken seriously, either. In contrast, Joseph (1995) does not question that Harris’ book is a competent contribution to historiography, nor does Langendoen’s review (1995), although they criticize it in different respects. Similarly to Murray (1994), Harris attributes the success of generativism not to a scientific revolution, but to revolutionary rhetoric. 58 Unlike Murray, how‐ ever, he does not use the term ›coup‹. He does not develop an explicit historio‐ graphical framework, either, although his approach is close to the postmodern streams of the philosophy and historiography of science which explain the con‐ tent of scientific knowledge by referring to psychological and sociological fac‐ tors. We reconstruct the main thesis of the book in the following way: (T11) After the publication of Syntactic Structures, Chomsky’s group started a ›lin‐ guistics war‹ against neo-Bloomfieldians and won it by applying rhetorical means. The following considerations yield (T11). First of all - in agreement with the claims made by Newmeyer (1986a: 1; 1986b: 7, footnote 6), Murray (1994) and Koerner (1989, 2002, 2004) which we have already cited - American structuralism was not in a Kuhnian crisis when and after Syntactic Structures was published. For this reason, one of the prereq‐ uisites of Kuhnian revolutions is not met. Harris (1994: 35-37) demonstrates - through the examples of Trager and Smith (1957) [1951] and Zellig S. Harris (1951) - that in the 1950s »not the slightest hint of frustration at the Bloomfiel‐ 2 From ›scientific revolution‹ to ›unscientific revolution‹ 56 <?page no="57"?> 59 »But - sponsored by [Zellig S.] Harris, nurtured by Bloch, adopted by Householder - how did it become heresy in the first place? The simple answer, and the fullest one, is that Chomsky changed his rhetorical stance to the holy Bloomfieldian church from ex‐ tension to rejection and replacement. He was no longer just taking American linguistics boldly into syntax, where it had once feared to tread, or had trod very timidly; he was systematically dismantling the Bloomfieldian program and erecting his own in its place. One by one, he attacked the foundations of recent American linguistics: behaviorism, positivism, and the descriptive mandate. One by one, he attacked the cornerstones of its specific theories: not just its Immediate Constituent syntax, but also its phonology, its morphology, and its very conception of language.« (Harris 1993a: 33; emphasis added) dian program« could be noticed and »there is little indication in the literature of the period that there was a crisis on any front« (Harris 1993a: 36). Therefore, he concludes that »measured dissent, pluralism, and exploration […] represent the exact opposite of Kuhn’s definition of crisis« (Harris 1993a: 37; emphasis added). Second, and also in harmony with Murray’s (1994) and Koerner’s (1989), (2002), (2004) views, but opposing Newmeyer’s (1986b), Harris claims that there is continuity between Syntactic Structures and neo-Bloomfieldian linguistics. He stresses that in the 1950s most linguists conceived of Syntactic Structures mainly as the propagation of Zellig S. Harris’ theories and that Chomsky’s program appeared to be a consistently improved version of neo-Bloomfieldianism (Harris 1993a: 37, 39). Third, similarly to Murray (1980), (1994), (1999), Harris believes that it was Chomsky who turned against his adherents by destroying the optimistic at‐ mosphere of peaceful development. 59 Finally, according to Harris, Chomsky and his followers did not apply sub‐ stantial arguments against the claims of neo-Bloomfieldians and later those of generative semanticists by responding to arguments with arguments. Rather, they based their argumentation on humiliating and ridiculing their opponents in the debate with the help of rhetorical tools. Chomsky’s opinion reflected his contempt for those whose views differed from his and he continuously empha‐ sized that except for himself and his small circle »virtually everyone else in linguistics is intellectually and emotionally and even morally callow« (Harris 1993a: 78) and thus not suited to conduct scientific research. Harris (1993a: 61, 69-73) provides a compelling description of the rhetorical arsenal reflecting the »missionary zeal«, with which Chomsky’s adherents led their war against neo-Bloomfieldians. In order to provide a coherent description of Harris’ view, we have to mention that at this point - although this refers to a later stage in generative linguistics - according to Harris, the development of Chomskyan 2.1 ›Syntactic Structures‹ (Chomsky 1957) 57 <?page no="58"?> 60 However, there are very few publications by Chomsky devoted primarily to combatting the ideas of generative semantics. 61 These tools are considered to be fallacies in logic and rhetoric. 62 »[…] a direct attempt to account for the actual behavior of speaker, listener, and learner, not based on a prior understanding of the structure of grammars, will achieve very limited success.« (Chomsky 1959: 57) generative linguistics after Aspects was not motivated by intellectual goals with respect to Chomsky’s reaction to the appearance of the generative semanticists (see also Harris 1993c). Rather, it was motivated by his objective of retaining power: »Attacking generative semantics […] occupied virtually all of his lin‐ guistic energies for several years« (Harris 1993a: 143). 60 Harris discusses a number of episodes in retrospect and demonstrates the alleged intrigues and rhetorical tools which Chomsky and his immediate circle used to achieve this goal (Harris 1993a: 135-197; see also 1993b, c). Harris (1993a: 160-161) considers three of these as especially effective: Chomsky’s ad hominem and straw man arguments as well as his vagueness, which he himself frequently chose to em‐ ploy while at the same time reproaching his opponents for that very fault. 61 Thus, Harris provides the following solution to (P): (SP11) The basic terms of the historiography of generative linguistics with respect to Syntactic Structures and Aspects are ›rhetoric‹ and ›linguistics war‹, its central hypothesis is (T11) and its framework is postmodern psychological, sociological and rhetorical analysis. 2.2 ›Aspects of the Theory of Syntax‹ (Chomsky 1965) 2.2.0 Background information In between the appearance of Syntactic Structures and his next influential book, Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Chomsky published his review of Skinner’s (1957) Verbal Behavior. The main characteristics of the review are as follows: • Chomsky launched a fierce attack on behaviorism which had also been presupposed in Bloomfieldian and neo-Bloomfieldian linguistics. • He argued for his assumption that verbal behavior (in the sense of be‐ haviorism) cannot be understood without understanding grammar (as a mental capacity). 62 2 From ›scientific revolution‹ to ›unscientific revolution‹ 58 <?page no="59"?> 63 »It appears that we recognize a new item as a sentence not because it matches some familiar item in any simple way, but because it is generated by the grammar that each individual has somehow and in some form internalized.« (Chomsky 1959: 56) 64 »It is reasonable to regard the grammar of a language L ideally as a mechanism that provides an enumeration of the sentences of L in something like the way in which a deductive theory gives an enumeration of a set of theorems.« (Chomsky 1959: 55-56) 65 »[…] the young child has succeeded in carrying out what […] seems to be a remarkable type of theory construction. Furthermore, this task is accomplished in an astonishingly short time, to a large extent independently of intelligence, and in a comparable way by all children. Any theory of learning must cope with these facts.« (Chomsky 1959: 57) »The fact that all normal children acquire essentially comparable grammars of great complexity with remarkable rapidity suggests that human beings are somehow spe‐ cially designed to do this, with data-handling or ›hypothesis-formulating‹ ability of unknown character and complexity.« (ibid) 66 »A fully adequate grammar must assign to each of an infinite range of sentences a structural description indicating how this sentence is understood by the ideal speaker-hearer.« (Chomsky 1965: 4-5) 67 »It is only when supplemented by a universal grammar that the grammar of a language provides a full account of the speaker-hearer’s competence.« (Chomsky 1965: 6) • At the same time, he was one of those who initiated the treatment of grammar as the result of mental processes, thus contributing to what came to be known in the 1960s as mentalism and later as cognitivism. 63 • He drew an analogy between the native speaker’s knowledge of grammar and the linguist’s scientific knowledge of grammar, and assumed that the former can be treated as a theory as well. 64 • In this review he also maintained that grammar should be capable of ex‐ plaining how the child acquires the grammar of her language. 65 Aspects of the Theory of Syntax carried on central insights of the review and by integrating further findings it became what, according to Boeckx (2006: 17), »ar‐ guably remains to this day the clearest statement of the generative enterprise as a whole«. This work put forward the following main ideas: • The »fundamental distinction between competence (the speaker-hearer’s knowledge of his language) and performance (the actual use of language in concrete situations)« was introduced (Chomsky 1965: 4; emphasis as in the original). • The object of investigation is the ideal speaker-hearer’s competence. 66 • The grammars of particular languages are supplemented by universal grammar. 67 • The grammar includes a semantic, a phonological and a syntactic com‐ ponent. The semantic and the phonological component are purely inter‐ pretive. Then, »the syntactic component of a grammar must specify, for 2.2 ›Aspects of the Theory of Syntax‹ (Chomsky 1965) 59 <?page no="60"?> 68 In a later phase of Chomsky’s linguistics (the period of Government and Binding Theory) this problem was further specified as the problem of the poverty of stimulus. See Section 2.4.0 on this. 69 »Much information can be obtained about both the primary data that constitute the input and the grammar that is the ›output‹ of such a device and the theorist has the problem of determining the intrinsic properties of a device capable of mediating this input-output relation.« (Chomsky 1965: 47) 70 »The evidence shows clearly that taxonomic views of linguistic structure are inadequate and that knowledge of grammatical structure cannot arise by application of step-by-step inductive procedures (segmentation, classification, substitution procedures, filling of slots in frames, association, etc.) of any sort that have yet been developed within lin‐ guistics, psychology, or philosophy.« (Chomsky 1965: 57) 71 »Thus it may well be that the general features of language structure reflect, not so much the course of one’s experience, but rather the general character of one’s capacity to acquire knowledge - in the traditional sense, one’s innate ideas and innate principles. It seems to me that the problem of clarifying this issue and sharpening our under‐ standing of its many facets provides the most interesting and important reason for the study of descriptively adequate grammars and, beyond this, the formulation and justi‐ fication of a general linguistic theory that meets the condition of explanatory ade‐ quacy.« (Chomsky 1965: 59) each sentence, a deep structure that determines its semantic interpretation and a surface structure that determines its phonetic interpretation. The first of these is interpreted by the semantic component; the second, by the phonological component.« (Chomsky 1965: 16; italics as in the orig‐ inal) • The deep structure is constituted of a set of basic phrase markers. »In addition to its base, the syntactic component of a generative grammar contains a transformational subcomponent. This is concerned with gen‐ erating a sentence, with its surface structure, from its basis.« (Chomsky 1965: 17) • The central problem is that of language acquisition as already raised in the review of Skinner’s book. Aspects specifies this problem by intro‐ ducing the term ›language acquisition device‹. 68 The latter is a theoretical construct referring hypothetically to a tool that helps children acquire the grammar of their language, starting from what is called ›primary lin‐ guistic data‹ (i.e. the data available to the child during language acquisi‐ tion) and resulting in the correct grammar of that language. The linguist’s task is to explain this process. 69 Thereby, the difficulty is that no inductive procedure can explain how a child succeeds in acquiring a grammar of high complexity in a very short time. 70 Therefore, it is to be assumed that the child has already innate universal predispositions that enable her to select the correct grammar compatible with the primary linguistic data. 71 2 From ›scientific revolution‹ to ›unscientific revolution‹ 60 <?page no="61"?> 72 Explanatory adequacy »offers an explanation for the intuition of the native speaker on the basis of an empirical hypothesis concerning the innate predisposition of the child to develop a certain kind of theory to deal with the evidence presented to him«. (Chomsky 1965: 25-26) • Grammars should be evaluated by three standards, called levels of ade‐ quacy. A grammar is observationally adequate if it correctly accounts for the data which are the input to language acquisition. A grammar is »descriptively adequate to the extent that it correctly describes the in‐ trinsic competence of the idealized native speaker« (Chomsky 1965: 24). Finally, it is explanatorily adequate if it explains how the child arrives at her grammar on the basis of linguistic evidence she observes in language acquisition. 72 In the 1960s a heated debate took place between Chomsky and a group of his disciples, primarily George Lakoff, John R. Ross, James D. McCawley and Paul Postal, on the status of semantics in grammar. The latter questioned the inter‐ pretive role of semantics as indicated above, and instead regarded semantics as the generative component of grammar. They argued for another model of grammar in which surface structures are derived from semantic structures. Thus, deep structure seemed to be, for them, no well-motivated component of the grammar. Eventually the generative semantics movement fell apart and Chomsky’s position retained dominance. 2.2.1 Kuhnian revolution Although it follows from Newmeyer’s (1986b), Koerner’s (1989), (2002), (2004), Murray’s (1980), (1994), (1999a), Seuren’s (1998) and Harris’s (1993a) claims that the appearance of Syntactic Structures did not trigger a Kuhnian scientific rev‐ olution in linguistics, it does not follow that later stages of generative linguistics could not have been revolutionary. As early as the 1970s consideration was given to the assumption that it was Aspects (Chomsky 1965) that bore revolutionary characteristics in the Kuhnian sense rather than Syntactic Structures. Thus the next thesis is the following: (T12) It was Aspects of the Theory of Syntax that triggered a scientific revolution in linguistics and led to the birth of a new paradigm. McCawley (1976: 4-5) argues for this thesis by making reference to three factors: 2.2 ›Aspects of the Theory of Syntax‹ (Chomsky 1965) 61 <?page no="62"?> • By the mid-sixties, the number of adherents of generative transforma‐ tional grammar - originally a small minority of linguists - had greatly increased. • Generative transformational grammar developed from an avantgarde movement into a leading and institutionalized field. • The nature of generative publications had significantly changed. While at the end of the 1950s and at the beginning of the 1960s, they were pri‐ marily motivated by polemics against neo-Bloomfieldians, after the ap‐ pearance of Aspects they became more research-oriented by systemati‐ cally focusing on constructive investigations. According to McCawley, the first two factors amount to a scientific revolution, and the third indicates the beginning of normal science in Kuhn’s sense. How‐ ever, he does not discuss further indications of Kuhnian revolutions. Koerner (1989: 133-134, 2004, pp. 44-45), in agreement with McCawley, ar‐ gues for (T12) as well, and highlights that, in his opinion, it is the following components of the content of Aspects which primarily support its revolutionary nature: • Semantics was included in Aspects (even if as an interpretive compo‐ nent): »Aspects brought semantics out of the closet« (McCawley 1976: 6). • The systematic nature of Aspects exceeded that of Syntactic Structures and thus the findings that could be pursued through the application of the theory became relatively transparent. • The theory brought the investigation of syntactic universals to the fore‐ ground. In summary: (SP12) The basic terms of the historiography of generative linguistics with respect to Aspects are ›scientific revolution‹ and ›paradigm‹, its central hypothesis is (T12) and its framework is Kuhn (1970) [1962]. 2.2.2 No revolution 2.2.2.1 Ideology The following approach illustrates that it is possible to evaluate the role of Aspects from another perspective than that of the Kuhnian revolution. As is well known, the generative semantics movement was closely related to the circum‐ stance that the role of deep structure, which was introduced in Aspects, was 2 From ›scientific revolution‹ to ›unscientific revolution‹ 62 <?page no="63"?> 73 Lakatosian ›scientific research programs‹ are not identical to the term ›research pro‐ gram‹ used by Ten Hacken (see Section 2.1.1.2.1). For the comparison of the two terms, see Kertész (2010b). evaluated in two different ways. According to generative semanticists, the gen‐ erative component of grammar is semantics and the strict division between syntax and semantics collapses. In contrast, the Chomskyan approach maintains that the semantic component is »purely interpretive« (see Section 2.2.0). As the rise of the generative semantics movement initiated by James D. McCawley, George Lakoff, Paul Postal and John Robert Ross is closely related to the ap‐ pearance of Aspects, we now briefly discuss the conflict between this movement and Chomskyan interpretive semantics. The evaluation of the conflict between them is similar in Harris (1993a, b, c), Huck & Goldsmith (1995), Murray (1994), Seuren (1996), and Seuren (1998); we exemplify this conception by Huck & Goldsmith (1995). The ›official‹ chronicle generally accepted as a result of Newmeyer’s (1980, 1986a) works - which was also propagated in widely used textbooks such as Riemsdijk and Williams (1986) - represents the process leading from the ap‐ pearance of Syntactic Structures to later developments as a continuous and linear progress. According to this view, generative semantics is seen as a regressive episode which justly lost the battle against the more progressive interpretive semantics, because it was both theoretically and empirically inferior to the latter. Huck & Goldsmith (1995) - just like Harris, Murray and Seuren - reject this ›received view‹. They ask the following question: If - according to the re‐ ceived view - the generative semantics movement fell apart because its tenets were refuted by the proponents of Chomskyan interpretive semantics, then how could it happen that the very same tenets were integrated into the later devel‐ opment of generative linguistics? They answer this question in the following way (Huck & Goldsmith 1995: 92-93): (T13) The received view according to which Chomsky’s interpretive semantics re‐ futed the tenets of generative semantics is »essentially ideological in character and scientifically unjustifiable.« As their historiographical framework, the authors choose Lakatos (1970b). They believe that within the framework of Lakatosian ›scientific research pro‐ grams‹ it is not possible to identify clear empirical grounds in the arguments put forward in the debate on which a decision between the two approaches could be based. 73 Consequently, there is no empirical, theoretical and conceptual - i.e., scientific - reason for the victory of interpretive semantics over generative 2.2 ›Aspects of the Theory of Syntax‹ (Chomsky 1965) 63 <?page no="64"?> 74 For the memoirs of other group members, see the extensive Appendix in McCawley (1980), and Huck & Goldsmith (1995). 75 See also Jäger (1993a), (1993b) as well as Section 2.4.2. semantics (Huck & Goldsmith 1995: 6-7, 91-95). Namely, the arguments put forward against the claims of generative semanticists were not strong enough to refute them; what is more, the tenets of the two approaches are compatible. Huck and Goldsmith devote special attention to argumentation, because they »understand that scholarly argument forms a crucial part of scientific life« (Huck & Goldsmith 1995: viii). That is, the downfall of generative semantics cannot be explained by its theoretical and empirical deficiency. Rather, it has to do with other - ideological, argumentative and rhetorical - factors. Thus, the victory of Aspects over generative semantics must not be seen as the result of a linear and progressive process. In summary: (SP13) The basic terms of the historiography of generative linguistics are ›ideology‹, ›rhetoric‹ and ›argumentation‹, which capture the relation‐ ship between interpretive semantics as discussed in Aspects and generative semantics; its central hypothesis is (T13) and its framework is Lakatos (1970b). 2.2.2.2 Untenable methodology and the clash of two kinds of personalities As the rise of the generative semantics movement is closely related to the ap‐ pearance of Aspects, in this section we discuss the evaluation of this book from the perspective of generative semanticists, using the example of Lakoff (1989). 74 Robin Lakoff ’s central hypothesis can be summed up in the following way: (T14) The intellectual differences between interpretive and generative semantics triggered by Aspects originate from (a) the different evaluation of the scientific method, and (b) the differences between two kinds of personality involved in the de‐ bate. As for (T14)(a), Robin Lakoff believes that one of the reasons why the war about deep structure started is that Chomsky attempted to force the methods of the natural sciences onto linguistics, which, in her view, was fundamentally mis‐ taken and harmful to the development of linguistics. 75 With regard to this, she points out the following: 2 From ›scientific revolution‹ to ›unscientific revolution‹ 64 <?page no="65"?> First, as opposed to the natural sciences, in the humanities - to which lin‐ guistics belonged and belongs, according to Lakoff - there were no uniform paradigms, but different views held simultaneously, due to the fact that the ob‐ ject of investigation could be approached from various perspectives. Therefore, in the humanities, the style of argumentation was gentlemanly, acknowledging the pluralism of views (Lakoff 1989: 964). There were no fights whose goal was to decide who the best scholar was, or who pursued real science. In contrast, in the light of the solid empirical basis and methodology of the natural sciences, the differences between the various views are of minor importance. Even if there appear to be distinct views, in principle it is easy to choose between these views based on the generally accepted methods and the solidity of data, and, quite evidently, the winning view is sooner or later accepted by the great majority of the scientific community. Since Chomsky forced the methodology of the natural sciences on linguistics, a methodology which is unsuited to the examination of the variety, complexity, and contradictory nature of the investigated data, two consequences followed immediately: Chomsky introduced »the tradition of contentious and acrimonious adversarial argumentation« (Lakoff 1989: 967) into linguistics, and along with this, »there was no place for pluralism« (Lakoff 1989: 968; emphasis added). Second, Lakoff does not dispute that it is possible to imitate natural sciences via formalizing, quantifying and the application of discrete categories. Never‐ theless, the findings will be different from those of the natural sciences (Lakoff 1989: 965). She makes a distinction between ›doing science‹ and ›playing sci‐ ence‹, where the latter imitates the former; and she places Chomsky’s approach in the latter category. If linguists mistakenly assume that they ›do science‹ while in reality they ›play science‹, then they run the risk of applying the surface manifestations of scientific behavior for their own sake. For instance, quanti‐ fying, formalizing, and replicating the findings, etc. may convey the impression that one is a responsible, real scientist - whereas, in reality, this is not so (Lakoff 1989: 965, footnote 8). Furthermore: It also may be germane to note that the paradigm ›science‹ social scientists like lin‐ guists are prone to take as a model is Newtonian physics, with its dichotomies, ob‐ jectivity, and certainty. But quantum physics has cast doubt on all these vaunted de‐ siderata, and we might ponder the dubious advantages of modeling our own theory and method on those of an obsolescent field (Lakoff 1989: 966, footnote 8, emphasis added). Third, the variety and complexity of linguistic data is not compatible with an adherence to the exclusive use of the formal methods represented in Aspects (Lakoff 1989: 595-596): 2.2 ›Aspects of the Theory of Syntax‹ (Chomsky 1965) 65 <?page no="66"?> 76 See also Harris (1993b: 432) for the pluralism of linguistics as a desideratum. To abjure non-discrete theories because they are unsettling, or because they conflict with the kinds of formalism we currently feel comfortable with, is antiscientific in the most dangerous way: analogous to the Church’s determination that Galileo’s claims were heretical because they were antithetical to current established wisdom (Lakoff 1989: 956, footnote 5, emphasis added). Finally, in accord with this observation and in stark contrast with the vulgarized linguistic application of Kuhn’s approach, she rejects the exclusive attitude of Chomsky’s group. She believes that the pluralism of linguistics stemming from the constitutive properties of data is valuable and contributes to a fuller and more precise understanding of the object of investigation: We have tried for most of this century to force language into the Procrustean bed of ›science‹, and the chaos and dissension that we have experienced in the field are the result. If we are a science, we must assume that only one paradigm has access to the truth, and it had better be our own. But the impossibility of getting everyone in the field to accept a single paradigm, to settle down to Kuhnian ›normal science‹, demonstrates that we have been seeing things incorrectly. […] each linguist, or each theoretical perspective, captures a different vision of the linguistic reality, and all, though incompatible as scientific theories, have something to add to our knowledge. But we can no longer require that perspectives be combinable into one single theory: We must settle for different, but equally valid, viewpoints (Lakoff 1989: 985-986, em‐ phasis added). 76 In connection with (14)(b), Lakoff uses religious metaphors when describing the generative group of the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, a group whose members had been forged by the war against a common enemy (»us against the world«, Lakoff 1989: 963). This bond that united the community broke up because the war against the neo-Bloomfieldians was over and there was no enemy to defy anymore. This allowed the conflicts between different personalities inside the group to come to the surface. Another reason why the war between generative semantics and the Chomskyan approach started, according to Robin Lakoff, is that two kinds of people were present in the group (Lakoff 1989: 944-946). The members of the first kind tended to think formally, using discrete terms; they were, by tem‐ perament, logicians or mathematicians. The other kind of personality followed humanist values: »to them being human entailed more than manipulating formal structures« (Lakoff 1989: 945). These two types got along well as long as they were forged together against the neo-Bloomfieldians, whom they had de‐ 2 From ›scientific revolution‹ to ›unscientific revolution‹ 66 <?page no="67"?> clared their common enemy. However, this war had ended with the victory of the Chomskyan group by the time Aspects was published (Lakoff 1989: 968). At that time, although both kinds of personalities thought they would proceed with their research in accord with Aspects, the community split into two groups (Lakoff, 1989: 946). The split was rooted in the vagueness of Chomsky’s work (and within this, of Aspects as well), which led the members of the group to develop the principles of Aspects along different lines, according to their own distinct personalities. According to Lakoff, this vagueness, on the one hand, left the way open to different interpretations as »a brilliant theoretical stroke« (Lakoff 1989: 944), thereby reducing the strength of counterarguments, and on the other hand, it also prevented conflicts within the group. One kind of personality emphasized the use of discrete terms and found it important to dis‐ regard data contradicting generalizations, to maintain an abstract system, which is partly independent of data, and to refine formalism. The other attempted to tailor the theoretical apparatus to the variety and complexity of data. The two types of theoretical habits originating from these distinct personalities were closely related to the structure of the groups. Whereas formal thinking requires an autocratic and hierarchical organization, humanist personalities accept equality and the pluralism of ideas. Lakoff demonstrates vividly the autocratic system that Chomsky established around himself and the increasing antipathy with which generative semanticists rejected not only Chomsky’s views but also his personality, as a result of which »once Chomsky was seen not to be an idol, he was recast as satanic, the Enemy« (Lakoff 1989: 970). The conflict that arose between the two groups by virtue of the distinct in‐ terpretations of deep structure in Aspects »was not a theory-internal conflict, such as can be resolved in terms of a Kuhnian paradigm shift« (Lakoff 1989: 946). Therefore, Aspects cannot be considered to be revolutionary, and genera‐ tive semantics was not a counter-revolution against it - it is simply the case that the history of generative linguistics, both before and after Aspects, cannot be evaluated in terms of the Kuhnian framework. The victory of Aspects can be viewed as a decline in the sense that it is not the result of scientific quality, but that of a claim to power, discrimination and personalities. We reconstruct Robin Lakoff’s answer to the question in (P) as the following: (SP14) The basic terms of the historiography of generative linguistics with respect to Aspects are ›scientific method‹ and ›personality‹ as the determinants of the theory’s content, its central hypothesis is (T14), and its framework is memoir complemented by metatheoretical reflection. 2.2 ›Aspects of the Theory of Syntax‹ (Chomsky 1965) 67 <?page no="68"?> 77 See the discussion between Householder (1965) and Chomsky & Halle (1965) which instructively highlights the position of generative phonology in generative linguistics. 78 »For example, a rule of the form (12) is to be understood as applying to the string (13): (12) A → B / X_______Y] v (13) XAY ] v Rule (12) states that an element of the type A is rewritten as a corresponding element of the type B when A appears in the context X______Y […] and when the item in question is a verb […].« (Chomsky & Halle 1968: 14) 2.3 ›The Sound Pattern of English‹ (Chomsky & Halle 1968) 2.3.0 Background information Chomsky and Halle’s work is coherent with Chomsky’s previous findings. It supplements Chomsky’s approach to syntax with a theory of phonology. Some of its main tenets are: 77 • The neo-Bloomfieldian term ›phonemics‹ was rejected and ›pho‐ nology‹ was used in its place. • Phonology is an autonomous component of grammar. • Underlying phonemic sequences are transformed to phonetic represen‐ tations that are realized by speakers. 78 • The term ›phoneme‹ was rejected and substituted by bundles of binary features such as [+voiced], [-voiced]. 2.3.1 Kuhnian revolution Murray (1994: 238) proposes the following hypothesis: (T15) It is generative phonology that ignited a scientific revolution. Hymes & Fought (1981) [1975], Murray (1994), Harris (1993a) and Koerner (1989) all state that Syntactic Structures as the direct continuation and syntactic extension of the work of Zellig S. Harris did not bring about significant intel‐ lectual innovations and thus never provoked resistance in neo-Bloomfieldians. Based on his investigations, which we have already reported on in Section 2.1.2.6.1, Murray (1994: 238) concludes that »[w]hat outraged neo-Bloomfiel‐ dians was not the theory of syntax, but the dismissal of phonemics« and that the disagreements in the 1950s and 60s reached their culmination in arguments around phonology rather than syntax. According to Murray, the dismissal of phonemics in linguistics was a much more provocative step than anything that 2 From ›scientific revolution‹ to ›unscientific revolution‹ 68 <?page no="69"?> 79 For an explanation of the status of this solution see e.g. Hornstein & Lightfoot (1981). Chomsky could have said about syntax or the conflict between behaviorism and mentalism (Harris is of a similar opinion, cf. Harris 1993a: 59-61). He makes reference to Archibald Hill’s famous memoir in which Hill writes that he had got on well with transformational grammarians until his »darling, the pho‐ neme« (Hill 1980: 75) was attacked. Murray draws a counterfactual conclusion: if this interpretation is correct and if one accepted Kuhn’s approach, then it would be better to deem Halle (1959) and Chomsky & Halle (1968) revolutionary instead of Syntactic Structures or Aspects (Murray 1994: 238-239). Consequently: (SP15) If we were to accept the terms ›scientific revolution‹ and ›paradigm‹ with respect to generative phonology as the basic terms of the historiography of generative linguistics in the framework of Kuhn, then its central hypothesis would be (T15). 2.4 ›Lectures on Government and Binding‹ (Chomsky 1981) 2.4.0 Background information The significance of Government-Binding Theory (Chomsky 1981), later called the Theory of Principles and Parameters (Chomsky & Lasnik 1993), is as follows: • It seems to have provided a framework for the solution of the logical problem of language acquisition already raised in Chomsky’s Skinner-review and re-formulated in Aspects. 79 The problem is rooted in the observation that children who are learning their mother tongue ex‐ perience data which are insufficient for the acquisition of the grammar, but in spite of this they acquire the grammar of their language quite easily and in a relatively short time. How can it happen that despite this poverty of stimulus, they acquire the grammar of their language? To put it simply, the core of the argument is this: • Children learn the grammar of their language in a relatively short time. • The language data which children experience and which serve as the input for the acquisition of grammar are insufficient for acquiring the grammar. • If the language data which serve as the input for the acquisition of grammar are not sufficient for acquiring the grammar and children 2.4 ›Lectures on Government and Binding‹ (Chomsky 1981) 69 <?page no="70"?> 80 See Section 4.2.2 for the argumentation theoretical reconstruction of this inference. 81 »Generative grammar […] is concerned with those aspects of form and meaning that are determined by the ›language faculty‹, which is understood to be a particular com‐ ponent of the human mind. The nature of this faculty is the subject matter of a general theory of linguistic structure that aims to discover the framework of principles and elements common to attainable human languages; this theory is now often called ›uni‐ versal grammar‹ (UG) […]. UG may be regarded as a characterization of the genetically determined language faculty. One may think of this faculty as a ›language acquisition device,‹ an innate component of the human mind that yields a particular language through interaction with presented experience, a device that converts experience into a system of knowledge attained: knowledge of one or another lan‐ guage.« (Chomsky1986: 3) 82 »[…] what we ›know innately‹ are the principles of the various subsystems of S 0 [the initial state of language acquisition] and the manner of their interaction, and the pa‐ rameters associated with these principles. What we learn are the values of the param‐ eters and the elements of the periphery (along with the lexicon, to which similar con‐ siderations apply). The language that we know is a system of principles with parameters fixed, along with a periphery of marked exceptions. What we know is not a rule system in the conventional sense. In fact, it might be that the notion of rule in this sense […] has no status in linguistic theory. […] This conceptual revision suggests a change in the way we view […] the problem of language acquisition: not as a problem of acquiring rules but one of fixing the parameters in a largely determined system.« (Chomsky 1986: 150-151) learn the grammar of their language in a relatively short time, then children are born with innate grammatical knowledge. 80 • Therefore, children are born with innate grammatical knowledge. But then, the next question is: what does this innate knowledge consist of ? In the Theory of Government and Binding, instead of ›language ac‐ quisition device‹, which was applied in Aspects, the term ›language fac‐ ulty‹ was introduced. The language faculty is assumed to be part of the mind and enables the child to acquire the grammar of her language on the basis of linguistic experience. 81 While induction does not provide an explanation for the solution of the problem, the solution proposed by the Theory of Principles and Parameters (Government-Binding Theory) says that children are born with the principles of universal grammar associated with parameters and it is these parameters that are set during the process of language acquisition on the basis of the linguistic data that they expe‐ rience in their environment. 82 • It explains the syntactic properties of individual languages by setting the parameters associated with universal principles. In this way, it is able to 2 From ›scientific revolution‹ to ›unscientific revolution‹ 70 <?page no="71"?> 83 »[…] UG [universal grammar] consists of various subsystems of principles: it has the modular structure that we regularly discover in investigation of cognitive systems. Many of these principles are associated with parameters that must be fixed by experi‐ ence. The parameters must have the property that they can be fixed by quite simple evidence, because this is what is available to the child […] Once the values of the pa‐ rameters are set, the whole system is operative.« (Chomsky 1986: 146) 84 »Constructions, in the traditional sense, may be simply an artefact, perhaps useful for descriptive taxonomy, but nothing more. […] There is no passive construction, inter‐ rogative construction, etc. Rather, the properties of the relevant expressions follow from the interaction of language invariant principles, with parameters set.« (Chomsky 1991: 24) account for both the universal regularities of the language faculty and the differences between the syntactic peculiarities of individual languages. 83 • The theory presupposes the modularity hypothesis which says that knowledge of language consists of relatively autonomous subsystems in‐ teracting with each other. As a consequence of this hypothesis, the theory explains the structure of particular expressions by the interaction of uni‐ versal principles that belong to different relatively autonomous subsys‐ tems of grammar rather than by structure-specific rules. 84 • »Linguistics […] becomes part of psychology, ultimately biology. Lin‐ guistics will be incorporated within the natural sciences […]«. (Chomsky 1986: 27) 2.4.1 Revolution 2.4.1.1 Kuhnian revolution In the publications of Chomsky’s adherents, the Theory of Principles and Pa‐ rameters is often claimed to be a new paradigm as the result of a scientific revolution. As a typical example, let us quote Grewendorf who believes that »[t]he Principle and Parameter approach has permitted many subtle and revo‐ lutionary discoveries over a broad domain of phenomena in a wide range of languages such that linguistic theory for the first time in its history came close to its crucial objective of explanatory adequacy« (Grewendorf 2007: 370; em‐ phasis added) and that by a »revolutionary hypothesis it brought about a com‐ pletely novel view of language acquisition« (Grewendorf 2006: 134; translation by the present author). However, it is not clear in what sense here the term ›rev‐ olution‹ is used and what kind of historiographical approach it is part of. Nev‐ ertheless, all such occurrences of the term are probably latently applied in a Kuhnian sense, as Grewendorf (1993: 119) cites Kuhn and uses the same termi‐ nology. Accordingly, the thesis is: 2.4 ›Lectures on Government and Binding‹ (Chomsky 1981) 71 <?page no="72"?> 85 »In what follows, under the term ›Construction Grammar‹ I will subsume a family of approaches that share central foundational principles and set themselves apart from Generative Grammar. I distinguish between four central variants of Construction Grammar: Construction Grammar based on C. Fillmore et al. (1988) and P. Kay & C. Fillmore (1999), Construction Grammar, as developed by A. Goldberg (1995, 2006) that goes back to Lakoff (1987), and W. Croft’s (2001) Radical Construction Grammar. Fur‐ thermore, I will also include R. Langacker’s (1987) Cognitive Grammar as well as the works by M. Tomasello (2003) in this paradigm.« (Kornmesser 2014a: 8; translation by the present author) However, it is questionable to what extent all these approaches can be subsumed under the same paradigm, because Fillmore and Kay’s approach is a version of generative grammar, whereas Goldberg’s, Croft’s and Langacker’s belong to the field of cognitive linguistics. (T16) Government-Binding Theory (the Theory of Principles and Parameters) led to a Kuhnian revolution. Thus the solution of (P) is: (SP16) The basic terms of the historiography of generative linguistics are ›revolu‐ tion‹ and ›paradigm‹ with respect to the Theory of Government and Binding (Principles and Parameters), its central hypothesis is (T16) and its framework is Kuhn (1970) [1962]. However, it is not the above references that make ( SP 16) really interesting, but the debate that was initiated by Lappin et al. (2000a) in the journal Natural Language and Linguistic Theory, because it raised the issue of the revolutionary nature of the Theory of Government and Binding in comparison to the Mini‐ malist Program. Therefore, we will summarize the essence of this debate when discussing the Minimalist Program in Section 2.5.2.2. 2.4.1.2 Kuhnian revolution without paradigm replacement Kornmesser’s (2014a), (2014b) approach is unique in that although the author makes use of the Kuhnian terms ›scientific revolution‹ and ›paradigm‹, he does not claim that the Theory of Principles and Parameters is revolutionary relative to previous stages of generative linguistics or the neo-Bloomfieldian school; rather, he argues that it is revolutionary with respect to another trend which coexists with it, namely, Construction Grammar. 85 Kornmesser’s line of argumentation starts with the reconstruction of the standard interpretation of Kuhn’s view of the relationship between scientific revolution and paradigm change. The standard interpretation says that »[i]f a scientific revolution takes place between an old paradigm P 1 and a new paradigm 2 From ›scientific revolution‹ to ›unscientific revolution‹ 72 <?page no="73"?> 86 As already mentioned in Section 1.3, the first edition of Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions that appeared in 1962 introduced the term ›paradigm‹, which was applied ambiguously in the book (Masterman 1970). Due to the debates that the ambiguity of this term raised, in the second edition of 1970, Kuhn introduced the term ›disciplinary matrix‹, which he suggested instead of ›paradigm‹ and which was meant to clarify the issues debated. P 2 , then P 1 is replaced by P 2 .« (Kornmesser 2014a: 91). As opposed to this, by analyzing Kuhn’s work, Kornmesser argues that there are scientific revolutions in the Kuhnian sense without paradigm change. In order to avoid that his claim, according to which there are scientific revolutions without paradigm replace‐ ment, turns out to be false or requires a different understanding of the term ›sci‐ entific revolution‹ from Kuhn’s, he tries to show that, contrary to common be‐ lief, Kuhn’s original idea of scientific revolution does not entail paradigm replacement. Following this, the author reconstructs the Theory of Principles and Para‐ meters and Construction Grammar according to a set of criteria. These criteria are yielded by the author’s interpretation of the components of Kuhn’s term ›dis‐ ciplinary matrix‹ (Kornmesser 2014b). 86 He concludes that since both ap‐ proaches conform to these criteria, they are to be regarded as paradigms in Kuhn’s sense, although they coexist: »the relation of both paradigms is that of a scientific revolution without one paradigm being replaced by the other one« (Kornmesser 2014a: 91). Accordingly, his central historiographical thesis is (T17): (T17) (a) The relation of the Theory of Principles and Parameters to Construc‐ tion Grammar is that of a Kuhnian scientific revolution. (b) There is no paradigm replacement between them; rather, they are coexisting rival paradigms. Since Kuhn claims that only those disciplines have reached maturity in which there has been at least one paradigm, linguistics is no longer an immature, but a mature discipline (Kornmesser 2014b). Finally, he asks the question of whether the competition between these two paradigms is constructive or destructive. Destructive competition between para‐ digms is assumed to be governed by ideological debates similar to conflicts be‐ tween proponents of different religions. Kornmesser’s (2014b) answer to this question says that, first, the competition of the two paradigms is not of an ideo‐ logical nature and it is therefore, in the sense mentioned, not destructive. Second, their comparison is very restricted because they are incommensurable and 2.4 ›Lectures on Government and Binding‹ (Chomsky 1981) 73 <?page no="74"?> 87 See also section 2.2.2.2 on this, in a different context. methodologically complementary. Consequently, it seems to be the case that neither of the two paradigms is capable of replacing the other. With respect to our main problem (P), Kornmesser’s train of thought boils down to ( SP 17): (SP17) The basic term of the historiography of generative linguistics is ›scientific revolution without paradigm replacement‹ with respect to the relation be‐ tween the Theory of Government and Binding (Principles and Parameters) and Construction Grammar, its central hypothesis is (T16) and its framework is Kuhn (1970) [1962]. 2.4.2 No revolution In 1993 and 1994, a fierce debate was published in Zeitschrift für Sprachwissen‐ schaft. The target of Jäger’s article ( Jäger 1993a) was Chomsky’s cognitivism, which was declared in his work after the appearance of Syntactic Structures and had become powerful in the Theory of Government and Binding, as well as its widespread application by the beginning of the 1980s. Jäger’s thesis is this: (T18) The dominance of the Theory of Government and Binding significantly con‐ tributed to the decline of linguistics and the erosion of its object of investi‐ gation. Jäger’s first argument for (T18) is that the dominance of generative linguistics is a consequence of importing methodological principles from the natural sci‐ ences. Jäger points out that linguistics used the same procedure at each stage in the course of its history in so far as it redefined its object of investigation, i.e. ›language‹, by importing methodological principles and theoretical schemes in accord with the current development stage of the natural sciences. 87 During this procedure, linguistics demonstrates the current stage of the natural sciences as an example to be followed, and as a final stage of maturity to be achieved. According to Jäger (1993a: 83-84), early Indo-European linguistics is charac‐ terized by adjusting to the current status of the natural sciences - Spencer’s organology and Darwin’s theory of evolution. The school of the neogrammar‐ ians considered Comte’s positivism as an example to be followed. Chomsky’s linguistic theory adjusts to the cognitive sciences. When faced with the chal‐ lenge posed by the natural sciences, linguistics responded by identifying itself with the ›aggressor‹ and took over the approach that appeared to be progressive 2 From ›scientific revolution‹ to ›unscientific revolution‹ 74 <?page no="75"?> 88 Bierwisch (1993) and Grewendorf (1993) rejected Jäger’s claims and argued for the pro‐ gressive nature of the Theory of Government and Binding. Jäger’s (1993b) response did not contain new arguments in comparison to his keynote article ( Jäger 1993a) which had initiated the debate. Schnelle (1994) summarized and evaluated the debate. ( Jäger 1993a: 92). In the case of Government-Binding Theory, this was cogniti‐ vism. However, Jäger claims that the ›real‹ object of linguistics can be grasped by the hermeneutic-functional tradition, which examines ›human‹ communica‐ tion, as embedded in the complex system of its social and historical environment. Therefore, the extreme scientism of the Chomskyan theories, which excluded the kind of linguistics that belonged to the hermeneutic-functional tradition, leads to the decline of linguistics. Second, Jäger finds it paradoxical that while, on the one hand, cognitive science, according to its own judgment, has made much progress regarding the analysis of particular aspects of language, on the other hand, as a result of this ›progress‹, linguistics has lost control over its object of research, namely, the definition of ›language‹ ( Jäger 1993a: 90). As a consequence of the rigid adjustment to the methodology of the natural sciences, referred to as the ›ag‐ gressor‹, the history of the Chomskyan theories is nothing but the history of the erosion of ›language‹, as the object of linguistics ( Jäger 1993a: 79). In the course of this process, the object of research has narrowed down to such an extent that linguistics is not even capable of retaining its disciplinary identity. Third, similarly to Aarsleff (1970), Koerner (1989), (2002) and (2004), as well as Murray (1994), Jäger claims that generativists rewrite the history of linguistics in a biased manner. They highlight only scientistic views by glorifying them and hiding their shortcomings. In this way, they also distort or simply deny the progressive elements of theories belonging to the hermeneutic-functional tra‐ dition without which, however, modern linguistics could not have come into existence. 88 Jäger offers the following solution to (P): (SP18) The basic terms of the historiography of generative linguistics are ›ero‐ sion‹ and ›decline‹ with respect to the Theory of Government and Binding, its central hypothesis is (T17) and its framework is comparison to the herme‐ neutic-functional tradition. 2.4 ›Lectures on Government and Binding‹ (Chomsky 1981) 75 <?page no="76"?> 89 »[…] what conditions are imposed on the language faculty by virtue of (A) its place within the array of cognitive systems of the mind / brain, and (B) general considerations of conceptual naturalness that have some independent plausibility, namely, simplicity, economy, symmetry, nonredundancy, and the like? « (Chomsky 1995: 1). 90 »[…] language is something like a perfect system, meeting external constraints as well as can be done, in one of the reasonable ways. The Minimalist Program for linguistic theory seeks to explore these possibilities.« (Chomsky 1995: 1) 91 For the application of the Galilean style of science in generative linguistics, see for example Botha (1983) and Kertész (2012). 2.5 ›The Minimalist Program‹ (Chomsky 1995) 2.5.0 Background information The following characteristics of minimalism (see e.g. Piatelli-Palmarini 1998; Boeckx 2006) should be highlighted: • The leading principles of grammar are economy, virtual conceptual ne‐ cessity, perfection and symmetry. 89 ›Economy‹ means that only the min‐ imal number of operations and symbols necessary for obtaining the output of analyses should be assumed. ›Virtual conceptual necessity‹ re‐ fers to the assumption that there are a series of ›big facts‹ we know about language and that these should be captured by any linguistic theory. Since theories may be wrong, ›conceptual necessity‹ is only ›virtual‹. As re‐ gards ›perfection‹, the starting idea is that the human language faculty is part of the biological constitution of humans and thus part of nature. 90 Nature is the way it is because this is the only way it could be. In this sense, nature is simple and perfect. Hence, since the language faculty is part of nature and nature is simple and perfect, language is simple and perfect in the same sense, too. ›Symmetry‹ is closely related to economy and virtual conceptual necessity. Namely, if there is symmetry, then the operations involved in generating structures will be few in number and simple, and it will be easier to construct a theory characterized, among others, by virtual conceptual necessity. • The Minimalist Program presupposes the Theory of Principles and Pa‐ rameters. Nevertheless, the analytic and explanatory apparatus has been radically simplified. • As already declared within the Principles and Parameters framework, linguistics is considered to be a natural science, specifically, biology. • The Galilean style in science has been applied (already advocated in Gov‐ ernment-Binding Theory). 91 In Chomsky’s interpretation, the ›Galilean 2 From ›scientific revolution‹ to ›unscientific revolution‹ 76 <?page no="77"?> 92 According to a certain part of the literature, what Chomsky seems to mean by this term has little to do with the views Galileo had. See for this, e.g. Botha (1983) and Riemer (2009), as well as the historiographical literature cited there. Nevertheless, in this book it is not our task to check whether Chomsky interpreted Galileo correctly or not. What matters is that, independently of its origin, the ›Galilean style in science‹ refers to a set of methodological principles which Chomsky expects to be followed in theoretical lin‐ guistics. 93 »The P&P model is in part a bold speculation rather than a specific hypoth‐ esis.« (Chomsky 1995: 7) style in science‹ consists of three components (for discussion see Botha 1983, Boeckx 2006, 2010, Freidin 2007, Freidin & Vergnaud 2001, Riemer 2009). 92 The first is the conviction that the way nature works can be cap‐ tured by mathematical structures. According to the second, one may reach a deep understanding of the universe by abstracting from what can be observed on the surface of phenomena. The third is what the literature calls ›epistemological tolerance‹ and considers the key component of Chomsky’s idea of the ›Galilean style in science‹ (Botha 1983, Klausen‐ burger 1983, Riemer 2009, Kertész 2012). Contradictions between the data and the hypotheses may be temporarily tolerated, in the hope that later development will resolve them, and in order to protect the explanatory principles. • As minimalism is not a well-established theory, but only a program, it enables us to evaluate such alternative solutions to various problems that a mature theory would not permit (see e.g. Boeckx 2006). 93 2.5.1 Revolution 2.5.1.1 Revolution within a revolution As with every stage of generative linguistics, minimalism (Chomsky, 1995) has also been the object of debates and divided the professional community. Ac‐ cording to one extreme view, »[…] the Minimalist Program is indeed a revolution within a revolution« (Piatelli-Palmarini 1998: xxii). Thus, the thesis: (T19) The Minimalist Program is a revolution within the revolution of generative linguistics. It is not clear in what historiographical framework and in what sense Pia‐ telli-Palmarini uses the term ›revolution within a revolution‹. Nevertheless, as Joseph (1995: 380) mentions in a different context, the idea of constant revolution 2.5 ›The Minimalist Program‹ (Chomsky 1995) 77 <?page no="78"?> 94 »It is very tempting to review the development of generative grammar by starting with Chomsky’s first published work, Syntactic Structures (1957). Conceptually, however, it makes much more sense to start with Chomsky’s review of Skinner’s Verbal Behavior (Chomsky 1959) and the first chapter of Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (Chomsky 1965), along with Lennebergs 1967 landmark on the Biological Foundations of Lan‐ guage. This is not to deny that Syntactic Structures initiated a revolution in linguistics. It clearly did. But the revolutionary character of that work, and of the work it was based on (The logical structure of linguistic theory, 1955), becomes even more significant once it is embedded in the psychological (mentalist) and biological setting that is made ex‐ plicit in Chomsky (1959) and even more so in Chomsky (1965) and Lenneberg (1967).« (Boeckx 2006: 16) 95 For the criticism of Boeckx’s approach, see Kertész (2010b). is not compatible with the Kuhnian framework. Therefore, Piatelli-Palmarini’s stance cannot be supported by Kuhnian considerations. The following solution is offered for (P): (SP19) The basic term of the historiography of generative linguistics is ›revolution within a revolution‹ with respect to the Minimalist Program, its central hy‐ pothesis is (T18) and its framework is undefined. 2.5.1.2 Lakatosian research program Boeckx does not question the revolutionary nature of generative linguistics. 94 However, he thinks its significance can be best understood in the light of men‐ talism and biolinguistics which evolved into minimalism. Therefore, we did not go into Boeckx’s view in discussing Syntactic Structures but present it at relative length with respect to minimalism. Boeckx’s argumentation centers on the view that the basic features of mini‐ malism are identical to those of ›scientific research programs‹ in the sense of Lakatos (1970b). Boeckx (2006) argues for the following thesis: 95 (T20) The Minimalist Program is a research program in the sense of Lakatos (1970b). We summarize the main features of the Lakatosian framework below. Boeckx’s argumentation revolves around the view that the basic features of minimalism are identical to those of ›scientific research programs‹ in the sense of Lakatos (1970b), which are the following: Scientific research programs are not finalized, mature theories, but keep changing and developing during a long maturing process (Boeckx 2006: 6, 2 From ›scientific revolution‹ to ›unscientific revolution‹ 78 <?page no="79"?> 91-93). It is this tenet that is at the heart of Boeckx’s approach and that motivates his line of argumentation (Boeckx 2006: 5). Namely, contrasting the term ›pro‐ gram‹ with ›theory‹ highlights the circumstance that […] we are still far from having a fully-fledged minimalist theory of language. This fact has important repercussions for what it means to do research in the minimalist program. A program is open-ended, it may take a long time to mature, it allows re‐ searchers to make maximal use of their creativity as they try to move from minimalist guidelines to concrete principles, it makes room for multiple, not necessarily mutually consistent and compatible perspectives, and it cannot be evaluated in terms of true or false, but in terms of fecund or sterile (Boeckx 2006: 6; emphasis added). This quotation expresses very well those aspects which a suitable methodolog‐ ical framework of minimalism is expected to capture. In Boeckx’s view the only such framework is Lakatos’ term ›scientific research program‹, which he there‐ fore adopts (Boeckx 2006: 6-7, 87-91). A scientific research program in Lakatos’ sense comprises a core that corre‐ sponds to the essence of the program in that it includes those components which are protected from refutation. The core is supplemented by auxiliary hypotheses which might change flexibly or which may yield alternatives that are different from each other yet all compatible with the core. Accordingly, the main task of characterizing minimalism is the identification of the core and the alternative auxiliary hypotheses. This is in harmony with the development and simulta‐ neous existence of the various approaches within minimalism (Boeckx 2006: 88). This type of scientific research program cannot be falsified or verified, but is ›progressive‹ or ›degenerating‹. A program is degenerating if the theories that belong to it are restricted to the accommodation of familiar knowledge. Boeckx (2006: 89, footnote 22) characterizes the last period of the era of Gov‐ ernment-Binding Theory as being degenerated in this sense: »New facts were accommodated in an ad hoc fashion, often by revising definitions of central relations (like government) on a case by case basis, with no great sense of unity«. Progressive programs make unexpected predictions, lead to radically new in‐ sights, shed fresh light on what has been assumed to be known, and raise new problems that pave the way to seeing things from new perspectives. 2.5 ›The Minimalist Program‹ (Chomsky 1995) 79 <?page no="80"?> 96 In general, heuristics are problem solving strategies which are (a) simple, (b) whose aim is to explore large domains in order to find a solution to the problem in question, and which also, (c) do not necessarily lead to a solution, not to mention an optimal solution. The most that can be expected from heuristics is that they temporarily and fallibly outline some kind of guidelines, a trick or a method applicable in the local circumstances that bring us closer to one of the possible solutions. As opposed to heuristics, algorithms yield the solutions of problems with certainty. Some peculiarities of heuristics, which will play a key role in our argumentation, will be presented in Chapters 4 and 5 in a different context. Scientific research programs are related to positive or negative heuristics (Boeckx 2006: 6-7, 89-91). 96 Lakatos adopts the term ›heuristics‹ from Polya (1948) and (1954). In Lakatosian ›scientific research programs‹, negative heu‐ ristics identify the ›core‹, that is, those components of the program which need to be protected against refuting evidence. Positive heuristics comprise problem solving strategies which serve the development, the refinement and the exten‐ sion of the program. Although Boeckx does not call the revolutionary impact of Chomsky (1957) into question, in his opinion the key work that triggered the rise of generativism simultaneously with the abandonment of neo-Bloomfieldian structuralism was Chomsky’s (1959) famous review of Skinner (1957), because it initiated the de‐ velopment of biolinguistics (Boeckx 2006: 16). Clearly, if the starting point of generative linguistics is interpreted in this way, then its further intellectual history can be seen as a linear process leading to the current interplay between biology and minimalism. This is the perspective from which Boeckx identifies the major driving forces of the development that culminated in the Minimalist Program. The first of these is that a theory of language should aim at explanatory adequacy, which is reached if the theory accounts for the biologically given structure making it possible for children to select a descriptively adequate grammar on the basis of primary linguistic data (Boeckx 2006: 18-19; Chomsky 1965: 25). Yet this aim brings with it - as the next driving force of the develop‐ ment of generative linguistics - the logical problem of language acquisition. In order to explain the solution to this problem, Boeckx highlights the necessity of assuming the biological basis of language acquisition, regarded as the ›language organ‹ which constrains the range of possible grammars (Boeckx 2006: 27). Against the background of this hypothesis, the next issue is how the language organ can be accounted for in computational terms. As an answer, Boeckx pro‐ vides a concise overview of Chomsky’s early argument against modeling grammar by finite state machines and sketches the process that led - via phrase structure grammars, transformations and conditions on transformations - to the Principles and Parameters approach. This historical process provides, ac‐ 2 From ›scientific revolution‹ to ›unscientific revolution‹ 80 <?page no="81"?> cording to Boeckx, the two major pillars on which the Minimalist Program rests (Boeckx 2006: 60): first, the solution of the logical problem of language acquis‐ ition within the Principles and Parameters approach, presupposing the language organ in a biological sense, and second, the emphasis on the formal tools of the theory of language which conform to the Galilean style in science. The core of the Minimalist Program - in Lakatos’ sense - includes a tripod which rests on the Principles and Parameters approach: virtual conceptual ne‐ cessity, economy and symmetry. With respect to the auxiliary hypotheses that supplement the core, the basic insight is that [a]s for auxiliary hypotheses, their existence simply indicates that there are various ways of articulating and defending a given research program. […] Programs allow researchers to try different combinations of the basic tenets, and to develop them with different emphases, vantage points, and ways of directing attention. The core will remain as a nucleus for observations and reflections, but beyond that there is great freedom and flexibility (Boeckx 2006: 94; emphasis added). Boeckx discusses the significance of minimalism by elucidating two issues: how minimalism goes beyond explanatory adequacy and how it can resolve the ten‐ sion between the search for general laws, simplicity and perfectness on the one hand, and the seemingly very different methods applied in biological inquiry on the other. It is the previously emphasized Galilean style in science that is at the heart of both issues. The deepest question of the natural sciences is: why is nature the way it is? The Galilean answer says that nature is the way it is »[…] because that is the simplest way it could be« (Boeckx 2006: 115); in this sense, nature is ›perfect‹. Minimalism goes beyond explanatory adequacy insofar as it asks the question resulting from this Galilean worldview: to what degree is language perfect? (Boeckx 2006: 116). Nevertheless, the problem emerges that while the Galilean style in science is rooted in physics, minimalism considers itself to be biology, and biology appears to be very different from physics. Bi‐ ology has not been able to adopt the Galilean style because - primarily due to the diversity of the phenomena it investigates - its aim is not to reveal the kind of natural laws which are the subject matter of physics (Boeckx 2006: 131-138). Therefore, minimalism challenges biology. Boeckx (2006: 151) argues that this challenge can be met because »[…] the adherence to the Galilean style […] promises to yield important hypotheses not just in the strictly linguistic realm of grammatical analyses but also in the realm of biology at large«. We summarize Boeckx’s solution to (P) in ( SP 20): 2.5 ›The Minimalist Program‹ (Chomsky 1995) 81 <?page no="82"?> 97 The literature abounds in similar evaluations. For example, Behme’s (2014: 672) analysis also concludes that Chomsky’s »recent work fails to meet serious scientific standards because he rejects scientific procedure, inflates the value of his own work, and distorts the work of others […].« See also Postal’s (2003), (2004), (2009) (2012a), (2012b) publi‐ cations. (SP20) The basic term of the historiography of generative linguistics is ›scientific research program‹ with respect to the Minimalist Program, its central hy‐ pothesis is (T20) and its framework is Lakatos (1970b). 2.5.2 No revolution 2.5.2.1 Spurious science According to others, however (Searle 2002a; Postal 2003; Pullum 1996; Seuren 2004 etc.), minimalism is neither revolutionary nor a progressive research pro‐ gram. This perspective will be represented by the example of Seuren (2004). The thesis is the following: (T21) The Minimalist Program is spurious science. According to Seuren (2004: 3), the Minimalist Program represents not the glo‐ rification but rather the destruction of the development that Chomsky started with his early work. What is more, 97 […] Chomsky’s book The Minimalist Program is a sad example of spurious science, as it fails to satisfy basic scientific criteria, such as respect for data, unambiguous formu‐ lations, falsifiability, and also, on a different level, simple good manners (Seuren, 2004: 4; emphasis added). Seuren (2004: 8-10) bases his judgment on methodological criteria taken from the philosophy of science. Referring to Popper (1959), he maintains that ac‐ cording to the analytic philosophy of science there are generally accepted cri‐ teria of scientific rationality which are rooted in common sense knowledge and are timeless. However, he also notes that this picture of science has been ques‐ tioned by recent post-Kuhnian approaches which tend to relativism and which highlight the role of social factors in scientific inquiry. The latter maintain that the content of scientific knowledge is determined by social factors that change over time and that are shaped by the structure of social groups and social in‐ terests. Seuren chooses the middle course between these extremes. He does not deny that social factors can influence scientific inquiry, but at the same time, in 2 From ›scientific revolution‹ to ›unscientific revolution‹ 82 <?page no="83"?> 98 For criticisms of Seuren’s stance, see e.g. Grohmann (2005), Fiengo (2006) and ten Hacken (2006). 99 In this context, it is worth noting that Searle - who declared generative linguistics to be revolutionary in a Kuhnian sense in his famous article published in The New York Review of Books in 1972 (see Searle, 1972) - considers that the revolution has been unsuccessful in the same journal thirty years later (Searle, 2002a). See Chomsky’s (2002b) and Bromberger’s (2002) response, as well as Searle’s responses in return (Searle, 2002b, c). See also Section 2.1.1.1. accordance with the principles of the analytical philosophy of science, he also assumes that scientific values have universal features. He holds that […] work that presents itself as in any way scientific or academic should satisfy certain judiciously applied elementary criteria of common rationality: clarity of expression; faithfulness to the relevant facts that are, or can be made, available, acceptance of whatever can be concluded on the basis of these facts; and a mandatory preference for the ›best theory‹ - that is, for the theory that explains more facts with less ma‐ chinery than rival theories on the market (Seuren 2004: 10). In Seuren’s view, the Minimalist Program fails to meet these criteria, and the final verdict is: 98 […] In the end, one is left with a story that is partly an incoherent fantasy […] and partly a repetition of old principles and methods (ibid 14). The MP does not emerge as a serious theory of grammar or language. Based as it is on flimsy general premises, an unsound methodology, unclear formulations and ideas, and a fatal scarcity of data. Every single element in the MP, to the extent that it was not taken over from elsewhere, has turned out to be badly researched, vaguely pre‐ sented, or unsufficiently tested (ibid. 228). The solution offered for (P) is: 99 (SP21) The basic term of the historiography of generative linguistics is ›spurious science‹ with respect to the Minimalist Program, its central hypothesis is (T21) and its framework is the generally accepted criteria of scientific ration‐ ality in the analytic philosophy of science. 2.5.2.2 Unscientific revolution We mentioned in Section 2.4.1 that the work of Lappin, Levine and Johnson - whose ironical title, The Structure of Unscientific Revolutions, intended to para‐ phrase the title of Kuhn’s book - created a heated debate by arguing for the following thesis: 2.5 ›The Minimalist Program‹ (Chomsky 1995) 83 <?page no="84"?> (T22) (a) Although the development of generative linguistics including the Theory of Government and Binding can rightly be called revolu‐ tionary, minimalism is a step backwards. (b) The retention of the Minimalist Program is motivated exclusively by the authoritative organization of the generative community, and not by its scientific significance. When arguing for (T22)(a), Lappin et al. (2000a,b, 2001), emphasize in different ways that they are in agreement with the claim according to which generative linguistics has been revolutionary since the end of the 1950s, culminating in Government-Binding Theory. However, they cannot provide a rational explan‐ ation for the circumstance that the progression of this revolutionary change came to halt as a result of the uncritical acceptance of minimalism. The authors analyze the main categories of minimalism, which we listed in the first point in Section 2.5.0 - above all, the term ›perfection‹ -, and they draw the conclusion that minimalism is built upon the vague metaphor of ›perfectness‹ instead of a firm empirical basis (Lappin et al. 2000a: 666). Contrary to the second point in 2.5.0, they demonstrate that it is precisely those categories which were excluded from the technical apparatus of minimalism that made the Theory of Principles and Parameters so well-known and successful worldwide (Lappin et al. 2000a: 668-9). In connection with the third point in Section 2.5.0, they consider Uriagereka (1998) to be the propagandistic defense of minimalism and take it as an example to demonstrate that minimalism »does not manage to specify even a remotely credible connection between the concepts and methodology of the MP [the Min‐ imalist Program] and those of the natural sciences« (Lappin et al. 2000a: 667-668; emphasis added; see also Levine 2002). Opposing the fourth point, they believe that minimalism is by no stretch of the imagination an implementation of the ideal of Galilean science. Instead, they argue that »this groundless aura of scientism is used to promote the view that minimalist theory has brought the study of syntax to a level of precision and empirical coverage comparable to that of chemistry and physics« (Lappin et al. 2000a: 667; emphasis added). Finally, the fact that minimalism is referred to as ›only‹ a program (see the fifth point in Section 2.5.0), from which one cannot expect results as mature and rigorous as from a theory, attempts to turn a shortcoming into a virtue. Namely, the authors express their doubts regarding the statement that minimalism is not a theory, but only a program, since the transition to the Minimalist Program from the Theory of Government and Binding involves a significant theoretical change (Lappin et al.: 2000b: 902). 2 From ›scientific revolution‹ to ›unscientific revolution‹ 84 <?page no="85"?> 100 Note that according to current trends in the sociology of knowledge, group membership has a decisive role in shaping the content of cognition. See e.g. Bloor (1976), (1983), Barnes et al. (2002). We have to add that according to argumentation theory rooted in the Aristotelian tradition, ›appeal to authority‹ (argumentum ad verecundiam) is one of the most harmful fallacies. 101 For a brief reconstruction of this conclusion, see Piatelli-Palmarini (2000: 859) 102 See ten Hacken (2007: 107, 122-123) and Boeckx (2006: 101, 122, 154, 158) as more recent defenses of minimalism against Lappin et al.’s arguments. Concerning (T22)(b), the authors find it »mystical« that the group of gen‐ erativists that had previously been enthusiastic about the Theory of Government and Binding and applied it successfully, gave it up overnight and stood up for a less mature program that lacked a firm methodological and empirical foundation and had not resulted in new scientific insights. They find it difficult to under‐ stand that »large numbers of researchers should substitute one theory for an‐ other simply on the basis of Chomsky’s personal authority, without subjecting his assumptions to the sort of critical evaluation that they would normally apply to theoretical innovations proposed under different authorship« (Lappin et al. 2000a: 669; emphasis added). Thus, in the authors’ view, rational argumentation is of a minor significance in generative linguistics (Lappin et al., 2000a: 670), and the solution of the ›mys‐ tery‹ is, as the last quotation shows, authority and group membership. 100 As their final conclusion, the authors question whether the Minimalist Pro‐ gram is scientific at all (cf. Lappin et al. 2000a: 670, 2000b: 878, 2001: 916), saying: »We know of no serious scientific discipline where theoretical para‐ digms are granted large scale acceptance in such a cavalier and uncritical manner« (Lappin et al., 2000a, p. 670). 101 This conclusion is even sharper than Seuren’s: while Seuren characterizes minimalism as spurious science, Lappin et al. suggest that it is not even a science, but, as the title of their target article suggests, the result of an »unscientific revolution«. The authors do not define their historiographical framework, but it obviously follows from the paraphrase of the title of Kuhn’s book and the use of Kuhnian terminology (›paradigm‹, ›paradigm shift‹) that they consider the Kuhnian ap‐ proach to the history of science as their historiographical point of departure. Lappin, Levine and Johnson’s article was followed by a debate in the same journal, in which the arguments for and against minimalism, and parallel to this, the opinions on the revolutionary nature of minimalism versus that of the Theory of Government and Binding polarized. 102 Lappin et al.’s solution for (P) can be reconstructed as follows: 2.5 ›The Minimalist Program‹ (Chomsky 1995) 85 <?page no="86"?> 103 A recent interview is Andor (2015). (SP22) The basic term of the historiography of generative linguistics with respect to the Minimalist Program is ›authority‹ and ›unscientific‹, its central hypoth‐ esis is (T22) and its historiographical framework is Kuhn (1970) [1962]. 2.6 Digression: Chomsky’s self-assessment Chomsky evaluated his own work in many interviews. 103 His answers to the questions raised cannot be treated as a historiographical achievement; however, it may be instructive to reflect on them, as they contribute to our understanding of the historiographical standpoints surveyed in the present book. Although, according to Murray (1994: 244, footnote 20; 246, footnote 22; 1989: 154) and Koerner (2004: 51), Chomsky did not use the word ›revolution‹ to characterize his own theories, from some of his statements we may infer that he considers the Theory of Government and Binding (Chomsky 1981) - or as it was later called, the Theory of Principles and Parameters (Chomsky & Lasnik 1993) - revolutionary. On the one hand, it is interesting to compare the arguments for the Kuhnian revolutionary nature of Syntactic Structures (see Section 2.1.1) with the way in which Chomsky, in the interview he gave to Riny Huybregts and Henk van Riemsdijk in 1979, rejects the statement that the first 25 years of generative lin‐ guistics can be considered a Kuhnian revolution, because Kuhn’s work »is wildly misused outside the natural sciences« (Chomsky 2004: 66). He continues as fol‐ lows: So I think that Kuhn’s notions do not really apply outside the fields in which really significant intellectual progress takes place. […] I just do not think that linguistics has undergone any kind of intellectual revolution (Chomsky 2004: 66). He interprets early generative linguistics as a refinement - and not as a radical replacement - of the method of neo-Bloomfieldian structuralism: […] it was very striking to me when transformational grammar first gained a certain small degree of popularity in the early 60s, to notice that primarily it was just used as another descriptive device. There are things that you can describe in that way more easily than in terms of constituent structure, but that is not a fundamental conceptual change […] Chomsky (2004: 66; emphasis added). 2 From ›scientific revolution‹ to ›unscientific revolution‹ 86 <?page no="87"?> 104 One of Kuhn’s examples of scientific revolution was his case study on the Copernican Revolution (Kuhn 1957). See also Murray’s (1989: 165-166, footnote 6) remark on whether the appeal to such an analogue is justified. 105 See also: »[…] more has been learned about the nature of language in the past 25 years than in the previous 2500« (Newmeyer 1986c: 80). He adds that »all of this work of the past twenty-five years [relative to 1979] is preliminary to a future conceptual revolution which I think we can begin to speculate about the vague outlines of« (Chomsky 2004: 67; emphasis added). In rejecting the revolutionary nature of his early work, Chomsky contradicts those of his followers who continue to assert the revolutionary nature of Syntactic Structures, while, in this respect, he seems to share the standpoint of those pub‐ lications that at the outset rejected the idea that Syntactic Structures was revo‐ lutionary (Hymes & Fought 1982, Murray 1994, Koerner 1989, 2002, 2004, Harris 1993, etc.). The above quotations are noteworthy in yet another respect. Inter‐ estingly enough, while the quotation maintains that in Chomsky’s view his early work was not revolutionary, this claim refers to the very phase of his profes‐ sional career in which - according to Murray, Lakoff, Harris and others - Chomsky applied revolutionary rhetoric as his most important weapon in the generativist war against the neo-Bloomfieldians. On the other hand, in an interview by Grewendorf he mentioned the Theory of Principles and Parameters without, however, referring to Kuhn, when he was asked which phase of generative linguistics he found revolutionary (Grewendorf 1994: 293). Chomsky (2002a: 95) describes the significance of the Theory of Government and Binding - which was explained systematically in lectures he gave in Pisa and later published as Chomsky (1981) - using expressions which might remind one of the usual characterization of the Copernican Revolu‐ tion: 104 The whole history of the subject, for thousands of years, had been a history of rules and constructions, and transformational grammar in the early days, generative grammar, just took it over. So the early generative grammar had a very traditional flair. […] What happened in the Pisa discussion was that the whole framework was turned upside down. […] the way of looking at things was totally different from any‐ thing that had come before, and it opened the way to an enormous explosion of re‐ search in all sorts of areas, typologically very varied. […] In fact I think it is fair to say that more has been learned about language in the last twenty years than in the preceding 2000 years (Chomsky 2002a: 95; emphasis added). 105 Nevertheless, even in this context he does not use the term ›revolution‹. Nor does he assume the revolutionary nature of the Minimalist Program. In a lecture 2.6 Digression: Chomsky’s self-assessment 87 <?page no="88"?> he remarked: »My feeling about linguistics is that we’re in a pre-Galilean stage. Maybe there will come a scientific revolution, but we are still struggling towards it« (Chomsky 2011). 2.7 Summary 2.7.1 Overview In chapter 2 we described the solutions that current historiographical ap‐ proaches offered to the following problem: (P) What historiographical framework, central hypothesis and basic terms can ac‐ count for the history of generative linguistics? Table 1 presents the solutions according to the parameters in (P). Chomsky’s work repre‐ senting a par‐ ticular phase in the history of generative linguistics The historiographical framework Central thesis Basic terms Author Chomsky (1957) Kuhn (1970) [1962] (T1) As a result of the ›climate of opinion‹, Syntactic Struc‐ tures triggered a scientific rev‐ olution in lin‐ guistics in Kuhn’s sense and led to a new paradigm. climate of opinion, scien‐ tific revolu‐ tion, paradigm Koerner (1978) [1972] Allan’s eclectic approach to linguistic met‐ atheory (T2) Syntactic Structures led to a paradigm shift in the Kuhnian sense from an induc‐ tivist paradigm to a hypo‐ thetico-deduc‐ tivist one whereby the core of Chom‐ sky’s revolu‐ scientific revo‐ lution, para‐ digm, inducti‐ vism, hypo‐ thetico-deduc‐ tivism Allan (2003), (2007) 2 From ›scientific revolution‹ to ›unscientific revolution‹ 88 <?page no="89"?> Chomsky’s work repre‐ senting a par‐ ticular phase in the history of generative linguistics The historiographical framework Central thesis Basic terms Author tion is the re‐ placement of discovering grammars with their justifica‐ tion and evalu‐ ation. Al‐ though a theory of lan‐ guage must be a hypo‐ thetico-deduc‐ tive theory, it also needs in‐ ductive data gathering. ten Hacken’s (2007) historio‐ graphical ap‐ proach to the methodology of scientific in‐ quiry (T3) Syntactic Structures trig‐ gered an ›intel‐ lectual revolu‐ tion‹ because it led to a new ›research program‹. research pro‐ gram, scientific revo‐ lution ten Hacken (2007) Laudan (1977) (T4) Syntactic Structures trig‐ gered a scien‐ tific revolution in the sense of Laudan (1977) rather than in the Kuhnian (1970) [1962] sense and thus led to a new ›research tradition‹. scientific revo‐ lution, research tradi‐ tion Newmeyer (1986b) the method‐ ology of lin‐ guistic histori‐ ography as discussed in Koerner (1989), (2002), (2004) (T5) The move‐ ment initiated by Syntactic Structures was not a revolu‐ tion in any sense; rather, it evolution Koerner (1989), (2002), (2004) 2.7 Summary 89 <?page no="90"?> Chomsky’s work repre‐ senting a par‐ ticular phase in the history of generative linguistics The historiographical framework Central thesis Basic terms Author was the evolu‐ tion of the American lin‐ guistics of the 1950s. the compar‐ ison of the mathematical and logical lit‐ erature with the linguistic literature be‐ fore 1957 (T6) Syntactic Structures orig‐ inates in the formal sci‐ ences. formal sciences Tomalin (2008) the combina‐ tion of histor‐ iographical terms, sources and research aspects (T7) Neo-Bloom‐ fieldian struc‐ turalism was not a coherent school, but consisted of a variety of alter‐ native trends and individual initiatives. Within neo-Bloomfiel‐ dian structur‐ alism, Syntactic Structures con‐ tributed to the victory of Zellig S. Harris’ s ap‐ proach over that of Trager and Smith’s. The historiog‐ raphy of gener‐ ative linguis‐ tics does not rely on a single basic term; rather, with re‐ spect to Syn‐ tactic Struc‐ tures, it requires a net‐ work of terms which is able to grasp the dif‐ ferentiated and complex na‐ ture of the his‐ tory of linguis‐ tics. Hymes & Fought (1981) [1975] The philolo‐ gical analysis and the history of ideas as ap‐ plied in Mat‐ thews (1993), (2001) (T8) Syntactic Structures is the direct con‐ tinuation and the improve‐ ment of the dis‐ tributionalism of Bloomfiel‐ distribution Matthews (1993), (2001) 2 From ›scientific revolution‹ to ›unscientific revolution‹ 90 <?page no="91"?> Chomsky’s work repre‐ senting a par‐ ticular phase in the history of generative linguistics The historiographical framework Central thesis Basic terms Author dian and neo-Bloomfiel‐ dian linguistics the association of historiog‐ raphy with the perspective of the philosophy of science, fo‐ cusing on the general princi‐ ples of scien‐ tific rationality (T9) Syntactic Structures is original insofar as it systemat‐ ized and criti‐ cally evaluated the theses, terms and methods of neo-Bloomfiel‐ dian structur‐ alism. In com‐ parison to neo-Bloomfiel‐ dianism, the novelty of Syn‐ tactic Struc‐ tures is of a metatheoret‐ ical, rather than of a lin‐ guistic nature. metatheory Seuren (1998) the sociolog‐ ical theory based on Grif‐ fith & Miller (1970) and Griffith & Mul‐ lins (1972), rooted in the critique of Kuhn (1970) [1962] (T10) After the publication of Syntactic Struc‐ tures, Chomsky and his ›mili‐ tant group‹ did not set off a sci‐ entific revolu‐ tion, but rather carried out a ›palace coup‹ followed by revolu‐ tionary rhet‐ oric revolutionary rhetoric, coup Murray (1980), (1994) postmodern psychological, sociological (T11) After the publication of Syntactic Struc‐ tures, Chom‐ rhetoric, the linguistics wars Harris (1993a) 2.7 Summary 91 <?page no="92"?> Chomsky’s work repre‐ senting a par‐ ticular phase in the history of generative linguistics The historiographical framework Central thesis Basic terms Author and rhetorical analysis sky’s group started a ›lin‐ guistics war‹ against neo-Bloomfiel‐ dians and won it by applying rhetorical means. Chomsky (1965) Kuhn (1970) [1962] (T12) It was As‐ pects of the Theory of Syntax that triggered a sci‐ entific revolu‐ tion in linguis‐ tics and led to the birth of a new paradigm. scientific revo‐ lution, para‐ digm Koerner (1989), (2002), (2004); McCawley (1976) Lakatos (1970b) (T13) The re‐ ceived view ac‐ cording to which Chom‐ sky’s interpre‐ tive semantics refuted the tenets of gen‐ erative seman‐ tics is »essen‐ tially ideological in character and scientifically unjustifiable«. ideology, rhet‐ oric, argumen‐ tation Huck & Gold‐ smith (1995) memoir com‐ plemented by metatheoret‐ ical reflection (T14) The intel‐ lectual differ‐ ences between interpretive and generative semantics trig‐ gered by As‐ pects originate from the dif‐ ferent evalua‐ scientific method, per‐ sonality Lakoff (1989) 2 From ›scientific revolution‹ to ›unscientific revolution‹ 92 <?page no="93"?> Chomsky’s work repre‐ senting a par‐ ticular phase in the history of generative linguistics The historiographical framework Central thesis Basic terms Author tion of the sci‐ entific method, and the differ‐ ences between two kinds of personality in‐ volved in the debate. Halle (1959) and Chomsky & Halle (1968) Kuhn (1970) [1962] (T15) It was generative phonology that ignited a scien‐ tific revolu‐ tion. scientific revo‐ lution, para‐ digm Murray (1994) Chomsky (1981) Kuhn (1970) [1962] (T16) Govern‐ ment-Binding Theory (the Theory of Prin‐ ciples and Pa‐ rameters) led to a Kuhnian revolution. scientific revo‐ lution, para‐ digm Grewendorf (1993), (2007) Kuhn (1970) [1962] (T17) The rela‐ tion of the Theory of Prin‐ ciples and Pa‐ rameters to Construction Grammar is that of a Kuh‐ nian scientific revolution. There is no paradigm re‐ placement be‐ tween them; rather, they are coexisting rival paradigms. scientific revo‐ lution without paradigm re‐ placement Kornmesser (2014a), (2014b) the herme‐ neutic-functio‐ nalist tradition (T18) The dom‐ inance of the Theory of Gov‐ ernment and erosion, de‐ cline Jäger (1993a), (1993b) 2.7 Summary 93 <?page no="94"?> Chomsky’s work repre‐ senting a par‐ ticular phase in the history of generative linguistics The historiographical framework Central thesis Basic terms Author Binding signif‐ icantly contrib‐ uted to the de‐ cline of linguistics and the erosion of its object of in‐ vestigation. Chomsky (1995c) ? (T19) The Min‐ imalist Pro‐ gram (Chomsky 1995c) is a rev‐ olution within the revolution of generative linguistics. revolution within a revo‐ lution Piatelli-Pal‐ marini (1998) Lakatos (1970b) (T20) The Min‐ imalist Pro‐ gram is a scien‐ tific research program in the sense of La‐ katos (1970b). scientific re‐ search pro‐ gram Boeckx (2006) the generally accepted cri‐ teria of scien‐ tific rationality in the analyt‐ ical philosophy of science (T21) The Min‐ imalist Pro‐ gram is spu‐ rious science. spurious sci‐ ence Seuren (2004) Kuhn (1970) [1962] (T22) Although the develop‐ ment of gener‐ ative linguis‐ tics including the Theory of Government and Binding can rightly be called revolu‐ tionary, mini‐ malism is a step authority, un‐ scientific Lappin et al. (2000a), (2000b), (2001) 2 From ›scientific revolution‹ to ›unscientific revolution‹ 94 <?page no="95"?> 106 The abbreviations are as follows: SS = Syntactic Structures, GB = Government-Binding Theory, SPE = The Sound Pattern of English, MP = The Minimalist Program. For the criteria of systematization see Section 2.0. Chomsky’s work repre‐ senting a par‐ ticular phase in the history of generative linguistics The historiographical framework Central thesis Basic terms Author backwards. The retention of the Mini‐ malist Program is motivated exclusively by the authorita‐ tive organiza‐ tion of the gen‐ erative community, and not by its scientific sig‐ nificance. Table 1 Figures 2 and 3 summarize these approaches with respect to the criteria, as well as Chomsky’s main works mentioned in Section 2.0. 106 The relations between the different solutions proposed for (P) are much more refined and complex than can be grasped from Figures 1, 2 and 3. These rela‐ tionships have already been touched on during the discussion of the approaches. However, in order to prepare their metahistoriographical evaluation, we will systematize and illustrate them by instructive examples in the next two sections. 2.7 Summary 95 <?page no="96"?> Chomsky's generative linguistics MP Aspects GB SPE SS revolution no revolution Kuhnian revolution other kinds of revolution K u h n i a n r e v o l u t i o n a n d t h e c l i m a t e o f o p i n i o n ( K o e r n e r 1 9 7 8 ) ( S P 1 ) K u h n i a n r e v o l u t i o n a n d l i n g u i s t i c m e t a t h e o r y ( A l l a n 2 0 0 3 , 2 0 0 7 ) ( S P 2 ) i n t e l l e c t u a l r e v o l u t i o n ( t e n H a c k e n 2 0 0 7 ) ( S P 3 ) L a u d a n i a n r e v o l u t i o n ( N e w m e y e r 1 9 8 6 b ) ( S P 4 ) e v o l u t i o n ( K o e r n e r 1 9 8 9 ) ( S P 5 ) f o r m a l s c i e n c e s ( T o m a l i n 2 0 0 8 ) ( S P 6 ) n e o - B l o o m f i e l d i a n t r e n d ( H y m e s a n d F o u g h t 1 9 8 1 ) ( S P 7 ) t h e i m p r o v e m e n t o f d i s t r i b u t i o n a l i s m ( M a t t h e w s 1 9 9 3 ) ( S P 8 ) m e t a l i n g u i s t i c s ( S e u r e n 1 9 9 8 ) ( S P 9 ) r h e t o r i c r e v o l u t i o n a r y r h e t o r i c a n d c o u p ( M u r r a y 1 9 9 4 ) ( S P 1 0 ) r e v o l u t i o n a r y r h e t o r i c a n d l i n g u i s t i c s w a r s ( H a r r i s 1 9 9 3 a ) ( S P 1 1 ) Figure 2 2 From ›scientific revolution‹ to ›unscientific revolution‹ 96 <?page no="97"?> Chomsky's generative linguistics SS Aspects SPE GB MP revolution no revolution i d e o l o g y ( H u c k a n d G o l d s m i t h 1 9 9 5 ) ( S P 1 3 ) u n t e n a b l e m e t h o d o l o g y a n d p e r s o n a l i t i e s ( L a k o f f 1 9 8 9 ) ( S P 1 4 ) revolution K u h n i a n r e v o l u t i o n ( M c C a w l e y 1 9 7 6 ) ( S P 1 2 ) K u h n i a n r e v o l u t i o n ( M u r r a y 1 9 9 4 ) ( S P 1 5 ) revolution no revolution K u h n i a n r e v o l u t i o n ( G r e w e n d o r f 2 0 0 6 ) ( S P 1 6 ) K u h n i a n r e v o l u t i o n w i t h o u t p a r a d i g m r e p l a c e m e n t ( K o r n m e s s e r 2 0 1 4 a , b ) ( S P 1 7 ) revolution no revolution r e v o l u t i o n w i t h i n t h e r e v o l u t i o n ( P i a t e l l i - P a l m a r i n i 1 9 9 8 ) ( S P 1 9 ) L a k a t o s i a n r e s e a r c h p r o g r a m ( B o e c k x 2 0 0 6 ) ( S P 2 0 ) s p u r i o u s s c i e n c e ( S e u r e n 2 0 0 4 ) ( S P 2 1 ) u n s c i e n t i f i c r e v o l u t i o n ( L a p p i n e t a l . 2 0 0 0 a ) ( S P 2 2 ) Kuhnian revolution Figure 3 e r o s i o n ( J Š g e r 1 9 9 3 a ) ( S P 1 8 ) Figure 3 2.7 Summary 97 <?page no="98"?> 2.7.2 Relevant correlations among the approaches Multiple relevant correlations seem to exist between the approaches that oth‐ erwise differ from each other in many respects. It is crucial to emphasize that the analysis of these links is further complicated by the fact that these ap‐ proaches may use the same terms in different senses. Some examples are as follows (see also Figure 1): • However diverse the approaches are, they suggest that the emergence of generative linguistics has been shaped by three kinds of factors: intellec‐ tual, social and rhetorical ones (see also Kertész 2004a, 2013 [1991]). Al‐ though some of the authors draw considerably different conclusions from the investigation of these factors, even these authors seem to agree on their relevance: for example, Newmeyer (1986a), (1986b), Koerner (1989), Murray (1994), Huck & Goldsmith (1995), Harris (1993a), McCawley (1976), Lappin et al. (2000a), (2000b), (2001), Jäger (1993a), (1993b). • One crucial term used in both the historiography and the philosophy of science is ›research program‹. Lakatos attempted to solve some of the problems raised by the comparison of Popper’s and Kuhn’s views with the help of this term. The term is also used in the various approaches in different senses; Huck and Goldsmith, as well as Boeckx, use it in the way attributed to Lakatos, while ten Hacken in a sense independent of Lakatos’ approach. See Figure 5. • There is a clear correlation between certain statements made by Koerner (1995), (2002), Murray (1994) and Harris (1993a), as we have already pointed out several times when discussing their views. For example, al‐ though Murray does not speak of ›evolution‹, while Koerner (1989), (1995), (2002) uses this category, Koerner accepts Murray’s explanation of the victory of Syntactic Structures, which says that it was the result of ideological, rhetorical and social factors. • There is an interesting connection between Newmeyer (1986b) on the one hand, and Murray (1994) and Harris (1993a) on the other. Although these authors assume entirely different positions in the controversy, they seem to agree that there has been no Kuhnian revolution in the history of gen‐ erative linguistics so far. However, whereas Newmeyer infers from this that there was another kind of scientific revolution, namely, a Laudanian one, Murray and Harris conclude that there have been no scientific rev‐ olutions at all in linguistics. 2 From ›scientific revolution‹ to ›unscientific revolution‹ 98 <?page no="99"?> 107 Nevertheless, Jäger (1993a) alludes vaguely to this possibility. However, he focuses on Government-Binding Theory and not Syntactic Structures. • As mentioned, Murray (1989), (1994), Koerner (1989) and Harris (1993a) are in agreement with Newmeyer (1986a, 1986b) in that in the 1950s the neo-Bloomfieldian school was not in a crisis in Kuhn’s sense. • There is also an apparent correlation between Matthews’ (1993) and Hymes and Fought’s (1981)[1975] standpoint, because both assume that Syntactic Structures was an immediate continuation of neo-Bloomfiel‐ dianism. However, while the former considers Chomsky’s distribution‐ alism the key to this continuity, the latter authors assume that Chomsky’s early work contributed to the victory of Zellig S. Harris’ approach over that of Trager and Smith within neo-Bloomfieldianism. • Tomalin (2008) considers formalization, while ten Hacken (2007) cogni‐ tivism to be the constant component of Syntactic Structures. • The role of ideological and social factors was also maintained in Seuren (2004) and Lappin et al. (2000a) with respect to minimalism, as well as in Lakoff (1989) and Huck & Goldsmith (1995), with respect to Aspects. • Jäger (1993a), referring to Government-Binding Theory, and Lakoff (1989), focusing on Aspects, reproach Chomsky for his servile and mis‐ chievous adaptation of the norms valid for the natural sciences which are not in accord with the real nature of the subject matter of linguistics. • Figure 6 summarizes the views which deem a given phase of the history of generative linguistics to be the result of a decline relative to the pre‐ vious phase. It is worth observing that none of the approaches we have overviewed interpret Syntactic Structures as a decline. 107 • According to Lakoff (1989), Murray (1994), Koerner (1989) and Huck & Goldsmith (1995) the emergence of generative linguistics was strongly influenced by ideological factors. • Partly independently of each other, different authors - Koerner (1989), Murray (1994) and Jäger (1993a) - charge generativists with a distortion of history: Jäger with respect to Government-Binding Theory, and the former in the context of Syntactic Structures. • The approaches maintaining the idea of continuous progress restrict themselves to an investigation of the relationship between neo-Bloom‐ fieldianism and Syntactic Structures (see Figure 1). Those approaches which focus on later phases assume some kind of break relative to the previous phase - that is, revolution, a new research program or a de‐ cline. 2.7 Summary 99 <?page no="100"?> 2.7.3 Relevant differences among the approaches There are many differences among the approaches that we have discussed, some of which we have already indicated by the structure of the present chapter and our commentaries on the approaches in the corresponding sections. It is trivial to find a sharp contrast between approaches that state the revolutionary nature of Syntactic Structures compared to Bloomfieldian linguistics and those ap‐ proaches that argue for its continuity with the latter. There are, however, dif‐ ferences that are not trivial and can be uncovered only by a more detailed anal‐ ysis. We would like to highlight some relevant examples: • There is a great diversity of the historiographical frameworks applied: for example, they range from memoirs (Lakoff 1989) through personal re‐ ports (Newmeyer 1980, 1986a) to the adaptation of relatively well defined frameworks (Murray 1994, Boeckx 2006 etc.). • There is a contrast between approaches that interpret the history as some kind of progress (as a revolution or a research program) and the ones that see it as a decline: in this respect, see e.g. Koerner (1978), (1989), McCawley 1976, Newmeyer (1986a,), (1986b), Boeckx (2006), Piatelli-Palmarini (1998) versus Jäger (1993a), (1993b), Lakoff (1989), Seuren (2004), Lappin et al. (2000a), (2000b), (2001). • The Kuhnian standpoint which stresses the relevance of the social factors of linguistic inquiry (e.g. Koerner 1978) is not compatible with the view which reduces revolution to intellectual factors (ten Hacken 2007), be‐ cause the latter handles the social component of the development of sci‐ ence in a way that differs from Kuhn’s treatment. • The idea of ›Laudanean revolution‹ is also incompatible with ten Hacken’s idea of ›intellectual revolution‹, although both stress the ›in‐ tellectual‹ aspect. • Different historical phases may be associated with different interpreta‐ tions of the term ›revolution‹. These diverse senses of ›revolution‹ are represented in Figure 4. Since the term ›revolution‹ plays an extremely important role in the historiography of generative linguistics, we have to touch on the richness of its applications. For example, Koerner (1978), McCawley (1976), ten Hacken (2007), Piatelli-Palmarini (1998) and others seem to agree that they consider a certain phase in the history of gener‐ ative linguistics as revolutionary, but their views are incompatible insofar as their ideas about which phase is revolutionary are different, and they also may differ in what they mean by ›revolution‹. In this sense, it is not the whole achievement of generative linguistics that can be considered 2 From ›scientific revolution‹ to ›unscientific revolution‹ 100 <?page no="101"?> the result of a revolution, because revolution is associated only with cer‐ tain fragments of the historical process. • For example, Seuren’s (1998) statement that the real founder of generative linguistics is Zellig S. Harris, and that Chomsky carried on the latter’s work not only by his own linguistic achievements but, rather, primarily by metatheoretical and philosophical reflection, presupposes a very dif‐ ferent kind of continuity than the statement that Chomsky built his in‐ novations on neo-Bloomfieldian foundations (see Hymes & Fought 1981 [1975]). • Distinguishing between ›evolution‹ and ›revolution‹ (Koerner 1989, 1995, 2002) - whereby Syntactic Structure is the realization of the former - is not the same as the assumption that the reason there is continuity is that in science there are no revolutions at all (Murray 1994). • There is a discrepancy between Tomalin’s (2008) view - which says that there is continuity because it is Bloomfieldianism and neo-Bloomfiel‐ dianism that can be ›adjusted to‹ Syntactic Structures by revealing that the Bloomfieldian approaches were also shaped by the formal sci‐ ences -, and those historiographical approaches which ›ad‐ just‹ Chomsky’s work to neo-Bloomfieldianism by assuming that it is the continuation of the latter. • Huck and Goldsmith on the one hand and Boeckx on the other hand draw incompatible conclusions from the application of Lakatosian research programs: while Boeckx applies this historiographical framework in order to argue for Chomskyan linguistics, Huck and Goldsmith use the same framework to criticize it. The next chapter will undertake the task of drawing metahistoriographical conclusions from the overview in Chapter 2 and from the above systematization of the approaches discussed. 2.7 Summary 101 <?page no="102"?> revolution Kuhnian revolution other kinds of revolution SS Aspects SPE intellectual revolution Laudanian revolution revolution in the revolution GB (SP1) (SP2) (SP12) (SP13) (SP16) (SP17) SS SS MP (SP3) (SP4) (SP19) Figure 4 Figure 4 2 From ›scientific revolution‹ to ›unscientific revolution‹ 102 <?page no="103"?> research program Lakatosian research program ten Hacken's research program Aspects MP SS (SP13) (SP20) (SP3) Figure 5 Figure 5 decline Aspects GB MP (SP18) (SP14) (SP21) (SP22) Figure 6 Figure 6 2.7 Summary 103 <?page no="104"?> 3 Metahistoriographical evaluation 3.0 Introduction Having completed a systematic overview of the 22 solutions to our main problem (P) represented in the historiographical literature, we will now evaluate these solutions from a metahistoriographical viewpoint. Historiographers may differ considerably in terms of what they consider to be an adequate history of lin‐ guistics. However, this circumstance is not incompatible with the very weak assumption that there is at least a set of characteristics that historiographical works should avoid. In order to motivate the evaluation criteria we will use, let us mention a few examples in order to document that they are not arbitrary but have been explicitly required in the literature. We divide the criteria into two subsets. We are compelled to infer the first set of criteria from the biased nature of the historiography of generative linguistics, since it is widely known and considered to be the most spectacular feature of the field. An instructive example is the following quotation: The vast majority of works on the rise of transformational grammar have been written by linguists who were themselves intimately involved in the theory-choice debates of the 1960s - among others, Frederick Newmeyer, Robert Hall, H. A. Gleason and P. H. Matthews. Their historical writings reflect their experiences and commitments: New‐ meyer, an ardent transformationalist, writes with strong pro-transformationalist sen‐ sibilities; Hall’s writings display his vehement anti-transformationalist commitments; and Gleason’s work is shaped by his adherence to stratificational grammar. Only a handful of outsiders have written in depth on 1960s American linguistics. They in‐ clude, most prominently, rhetoricist Randy Allan Harris and sociologist Stephen O. Murray. These accounts, too, are influenced by biases: Murray adopts a confronta‐ tional attitude towards transformational grammar, while Harris overstates and exag‐ gerates the mood and radicalism of the era. Lacking is a balanced account of the era, informed by history of science methodology. (Nielsen 2010: 5-6; emphasis added) Although Nielsen criticizes the biased nature of virtually all contributions to the historiography of generative linguistics, her dissertation, from which this pas‐ sage has been quoted, is biased as well. Her main claim there is that between 1957 and 1968 generative grammarians developed an underground culture in <?page no="105"?> which, among others, their findings circulated only among those who had priv‐ ileged access to their research. As Newmeyer points out, Nielsen’s assessment as well as the commentaries it makes use of »are all either greatly exaggerated or flat out wrong« (Newmeyer 2014: 242). It may also be remarked that it is questionable whether Harris is an outsider, since his Ph. D. advisor was Vic‐ toria L. Bergvall, who has a degree in linguistics from Harvard. It is also worth comparing the papers in Bricmont & Frank (2010) and Kibbee (2010) published in the same year, which illustrate spectacularly the clash be‐ tween different kinds of biases. The requirement that bias should be avoided is clearly documented in the historiographical literature even by those who have been charged with being biased themselves. For example, Koerner (1989), (2004), (2006), Murray (1989), (1994), Aarsleff (1971), Harris (1993a) require the abandonment of ›Whig‐ gish‹, ›partisan‹, ›pro domo‹, ›propagandistic‹ historiography. We add two remarks. These authors use the terms mentioned in order to criticize works which, in their opinion, serve the interests of the generative community. We assume, however, that the requirement of avoiding bias should have general validity and must be applied to the works of all authors as well and not only to those of their opponents. Furthermore, we assume that this requirement is well motivated, but it is not sophisticated enough. We suggest the following subset of minimum criteria: • Bias • The content of historiographical statements must not be influenced by the personal relationship between historiographers. • The content of historiographical statements must not be influenced by bias towards or against Chomsky’s personality. • The content of historiographical statements must not be influenced by bias towards or against the object of investigation. • Historiographical theses must not aim at the legitimization of gener‐ ative linguistics or its alternatives. The second subset of evaluation criteria concerns the historiographical method. One major principle of post-Kuhnian historiography of science requires the in‐ teraction of the philosophy and the historiography of science (Lakatos 1970a, 1970b), thereby also acknowledging the possible diversity of such interaction as well as the consideration of current developments (Schikore 2011, Arabatzis & Schikore 2012, Scholl & Räz 2016 etc.). We may decompose the minimum re‐ quirement against historiographical methods into the following criteria: 3.0 Introduction 105 <?page no="106"?> • Method • Research must not ignore recent developments in the historiography of science. • Historiography must not be conducted independently of the philos‐ ophy of science. Accordingly, our criteria of evaluation will be these two subsets of minimum requirements. The criteria will be further motivated in the following sections. In Section 3.1 we will point out those factors which, in the light of the above criteria, weaken the credibility of the historiographical approaches at issue. These factors have to be treated in a sophisticated manner, because they are not present in each of the approaches; in spite of this, their tendency to be present justifies our reflecting on them. In Section 3.2 we will put forward the general‐ izations which the metahistoriographical evaluation of the solutions to (P) as discussed in the literature and overviewed in Chapter 2 suggests. 3.1 Factors weakening the credibility of (MP1)-(MP22) 3.1.1 Bias 3.1.1.1 The historiographers’ bias against one another Views whose content has been significantly influenced by the personal rela‐ tionship between their authors lose credibility. Of course, personal issues are irrelevant if a debate is based on data, reasoning or theoretical considerations. However, it weakens the credibility of a particular historiographical approach if statements about its subject matter - in our case, the history of generative linguistics - are interwoven with ad hominem formulations. The way some his‐ toriographers refer to each other’s works in their publications witnesses a mix‐ ture of personal and professional opinion. In such cases, the authors seem to presuppose that if the personality of the opponent is unappealing, then the views he or she maintains are also to be rejected. We restrict the examples below to citing a few examples as documented in publications. As a first example, we quote Koerner (2006: 2812), who, while deeming New‐ meyer’s method ›partisan historiography‹ and ›Whig-historiography‹ (after Butterfield 1931), supports this claim by remarking that Newmeyer had not done his doctorate at the center of the school whose success story he depicted: »New‐ meyer took his doctorate […] at the University of Illinois, not at MIT «. Obvi‐ ously, this personal information does not affect directly whether Newmeyer’s 3 Metahistoriographical evaluation 106 <?page no="107"?> books are Whiggish or not. However, it gives rise to an implicature that serves to diminish Newmeyer’s reliability as a scholar, and through this, strengthens Koerner’s judgment of Newmeyer’s work indirectly. As a second example, we illustrate Murray’s use of rhetoric when blaming the University of Chicago Press for publishing Newmeyer’s (1986c) The Politics of Linguistics. Although Murray charges Newmeyer of being biased, such rhet‐ oric is biased itself: […] I am surprised to find it [the University of Chicago Press] serving as an organ for the cynical misrepresentation of the past which is characteristic of Stalinist history, whether of political or of academic power grabs self-legitimated as ›revolutions‹. There is hardly a page in it that doesn’t exemplify the distortions of a perspective that takes Chomsky’s pronouncements as the telos of human thought. Having already offered a warning to the customer that the book is wildly biased and unsuitable as a textbook either for history of linguistics, I will point to some of the more egregious misrepresentations of the history of linguistics in the book. There is hardly a page in it that doesn’t exemplify the distortions of a perspective that takes Chomsky’s pro‐ nouncements as the telos of human thought (Murray 1989: 156-157; emphasis added). Third, when writing her memoirs, Robin Lakoff was directly motivated by Newmeyer (1980) and (1986a) since, according to her, Newmeyer’s bias is the most dangerous kind […] Newmeyer misleads the reader and distorts the facts. I believe that, when a historian is in a position to be biased, it is his or her responsibility to discover the form and extent of that subjectivity, and make it clear to the audience (Lakoff 1989: 940; emphasis added). This formulation suggests that, according to Lakoff, Newmeyer pretends his evaluations are objective, while, in fact, they represent Chomsky’s interests. Fourth, Koerner originally submitted his (1983) article to Language, but due to Newmeyer’s negative review, it could not be published there. After it had appeared in the journal Language & Communication in 1983, Newmeyer reacted to it in Newmeyer (1986b). Koerner (1989) is a revised version of his paper pub‐ lished in 1983. Its first footnote (Koerner 1989: 101) - while referring to its pre‐ vious versions and their history - serves as a response highlighting the »unfair and irregular« treatment of the paper by Newmeyer and the journal editor, which amounts to the claim that »[…] it had already been quite irregular to print a reply to a paper that had not been published in the same journal; in fact F. J. Newmeyer was one of the readers strongly arguing for rejection of my 1982 3.1 Factors weakening the credibility of (MP1)-(MP22) 107 <?page no="108"?> 1 The evaluation procedure of contributions submitted to Language is double blind, so normally the referees cannot be identified. Moreover, the rejection of Koerner’s paper was not a special case, because about 90 % of submissions to Language are rejected. manuscript« (Koerner 1989: 101). 1 Newmeyer (1986b) quotes Koerner’s changing views and Murray’s and others’, in his opinion, untenable statements with respect to the Chomskyan coup. Here Koerner’s personal judgment of Newmeyer’s and the editor’s alleged »unfair« behavior may contribute to con‐ vincing the reader of the acceptability of his historiographical standpoint put forward in the paper in opposition to that of Newmeyer. In our final example - out of the many available - we mention the debate which took place in Murray’s startling critique of Newmeyer’s two books (1980, 1986c) and in Newmeyer’s reaction (Murray 1981, 1982, 1989, Newmeyer 1982) including ad hominem formulations. In sum, in these examples the content of the historiographical standpoint and the author’s evaluation of the opponent’s personality seem to be inseparable. 3.1.1.2 The historiographers’ bias towards or against Chomsky’s personality Many of the historiographical approaches discussed above are permeated with sympathy or antipathy towards Chomsky’s personality. Their object of inves‐ tigation is not only the history of generative linguistics, but overlaps with the assessment of Chomsky’s personality. The latent background assumption of those authors who oppose Chomskyan generative linguistics seems to be that if Chomsky’s personality is unacceptable, then generative linguistics is unac‐ ceptable, too. For instance, Murray compares Chomsky’s dictatorial behavior to that of Stalin and Mao Zedong: Cohort after cohort of MIT students emulates Chomsky’s contemptuous rhetoric dismissing those who have not accepted his latest revelations. The contents change, the style remains the same. Constant purges, persistent rhetoric about a sacred ›rev‐ olution‹ accompanied by persistent misgovernment as judged by any external stand‐ ards recalled Stalin […]. The ›Cultural Revolution‹ of Mao Zedong […] is an even better political analog for the Chomskyan regime: the aging dictator questions the zeal and loyalty of his former followers, and encourages the ferocity of the young, who gladly challenge ›traditions‹ of all ages (Murray 1994: 445; also quoted in Joseph 1995: 387). Or: Robin Lakoff, even in her historiographical contribution, appears to identify with a previous opinion expressed by generative semanticists which considers Chomsky to be »satanic« (Lakoff 1989: 970), and in another context, draws a 3 Metahistoriographical evaluation 108 <?page no="109"?> comparison between the Chomskyan dictatorship and Mussolini’s regime (Lakoff 1989: 973). At the other extreme there are authors whose historiographical judgments are enthusiastic towards Chomsky’s personality. From the numerous examples, as an illustration we have chosen a less known work by one of the most out‐ standing European generative linguists. The first sentence of Grewendorf’s (2006) book on Chomsky cites The New York Review of Books in which Chomsky was characterized as the most prominent living intellectual. According to Gre‐ wendorf (2006: 10), this judgment concerns the power, scope, innovativity and influence of his linguistic and political thought. He has not only revolutionized the science of language but he also had an impact on the investigation of the human mind which led to far reaching consequences in the whole of the cognitive sciences from psychology through philosophy to medicine (transla‐ tion by the present author). A few pages below Grewendorf continues the characterization of Chomsky’s personality by praising his moral in that, although »Chomsky has reached the status of an intellectual popstar, personality cult is repugnant to him« (Gre‐ wendorf 2006: 17; translation by the present author; see also Barsky 1997: 5). 3.1.1.3 The historiographers’ bias towards or against the object of investigation It is easy to find numerous examples with respect to all phases of generative linguistics which witness the historiographers’ bias directly towards or against their object of investigation, namely, generative linguistics. We mention only a few ones for the sake of illustration. As we have already indicated in several sections of Chapter 2, it is well known and often cited that Koerner, Murray, Tomalin, Harris and Lakoff charge New‐ meyer with bias towards generative linguistics. Therefore, now it may be more interesting to take examples from the works of other authors with respect to different historical periods. In order to witness that this kind of bias is not re‐ stricted to the first 20 years of generative linguistics which Newmeyer chroni‐ cled, we exemplify it by the reception of Chomsky’s current thought. Pia‐ telli-Palmarini’s and Boeckx’s argumentations for the Minimalist Program are strikingly euphoric. According to Piatelli-Palmarini, minimalism is well on its way to becoming a full-blown natural science, offering a serious promise of an advanced field of scientific inquiry whose idealizations, abstractions, and de‐ ductions will eventually match in depth and subtlety those of the most advanced domains of modern science. Generative grammar is turning into a natural science already, be‐ 3.1 Factors weakening the credibility of (MP1)-(MP22) 109 <?page no="110"?> cause of what it is now, not because of what it might one day turn into, when neural imaging and neurobiology will have provided dramatic new refinements (Piatelli-Pal‐ marini 1998: xxv; emphasis added.). Boeckx (2006: 13) propagates minimalism as follows: For me, minimalism is worth pursuing because, to the extent that one can reach ex‐ planations by following minimalist guidelines, such explanations will have a deep and pleasing character. In contrast, both approaches which in Chapter 2 have been meant to illustrate the rejection of the minimalist program are biased as well. The quotations from Lappin et al.’s and Seuren’s contributions discussed in Sections 2.5.2.1 and 2.5.2.2 are compelling illustrations of such bias. Finally, as an extreme example let us mention Jäger’s bias against Chomsky’s cognitivism, which culminates in the verdict that »this kind of linguistics is no science of language at all« ( Jäger 1993a: 94; emphasis as in the original; trans‐ lation by the present author). Nevertheless, there are opinions between the two extremes, too. Huck & Goldsmith (1995) for example reveal the motivations for generative semantics in a moderate manner; although Matthews (1993), Allan (2003), (2007) and Kornmesser (2014a), (2014b) deem Chomsky’s achievement ›revolutionary‹ in different senses, they present balanced standpoints without any kind of bias. 3.1.1.4 Legitimization 3.1.1.4.1 Historiographical frameworks as legitimizing tools The application of certain historiographical frameworks serves the legitimiza‐ tion of generative linguistics. One of the consequences of the impact of Kuhn’s seminal work was that in a series of disciplines, especially the social sciences, and within these, linguistics as well, it became fashionable to argue for their ›scientific‹ status by proving the existence of ›revolutions‹ and ›para‐ digms‹. The circumstance that in general the historiography of science became a focal topic of scientific thought through the works of Kuhn and Lakatos (see the Preface), has also created an extreme legitimizing strategy in linguistics. That this is so is witnessed by Robin Lakoff who points out that Popper’s and Kuhn’s work »has been taken up with passion within a number of the social sciences, where it has been treated as a litmus test for legitimacy or entry in the club« (Lakoff 1989: 966; emphasis added). Continuous references to Popper and Kuhn convey the message that »[i]f you can prove that the findings of your field 3 Metahistoriographical evaluation 110 <?page no="111"?> 2 Lakoff (1989: 966) cites Dougherty (1974), as an extremely unprofessional example of legitimization. Dougherty believes that the reason why the Extended Standard Theory - which followed Aspects - was better than its competitors is that it covered more rev‐ olutions. 3 That linguistics strives to adapt itself to the natural sciences is not new. In this respect, the predecessors of generative linguistics, such as Bloomfield (1935: vii, 509), articulated frequently cited requirements. are falsifiable, that your field has paradigms, etc., you are respectable« (Lakoff 1989: 966; emphasis added). 2 This strategy has the following general structure: • If the rise of an approach in linguistics can be described by the same historical mechanisms which are valid for the prestigious and highly suc‐ cessful natural sciences representing the highest level of scientific quality, then this linguistic approach is on a par with the latter. 3 • The rise of the approach X in linguistics can be described by the same historical mechanisms which are valid for the prestigious and highly suc‐ cessful natural sciences representing the highest level of scientific quality. • Therefore, the linguistic approach X is on a par with the prestigious and highly successful natural sciences representing the highest level of sci‐ entific quality. And vice versa: • If a certain linguistic approach cannot be described by the same categories of the history and the philosophy of science as the natural sciences can, then it loses legitimacy, and rival approaches may simultaneously gain legitimacy. • The linguistic approach X cannot be described by the same categories of the history and the philosophy of science as the natural sciences can. • Therefore, X loses legitimacy, and rival approaches may simultaneously gain legitimacy. An instructive example of legitimizing argumentation is Boeckx’s approach. Boeckx’s primary goal is to legitimize the uncertainty, the incoherence, the contradictory and empirically unfounded nature of minimalism, all of which have been targets for critics. For instance: Programs take time to mature, and rigor cannot be required in the beginning (Boeckx 2006: 91). […] I want to encourage the pursuit of the minimalist program even if some of its ideas are taking a long time to mature (Boeckx 2006: p. 93). 3.1 Factors weakening the credibility of (MP1)-(MP22) 111 <?page no="112"?> Because it is my overall goal in this book to show that the minimalist program has great merits, I want to show that the criticism is in fact unwarranted, and that the pursuit of the minimalist program in syntactic theory is not only legitimate […] but also rewarding (Boeckx 2006: 154). The framework for legitimacy is Lakatos’ term ›scientific research program‹. Boeckx’s (2006: 84-109) legitimizing argumentation strategy can be recon‐ structed as follows: • Minimalism is not a well-established, rigorous theory based on a solid formal and empirical foundation, but only an immature program. • Lakatos’ historiographical framework describes even the most significant achievements of the natural sciences with the term ›scientific research program‹. • Lakatos’ term ›scientific research program‹ can be applied to mini‐ malism. • Therefore, in spite of its immaturity and the lack of rigor, minimalism can also yield highly significant scientific findings. It is indeed the case that Newmeyer, ten Hacken, Grewendorf, Piatelli-Palmarini and Boeckx in the way we have discussed in Chapter 2 and many others whose contributions we have not cited seem to use the terms ›revolution‹ and ›para‐ digm‹ in order to legitimize generative linguistics as a whole or a certain stage of its history. However, not all occurences of these terms are biased. For example, there is no legitimizing attitude in Searle’s, Allan’s, McCawley’s or Korn‐ messer’s references to the Kuhnian notion of revolution and in Matthews’ naïve mentioning of this term. 3.1.1.4.2 The legitimizing interpretation of historical data Different authors sometimes draw conflicting conclusions from the same data. Of course, due to the theory-dependence of data, this is one of the characteristic features of scientific inquiry and scientific debates. For example, Grewendorf’s and Boeckx’s very different assessments of minimalism belong to this kind of contradiction, because both of them are proponents of minimalism. Although one cannot exclude that within minimalism they represent different group in‐ terests, it is much more probable that the differences between the ways they interpret minimalism has intellectual reasons, resulting from the very nature of scientific inquiry. As we have mentioned, Boeckx (2006) highlights the imma‐ turity of the Minimalist Program, namely, that it is not a fully developed theory but only a programmatic initiative. In contrast, Grewendorf (2006: 158) - while also propagating the Minimalist Program - maintains that it has »consolidated 3 Metahistoriographical evaluation 112 <?page no="113"?> to a theory« and that »the fragments at our disposal may certainly claim the status of a theory« (translation by the present author). However, the contradictory evaluation of the data does weaken the credibility of the historiographical approaches we have overviewed, if the interpretation of the historical data serves the legitimization either of generative linguistics or of its rejection. For instance, while Newmeyer (1986b: 12) believes that Chomsky and his followers received only a small minority of the grants allocated to lin‐ guistics at the turn of the 1950s and 1960s (see Section 2.1.1.2.2), Koerner (1989: 108-109) claims that this is not so. As another example, we mention the cir‐ cumstance that despite the common elements of the neo-Bloomfieldian tradition and those of Syntactic Structures, Newmeyer (1986b) claims the revolutionary nature (in the sense of Laudan) of the latter; in contrast, Koerner (1989) refers to the same common elements in order to question this claim. An even more striking example is, as cited before, that whereas Murray (1980), (1994), (1999a) considered the international linguistics conference held in Cambridge in 1962 to be a coup d’etat which had been cunningly prepared (Section 2.1.2.6.1), New‐ meyer (1986b) regarded it as a convincing intellectual success for Chomsky (Section 2.1.1.2.2). 3.1.1.4.3 Circular argumentation as a legitimizing tool As we have seen, there are conflicts among the approaches we have surveyed in Chapter 2 and evaluated in the last sections. Those approaches which fiercely argue against one another commit the fallacy of circular argumentation on two levels. On the one hand, the very framework which the author has chosen - for example, the Kuhnian or the Lakatosian or a sociological or a rhetorical etc. - has been introduced in order to justify certain theses with respect to Chomskyan linguistics. Therefore, the frameworks will indeed justify them, and make Chomskyan linguistics appear exactly as the author’s legitimizing attitude would like it to appear: as a Kuhnian scientific revolution, as evolution, as erosion, as rhetoric, as a Lakatosian research program or whatever. On the other hand, circularity serves the self-legitimization of the historiographical framework it‐ self: because it seems successful in justifying the theses which it has been in‐ troduced to justify, it is seen as an adequate way of accounting for relevant properties of Chomsky’s linguistics. 3.1 Factors weakening the credibility of (MP1)-(MP22) 113 <?page no="114"?> 4 Koerner (2006) also identifies four types of historiographical approaches, which, how‐ ever, differ from our proposal below. His Type I includes »summing-up histories of linguistics« which »viewed the evolution of the field as growing in an essentially uni‐ linear fashion« (Koerner 2006: 2811). Type II is characterized as »celebratory or prop‐ agandistic histories of linguistics« exemplified by Newmeyer’s (1980) and Chomsky’s (1966) alleged »Whiggish«, »propagandistic, if not ideology-driven« (Koerner 2006: 2812-2813) approaches. The third type is »detached histories of linguistics (Problem‐ geschichte)«. Finally, the fourth type is Koerner’s own approach which »demands that the history of linguistics should not merely be subservient to the discipline, but should assume a function comparable to that of the history of science for the natural scien‐ tist […]« (Koerner 2006: 3814). 5 For thorough analyses of the applicability of Kuhn’s approach to linguistics see e.g. Percival (1976a), (1977), (1981), Oesterreicher (1979), Winston (1976) etc. 3.1.2 Method 3.1.2.1 The application of historiographical frameworks Whereas in some other disciplines - physics, biology, chemistry - historio‐ graphical theories dynamically change and react immediately to new ideas dis‐ cussed in the philosophy and history of science, several approaches to the his‐ toriography of generative linguistics seem to ignore current trends. With respect to their frameworks, the approaches analyzed in Chapter 2 belong to one of four groups. 4 The first includes approaches which do not make use of any kind of estab‐ lished historiographical framework, and do not develop their own framework, either. Rather, they compile a primarily ad hoc report based on the author’s personal experiences, opinion, biases and undocumented sources (see e.g. Pia‐ telli-Palamirini’s, Lakoff’s or Lappin et al.’s works). The methodologically un‐ reflected nature of these approaches is obvious, even though the authors seem to presuppose - latently, at least - Kuhn’s basic terms, or some other framework (see also Sections 2.4.1 and 2.5.2.2). The main feature of the second group is the unreflected adaptation of his‐ toriographical frameworks which have already been applied to other disciplines. For example, this applies to those approaches which mechanically argue for the Kuhnian revolutionary nature of generative linguistics without systematically comparing Kuhn’s general claims (however vague they are) to the peculiarities of the process during which generative linguistics came into being, and disre‐ gard those arguments which call into question the applicability of Kuhn’s terms to linguistics. 5 For example, Boeckx’s interpretation of Lakatos’ scientific re‐ search programs also belongs to this group. Boeckx seems to confront the term ›theory‹ with ›program‹, suggesting that Lakatos was defending the im‐ maturity, uncertainty and inconsistency of a program against the maturity and 3 Metahistoriographical evaluation 114 <?page no="115"?> 6 Contradictio in adiecto is a fallacy in which the meaning of an attribute is not compatible with that of the noun to which it belongs. 7 However, as already mentioned, the credibility of these analyses is endangered by the biased characterization of Chomsky’s and Newmeyer’s personality. rigor of a theory. However, Lakatos’ framework does not focus on the legitimi‐ zation of programs in this sense, and Boeckx seems to have at least partially misunderstood it (see also Kertész 2010b). For Lakatos, the introduction of the term ›scientific research program‹ served to present an original solution to the ›demarcation problem‹ - namely, an answer to the question of how to detach empirical science from pseudo-science - by reconciling some of Popper’s and Kuhn’s ideas. Huck & Goldsmith (1995) present Lakatos’ (1970b) theory of the development of science correctly, but the authors do not clarify the details of its application. Rather, after having introduced it, they argue using different basic terms, whose relation to those used by Lakatos remains undefined. Ten Hacken treats Kuhnian terms in an analogously questionable way (see Kertész 2010b). While ten Hacken argues for the applicability of Kuhnian terms to linguistics, which cannot be understood without their social aspects, he eliminates the social component from the meaning of the terms ›paradigm‹ and ›scientific revolu‐ tion‹. Since the elimination of the social component changes Kuhn’s framework substantially, the arguments in favour of the application of Kuhn’s framework become questionable at the outset. Therefore, ten Hacken’s term ›intellectual revolution‹ is a contradictio in adiecto (see Kertész 2010b). 6 The third group comprises approaches which competently argue for the methods already used in the historiography of other disciplines, including a discussion of how they might be modified to the necessary extent and in the necessary way. For example, Murray’s (1994) approach is rooted in the meth‐ odologically accurate sociological and historiographical analysis of rich data within a well-defined theoretical framework, which had already been applied successfully to other disciplines. 7 Similarly, Allan (2003), (2007) and Kornmesser (2014a), (2014b) make efforts to adapt the Kuhnian terms, making substantial modifications that seem to be compatible with the peculiarities of their object of investigation. Finally, the fourth group consists of approaches which set out to develop frameworks serving the specific aims of the historiography of linguistics. Such approaches are outlined in Koerner (1989), (1995), (2002), (2004), Matthews 3.1 Factors weakening the credibility of (MP1)-(MP22) 115 <?page no="116"?> 8 See for example: »It is important to realize […] that the historians of linguistics because of the particular nature of the subject of investigation, namely theories of language (as well as theories of linguistics) and their evolution through time, must find their own framework, methodology and epistemology, and cannot expect to be able to apply methods and insights from other fields directly to their own subject of investiga‐ tion […].« (Koerner 1995: 7-8, emphasis added) (1993), (2001), Tomalin (2008), Seuren (1998), (2004) and Hymes & Fought (1981) [1975]. 8 Obviously, if a given approach belongs to the first or the second group, this weakens its credibility. Being in the third or fourth group is in itself no reason for acceptance; in these cases, any evaluation of its worth will depend on further features of the approach (primarily, to what extent they are biased). 3.1.2.2 The necessity of philosophical reflection Several of the approaches discussed disregard the commonplace principle of the post-Kuhnian developments, according to which there is a close interaction be‐ tween the history and the philosophy of science (see footnote 2 and Kertész 2004a, 2013). Newmeyer and Koerner in all their contributions to the topic as well as Matthews (1993), Huck & Goldsmith (1981)[19 975], Piatelli-Palmarini (1998), Lappin et al. (2001a), (2001b), Grewendorf (2002), (2006), (2007), McCawley (1976), Harris (1993a) and Tomalin (2008) belong to those who seem to ignore this principle. However, several authors do consider it. Seuren attempts to associate histor‐ iographical research with aspects of the philosophy of science in a well-moti‐ vated way. Jäger also strives to relate historiographical and philosophical aspects in presenting his hermeneutic-functional approach, an approach which is, as we have remarked, in other respects biased. Schnelle (1994: 110) emphasizes that although the debate initiated by Jäger (1993a), (1993b) appears to revolve around the question of whether linguistics became better or worse in the course of its history, in fact it centers on a related, but still different problem, namely: What kind of philosophy of science should provide the appropriate methodological basis to pursue linguistics? Ten Hacken seems to support his metascientific framework carefully; however, as we have also mentioned, his interpretation and application of Kuhn’s terms is undermined because of the elimination of the social component. Boeckx applies Lakatos’ historiographical framework, which per definitionem follows the principle of the interaction between the history and the philosophy of science. Nevertheless, in other respects the way he applies Lakatos’ (1970b) framework is - as we have just mentioned - problematic. Huck and Goldsmith refer correctly to Lakatos and via this, the symbiosis of the his‐ 3 Metahistoriographical evaluation 116 <?page no="117"?> toriography and the philosophy of science. Allan (2003), (2007) and Kornmesser (2014a), (2014b) relate historiographical and philosophical aspects explicitly. Murray’s (1994) sociological framework also meets this criterion. 3.2 Summary The metahistoriographical evaluation of the state of the art has shown that the approaches surveyed in Chapter 2 meet the criteria introduced in Section 3.0 in different ways and to a different extent. In sum, the following overall picture seems to emerge: • On the one hand, none of the approaches can be accepted invariably at the outset and they do not converge towards some kind of ›standard view‹, either. • On the other hand, although, as is often emphasized in the historiograph‐ ical literature, the diverse manifestations of bias belong to the most spec‐ tacular characteristics of the state of the art in this field, most approaches include instructive insights which may further later research. • In spite of the fact that most historiographical approaches take sides either for or against generative linguistics, it is not possible to associate the shortcomings or the merits with one of the camps. It is not the case that in general the works by the proponents of generative linguistics are more biased than those of its opponents or vice versa. • Our metahistoriographical evaluation motivates at least two points of departure for alternative approaches to be outlined: • It seems to be well motivated to develop novel approaches which are not exposed to the same kind of criticism that has been triggered by the violation of the criteria enumerated in Section 3.0. • It also seems to be well motivated to put forward novel historiograph‐ ical frameworks that capture aspects of the history of generative lin‐ guistics which none of the current approaches capture but which seem to follow from our analyses. After having evaluated ( SP 1)-( SP 22), in the second part of the book we have to present our own attempt at a possible solution to the problem (P). 3.2 Summary 117 <?page no="119"?> Part 2: Toward a new historiography <?page no="121"?> 4 Historiography and plausible argumentation 4.0 Introduction Against the background of the conclusions summarized in Section 3.2, we have two points of departure at our disposal for outlining an alternative approach as a possible solution to our main problem (P). First, although in Chapter 2 the analysis of the literature revealed what basic terms, theses and frameworks current historiographical approaches use in order to investigate the history of generative linguistics, their evaluation in Chapter 3 motivated their supplementation by further approaches conforming to all the criteria introduced in Section 3.0. Second, as we have seen in Chapter 2, some authors think there is a revolu‐ tionary break between particular stages of generative linguistics (in whatever sense): Piatelli-Palmarini (1998) considers the Minimalist Program, Grewendorf (1993), (1994), (2007) Government-Binding Theory, and McCawley (1976) As‐ pects to be revolutionary. Others hold the view that after Syntactic Structures had triggered a revolution and overcome neo-Bloomfieldian linguistics, the rela‐ tionship between subsequent stages was characterized by linear development (Newmeyer 1980, 1986a; ten Hacken 2007; Boeckx 2006, Matthews 1993). Finally, a third group of approaches interprets the history of generative linguistics as one of decline ( Jäger 1993a, 1993b; Lakoff 1989; Seuren 2004; Lappin et al. 2000a, 2000b, 2001). However, our conclusions drawn in Section 3.2 suggest that, while the approaches discussed include valuable insights, none of them can be ac‐ cepted invariably, nor do they yield a ›standard view‹. One of the possibilities to enrich the state of the art would be to propose an alternative approach that goes beyond these three groups. Thus, ( SP 1)-( SP 22) may be supplemented, among others, by a model which, instead of assuming breaks or linear develop‐ ment or decline, hypothesizes that the relation between particular stages of the development of generative linguistics as well as the relation between Syntactic Structures and neo-Bloomfieldianism are based on another kind of process. It is these two insights emerging from the analyses of the preceding chapters that motivate the line of reasoning to be put forward in the next sections. In the present chapter we will - in a very simplified way, focusing solely on the concise and easily understandable presentation of the main idea - outline such an ap‐ <?page no="122"?> 1 In order to make later references to the quotations more transparent, we will subdivide them into smaller units. This subdivision does not necessarily correspond to the para‐ graphs of the original text. proach. Thereby, we will propose a possible new solution to our problem (P), which we raised in Section 1.1. In order to avoid misunderstandings, it is worth making two additional re‐ marks at the outset. On the one hand, this approach is not intended to be better than the ones discussed; however, it will be different from them in capturing a specific aspect which the former do not. On the other hand, this aspect is a very narrow one, restricted solely to certain features of the process just mentioned; thus, our model cannot capture those features of the history of generative lin‐ guistics which the other approaches aim to account for - for example, the social and rhetorical ones. We will proceed as follows: In Section 4.1, we will motivate the central idea underlying our solution to (P), which we label as ( SP 23). In Section 4.2, our new framework - called the p-model of plausible argumentation - will be introduced from which the basic terms, the hypothesis and the framework associated with ( SP 23) can be inferred. In Section 4.3, we will summarize the main properties of the p-model. 4.1 A possible solution to (P): (SP23) Our point of departure is the idea that it is Syntactic Structures itself that provides the key to a new solution to (P). What is this key? Here is the answer: 1 (1) (a) »Notice that neither the general theory nor the particular grammars are fixed for all time, in this view. (b) Progress and revision may come from the discovery of new facts about particular languages, or from purely theoretical insights about organ‐ ization of linguistic data - that is, new models for linguistic structure. (c) But there is also no circularity in this conception. At any given time we can attempt to formulate as precisely as possible both the general theory and the set of associated grammars that must meet the em‐ pirical, external conditions of adequacy.« (Chomsky 1957: 50; em‐ phasis added) 4 Historiography and plausible argumentation 122 <?page no="123"?> 2 We have already introduced the term ›heuristics‹ in Section 2.5.1.2. In what follows we will use this term not in its specific Lakatosian, but in its general sense, as outlined there. The p-model does not use the term ›positive and negative heuristics‹ as intro‐ duced by Lakatos. 3 Please note that we interpret a ›fact‹ not as a statement which is true with certainty, but rather, as a statement with a high plausibility value. See the basic terms and tenets of the p-model, to be introduced below. 4 However, in the passage quoted, ›revision‹ is applied only to the hypotheses of the theory and is not extended to data and methodological principles. The process described in the quotation is a possible heuristics of selecting a grammar. 2 (1)(a) refers to the circumstance that those statements which consti‐ tute the general theory or particular grammars cannot be true with certainty. Statements which are uncertain, but which are at the same time assumed to be the most acceptable relative to the alternatives at one’s disposal, are called plausible in the literature of argumentation theory and the philosophy of sci‐ ence. Although they are uncertain, with respect to the information available at a particular time they are acceptable to a certain extent - as long as we do not revise them in the light of new pieces of information. Thus, according to (1)(a), the hypotheses of grammars are not certainly true, but plausible statements. (1)(b) says that the revision of the information about grammars is not a uni‐ directional and inductive process, but it is of a very different kind: it is built on the retrospective re-evaluation of previously acquired knowledge, as a result of which the plausibility of the statements about the grammar changes. 3 This means that the linguist’s knowledge about a grammar is re-evaluated through the ›prism‹ of new information, i.e. it is revised ›prismatically‹. In this way, the perspective changes, too, i.e. the perspective from which one views the data, the hypotheses and the methodological principles at issue. 4 Finally, (1)(c) clarifies that the retrospective re-evaluation is not circular, but cyclic. Namely, the process does not return to the same informational state from which it started, but to one that has been revised in the light of later information. How can a new historiographical approach be erected on the idea quoted in (1) and thus explicated? Its basic terms and central hypothesis can be immedi‐ ately inferred from the quotation. In particular, if we accept the picture that Chomsky draws of the mechanism along which the linguist’s knowledge of grammars changes, then the terms that might capture such changes are: plau‐ sible, retrospective re-evaluation, prismatic and cyclic. These terms make it pos‐ sible to apply Chomsky’s quoted insight to the history of his own theory in a reflexive way. So, the historiographical thesis which makes use of these terms and mirrors the mechanism sketched in the quotation says the following: 4.1 A possible solution to (P): (SP23) 123 <?page no="124"?> (T23) The history of generative linguistics is a process of plausible argumentation based on the cyclic, prismatic and retrospective re-evaluation of the linguist’s knowledge of grammars. However, Chomsky’s aim in Syntactic Structures was, of course, not to put for‐ ward a historiographical approach to his own theory. Therefore, although the quotation in (1) seems to motivate the basic terms and the central hypothesis we have just summarized in (T23), it obviously does not provide the historio‐ graphical framework we need. We have to look for the framework for a new historiography of this kind elsewhere: in the literature on plausible argumenta‐ tion and the philosophy of science. It is not only the above quotation that supports this decision, but also one of our man findings discussed in Chapter 3, which says that many of the approaches surveyed in Chapter 2 lack philosophical re‐ flection. We should find a workable framework which is capable of accounting for aspects of the philosophy of science relevant for (T23). The basic terms introduced above lead us to a model of plausible argumen‐ tation which was originally put forward independently of the insight outlined in the quotation in (1), but which is compatible with it: Kertész & Rákosi’s (2012) p-model. Originally, the p-model was not intended as a historiographical ap‐ proach, but rather a metatheoretical one, dealing with foundational issues of linguistic inquiry. Nevertheless, in harmony with the close connection between the historiography and the philosophy of science, which we have already em‐ phasized, a historiographical extension can be derived from the hypotheses of the p-model. Since the p-model handles linguistic theories as dynamic processes of plausible argumentation, it is capable of reconstructing both a given ›synchronic‹ state of such processes and the ›diachronic‹ relation between different states. Thus, the metatheoretical assumptions we have just touched on briefly, immediately yield a possible solution to (P). We will consider this solution as a possible - but by no means as the only - alternative to the approaches discussed in Chapter 2: (SP23) (a) The basic terms of the historiography of generative linguistics are: plausible, retrospective re-evaluation, prismatic and cyclic. (b) The central thesis is (T23). (c) The framework is the historiographical extension of Kertész & Rá‐ kosi’s (2012) p-model. 4 Historiography and plausible argumentation 124 <?page no="125"?> 5 For the precise definition of the terms to be introduced below and the illustration of their workability by a great number of examples from different linguistic theories, see Kertész & Rákosi (2012), as well as Kertész & Rákosi (eds.) (2014). 6 See also Kertész & Rákosi (2014). 7 The claim that admitting the uncertainty of the data may increase the effectiveness of problem solving in linguistics seems to be at first sight paradoxical. However, as the case studies in Kertész & Rákosi (eds.) (2014) have shown, it is not. In order to apply ( SP 23) to the solution of our problem (P), in the next section we must introduce the main tenets of the p-model. 4.2 The p-model 5 4.2.1 The main features of the p-model The p-model rejects a series of methodological and metatheoretical prejudices which have been accepted explicitly or implicitly by mainstream theoretical linguistics but which are not in accord with research practice. Its main innova‐ tions are the following: 6 • Uncertainty instead of certainty. The p-model assumes that the data types made use of in linguistics - i.e. introspective data, corpus data, experi‐ mental data, thought experimental data - are in most cases uncertain. Therefore, the p-model has been designed to account for the uncertainty of linguistic data. Nevertheless, the p-model also presumes that by cap‐ turing the uncertainty of data - by revealing the process of plausible argumentation - the effectiveness of linguistic problem solving can be increased. 7 • Plausible statements instead of true statements. Normally, linguistic data are neither ›facts‹ which are certain, nor are they statements about the facts that are true with certainty, but are statements whose main feature is their uncertainty. The p-model explicates this ›uncertainty‹ as ›plau‐ sibility‹, and, accordingly, the p-model’s central term is ›plausi‐ bility‹. ›Truth‹ is merely an extreme case of the latter. • Plausible inference instead of deductive inference. One of the most impor‐ tant features of plausible inferences is that they do not constitute a cal‐ culus. One reason for this is that plausible inferences reflect properties of statements that resist formalization. The p-model of plausible inferences is neither a logic nor can it be interpreted as a formal system in some sense broader than logic. 4.2 The p-model 125 <?page no="126"?> 8 This includes the application of theoretical tools used in linguistics such as models, programs, methods etc., whatever these terms mean. 9 See Section 1.3 for a brief characterization of the standard view of the analytical phi‐ losophy of science. 10 See Kertész & Rákosi (2012), (2013), and Kertész (2012). • Process of plausible argumentation instead of logical structure. Among others, the p-model says that metatheoretical reflection must not be re‐ stricted to revealing the logical structure of theories. Rather, it should scrutinize their argumentation structure. Accordingly, linguistic theories are to be treated as processes of plausible argumentation. 8 • Dynamic processes instead of static states. Processes of plausible argumen‐ tation are dynamic and not static. So, in contrast to the standard view of the philosophy of science, 9 the p-model does not treat linguistic theories as static constructs to be reduced to their logical structure, but rather, as dynamic processes of plausible argumentation. In such processes, any el‐ ement of the theory at issue can be re-evaluated retrospectively and no element is immune to revision. • Inconsistency-tolerance instead of consistency at all costs. Since the p-model admits the uncertainty of data, it has to account for the possible incon‐ sistency between the data and the hypotheses of the theory and has to reveal the strategies needed to come to grips with such inconsistency. 10 One main task of the process of plausible argumentation is to coordinate the mechanism of the emergence and the resolution of inconsistencies in a way that serves the solution of the problems raised. • Pluralism instead of absolutism. From the circumstance that the p-model treats linguistic theories as dynamic processes of plausible argumentation in the course of which data, terms and hypotheses can be retrospec‐ tively, cyclically and prismatically re-evaluated, it also follows that there are no problem solutions which should be considered valid forever and which should be defended at any costs. The p-model does not accept the view which says that linguistic theorizing starts with a couple of axioms and reaches true conclusions by the application of deductive inferences. Rather, the essence of linguistic theorizing is the continuous revision of information. The p-model’s perspective is not compatible with the abso‐ lutistic defense of particular theories and the unreflected rejection of all those which do not share one’s preferences. The pluralism of linguistic theories is not a flaw, but a fruitful property of the discipline. This plu‐ 4 Historiography and plausible argumentation 126 <?page no="127"?> 11 See also Sternefeld & Richter (2012) as well as Kertész et al. (forthcoming) on the ques‐ tion of how to treat the pluralism of linguistic theorizing. 12 We will come back to these desiderata in Chapter 7. 13 In the linguistic literature we often find views which have been motivated by a belief in the truth of the statements at issue. Nevertheless, there are also much more refined claims. For example, according to Hockett (1968: 34-35) »the source of Zellig S. Harris’s modesty and tolerance seems to have been a particular philosophical orienta‐ tion: the Real Truth (at least about language) is not attainable […]«. In discussing the nature of induction, Bach (1965: 119) reaches the generalization that »theories about the world are not absolute truths«. This is, of course, an epistemological commonplace. Yet, it is worth mentioning such statements as counterpoints to the claims of linguists who believe in the truth of their theory. 14 For example, if we consider the intuition of a native speaker to be a reliable source, then this source will make the grammaticality judgments which stem from it very plausible. This was the case with generative grammar until the recent debates on linguistic data (Kertész & Rákosi 2012). However, if a corpus linguist thinks this source is unreliable, then she will assign low plausibility values to grammaticality judgments (see e. g. Sampson & Babarczy 2014). ralism is expected to contribute to the effectiveness of linguistic problem solving. 11 The task of the historiographical application of the p-model is to analyze and to evaluate the history of generative linguistics in the light of the above aspects. It is expected to yield insights which may further both the historiography of lin‐ guistics and linguistic theorizing itself. 12 4.2.2 An outline of the p-model The central idea of the p-model is analogous to what Chomsky put forward in (1): in linguistic theorizing one only rarely - in extreme cases - encounters true statements. Those statements which play a relevant role in problem solving are, as a rule, not true but merely plausible. 13 That they are plausible means, as a first approximation, that, although they are not true with certainty, one is ready to accept them - at least to a certain extent. The plausibility value of a statement depends on how reliable the source of this plausibility value is. More reliable sources assign higher, less reliable sources assign lower plausibility values to a statement. 14 New pieces of information may influence the reliability of a given source which may thus change, and conse‐ quently, the plausibility value of the statements stemming from this source may also change. We will indicate the plausibility value of a statement by putting it within ›|‹ and referring to the source of the plausibility value in the subscript. 4.2 The p-model 127 <?page no="128"?> 15 Rescher (1976) as well as Kertész & Rákosi (2012) use a numerical scale in order to characterize plausibility values. For the sake of simplicity, here we do not apply such a scale and do not go into the technique of representing plausibility values. If necessary, we will explain differences between plausibility values informally. For example, ›|p| S ‹ is to be read as ›the plausibility value of the statement p on the basis of the source S‹. The plausibility value of a statement can be charac‐ terized in general as follows: • |p| S = 1, if p is true with certainty on the basis of S; • 0<|p| S <1, if p is plausible on the basis of S; • 0<|~p| S <1, if p is implausible on the basis of S; • |p| S = 0, if p is of neutral plausibility on the basis of S, i.e., if it is neither plausible nor implausible on the basis of this source. We distinguish two kinds of sources: direct and indirect ones. In the case of indirect sources the plausibility value of a statement depends on the reliability of the whole source. Such direct sources are, for example, observations, corpora, experiments, thought experiments, publications, introspection etc. (see also Re‐ scher 1976: 6 ff. and Kertész & Rákosi 2012 for further discussion). Among par‐ ticular circumstances it may be useful to differentiate between several kinds of direct sources: for example, intellectual factors (books, papers, experiments, thought experiments etc.) or social factors (authority, group interests, economic demands etc.) or rhetoric. Indirect sources differ from direct ones insofar as the plausibility value of a given statement depends on further statements which have already been assigned a plausibility value. As a rule, indirect sources are inferences which assign plausibility values to statements. Using the notation we have just introduced, the following example illustrates that within an inference the premises serve as the indirect sources of the con‐ clusion: Premises (a) 0<|If Real Madrid is a better team than Barcelona, then it will win tonight.| S <1 (b) 0<|Real Madrid is a better team than Barcelona.| S <1 Conclusion (c) 0<|Real Madrid will win tonight.| I <1 Here, neither of the premises is true, both are merely plausible. In the subscripts, the indirect source is symbolized by I, while S stands for those direct sources which the plausibility values of the premises (a) and (b) rest on. A statement which has received its plausibility value from an indirect or a direct source is called a plausible statement. 15 4 Historiography and plausible argumentation 128 <?page no="129"?> 16 For example, according to Jackendoff (1994: 48), introspection »is so reliable that, for a very good first approximation, linguists tend to trust their own judgments and those of their colleagues« (emphasis added). 17 See Kertész & Rákosi (2012: 7-43) for a detailed analysis of this development. As an illustration of the change in plausibility values, let us mention the well-known circumstance that over several decades, in the practice of generative linguistics analyses the native speaker’s (in most cases the linguist’s) intuition was treated as a reliable source. 16 Therefore, this source assigned a high plau‐ sibility value to grammaticality judgments. However, during the current debate on linguistic data and evidence, the belief that introspection is a highly reliable source of grammaticality judgments has been shattered. 17 Consequently, the plausibility values of grammaticality judgments have decreased and it is be‐ coming more and more important to consider other sources as well, notably, corpora and experiments (see e.g. Kertész 2012). Furthermore, it may happen that a certain statement is highly plausible on the basis of a particular source but less plausible with respect to another. It may also be the case that certain sources support the negation of the statement at issue and make it implausible. In addition, if several sources support a statement, then its plausibility value will be higher on the basis of these sources than on the basis of any single source. It is also important to remark that a statement’s plausibility value is not absolute, but only plausible relative to other - alterna‐ tive, rival - statements. The p-model defines ›data‹ as plausible statements with a positive plausibility value rooted in a direct source. Accordingly, it is not the utterances or sentences or ›examples‹ in a paper that count as data, but the statements referring to them. Thus, data are, by definition, never certain, but merely plausible. Let us illustrate this by the specific case of grammaticality judgments. The p-model treats grammaticality judgments as plausible statements: (a) 0<|The sentence It is unclear what shocked whom is grammatical in English.| S <1 (b) 0<|The sentence It is unclear whom what shocked is ungrammatical in English.| S <1 (c) It is unclear what shocked whom. The statements in (a) and (b) are data whose direct source S may be the intuition of one or more informants. If one trusts introspection as a source, then (a) and (b) are accorded a high plausibility value. If, in turn, one is a corpus linguist questioning the reliability of introspection, then they will have a low plausibility value. Such statements claim that it is plausible / implausible that the English sentence mentioned does or does not have the property of being grammatically correct. Accordingly, the sentence itself in (c) does not count as a datum. 4.2 The p-model 129 <?page no="130"?> If the data and the hypotheses of linguistic theorizing are plausible state‐ ments, then the inferences in which such statements serve as premises cannot yield true conclusions. As Kertész & Rákosi (2012) illustrates, using many ex‐ amples taken from a series of different linguistic theories, in linguistic theorizing one encounters the following three cases: • There is a logical consequence relation between the premises and the conclusion, while at least one of the premises is not true with certainty but only plausible on the basis of the sources available. A simple example: Premises (a) 0<|If the weather is rainy, John gets high blood pressure.| S <1 (b) 0<|The weather is rainy.| S ≤1 Conclusion (c) 0<|John gets high blood pressure.| I <1 Here at least premise (a) is plausible and not true with certainty. Therefore, the conclusion is only plausible. As another example we refer back to the poverty of stimulus argument, which we mentioned in Section 2.4.0 and which we can reconstruct now as follows: Premises (a) 0<|Children learn the grammar of their language in a relatively short time.| S <1 (b) 0<|The language data which children experience and which serve as the input for the acquisition of grammar are insufficient for acquiring the grammar.| S <1 (c) 0<|If language data which children experience and which serve as the input for the acquisition of grammar are insufficient for acquiring the grammar, and children learn the grammar of their language in a relatively short time, then chil‐ dren are born with innate grammatical knowledge.| S <1 Conclusion (d) 0<|Children are born with innate grammatical knowledge.| I <1 • There is no logical consequence relation between the premises and the conclusion. Therefore, latent background assumptions are needed as hidden premises that make the inference logically valid, whereby the la‐ tent background assumptions should be plausible or at least must not be 4 Historiography and plausible argumentation 130 <?page no="131"?> 18 See, e.g. Rapp (2010) for the history of this term. See Rescher (1976: 60 ff.), and Polya (1948: 223) for enthymematic plausible inferences. For an overview of the problems they raise and the argumentation schemes in which they participate, see Walton et al. (2008). Nevertheless, the identification of the latent background assumptions is not without problems: »One problem with enthymemes is that reasonable people can have differences of opinion on what the implicit assumptions are supposed to be. Filling in the missing parts of an enthymeme may depend on interpreting the natural language text in which the argument was put forward […].« (Walton et al. 2008: 189) 19 The classical literature on plausible inferences includes Polya (1948), (1954), Rescher (1976), and Walton (1992). implausible or false. This type of inference is called enthymematic. 18 For example: Premises (a) 0<|John’s body is big.| S ≤1 (b) 0<|John’s nose is part of his body.| S ≤1 Conclusion (c) 0 < |John’s nose is big.| I <1 Here (a) and (b) could be true with certainty, but even if this were the case, no true conclusion would follow from them. The latent background assumption which is missing from the premises but which would be nec‐ essary in order to make the inference valid, is the following: [0<|If the whole has property P, then the part also has property P.| S <1] Latent background assumptions will be put between square brackets. Of course, the conclusion is only plausible and not true with certainty. • These two cases occur simultaneously: at least one of the premises is not true with certainty, but plausible, and there is no logical consequence relation between the premises and the conclusion. For example: Premises (a) 0<|Knowledge of language is modularly organized.| S <1 (b) 0<|Knowledge of language is part of human cognition.| S <1 (c) [0<|If the part has property P, then the whole also has property P.| S <1] Conclusion (d) 0<|Human cognition is modularly organized.| I <1 The inference is enthymematic and all premises are merely plausible. Inferences that meet one of these three conditions will be called plausible infer‐ ences. 19 Plausible inferences make their conclusion plausible but not certainly 4.2 The p-model 131 <?page no="132"?> 20 See also Rescher (1976), (1987) and Rescher & Brandom (1980) on informational overand underdetermination. true. Since the conclusion is not true with certainty, plausible inferences are fallible. The reliability of the sources of plausible statements and the plausibility values of these statements may depend on a series of different factors. The to‐ tality of these factors is called the p-context. The p-context includes, first, the sources with the help of which the plausibility value of statements can be esti‐ mated. Second, it also includes the latent background assumptions together with their relevant properties (for example their plausibility values on the basis of the sources available in the p-context or their logical and semantic structure). Third, the methodological tools pertaining to particular elements of the p-con‐ text are also included in the context: for example, the criteria for handling in‐ consistencies, or instructions on how to use the methods that enable the eval‐ uation of the reliability of the sources, or the accepted methodological norms. It may be the case that the sources in the p-context provide too much infor‐ mation, in the sense that there is at least one statement that is plausible with respect to a certain source while its negation is plausible on the basis of another source. In such cases the p-context is informationally overdetermined and the set of statements in the p-context is p-inconsistent. The opposite is also possible, namely, that the p-context is informationally underdetermined. A typical in‐ stance of informational underdetermination is the p-incompleteness of the p-con‐ text, i.e. a situation in which there are statements that are neither plausible (in the extreme case: true with certainty) nor implausible (in the extreme case: false with certainty) on the basis of the sources at our disposal. 20 The p-context may be both underand overdetermined with respect to different statements. Instances of informational underand overdetermination are called p-problems. A p-context is p-problematic if it is informationally underor over‐ determined. In order to solve these p-problems, certain elements of the p-context have to be re-evaluated by revising them and by integrating new pieces of in‐ formation into the p-context. One obtains the solution of a p-problem if one of the following two conditions is met: • The sources in the p-context unanimously speak for or against the state‐ ment at issue; that is, the statement is either unquestionably plausible or implausible against the background of all the available sources. 4 Historiography and plausible argumentation 132 <?page no="133"?> 21 This is the paraconsistent solution. See also Kertész (2012) and Kertész & Rákosi (2013). 22 »The sort of ›self-criticism‹ at issue does not reflect any vicious or vitiating circularity, but in effect amounts simply to a feedback process that uses later, more refined stages of the analysis to effect revisionary sophistications in the materials from which earlier stages proceeded. One indeed returns to ›the same point‹, but does so at a different cognitive level.« (Rescher 1976: 119; emphasis as in the original) For the distinction between cyclic and circular argumentation in linguistics, see Kertész & Rákosi (2009). • The two statements contradicting each other and thus generating p-in‐ consistency can be separated in such a way that their separation is well motivated and both statements separately meet the first condition. 21 P-problems may have several solutions. The resolution of the p-problem at issue is a particular solution which is - relative to its rivals, in the light of the accepted criteria and the information at one’s disposal - the most optimal one. In order to find the solutions and the resolution of a given problem, we need a heuristic tool which facilitates the revision of the p-context. This heuristic tool is called plausible argumentation. To put it simply, plausible argumentation is a process consisting of a series of plausible inferences and its task is to transform a p-problematic p-context into a p-context that is no longer (or at least less) p-problematic. The process of plausible argumentation aims at finding all the available solutions so that one can decide which of them to accept as the reso‐ lution of the p-problem. Since plausible argumentation may, but does not nec‐ essarily, lead to a solution or the resolution of the p-problem, it is - just like plausible inferences - fallible. Basically, plausible argumentation is not linear, because, as we have just men‐ tioned, the re-evaluation of a p-problematic informational state does not lead immediately to the resolution of the p-problem, but the provisional solution of particular p-problems raises new p-problems. It may question earlier decisions and raise new alternative solutions. This means that the plausible argumentation process may return to earlier hypotheses several times and re-evaluate their plausibility values, the reliability of their sources, the acceptance of the meth‐ odological principles and other decisions previously taken. Accordingly, the ar‐ gumentation process is cyclic, and during the argumentation cycles the contin‐ uous retrospective re-evaluation of the pieces of information at one’s disposal takes place. However, cyclic argumentation has to be strictly distinguished from circular argumentation. Specifically, the cycles of retrospective re-evaluation do not return to the same previous informational state, but to an altered version that has been re-evaluated, modified, narrowed down or supplemented etc. in the light of later cycles. 22 In this way, since plausible argumentation makes one 4.2 The p-model 133 <?page no="134"?> 23 See e.g. Rescher (1987) for a concise discussion of the cyclic, prismatic and retrospective re-evaluation of knowledge in an epistemological context. 24 (1)(b) and (c) in Section 4.1 reflect this cyclic and prismatic process of the retrospective re-evaluation of information in the course of plausible argumentation. observe previously accepted hypotheses, terms, principles etc. through the ›prism‹ of later argumentation cycles, plausible argumentation is not only cyclic but prismatic as well. 23 This means that the cycles continuously modify the perspective from which information is evaluated. Thus, later argumentation cycles generate different rival solutions to the p-problem raised. 24 In what fol‐ lows, we will discuss briefly the structure of argumentation cycles and will also touch on the perspectives related to the prismatic nature of the argumentation process. The first phase of the argumentation process is the starting p-context which includes the p-problem. The p-context at which the plausible argumentation process terminates because a solution or the resolution of the p-problem has been found, is the final p-context (in which in most cases both the solution and the resolution may be only provisional). Between these two phases there is a series of argumentation cycles. An argumentation cycle is a part of the plausible argumentation process which develops a new solution to the p-problem raised in the starting p-con‐ text. It examines whether with this solution its resolution has been achieved. It may be subdivided into subcycles which feed back to earlier argumentation phases and retrospectively re-evaluate some decision made within the cycle. In the prototypical case - from which, due to their individual properties, particular cases may diverge - argumentation cycles consist of three subphases. The first is setting up a new p-context or a new version of an earlier one. Thereby, hypotheses, sources and methodological principles are presented which serve as the starting points for later stages in the argumentation process. The new p-context may contain the starting p-problem (that is, it is p-inconsis‐ tent or p-incomplete); it may be the continuation of an earlier p-context (that is, the argumentation process may return to an earlier stage); or the combination of two alternative p-contexts in which the latter are systematically separated in order to avoid p-inconsistency. Second, the new p-context version is elaborated. This involves the extension of the p-context by new plausible statements, sources or methodological prin‐ ciples. Then, the extended p-context is coordinated: one draws plausible infer‐ ences from the plausible statements available, also using the latent background assumptions in the p-context; the statements are related to the old and the new sources, for example those stemming from indirect sources such as plausible 4 Historiography and plausible argumentation 134 <?page no="135"?> inferences; and the pieces of information pertaining to the reliability of the sources are considered. As a next step, the coordinated p-context is modified. This means that one makes decisions on the basis of the coordination of the old and new pieces of information in order to elaborate a revised, re-evaluated ver‐ sion of the starting p-context which may (but need not) provide a solution of the starting p-problem. Accordingly, the modified p-context is a re-evaluated version of the starting p-context, possibly enriched by new elements. During the third subphase of an argumentation cycle, one compares the ela‐ borated p-context version to its rivals. If a solution has already been arrived at, then it has to be examined to see whether it is a better solution according to the accepted criteria, than the ones elaborated earlier, and whether further rival solutions are conceivable. The question is whether the solution of the starting p-problem obtained in the modified p-context is its resolution, i.e. whether it can be regarded as the most optimal among the solutions one knows. If it is not a resolution, then the argumentation process turns back and a new subcycle is started in order to elaborate on the given p-context. The argumentation process can only terminate if one is in possession of the best solution available within the practical limits given, i.e. the resolution of the starting p-problem. Otherwise, a new argumentation cycle has to be initiated. Now let us turn to the prismatic nature of the plausible argumentation process already mentioned. The ›prism‹ through which one evaluates the information at issue in the course of the argumentation process has different sides, and these do not follow any prefabricated pattern. However, the phases of argumentation cycles outlined above are related to types of perspectives which may contribute to the retrospective re-evaluation of information - although not mechanically and not necessarily, but from case to case in different ways. These perspectives are not sequential, that is their application is not ordered at the outset, and the enumeration given below is not complete. In complex argumentation processes their multiple application is also possible. The diagnostic perspective contributes to setting up a new p-context version within a given cycle. It identifies the p-problem by revealing the p-inconsistency or the p-incompleteness, the sources related to the p-problem, the methodolog‐ ical principles and the plausible statements relevant to the p-problem. Normally, the diagnostic perspective does not lead to a solution of the p-problem. The contrastive perspective is applied to the solution of a p-inconsistency. During the elaboration of the p-context, the task is to decide between the two contradicting statements after they have been separated as a consequence of applying the diagnostic perspective. In order to do this, the p-context should be 4.2 The p-model 135 <?page no="136"?> 25 Then, the p-context is paraconsistent. There is a vast literature on paraconsistency. For the paraconsistency of generative linguistic theorizing, see Kertész (2012) and Kertész & Rákosi (2013). supplemented by new pieces of information that may be suitable for considering the plausibility values of the alternatives. If one succeeds in establishing a p-context in which the decision can be made, it is the exclusive perspective that has to be chosen. The exclusive perspective leads to giving up one of the two rival hypotheses in that we investigate whether the p-context version thus selected is workable. If, during the elaboration of the p-context, it turns out that neither of the rival hypotheses can be given up, the combinative perspective is to be applied. The two hypotheses can be retained if they are treated separately so that they cannot serve jointly as premises of inferences. Then, although they can be combined in this separated way, they do not lead to logical chaos, and they illuminate the p-problem from different points of view. 25 In the last subphase of the argumentation cycle, after the elaboration of the p-context, the evaluative perspective follows. It is as a result of this perspective that the solutions suggested during the previous argumentation cycles can be compared and evaluated so that one can consider whether the argumentation process has reached the resolution of the starting p-problem. This brief overview yields a characterization of linguistic theories which makes them appear as cyclic and prismatic processes of plausible argumentation rooted in the retrospective re-evaluation of information. Characterizing lin‐ guistic theories as dynamic processes of plausible argumentation sheds new light on linguistic theorizing. It differs radically from the static conception of theory as advocated by the standard view of the philosophy of science which is still dominant in mainstream linguistics. 4.3 Summary Figure 7 summarizes the main components of the plausible argumentation process we outlined in the previous section (see also Kertész & Rákosi 2012: 161). 4 Historiography and plausible argumentation 136 <?page no="137"?> starting (p-problematic) p-context argumentation cycle setting up a new p-context (version) elaboration of the p-context sub-cycle extension of the p-context coordination of the p-context modification of the p-context comparison of the elaborated p-context to the rival solutions plausible argumentation process (cyclic and prismatic re-evaluation of the starting p-context) final p-context (resolution of the starting p-problem) Figure 7 Figure 7 4.3 Summary 137 <?page no="138"?> 1 »[…] case studies provide the essential link between the history and the philosophy of science.« (Pietsch 2016: 49) 2 The application of the p-model is reflexive: our train of thought in the present book is of course a plausible argumentation process itself. For example, this inference corre‐ sponds to the third type of plausible inference we discussed briefly in Section 4.2.2, because it is enthymematic (i.e. it contains latent background assumptions) and its premises are not true with certainty, but are merely plausible to a certain extent relative to the degree of the reliability of the sources mentioned. 5 Case study 5.0 Introduction 5.0.1 The problem Due to the genre of this short monograph, we cannot present a detailed analysis of the whole history of generative linguistics with the help of ( SP 23). Therefore, we narrow down (P) to the relationship between Syntactic Structures and its neo-Bloomfieldian predecessors: (P’) What historiographical framework, central hypothesis and basic terms can ac‐ count for the relationship between Syntactic Structures and neo-Bloomfieldian linguistics? Following this, we will present our solution to (P’), namely, ( SP 23), in a case study. 1 The reason why we will narrow down (P) to (P’) and exemplify the workability of ( SP 23) by a case study is that • it is the relationship between Syntactic Structures and neo-Bloomfieldian linguistics that raised the Kuhnian revolutionary nature of generative linguistics in the most pointed way; • the p-model can be applied to later stages of the development of genera‐ tive linguistics in analogy to the analysis of this relationship; and • since (P’) is a sub-problem of (P), and ( SP 23) is the solution to (P), ( SP 23) is the solution to (P’), as well (in the sense of the p-model). 2 Some of the approaches we have surveyed question the continuity of Syntactic Structures with neo-Bloomfieldian structuralism by highlighting its innovations, which are assumed to stand as witnesses to its revolutionary nature in some <?page no="139"?> sense, and others, on the contrary, claim the continuous development of gen‐ erative linguistics. The first group includes Koerner (1978); Newmeyer (1980), (1986a), (1986b), Allen (2003), (2007) and ten Hacken (2007); the second Hymes and Fought (1981) [1975]; Koerner (1989), (2002), (2004); Murray (1994); Harris (1993a); Matthews (1993); Tomalin (2008), and Seuren (1998). Nevertheless, as we have already seen in Section 3.1, if we compare these approaches, then the differences and the similarities between Syntactic Structures and the findings of neo-Bloomfieldianism turn out to be much more sophisticated than these two patterns suggest. 5.0.2 The structure of the chapter The case study focuses on three examples that illustrate the mechanism of the p-model due to which ( SP 23) may count as a possible solution to (P’). With the help of the p-model, in Section 5.1, we will examine the term ›language‹ as used in Syntactic Structures. In Section 5.2, we will reconstruct the plausible argu‐ mentation process in the course of which Chomsky gives an answer to the question of what kind of grammar is capable of generating all grammatical sentences of English and only the grammatical ones. Section 5.3 will comment on the introduction of Chomsky’s evaluation procedure from the point of view of the p-model. Having discussed these three examples, we will summarize our findings in Section 5.4. In the course of our line of reasoning, we will approvingly cite the proposals of certain historiographers, while we will mention the differences between their claims and ( SP 23) as well. One reason why we will refer to them is that the authors whose works we will cite made a series of insights rooted in thorough philological analyses that seem to be compatible with ( SP 23) and may thus con‐ tribute to convincing the reader of the latter’s workability. Another is that we would like to demonstrate that ( SP 23) is not an exotic stance, but rather, one - but not the only - way to synthesize the constructive ideas already put forward by some of the approaches to the historiography of generative linguistics. 5.0.3 The starting and the final p-context Chapter 1 of Syntactic Structures specifies the starting p-context and within this, raises the following p-problem with the help of the diagnostic perspective: 5.0 Introduction 139 <?page no="140"?> 3 The resolution is, of course, provisional, since in later phases of the development of generative linguistics this resolution turned out to be unworkable and had to be retro‐ spectively re-evaluated. 4 Since definitions prescribe the use of expressions, it does not make sense to say that a definition is true or false or is accepted as plausible to a certain extent. (2) »[…] linguists must be concerned with the problem of determining the fun‐ damental underlying properties of successful grammars.« (Chomsky 1957: 11; emphasis added) Chapter 10 - the last chapter of Syntactic Structures - overviews the problem-sol‐ utions that have been inferred, analyzed and evaluated in the course of the ar‐ gumentation cycles carried out after the starting p-context. The final p-context repeatedly applies the evaluative perspective (in the sense we have introduced this term in Section 4.2.2) and proposes the resolution of (2) by the most plausible hypothesis available in the given informational state. 3 In order to illustrate ( SP 23), in what follows, we will select instructive examples of argumentation subphases from the argumentation cycles conducted between the starting and the final p-context - as mentioned, without striving for completeness. 5.1 First example: What is a ›language‹? Chomsky starts the new p-context version with the first sentences of Chapter 2 of Syntactic Structures: (3) (a) »From now on I will consider a language to be a set (finite or infinite) of sentences, (b) each finite in length and constructed out of a finite set of elements. (c) All natural languages in their spoken or written form are languages in this sense, since each natural language has a finite number of phonemes (or letters in its alphabet) and each sentence is represent‐ able as a finite sequence of these phonemes (or letters), though there are infinitely many sentences. (d) Similarly, the set of ›sentences‹ of some formalized system of math‐ ematics, can be considered a language.« (Chomsky 1957: 13; em‐ phasis as in the original.) Definitions have no plausibility values, so (3)(a) and (b) cannot be analyzed with respect to plausibility values. 4 However, (3)(c) has a plausibility value. It says 5 Case study 140 <?page no="141"?> 5 »Different non-minimum forms may be alike or partly alike as to the order of the con‐ stituent forms and as to stimulus-reaction features corresponding to this order. […] The order may be successive, simultaneous (stress and pitch with other phonemes), sub‐ stitutive (French au [o] for a le), and so on. […] Such recurrent sames of order are constructions; the corresponding stimulus-reaction features are constructional mean‐ ings.« (Bloomfield 1926: 157-158; emphasis as in the original) that existing natural languages are languages in terms of (3)(a) and (b). (3)(d) has a plausibility value, too; it makes a similar claim with respect to formalized languages. In order to make our later reasoning more transparent, we repeat these two claims using the notation we have introduced in Section 4.2.2: (3) (c) 0<|All natural languages in their spoken or written form are lan‐ guages in this sense, since each natural language has a finite number of phonemes (or letters in its alphabet) and each sentence is repre‐ sentable as a finite sequence of these phonemes (or letters), though there are infinitely many sentences.| S <1 (d) 0<|Similarly, the set of ›sentences‹ of some formalized system of mathematics, can be considered a language.| S <1 Since, as we have just said, (3)(c) and (d) have a plausibility value, we have to identify the source of their plausibility values, that is, we have to clarify what S stands for. One of the direct sources is Bloomfield’s definition of a ›language‹. According to Bloomfield (1926: 155), »[t]he totality of utterances that can be made in a speech-community is the language of that speech-community«. Bloomfield dis‐ tinguishes between ›sentence‹ and ›utterance‹. He defines utterances as acts of speech (op. cit. 154), while »a sentence is a construction which, in the given utterance, is not part of any larger construction. Every utterance therefore con‐ sists of one or more sentences […]« (op. cit. 158). 5 Consequently, if a language is the totality of utterances and utterances consist of sentences, then a language is the totality of sentences. At first glance this seems to be exactly what Chomsky said in (3)(a). But what Chomsky says is not the same as Bloomfield’s definition. Namely, as we have just seen, Bloomfield makes a distinction between ›sen‐ tence‹ and ›utterance‹ in that he considers the former to be part of the latter, whereas Chomsky uses these two terms as synonyms. Matthews (1993: 129-130) points out that it was Zellig S. Harris who introduced their synony‐ mous use, thus diverging from Bloomfield’s definitions. Accordingly, the second direct source is Zellig S. Harris’ terminology. Table 2 illustrates that Syntactic 5.1 First example: What is a ›language‹? 141 <?page no="142"?> Structures uses the terms ›sentence‹ and ›utterance‹ synonymously and inter‐ changeably in similar contexts. ›sentence‹ ›utterance‹ »That is, each grammar is related to the corpus of sentences in the language it describes in a way fixed in advance for all grammars by a given linguistic theory. We then have a very strong test of adequacy for a linguistic theory that attempts to give a general explanation for the no‐ tion ›grammatical sentence‹ in terms of ›observed sentence‹, and for the set of grammars constructed in accordance with such a theory.« (Chomsky 1957: 14; bold emphasis as in the original, italics added). »[…] Any grammar of a language will project the finite and somewhat acci‐ dental corpus of observed utterances to a set (presumably infinite) of grammatical utterances.« (Chomsky 1957: 15; bold em‐ phasis as in the original, italics added) »In producing a sentence, the speaker be‐ gins in the initial state, produces the first word of the sentence, thereby switching into a second state which limits the choice of the second word, etc.« (Chomsky 1957: 20; italics added) »[…] the ability of a speaker of English to produce and understand new utter‐ ances […]« (Chomsky 1957: 23; emphasis added). »[…] each sentence as its representa‐ tion […]« (Chomsky1957; 33; emphasis added) »[…] an utterance is repre‐ sented […]« (Chomsky 1957: 47; emphasis added) »We have described these grammars as devices for generating sen‐ tences« (Chomsky 1957: 48; emphasis added) »Each such grammar is simply a descrip‐ tion of a certain set of utterances, namely, those which it generates. […] a grammar generates all grammatically ›possible‹ ut‐ terances.« (Chomsky 1957: 48; emphasis added) Table 2 These two sources witness that in (3), the use of the term ›language‹ reflects Bloomfield’s definition while that of ›utterance‹ follows Zellig S. Harris’ termi‐ nology. The plausibility value of (3)(c) depends on the joint reliability of these two sources. Since in the given p-context both count as very reliable sources, the plausibility value of (3)(c) is high. So far, we have seen that certain basic terms of Syntactic Structures correspond either to Bloomfield’s or Zellig S. Harris’ usage. The observation seems to present itself that, in this respect, Chomsky’s early work is deeply rooted in Bloomfieldian and neo-Bloomfieldian linguistics. However, this observation is oversimplified and is in need of differentiation, because the p-context which 5 Case study 142 <?page no="143"?> 6 See Bach (1965: 123), Seuren (2009: 100) and Lasnik & Lohndal (2013: 27) on the impact of Post’s work on algorithms on Syntactic Structures. As Seuren points out, Chomsky did not clarify explicitly that his idea of generative grammar was at least in part moti‐ vated by Post’s definition of algorithm. contains the sources influencing the plausibility value of (3)(c), is not constant but changes continuously. Chomsky does not accept the two terms invariably. Through the ›prism‹ of further cycles of the plausible argumentation process in Syntactic Structures, he retrospectively re-evaluates the p-context that is re‐ sponsible for the plausibility value of (3)(c). Let us exemplify this by one (but not the only) relevant side of the ›prism‹: the mathematical foundations. The reason why we highlight this side of the ›prism‹ is that several of the historio‐ graphical approaches overviewed in Chapter 2 consider the erection of the lin‐ guistic theory on mathematical foundations to be one of the most innovative features of Syntactic Structures. In (3)(d), Chomsky applies the term ›language‹ to formalized systems of mathematics. The p-context extended in this way places the term ›lan‐ guage‹ into a formal system of operations that facilitates its repeated re-evalu‐ ation. This kind of retrospective re-evaluation process in the course of which the formal foundations of generative transformational grammar were laid down, seems to have been triggered by the application of Emil Post’s idea of algorithm to sentences (Bach 1965: 123; Seuren 2009: 100; Lasnik & Lohndal 2013: 27). Thus, Post’s (1944) definition of ›algorithm‹ is a new direct source of the plausibility value of (3)(c) and (d). The high reliability of this new source of the plausibility value of (3)(c) and (3)(d) is witnessed by the methodological norms of the formal sciences which gained high prestige during the first half of the twentieth century (Tomalin 2008, Seuren 2009, Lasnik & Lohndal 2013; see also below). According to Post, an algorithm is a finite mechanical ›device‹ that generates a finite or infinite set of finite strings of symbols from a given finite alphabet whereby a finite set of production rules is made use of. A transformational generative grammar, as documented by the claims in (3), is an algorithm in this sense, one that is applied to sentences. 6 The p-context is further extended by the introduction of the terms ›gram‐ matical sequence‹, ›ungrammatical sequence‹ and, a few lines below, by the explication of ›grammatical in English‹ and the latter statement’s generalization as ›grammatical‹ (Chomsky 1957: 13). In the p-context thus extended by the new source a sentence/ utterance is no longer something that has been or could be uttered in speech, but an abstract construct with mathematical properties. Con‐ sequently, the Bloomfieldian term ›language‹ is now associated with a new piece of information that modifies its content substantially: a language is the totality 5.1 First example: What is a ›language‹? 143 <?page no="144"?> 7 See Hockett (1968: 27 f.) on the ›rigor‹ of neo-Bloomfieldian analyses. of abstract constructs that have mathematical properties and that are judged by the members of a speech community as grammatical. At this point, the process of plausible argumentation prismatically and retrospectively re-evaluated the term ›language‹ that had been introduced in the starting p-context, through the continuous extension of the p-context. As a result, relative to the starting p-con‐ text, the meaning of this term changed significantly. Now we interrupt the analysis because, as mentioned, our aim is not a com‐ prehensive reconstruction of the argumentation process as conducted in Syn‐ tactic Structures, but rather, the illustration of ( SP 23) by a few examples. The mechanism we have sketched above demonstrates that according to ( SP 23), on the one hand, claims such as (3)(c) and (d) get their plausibility values at least in part both from Bloomfieldian and neo-Bloomfieldian linguistics and therefore they must not be interpreted as a radical break with the latter. On the other hand, the plausibility values of (3)(c) and (d) are the result of extending the p-context by a new source that plays an important role in the process of retrospective re-evaluation. In this respect, it is not acceptable to say that Syntactic Structures is simply post-Bloomfieldian structuralism (Hymes & Fought 1981, Koerner 1989). Since (3)(c) and (d) have been supported by Bloomfieldian and neo-Bloom‐ fieldian sources as well as a very reliable new source that has been integrated into the p-context in the course of its extension, their plausibility values are higher than those of the analogous claims by Bloomfield, Zellig S. Harris and others. So, the increase of the plausibility values is due to the following factors: • The p-context was extended by a new direct source. • The direct sources were integrated. • The scientific community that accepts Syntactic Structures judged the re‐ liability of the new source higher than that of the Bloomfieldian and neo-Bloomfieldian ones. The reason why a group of linguists - i.e. those advocating Syntactic Struc‐ tures - considered the new source more reliable than the old ones is that they assumed relevant differences existed between the ›rigor‹ which in their analyses neo-Bloomfieldians were striving for, and a formalized theory built on mathe‐ matical foundations in a period of the history of science in which the authority of the ›formal sciences‹ was very high and the trends associated with them counted as ›more scientific‹ (whatever this means) than others (Tomalin 2008: 1). 7 5 Case study 144 <?page no="145"?> 8 This operation is called ›notation‹. For the philosophical foundations of notation see Goodman (1976). As for the last claim, it is worth making a brief digression in order to resolve the ambiguity of the term ›formal‹. Its two interpretations are often confused (see also Seuren 2009, Scholz & Pullum 2007). In one of its senses, the term contrasts the ›form‹ - i.e. the phonological, morphological and syntactic level - of linguistic expressions with their ›meaning‹ and indicates that the research focuses on the former rather than on the latter. The other sense of ›formal‹ does not refer to the object of research but highlights a specific feature of the theory, according to which it constitutes a mathematical or logical system. An axiomatic system of logic or mathematics is called ›calculus‹. Bloomfieldian and neo-Bloomfieldian linguistics is ›formal‹ in the first sense. For example, al‐ though Hockett (1968: 27) emphasizes the ›rigor‹ of neo-Bloomfieldian linguis‐ tics, this kind of linguistics can be ›formal‹ in the first sense only. Namely, its ›rigor‹ amounts to denoting the components of the object of investigation in the first sense by symbols, but these symbols do not constitute a calculus. 8 Syntactic Structures is ›formal‹ in the first sense and in the second, as well, be‐ cause it deals with an axiomatic and algorithmic mathematical theory of a frag‐ ment of English syntax. By way of summary, the following conclusions present themselves. • The plausibility values of (3)(c) and (d) in Syntactic Structures are higher than those of their alternatives in the works of the time. • The reason for this is that (3)(c) and (d) receive their plausibility values from several direct sources: • Bloomfieldian linguistics, • neo-Bloomfieldian linguistics, and • as a new direct source, the formal sciences, and primarily, Post (1944). • It is the new source, in particular, Post’s term ›algorithm‹, that triggers the retrospective re-evaluation of the p-context and, accordingly, the in‐ crease of the plausibility values of the statements quoted. The reliability of the mathematical system used as a new source and reflecting the second sense of ›formal‹ is, at least according to the adherents of Syntactic Struc‐ tures, higher than the ›rigorous‹ notational system restricted to the as‐ sociation of the analyzed linguistic units in the first sense of ›formal‹ with symbols. Consequently, as the example we have discussed here shows, ( SP 23) explains the ›superiority‹ of Syntactic Structures to Bloomfieldian and neo-Bloomfieldian 5.1 First example: What is a ›language‹? 145 <?page no="146"?> 9 The plausible inferences we will reconstruct can be subdivided into further plausible inferences, which we will not specify here. linguistics - which different historiographical approaches called ›revolu‐ tion‹, ›evolution‹ or ›continuity‹ - by the circumstance that the p-context was extended in that a new source was integrated and, as a result of this, the process of retrospective re-evaluation brought about an increase in the plausibility values of certain plausible statements. 5.2 Second example: What sort of grammar is needed? 5.2.0 The p-problem We will reconstruct Chomsky’s famous argumentation that starts with the ap‐ plication of finite state machines to grammars and infers the necessity of con‐ structing transformational grammars. Thereby, we will focus on the substantial features of this plausible argumentation process and abstract from details. 9 In a new p-context version, Chomsky raises the following p-problem: (4) »We ask what sort of grammar is necessary to generate all the sequences of morphemes (or words) that constitute grammatical English sentences, and only these«. (Chomsky 1957: 18) There are three subcycles in the plausible argumentation process which Chomsky conducts in order to find a solution to (4). We will reconstruct these subcycles in the following sections. 5 Case study 146 <?page no="147"?> 10 Let us add a few remarks which highlight how different the evaluations of Chomsky’s argumentation are. On the one hand, Otero (1994: 1), in agreement with George Miller (1979) and Howard Gardner (1985), identifies September 11th, 1956 as the birth date of cognitive science - the day on which Chomsky gave his famous talk in which he showed that finite state machines are not capable of modeling natural language structures (see Chomsky 1956); it is this paper on which the argumentation in Syntactic Structures which we will partially reconstruct here has been based. On the other hand, Seuren (1998: 272), citing Levelt (1974), claims that »Chomsky’s argument against finite state machines is […], in fact, faulty«. Similarly, Pullum (2011: 277) argues that »SS contains no proof that English is beyond the power of finite state description (it is not clear that Chomsky ever gave a sound mathematical argument for that claim). The approach advocated by SS springs directly out of the work of the mathematical logician Emil Post on formalizing proof, but few linguists are aware of this, because Post’s papers are not cited.« Nevertheless, Seuren adds that »even though Chomsky’s (1956) argument […] is seen to be faulty, it does not follow that the conclu‐ sion is false. In fact, it is universally accepted that the conclusion is correct« (ibid. 273-274). And Pullum (2011: 294) concludes that »SS is credited with a degree of orig‐ inality, explicitness, and technical coherence that it does not actually exhibit, but to say that is not to deny that somehow it managed to stimulate other linguists to strive for these virtues. Its effect was catalytic rather than substantive (it contains no results that are defended in detail today).« Citing Seuren and Pullum, Behme (2014: 686 footnote 16) also remarks that »[i]t is a matter of debate whether Chomsky’s early work was as rigorous as it is often described […]. For my argument it is not necessary to establish how rigorous this work in fact was. I am only claiming that Chomsky’s work was widely perceived as rigorous.« These claims support our assumption that the premises on which the conclusions of Chomsky’s inferences rest are not true, but appear to be only plausible in a particular p-context. The plausibility values of these premises rest on a source - namely, the as‐ sumed mathematical foundation - which was considered to be highly reliable. 5.2.1 English is not a finite state language 10 During the elaboration of the new p-context version, Chomsky extends the p-context by pieces of information about finite state machines. (5) A finite state machine (a) has an initial state; (b) consists of a finite number of states; (c) switches from one state to the next, in that it produces a symbol the choice of which is limited only by the immediately preceding state; (d) operates in a way in which the past and the future of a given state are independent of each other, i.e. the future state is determined only by the present, even if the past state is known; 5.2 Second example: What sort of grammar is needed? 147 <?page no="148"?> 11 See Chomsky (1957: 17, footnote 3). 12 We use the term ›data‹ in the sense of Section 4.2.2. In (7), S1 is the assumed knowledge of the fictional language. In (8), S2 is Chomsky’s native speaker intuition. (e) reaches a final state. If a ›language‹ is modeled by a finite state machine, then • the final state is a sentence; • any language produced by a finite state machine is a finite state language; • a machine that produces a finite state language is a finite state grammar. Thus, in this argumentation subcycle - applying the contrastive perspective as introduced in Section 4.2.2 - two rival hypotheses present themselves as possible solutions to (4). Accordingly, the p-context is informationally underdetermined, that is, it is p-inconsistent: (6) (a) 0<|A finite state grammar is capable of generating all the grammatical sentences of English and only the grammatical ones.| S1 <1 (b) 0<|A finite state grammar is not capable of generating all the gram‐ matical sentences of English and only the grammatical ones.| S2 <1 The plausibility of (6)(a) stems from a neo-Bloomfieldian source (=S1), primarily Hockett (1955). 11 Chomsky examined the nature of S2, that is, in our terminology, whether the p-context can be enriched by new sources that facilitate the com‐ parison of the plausibility value of (6)(b) with that of (6)(a). In this p-context, he defines a language »by giving its ›alphabet‹ (i.e., the finite set of symbols out of which its sentences are constructed) and its grammatical sentences (Chomsky 1956: 21)«. Among others, he considers the data of the following fictional lan‐ guages whose alphabets contain only the letters a and b: 12 (7) (a) 0<|In the language L1 the sentences consisting of the strings ab, aabb, aaabbb are grammatical.| S1 <1 (b) 0<|In the language L2 the sentences consisting of the strings aa, bb, abba, baab, aaaa, bbbb are grammatical.| S1 <1 In L1, »all sentences consisting of n occurrences of a followed by n occurrences of b and only these« are grammatical. In L2, in turn, »all sentences consisting 5 Case study 148 <?page no="149"?> 13 As we have already remarked in Section 4.2.2, the current debate on linguistic data and evidence has revealed that grammaticality judgments cannot be true with certainty. (Please remember that the p-model treats grammaticality judgments as statements. So, in principle they can be true or false or plausible to some extent. See Section 4.2.2.) This is in sharp contrast with what certain proponents of generative linguistics propagated during the past decades (see e.g. Jackendoff’s formulation quoted in footnote 16 in Sec‐ tion 4.2.2). In this respect, the seminal work is Schütze (1996), but see Kertész & Rákosi (2012) for an analysis of later developments. Therefore, not only 7(a), (b) and (9)(a), but (8) and (9)(b) are also plausible statements. Consequently, (9)(c) is a plausible statement, too, and (9) is a plausible inference. 14 Here S1 stands for the direct source of the premise (9)(a) which comprises information about finite state machines (=(5)). S2 denotes Chomsky’s native speaker intuition of English which enables him to judge the grammaticality of the sentences in (8)(a)-(c). I(9) symbolizes the indirect source of the plausibility value of the conclusion (9)(c), namely, that its plausibility value stems from the premises of the inference. of a string X followed by the ›mirror image‹ of X (i.e. X in reverse), and only these« are grammatical (Chomsky 1957: 21). Then, he investigates English data as well, which we reconstruct in (8): (8) 0<|If A1-A5 are grammatical sentences of English, then the sentences (a) If A1, then A2; (b) Either A3 or A4; (c) The man who said that A5, is arriving today are grammatical sentences of English, as well.| S2 <1 What the sentences in (7) and (8) have in common is that there is non-local dependency between two linguistic units. The dependency is non-local in the sense that the two units belong to different clauses. (8) works as the premise of an inference - that is, as an indirect source - which supports the conclusion in (9)(c): 13 (9) Premises 14 (a) 0<|If (8), then in English there is non-local dependency.| S1 <1 (b) 0<|(8)| S2 < 1 Conclusion (c) 0<|In English there is non-local dependency.| I(9) <1 5.2 Second example: What sort of grammar is needed? 149 <?page no="150"?> 15 Recursion is an operation during which an operation is carried out that has been defined by this operation itself. That is, the operation repeats itself. In linguistics, embedded sentences are a typical case of recursion. With the help of recursion, infinitely many different sentences can be generated from a finite set of elements. 16 Similarly to (9), S1 denotes the direct source of the premise (9)(a), which consists of one’s knowledge about finite state machines. I(10) stands for the indirect source of the conclusion in (10)(c), namely, that its plausibility value is rooted in the premises of the inference. In this stage of the plausible argumentation process, the p-context is coordinated insofar as the plausibility value of (6)(a) and that of (6)(b) are compared on the basis of the new sources just mentioned. Although finite state machines are recursive, and, accordingly, can generate an infinite number of sentences from a finite number of elements, 15 they cannot generate all grammatically correct sentences and only the grammatically correct ones. Among other things, they cannot generate sentences in which there is non-local dependency between the elements of a certain string. For example, they cannot generate the fictional languages as indicated in (7) and English as indicated in (8). At this point of the plausible argumentation process, another relevant infer‐ ence is (10): (10) Premises 16 (a) [0<|If a grammar cannot describe non-local dependency, then it cannot generate all the grammatically correct sentences.| S1 <1] (b) 0<|A finite state grammar of English cannot describe non-local de‐ pendency.| S1 <1 Conclusion (c) 0<|A finite state grammar of English cannot generate all the gram‐ matically correct sentences of English.| I(10) <1 (10) is an enthymematic plausible inference. Syntactic Structures mentions only premise (10)(b), but, in order to make (10) an inference with a valid structure, at least one additional premise is needed. (10)(a) is a latent background assumption which has not been formulated, but which is part of the p-context. (10)(c) yields one component of (6)(b), namely, that a finite state grammar is not capable of generating all grammatically correct sentences. The other com‐ ponent is the claim that besides grammatically correct sentences, finite state grammars can also generate ungrammatical ones. Now we turn to this latter 5 Case study 150 <?page no="151"?> 17 In (11), S1 stands for Chomsky’s native speaker intuition. It is the direct source of the plausibility value of the statement. 18 »If a grammar of this type produces all English sentences, it will produce many non-sentences as well.« (Chomsky 1957: 24) 19 Here S1 denotes Chomsky’s native speaker intuition and S2 the information on finite state machines (see (5)). The type of plausible inference in (12) is reduction. component. For example, Chomsky (1957: 23) introduces the following datum into the p-context: 17 (11) 0<|The sentence Either A1, then A2 is ungrammatical in English.| S1 <1 (11) is a datum that is part of (12)(a): 18 (12) Premises 19 (a) 0<|If a finite state grammar of English generates all English sen‐ tences, then it will generate ungrammatical sentences like Either A1, then A2 as well.| S1 <1 (b) 0<|A finite state grammar of English can generate the language in‐ cluding Either A1, then A2.| S2 <1 Conclusion (c) (c) 0<|A finite state grammar of English will generate ungrammatical sentences like Either A1, then A2 as well.| I(12) <1 In the p-context thus modified (in the sense of Section 4.2.2), (10)(c) and (12)(c) do not solve (4) themselves, but they take a step further toward a solution. In particular, they clarify what type of grammar does not meet the task specified in (4), but they do not identify that type of grammar that does. To illustrate this, let us quote Chomsky (1957: 23): (13) »[…] it seems quite clear that no theory of linguistic structure based exclu‐ sively on Markov process models and the like, will be able to explain or ac‐ count for the ability of a speaker of English to produce and understand new utterances, while he rejects other new sequences as not belonging to the language.« To summarize: the process of plausible argumentation we sketched makes (6) (b) plausible with the help of the exclusive perspective (see Section 4.2.2). Since (6)(a) and (6)(b) are the negations of each other, at the same time this makes (6) 5.2 Second example: What sort of grammar is needed? 151 <?page no="152"?> 20 The classic overview is Wells (1947). (a) implausible. Accordingly, this example illustrates that ( SP 23) reconstructs historical change as a process of plausible argumentation that decreases the plau‐ sibility value of a neo-Bloomfieldian statement while increases that of the rival statement. 5.2.2 Phrase structure In the next argumentation subcycle Chomsky raises the p-problem in (14)(b): (14) (a) »Customarily, linguistic description on the syntactic level is formu‐ lated in terms of constituent analysis (parsing). (b) We now ask what form of grammar is presupposed by description of this sort.« (Chomsky1957: 26) Here the p-context is informationally underdetermined because the following statement cannot be assigned a plausibility value (Chomsky 1957: 26; bold em‐ phasis added, italics as in the original): (15) |»We find that the new form of grammar is essentially more powerful than the finite state model rejected above […].«| S =0. At this point, the argumentation process has to extend the p-context (in the sense of Section 4.2.2) and through this, assign a plausibility value to (15) by finding the sources which S stands for. The extension of the p-context amounts to the inclusion of at least two new sources. One of them is what has been known about the neo-Bloomfieldian approach to constituent structure mentioned in (14)(a), and the other is the introduction of non-terminal symbols. First we will have a look at the role that the reference to constituent structure plays in the plausible argumentation process of Syntactic Structures. In order to do so, we have to examine the reliability of the source which the plausibility value of (14)(a) stems from. Bloomfield’s (1935: 161) arguments in favor of immediate constituent ( IC ) analysis are an important milestone in the history of linguistic description. 20 Percival (1976b) systematically compares the method of IC analysis with tradi‐ tional grammars that had been on the scene before Bloomfield’s work appeared. Until the end of the 1970s the commonly accepted view was that there was a parallelism between IC analysis and the way traditional grammars subdivided 5 Case study 152 <?page no="153"?> 21 So, a single morpheme class is equivalent to a sequence of morpheme classes. For ex‐ ample, according to traditional grammar, in the expression very cold beer the word beer is a noun modified by the adjective cold and very is an adverb modifying the adjective cold. However, according to the IC analysis, there is no relationship between cold and beer, because the phrase very cold has a similar relation to beer as very to cold. sentences into subject and predicate, and these into smaller units (see e.g. Lyons 1968: 210). Percival argues against this view and maintains that traditional grammar and IC analysis are logically incompatible. Percival (1976b: 232-233) concludes that IC analysis has three essential features: • Every sentence can be subdivided binarily into a subject part and a pred‐ icate part. To apply Bloomfield’s (1935: 161) example, the sentence Poor John ran away can be subdivided into poor John and ran away. • Certain groups of words behave syntactically as single words. For ex‐ ample, very rich behaves syntactically like the single word poor in the expressions very rich man and poor man. • Sentences are analyzed hierarchically. They are first analyzed into two parts, and then these are analyzed into two parts again, and so on till one reaches the smallest units that cannot be subdivided into even smaller ones. Percival emphasizes that each of these principles are in sharp contrast with the subject-predicate analysis of traditional grammars. His first argument says that traditional grammars cannot handle binarity because they do not operate with constituents. Since they apply ›subject‹ and ›predicate‹ to single words, binarity would work only with sentences that consist of two words. Second, it cannot handle the equivalence of single words and word groups. Third, since traditional grammars do not capture the hierarchical relations assumed by IC analysis, the two methods analyze the same structures differently. 21 From these considerations Percival concludes that - in opposition to Lyons (1968: 210) - IC analysis is not merely a more explicit extension of traditional grammatical analyses, but logically incompatible with it. But if this is so, what then is the origin of IC analysis? Percival’s answer is: The chapter entitled Die Sprache of Wilhelm Wundt’s Völkerpsychologie (Wundt 1911-1912). Wundt de‐ parted consciously from the traditional method of analysis, and - although in different ways - Bloomfield (1914) and (1935) reflect the adaptation of Wundt’s ideas concerning the analysis of sentences based on binarity. Nevertheless, Bloomfield adapted Wundt’s idea in a modified way. One example of this was that, unlike Wundt, who applied geometric figures similar to trees, he does not make use of trees. 5.2 Second example: What sort of grammar is needed? 153 <?page no="154"?> 22 For example, let us assume that A stands for the morpheme class of good and N for that of boy and man. Then one obtains the formula A N = N which says that the class N does not contain only single morphemes but also sequences of morphemes whose distribu‐ tion is identical: for example, the morpheme sequences good boy or your sister or that man you detest. 23 In the first sentences of Chapter 5, Chomsky mentions that the phrase structure model is based on IC analysis. 24 It is worth calling attention to the contrast between Matthews’ conclusion, inferred from thorough historiographical analyses, on the one hand, and on the other hand the rhetoric of Chomsky’s followers who use terms like ›classification‹ and ›taxonomy‹ pe‐ joratively and who dispute the distributionalist roots of Syntactic Structures even though they are, despite this rhetoric, quite obvious. Thus, it is not the analytical method based on the categories of traditional grammar, but Wundt’s method that Bloomfield re-evaluated in order to develop the method of IC analysis. From this point on, a series of further cycles of retrospective and prismatic re-evaluation lead to the phrase structures in Chomsky (1957). Distribution played an important role in the process of the later re-evaluation of the IC method. Bloomfield clearly realized that, since during the investigation of distributional relations the main task is revealing which expressions can be substituted for which expressions in a given distribution, IC analysis must not operate independently of the substitution of elements in a given context, either. Zellig S. Harris (1946), (1951)[1947] re-evaluates this insight in that he intro‐ duces the notation of the equivalence of larger and smaller morpheme classes based exclusively on substitution. 22 Zellig S. Harris emphasizes that the only operation to be applied is »substitution, repeated time and again« (Zellig S. Harris 1946: 161; see also Matthews 1993: 145-146). As a result of this, syntactic units consisting of sequences of morphemes are obtained whose description does not require the analysis of their meaning. To sum up what has been said so far, the main features of IC analysis are as follows: 23 • disregarding meaning, • the binary subdivision of sentences, • the substantial role of distribution (because the main method is substitu‐ tion), • the representation of the hierarchical relations within the sentences, • the syntactic equivalence of larger and smaller units. The way Matthews characterizes the relation between IC analysis and the phrase structure grammar in Chomsky (1957) is quite instructive: 24 5 Case study 154 <?page no="155"?> 25 See also Boeckx 2006: 31 ff. for a similar summary. (16) (a) »But the continuity with Chomsky’s model is already perfectly clear. […] The model of syntax with which serious study of generative grammars was to begin, and which served as the springboard for the development of the transformational model, was in essence the one implied by the procedures of segmentation, substitution and classi‐ fication that they had developed.« (Matthews 1993: 146; emphasis added) (b) »The origin of phrase structure grammar was, in short, Bloomfieldian constituency analysis, and the origin of that, in turn, was what re‐ mained of Bloomfield’s model when, first, grammatical arrangement is reduced to selection and order and, secondly, all reference to meaning is taken out. It was, in consequence, a brilliantly simple model.« (Matthews 1993: 148) So far, the above overview seems to suggest that toward the middle of the 1950s the linguistic literature on IC analysis counted as a reliable source that assigned a high plausibility value to (14)(a). Since (14)(a), as we will see below, has been integrated into the plausible inference whose conclusion is (15), the latter obtains its plausibility value in part from neo-Bloomfieldian IC analysis. Nevertheless, Chomsky did not adapt this method invariably, but he re-evalu‐ ated it retrospectively and prismatically from different perspectives. Since, for lack of space, we cannot reconstruct all details of the argumentation process, here we merely point out that during the extension of the p-context, Chomsky supplements the information on IC analysis by at least three relevant pieces of information, and thereby, in the extended p-context, he retrospectively re-evaluates an earlier p-context of (14)(a) that was accepted in neo-Bloomfiel‐ dian linguistics. One is the introduction of rewriting rules, another is their for‐ malization, and the third is the recursive application of non-terminal symbols. As already mentioned, we will illustrate the argumentation process by the third case. The central idea of the recursive application of non-terminal symbols is that phrase structure grammar may contain rewriting rules like (17)(c): 25 (17) (a) S (b) S → ab (c) S → aSb Then, we obtain the following derivation: 5.2 Second example: What sort of grammar is needed? 155 <?page no="156"?> 26 S1 stands for (17) and (18) as the direct sources of (19). For S2 see below. (18) (a) S (by virtue of (17)(a)) (b) aSb (by the application of (17)(c)) (c) aaSbb (by the re-application of (17)(c)) (d) aaaSbbb (by the reapplication of (17)(c)) (e) aaaabbbb (by the application of (17)(b)) (18)(e) is a string which a finite state grammar could not generate. In this way, (17) and (18) are direct sources assigning a high plausibility value to (19): 26 (19) 0<|A phrase structure grammar can describe non-local dependency.| S1 <1 At the same time, (19) is premise (20)(b) of the plausible inference in (20): (20) Premises (a) [0<|If a grammar can describe non-local dependency, then it is more powerful than a finite state grammar.| S2 <1] (b) 0<|A phrase structure grammar can describe non-local dependency.| S1 <1 Conclusion (c) 0<|A phrase structure grammar is more powerful than a finite state grammar.| I(20) <1 (20)(c) includes (15) supplemented by a plausibility value. In this way, it has been possible to assign a plausibility value to (15) and through this, to solve the p-problem raised in (14)(b). Chomsky writes: (21) »We have not proved the adequacy of the phrase structure model, but we have shown that large parts of English which literally cannot be described in terms of the finite state process model can be described in terms of phrase struc‐ ture.« Chomsky 1957: 31; emphasis added) In sum, (15) could be assigned a plausibility value on the basis of the following sources: 5 Case study 156 <?page no="157"?> 27 We will discuss below the sources which S1 stands for. • accepted knowledge of IC analysis provided by Bloomfieldian and neo-Bloomfieldian linguistics; • rewriting rules, their formalization and the recursive introduction of non-terminal symbols; • the plausible inference in (20). The first two are direct sources and the third is an indirect one. The plausible argumentation process leads to a statement with high plausi‐ bility value, namely, (20)(c) - which is equivalent to (15) supplemented by plau‐ sibility values - through the interaction of the sources, the change in their re‐ liability, latent background assumptions and plausible inferences. The above fragmentary reconstruction of this process contributes to the explanation that ( SP 23) gives for the alleged ›superiority‹ of Syntactic Structures to neo-Bloom‐ fieldian linguistics. 5.2.3 Transformations The starting point of the next subcycle of the plausible argumentation process is the insight that »grammatical transformations« should be introduced because phrase structure grammars »will be so hopelessly complex that they will be without interest unless we incorporate such rules« and that transforma‐ tions »lead to an entirely new conception of linguistic structure« (Chomsky 1957: 44). That is, Chomsky modifies (in the sense of Section 4.2.2) the p-context by the acceptance of the following plausible statement: 27 (22) 0<|In the grammar, the level of phrase structure is to be supplemented by the level of grammatical transformations.| S1 <1 Seuren (1998) argues that the introduction of transformations opened a new era in linguistics, but that - in contrast to the widely held view - this era was ini‐ tiated by Zellig S. Harris, rather than Chomsky. In this section we will show that the plausibility value of (22) basically rests on a series of both direct and of indirect sources. One of the direct sources is two papers by Zellig S. Harris on the idea of transformation, and another is a methodological principle pertaining to the reliability of the formal sciences. We will maintain that the plausibility value of (22) is increased by the second source, which is considered to be very reliable by generative grammarians, thus retrospectively re-evaluating Zellig S. Harris’ statements on transformations. 5.2 Second example: What sort of grammar is needed? 157 <?page no="158"?> Zellig S. Harris (1952) was the first to realize that phrase structure rules themselves were not sufficient and that they should be supplemented by trans‐ formations. As Seuren (1998: 234, footnote 17) remarks, this was the first time in the linguistic literature that the term ›transform‹ was mentioned. However, it was not syntactic considerations that motivated Zellig S. Harris to introduce transformations, but his attempt to extend the distributional method beyond sentences to texts. He thought the analysis of the structure of texts would be more effective if certain sentences could be transformed into different but ›equivalent‹ sentences, for example active sentences into passive ones: (23) (a) »[…] such use of grammatical information does not replace work that could be done by the discourse-analysis method, nor does it alter the independence of that method. (b) It merely transforms certain sentences of the text into grammatically equivalent sentences […], in such a way that the application of the discourse-analysis method becomes more convenient, or that it be‐ comes possible in particular sections of the text where it was not possible to apply it before.« (Zellig S. Harris 1952: 4; emphasis added) In comparison to (22), it is (23)(b) that concisely summarizes Zellig S. Harris’ idea of transformations. However, Zellig S. Harris (1957) goes beyond the claims he put forward in his 1952 paper in a relevant way (see also Seuren 1998 and Matthews 1993): • There is a shift from the level of discourse to that of sentence and, ac‐ cordingly, transformations are no longer motivated by the analysis of discourse. • Transformations are based on ›categorial restrictions‹ which in Syntactic Structures Chomsky labeled as ›selectional restrictions‹ and which were thus introduced into his linguistic theory. Selectional restrictions later played a very important role in Aspects (Chomsky 1965: 75-127). • The term ›kernel‹ is introduced, which was also applied in Syntactic Structures in a re-evaluated way. By this term Harris means a set of ele‐ mentary sentences from which transformations may derive all sentences of a language (Zellig S. Harris 1957: 335). • The elementary sentences constituting the kernel are called ›under‐ lying‹ in the sense that they are the input of transformations. 5 Case study 158 <?page no="159"?> 28 (24) is a definition, therefore it has no plausibility value. 29 Zellig S. Harris (1952), (1957) proposes a series of transformations most of which, how‐ ever, turned out to be unworkable. 30 »[…] as has been mentioned, the kernel (including the list of combiners) is finite; all the unbounded possibilities of language are properties of the transformational operations. This is of interest because it is in general impossible to set up a reasonable grammar or description of a language that provides for its being finite. Though the sample of the language out of which the grammar is derived is of course finite, the grammar which is made to generate all the sentences of that sample will be found to generate also many other sentences, and unboundedly many sentences of unbounded length.« (Zellig S. Harris 1957: 338-339) 31 Chomsky adapted the term ›generative‹ from mathematics via Post’s approach to al‐ gorithms, and not from the neo-Bloomfieldians. By ›generative‹ he meant ›formally explicit‹. Botha (1989: 3) calls it the ›Generative Gaffe‹ that many people use the term ›generative‹ not in this sense but in the sense of ›producing‹. • The introduction of the last two terms led to the consequence that the transformation is no longer a static correlation between two sentences simultaneously present, but: 28 (24) A transformation is an operation as a result of which from an un‐ derlying sentence another sentence can be derived. In this way, grammatical description becomes simpler and facilitates generalizations that would not be possible without transformations. 29 However, although this approach to operations between sentences goes beyond mere taxonomy, it still remains within the boundaries of the distributional method, because transformations are distributionally de‐ termined. • Zellig S. Harris (1957: 336-339) also puts forward the idea that the kernel consists of a finite set of sentences from which transformations generate infinitely many sentences of »unbounded« length. 30 Thus he prepares one of Chomsky’s main theses: the grammar generates an infinite number of grammatically correct sentences from a finite set of elements. 31 • The grammar consists of phrase structure rules, transformational rules and morphosyntactic rules, similarly to Syntactic Structures. Chomsky seems to evaluate the relation of his own conception of transformation to that of Zellig S. Harris in a contradictory way. On the one hand, he admits that his syntactic theory is rooted in Zellig S. Harris’ discourse analysis (see Chomsky 1964b: 211) and that he adapted Zellig S. Harris’ term of grammatical transformation (Chomsky 1975: 40-41). On the other hand, in emphasizing the significance of Syntactic Structures, Chomsky (1964a: 83) distances himself from 5.2 Second example: What sort of grammar is needed? 159 <?page no="160"?> 32 According to Tomalin (2008: 1-2), »[…] it has sometimes been claimed that TGG was a superior linguistic theory primarily because it was more ›scientific‹ (whatever that means) than the syntactic theories that preceded it. […] TGG was perceived by some of its first adherents to be a more scientific theory than its predecessors partly because it employed the axiomatic-deductive method […].« Zellig S. Harris. He argues that - in contrast to Zellig S. Harris’ view - in trans‐ formational generative grammar transformations do not operate on sentences but on abstract structures which do not necessarily correspond to sentences. Nevertheless, in the light of ( SP 23) this seeming contradiction can be easily resolved. In particular, in Syntactic Structures the term ›transformation‹ is not a mechanical adaptation of Zellig S. Harris’ proposal, and it is not the case that Chomsky introduces the term completely independently of Zellig S. Harris, ei‐ ther: • First of all, here the formalism of Syntactic Structures plays an important role again. Namely, since Chomsky made transformations on a mathe‐ matical basis an integral component of a formal system, he handles trans‐ formations not as an operation between sentences but as one between structures (see also Seuren 1998: 238, 245). In this respect, he indeed goes beyond what Zellig S. Harris had proposed. The methodological principle in (25) (see Tomalin 2008: 1) is, at least according to some proponents of generative linguistics, a highly reliable source which increases the plau‐ sibility value of the statements on transformations to a considerable ex‐ tent: (25) A formalized theory is more ›scientific‹ than one which has not been formalized. 32 However, that (25) has high reliability depends on the generative com‐ munity, and is not generally accepted. Accordingly, the statements which presuppose it cannot be true with certainty but are only plausible; pro‐ vided that (25) is accepted, the community at issue assigns them a high plausibility value. • The evaluation of (22), i.e. the statement on the introduction of transfor‐ mations, should be carried out differently. Namely, in the course of the plausible argumentation process whose starting point is the problem of the applicability of finite state machines to natural languages, Chomsky motivates (22) with the shortcomings of phrase structure grammars. • We have already mentioned that Zellig S. Harris tried to capture the in‐ finiteness of natural languages with the help of transformations. 5 Case study 160 <?page no="161"?> 33 Seuren (1998: 247) calls attention to footnote 6 in Chapter 7 of Syntactic Structures in which Chomsky mentions the connection between his transformational analysis and Bloomfield’s morphological reasoning. This footnote is instructive, first because it makes clear that although Bloomfield did not use the term ›transformation‹, he revealed an operation similar to what Chomsky called later ›transformation‹. Second, it also highlights the circumstance that one substantial aspect of Chomsky’s transformations - namely, that a sentence can be derived from an »artificial underlying form« - was already present in Bloomfield’s work. Third, this underlying form can be determined with the help of the criterion of simplicity. Chomsky adapts this idea but, as Seuren (1998: 242) points out, he was clearly ahead of Zellig S. Harris in that he identified recursivity as the root of infiniteness on the level of phrase structure. • Although, as we have seen, Zellig S. Harris uses the term ›underlying‹, he did not carry out the argumentation process which could have resulted in the claim that transformations derive sentences from underlying struc‐ tures. 33 This insight does not appear in Chomsky’s text in 1957, either, but it was explicitly considered in the early 1960s and became one of the main innovations of Aspects. • Although Zellig S. Harris (1957) associates categorial restrictions with transformations, and Chomsky also discusses them in a re-evaluated way under the label of ›selectional restrictions‹, it is only in Syntactic Struc‐ tures that the relationship between these restrictions and transformations is clarified. For example, if one derives active constructions from passive ones, then selectional restrictions have to be introduced only once and, in this way, the grammar obviously becomes simpler. • Unlike Zellig S. Harris, Chomsky introduces transformations as rules and specifies their structure precisely (see e.g. (34) in Syntactic Structures). Consequently, these peculiarities of the plausible argumentation process lead to the prismatic and retrospective re-evaluation of the statements on transforma‐ tions. As a result, (22) receives a higher plausibility value than (23)(b). 5.2.4 The solution of the p-problem (10)(c), (12)(c), (20)(c) and (22) - through the application of the evaluative per‐ spective we have specified in Section 4.2.2 - lead jointly to the solution of the p-problem in (4). In Section 5.2 we exemplified the following: 5.2 Second example: What sort of grammar is needed? 161 <?page no="162"?> • The argumentation process carried out in Syntactic Structures consists of a series of plausible inferences and can be reconstructed in the framework of the p-model. • The relevant statements of Syntactic Structures are the result of the ret‐ rospective re-evaluation of the analogous statements represented in neo-Bloomfieldian works. They are brought about by the extension of the p-context and acquire a higher plausibility value than the latter. • There are multiple sources of the plausibility values of Chomsky’s state‐ ments some of which are rooted in Bloomfieldian and neo-Bloomfieldian linguistics, while others are new and extend the p-context. • During the cycles of retrospective re-evaluations the modification of plausibility values is not restricted to particular statements. Rather, the conclusions of plausible inferences inherit the modifications of the plau‐ sibility values of the premises or those of the latent background assump‐ tions. • It is sequences of argumentation subcycles that result in the solution of the p-problem at issue. 5.3 Third example: the introduction of the evaluation procedure It is an important difference between Bloomfield’s linguistics and the neo-Bloomfieldian approach that while the former did not develop an explicit method whose application would allow morpheme classes and alternants to be identified, Bloomfield’s disciples focused on the heuristics of revealing the mor‐ pheme classes (Hockett 1968: 35-36). Although Bloomfield introduced a few terms and defined them precisely (Bloomfield 1926, 1935), these terms do not correspond to particular steps in the process of analysis. As opposed to this, Zellig S. Harris (1942: 169) suggests »a technique for determining the mor‐ phemes of a language, as rigorous as the method used now for finding its pho‐ nemes«. As a result of an analysis of the relations between linguistic theory and the grammars that can be derived from it, in Chapter 6 of Syntactic Structures Chomsky rejects what he calls the ›discovery procedure‹ and suggests instead the ›evaluation procedure‹ as the means of selecting the grammar of a lan‐ guage. The generative linguistics literature considers this proposal to be one of Chomsky’s most original ideas. Below we will show briefly that the latter state‐ ment, which postulates a break between the methodology of neo-Bloomfiel‐ 5 Case study 162 <?page no="163"?> dianism and that of Syntactic Structures with respect to the introduction of the evaluation procedure, needs a more sophisticated treatment. The term ›discovery procedure‹ as used in Syntactic Structures refers to the view which assumes that if one carries out distribution analysis rigorously, then one obtains »the statements which enable anyone to synthesize or predict ut‐ terances in the language« (Zellig S. Harris 1951: 372; also quoted in Matthews 1993: 136). Although not all neo-Bloomfieldian linguists shared every detail of this method, what their standpoints have in common is that the method basically consists of two main steps. The first step is the subdivision of utterances to be found in the corpus into immediate constituents, and then into their immediate constituents, and so on until one obtains the smallest constituents. Thus, one arrives at alternative systems of immediate constituents, which can be regarded as grammars of the language at issue. Then, as a second step, one decides which of these alternative grammars is to be accepted as the best one. Matthews (1993: 137) holds the view that if we take the second step, then the first turns out to be irrelevant, because, in order to decide between alternative grammars, we do not have to know how we obtained them. Accordingly, Chomsky eliminated those problems which were associated with the continuous application of inductive heuristics and were assumed to be of high relevance by neo-Bloomfieldians, and at the same time, he focused on the second stage, that is, the problem of how to select the best grammar. In the light of ( SP 23) this means that Chomsky did not reject the whole of the neo-Bloomfieldian method, but, in re-evaluating it ret‐ rospectively, he retained the re-evaluated version of the p-context that he con‐ sidered fruitful. The following quotation illustrates this: (26) (a) »It is quite true that the higher levels of linguistic description depend on results obtained at the lower levels. But there is also a good sense in which the converse is true. For example, we have seen above that it would be absurd, or even hopeless, to state principles of sentence construction in terms of phonemes or morphemes, but only the de‐ velopment of such higher levels as phrase structure indicates that this futile task need not be undertaken on lower levels. Similarly, we have argued that description of sentence structure by constituent analysis will be unsuccessful, if pushed beyond certain limits. But only the development of this still more abstract level of transforma‐ tions can prepare the way for the development of a simpler and more adequate technique of constituent analysis with narrower limits (b) The grammar of a language is a complex system with many and varied interconnections between its parts. In order to develop one part of grammar thoroughly, it is often useful, or even necessary, to have some picture of the character of a completed system.« (Chomsky 1957: 59-60) 5.3 Third example: the introduction of the evaluation procedure 163 <?page no="164"?> 34 »[…] we shall never consider the question of how one might have arrived at the grammar whose simplicity is being determined […] One may arrive at a grammar by intuition, guess-work, all sorts of partial methodological hints, reliance on past expe‐ rience, etc. […] Our ultimate aim is to provide an objective, non-intuitive way to eval‐ uate a grammar once presented, and to compare it with other proposed grammars. We are thus interested in describing the form of grammars (equivalently, the nature of linguistic structure) and investigating the empirical consequences of adopting a certain model for linguistic structure, rather than in showing how, in principle, one might have arrived at the grammar of a language.« (Chomsky 1957: 56) The quotation is instructive, because it exemplifies that in Syntactic Structures the cyclic, prismatic and retrospective re-evaluation of previously accepted in‐ formation is manifested in two domains. The first is that of grammar. The quotation characterizes a mechanism similar to one that we have already illustrated in (1) in Section 4.1 by a quotation from another passage of Syntactic Structures. From (26)(a) it follows that the con‐ struction of a grammar is not linear, but is cyclic and retrospective, because it is not only the case that the units of a higher grammatical level presuppose the units of a lower level, but, in addition, that in order to describe the units of the lower levels one needs information about the higher levels. Moreover, (26)(b) highlights the prismatic nature of the construction of grammar: in particular, that we obtain our scientific knowledge of grammars from different perspec‐ tives, by manifold, continuous feedback and re-evaluations. In short, grammar is constructed via a process of plausible argumentation. The other is the domain of the methodology of science. Namely, what Chomsky outlines in (26), is in reality a specific kind of heuristics. It is an argu‐ mentation strategy whose application does not necessarily and immediately lead to the correct grammar, but which is still a process that serves the construction of grammars. Although he rejects the heuristic procedure which the neo-Bloom‐ fieldians thought would yield the grammar directly (Chomsky 1957: 64), 34 and instead considers the posterior evaluation of the grammar to be workable, he does argue for the application of a heuristics. What the procedure described in the quotation and the neo-Bloomfieldian method have in common is that both are heuristics and that Chomsky, similarly to his predecessors, applies a heuristics that seems to him to be fruitful. Of course, it goes without saying that the two heuristics are different; and it is also evident that the evaluation procedure leads to more effective problem solutions than the discovery procedure. In sum: the p-model has shown that although Chomsky advocates a different methodology than the neo-Bloomfieldians, his methodology does not break in all respects with the methodology it intends to replace. 5 Case study 164 <?page no="165"?> 5.4 Summary It is the following features of ( SP 23) that significantly differ from ( SP 1)-( SP 22) and reflect a new way of thinking about the history of generative linguistics: • ( SP 23) meets all the criteria introduced in Section 3.0, which serve the evaluation of historiographical approaches: • The content of historiographical statements derived from ( SP 23) has not been influenced by the personal relationship between historiog‐ raphers. • The content of our historiographical statements has not been influ‐ enced by bias towards or against Chomsky’s personality • The content of our historiographical statements has not been influ‐ enced by bias towards or against the object of investigation. • Our historiographical theses do not aim at the legitimization of gen‐ erative linguistics or its alternatives. • ( SP 23) considers recent methods of the historiography of science. • ( SP 23) is the historiographical extension of the p-model, which is an approach to the philosophy of linguistics. • It does not apply the term ›scientific revolution‹. • Nor does it accept continuity as the basic principle of the historiography of generative linguistics that presupposes the unchanged preservation and supplementation of particular aspects of the given theory or method. • Instead of the myth of the unity of science, it acknowledges the diversity of scientific knowledge, and within this, both that of linguistic inquiry and the historiography of linguistics. In particular, the process of the cyclic, prismatic and retrospective re-evaluation that we have demonstrated in this chapter has revealed the following features of the relationship between neo-Bloomfieldian linguistics and Syntactic Struc‐ tures: • ( SP 23) explains the relationship between generative linguistics and the period that preceded it by the assumption that the relevant statements in Syntactic Structures partly originate in the previous informational states of the p-context, but Chomsky does not adopt them as they were applied by his predecessors. Rather, in the course of the plausible argumentation process, he developed their cyclically, prismatically and retrospectively re-evaluated variants. • On the one hand, in a series of cases in which Chomsky seemingly stuck to the method of neo-Bloomfieldian linguistics, in reality he departed from 5.4 Summary 165 <?page no="166"?> it. At the same time, as the result of the plausible argumentation process, the statements that he borrowed from Bloomfield and the neo-Bloom‐ fieldians have been integrated into the theory in Syntactic Structures in a re-evaluated way with increased plausibility values. • On the other hand, even where he seemingly claimed something radically new, there remained a clear connection between his views and those of his predecessors. As we have seen, an instructive example is the rejection of the discovery procedure and the introduction of the evaluation proce‐ dure, which is a heuristics as well. This case is explained by the plausible argumentation process indicated in ( SP 23), too. • ( SP 23) has shown that, since during the plausible argumentation process in Syntactic Structures the p-context was extended by new sources that the generative community regarded as reliable, and since the plausibility values of statements partly depend on the reliability of direct sources, the plausibility values of the statements in Syntactic Structures were evaluated higher than those of the analogous statements advocated in neo-Bloom‐ fieldian linguistics. • Nevertheless, ( SP 23) also made clear that it is the combination of more than one - direct and indirect - source that contributed to the increase in plausibility values. Although these findings shed new light on the relationship between neo-Bloom‐ fieldian linguistics and Chomsky’s early work, they must be treated with cau‐ tion. Among other considerations, because the present chapter did not strive for a comprehensive analysis of this relationship, but rather, has been restricted to the illustration of the workability of ( SP 23) by a simplified discussion of a few cases. 5 Case study 166 <?page no="167"?> 6 Open questions 6.0 Introduction The approaches discussed in Chapter 2 left questions open that the historiog‐ raphies of generative linguistics ought to answer, but that they have not been able to cope with. Likewise, ( SP 23) is expected to answer these questions, too. However, within the limits of the present short monograph, it is not possible to carry out the detailed analyses that the possible answers presuppose. Therefore, even with respect to ( SP 23), we still consider them to be open questions. In what follows, we will briefly touch on some of them. We will motivate them and while referring to the possibility of the solutions that ( SP 23) might yield, we will not present the details of such solutions; their comprehensive discussion should be left for future work. Thereby, we admit that the elaboration of detailed answers to them may lead to insights that we cannot even mention. A minimal list of open questions includes the following: • Diachrony: historical stages • What kind of relationship is there between the problem solutions of a particular historical stage and the more effective problem solutions of the next stage immediately following it? • How should ( SP 23) treat cases in which in particular stages of gen‐ erative linguistics, problem solutions emerge that have previously been rejected in a previous stage? • How should ( SP 23) treat cases in which an earlier stage raised and tried to solve problems that a later stage could not account for? • What are the constant elements present in every developmental stage of generative linguistics? • Synchrony: rivals • What is the relationship between Chomskyan generative linguistics and its alternatives within theoretical linguistics? • What is the relationship between the cognitivism of generative lin‐ guistics and behaviorism? While Section 6.1 will raise the issue of the relationship between the develop‐ mental stages of generative linguistics from a diachronic perspective, Section 6.2 will focus on the synchronic relationship between particular stages and their <?page no="168"?> rivals. Section 6.3 will summarize the insights we have gained in this way by revealing what the prospects of ( SP 23) are in terms of answering the open ques‐ tions and what limits it has to face. 6.1 Historical stages 6.1.1 What kind of relationship is there between the problem sol‐ utions of a particular historical stage and the more effective problem solutions of the next stage immediately following it? From ( SP 23) it follows that it is not only the relationship between neo-Bloom‐ fieldianism and Syntactic Structures that was shaped by the cyclic, prismatic and retrospective re-evaluation of the p-context in the course of the plausible argu‐ mentation process that yielded the change in the plausibility values of state‐ ments, but the relations between particular developmental stages of generative linguistics as well. Now we will exemplify this answer to the question in the title of this section, which seems to follow immediately from ( SP 23), without a detailed elaboration on the topic. As we know, one of the most important components of the relationship be‐ tween Syntactic Structures and Aspects is the change in the role and the theo‐ retical position of semantics. On the one hand, Chomsky (1957: 102-103) con‐ siders the correspondence between the formal and the semantic properties of expressions in a sophisticated way, and does not exclude at the outset that a theory to be developed later would account for this correspondence. On the other hand, he accepted the view which excluded semantics from grammar, which was also advocated, among others, by Zellig S. Harris. Chomsky (1957: 102) concludes that grammar must be built on clearly formal foundations (›formal‹ in both senses) and that meaning cannot contribute significantly to the generation of grammatically correct sentences. But in Aspects semantics was integrated into the grammar, though marginally, as an interpretive component. However, since distribution analysis operates on purely formal properties of expressions, as independently of meaning as possible, the integration of seman‐ tics into the grammar, even if only as an interpretive component, decreased the relevance of the role which distribution played, and restricted the scope of dis‐ tribution analysis. As we have seen in the previous chapter, Syntactic Structures did not reject distributionalism radically; therefore, this is a significant change with respect to the way distribution contributes to the generation of grammar. But from the point of view of semantics, as the debate between interpretive and generative semantics suggests, there is no basic difference, because it is still 6 Open questions 168 <?page no="169"?> 1 Bloomfield (1935: 194 ff.) discusses the difference between endocentric and exocentric constructions. Exocentric constructions belong to different form-classes than their constituents. A construction is endocentric if it belongs to the same form-class as one or more of its constituents. syntax that is the generative component of grammar. In the plausible argumen‐ tation process which in the literature led from Syntactic Structures to Aspects, argumentation cycles occurred which repeatedly revised the effectiveness of distribution analysis, and through the attempts to solve the problems that arose, retrospectively modified the hypotheses concerning distribution, phrase struc‐ ture and transformations. The dynamism of the argumentation process affected all elements of linguistic theory and grammar, thus leading to hypotheses whose plausibility - based on the new methodological principles and terms introduced in Aspects - changed continuously. Through further argumentation cycles, the re-evaluation process pertaining to the handling of the relationship between formal and semantic properties reached the developmental stage of minimalism in which the syntactic level is extremely reduced, and grammar basically in‐ vestigates pairs of sound and meaning. As a second example, we mention the re-evaluation of the phrase structure component as X-bar theory. During the later changes of the phrase structure component of generative grammars, X-bar theory was an important innovation. The main idea was outlined in Chomsky (1970) and was further developed in Jackendoff (1977). It had no immediate predecessor in Syntactic Structures and in Aspects, but its origin can be documented in Bloomfield’s and Zellig S. Harris’ work. 1 Bloomfield (1935: 195) introduces the term ›head‹ in order to refer to those constituents whose form class is identical to the form class of the con‐ struction. The Bloomfieldian conception of endocentric construction is one of the direct sources of Zellig S. Harris’ insight we have already mentioned, ac‐ cording to which the distribution of certain single morpheme classes is identical to the distribution of certain classes of groups of morphemes. For example, in Syntactic Structures, ›noun phrase‹ is a basic term that is in no definitional re‐ lationship with ›noun‹, which is a basic term as well. In contrast, after the term ›endocentric construction‹ has been introduced, ›noun‹ is no longer a basic term, but can be defined with respect to the phrase which it is part of: the head of the phrase in category X is an X of a lower level within X ( Jackendoff 1977: 30). In this way, in the 1970s a conception of phrase structure emerged which in part differed from that in Syntactic Structures, but which was rooted in Bloomfield’s and Zellig S. Harris’ work. It is no accident that Matthews (1993: 158) concludes his overview of the role which X-bar theory played in the history of generative grammar with the remark that »it is a very Bloomfieldian solution 6.1 Historical stages 169 <?page no="170"?> to a Bloomfieldian problem«. Nevertheless, we have to emphasize at this point that X-bar theory adapts Bloomfield’s and Zellig S. Harris’ views through the ›prism‹ of the developmental stage of generative linguistics in the 1970s - namely, that, among others, as already mentioned, Syntactic Structures departed from these Bloomfieldian and neo-Bloomfieldian insights and as the result of later changes, returned to them in a different sense. Therefore, the plausibility of the statements on X-bar theory does not stem from Bloomfield’s and Zellig S. Harris’ models, which were at that time already of low reliability. Rather, its source was the current state of generative grammar, which was con‐ sidered to be highly reliable. As part of the p-context, the methodological prin‐ ciple which prescribes the search for generalizations beyond categories and phrase structure rules also contributed to the plausibility of the statements on X-bar structure. 6.1.2 How should (SP23) treat cases in which in particular stages of generative linguistics problem solutions emerge that have previously been rejected in some earlier stage? One of the most revealing examples of the relationship touched on in the title of this section is that some ideas put forward in the generative semantics move‐ ment, which Chomsky rejected, contributed to the emergence of Govern‐ ment-Binding Theory. Harris (1993a: 253) claims that Chomsky has »stolen« the findings of his opponents, the generative semanticists. Or: according to some critics of minimalism, it returned to the original endeavors of generative se‐ mantics (see, for instance, Seuren 2004 and Pullum 1996). Newmeyer (1986a: 139) also remarks that a significant part of these ideas was integrated into the work of the interpretivists »virtually always without acknowledgement«. Another example is that minimalism assumes two levels of representation, namely, the phonetic and the semantic, and - as Pullum (1996: 138) remarks - this is reminiscent of Postal’s (1972) proposal. Newmeyer maintains that »[i]ronically, the Chomsky of the 21st century reads like a reincarnation of the Postal of the 20th« (Newmeyer 2004: 418; see also Newmeyer’s 2003 review of Chomsky 2002a). Boeckx (2006: 178-180) admits that some proposals made by Ross (1967) - who is one of the former generative semanticists - have been re-interpreted in the Minimalist Program: such is the analysis of ›sluicing‹ or of ›island repair’. The adaptation of some previously rejected findings of gen‐ erative semantics in the Minimalist Program can be illustrated by the fact that even Boeckx himself says: »What is important to note is that there is nothing 6 Open questions 170 <?page no="171"?> 2 This view was dominant until the mid-1990s - i.e. through the whole period of Gov‐ ernment-Binding Theory. Robin Lakoff could not know what would happen in the fu‐ ture. That she was right is best witnessed by the fact that about a decade after the publication of her article, in the second half of the nineties - as a result of Schütze’s (1996) influential monograph - the Chomskyans realized the relevance of the problems which the dichotomy could not handle. The debate on the nature of data and gram‐ maticality judgments is still going on (for an evaluation of the discussion see Kertész & Rákosi 2012). odd, irrational, or inconsistent about recruiting old tools for new purposes in a different theoretical context« (Boeckx 2006: 179, footnote 14). The p-model is expected to explain these and similar relations by the retro‐ spective re-evaluation of particular terms, hypotheses and problem solutions within the plausible argumentation process, in analogy to the mechanism ex‐ emplified in Chapter 5. 6.1.3 How should (SP23) treat cases in which an earlier stage raised and tried to solve problems that a later stage could not cope with? Let us mention two examples from many. The first concerns the relationship between generative semantics and Government-Binding Theory, the second that between the latter and minimalism. Robin Lakoff (1989: 959-962) mentions as one of the most important and most progressive findings of generative semanticists that instead of the interpreti‐ vists‹ »false dichotomies« they suggested that the meaning of certain gram‐ matical, theoretical and methodological terms should be conceived of as con‐ tinua. However, the interpretivists rejected such suggestions immediately. For example, one of the allegedly false dichotomies was the simple ›grammatical vs. ungrammatical‹ distinction. As regards Aspects, the problem arose that with respect to many data it could not be decided whether a sentence was clearly grammatical or ungrammatical; rather, in the view of the generative semanti‐ cists, grammaticality judgments could be made only along a continuum. Al‐ though Chomsky himself raised the issue of degrees of grammaticalness in Syntactic Structures (Chomsky 1957: 36, footnote 2) and touched on it later as well, in research practice, interpretivists stuck to the dichotomy. 2 According to Lakoff, the circumstance that the interpretivists were not ready to handle the meaning of such terms as continuous transitions between degrees 6.1 Historical stages 171 <?page no="172"?> […] is oddly reminiscent of that of the Church in its confrontation with Galileo: If the current conventional wisdom, or scientific method, is in disagreement with the facts, deny the facts. Eppur si muove (Lakoff 1989: 691). The second example, namely, that Government-Binding Theory could handle problems which are beyond the capacity of minimalism, is extensively discussed e.g. in Postal (2003), Pullum (1996), Lappin et al. (2000a,b), (2001), Levine (2002), Newmeyer (2003, 2004). By way of illustration, we quote Newmeyer (2003: 590): Does the MP bring phenomena under its explanatory scope that were outside the scope of GB? Quite the contrary. […] Given the impoverished ontology of the bare theory […], the empirical coverage of the MP is vastly reduced compared to the GB. As a consequence, just in order to describe the facts in question, virtually every min‐ imalist-oriented paper posits an ancillary set of hypotheses, either directly borrowed from the GB era or posited ad hoc for the analysis in question. The topic mentioned in the title of this section is also related to the retrospective re-evaluation of problems and their solutions. While in the previous section we saw examples which witnessed that certain earlier findings were successfully reinterpreted in some later theoretical framework, here we encounter another process: the later rejection of previously successful problem-solutions. 6.1.4 What are the constant elements that are present in every developmental stage of generative linguistics? The question of what elements have been constant in all stages of generative linguistics is important, because the evaluation of the unity and diversity of gen‐ erative linguistics will partly depend on the answer. For example, as we have seen in Chapter 2, there is a view according to which Chomsky’s research program was »fully in place« in 1960 at the latest (ten Hacken 2007: 104-105), and this applies to its cognitivism, too. In turn, instead of cognitivism, Tomalin (2008: 188) considers formalism as its constant component which had been present before the appearance of Syntactic Structures in Chomsky’s thinking and has been retained until the present day, thus witnessing the unity of generative linguistics. Seuren (1998) thinks that the metatheoretical aspect of Chomsky’s work is constantly present in all stages of its development. Accordingly, due to the diversity of the answers, the question is anything but trivial. Nevertheless, ( SP 23) suggests a definite answer to this question: there are no constant elements in the sense that they are transferred with unchanged content from earlier stages to later ones. Namely, ( SP 23) represents the dynamism of 6 Open questions 172 <?page no="173"?> 3 This quotation is especially instructive if we know that one of the authors was the most prominent formal linguist in Germany at that time. Chomsky (1987) also mentions that formalization is rarely useful in linguistics. See also Cook & Newson (1996: 35-36) for the explanation of why a principle-oriented theory cannot be treated according to the same standards of formalization as a rule-oriented one like Syntactic Structures or As‐ pects. theory formation: in particular, that the sources of the plausibility values of the hypotheses of generative linguistics (the data, the hypotheses of related disci‐ plines like psychology, biology, physics, neurology, information science etc.) continuously change and bring about new informational states. Therefore, nei‐ ther the plausibility values of the hypotheses nor the hypotheses themselves remain constant. One of the examples mentioned above was formalization. However, ( SP 23) implies that the content as well as the plausibility values of statements con‐ cerning the formalism of the theory were very different in 1957, 1965, 1981 or 1993. It is not very difficult to support this claim among others by comparing the basic terms used in the particular historical stages. For example, while Syn‐ tactic Structures intended to base its terms on a mathematical system, in Gov‐ ernment-Binding Theory the terms are no longer explicated formally (in the second sense we have mentioned in Section 5.1) and the theory does not con‐ stitute a calculus, although rhetorically it is still propagated as a formal system. To illustrate this, let us quote one of the most influential German introductions to Government-Binding Theory: 3 One of the most confusing aspects of Chomsky’s recent theory of language is that the concept of language in general and that of sentence in particular are not well de‐ fined. […] This is frustrating insofar as one of the most attractive features of Chom‐ sky’s early writings was that they offered a precise theoretical concept of language and sentence (Stechow & Sternefeld 1987: 100; my translation A. K.). It should be also clear why one does not strive for a formal system: in the present state of the art the latter would lack any empirical justification. It may also have become clear that the abandonment of a formal system is not identical with the abandonment of clarity. If clarity has anything to do with intelligibility, then the abandonment of a formal system is even called for, because the latter is as a rule quite unin‐ telligible (Stechow & Sternefeld 1987: 103; italics as in the original; bold emphasis added; my translation A. K.). The second example we have mentioned was cognitivism. In the light of ( SP 23), cognitivism can be characterized similarly: as a result of the continuous retro‐ spective re-evaluation of the hypotheses and terms of the earlier stages, its con‐ 6.1 Historical stages 173 <?page no="174"?> 4 See the quotation in footnote 8 in Section 2.1.0. Chomsky’s critics often remarked that he does not like to cite his sources. He does not cite Popper, either. Nevertheless, irre‐ spective of this, the paragraph we refer to here is a concise summary of the structure of theories in the sense of Popper’s philosophy of science. tent also changed. Here the basic problem is this: on the one hand, Chomsky’s influence on the development of the cognitive sciences is unquestionable, on the other hand, the latter gradually developed in a different direction than Chomsky’s cognitivist hypotheses. For example, according to Hyman (2010: 292; emphasis added) […] Chomsky’s cavalier disregard for key principles of mainstream evolutionary theory, together with his resolute anti-empiricism create a chasm between Chomsky’s work and contemporary research in biology that simply cannot be bridged. Likewise, his anti-empiricism separates him from contemporary psychology, which is a ma‐ turing empirical discipline. Chomsky’s ideas have certainly been influential - but more often than not as foils for those of others.« Finally, Chomsky’s metatheoretical hypotheses are exposed to dynamic changes as well. Let it be sufficient to refer to the circumstance that the source of the metatheoretical statements in Syntactic Structures is Karl Popper’s critical ra‐ tionalism, which considered the methodology of physics as a norm (Chomsky 1957: 49). 4 In the period of Aspects it was psychology that became the source of the plausibility of metatheoretical statements and in minimalism it is biology. Although ( SP 23) may be (at least partially) capable of capturing the plausible argumentation process in the course of which the plausibility values of meta‐ theoretical statements stemming from changing sources were re-evaluated through these stages, we must leave the question raised in the title of this section open, because we have not carried out the thorough analyses that the answer requires. 6.2 Rivals 6.2.1 What is the relationship between Chomskyan generative linguistics and its alternatives within theoretical linguistics? Within theoretical linguistics, the relationship between Chomskyan generative linguistics and its rivals such as Lexical-Functional Grammar (see e.g. Bresnan 1982, 2001), Head-driven Phrase Structure Grammar (Pollard & Sag 1994), Gen‐ eralized Phrase Structure Grammar (Gazdar et al 1985), and Jackendoff’s Parallel 6 Open questions 174 <?page no="175"?> 5 See Section 1.3 on the term of ›incommensurability‹. 6 See also their debate on the evolution of language: Hauser et al. (2002), Fitch et al. (2005), Pinker & Jackendoff (2005), Jackendoff & Pinker (2005). 7 See Müller (2016: 494 ff.) for a criticism of ten Hacken’s account of (HPSG). Architecture Theory ( Jackendoff 1997, 2002) is anything but clarified. While most historiographical approaches we have discussed do not raise this issue, the two approaches which do, differ considerably. Newmeyer distinguishes between formalist and functionalist approaches. He assumes that within formalist ap‐ proaches there are two trends: Chomsky’s work and several other theories which differ from Chomsky’s only in details of minor importance (Newmeyer 1998: 12). In contrast, ten Hacken (2002, 2007: 268) argues that this picture painted by Newmeyer is inadequate. Instead, he assumes that there are incom‐ mensurability effects in the discussions between the proponents of Chomskyan linguistics, on the one hand, and the leading personalities of these approaches, on the other - effects which bear witness to the presence of different research programs. 5 Nevertheless, although all four are rival research programs to Chomskyan linguistics, according to ten Hacken (2007) they do not diverge from the latter in the same way and to the same extent (see also Section 2.1.1.2.1). LFG and Jackendoff ’s approach to language acquisition, language processing and the evolutionary origin of language share an acceptance of the basic assumptions of Chomskyan linguistics in that they focus on competence and treat grammars as theories of competence. However, they assign different roles to language processing and learnability in the evaluation of grammars (ten Hacken 2007: 268). Chomskyan linguistics and Jackendoff ’s (1997, 2002) approach have in common the fact that they accept that universal grammar describes the language faculty and that it explains the grammar of individual languages. They differ in their views on the emergence of human language in evolution and the criteria that Jackendoff (2002) applies in his argument for parallel architectures (ten Hacken 2007: 267). 6 The differences between Chomskyan linguistics, on the one hand, and GPSG and HPSG , on the other, are more fundamental, because the latter maintain a perspective on science that is in sharp contrast with the former. GPSG is formal science and HPSG neither accepts the mentalist conception of language nor commits itself to a non-mentalist view (ten Hacken 2007: 268). 7 Showing that these four frameworks are different research programs and that they must not 6.2 Rivals 175 <?page no="176"?> 8 Ten Hacken (2007: 273) also claims that although Chomskyan linguistics has been ac‐ cused of focusing only on grammar and neglecting other aspects of language, in recent years generative linguists have shown a growing interest in fields beyond grammar. Thus, ten Hacken discusses the relationship of Chomskyan linguistics to the following areas: first and second language acquisition, historical linguistics and language change, and linguistic communication (pragmatics). With respect to their impact on Chomskyan linguistics, ten Hacken (2007: 327) divides these areas into two categories: linguistic communication, which has a weak impact and the remaining fields which have a strong impact. He emphasizes that, on the one hand, first and second language acquisition are closely connected with I-language, while linguistic change is seen as a side effect of the development of I-language. On the other hand, I-language is not immediately related to linguistic communication, so any approach to pragmatics which accepts the au‐ tonomy of competence seems to be compatible with Chomskyan linguistics. (›I-lan‐ guage‹ is an explication of the term ›competence‹ suggested in Chomsky (1986). I(in‐ ternalized)-language »is some element of the mind of the person who knows the language« (Chomsky 1986: 22). It is contrasted with E(externalized)-language which was introduced as an explication of the earlier term ›performance‹.) be subsumed under what Newmeyer (1998: 7) calls ›the generativist orientation‹, is a provoking claim. 8 Ten Hacken (2007: 268) points out that […] it is interesting to see that a number of recurrent themes are elaborated in most or all of the four competing frameworks. […] the research programmes are not too far apart for ideas to be taken over from one into another. Typically, however, they are adapted to the receiving research programme and their further development is subject to evaluation criteria not shared by the original research programme. Apart from our criticism of certain aspects of ten Hacker’s view in Section 3.1.1.3 and in Kertész (2010b), the question arises whether ( SP 23) could handle relations like those mentioned above and summarized in the quotation. As a first approximation, we may assume that the relationship between the four theories and Chomskyan linguistics is prismatic in the sense of ( SP 23): during the plausible argumentation process, in a series of argumentation cycles, the plausibility values of the statements are retrospectively re-evaluated from different perspectives. This mechanism may explain factors which could not be explained otherwise; above all that of the relation between the unity and the diversity in that field of linguistics in which Chomsky’s work is one source of the plausibility of statements. The four theories mentioned belong to this field, but not only these; there are others as well, which could not have come into being without Chomsky’s activity, but which define themselves in opposition to it. Let it be sufficient to refer to holistic cognitive linguistics pioneered by Lakoff & Johnson (1980), Lakoff (1987), Langacker (1987) or Robin Lakoff’s con‐ tribution to pragmatics, or certain trends in corpus linguistics such as Sampson 6 Open questions 176 <?page no="177"?> 9 The term ›mentalism‹ that Chomsky used in the late 1950s and 1960s was later replaced by ›cognitivism‹. We do not go into the history of these terms. and Babarczy (2014). Nevertheless, since here we cannot carry out the analyses needed for a systematization of these relations with the help of the p-model, again we leave open the question exactly how ( SP 23) might draw a picture of them. 6.2.2 What is the relationship between the cognitivism of generative linguistics and behaviorism? 9 The historiographers in favor of generative linguistics attribute great signifi‐ cance to Chomsky’s (1959) legendary review of Skinner’s (1957) book Verbal Behavior and in connection with this, to Chomsky’s role in the development of cognitive science, because with this review he launched an effective attack not only on behaviorism itself but also on neo-Bloomfieldianism, which presup‐ posed it (see also, among others, Chomsky 1968). For example, Boeckx (2006: 16) does not regard Syntactic Structures as the real turning point, but Chomsky’s Skinner-review, because according to him, it was the latter that laid the foun‐ dations of biolinguistics, which is also in the center of the Minimalist Program. Ten Hacken, as we have already mentioned, argues that cognitivism had been a constitutive component of Chomsky’s linguistics before the appearance of Syntactic Structures. In contrast, for example Murray (1994: 232-233) believes that the Skinner-review and anti-behaviorism were only a rhetorical means to attack the neo-Bloomfieldians. Similarly to Seuren (1998: 252), Murray highlights Chomsky’s straw man argument which he did use to argue against Skinner’s views but against a stance that was constructed by Chomsky himself and arbi‐ trarily projected onto Skinner’s book. Although Harris (1993a: 55) cites Miller’s and Gardner’s evaluation, too, he holds the view that cognitivism was one - but not a particularly distinguished - weapon in the war against the neo-Bloom‐ fieldians, while, for example, the publication of Halle’s (1959) approach to pho‐ nology may have been a more effective move against them. Obviously, such extremes make the evaluation of the relationship between cognitivism and be‐ haviorism in the historical process difficult. As possible points of departure, we mention two circumstances. On the one hand, Bloomfield’s work was undoubtedly the most significant achievement of linguistics in the first half of the twentieth century. As Seuren (1998: 197) puts it, 6.2 Rivals 177 <?page no="178"?> 10 The first half century of the history of cognitive science was dominated by the debate between two trends, namely, holism and modularism. For an overview of the history of cognitive science see e.g. Gardner (1987) and for the historical roots of the debate be‐ tween holism and modularism, Müller (1991). Bloomfield’s Language has proved to be the pivot of 20th century linguistic theory. In 1960 one could say that all existing schools of linguistic thought derived, one way or another, from this book. […] it is still so that within linguistics proper no theory of any note has emerged that stands outside the Bloomfieldian tradition. On the other hand, we know that the rhetoric of the first period of generative linguistics distanced itself from this very tradition. Therefore, the question now is how ( SP 23) can resolve the apparent tension between these two circum‐ stances. We have already mentioned in several sections of Chapter 2 that the history of linguistics has been strongly influenced by the effort to clarify the empirical foundations of the discipline and to become a natural science according to the historically changing norms of different eras (see e.g. Jäger 1993a, Lakoff 1989, Seuren 1998: 140, 178, Kertész & Rákosi 2012, Rákosi 2012 etc.). Bloomfield’s work is also characterized by this effort as one of its substantial features. Con‐ sider the concluding paragraph of his seminal book: The methods and results of linguistics, in spite of their modest scope, resemble those of natural sciences, the domain in which science has been most successful. It is only a prospect, but not hopelessly remote, that the study of language may help us toward the understanding and control of human events« (Bloomfield 1935: 509). The application of behaviorism and cognitivism to linguistics seem to have been, at least in part, motivated by this desideratum. According to Seuren (1998: 197), behaviorism basically rests on three claims. The first says that psychological data stem from the observation of living organisms. The second maintains that there are forms of behavior that cannot be explained by direct physical causa‐ tion. Finally, these forms of behavior constitute the subject matter of psychology, which attempts to find causal explanations for them by the simple mechanism of stimulus and reaction. Cognitive science differs from behaviorism only with respect to the third feature. The Chomskyan conception of cognitive science that was emerging toward the end of the 1950s assumed a computational mech‐ anism of the mind based on the interaction of modules that are assumed to be autonomous but interacting systems. 10 Seuren also says that although Bloomfield’s behaviorism is undoubtedly present in Language, it did not influence his linguistic achievement substantially. 6 Open questions 178 <?page no="179"?> Its primary role was to pave the way for formal linguistic analysis, to exclude previous obscure mentalist views and to provide an ideological framework for the investigation of language in the spirit of empirical natural sciences. But this role was foredoomed to failure at the outset. As Seuren (1998: 203) concludes, although, due to the inappropriateness of the earlier obscure mentalist views, in the 1930s, behaviorism had no rational alternative, most scholars both in Europe and in America rejected it as extremely superficial and unacceptable. Nevertheless, it contributed significantly to the cognitivism of generative lin‐ guistics: Behaviourism is now universally rejected. Even so, however, it has been of great im‐ portance in the recent history of linguistics. Not only did it help linguistics to con‐ centrate more than before on an analysis of forms rather than of meanings, a strategy which has proved extremely fruitful. It also acted as a stepping stone to the computing view of the mind which is current nowadays and which is proving its value. It must not be forgotten that the difference between this and the behaviourist view consists only in the kind of theory adopted: instead of a stimulus association theory we now work with a computational theory, but the definition of the primary data and the causal question have remained unchanged. In this, partly negative, way, the behav‐ iourist period can be seen as a perhaps necessary, first act in the scientific approach to mental phenomena. It is for this reason that it is fundamentally important to know about behaviourism and understand its background. Without such knowledge modern linguistics cannot be understood (Seuren 1998: 203). If we compare Bloomfieldian and neo-Bloomfieldian behaviorism with Chomsky’s cognitivism against the background of this quotation, then it will be clear that the relation between them must not be reduced to a revolutionary break. However fiercely Chomsky’s cognitivism attacked behaviorism, the quo‐ tation witnesses that it does not reject two of its three main tenets at the outset. Although the third has been replaced by a new claim that is undoubtedly much more fruitful, better founded and - with well-motivated modifications - more workable, historically this new claim presupposes all of the three ones. Accordingly, the resolution of the tension between the two extreme evalua‐ tions of Chomsky’s anti-behaviorism mentioned at the beginning of this section says that Chomsky’s anti-behaviorism is a typical case of the retrospective, prismatic and cyclic re-evaluation of knowledge within the plausible argumen‐ tation process. However, the detailed analysis of this process would be a mon‐ umental task that cannot be carried out within the limits of the present mono‐ graph and should be left for the future. 6.2 Rivals 179 <?page no="180"?> 11 Kertész (2004a) and (2013 [1991]) focus on the relationship among these factors. 6.3 Summary This chapter attempted to show that although the solution to the questions raised in Section 6.1 could in principle be derived from ( SP 23) after the necessary analyses have been done, they must be left open, because the elaboration of the solutions would go beyond the scope of our present line of reasoning. However, even this potential of ( SP 23) is limited and it is by no means capable of providing answers to all relevant open questions. Now we will illustrate this as follows. The historiographical approaches we have surveyed in Chapter 2 have wit‐ nessed that in the history of generative linguistics the role of three factors was decisive: social factors influencing the content of scientific knowledge, ›intel‐ lectual‹ factors, and rhetorical factors (see also Kertész 2004a, 2010b, 2013 [1991]). 11 ( SP 23) does not aim at capturing all relevant features of the history of generative linguistics. Its limits are obvious: its scope is very narrow. For ex‐ ample, it does not account for the personal and social conflicts that might be responsible for the defeat of generative semantics in the early 1970s. This must not mean that we ignore the significance of social factors. Although we have not adapted Lakatos’ framework, its distinction between ›external‹ and ›in‐ ternal‹ history might help explain the scope and limits of ( SP 23) which, should we presuppose this distinction, would be an approach to the ›internal‹ history of generative linguistics. The following relevant features of this distinction may shed light on the nature of ( SP 23): • While, according to Lakatos (1970a: 91), ›internal‹ history comprises the rational reconstruction of scientific knowledge, it should be supple‐ mented by ›external‹ history which accounts for the social and psycho‐ logical aspects of science. Our approach reconstructs the internal history of generative linguistics as a process of plausible argumentation. Never‐ theless, the possibility of the integration of social and rhetoric factors into the p-model is given at the outset. Namely, as we have seen, according to the p-model, the increase or the decrease of the plausibility values of the statements at issue depends, among others, on direct sources which are included in the p-context. These sources may be substantially shaped by social factors - such as authority, social interests and group structure - and rhetoric tools. Consequently, one way to improve the p-model and to enhance its effectiveness in the future would be to investigate the very nature of these sources in the p-context and to relate them to the plausi‐ bility values of the hypotheses. Nevertheless, though the supplementation 6 Open questions 180 <?page no="181"?> of ( SP 23) by such investigations may seem to be a fruitful option, ( SP 23) is in agreement with Lakatos’ claim that »internal history […] is primary, and external history only secondary« (Lakatos 1970a: 92). • Lakatos writes: »[…] in constructing internal history the historian will be highly selective: he will omit everything that is irrational in the light of his rationality« (Lakatos 1970a: 106). ( SP 23) is highly selective insofar as it has been designed to capture only one very specific aspect of ›in‐ ternal‹ history, namely, the plausible argumentation process relevant for theory formation which we assume to be a rational process. ( SP 23) is not intended to replace ( SP 1)-( SP 22), it merely tries to enrich the state of the art by a perspective that differs from them. • According to Lakatos, »[w]hatever problem the historian of science wishes to solve, he has first to reconstruct the relevant section of the growth of objective scientific knowledge, that is, the relevant section of ›internal history‹. As it has been shown, what constitutes for him in‐ ternal history, depends on his philosophy, whether he is aware of this fact or not« (Lakatos 1970a: 106). As we have mentioned in Section 4.0, ( SP 23) has been obtained as the historiographical extension of the p-model, which is an approach to the philosophy of linguistics. The potential of ( SP 23) consists in its capability to describe the dynamic rela‐ tionships among the problem solving strategies of different historical stages, instead of insisting on the discredited terms of ›scientific revolution‹ and ›para‐ digm‹ that oversimplify and distort historical processes. The next step to be taken in later research should be a thorough and detailed argumentation theo‐ retical investigation of these historical processes within the framework of the p-model. 6.3 Summary 181 <?page no="182"?> 1 See the desiderata in the last paragraph of Section 4.2.1. 7 Conclusions 7.0 Introduction After we have discussed 23 solutions to (P) and revealed both their merits and limits, let us now ask two concluding questions: 1 (a) How do our findings contribute to the effectiveness of linguistic histori‐ ography? (b) How do our findings contribute to the effectiveness of linguistics? 7.1 The contribution of (SP23) to linguistic historiography As regards (a), let us begin with one sub-problem of (P), namely, what basic terms could, in part, account for the history of generative linguistics. To be sure, there is no single correct answer to this question, but it is possible to decide which terms are not appropriate. Our overview has revealed that ›revolu‐ tion‹ and ›paradigm‹ have lost their credibility because their use is closely re‐ lated to the violation of the criteria discussed in Chapter 3. The historiographical literature witnesses that Percival’s warning issued four decades ago is still valid: […] an unhealthy situation might arise if linguists began to look upon all theoretical disagreements within their profession as conflicts between rival paradigms, i.e. in‐ commensurable viewpoints, and used this as an excuse not to observe the ground rules of rational discussion (Percival 1976a: 92; emphasis added). Then, such an attitude could »lead to a lowering, rather than a raising, of sci‐ entific standards within linguistics« (ibid; emphasis added). Our overview can provide two points of departure for finding a suitable historiographical framework. One is the insight that historiography must not be conducted without sophisticated metatheoretical reflection that focuses on the foundational problems of the historiography of linguistics. Second, in general it is acceptable that linguistic historiography should apply a complex system of a rich inventory of aspects by making use of diverse data sources and account for the intellectual, social and rhetoric factors shaping the <?page no="183"?> historical processes. Such a view has been held, for example, in Koerner (1995), (2002), Huck & Goldsmith (1995), and Hymes & Fought (1981) [1975]. Never‐ theless, the complexity of the object of investigation - that is the history of generative linguistics - does not exclude, but rather, motivates focusing on one particular aspect and abstracting from others. Highlighting one aspect - for example the rhetorical, the social or the argumentational - and investigating it within an appropriate framework may be well founded, if we do not claim its exclusiveness, but clarify exactly which questions it can tackle and which not. These general points of departure narrow down the range of possible ap‐ proaches to the historiography of linguistics, but do not define it. The diversity of the terms and the frameworks within the limits just mentioned allows the pluralism of the central hypotheses as well; however, it does not allow us to consider a particular thesis as the only acceptable one. In summary: • On the one hand, authentic historiographical approaches that are ex‐ pected to provide solutions to the problems in their domain are expected to meet the criteria introduced in Section 3.0. • On the other hand, within the general guidelines touched on above, they should allow for the pluralism of frameworks, basic terms and hypotheses (see also Kertész 2010a). • ( SP 23) is meant to provide an original solution to (P) which meets the criteria enumerated in Section 3.0. • Nevertheless, ( SP 23) represents not the only, but only one of the possible historiographies of generative linguistics. 7.2 The contribution of (SP23) to linguistics Practicing linguists justifiably ask question (b): why should linguists, who do not consider themselves to be historians, but whose man task is to collect data, to analyze them and to find generalizations about some aspect of language, deal with linguistic historiography? The trivial answer is obviously that knowledge of the past helps understand the present and pave the way for the future. How‐ ever, ( SP 23) offers less trivial and more instructive answers as well. The first part of the answer to question (b) starts from the circumstance that linguistics is a network of rival approaches. As we have seen in the present study, one important argument in favor of one’s own linguistic theory and against its rivals has been so far the evaluation of historical processes. Thus, historio‐ graphical argumentation, which is of a metascientific nature, becomes a tool of 7.2 The contribution of (SP23) to linguistics 183 <?page no="184"?> object-scientific argumentation. Consequently, if the historiographical evalua‐ tion is flawed, then the arguments for a particular linguistic approach will be also flawed and from this flawed evaluation mistaken conclusions about lan‐ guage may be drawn on the object-scientific level. Therefore, it might be worth dealing with historiography, because through the metascientific reflection it offers, we may learn how to avoid such flaws of our linguistic argumentation. Another result of historiographical reflection is not only the acceptance of the pluralism of linguistics, but also the insight that, in contrast to the Kuhnian view, this pluralism is not a shortcoming resulting from the nature of premature disciplines, but rather, a value. It is a value that legitimizes the prismatic view of linguistic inquiry, allowing the co-existence of different perspectives in op‐ position to exclusive behavior. If we realize that we construct our linguistic theories in the process of plausible argumentation, prismatically and cyclically, then we cannot expect that we will find the only correct answer to our questions, which we try to defend by all means. We do not seek statements that are true with certainty, and exclusive paradigms, but we strive for the prismatic and cyclic correction of our knowledge by taking into account a large number of plausible statements and by considering alternatives. The view of linguistics which follows from ( SP 23) is not compatible with an unreflected and absolutistic treatment of particular theories, particular points of view, particular methods and theses, and the unreflected rejection of other points of view. Third, the history of linguistics basically amounts to the history of methodo‐ logical debates. Our survey has shown that the study of the history of linguistics reveals the shortcomings of the debates on methods and teaches researchers how to raise methodological problems in a sophisticated, balanced, problem-sensitive and reflected way, as well as how to conduct discussions constructively and fairly. It highlights how important it is that the linguist - whatever technical apparatus she uses - traces her minor technical problems back to the deep foundational problems, avoiding the unreflected and arbitrary application of the technical machinery. In this way, historiographical reflection helps linguists not to lose track of the really important foundational questions that motivate the minor technical problems which they deal with on the surface in their everyday activity. To summarize the above reasoning, historiographical reflection, as a meta‐ theoretical enterprise, contributes significantly to the effectiveness of linguistic problem solving, because it • may enter object-scientific argumentation and thus may distort or in‐ crease its effectiveness, 7 Conclusions 184 <?page no="185"?> • strengthens the tolerance of the diversity of scientific approaches to the investigation of language, • and highlights the importance of openness for the foundational questions of linguistics. 7.3 Summary: Why should linguists get out of bed in the morning? Referring back to John E. Joseph’s witty remark we quoted in Section 1.1, now, after we have at least provisionally accomplished our train of thought in the present short monograph, we can turn to the question of: Why is it worth getting out of bed in the morning, if one is a linguist? Although neither the result of the metahistoriographical evaluation of the approaches we have overviewed nor our own solution to (P), namely, ( SP 23), do in fact suggest an answer that is true with certainty, they seem to assign a high plausibility value to the statement that it may make sense for the linguist to get out of bed in many different ways, but taking part in a daily revolution is not one of them. 7.3 Summary: Why should linguists get out of bed in the morning? 185 <?page no="186"?> References Aarsleff, Hans (1970): The history of linguistics and Professor Chomsky. In: Language 46, 570-585. Aarsleff, Hans (1971): ›Cartesian Linguistics‹: History or phantasy? In: Language Sciences 17, 1-12. Aarsleff, Hans (1973): A word on Koerner’s historiography of linguistics. In: Anthropo‐ logical Linguistics 15, 148-50. Allan, Keith (2003): Linguistic metatheory. In: Language Sciences 25, 533-560. Allan, Keith (2007): The Western Classical Tradition in Linguistics. London: Equinox. 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[The New York Times Magazine (3. Dec. 1972) 42-43, 112-27] References 199 <?page no="201"?> Index of Names201 Index of Names Aarsleff, Hans 30, 42, 75, 105 Allan, Keith 30-33, 88, 104, 110, 112, 115, 117 Andor, József 86 Anttila, Raimo 49 Arabatzis, Theodore 10, 105 Babarczy, Anna 127 Bach, Emmon 127, 143 Barnes, Barry 10, 85 Barsky, Robert F. 56, 109 Behme, Christina 82 Bierwisch, Manfred 51, 75 Bloor, David 10, 85 Boeckx, Cedric 35, 51, 59, 76-81, 85, 94, 98, 100 f., 109-112, 114, 116, 121, 155, 170, 177 Botha, Rudolph P 76 f., 159 Bresnan, Joan 174 Bricmont, Jean 105 Bromberger, Sylvain 28, 83 Butterfield, Herbert 41, 106 Chomsky, Noam 10 f., 13, 23-32, 34, 36, 38-61, 63-71, 74, 76 ff., 80, 82 f., 85-88, 91-95, 99, 101, 105, 107-110, 113 ff., 122 ff., 127, 139-143, 146-149, 151 f., 154-166, 168-177, 179 Cook, Vivian 173 Croft, William 72 Dougherty, Ray 111 Droste, Flip G. 48 Falk, Julia S. 48 Fiengo, Robert 83 Fillmore, Charles J. 72 Fitch, Tecumseh W. 175 Fought, John 30, 45 ff., 51, 68, 87, 90, 99, 101, 116, 139, 144, 183 Freidin, Robert 77 Gardner, Howard 147, 177 f. Gazdar, Gerald 174 Goldberg, Adele E. 72 Goldsmith, John A. 38, 63 f., 92, 98 f., 101, 110, 115 f., 183 Goodman, Nelson 44 f., 145 Gray, Bennison 49 Grewendorf, Günther 56, 71, 75, 87, 93, 109, 112, 116, 121 Griffith, Belver 49, 55, 91 Grohmann, Kleanthes K. 83 Hacken, Pius 23, 33-36, 45, 63, 83, 85, 89, 98 ff., 112, 115 f., 121, 139, 172, 175 ff. Halász, Katinka 12 Halle, Morris 50, 52, 54, 68 f., 93, 177 Harris, Randy Allen 28, 32, 36 f., 40 f., 55-58, 61, 63, 66, 68, 87, 91, 98 f., 104 f., 109, 116, 139, 170, 177 Harris, Zellig S. 23, 32, 41, 45, 48, 51, 56 f., 68, 90, 99, 101, 127, 141 f., 144, 154, 157-163, 168 f. Hauser, Marc. D. 175 Henry, John 41 Hill, Archibald A. 69 Hockett, Charles F. 41, 127, 144 f., 148, 162 Hornstein, Norbert 69 Householder, Fred W. 57, 68 Huck, Geoffrey J. 38, 63 f., 92, 98 f., 101, 110, 115 f., 183 Hung, Edwin 16 Hyman, Malcolm D. 174 Hymes, Dell 30, 38, 45 ff., 51, 68, 87, 90, 99, 101, 116, 139, 144, 183 Jackendoff, Ray 35, 129, 149, 169, 174 f. Jäger, Ludwig 41, 64, 74 f., 93, 98 ff., 110, 116, 121, 178 Johnson, David D. 83, 85 Johnson, Mark 176 <?page no="202"?> 202 Index of Names Joseph, John E. 13, 54 ff., 77, 108, 185 Kay, Paul 72 Kertész, András 10, 15, 35, 63, 76 ff., 98, 115 f., 124-130, 133, 136, 149, 171, 176, 178, 180, 183 Kibbee, Douglas 105 Kiefer, Ferenc 12 Klausenburger, Jürgen 77 Koerner, E. F. Konrad 27-30, 36-43, 46, 51 f., 56 f., 61 f., 68, 75, 86-89, 92, 98-101, 105-109, 113-116, 139, 144, 183 Kornmesser, Stephan 18, 72 ff., 93, 110, 112, 115, 117 Kuhn, Thomas S. 9, 13-19, 24, 27-34, 36 f., 46, 49, 51 f., 54 f., 57, 62, 66, 69, 71-74, 83, 85-88, 91-94, 98 ff., 110, 114, 116 Lakatos, Imre 9 f., 33, 63 f., 78-82, 92, 94, 98, 105, 110, 112, 114, 116, 123, 180 f. Lakoff, George 28, 61, 63, 72, 176 Lakoff, Robin 36, 38, 40, 64-67, 87, 92, 99 f., 107-111, 114, 121, 171 f., 176, 178 Langacker, Ronald W. 72, 176 Langendoen, D. Terence 56 Lappin, Shalom 72, 83 ff., 94, 98 ff., 110, 114, 116, 121, 172 Lasnik, Howard 69, 86, 143 Laudan, Larry 36, 38 f., 89, 100, 113 Lees, Robert 42 f., 53 f. Leiber, Justin 27 Lenneberg, Eric. H. 78 Levelt, Willem J. M. 147 Levine, Robert D. 83 ff., 172 Lightfoot, David 69 Lohndal, Terje 143 Lyons, John 153 Maher, John Peter 39 Masterman, Margaret 18, 73 Matthews, Peter H. 36, 46 f., 51, 90, 99, 104, 110, 112, 115 f., 121, 139, 141, 154 f., 158, 163, 169 McCawley, James D. 40, 61-64, 92, 98, 100, 112, 116, 121 Miller, A. J. 49, 55, 91 Miller, George A. 147, 177 Moravcsik, Edith A. 12 Müller, Ralph-Axel 178 Müller, Stefan 35, 175 Mullins, Nicholas C. 49, 55, 91 Murray, Stephen O. 32, 36 ff., 40 f., 49- 57, 61, 63, 68, 75, 86 f., 91, 93, 98-101, 104 f., 107 ff., 113, 115, 117, 139, 177 Nevin, Bruce E. 45 Newmeyer, Frederick J. 12, 27, 32, 35-39, 42 f., 51 f., 54, 56 f., 61, 63, 87, 89, 98 ff., 104-109, 112-116, 121, 139, 170, 172, 175 f. Newson, Mark 173 Nielsen, Janet 104 Oesterreicher, Wulf 114 Otero, Carlos P. 29, 147 Percival, W. Keith 30, 37, 39, 46, 114, 152 f., 182 Piatelli-Palmarini, Massimo 76 f., 85, 94, 100, 109 f., 112, 116, 121 Pietsch, Wolfgang 138 Pinker, Stephen 175 Pollard, Carl 174 Polya, George 80, 131 Popper, Karl R. 16, 82, 98, 110, 115, 174 Postal, Paul M. 61, 63, 82, 170, 172 Pullum, Geoffrey K. 45, 82, 145, 147, 170, 172 Rákosi, Csilla 12, 15, 124-130, 133, 136, 149, 171, 178 Rapp, Christof 131 Räz, Tim 10, 105 Rescher, Nicholas 128, 131-134 Richter, Frank 127 Riemer, Nick 77 Riemsdijk, Henk 63, 86 Ross, John R. 61, 63, 170 Sag, Ivan 174 Sampson, Geoffrey 127, 176 <?page no="203"?> Index of Names 203 Schikore, Jutta 10, 105 Schnelle, Helmut 75, 116 Scholl, Raphael 10, 105 Scholz, Barbara C. 45, 145 Schütze, Carson T. 149 Searle, John R. 27 f., 82 f., 112 Sells, Peter. 35 Seuren, Pieter A. M. 23, 45, 48, 61, 63, 82 f., 85, 91, 94, 99 ff., 110, 116, 121, 139, 143, 145, 147, 157 f., 160 f., 170, 172, 177 ff. Skinner, B. F. 58, 60, 69, 78, 80, 177 Sklar, Robert 27 Smith, Henry Lee 45, 56, 90, 99 Stechow, Arnim 173 Sternefeld, Wolfgang 127, 173 Thorne, James Peter 27 Tomalin, Marcus 34, 36, 38, 42-45, 56, 90, 99, 101, 109, 116, 139, 143 f., 160, 172 Trager, George L. 45, 56, 90, 99 Uriagereka, Juan 84 Vergnaud, Jean-Roger 77 Vidanovič, Đorđe 27 Voegelin, C. F. 42 Walton, Douglas N. 131 Wells, Rulon 152 Williams, Edwin 63 Winston, Morton E. 114 Wundt, Wilhelm 153 f. Yergin, Daniel 27 <?page no="205"?> Index of Subjects205 Index of Subjects ad hominem 40, 58, 106, 108 algorithm 27, 143, 145 anomaly 18 f., 52, 54 Aspects 23, 29, 51, 58-62, 64 f., 67, 69 f., 78, 92, 99, 111, 121, 158, 161, 168 f., 171, 173 f. authority 18, 28, 85 f., 94, 128, 144, 180 behaviorism 57 f., 69, 167, 177 ff. bias 10, 14, 42, 75, 104-110, 112, 115 ff., 165 biology 32, 71, 76, 78, 80 f., 114, 173 f. Bloomfieldian 25 ff., 30 ff., 35, 37, 44 f., 47, 50-58, 68, 72, 80, 86, 90, 99 ff., 113, 121, 138, 142-145, 148, 152, 155, 157, 162-166, 169, 178 f. certainty 65, 80, 123, 125, 127 f., 130 ff., 138, 149, 160, 184 f. circular 113, 122 f., 133 climate of opinion 27, 29 f., 36, 46, 88 cognitive 10, 16, 31, 45, 59, 71 f., 74 ff., 99, 109 f., 133, 147, 167, 172 f., 176-179 compactness 45 consistent 79, 126 Construction Grammar 72 ff. continuity 48, 50 f., 57, 99 ff., 138, 146, 155, 165 contradiction 43, 65, 77, 111 ff., 159 coup 14, 49, 52, 55 f., 91, 108, 113 crisis 18 f., 37, 51, 56, 99 cyclic 33, 35, 123 f., 133-136, 164 f., 168, 179, 184 data 18, 28-32, 34 f., 43, 46, 48 f., 59 ff., 65 ff., 69 f., 77, 80, 82 f., 89, 106, 112 f., 115, 122 f., 125 ff., 129 f., 148 f., 171, 173, 178 f., 182 f. decline 67, 74 f., 93 f., 99 f., 121 deductive 16, 26, 30-33, 43 ff., 59, 88, 125 f., 160 demarcation problem 115 dependency 149 f., 156 disciplinary matrix 18, 73 discovery procedure 47, 162 ff., 166 distributional 25, 46 f., 90, 99, 154, 158 f., 168 economy 45, 76, 81 elegance 30, 45 enthymematic 131, 138, 150 erosion 14, 74 f., 93 f., 113 evaluation procedure 26, 108, 139, 162, 164, 166 evolution 175 scientific 30, 14, 31, 33 f., 36, 39, 41, 43, 49, 62, 68, 72 ff., 89 f., 98, 101, 113 f., 116, 146 fallible 132 f. finite 26, 80, 140-143, 146-152, 156, 159 f. finite state machine 80, 146-151, 160 formal 29, 43 ff., 65 f., 81, 90, 101, 112, 125, 143 ff., 157, 160, 168, 173, 175, 179 Galilean 76 f., 81, 84, 88 gatekeeper 53 Generalized Phrase Structure Grammar 35, 174 generate 25, 134, 146, 150 f., 156, 159 Government and Binding, Theory of 34, 47, 55, 69 f., 72, 74 ff., 79, 84-87, 93 ff., 99, 121, 170-173 grammar 25 ff., 29, 35, 38, 40 ff., 44, 55, 58-63, 68-73, 76, 78, 80, 83, 86 f., 93, 104, 109, 123, 127, 130, 139, 142 f., 146, 148, 150-157, 159-164, 168 f., 175 f. grammatical 25 f., 60, 70, 81, 127, 129 f., 139, 142 f., 146, 148 f., 153, 155, 157 ff., 164, 171 grammaticality judgments 127, 129, 149, 171 <?page no="206"?> 206 Index of Subjects Head-driven Phrase Structure Grammar 35, 174 hermeneutic-functional 75, 93, 116 heuristic 80, 123, 133, 162 ff., 166 historiography 9-12, 14 f., 18, 23 f., 27, 30, 33, 35 f., 38 f., 41-49, 55 f., 58, 62 ff., 67, 69, 71-75, 77 f., 82 f., 85 f., 88-91, 98, 100 f., 104 ff., 108 ff., 112-117, 119, 121, 123 f., 127, 138 f., 143, 146, 154, 165, 175, 180-184 history 9-15, 19, 24, 27, 31 ff., 38, 40 ff., 44, 46-49, 51, 55, 67, 71, 74 f., 80, 85, 87 f., 90, 98 ff., 104, 106 ff., 111 f., 114, 116 f., 121-124, 127, 131, 138, 144, 152, 165, 169, 177-184 IC analysis 152-155, 157 ideology 40, 42 f., 63 f., 73, 92, 98 f., 114, 179 immature 17 ff., 35, 73, 112 immediate constituent 152, 163 incommensurable 18 f., 35, 73, 175, 182 inconsistency 114, 126, 132-135, 148, 171 inductive 15, 26, 30-33, 60, 88, 123, 163 infinite 26, 59, 140, 142 f., 150, 159 Kuhnian 14 f., 27-30, 32, 36 f., 39, 46, 51 f., 54, 56, 61 f., 66 ff., 71 ff., 78, 82 f., 85 f., 88 f., 93, 98, 100, 105, 112-116, 138, 184 language 9 f., 18, 25 f., 31 f., 34, 38, 57, 59 ff., 66, 69 ff., 74 ff., 79 ff., 83, 87, 89, 109 f., 116, 122, 127, 130 f., 139-143, 147 f., 150 f., 158 ff., 162 ff., 173, 175 f., 178 f., 183 ff. latent background assumption 108, 130 ff., 134, 138, 150, 157, 162 legitimization 41, 105, 110-113, 115, 165 Lexical-Functional Grammar 35, 174 linguistics wars 28, 55, 91 logic 9, 15 f., 29, 43 ff., 58, 69, 78, 80, 90, 125 f., 130 ff., 136, 145 mathematical 27, 29, 43 ff., 51, 77, 90, 140 f., 143 ff., 147, 159 f., 173 mature 17 ff., 73, 77 ff., 84 f., 111 mentalism 45, 59, 69, 78, 177 metahistoriographical 15, 95, 101, 104, 106, 117, 185 metalinguist 48 metascientific 11, 48, 116, 183 metatheoretical 48, 67, 91 f., 101, 124 ff., 172, 174, 182, 184 metatheory 30, 49, 88, 91 methodology 17, 30, 36, 41 ff., 46 f., 64 f., 75, 83 f., 89, 104, 116, 162, 164, 174 minimalism 45, 76-82, 84 f., 94, 99, 109-112, 169-172, 174 Minimalist Program 23, 34 f., 44, 47, 55, 72, 76 ff., 80-87, 94 f., 109, 112, 121, 170, 177 missionary zeal 57 model conflict 50 f. functionalist 49 p- 15, 122-127, 129, 138 f., 149, 162, 164 f., 171, 177, 180 f. modular 71 morpheme 25, 27, 31, 146, 153 f., 162 f., 169 morphology 25, 57, 145, 161 neo-Bloomfieldian 25 ff., 30 ff., 44 f., 47 f., 50-58, 62, 66, 68, 72, 80, 86 f., 90 ff., 99, 101, 113, 121, 138, 142, 144 f., 148, 152, 155, 157, 159, 162-166, 168, 170, 177, 179 object-scientific 184 paradigm 14, 17 ff., 28-33, 38, 46, 50, 52 f., 61 f., 65 ff., 69, 71-74, 85, 88, 92 f., 110, 112, 115, 181 f., 184 Parallel Architecture Theory 175 partisan historiography 41 f., 106 p-context 132-136, 139 f., 142-148, 150 ff., 155, 157, 162 f., 165 f., 168, 170, 180 perfection 76, 84 <?page no="207"?> Index of Subjects 207 perspective combinative 136 contrastive 135, 148 diagnostic 135, 139 evaluative 136, 140, 161 exclusive 136, 151 philosophy of science 9 ff., 15 f., 26, 33, 48 f., 82 f., 91, 94, 98, 106, 111, 116, 123 f., 126, 136, 138, 174 phoneme 26 f., 31, 68 f., 140 f., 162 f. phonemics 25, 42, 52, 68 phonology 25, 57, 68 f., 93, 177 phrase structure 27, 80, 154-161, 163, 169 physics 26, 30 f., 65, 81, 84, 114, 173 f., 178 p-incompleteness 132, 134 f. p-inconsistency 133 ff. plausibility value 123, 127 ff., 132 f., 136, 140-152, 155 ff., 159-162, 166, 168, 173 f., 176, 180, 185 plausible argumentation 121 f., 124 ff., 133-136, 138 f., 143 f., 146, 150 ff., 157, 160 f., 164 ff., 168 f., 171, 174, 176, 179 ff., 184 inference 125, 131, 133 f., 138, 146, 149 ff., 155 ff., 162 statement 123, 125, 128 ff., 132, 134 f., 146, 149, 157, 184 pluralism 11, 17, 57, 65 ff., 126 f., 183 f. p-problem 132-136, 139, 146, 152, 156, 161 f. Principles and Parameters, Theory of 69-73, 76, 80 f., 84, 86 f., 93 prismatic 123 f., 126, 134 ff., 144, 154 f., 161, 164 f., 168, 176, 179, 184 progress 13, 34 f., 41, 63, 75, 86, 99 f. recursive 150, 155, 157, 161 research program 12, 33-36, 63, 78-82, 89, 94, 98-101, 112 ff., 172, 175 f. tradition 19, 36, 38 f., 89 resolution 126, 133-136, 140, 179 retrospective 51, 123 f., 126, 133-136, 140, 143-146, 154 f., 157, 161-165, 168 f., 171 ff., 176, 179 revolution Copernican 42 intellectual 33, 86, 89, 100, 115 Kuhnian 27, 29 f., 32, 37, 56, 61 f., 68, 71 f., 86, 93, 98, 114, 138 Laudanian 36 linguistic 13 scientific 12, 14 f., 18, 23 f., 29 f., 33-39, 49-52, 55, 61 f., 69, 71-74, 87 ff., 91 ff., 98, 113, 115, 165, 181 unscientific 12, 14, 23, 85 within a revolution 77 f., 94 revolutionary 13 f., 27-30, 34, 36-41, 45, 48-51, 54 ff., 61 f., 67, 69, 71 f., 78, 80, 82-87, 91, 94, 100, 110, 113 f., 121, 138, 179 rhetoric 40, 49 ff., 54-58, 64, 87, 91 f., 98, 107 f., 113, 122, 128, 154, 173, 177 f., 180, 182 science formal 43 ff., 90, 101, 143 ff., 157, 175 natural 9, 14, 17, 26, 29, 31, 64 f., 71, 74 ff., 81, 84, 86, 99, 109, 111 f., 178 f. normal 17, 19, 62, 66 spurious 14, 82 f., 85, 94 scientific 10, 12, 14-18, 23 f., 26, 28-39, 43, 45, 49-53, 55 ff., 59, 61-69, 71-74, 78 ff., 82-85, 87 ff., 91-95, 98, 109-114, 144, 160, 164 f., 172, 179-182, 184 f. scientism 75, 84 semantics generative 28, 55, 58, 61-64, 66 f., 92, 110, 168, 170 f., 180 interpretive 92 sentence 59, 60, 63 f., 129, 140-143, 146, 148-151, 153 f., 158-161, 163, 171, 173 simplicity 26, 30, 44 f., 47, 76, 81, 128, 161, 164 <?page no="208"?> 208 Index of Subjects social 9, 16 f., 23, 33 f., 37, 43, 49 ff., 53, 55 f., 58, 65, 75, 82, 91, 98 ff., 110, 113, 115 f., 122, 128, 180, 182 solution 121 f., 124 ff., 132-136, 138 ff., 146, 148, 151, 161 f., 164, 167-172, 180, 182 f., 185 source 127-130, 132-135, 138, 141-147 148, 149-152, 155 ff., 160, 162, 166, 169, 173 f., 176, 180, 182 string 27, 68, 143, 148 ff., 156 structuralism 10, 29 f., 35, 37, 40 f., 44-48, 51, 56, 80, 86, 90 f., 138, 144 symmetry 76, 81 Syntactic Structures 23, 25-31, 33, 36 f., 39 f., 42-49, 51-58, 61 ff., 68, 74, 78, 86-91, 95, 98-101, 113, 121 f., 124, 138 ff., 142-145, 147, 150, 152, 154, 157-166, 168 f., 171-174, 177 theory 10, 16 ff., 23, 26 f., 29-35, 38, 41, 43, 45, 47, 49, 51, 54 f., 59-62, 65-68, 70 f., 74, 76-80, 83 ff., 89, 91, 104, 112, 114, 122 ff., 126 f., 136, 142-145, 151, 158 ff., 162, 165 f., 168 f., 172 ff., 178 f., 181, 183 transformation 27, 35, 37 f., 41, 51, 55, 60, 62, 69, 80, 86 f., 104, 143, 146, 155, 157-161, 163, 169 uncertainty 32, 36, 111, 114, 125 f. ungrammatical 25, 129, 143, 150 f., 171 utterance 26, 129, 141 ff., 151, 163 virtual conceptual necessity 76, 81 Whig history 41, 105 f., 114 X-bar theory 169 <?page no="209"?> List of Figures Figure 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Figure 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 Figure 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 Figure 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 Figure 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 Figure 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 Figure 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 <?page no="210"?> List of Tables Table 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 Table 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142 <?page no="211"?> Although the past decades have seen a great diversity of approaches to the history of generative linguistics, there has been no systematic analysis of the state of the art. The aim of the book is to fill this gap. Part I provides an unbiased, balanced and impartial overview of numerous approaches to the history of generative linguistics. In addition, it evaluates the approaches thus discussed against a set of evaluation criteria. Part II demonstrates in a case study the workability of a model of plausible argumentation that goes beyond the limits of current historiographical approaches. Due to the comprehensive analysis of the state of the art, the book may be useful for graduate and undergraduate students. However, since it is also intended to enrich the historiography of linguistics in a novel way, the book may also attract the attention of both linguists interested in the history of science, and historians of science interested in linguistics. ISBN 978-3-8233-8156-3 Kertész The Historiography of Generative Linguistics András Kertész The Historiography of Generative Linguistics