1 For a wide-ranging consideration of Labour’s ‘problem’ with affluence see Black (2003). AAA - Arbeiten aus Anglistik und Amerikanistik Band 32 (2007) Heft 2 Gunter Narr Verlag Tübingen Moral Objection or Trading Imperative? The British Consumer Co-operative Movement Responds to Commercial Television in the 1950s Alan Burton While the introduction of commercial television in Britain in 1955 has attracted much comment and analysis, the role of the powerful Consumer Co-operative Movement in resisting change in broadcasting at this time has remained unrecognised. In an unprecedented move within the labour movement, the Co-operative Wholesale Society made approaches to the authorities regarding the acquisition of a franchise to operate a commercial TV station and take some control of competitive broadcasting. This bold action put the Co-operative Movement at the centre of the debate on the new proposals for television during the final reading of the Bill in the House of Commons. This article examines the circumstances surrounding the intervention by the Co-operators into TV policy, the criticisms within the Movement of any further extension of materialism during a period of broadening affluence, and its role in the stormy period leading to the establishment of commercial television in Britain. Commercial television was introduced into Britain in the middle 1950s. It proved an enormous cultural and political event, ending the BBC’s threedecade long broadcasting monopoly and marking the new ‘age of affluence’ that had replaced the austerity of the wartime period. While the issue is much studied, and not least from the perspective of the Left’s critical attitude to competition in broadcasting and a further entrenchment of commercialisation in British society, the place of the influential Consumer Co-operative Movement in the divisive debate has remained unrecorded. 1 Curiously, Bert Hogenkamp’s Film, Television and the Left 1950-1970 ignores the establishment of commercial TV, and Des Freedman’s more focussed Television Policies of the Labour Party 1951-2001 has very little to say about the Co- Alan Burton 242 2 I have found no evidence from the Co-op side that the Movement made a further bid for an ITV franchise at this time. 3 The Labour Party was split rather more on the lines of those traditionally against materialism and a smaller group of modernisers. See (Freedman 2003: 8-25). operative Movement and its concerns about the new service, although he makes opportunity to consider the Trade Union Congress and its actions in view of commercialisation. In an otherwise important article, Lawrence Black makes the rather mistaken statement that around the time of the Pilkington Report (1962), “The ITA [Independent Television Authority] rejected a franchise bid from a Co-operative movement consortium” (Black 2005: 566). 2 As will be demonstrated, the application came specifically from the Co-operative Wholesale Society (CWS) sometime in 1952-3 during the height of the contentious debate regarding the commercialisation of television broadcasting. Thus, the existing literature shows some ignorance and confusion concerning the Co-operative Movement and its conflicting interests in relation to the issue of commercialised television, being both a significant labour organisation and a substantial trading concern that conceivably had something to gain from the change. The prospect of commercial TV, funded through advertising, was a considerable contradiction for the Co-operative Movement to confront. On the one hand, there was a firm resistance among its cultural and educational leaders to the American model of sponsored television programmes, which, it was felt, would degrade the quality of programming and potentially allow a sinister influence to advertisers. On the other hand, the Movement’s trading interests, in a period of relative decline, sensed economic benefits from the marketing potential of the new service. 3 The Co-operative Movement had been founded in the middle of the nineteenth century with the aim of bringing consumers’ control to retailing. Numerous local societies enjoyed rapid success, some amalgamating into larger regional societies and the whole coordinated in national bodies such as the CWS, which deployed the united strength into distribution, manufacturing and a range of financial services. Collectively, the Co-ops were Britain’s largest business by the 1940s-50s (Birchall 1994). In particular, the wartime period had been good for the Cooperative Movement. It had serviced giant contracts for the armed services; it had secured a large customer-base with around 11m registrations tied to the Co-ops through rationing regulations; and it enjoyed a general groundswell of support arising from the New Jerusalem ethos of the time (Bonner 1970: 209-267). However, these masked some general and entrenched problems which became increasingly apparent in the 1950s: a lack of development capital; increasing competition from multiple traders; a low level of trade per member; and a perceived member apathy - for which TV was sometimes blamed (Sparks 1994; Hornsby 1989). The Movement was failing Moral Objection or Trading Imperative? 243 4 The BBC reacting to criticism had introduced an element of ‘differentiation’ in radio broadcasting at the end of the war with channels ‘targeted’ at different audiences: the populist Light Programme, the middlebrow Home Service and the highbrow Third Programme. The idea, according to a senior official, was to allow “the freest possible ‘competition’ within the BBC monopoly”. (Cited in Camporesi 1994: 274). to respond to changing consumption patterns and its ‘moral economy’ was wilting under the challenge of affluence. In 1958, a Co-operative Independent Commission was appointed to deliberate the problems and recommend measures for recovery (Co-operative Independent Commission Report 1958). The British Consumer Co-operative Movement had been among the first labour organisations in the world to bring film to its cultural and propaganda work. In 1938, Co-operators had been instrumental in the formation of the Workers’ Film Association, which included the participation of the Labour Party and the Trades Union Congress. The Co-operative Movement remained the driving force behind the post-war National Film Association (1946-53) and therefore had considerable experience in and commitment to visual propaganda. However, by the early 1950s, attention was switching from film to more modern media forms like TV (A. Burton 2005). The Emergence of Independent Television On the resumption of TV broadcasting by the BBC in June 1946, there was considerable debate regarding the service and its provision, and one critic has gone so far as to suggest “that the basic principles of the British approach to broadcasting came under a radical revision” (Camporesi 1994: 268). The Hankey and Woolton Committees had met in 1944 and the Report of the Beveridge Committee in 1951 recommended the continuation of the BBC monopoly in broadcasting. 4 White Papers were issued in 1952 and 1953 by a new Conservative Government seeking to bring competition to television broadcasting through the introduction of a commercial service. The Television Act of 1954 was the realisation of this aim, but achieved only after much passionate resistance and acrimonious exchanges (P. Burton 1981: 57-63). While there was seemingly little public demand for the new service, a group of interests in the Conservative Party were intent on forcing through commercial TV. These included free enterprise Tories for whom the BBC monopoly was deemed unacceptable and aimed at ‘liberating’ broadcasting, traditional Tory critics of the BBC and its suspected left-wing tendencies (these included Prime Minister Churchill), and Conservatives with advertising agency and electronic manufacturing interests who expected a windfall from the commercialisation of television broadcasting. The politicians had the Alan Burton 244 5 The PTA tactically referred to the new service as ‘competitive television’. 6 The Daily Mirror group and many provincial papers declared for commercial TV. 7 A detailed analysis of the fears regarding American-style commercial broadcasting can be found in (Camporesi 1994). It is pointed out here that some British listeners had developed a taste for American-style broadcasting during the war when they had tuned into the American Forces Network on radio. support of a well-organised business lobby: equipment manufacturers provided funds for the campaign and advertising agencies were among the most prominent advocates. A committee of agency executives formed in 1952 undertook much basic planning. The political work was spearheaded by the Conservative Party Broadcasting Study Group led by Ian Orr-Ewing (interests in the electronics industry), Anthony Fell (employee of Pye Radio) and Sir Wavell Wakefield (associated with Rediffusion). This group largely had the task of bringing the Party behind the measure for reform. A more public lobby group was established in 1953 with the Popular Television Association (PTA). Its propaganda repeatedly hammered on two main issues: the evils inherent in monopoly; and the certainty that British advertising would conform to British taste. The PTA was supported by the advertising industry and Conservative Central Office (Wilson 1961: 129-150; 164-179). 5 The opposition included ‘traditional’ Tories who sought to resist Americanisation and the weakening of British cultural institutions and values, demonstrating that the issue of commercial TV did not divide simply on party lines. Many newspapers developed strong editorial lines against commercial television, including the Times, the Manchester Guardian and the Observer. While declaring for a cultural rejection of commercialised broadcasting, there was clearly a fear within the press of losing advertising revenue to a competitor. 6 Numerous university vice-chancellors and religious figures joined with labour and educational groups to oppose reform, fearing the lowering of standards and the ‘cheap distraction’ of a debased TV service. All of these critics were firm advocates of the public service ethos that underpinned the BBC monopoly and rejected a free market approach to culture, which, it was believed, would lead to a vulgarised service. In June 1953, the National Television Council (NTC) was formed as a pressure group “to resist the introduction of commercial television into this country”. Labour MP and BBC broadcaster Christopher Mayhew was the moving spirit of a “cross-party campaign whose organising committee included an impressive array of lords, reverends, entertainment entrepreneurs, two viscounts and a media trade union leader” (Freedman 2003: 12). The Council sought to protect standards and values in television broadcasting and resist the increasing Americanisation of British culture. 7 Mayhew likened the campaigns to their respective broadcast causes: the PTA was “populist, mendacious, mercenary and rich”, while the NTC “like much public service broadcasting, was weighty, honest, public-spirited and poor” (cited in Black Moral Objection or Trading Imperative? 245 8 In the Lord’s debate on the first White Paper, Lord Hawke believed that some BBC programmes were “drivel”, but at least “drivel in good taste” (cited in Wilson 1961: 116). 9 Both the PTA and NTC suffered from low turn out at public meetings. 10 It has been shown that the introduction of commercial television encouraged the adoption of TV sets in lower income families (Hand undated A). See also (Hand undated B), where recent research largely confirms the standard view of the contemporary audience for ITV (populist) and the BBC (educated). 11 A similar arrangement was already in place in the film industry, which had been protected from Hollywood since 1927. 2005: 555). Surprisingly, the Labour Party had no official involvement in the campaign against commercial TV, its leaders seemingly considering TV policy in general to be less important than either press policy or matters of political broadcasting. So, the introduction of commercial television was never debated by a Labour conference, although individual Labour members did make a passionate case against reform or specific proposals in the House debates (Freedman 2003: 10-11). The official Labour position was to defend the BBC - with certain reservations - and deny the need for commercial TV. 8 If need be, an additional channel could be given to the BBC offering more choice to viewers, but within the public service framework. The evidence suggests that there was no widespread popular support for ‘commercial’ television; the public seemingly did not care who provided the extra channel. 9 Among the many ironies associated with the campaign for commercial television in Britain, it is notable that the parties were to a degree out of synch with their supporters: that is, Labour voters were most in favour of commercialisation; and far more Conservative voters were against a change that threatened cultural standards. Labour M.P. Richard Crossland observed in August 1954: “In my experience the strongest opposition comes from nonviewing Conservatives whereas Labour supporters who view regularly are chiefly concerned to have as many programmes to select from as possible” (cited in Wilson 1961: 179). 10 The efficient campaign run by the NTC hammered on some general issues. Prominent was the fear of further Americanisation of the national culture. It was argued that commercial stations would be flooded with vulgar American imports and as protection entertainment unions demanded a quota of 80% for British programmes. 11 Significantly, the handling of the Coronation by the American networks in 1953 had appalled influential sections of British society. In June, the BBC broadcast the ceremony having prepared for more than a year to ensure a dignified transmission: Meticulous agreements were concluded with the American networks to enforce the BBC’s sole right. The expected audience in the United States was impressive. So, when the news spread that an American television station had interrupted the Coronation programme with “unsuitable” commercials, the opponents of commercial television were provided with what looked like a final Alan Burton 246 12 The Chimp, ‘J. Fred Muggs’, became a notorious character in the debate. The Coronation was watched on TV by more than 20m viewers, the first time a British television audience was greater than for radio. 13 The Co-operative Party had been formed in 1917 to help protect the Movement during a period of serious attacks occasioned by the wartime emergency. opportunity to illustrate the quality of commercial broadcasting. The debate raged for weeks. The controversial commentaries inserted by the US networks, criticising the imperial grandeur, were denounced as unacceptable; and the chimpanzee which, “in the middle of the Communion Service … was solemnly asked ‘Do you have a coronation where you come from? ’” stigmatised as utterly outrageous (Camporesi 1994: 280). 12 The Co-operative Movement Responds to Television Since the establishment of national broadcasting in the 1920s, the Co-operative Movement had experienced an ambivalent relationship with the BBC. While seeing the Corporation as both a powerful force for democracy and the spread of co-operative ideals, it was angered by what it considered a sometime bias against the Movement in its programming and access to the microphone (A. Burton 2005: 65-66). Ironically, the prospect of commercial TV converted the Co-operative Movement into a firm supporter of the BBC and the public service ideal. In 1952, following the first government White Paper on the subject, the Co-operative Press issued a condemnation of the principle of sponsored TV and radio and sought, through the Co-operative Party and the National Council of Labour, to bring pressure to bear on the Conservative government (“Sponsored Radio and Television Programmes” 1952: 7). 13 In 1953, a motion sponsored by the Co-op Press was adopted at Cooperative Congress, the annual forum of the wider Movement. It stated that: [the Central Executive of the Co-operative Union v]iews with alarm the proposals to introduce commercial television into this country. We consider that the proposals set out in the White Paper on Television Policy would lead inevitably to a lowering of programme standards under pressure from advertisers and would weaken the power of the BBC to provide a television and sound radio service which expresses British culture and aspirations (“Sponsored Television” 1953: 8; “Sponsored Television” 1954: 3). A commercialised television service funded by the advertising industry on behalf of competitive firms ran counter to the fundamental ethos of the Movement, which has aptly been called ‘the moral economy’ of Co-operation (Gurney 1996). Writing in the Co-operative News, 12 September 1953, Arthur Ledger questioned: “At whom are the advertisers aiming? ”. In what was becoming a typically pessimistic take on American-style broadcasting, he continued: Moral Objection or Trading Imperative? 247 14 A debate about the moral efficacy of advertising ranged across the Movement in the early years of the twentieth century and proved a contentious issue for a large-scale trading organisation. See (A. Burton 2000) 15 The WCG had been formed in 1883 and quickly became the largest organisation of working-class women in Britain. Its constituency was essentially that of the married mother and organiser of family consumption. The American sponsors realise that one way to the housewife’s purse is through her children. It means that goods are not being sold entirely on their quality or their value for money, but on their attractiveness to the child population […] If sponsored television does come about, more and more firms will use popular characters to sell their goods. Ledger believed parents accepted the “least line of resistance” and was acknowledging what today we would call ‘pester power’. In conclusion he asked: “Is it legitimate to get at the family purse through the children? ” (Ledger 1953: 2). It was a traditional appeal within the Movement for ‘rational consumption’, which in its extreme denied all forms of advertising other than the purely informational. 14 An editorial in the Co-operative Productive Review in February 1953, the mouthpiece of producer Co-operation in Britain, acknowledged the spread of television and, in a further appeal to ‘rational consumption’, hoped “that essential expenditure on food, clothing and other necessities” was not being lost to TV (“Spread of Television” 1953: 39). The Women’s Co-operative Guild also expressed objections against a new commercial service. 15 In June 1953, Mrs F. Hall, in her first speech as Guild President, feared that continual interruptions for commercial announcements would be distasteful to viewers and, furthermore, that the extra costs represented by advertising would have to be borne by the consumer, a typical concern within the Movement being excessive costs of distribution. Such objections were couched at a time when the Guild was becoming highly suspicious of TV as one of the attractions that adversely affected attendance at meetings and ultimately the level of membership (“Oppose Commercial TV, Says President” 1953: 8). Educational meetings of co-operative societies were receptive forums for the speakers of the National Television Council. Leading spokesman Christopher Mayhew addressed members of the Birmingham Society on the subject of ‘Commercial Television’, which he believed “would only give viewers the programmes the advertisers wanted”. He did not believe that the public wanted the detriments of commercial television and that the ‘push’ was coming from the manufacturers. Playing to the sensibilities of his audience, he warned that “[i]n the long run the great cost of television advertising would not come out of the pockets of the advertisers but would be paid by the consumers of their goods” (“Commercial TV drive comes from makers” 1953: 11). Alan Burton 248 16 Part of the propaganda of the commercial TV lobby, in countering accusations of the lowering of standards, was that reputable bodies like universities could be given licences to broadcast. 17 The CWS had begun producing ‘Defiant’ radio sets in the early 1930s following a boycott by the radio manufacturers cartel, which objected to the Movement’s mechanism of returning dividend to customers based on their level of purchases. (See Geddes 1991: 178; “CWS and Radio Action Against Threatened Boycott” 1933: 1; “‘Defiant’ and Victorious. Popularity of CWS Wireless Sets” 1934: 1.) 18 The guide was published as Everybody’s Guide to Television and compiled and edited by the paper’s TV critic Fred Cooke. The Co-operative Movement also embraced some supporters of a second commercial channel, illustrating the complex and divisive nature of the issue and the problem for many organisations to be united and consistent. R.A. Reed, an education officer with experience in film work, thought that independent TV might be harnessed in Co-operative educational work - and was one of the few on the Left who sought to take advantage of sponsored programmes. He envisaged: “discussion groups meeting around a set supplied by the local society and its education centre, with one of television’s more serious programmes as part of the curriculum”. He warned, “The cooperative movement must make better use of it than it had made of the cinema and radio”, and added: “It was not beyond the bounds of reason to suggest that the movement could sponsor its own programmes for educational purposes, with local education committees having sets and sponsoring local television groups” (“Harness Television For Co-operative Education” 1953: 3). 16 Others sectors of the Movement were finding the need to accommodate to television. The CWS had moved quickly to manufacture and market its Defiant TV sets following the resumption of broadcasting after the war and could hope for an increase in trade following the launch of an additional service (Richardson 1977: 177). 17 While Reynold’s News, the Co-op’s Sunday newspaper, offered readers a popular guide to television as the popularity of the medium was making itself more and more felt (“The Answer to Every T/ V Query” (1952): 3). 18 It needs to be noted in this respect that opponents of Co-operation, especially small independent shop-keepers, felt the larger Co-ops, with national organisation, to be advantaged in view of the anticipated high cost of TV advertising. While the smaller trader would not be able to afford TV advertising, the larger stores and traders like the Co-ops would: “Co-operative societies seemed to have a wonderful medium in commercial television to say to the family sitting round the fireside: ‘Shop at the Co-op - there’s a branch round the corner’”. And indeed, the Bolton Chamber of Commerce passed a resolution against commercial television, as it would give the Co-operative Movement “great scope for propaganda” Moral Objection or Trading Imperative? 249 19 The debate took place at the quarterly conference of the North-West Area Council of the National Chamber of Trade. In a similar vein, small advertising agencies were hostile to sponsored TV as they felt they would be unable to compete with the larger firms. 20 The contradictions are apparent in the Movement’s criticism of programme sponsorship as the model for funding commercial TV, while concurrently the CWS was sponsoring a show on Radio Luxembourg, a practice that went back to the 1930s. See The Wheatsheaf (August 1939: 7); The Producer (October 1954: 26, 34); and The Co-operative News (9 October 1954: 9-12). 21 Quotations form the debates are derived from Hansard, the official record of Parliament. (“TV will help to boost the ‘co-op’, they say” 1953: 6). 19 Certainly within the Movement, the fears concerning the cultural and social impact of commercial television were balanced by the expectations of the trading interests which saw benefits from the advertising potential of the service. 20 In the uncertain period before the launch of the new service, a meeting of the influential Conservative 1922 Committee in February 1952 voiced the dangers that could arise from change: the possibility that the Communist Party of Great Britain would buy broadcast time for its propaganda; or that the Co-operative Movement would undoubtedly become commercial sponsors with the result of weakening and destroying the small shop-keeper, a traditional friend of Conservativism. It would take a lot of persuading to win over some anxious and sceptical Tories. The Political and Parliamentary Debate 21 The “setting and tone which was to characterise all subsequent public discussion of this issue” was established in the Lord’s debate on the first White Paper in May 1952 (Wilson 1961: 107). In the most notorious intervention, Lord Reith, the influential founding head of the BBC, accused: “Somebody introduced smallpox, bubonic plague and the Black Death. Somebody is minded now to introduce sponsored broadcasting” (cited in Wilson 1961: 107). The attendance at the Lord’s debate on the reading of the second White Paper was said to have been greater than any for a generation with the government issuing a two-line whip to ensure the attendance of Tory peers to support the motion. While the Common’s debate on the second Paper was an unruly affair and delayed on several points of order relating to issues of Members with special interests. Labour Minister Herbert Morrison, the spokesman for the party in the debate, considered it one of the most important debates since the war. A principal attack by those opposing changes in broadcasting was the intimation that some Conservative MPs had interests in advertising firms, and by extension the establishment of a commercial television channel. Frank Bowles (Labour) made this point: “May I say that it is well-known to every Alan Burton 250 honourable Member that there are certain honourable Members on the other side of the House who are directly connected with the future of sponsored or competitive TV”. Herbert Morrison advanced this line of accusation: It is known that certain honourable members who have been advocating commercial TV very actively have an individual and personal interest in advertising concerns which intend to participate in the new venture […] they are seeking to do business out of TV for their own personal profit. These accusations led to a surprising revelation. The Conservative Member, Mr A. Marlowe, responded to the attack with his own question: “In view of the fact that the Co-op Society has applied for one licence, would any honourable member who is a Member of the Co-operative Society have to declare his interest when speaking in the debate? ” A surprised Morrison viewed this as “silly”: “As my honourable Friends associated with the Co-operative Movement intend to vote against the Government on the matter, how can they be guilty of voting for their own interests? ” An angry George Darling (a Co-op sponsored MP) questioned where Marlowe had gotten this confidential information, which was only known to the directors of the CWS, the representative in Parliament of the Post Office (the Postmaster-General) and himself? Furthermore, he confirmed: “the whole Movement is utterly and completely opposed to commercial TV”. Responding to a different line of criticism, an advocate for independent television, Brig. T. Clarke, interjected with the claim for the Co-op as a monopoly, and therefore in natural sympathy with the broadcasting monopoly of the BBC. Morrison, a passionate defender of the status of the BBC as a regulated monopoly, responded: The Co-op is in competition. In the case of the Co-op, a number of these businesses which may support commercial TV in the interests of competition, flatly refuse to supply the Co-op with goods because the Co-op is an effective competitor. Morrison, a lifelong member of the Royal Arsenal Co-operative Society, was well-informed about the traditional weapon of the boycott operated against the Co-operative Movement. George Darling developed this point, and, unrehearsed, outlined the position of the Co-operative Movement: The societies are not allowed to sell the products of these manufacturers unless they undertake to distribute their profits in the way in which the radio manufacturers dictatorially lay down. There is no radio manufacturer outside the ring and the Co-operative movement has been forced against its will into the manufacture of radio and television sets […] The point is that if the Co-operative movement is compelled to go into commercial television, that is, to have its advertisements placed at the beginning and end of the commercial television programme, then in order to get the job done it either must have its own studios, which would be foolish and Moral Objection or Trading Imperative? 251 22 The Associated Broadcasting Development Company had been formed in 1952 for the express purpose of private enterprise television and a demonstration to the government that powerful financial and manufacturing interests were prepared to invest in commercial TV. wasteful, or it will have to go to the people who apply this boycott and ask them to produce a programme. One can see what difficulties are involved there. Then Darling expounded on the application for a licence to run a TV station: It is also a fact that the Co-operative Wholesale Society, which is the central trading body of the whole Co-operative movement, applied to the Postmaster- General for a licence to run a television service. The first reason for its doing so was to remind the Government that the Co-operative movement ought not to be left out of any consideration. At the time that the request was made and the application was put forward, things were very vague and nobody knew what the Government’s proposals would be. So the second purpose of the application from the Co-operative movement was to obtain more information. It was hoped that in the correspondence that would follow the Co-operative Wholesale Society would obtain some idea of the Government’s intention. In an article for the Co-operative News soon after the debate, George Darling accepted that the Government had made concessions to the opponents of commercial TV. In particular, the American model of direct sponsorship of programmes was to be dropped in favour of spot-advertising, loosening the link between advertising revenue and programme content. In addition, the new service would be subject to public service regulations; that is, private firms would not own the new stations and would broadcast under licence to a newly created Independent Broadcasting Authority. However, Darling argued that, “the fundamental objections to commercial TV have not been met”. Firstly, the new service would not initially provide a national service and would in most likelihood just reach London, Birmingham and Manchester. And secondly, that due to the high cost of programme-making, estimated at £ 50,000 per week: There is at the moment only one prospective company in the field, the Associated Broadcasting Development Company, which includes in its association radio manufacturing and advertising firms, at least one daily newspaper and other similar commercial interests. 22 Darling was arguing that the high cost of TV would deter other entrants and hence the notion of free competition was a sham. For him, “The new policy is basically as bad as the old and just as dangerous to Co-operative interests”. Moreover, he pointed out that the ABDC had been paying out large sums on propaganda for commercial TV, and the new proposals set out in the White Paper (1953) have been done so, Alan Burton 252 23 The separate Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society does not appear to have participated in the events. 24 There is some confusion regarding when, actually, the CWS submitted an application. It states in this article published in December 1953 that the application was forwarded 15 months earlier, making for around July 1952. However, the Minutes of the Committee Meetings of the CWS Board do not approve the recommendation to make an application until June 1953. The tactical discussions took place within the Finance No. 1 Committee of the CWS, but unfortunately these have not been preserved, making it impossible to discern what exactly lay behind the thinking of the CWS. for the sole purpose of satisfying an obviously influential private company. In placating and favouring the ABDC the Government has retained the worst features of commercial television […] The radio manufacturers and the daily newspaper included in ABDC have frequently shown their dislike of co-operative enterprise. They are not likely to drop their opposition when they take charge of TV programmes. And the co-operative movement, along with all other democratic institutions now faces a very dangerous situation (“”Sponsoring” is out - but danger remains” 1953: 2, 14). In a lead article in The Co-operative News soon after the debate in the House more was revealed about the secret application for a licence to operate a commercial TV station. Darling was quoted on the impact of what the paper described as a “statesmanlike” move, The application from the CWS put the Government in a desperate dilemma. They could not fit the Co-operative Movement into their plans and they knew there would be tremendous public criticism if the Movement were left out. 23 According to the CWS, it remained opposed to commercial television, but sought “to influence events in the service of Co-operation”. In a statement issued following the Parliamentary debate, a spokesman informed that the Movement, will require equal facilities to those granted to other commercial advertisers, and the CWS has taken steps to protect its position in this respect by acquiring from the Postmaster-General as to the possibility of being granted licences to operate television services for the 10 million Co-operators in England and Wales (“C.W.S. Application For Commercial TV Place Hit Tory Plan” 1953: 1). 24 The vote on the second Reading of the Bill was passed on 25 March 1954 by the narrow majority of 296 to 269 votes. On 30 July 1954, after a further twenty days of debate, the Bill to create the Independent Television Authority became law. Conclusion The Co-operative Movement made the bold claim that its action led to a modification of the original proposals, away from direct sponsorship of pro- Moral Objection or Trading Imperative? 253 25 Once commercial television was a successful reality, the initiative within the Labour Party passed on to the ‘revisionists’, who sought to connect with the rising expectations and living standards of the period and eschewed the ‘highbrow’ attitudes to popular culture that had prevailed. gramming to a system of discrete spot-advertising. That is, the Movement played a ‘decisive’ part in the Conservative Government’s retreat from its original intentions for commercial television and its acceptance of competitive TV within a public service framework. Later commentators like Freedman point to the widespread opposition to the Conservative’s plans for commercial TV, but singles out the National Television Council’s high-profile campaign as helping to convince the Government to drop American-style sponsorship in favour of regulated advertising as the source of revenue for the new system (Freedman 2003: 19). The historian of the BBC, Asa Briggs, highlights the “many interesting undercurrents and the ultimate compromises on many points” which attended the working out of the legislation (Briggs 1979: 933). It has to be further acknowledged that many MPs were against the American system of commercial television, including many influential Tories. The Television Bill might have been rejected if it had advocated a system of unregulated programme sponsoring. Bernard Sendall also maintains that the Government, mindful of cross-party opposition, was willing to compromise (Sendall 1982: 34). The Co-operative Movement thus added its substantial voice to an array of opposing viewpoints. What the episode does unqualifyingly reveal is that a significant leftist organisation of consumers had a role to play in cultural policy in the 1950s. That a substantial part of the Parliamentary debate centred on the Co-operative Movement’s policy and intentions in relation to commercial television confirms this. This is an important dimension to the whole commercial TV saga that has been ignored by television and labour historians. Wilson’s detailed account of the campaign for commercial television states that “no new arguments” were offered in the final Commons debate, which rather elides the revelation about the CWS and its interest in securing an operating licence (Wilson 1961: 191). In a similarly reductive manner, Des Freedman is able to conclude that, although no Labour [Party] amendments were accepted by the government, its constant pressure was effective in securing the inclusion of various safeguards concerning programme range, editorial impartiality and limits on advertising time in the final legislation (Freedman 2003: 19). 25 One needs to broaden out the conception of the Labour Party to that of the labour movement, thus embracing and acknowledging other significant organisations on the Left with a stake in broadcasting and popular culture. The events also demonstrate the clear sectarian positions of different interests and the Co-op’s concern to defend its interests within what it viewed Alan Burton 254 26 Details of the co-ordinated campaign linking the TV ads to store displays are given in “Fireside View of C.W.S. Products” 1955: 2-3). 27 Bernstein’s position exactly paralleled that of the CWS, arguing that his action did not “indicate any change of feelings about commercial or sponsored television; I still think the country would be better off without it. However, if there is to be commercial television in this country, we think we should be in, and this may very well be useful one day” (quoted in Freedman 2003: 16-17). as a hostile system that had persistently operated the boycott against it. It was firmly believed for example, mistakenly as it turned out, that the Cooperative Movement could not afford to be outside of commercial television should it become a reality in the fear that it would be barred from commercial stations. It was the last time the declining Co-operative Movement had the authority to significantly influence British cultural life. On the launch of the independent television stations in September 1955, the CWS placed advertisements in the very first series of transmissions. In an ironic twist of history, the CWS’s persistent support for commercial television through its advertising, helped the infant service through an uncertain period, and undoubtedly contributed to its firm establishment by the later 1950s. The inaugural Co-op advert went out on the first up London transmitter on Wednesday 28 September, between 7.00-8.00pm, adopting a ‘Spot the Likeness’ theme and having “all the attractions of a panel game”. So pleased were the Movement’s publicists, with both the campaign and the opportunities offered by the new commercial service, that screen time was booked as far ahead as was possible and similar reservations were made on the Birmingham and Manchester transmitters that were expected to be in operation early in 1956. The News, in a smart about turn, editorialised that, “It is a matter of congratulation that the C.W.S. is so far advanced with its TV plans” (“C.W.S. and Commercial TV” 1955: 1). 26 The Co-operative Movement was not the only body on the Left compromised in its ideals by commercial television. Long-term Labour Party supporter Sidney Bernstein successfully applied for a licence for his Granada cinema chain and developed one of the most influential regional stations. 27 Another significant cinema interest, the Associated British Picture Corporation, acquired the ABC franchise, even though its vice-president, Eric Fletcher, was a Labour MP and actively involved with the NTC. By early 1956, Labour supporters were playing key roles in three of the four ITV companies. In the final account, the Co-op’s intervention in the Television Bill of 1954 demonstrates the Movement’s latent idealism. At a testing time of relative decline, the Co-operative Movement was still prepared to pursue its cultural ideals in face of its material interest. One Conservative official speaking in 1959 believed that commercial television had done the Party “incalculable good”: it had brought goods into people’s homes and raised their expectations about more; it had given people a stake in things, making them conser- Moral Objection or Trading Imperative? 255 vative; and it had provided distraction, focussing desires on the products advertised (Wilson 1961: 212). Commercial TV had played its part in making people think that they had ‘never had it so good’. Co-operators and others on the Left had alternatively sought to counter the tide of thoughtless materialism and morally corrosive affluence. If nothing else, the episode offered the glorious prospect of ‘People’s Television’: a commercial TV channel run by a working-class, democratically controlled organisation of consumers, and programmes reflective of rational consumption and the moral economy of Cooperation. If one accepts that British society since the 1950s has been characterised by materialism and selfish acquisitiveness, then the post-war period just might have been a little different. References/ Bibliography Birchall, J. (1994). Co-op. the people’s business. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Black, L. (2003). The Political Culture of the Left in Affluent Britain, 1951-64: Old Labour, New Britain? New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Black, L. (2005). “Whose Finger on the Button? British Television and the Politics of Cultural Control”. Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television 25: 4. 547-575. Briggs, A. (1979). Sound and Vision: vol. IV of The History of Broadcasting in the United Kingdom. Oxford: OUP. Bonner, A. (1970). British Co-operation. Manchester: Co-operative Union. Burton, A. (2000). “‘To gain the whole world and lose our soul’: visual spectacle and the politics of working-class consumption before 1914”. In: Simon Popple / Vanessa Toulmin (eds.). Visual Delights. Essays on the Popular and Projected Image in the 19 th Century. Trowbridge: Flicks Books. [PAGE NUMBERS MISSING] Burton, A. (2005). The British Consumer Co-operative Movement and film, 1890s-1960s. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Burton, P. (1981). Television and Radio in the United Kingdom. London: Macmillan. Camporesi, V. (1994). “There are No Kangaroos in Kent. The American ‘Model’ and the Introduction of Commercial Television in Britain, 1940-1954”. In: D.W. Ellwood / R. Kroes (eds.). Hollywood in Europe. Experience of Cultural Hegemony. Amsterdam: VU University Press. [PAGE NUMBERS MISSING] Co-operative Independent Commission Report (1958). Manchester: Co-operative Union. Freedman, D. (2003). Television Policies of the Labour Party 1951-2001. London: Frank Cass. Geddes, K., in collaboration with G. Bussey (1991). The Setmakers. A History of the Radio and TV Industry. London: British Radio and Electronic Equipment Manufacturers Association. Gurney, P. (1996). Co-operative Culture and the Politics of Consumption in England, 1870-1930 . Manchester: Manchester University Press. Hand, Chris (Undated A). The advent of ITV and television ownership in lower income households: correlation or causation? http: / / www.kingston.ac.uk/ ~ku32101/ tvlogits.pdf. [Accessed 19.08.2006]. Hand, Chris (Undated B). The arrival of choice in television viewing in Britain: who watched ITV? http: / / www.rhul.ac.uk/ media-arts/ mk/ staff/ Choice%20of%20Channels-revised.pdf. [Accessed 19.08.2006]. Alan Burton 256 Hogenkamp, B. (2000). Film, Television and the Left 1950-1970. London: Lawrence and Wishart. Hornsby, M. (1989). Co-operation in crisis, challenge and response in the co-operative retail movement in England from the late 19 th century to the mid-20 th century. Unpublished M.Phil. Thesis: University of York. Ledger, A. (1953). “Children’s Choice and the advertiser”. The Co-operative News (12 September): 2. Richardson, W. (1977). The CWS in War and Peace 1938-1976. Manchester: CWS Sendall, B. (1982). Origin and Foundation, 1946-1962: vol. 1 of Independent Television in Britain. London: Macmillan. Sparks, L. (1994). “Review - and prospects”. Journal of Co-operative Studies (February). Wilson, H.H. (1961). Pressure Group. The Campaign for Commercial Television. London: Secker & Warburg. “The Answer to Every T/ V Query” (1952). The Co-operative News (20 September). 3). “Commercial TV drive comes from makers. Labour M.P. Hits White Paper” (1953). The Cooperative News (12 December). 11. “C.W.S. and Commercial TV. Quick off the mark with grocery and provision minute ‘spots’” (1955). The Co-operative News (17 September). 1. “CWS and Radio Action Against Threatened Boycott” (1933). The Co-operative News (28 January). 1. “C.W.S. Application For Commercial TV Place Hit Tory Plan” (1953). The Co-operative News (19 December). 1. “”Defiant” and Victorious. Popularity of CWS Wireless Sets” (1934). The Co-operative News (13 January). 1) “Fireside View of C.W.S. Products” (1955). The Producer (October). 2-3. “Harness Television For Co-operative Education” (1953). The Co-operative News (4 April). 3. “Oppose Commercial TV, Says President” (1953). The Co-operative News (27 June). 8. “Sponsored Radio and Television Programmes” (2 June 1952). Minutes of the Central Executive of the Co-operative Union). 7. “Sponsored Television” (1953). Minutes of the Central Executive of the Co-operative Union (2 December). 8. “Sponsored Television” (1954). Annual Co-operative Congress Report. 3. “”Sponsoring” is out - but danger remains says George Darling, M.P.” (1953). The Cooperative News (21 November). 2, 14. “Spread of Television” (1953). Co-operative Productive Review (February). 39. Alan Burton Institut für Anglistik und Amerikanistik Alpen-Adria-Universität Klagenfurt and Associate Research Fellow in British Film and TV History, De Montfort University, UK