Aesthetic Life and Tragic Insight in Nietzsche’s Use of Goethe PAUL BISHOP U NIVERSITY OF G LASGOW In a note in his Nachlass dated October-November 1888, Nietzsche returns to one of his most important themes: the significance for him of Goethe. 1 In this fragment, which begins «Was Goethe angeht,» Nietzsche says, among other things: Eine verklärt-reine Herbstlichkeit im Genießen und im Reifwerdenlassen, - im Warten, eine Oktober-Sonne bis ins Geistigste hinauf; etwas Goldenes und Versüßendes, etwas Mildes, nicht Marmor - das nenne ich Goethisch. (KSA 13, 24[10], 634) This is a richly evocative passage, but can we be more precise about Goethe’s influence, as an emblematic writer of the eighteenth century - «man studirt achtzehntes Jahrhundert, wenn man den ‹Faust› liest» (KSA 13, 24[10], 635) - on Nietzsche, a philosopher who placed the cultural problems of his day, the nineteenth century, at the heart of his intellectual concerns? 2 Two books have recently examined Nietzsche’s use of Goethe in the formulation of his philosophical aesthetics (Bishop and Stephenson; von Seggern). Right from his earliest work, Die Geburt der Tragödie, through his philosophical centre-text, Also sprach Zarathustra, to his encomium of Goethe’s «Dionysian» faith in Götzen-Dämmerung, Nietzsche develops a critical, but appreciative, set of responses to Goethe’s writings, particularly Faust. Not that Nietzsche was incapable of expressing criticism of Goethe. In a section entitled «Goethe’s Irrungen» in volume two of Menschliches, Allzumenschliches, Nietzsche discussed what he regarded as Goethe’s errors (in the first half of his life, his efforts to be a plastic artist; and, in the second half, his belief in the importance of his scientific studies). In his attitude to poetry, Nietzsche remarked, Goethe had been like an ancient Greek who, every now and then, visited a mistress, but did so, wondering whether she was, in fact, a goddess whom he could not quite name. But, Nietzsche concluded (thereby recapitulating the eighteenth-century «doctrine of indirection»), without this «digression through error» (Umschweife des Irrthums), Goethe would not have become Goethe - that is, «der einzige deutsche Künstler der Schrift, der jetzt noch nicht veraltet ist» (KSA 2, 483). And in a later section entitled «Die Faust-Idee» Nietzsche implicitly satirized the plot of Faust as the seduction 58 Paul Bishop and dishonouring of a little seamstress - «die gute Seele, / Die sich einmal nur vergessen» (Faust I, ll. 12065-66) - by a great scholar, albeit with the assistance of the devil: could this really be «der grösste deutsche ‹tragische Gedanke› […], wie man unter Deutschen sagen hört»? 3 After all, did not Goethe in a letter to Zelter describe his own nature as being too «konziliant» for tragedy? 4 In another (and, again, extremely suggestive) passage, however, Nietzsche evokes the qualities of the poet who will produce «die Dichtung der Zukunft» - Kraft, Güte, Milde, Reinheit und ungewolltes, eingeborenes Maass in den Personen und deren Handlungen: ein geebneter Boden, welcher dem Fusse Ruhe und Lust giebt: ein leuchtender Himmel auf Gesichtern und Vorgängen sich abspiegelnd: das Wissen und die Kunst zu neuer Einheit zusammengeflossen: der Geist ohne Anmaassung und Eifersucht mit seiner Schwester, der Seele, zusammenwohnend und aus dem Gegensätzlichen die Grazie des Ernstes, nicht die Ungeduld des Zwiespaltes herauslockend: - diess Alles wäre das Umschliessende, Allgemeine, Goldgrundhafte, auf dem jetzt erst die zarten Unterschiede der verkörperten Ideale das eigentliche Gemälde - das der immer wachsenden menschlichen Hoheit - machen würden. (KSA 2, 420) - and remarks in his conclusion to this aphorism that the path to this «poetry of the future» starts out from Goethe: «Von Goethe aus führt mancher Weg in diese Dichtung der Zukunft.» Like his famous criticism of Schiller in Götzen-Dämmerung as «der Moral-Trompeter von Säckingen» (KSA 6, 111), his strictures are primarily directed, not so much against the proponents of Weimar classicism themselves, as against those who misunderstood or, worse, misrepresented their cultural project. 5 «Aber es bedarf guter Pfadfinder und vor Allem einer viel grössern Macht als die jetzigen Dichter […] besitzen,» as Nietzsche adds in the concluding sentence of his aphorism on the poet as the signpost to the future. Moreover, we can pinpoint with even greater precision the significance of Goethe for Nietzsche by triangulating the Goethe-Nietzsche relationship with a third term, the Dutch philosopher, Baruch Spinoza. 6 Now, Spinoza had functioned as a major reference point for philosophical discussion, ever since the pantheism controversy, or the Spinoza-Streit, between Jacobi, Lessing, and Mendelssohn in the late eighteenth century. 7 (In part, this debate centered on the interpretation of Goethe’s poem «Prometheus»). 8 For his part, Goethe read Spinoza intensively in the period Winter 1784 to Spring 1786, 9 and in Dichtung und Wahrheit he discussed his reading of Spinoza in some detail (HA 10, 34-36 and 76-80). In the nineteenth century, Spinoza’s influence on European thought continued to grow. As one commentator has noted, «the nineteenth century Jew- Aesthetic Life and Tragic Insight in Nietzsche’s Use of Goethe 59 ish Enlightenment was like a beam of light refracted through a prism into a spectral band of brilliant intellectual colors spread across Western Europe,» and this prism was Spinoza (Dimont 343). Just as Spinozism exerted a powerful influence on Dutch cultural life, particularly in the second half of the nineteenth century (Thissen), so the reception of Spinoza in Germany, particularly by other Jewish thinkers, became increasingly complex (Levy). For his part, Nietzsche’s major encounter with Spinoza came in 1881 in the Engadin, as he was preparing to write Zarathustra. In the elevated atmosphere, both meteorologically and psychologically speaking, of Sils Maria, Nietzsche turned to fresh intellectual tasks, including, as he told Franz Overbeck on 30 July 1881, reading Spinoza: «Ich bin ganz erstaunt, ganz entzückt! Ich habe einen Vorgänger und was für einen! » (KSB 6, 111). 10 In the same letter, Nietzsche spoke of his «Einsamkeit» becoming a «Zweisamkeit,» anticipating his later use of the phrase «wurde Eins zu Zwei» to describe his encounter with Zarathustra in his poem «Sils-Maria» (KSA 3, 649). Probably a major source of Nietzsche’s knowledge of Spinoza was Kuno Fischer’s Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, vol. 1, part 2, Descartes’ Schule: Geulinx, Malebranche: Baruch Spinoza (Mannheim: F. Bassermann, 2 1865), which Nietzsche had asked Overbeck to send to him in Sils Maria. And his interest at this time in Spinoza is reflected in his notebook, where he excerpts Spinoza and comments on him (KSA 9, 11[193], 517-18). Not only is Nietzsche’s preoccupation with Spinoza reminiscent of Goethe’s, but later, in 1887, he expressly notes Goethe’s admiration for Spinoza. 11 At first sight, Spinoza might seem out of place in the tradition of Weimar classicism which is primarily concerned with aesthetics. After all, Spinoza has virtually nothing to say about aesthetics. 12 He even argues in the appendix to Part 1 of the Ethics that judgments of beauty are nothing other than «modes in which the imagination is affected in different ways» (Spinoza 1928, 141). When he writes that «if the motion by which the nerves are affected by means of objects represented to the eye conduces to well-being, the objects by which it is caused are called beautiful» (141), Spinoza appears to suggest that beauty itself is a «mode of imagining», i.e., appearance. (Such moral and aesthetic judgements would correspond to what, in the Ethics, Spinoza calls the first mode of knowledge, i.e., imagination or experientia vaga.) 13 Spinoza dismisses the idea that any significance can be attached to these «mere modes of imagining» (Spinoza 1955, 80), according to which «things which are perceived through our sense of smell are styled fragrant or fetid; if through our taste, sweet or bitter, full-flavoured or insipid; if through our touch, hard or soft, rough or smooth, etc.» and that «whatsoever affects our ears is said to give rise to noise, sound, or harmony» (Spinoza 1955, 80). And 60 Paul Bishop he adds acerbically that «in this last case, there are men lunatic enough to believe that even God himself takes pleasure in harmony.» However, the link made above between the beautiful and well-being is the crucial one. For towards the end of this appendix in part 1, Spinoza states that «the perfection of things is to be judged by their nature and power alone» (Spinoza 1928, 142). The later parts of the Ethics are dedicated to the emotions or affects; indeed, the essence of the «geometrical» method of the Ethics lies in Spinoza’s endeavour to «consider human actions and appetites just as if […] considering lines, planes, or bodies» (Ethics, Part 3, «On the Origin and Nature of the Affects»; Spinoza 1928, 206). 14 For Spinoza «desire» is defined as «all the efforts, impulses, appetites, and volitions of a man, which vary according to his changing disposition, and not unfrequently are so opposed to one another that he is drawn hither and thither, and knows no whither he ought to turn» (Ethics, Part 3, «The Affects,» definition 1, explanation; Spinoza 1928, 267). Of all the affects, the most important is «joy,» which Spinoza defines as «the transition to a greater perfection» (Ethics, part 3, proposition 21; Spinoza 1928, 227; compare with «The Affects,» definition 2; Spinoza 1928, 267). 15 Thus, to increase one’s joy is also to increase one’s perfection; and hence, for Spinoza, the importance of joy. 16 For «nothing but a gloomy and sad superstition,» he writes, «forbids enjoyment,» and his conception of enjoyment clearly includes aesthetic beauty: It is the part of a wise man, I say, to refresh and invigorate himself with moderate and pleasant eating and drinking, with sweet scents and the beauty [amaenitate] of green plants, with ornament [ornatu], with music, with sports, with the theatre, and with all things of this kind which one man can enjoy without hurting another. Indeed «this mode of living,» Spinoza adds, «is the best of all, and is to be universally commended» (Ethics, Part 4, proposition 45, scholium; Spinoza 1928, 327-28). We might compare Spinoza’s dictum with the sentiments expressed by Serlo in Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre: Man sollte alle Tage wenigstens ein kleines Lied hören, ein gutes Gedicht lesen, ein treffliches Gemälde sehen und, wenn es möglich zu machen wäre, einige vernünftige Worte sprechen. 17 In the case of Spinoza and Goethe alike, their aesthetic ethics, or their ethical aesthetics, are characterized by their eminent practicability. Although it is not so immediately obvious that Nietzsche’s ethics are equally practicable, they are. For although Zarathustra’s world is concerned with caves, snakes, and eagles, in Ecce Homo Nietzsche is explicit about the importance of nutrition, climate, location, recreation - in short, he pays great attention to «die ganze Casuistik der Selbstsucht,» and he insists that «diese kleinen Dinge […] sind Aesthetic Life and Tragic Insight in Nietzsche’s Use of Goethe 61 über alle Begriffe hinaus wichtiger als Alles, was man bisher wichtig nahm» (KSA 6, 295). In Nietzsche’s thought, such a «transfiguration» (Verklärung) of «existence» (das Dasein) in «the highest and most illustrious human joys» (den höchsten und erlauchtesten Menschen-Freuden) is represented by the figure of Dionysos (KSA 11, 41[6], 680). And it is, of course, in the name of Dionysos that Nietzsche baptizes the faith he ascribed to Goethe in the famous passage in Götzen-Dämmerung, in which he again recalls Goethe’s enthusiasm for Spinoza: Ein solcher freigewordner Geist steht mit einem freudigen und vertrauenden Fatalismus mitten im All, im Glauben, daß nur das Einzelne verwerflich ist, daß im Ganzen sich alles erlöst und bejaht - er verneint nicht mehr… Aber ein solcher Glaube ist der höchste aller möglichen Glauben: ich habe ihn auf den Namen des Dionysos getauft. - (KSA 6, 152) In this celebratory passage, Nietzsche builds in a quotation from Goethe, an allusion to a passage from Dichtung und Wahrheit (Part 3, Book 12), where Goethe attributes to Johann Georg Hamann the following view: «Alles, was der Mensch zu leisten unternimmt, es werde nun durch Tat oder Wort oder sonst hervorgebracht, muß aus sämtlichen vereinigten Kräften entspringen; alles Vereinzelte ist verwerflich» - «eine herrliche Maxime! » is Goethe’s comment (HA 9, 514). 18 This affirmation of the totality (of the individual) is linked to the affirmation of the totality (of the whole), an idea expressed in the concept of amor fati, when Nietzsche writes of Goethe: «Was er wollte, das war Totalität […] Ein solch freigewordner Geist steht mit einem freudigen und vertrauenden Fatalismus mittem im All […]» (KSA 6, 152). Precisely this acceptance of fate constitutes, in Nietzsche’s eyes, the source of greatness: «Meine Formel für die Grösse am Menschen ist amor fati: dass man Nichts anders haben will, vorwärts nicht, rückwärts nicht, in alle Ewigkeit nicht. Das Nothwendige nicht bloss ertragen, noch weniger verhehlen - aller Idealismus ist Verlogenheit vor dem Nothwendigen -, sondern es lieben …» (KSA 6, 297). 19 Goethe, too, demonstrates a dialectical understanding of the relation between freedom and necessity when he writes in Dichtung und Wahrheit (Part 3, Book 11) about the task of biography: Unser Leben ist, wie das Ganze, in dem wir erhalten sind, auf eine unbegreifliche Weise aus Freiheit und Notwendigkeit zusammengesetzt. Unser Wollen ist ein Vorauskünden dessen, was wir unter allen Umständen tun werden. Diese Umstände aber ergreifen uns auf ihre eigne Weise. Das Was liegt in uns, das Wie hängt selten von uns ab, nach dem Warum dürfen wir nicht fragen, und deshalb verweist man mit Recht aufs Quia. (HA 9, 478) 20 62 Paul Bishop This affirmation of fate constitutes the tragic insight that links Spinoza, Goethe, and Nietzsche in the context of Goethe’s significance for the nineteenth century. * * * * * «A philosopher’s real power over mankind resides not in his metaphysical formulas, but in the spirit and tendencies which have led him to adopt those formulas.» (Arnold 181) Given the title of his first major work, Die Geburt der Tragödie, the link between Nietzsche and tragedy is clear. But Spinoza never discusses tragedy; and, as we have seen, Goethe claimed he had not been «zum tragischen Dichter geboren,» because his nature was too «konziliant.» (Nevertheless, he did outline a theory of tragedy in an essay of 1827, «Nachlese zu Aristoteles Poetik» [HA 12, 342-45]). 21 Yet, in the sense that Nietzsche gives to the concept of tragedy, all three - Spinoza, Goethe, Nietzsche - are tragic. In his notes from the Nachlass, later published as Der Wille zur Macht, Nietzsche claimed that he had been the first person to discover the tragic: «Ich habe das Tragische erst entdeckt» (KSA 11, 25[95], 33). Contra Schopenhauer, Nietzsche teaches that tragedy does not teach resignation. «Die furchtbaren und fragwürdigen Dinge darstellen ist selbst schon ein Instinkt der Macht und Herrlichkeit am Künstler: er fürchtet sie nicht», he argues; «Es giebt keine pessimistische Kunst … Die Kunst bejaht» (KSA 13, 14[47], 241). In another note, Nietzsche contrasts the «Christian» meaning of suffering with the «tragic»: in the case of the first, suffering is «der Weg […] zu einem heiligen Sein,» whereas in the second - the tragic - «das Sein [gilt] als selig genug, um ein Ungeheures von Leid noch zu rechterfertigen.» In the case of the first, «der christliche [Mensch] verneint noch das glücklichste Los auf Erden: er ist schwach, arm, ernterbt genug, um in jeder Form noch am Leben zu leiden»; in the case of the second, «der tragische Mensch bejaht noch das herbste Leiden: er ist stark, voll, vergöttlichend genug dazu» (KSA 13, 14[89], 266). Earlier, in the section entitled «Streifzüge eines Unzeitgemässen,» Nietzsche had declared that «die Kunst ist das grosse Stimulans zum Leben,» and concluded about the role of the tragic artist as follows: Was theilt der tragische Künstler von sich mit? Ist es nicht gerade der Zustand ohne Furcht vor dem Furchtbaren und Fragwürdigen, das er zeigt? - […] dieser siegreiche Zustand ist es, den der tragische Künstler auswählt, den er verherrlicht. (KSA 6, 127-28) Aesthetic Life and Tragic Insight in Nietzsche’s Use of Goethe 63 And in the section «Was ich den Alten verdanke,» Nietzsche defined the tragic feeling even more explicitly as the affirmation of life: Die Psychologie des Orgiasmus als eines überströmenden Lebens- und Kraftgefühls, innerhalb dessen selbst der Schmerz noch als Stimulans wirkt, gab mir den Schlüssel zum Begriff des tragischen Gefühls […]. […] Das Jasagen zum Leben selbst noch in seinen fremdesten und härtesten Problemen; der Wille zum Leben, im Opfer seiner höchsten Typen der eignen Unerschöpflichkeit frohwerdend - das nannte ich dionysisch, das errieth ich als die Brücke zur Psychologie des tragischen Dichters. (KSA 6, 160) These passages recall Nietzsche’s argument at the end of section 7 of Die Geburt der Tragödie that tragedy arises from insight into «das Entsetzliche oder Absurde des Daseins,» expressed in the sublime (das Erhabene) as «die künstlerische Bändigung des Entsetzlichen» and in the comic (das Komische) as «die künstlerische Entladung vom Ekel des Absurden.» Both the sublime and the comic, combined in the satyr chorus of the dithyramb, turn it into the saving deed of Greek art - «der Satyrchor des Dithyrambus ist die rettende That der griechischen Kunst» (KSA 1, 57). For this reason in section 16 the voice of tragedy itself invites us to declare, «Wir glauben an das ewige Leben» (KSA 1, 108). This affirmation of life is the Dionysian, is «die dionysische Lust» which alone can suffice - «reicht aus» (KSA 11, 25[95], 33); which turns art (die Kunst) into «[die] rettende, heilkundige Zauberin» (KSA 1, 57). This is the Dionysos who is «die religiöse Bejahung des Lebens, des ganzen, nicht verleugneten und halbirten Lebens» (KSA 13, 14[89], 266); this Dionysos, «der in Stücke geschnitte Dionysos», is «eine Verheißung ins Leben: es wird ewig wiedergeboren und aus der Zerstörung heimkommen» (KSA 13, 14[89], 267); and this Dionysos is identified precisely with pantheism, when Nietzsche writes that «mit dem Wort ‹dionysisch› ist ausgedrückt»: Ein Drang zur Einheit, ein Hinausgreifen über Person, Alltag, Gesellschaft, Realität, als Abgrund des Vergessens: das leidenschaftlich-schmerzliche Überschwellen in dunklere vollere schwebendere Zustände; ein verzücktes Jasagen zum Gesammt-Charakter des Lebens, als dem in allem Wechsel Gleichen, Gleich-Mächtigen, Gleich-Seligen; die große pantheistische Mitfreudigkeit und Mitleidigkeit, welche auch die furchtbarsten und fragwürdigsten Eigenschaften des Lebens gutheißt und heiligt, aus einem ewigen Willen zur Zeugung, zur Fruchtbarkeit, zur Ewigkeit hinaus: als Einheitsgefühl von der Nothwendigkeit des Schaffens und Vernichtens … (KSA 13, 14[14], 224) Such a tragic outlook constitutes, in the words of the French philosopher Michel Onfray, «le tragique nietzschéen,» in which «the-fact-of-having-to-die» (devoir mourir) becomes «the-task-of-having-to-live» (avoir à vivre). «Ce 64 Paul Bishop qui mobilise et motive l’homme tragique,» Onfray writes, «est moins de devoir mourir - ce qui soucie optimistes et pessimistes - que d’avoir à vivre, et à bien vivre, à mieux vivre» (Onfray 279). 22 Thus tragedy, as we encounter it in Spinoza, Goethe, and Nietzsche, is not a tragedy of death, but a tragedy of life. And for this reason, Spinoza writes in the Ethics: «A free man thinks of nothing less than of death, and his wisdom is not a meditation upon death but upon life» (Part 4, proposition 67; Spinoza 1928, 346). Notes 1 A shortened version of this paper was presented at the Goethe and the Nineteenth Century I panel at the Thirtieth Annual Conference of the GSA (Pittsburgh, PA, 28.9. - 1.10.2006). My thanks to fellow panel members (Karin Schutjer and Johannes Anderegg), the moderator (Angus Nicholls), the commentator (Clark S. Muenzer) and the audience at the session for making this panel so stimulating. 2 See, in particular, Nietzsche’s essays on Friedrich Strauß (1873) and on history (1874) in Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen. 3 In this section Nietzsche echoes a letter by Stendhal, another of his cultural heroes (see Stendhal’s letter of 20 January 1838 to G.C.; see KSA 14, 192). 4 See Goethe’s letter to Zelter of 31 October 1831. 5 Compare with Benno von Wiese’s lament on «der bis heute unausrottbar gebliebenen Verkennung und Verfälschung, die Schiller durch die Nachwelt gefunden hat» (v). 6 See von Seggern 127-47. 7 See Beiser 48-83. For the relevant texts themselves, see Scholz. 8 See Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, Über die Lehre des Spinoza (1785) (Scholz 45-201). 9 On Goethe’s reading of Spinoza, see Bell. 10 KSB 6, 111. As Nietzsche rightly says, he was ignorant of Spinoza, but not entirely: in Menschliches, Allzumenschliches, he cited the Tractatus Politicus (KSA 2, 91); referred to him, along with Kepler, as an instance of «der wissende Genius» (KSA 2, 147-48); described him as «den reinsten Weisen» (KSA 2, 310); and mentioned him - paired with Goethe, and along with Epicurus and Montaigne, Plato and Rousseau, Pascal and Schopenhauer - as one of the dead philosophers with whom he had spoken in Hades (KSA 22, 533-34). The ambivalence of Nietzsche’s relation to Spinoza, however, is reflected in Die fröhliche Wissenschaft where, as well as admiring Goethe’s discussion in Dichtung und Wahrheit (HA 10, 35; cf. HA 7, 235) of Ethics, Part 5, proposition 19 (Spinoza 1928, 380) (KSA 3, 489), he questions Spinoza’s intelligere - the ambition stated in the introduction to his Political Treatise «not to laugh at human actions, nor to weep at them, nor to hate them, but to understand them» - as nothing else than «die Form, in der uns eben jene Drei auf Einmal fühlbar werden» (KSA 3, 558) and criticizes the «bloodlessness» of the amor intellectualis dei: «Philosophiren war immer eine Art Vampyrismus. Fühlt ihr nicht an solchen Gestalten, wie noch der Spinoza’s, etwas tief Änigmatisches und Unheimliches? » (KSA 3, 624). For a discussion of Spinoza in the context of the doctrine of the eternal recurrence, see note 7 from a sequence of notes entitled «Der europäische Nihilismus,» dated 10 June 1887 (KSA 12, 5[71], 213-14). Aesthetic Life and Tragic Insight in Nietzsche’s Use of Goethe 65 11 KSA 12, 9[176], 439; compare Goethe’s letter to Knebel of 11 November 1784. 12 The opinion of the commentators on Spinoza is divided. James Morrison has argued that «once the good life is identified with the life of reason, and reason is opposed to emotion, imagination, and sense, art and beauty become suspect» (Morrison 363), and his claim has been extended by David Bidney to the entire concept of value in Spinoza (Bidney 408-37). Against this approach, Lee Rice has contended that «there is a framework within Spinoza’s system for an aesthetic theory, rooted in the sensible nature of human imagination, but extended to social apprehension of shared objects of value» (Rice 488). Rice cites the view advocated by Filippo Mignini that «il existe dans la philosophie de Spinoza une question esthétique, c’est-à-dire une doctrine de l’imagination et de la cupiditas, et un ensemble de textes fragmentaires à propos du beau et de l’art, qui peuvent et doivent être interprétés dans leur ensemble» (Mignini 125). 13 The other modes of knowledge are a second kind (equated with ratiocination and discursive thought), and a third kind, which he calls «intuitive knowledge» or scientia intuitiva (Ethics, Part 2, proposition 40, scholium 2) (Spinoza 1928, 186). This third kind of knowledge is defined by Spinoza in Part 5 as follows: «The third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of certain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things» (Spinoza 1928, 386). For discussion of Spinoza’s classifications of knowledge, see Wolfson 131-63. 14 In this sense - that is, in the sense that Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten defined «die Ästhetik» as «die Wissenschaft der sinnlichen Erkenntnis» (scientia cognitionis sensitivae) (Baumgarten 3) - Spinoza is interested in aesthetics. Likewise, the poet, Herder argued, should express feelings (Herder 1985, 402), and the function of Schillerian Schein is to serve as a «symbol» of human feelings, in the sense that Susanne K. Langer uses this term (Wilkinson 1955, 225; Langer 24-43). The affects are understood by Spinoza above all in a bodily way: «The human body can be affected in many ways by which its power of acting is increased or decreased» (Ethics, Part 3, definition 3, postulate 1; Spinoza 1928, 207). The notion of the body as the site of many contestations is one of the sources of Deleuze’s interest in Spinoza (Deleuze 1968; Deleuze 2003; and his lectures on Spinoza <http: / / www.deleuze.com>). See, too, the articles by Julie Saada-Gendron, Pascal Séverac, Pierre Zaoui, Épaminondas Vamboulis, Laurent Bove, and Lamine Hamlaoui in Astérion: Philosophie, histoire des idées, pensée politique, 3 (September 2005), special issue on «Spinoza et le corps.» <http: / / asterion.revues.org/ sommaire31.html>. 15 Compare with Zarathustra’s comment in «Von den Freuden- und Leidenschaften»: «Am Ende wurden alle deine Leidenschaften zu Tugenden» (KSA 4, 43). 16 In On the Improvement of the Understanding, Spinoza states his goal as «continuous, supreme, and unending happiness» (Spinoza 1928, 1). In his Ethics, Spinoza’s list of joyous passions includes joy, love, inclination (propensio), devotion, hope, confidence, gladness (gaudium), favour, compassion, pride, self-satisfaction, self-exaltation, benevolence, thankfulness or gratitude, courtesy or moderation; while his list of sad passions includes sorrow, hatred, aversion, derision, fear, despair, remorse, indignation, over-estimation, contempt, envy, humility, repentance, despondency, shame, regret, anger, vengeance, cruelty or ferocity, fear, luxuriousness [ = immoderate desire for good living], drunkenness [= immoderate desire for drinking], avarice [= immoderate desire for riches], lust [= immoderate desire for sexual intercourse], jealousy (all listed in part 3, «The Affects»). 17 Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre, Book 5, chapter 1 (HA 7, 284); compare with Goethe’s programme for his own life as laid out in his letter to Hetzler of 24 August 1770: «Die 66 Paul Bishop Sachen anzusehen so gut wir können, sie in unser Gedächtniss schreiben, aufmerksam zu seyn und keinen Tag ohne etwas zu sammeln, vorbeygehen lassen. Dann, ienen Wissenschafften obliegen, die dem Geist eine gewisse Richte geben, Dinge zu vergleichen, iedes an seinen Platz zu stellen, iedes Wehrt zu bestimmen: eine ächte Philosophie meyn ich, und eine gründliche Mathesin [= mathesis, «Größenlehre»]: das ists, was wir ietzo zu thun haben. Dabey müssen wir nichts seyn, sondern alles werden wollen, und besonders nicht öffter stille stehen und ruhen, als die Nothdurfft eines müden Geistes und Körpers erfordert.» For further discussion of Goethe and happiness, see d’Harcourt, Hadot, and - most recently - Armstrong. 18 In the third volume of his Philosophie der symbolischen Formen Ernst Cassirer extends his outlook from Hamann to Johann Gottfried Herder (Cassirer 35-40, esp. 38). The following passage from letter 25 of the Briefe zur Beförderung der Humanität shows Herder embracing the idea of totality in terms similar to Spinoza’s concept of conatus: «Vollkommenheit eines einzelnen Menschen ist also, daß er im Kontinuum seiner Existenz Er selbst sei und werde. Daß er die Kräfte brauche, die die Natur ihm als Stammgut gegeben hat; daß er damit für sich und andre wuchere» (Herder 1991, 124). Other passages from this twenty-fifth letter demonstrate the similar social implications of this outlook: «Wozu hätten sich Menschen vereinigt, als daß sie dadurch vollkommenere, bessere, glücklichere Menschen würden? […] [Der Mensch] soll seine Existenz genießen und das Beste davon andern mitteilen […]» (Herder 1991, 124-25); compare with Ethics, Part 2, notice, where Spinoza shows how his philosophy contributes to «the welfare of our social existence» as well as contributing to «the advantage of common society» (Spinoza 1928, 204). 19 The concept of amor fati is introduced in §276 of Die fröhliche Wissenschaft (KSA 3, 521) and is applied in the epilogue to Nietzsche contra Wagner by Nietzsche to himself (KSA 6, 436). The notes in the Nachlass make a link between amor fati and the Dionysian: «Höchster Zustand, den ein Philosoph erreichen kann: dionysisch zum Dasein stehn -: meine Formel dafür ist amor fati …» (KSA 13, 16[32], 492). 20 Nietzsche argues consistently against the notion of free will, and so does Spinoza. In his letter to Schuller of October 1674 he uses the example that a stone thrown through the air might believe it chooses to do so (Spinoza 1955, 390), and in the Ethics he writes: «Thus the infant believes that it is by free will that it seeks the breast; the angry boy believes that by free will he wishes vengeance; the timid man thinks it is with free will he seeks flight; the drunkard believes that by a free command of his mind he speaks the things which when sober he wishes he had left unsaid. […] Experience itself, no less than reason, clearly teaches that men believe themselves to be free simply because they are conscious of their own actions, knowing nothing of the causes by which they are determined» (Ethics, Part 3, proposition 2, scholium; Spinoza 1928, 212). 21 For further discussion, see Wilkinson 1957. 22 Onfray reminds us that «être nietzschéen, c’est penser à partir de Nietzsche - pas comme lui,» and he argues, tellingly, that «l’hédonisme est une esthétique,», inasmuch as «l’hédonisme propose une esthétique, une vision du monde nourrie de l’étymologie fidèlement assumée: sentir - experimenter physiquement sa propre vitalité» (Onfray 280-81). Aesthetic Life and Tragic Insight in Nietzsche’s Use of Goethe 67 Works Cited Armstrong, John. Love, Life, Goethe: How to Be Happy in an Imperfect World. London: Allen Lane, 2006. Arnold, Matthew. «A Word more about Spinoza.» In Essays: Literary and Critical. London and Toronto: J.M. Dent and Sons; New York: E.P. 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