Review Essay: The Fate of the Martial Sublime: Studies of War in the German Lands JOSEPH D. O’NEIL Univ ersity of K entuck y Books reviewed: Michael Gratzke, Blut und Feuer: Heldentum bei Lessing, Kleist, Fontane, Jünger, and Heiner Müller. Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 2011. Krimmer, Elizabeth and Patricia Anne Simpson, eds. Enlightened War: German Theories and Cultures of Warfare from Frederick the Great to Clausewitz. Rochester, NY: Camden House, 2011. Krimmer, Elizabeth. The Representation of War in German Literature: From 1800 to the Present. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP, 2010. Why war now? The answers might seem too obvious and perhaps refer to the same phenomenon: trans-Atlantic remilitarization after the end of the Cold War, culminating in the response to the attacks of September, 2001, and the attendant anxiety provoked in citizen-subjects and observers of the regimes participating in military adventures in Afghanistan, Iraq, around the Horn of Africa, and the other theaters of the diffuse «war on terror.» «From Plato to NATO,» the popular title of the old Western Civilization course at some US universities, is perhaps more apt than we thought during the conflicts over the Western canon in the early 90s. Now, the cannons are part of the canon, and the revived interest in war attested to in these three recent studies of war in the German context does not fail to roll out the German literary-historical arsenal, including Lessing, Goethe, Schiller, Kleist, Kant, Fontane, Böll, Grass, and Handke, but with the unsurprising addition of well-studied but less dominant figures such as Ernst Jünger and Heiner Müller, alongside Frederick the Great and Carl von Clausewitz, these last better known for real or theoretical cannonades than for literary representations of warfare. Women are also announced, in one case (Krimmer and Simpson), under the rubric «War and Gender»: Angelica Kauffmann, Elfriede Jelinek, and Therese Huber. (By one standard, these volumes also achieve gender parity, as the twelve pieces in the anthology Enlightened War are evenly divided among male and female authors.) In what follows, I attempt to do justice to the breadth of these contributions while emphasizing CG_45_2_s113-208_End.indd 179 14.07.15 20: 41 180 Joseph D. O’Neil selectively the currents that define a discourse of war across these three volumes and thirteen authors: the focus on sublime experience, the question of the medium (in the broadest sense) of war or peace, and the idea of a position beyond conflict, whether as a moral law, a language of peace, or a «queer» space or time in which an ideal beyond the sublime virtues of the warrior can be imagined. The approaches in the three studies I shall discuss here range from Gratzke’s more straightforward literary-historical approach to the theme of war through Krimmer’s more theoretically nuanced monograph with the same historical reach, from the 18 th to the 21 st century, to the Krimmer and Simpson anthology incorporating many different perspectives on war in philosophy, cultural theory, gender studies, and the visual arts in a focus on problems of the late eighteenth and earlier nineteenth centuries. Even so, essays by Ute Frevert and Wolf Kittler do not fail to update the earlier discourse, respectively in terms of conscription and inclusion around 1900 and the US Army/ Marine Corps field manual on counterinsurgency of 2007. Each of these volumes offers a compelling survey of war in terms of history, representation, and subjectivity. Taken together, they are an indispensable manual of critical approaches to war in literature. In what follows, I shall examine each briefly and then identify some points of comparison in order to problematize the question of reading war and wanting peace. Ultimately, it is the desire to understand war through the category of the aesthetic, implicit in the desire most clearly articulated by Krimmer for a culture and texts of peace, that withdraws the matter of war and peace from the world of real conflict and inscribes both as categories of consciousness. Perhaps such a withdrawal is only a condition of the literary and literary-critical approach to questions of war and peace. It would be only fitting since Krimmer’s study in particular examines the notions of guilt, complicity, and agency as they can be read in textual spaces. Nonetheless, this seems to imply that, beyond the representation of reality (or its sheer distortion), there is a standpoint from which to evaluate such representations. Finding this standpoint is the task of many of the essays and of key moments in these two monographs. Michael Gratzke looks for a third way of heroic conduct or Haltung beyond the Romantic and sacrifical approaches to heroism. Elizabeth Krimmer finds the poetics of peace an elusive goal, and several of the contributors to Enlightened War posit either a solid third position or a model of enduring conflict with no clear resolution. The central question behind this poetics of war and peace might therefore be whether such a third position is tenable or whether conflict, latent and potential or visible and real, is the only medium in which to think about war and peace. CG_45_2_s113-208_End.indd 180 14.07.15 20: 41 The Fate of the Martial Sublime 181 This is the premise on which I want to read these works, and it will account for my own lopsided standpoint in taking these texts together as a constellation of Fragestellungen about conflict, a sort of martial symposium. War is not only a historical or cultural phenomenon. As Immanuel Kant sees it in the Kritik der Urteilskraft, war is an example of where moral subjectivity meets the outside world that endangers the very life of the subject. «Selbst der Krieg, wenn er mit Ordnung und Heiligachtung der bürgerlichen Rechte geführt wird, hat etwas Erhabenes an sich, und macht zugleich die Denkungsart des Volkes, welches ihn auf diese Art führt, nur um desto erhabener, je mehreren Gefahren es ausgesetzt war, und sich mutig darunter hat behaupten können» (Kant 10: 187). 1 Either this statement is banal - if das Volk survives, it has a more sublime mentality, or it doesn’t survive at all - or it is a version of the gambler’s fallacy: winning one battle makes it more likely to win the next one, a version of Machiavelli’s maxim that fortune favors the bold. The feeling of the dynamic sublime, the belief in one’s own power to overcome even the greatest opposition in fidelity to the moral law, is temporalized here as the increase of that belief each time it seems to be empirically confirmed, an intrusion of the empirical into the absolute only to strengthen the absolute. Kant’s transformation of war into an instance of the sublime is not based on the same experience of the «Grausen» and «heiliger Schauer» that the spectator experiences before the phenomena of nature (Kant 10: 195), as if the spectator were the army, but in the conversion of the courageous actor into the object of the spectator’s attention: A «Gegenstand der größten Bewunderung» is «ein Mensch, der nicht erschrickt, der sich nicht fürchtet.» The army in the field is only a collective instance of this case, as «vorzügliche Hochachtung für den Krieger» is morally edifying as well, and not just the feeling of the sublime in the spectator who knows himself to be greater - morally, at least - than the adversity he faces (Kant 10: 187). This passage informs or describes persistent modes of thinking about the relationship between war, subjectivity, morality, and judgment, whether in the quest for a heroic ideal as the object of the proper sort of admiration in inevitable defeat (as in Gratzke’s study) or in the belief that the warrior with the moral good on his side will triumph against all odds, or indeed that the nation fighting for the right will prevail. These three ideas are prevalent either in affirmative or negative versions throughout the critical discourse on war in the German lands. In spite of their being centered on the decades circa 1800, the studies in the Krimmer and Simpson volume offer the broadest range of material and perspectives, and not just for their lack of a single authorial voice or program. This collection is coherent and illuminating, examining topics from broadly CG_45_2_s113-208_End.indd 181 14.07.15 20: 41 182 Joseph D. O’Neil literary and gender studies to the theory and reality of Prussia’s wars. The premise of this collection and thesis of the editors’ introduction is that «Enlightenment discourse not only was developed during but responded to and was profoundly shaped by a period of prolonged European warfare» from the Seven Years’ War to the Napoleonic Wars (2). In an essay entitled «War, Anecdotes, and the Backsides of Reason,» Galili Shahar cites the above passage from Kant as an example of how the subject of Enlightenment is also a «subject of violence» requiring courage to attain the state of mind required by Kant’s practical philosophy (116). The «Sapere aude! » of the «Beantwortung der Frage: Was heißt Aufklärung? » of 1784 is now a property of the warrior, but is Kant, for all that, «not a philosopher of war» (116)? After all, Kant goes out of his way in the above-cited section of the third Critique to condemn the effects of a «long peace» that conduces to «den bloßen Handelsgeist, mit ihm aber den niedrigen Eigennutz, Feigheit und Weichlichkeit herrschend zu machen und die Denkungsart des Volkes zu erniedrigen pflegt» (Kant 10: 187). In any case, even Kant’s liberal optimism seems to require a Kleistian correction. Shahar sees Kleist’s «backsides» as islands of exception to dominant reason, a writing practice that is a «pure gesture of resistance, a principle of negation, an experience of revolt» (Krimmer and Simpson 108), troped as an «anal poetics» (117). Kleist «declared war […] against war itself» in making his protagonists «war machines,» «naked reflections of ‹practical reason›» as the bodies that reason denies (103-104). (This is exactly the sort of position with which Gratzke will take issue, seeing in Friedrich von Homburg an alternative to the exposure or abjection of the body.) Framing Kleist’s authorial voice through his protagonists, for example Michael Kohlhaas, and in term strongly reminiscent of Gilles Deleuze’s and Félix Guattari’s conception of the «war machine» in their A Thousand Plateaus and Mathieu Carrière’s Kleist: Für eine Literatur des Krieges, Shahar overlooks what Wolf Kittler, among others, has stressed: the production of spontaneity through institutional practices. Prinz Friedrich von Homburg, for example, acts not just on a «spontaneous and inner movement» (107) but because he has been programmed in the sleepwalking scene to act upon his dream of glory and associate military laurels with the movements of his heart. The Kantian suspension of inclination (Neigung) in moral judgment is here not circumvented but attached to the sublimity of particular cues: a glove, a laurel wreath, the name Natalie. 2 The end of the Prügelstrafe means only the beginning of another kind of obedience. As it turns out, the Deleuzian «war machine,» a «microorganism of violence that moves against the political order on ‹paths of escape› [i.e., lines of flight] and irony» (111) is only an infinitely more fun- CG_45_2_s113-208_End.indd 182 14.07.15 20: 41 The Fate of the Martial Sublime 183 gible and re-territorializable version of the self given over to the force of the sublime. If the actions of Kleist’s heroes are motivated by their Gemüt, it is also in part thanks to Kant’s institutionalization of this Gemüt precisely on the military terms Kleist evokes in «Französisches Exercitium, das man nachmachen sollte,» the anecdote of the French artillery captain who positions the artillery by ordering the cannoneers, «Hier stirbst du! » (Kleist 3: 362). 3 Of course, as in Kant’s account of the sublime, no one dies. The transformation of the sublime into the counterintuitive aspect of such «unwahrscheinliche Wahrhaftigkeiten» only makes the problem of war, moral agency, and critique more acute. Elisabeth Krimmer’s essay in this volume, «‹Schon wieder Krieg! Der Kluge hörts nicht gern›: Goethe, Warfare, and Faust II,» underscores the contradiction between the culture of genius in Clausewitz, on which political decision-making acts as a check, and Goethe’s version in Faust II, which admits of no such check. Goethe extends the «blind force of nature» as which Clausewitz saw war into a general anthropology, the infamous «Faustian personality.» This indicates skepticism about war, a skepticism that cultivated people perhaps shared but, as Krimmer points out in the case of the philosopher J.G. Fichte, could give way in the struggle against Napoleon to an absolute enthusiasm for unconditional freedom. More to the point, the question might be whether, as Clausewitz suggests, any single discourse needs to be seen as in tension with others. The stirrings of modern sociological analysis of self-sustaining and self-perpetuating discourses, as Clausewitz sees war, and the control of such autonomous discourses by a higher governmental instance also points to the notion that the sublime, the unrepresentability of absolute war, or the genius of the commander, is a matter of technical success and failure but that the political command is not of a technical nature. The positive side to this is that war, its use, its development and extent is subject to interference from a sphere subject to public scrutiny, one that has and has to articulate goals not simply given by the technical possibilities of warmaking. In his essay «Agamenon on the Battlefield of Leipzig: Wilhelm von Humboldt on Ancient Warriors, Modern Heroes, and Bildung through War,» Felix Saure contrasts Wilhelm von Humboldt’s (as he sees it) liberal Hellenism, which focuses on the individual as citizen and soldier, with Romantic militarization of the people as a national organism and with Ludwig August von der Marwitz’s conservative desire to maintain the semi-feudal structures of hierarchy and dependence that were the basis for military and social life in Prussia before the reforms of the early 1800’s. These other social models look at war on the basis of its agent and the purpose dictated by that notion of agency: the citizen-soldier (the poet Körner, in Humboldt’s case) who ex- CG_45_2_s113-208_End.indd 183 14.07.15 20: 41 184 Joseph D. O’Neil emplifies the virtues of a noble character; the trans-historical and biological essence of the nation fighting against another national entity; and the battle of tradition against modernity (only a brief note in Saure’s article). These forms of enmity are addressed in Sara Eigen Figal’s cogent take on Frederick the Great’s «military enlightenment»: «The Point of Recognition: Enemy, Neighbor, and Next of Kin in the Era of Frederick the Great.» She points out that warfare on this basis need not be seen in the polarized form of universal tolerance and harmony versus destruction of a monstrous other. Based on a reading of Frederick’s Political Catechism, Eigen emphasizes the idea of limited war as a rivalry between brothers, not utter destruction of one qualitatively unlike us. From another perspective, the two terms of the polarity she resists, a universal harmony versus a monstrous or satanic other, entail each other, as Carl Schmitt shows. While Schmitt attained notoriety for his legal work on behalf of Franz von Papen and his affiliation with the Nazi Party as a theorist of the absolute state, his Concept of the Political and his postwar work are based on a similar insight: that parity among different parties and the treatment of war as a political, not a moral or anthropological, conflict are necessary in order to limit its scope. War in the name of humanity or morality makes the enemy inhuman, immoral, or monstrous. Schmitt’s figure of the partisan appears in Galili Shahar’s essay, albeit miscontrued as the application of an already existing theory. Schmitt’s historical point in Theorie des Partisanen is that the practice of partisan warfare in Spain was not theorized there and that the Prussians who did theorize it later could not implement the theory. 4 Patricia Anne Simpson’s essay «Recoding the Ethics of War in Grimms’ Fairy Tales» finds postwar reconstructions of masculinity in the second volume of the Grimms’ Kinder- und Hausmärchen, published in 1815. In three of these tales, she reads a common motif: soldiers who find redemption after making a pact with the devil. Whether as deserters who abandon the war or soldiers somehow abandoned by the war and left to their own devices, the men in these stories survive by their wits and ingenuity while demonstrating military virtues such as the cohesion of the unit or courage in the face of danger while at the same time challenging military hierarchy. Two of the stories end with marriages, and in each case the soldiers enjoy a comfortable private life courtesy of the devil. This reaffirmation of masculinity runs counter to the premise that war disrupts gender identities (to which effect Simpson cites her co-editor, Krimmer), but these tales are about the restoration after the war, in which transgressive women who refuse the soldiers sexually are punished and military morality invades civilian life. The moral of the tale here CG_45_2_s113-208_End.indd 184 14.07.15 20: 41 The Fate of the Martial Sublime 185 seems to be that the poverty and wildness of these soldiers challenges both the idea of a non-militarized civilian life and the idea of a new professionalization of the army evident in Prussia’s military reforms. Inge Stephan’s examination of Therese Huber’s novel Die Familie Seldorf («On Gender Wars and Amazons: Therese Huber on Terror and Revolution») treats this horrific tale of the French Revolution as paradigmatic for the alternatives faced by women in the revolutionary age. Her essay, Waltraud Maierhofer’s consideration of the art of Angelika Kauffmann, and Ute Frevert’s study of general conscription and the questions of citizenship and exclusion it raises make up the third section of Enlightened War, on war and gender. On Maierhofer’s reading of these gender relationships («Angelika Kauffmann’s War Heroes: (Not) Painting War in a Culture of Sensibility»), both the sentimental allegories of Angelika Kauffmann’s paintings and Kauffmann’s own maintenance of an apolitical celebrity status as an independent artist in Rome (with many women patrons as well) allowed her to juxtapose women and war in a way that was safe but fated to give way to a search for masculine national heroes, starting with Napoleon, as sentimental Classicism yielded to Romantic nationalism. Both Huber and Kauffmann treat situations in which women who were not supposed to address questions of politics, revolution, and war cross the gendered boundary of martial discourse and art. While Huber depicts war more vividly, as Stephan claims, than any of her contemporaries, Kauffmann uses the culture of sensibility, so Maierhofer argues, to transfer the scene of conflict inward to «scenes of emotional struggle and loss» related to war, presenting women in relation to war as heroic (194). Stephan transforms the anxiety over the revolutionary woman as hyena or Amazon into a gendered perspective that is the obverse of that of the French proto-feminist Olympe de Gouges, who demanded liberty and equality, «the rights of man,» for women as well in relation to men. Huber’s own revolutionary political convictions and her standpoint as the ex-wife of Mainz revolutionary Georg Forster allows her to produce a fictional revelation of the «so-called dark side of the male struggle for freedom» (184) in the terror of war and revolution and in the fate to which her heroine succumbs, even as Huber’s text maintains an internal gender distinction between women who are fully depraved and those like the protagonist Sara who are frustrated by gender and circumstance from a fulfilled life of whatever sort. Frevert’s historical outline of conscription laws and the education of men for the nation («Citizen-Soldiers: General Conscription in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries») sees the decline of the gendering of national service as male since the 1950s but a slower growth in the ability of women to CG_45_2_s113-208_End.indd 185 14.07.15 20: 41 186 Joseph D. O’Neil take part in military service. This is a drastic transformation in any case from the situation around 1800. Like the unmanly virtues that, for Kant, are remedied by a properly martial courage in the performance of moral duty, reformers in Prussia believed that the imposition of a military culture on the male population would be a response to the French challenge of universal conscription, the levée en masse. This dream of a nation in arms followed republican aspirations in the nineteenth century , in which military service becomes the vehicle of citizenship and a cohesive bourgeois national identity. While not mentioned specifically in Frevert’s outline beyond its theorization by Carl Theodor Welcker in the context of the republican-nationalist Hambach Festival of 1832, the role of the Bürgerwehr in the uprisings of 1848 is striking for its enabling of an armed confrontation between the politicized, urban bourgeoisie and the armies of Prussia, Hesse, Austria, and other large territorial units. The prestige of the Prussian and German army after 1871 and the importance of the officer class in Prussian society contributed to a stricter, illiberal militarization that made soldiering the province of unmarried men and schooled recruits against political dangers from the Left while embodying a distrust of Jews even as many Jews aspired to military service as a gateway to civil acceptance. Now that mandatory military service has been suspended while remaining legally in force, the ideal of a military path to citizenship, liberal or illiberal, seems distant enough, but the apparently bygone power of abstraction to militarize itself is apparent enough in the essays in the next section. Theory always lags behind history, and so, aptly enough, three essays on «War and Theory» close this volume. The first essay in this set, David Colclasure’s «Just War and Perpetual Peace: Kant on the Legitimate Use of Political Violence,» supplements Kant’s On Perpetual Peace, with its arguments for transparency and comity in international relations, with the notion of international intervention where human rights are massively threatened. Unfortunately, Colclasure falls back into an undercomplex Habermasian model that relies on the same paradoxes that Sara Eigen Figal’s essay seems to challenge. He takes the notion of intervention one step beyond Habermas by arguing not just for a right but for the duty of intervention on behalf of a «global community» with the assent of «world citizenry» (my emphasis). The nominal adherence to democratic norms here - the consent of the governed and so on - is impressive, but one also has to ask what it means for a global community to intervene militarily in the affairs of any member of that community unless not every state is a member of this global community, a res publica that wants to enforce norms from Kant like the philosopher king of Plato with the means available only to NATO. Rather than parity among CG_45_2_s113-208_End.indd 186 14.07.15 20: 41 The Fate of the Martial Sublime 187 fellows or even pragmatic or urgent intervention for a specific, politically determined goal (a Clausewitzian limit on absolute war), a trans-political standard of the most individualistic, liberal sort of autonomy as moral a priori authorizes its own permanent global policing. On more empirical grounds, one might ask whether «the sovereign state has» in fact «traditionally served» as «guarantor of the rights of the citizen, the securing of the autonomy of the individual,» as Colclasure claims (250). If this guarantee of autonomy in the Kantian, liberal vein - an autonomy Kant hoped to reach, in the essay on Enlightenment as in On Perpetual Peace, by a gradual process of negotiation and progress - is now to be achieved, wherever that autonomy is violated, on behalf of the moral authority of a «global public sphere» apparently devoid of all particular interests, this is through another sort of militarization of the sublime: neither one that treats «universal legislation» of the categorical imperative as a test for the autonomous subject, so that one’s maxim could become the principle of universal laws; nor one that attends to the character, mentality, or feeling of the subject in order to guarantee that he or she can act morally (Kant’s concern in the section of the Critique of Judgment on the dynamic sublime); but instead, one that makes cosmopolitanism a matter of legislation of positive law for all who are in fact included in this global public sphere. In this sense, it is only fitting that this compulsory liberation in practice (in the name of «the expansion of freedom in all the world,» as George W. Bush called it in his second inaugural address, for instance 5 ) uses gender as the fulcrum of its militarization, making women’s rights a reason for new culture wars and geopolitical conflict (refusing, said Bush, the idea «that women welcome humiliation and servitude»), liberating, as Kant put it in his Aufklärung essay, «das ganze schöne Geschlecht» from its guardians (Kant 11: 53) rather than attending to the status of women, of ethnic and cultural minorities, of historically oppressed and disadvantaged groups, of working people (etcetera) at the heart of these sovereign states that can hardly guarantee the moral and material autonomy of their own citizens. 6 The problem with an absolute, global, and moral standard is that there is no wiggle room for the hypocrisy that is sometimes implied even in the most necessary policies and measures. It is no wonder, then, in spite of abstract considerations of public morality and duty, that the question of war - the means proposed by geopolitical humanitarianism - takes place in a medium other than that of justification and moralization. As Arndt Niebisch points out in his essay «Military Intelligence: On Carl von Clausewitz’s Hermeneutics of Disturbance and Probability,» war takes place in a medium that makes everything more difficult. While the use of the concept of friction in English translations of Clausewitz CG_45_2_s113-208_End.indd 187 14.07.15 20: 41 188 Joseph D. O’Neil seems to make this a factor that can be reduced or eliminated, for Clausewitz it is simply an «erschwerendes Mittel» that is everywhere in war and cannot be isolated (259). This medium has been read by theorists Niebisch calls «postmodern» in terms of battlefield communication and intelligence, and Niebisch extends this reading to the information theory of Claude Shannon, which accounts for «noise» in the communication channel as a positive source of information. The massive amount of information on the battlefield and not, as one might expect for this era, its scarcity because of technical limitations, has to be filtered, and war in the eighteenth century, it turns out, runs on its own sort of information economy. While the discussion of this process in the postmodern context is complex and covered mostly in summary considerations of information and game theory, Niebisch shows that Clausewitz and his rival Antoine Henri de Jomini are still a relevant pair for considering the technical side of war-making today. What happens when the expansion of humane and democratic freedoms does not sit well with those in whose countries those values are introduced? This is the central problem of the phenomenon of insurgency, and Wolf Kittler’s essay evokes both its origins in the Spanish partisans who fought against occupation by Napoleon’s armies and its present and future in military counterinsurgency doctrine, particularly that authored by General David M. Petraeus. As a figure of the warrior, the partisan embodies the telluric identity of a nation, bound to the earth and its national territory. In the essay that closes this volume, «Host Nations: Carl von Clausewitz and the New U.S. Army/ Marine Corps Field Manual, FM 3-24, MCWP 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency,» Kittler examines the dynamic implied in the US counterinsurgency manuals for the Army and Marine Corps as they attempt to bring such figures under control after attempts to spread democracy are not welcomed euphorically. Kittler’s text revolves around a key term in its title: «host nation.» He underscores the ambivalence in the language of friend and enemy that makes this nation both a host and a hostis, an enemy. This ambivalence marks other theoretical situations in Clausewitz as well, with similar effects. The idea that political decision-making should guide war is inverted in the situation of counterinsurgency, as nation-building and the restablishment of political legitimacy in the «host country» (Petraeus; qtd. Kittler 299) make politics an extension of war. Of course, this process only makes sense from a perspective such as that articulated by Colclasure: the invading, occupying, or «advising» force knows what international norms are and seeks to establish or reestablish them in the «host» nation. That this does not preclude obstinate enmity is proven by the history of the American and British occupa- CG_45_2_s113-208_End.indd 188 14.07.15 20: 41 The Fate of the Martial Sublime 189 tion of Iraq. While Kittler is «not convinced by the attempt to turn Clausewitz into a precursor of complexity theory» (304), one might conclude from Niebisch’s and Kittler’s essays that the same grasp of complex causality and communication is required to negotiate the «host» relationship as the nexus where the ideal and empirical reality meet notions of legitimacy, justice, enmity, and conflict. Similarly complex is Elizabeth Krimmer’s search for a language of peace in her study The Representation of War in German Literature: From 1800 to the Present. The question of the medium in which war and peace are made visible or thinkable animates this volume, which is divided into four parts covering four conflicts, from the Napoleonic wars to the conflicts in Yugoslavia and Iraq just before and after 2000. In 13 brief chapters, each dedicated to an author, Krimmer examines the vicissitudes of the representation of war in terms of aesthetic, narrative, linguistic, and historical discourses. A survey of great breadth and critical insight, ranging from Heinrich von Kleist to Peter Handke, this study seeks to establish at least negatively, by considering the poetics of war, the chances for a poetics of peace, a «Friedenstext» in which peace is a «language that possesses its own grammar, its own body of rules, kit of constitutive elements, and, most of all, its own tradition of stories» (202). The search for this language begins with another medium, known from Clausewitz as friction. Krimmer suggests that writing about war and peace inverts Clausewitz’s dictum that «Friktion ist der einzige Begriff, welcher dem ziemlich allgemein entspricht, was den wirklichen Krieg von dem auf dem Papier unterscheidet» (qtd. in Krimmer 2). As much as real war is marked by the medium of friction, war on paper is marked according to Krimmer by the «formal and thematic aporiae that demarcate the limits of war representations» (2). Krimmer offers four forms of friction that characterize the texts she reads, forms that address the text as a rhetorical construct via metonymic slippage from violence to fantasies of transcendence in the experience of the sublime, a notion she ties to Kant’s third Critique once more in the idea that reason is beyond all bodily, empirical determinations. While exonerating Kant from a fascination with or an advocacy of war (in spite of the many echoes of the above passage in another passage she cites from the third Critique that is punctuated with a «vielleicht»), Krimmer reads the relationship between the military and the political in Schiller as a hybrid, a progressive «amalgamation of national and transcendental warfare» (36) between the Wallenstein trilogy and Die Jungfrau von Orleans. If the former is a pure example of the self-reproduction of military logic, as in Clausewitz’s theory without the political guidance (in this case from the Emperor), the latter, Joan of Arc, is also Carl Schmitt’s example of the «telluric partisan» CG_45_2_s113-208_End.indd 189 14.07.15 20: 41 190 Joseph D. O’Neil who fights for the idea of the nation, also beyond petty empirical determinations like the actual sovereign or questions of dynastic legitimacy. Krimmer compares the situation in Kleist’s Hermannschlacht with the invasion of Iraq: an imperial power seizes hegemony over natural resources but faces an insurgency that neglects all worldly goods in favor of absolute resistance. Kleist therefore replaces Kant’s sublime with terror in the readiness to lose everything; only under those conditions can the insurgent win (Krimmer 49-50). If Die Hermannschlacht is «an intellectual’s omnipotence fantasy» played out on the female body and requiring sacrifice for the foundation of the German nation (53-4), his Penthesilea demonstrates the escape of war from any form of rational control, and a regression to the «pre-symbolic world» of «mute violence» (60). This is a familiar story with many variations, but it seems here to present the semiotic corollary to Clausewitz’s linkage of war and politics: there is no guidance of one thing by another, no split of symbolization between signified and signifier, as Krimmer puts it (60). While this does not necessarily add to the discussion of Kleist and war, it certainly marks an important step in the overall argument of this study: the transformation of sublime capacity into a destructive absolute, which in Penthesilea is gendered feminine and conflated with savagery (198). Krimmer’s two chapters on the First World War cover the odd couple of Ernst Jünger and Erich Maria Remarque. Writing of «transcend[ing] the representation of war toward a grammar of peace,» Krimmer doubts that texts of the Materialschlacht can overcome the focus on the powerlessness and lack of agency of the warrior who simply endures (67). Agency is necessary for peace to be achieved politically, but both Jünger’s subordination of heroism to cosmic cycles and Remarque’s abjection of the body undermine that agency (70). Jünger harks back to Schiller both in the connection to the sublime and in the scheme of self-improvement through the nation, but both he and Remarque are caught in the political dilemma of representation itself: that celebrations of heroism can reveal the horror of war and that professions of anti-war sentiment can so thorougly victimize the subject (here, the soldier) that the notion of opposition itself becomes impossible. Both Krimmer and Gratzke emphasize this double bind, to which Gratzke offers an alternative gestural economy of self-sacrifice, as I shall discuss below. Krimmer’s interest is in the articulation of a positive program of peace, poetic or political, and so her constant questioning of the hinge between representation and a position on conflict needs to preserve agency in the face of its reduction to what she identifies in Remarque: individual and collective victim discourse where the German past is concerned. CG_45_2_s113-208_End.indd 190 14.07.15 20: 41 The Fate of the Martial Sublime 191 A more complex topic is the representation of memory in the case of the Second World War. Much of this memory invokes the victim discourse learned, says Krimmer, from the representation of the First World War. She addresses the translation of «moral and political concerns» into «questions of aesthetic form and narrative structure» (111) through Heinrich Böll and Günter Grass. She usefully distinguishes both the complexity and elusiveness of Böll’s radical critique combined with compassion and Grass’s invective against any accommodation of Germans as victims even where this is implicit in narrative structures, as Krimmer implies is the case with Im Krebsgang. If Böll maintains through poetic means the complicity of many German victims, Grass uses irony and an acknowledgement of the impossibility of narrating German victimhood (148). While these two chapters on the workhorses of postwar German literature are largely summary and skirt some of the issues other critics might raise about Grass’s depiction of a war in which he was involved as a combatant or his status as a moralische Instanz - perhaps an important factor in looking for the hinge between representation and reality or between a moral discourse of guilt and victimhood and political, programmatic action - Krimmer’s focus remains on the poetic problems of war and peace. This focus becomes difficult to sustain in the following section on the Austrians Peter Handke and Elfriede Jelinek and their treatments of the wars in Yugoslavia and Iraq, respectively. While Jelinek combats the tyranny of media as producing a simulacrum of conflict on terms that obscure real conflicts, so one might conclude from Krimmer’s discussion, Handke searches for a «Friedenstext» by means that reiterate or perhaps unintentionally parody the tensions between reality and representation, war and peace in the foregoing chapters. After all, here is an author who, as Krimmer frames his critical reception, could be «an elitist poet-priest in the tradition of German Romanticism» or an avant-gardist who combines experiment with popular culture (153), but in the 1990’s decides to return to his maternal roots, the former Yugoslavia, and defend the national character of the Serbs in what also seems to some critics, as Krimmer duly notes, a kind of Blut-und-Boden literature. Inverting Böll’s approach, Handke’s empathy with those accused of being perpetrators of genocide involves a pattern of equivocation, prevarication, and insult as well as an aestheticization of the Serbian nation in an attempt to redeem it of responsibility for a genocide that Handke never acknowledges or treats except as an invention of non-Serbian outsiders and large media outlets. Is producing a Friedenstext, as is Handke’s «declared intention» (153), a serious endeavor, or does «peace» here simply mean the refusal to represent war and conflict in favor of an idyllic national culture? I want to dwell on the CG_45_2_s113-208_End.indd 191 14.07.15 20: 41 192 Joseph D. O’Neil problem of Handke’s Friedenstext for a moment because it encapsulates the question of finding an adequate literary medium for war or peace, a question that is implicit or explicit in all three of the volumes I consider here. In «Eine Winterliche Reise zu den Flüssen Donau, Sava, Morawa, und Drina,» Handke covers over scenes of genocide with scenes of nature and folk culture, particularly in the context of his parallel apologetics for the Serbian and Bosnian Serb leadership. His long essay and travelogue was originally entitled «Gerechtigkeit für Serbien» when it appeared in the Süddeutsche Zeitung in January, 1996, and bore the main title only as its subtitle when it appeared later in book form. Nonetheless, the original, polemical title with its reference to the sphere of justice seems to describe better the content of the book. This polemical dimension and Handke’s legal gloss on this landscape, which frames it as an indictment of international policy and of failures to understand South Slav history, obscure in his text even the connections that Krimmer draws between war and the sublime that persist in Handke’s search for a «Friedenstext.» This search seems to be enabled by the simple neglect of war and violence, the obverse of the international human rights discourse that wages war in the name of peace. Handke’s critique of NATO and Western media also marks the text in ways to which Krimmer does not entirely do justice. It is not just a matter of criticizing the critics - for Handke, center and center-left German and French media (particularly Der Spiegel and Le Monde) and French nouveaux philosophes such as André Glucksmann and Bernard-Henri Lévy, apostles of an international interventionist liberalism verging on neo-conservatism - but of proclaiming the virtues of immediate observation as superior to the distorting «Spiegel» (mirror) of Der Spiegel, for instance (see Handke 13). Handke’s linking together the authenticity of the Serbian countryside, its purification from Western influence through the popular reaction to NATO bombings, and his observational method enable «the transformation of Serbia into a land of essence» (Krimmer 163), but this pastoral aesthetic is linked essentially to Handke’s own apolitical position (167). It should not be surprising then that this «project of peace is addressed to one party only,» the Serbs as victims (167), since Serbia is in Handke’s writing a fantasy that, according to Krimmer, comes close to reconnecting war with the sublime. If peace is really as uninteresting as much of war literature seems to say it is, then Handke’s text perhaps evinces its own irrelevance, at least as that which it claims to want to be. Like the search for philosophical grounds enabling «humanity» to intervene in a part of itself that commits crimes against the whole, both the irenic text on the scene of genocide and the militant language of liberal pacification indulge a paradox that undermines their central claims. CG_45_2_s113-208_End.indd 192 14.07.15 20: 41 The Fate of the Martial Sublime 193 That Handke’s «decision to elide the plight of the Muslims» «depopulate[s]» his text, leaving only nature and the folkways of a highly literate and mostly harmless Serbian nation, or that he refers to Muslims, particularly women and girls, as «kopftuchliebe Kleinmenschen» (qtd. in Krimmer 170) also runs counter to any professed concern with a Yugoslav identity for Bosnia-Herzegovina, since the territory is polemically particularized here in terms of a struggle between Islam and the West, another beloved theme of the nouveaux philosophes and of European Islamophobia today. If «[t]he scandalous effect of Handke’s Yugoslavia essays is rooted not in the author’s oblivion to facts or his withdrawal from history, but in his attempts to harness history for his enterprise of utopian mythification» (Krimmer 159), then the ideological overdetermination of the images in the Winterliche Reise in ready-made Serbian nationalist discourse is hardly a cunning aesthetic project. A «performance of uncertainty» and the dissolution of a single authorial or narrative viewpoint (173) might also incorporate different voices or possibilities, or it might engage in a consideration of historical and political complexity. However, one might add to Krimmer’s critique that Handke’s response to the question of Serbia’s identity, territorial integrity, and relationship to its neighbors - even Handke’s maternal Slovenia - echoes only too predictably the official and quasi-official Serbian nationalism of the decade before the First World War. 7 If, «[i]n Handke’s works, history is the handmaiden of myth, and myth guides the way toward peace» (159) or his works are indeed «harbingers of peace» (174), it is not clear what the term «peace» means anymore except as an irony at the heart of the idea of war. 8 This problem is especially acute if, in Kleist or Jelinek, as Krimmer concludes, peace is depicted as stabilizing war, as its continuation by other means. As «a force in its own right» for Grass or Handke, it «emerges as a language that possesses its own grammar, its own body of rules, kit of constitutive elements, and, most of all, its own tradition of stories» (202). If it is indeed more than the absence of war, however, then what is it, exactly, except the projected space beyond war, which exists only as the foil to really existing and potential conflict, whether in the most chaotic, bloody, and violent of conflicts or in the other scene of the Balkans where it can simply disappear into a clash of media and observation, leaving behind only an idyll with no traces of the war. All in all, this search for peace inside war seems to suggest that a «text of peace» plays off of the moral imperative that creates the noble character of the warrior by reducing conflict to vital and immediate aesthetic experience: Kant versus Kant, so to speak. Krimmer does not fail to track what one might call a split in the sublime across martial discourses in literature, with the CG_45_2_s113-208_End.indd 193 14.07.15 20: 41 194 Joseph D. O’Neil merger of self and law on the one side and of nature and myth on the other. Whether this split is a mirroring of peace and war or locating peace within the aestheticized and moralized conception of war as its product (and not, for instance, in the real-world medium of war that goes under the rubrics of complexity and friction), it seems that peace is only enabled by violence, and that the medium that would be a language or a text of peace is still that of war. Michael Gratzke notes this coincidence in Blut und Feuer: Heldentum bei Lessing, Kleist, Fontane, Jünger, und Heiner Müller. He asserts a gestural economy of dynamic tension as an alternative to the abstractions induced or supported by the sublime, whether of peace or war (86-87). This permanent tension between two poles involves terms that shift among leaderto victim-hero (Führerheld/ Opferheld); endurance and expression (Aushalten/ Ausdruck); duty and inclination (Pflicht/ Neigung); obedience and rebellion (Gehorsam/ Auflehnung); courage and cowardice; and state and individual. In the course of elaborating these binaries, he manages to infuse the tired evocations of tension between similarly opposed terms in Kleist, the notorious arch - «Es steht weil alle Steine aufeinmal einstürzen wollen» (letter to Wilhelmine von Zenge, 16 November, 1800; Kleist 4: 159) or the gestural language of standing and falling in Kleist’s plays with a productive capacity that informs the dynamic of heroism and sacrifice. Taken in historical and textual context in terms of the former set, Gratzke can read this tension as shaping the dynamics of representation specific to the authors of his subtitle. The organizing dimension of his readings is the idea of «queer» times and places borrowed from Judith Halberstam as joining heroism and resistance, creating «Zeit und Ort des Heldentums als potenziell widerständige Kategorien» (20). For Gratzke, this is a model of a «good death» that resists the economical and future-oriented imperatives of the bourgeois good life in favor of a kind of masculinity - following queer theory, one not limited to those born male - of heroism with which bourgeois society is paradoxically infatuated (27-28). Rather than a satisfaction with virtuous consciousness, Kant’s morally sublime «Denkungsart,» the hero is for Gratzke constituted by the suffering manifested in the symptom or symbol of the wound (177). With this turn away from the sublime cancellation of embodiment and inclination in favor of abstraction and duty, Gratzke redefines what Kant’s «vorzügliche Hochachtung für den Krieger» might mean by taking the physicality of the warrior as a symbol not of the respect for the moral law in Kant’s definition of duty 9 but a symbol of the tension between action and sacrifice. Gratzke confines his exposition to questions of textual interpretation, but this tension could be expanded productively (and beyond the stoic model) to address questions of political theory and action. CG_45_2_s113-208_End.indd 194 14.07.15 20: 41 The Fate of the Martial Sublime 195 For Gratzke, queer socialization («queere Vergesellschaftung» 88) stands as an alternative to the previous critical emphasis upon the bodily rebellion or self-expenditure in Heinrich von Kleist and marks Gratzke’s alternative scenario, here a «Traumzeit» in which for Kleist an alternative Prussia is possible. Kleist’s own self-expenditure in the refusal of the «Ökonomie des guten Lebens» (89) in his suicide with Henriette Vogel contrasts with this ideal and underscores Gratzke’s initial claim that such figures of sacrifice as they are presented in Kleist, Schiller, Heiner Müller, and Ernst Jünger do not attain the ideal but only perform the groundlessness of identity (21). This ideal is adumbrated in his first chapter, on Lessing, Gleim, and Ewald von Kleist. The elder von Kleist of German literary history, Heinrich’s greatuncle, represents here a forgotten bourgeois-melancholic ideal of patriotism, one that has been refunctioned for the «performativity» of society rather than lingering upon the original figure of the poet, mortally wounded at the battle of Kunersdorf. The tension in Kleist’s work as in Lessing’s between the intimate communication of Empfindsamkeit and the attempt to mask a personal void by seeking another, non-intimate identity in patriotism create the tension between the hollow interior and the mask, which Gratzke expresses throughout in terms of «stigma management» and the «personal front» taken from the psychologist Erving Goffmann. Heinrich takes up the performativity of the hero’s body in similar terms, as the Prince of Homburg falls and is caught and held by Hohenzollern as he joins the battle cry «In Staub mit allen Feinden Brandenburgs! » (Kleist 2: 644). Heroic Prussian masculinity is also the theme of Gratzke’s chapter on Fontane, whom he interprets as seeking to remedy the ills of the present with the evocation of an upright manly ethos (it is «standhaft» and static, demanding «gute Haltung»), including the principled choice to rebel against authority, that has to give way to an ethos of resignation (102). Fontane chooses to reconstitute a utopian space of fantasy in Brandenburg not only as melancholy but as a meaningful union of Romantic notions and practical, domestic life and productivity. He does so on Gratzke’s account by integrating older Prussian virtues while penetrating the façade of soldierly bravado, a condition one might compare to Frevert’s sociological analysis of the prestige of the military in Wilhelmine times as a place for an imagined bachelor masculinity. Since Fontane takes Frederick the Great’s supposed lover Lieutenant von Katte as Fontane’s foil in criticizing this sort of homo-oriented masculinity, it is not entirely clear how this utopian fantasy of domestic bliss in Fontane squares with the homosocial spaces of Empfindsamkeit or the queerness of queer sociability, which are here unresolvable contradictions that mark the Prussian character whether in obedience or rebellion. CG_45_2_s113-208_End.indd 195 14.07.15 20: 41 196 Joseph D. O’Neil Rather than articulate the standard of a search for peace within or beyond war in Jünger, as Krimmer does, Gratzke treats Jünger’s narrator in In Stahlgewittern as the subject of Empfindsamkeit, particularly at the one spot where the narrative perspective changes to that of his brother. Jünger’s falling and getting up again marks the gestural tension between sacrifice and courage or between duty and feeling, and the absolution from personal guilt by the higher agency of the state does not remove the affective burden of mourning. Gratzke does not let Jünger off the hook entirely, as Jünger redirects the trajectory of Prussian poetic-soldierly Empfindsamkeit from Ewald von Kleist to Fontane toward the self-stylization of fin-de-siècle artistic decadence. The soldier Jünger is ultimately a dandy. Nonetheless, he seeks in his other work (Gratzke discusses Das abenteuerliche Herz, Der Arbeiter, and Afrikanische Spiele, among others) to develop the tension between nature and sentiment, on the one hand, and modernity and machines on the other. By virtue of a «stereoscopic» gaze, Jünger manages to reconcile these while preserving some space for sentimentality. Gratzke’s thesis is thus an implicit answer to the question posed by the «Kant vs. Kant» situation I sketch above. The imperative of radical self-abnegation brought on by the modernization of war parallels the refusal of inclination (Neigung) and the abjection of the individual, as Jünger sketches it in Der Arbeiter, and the wild heart with its own categorical imperatives, as Jünger also puts it (qtd. in Gratzke 140). But this stereoscopy does not hold, especially, for Gratzke, because Jünger’s hero has no inner core of conviction that would allow him, like Lessing’s Philotas, to go voluntarily to his death. The simple maintenance of life masks this inner lack, which Heiner Müller fully subjects to the outside forces that would assimilate or annihilate the subject. One version of the thesis of Gratzke’s study can be found in Müller’s comment on his LEBEN GUNDLINGS that three characters, the young Frederick the Great, Kleist, and Lessing, are to be played by one actor as «drei Figurationen eines Traumes von Preußen, der dann staatlich abgewürgt wurde» (Müller, Krieg ohne Schlacht, qtd. in Gratzke 164). These figures represent Müller’s own dream of another path for the German Democratic Republic and appear as intractable figures who nonetheless fail to shape that future. Now, it is not the heroic gesture so much as individual pathology («Symptom») that marks this intractability and represents the last point of refuge for Müller’s artist figures (173), as an «unverwertbaren Rest von Individualität, der sich der Dienlichkeit für den Staat verweigert» but is still ready to sacrifice itself for something beyond individual happiness or social harmony. Where this leaves the reader is perhaps in a now politicized space of «queer» aesthetics and conduct as Haltung. If not ex- CG_45_2_s113-208_End.indd 196 14.07.15 20: 41 The Fate of the Martial Sublime 197 actly the iconography of Saint Sebastian as a beautiful male body sacrificed in martyrdom, the figural result of this negative principle seems to be not one idea or image but a spectrum ranging from tension between two poles to an incomplete surrender as the pole of sacrifice takes over from that of survival. That this sublime quantum of individuality, to which Jünger refers as a «kategorische[s] Imperativ des Herzens» (qtd. Gratzke 140), represents the real object of admiration rather than the struggling body of the warrior constitutes a reduction of the sublime, but not its elimination. The possibility of sentimental, empathetic, or Romantic identification with this symptom is the last element in the chain that began with other versions of Kant: the moral law as political imperative to wage war (Colclasure), the subversive anality of practical reason (Shahar), or the search for a poetics of peace as included in one of war (Krimmer, Representations). In offering a critical summary of the impressive collection Enlightened War and the equally compelling monographs by Krimmer and Gratzke, I have attempted to indicate how persistent this sublime quantum is. Whether in the service of the state, of morality, of aesthetic objectivity or the intimate communication of nonconforming sensibility, the transmigration of the sublime from one model to another seems to define the possibility and the persistence of conflict even in the dream of perpetual peace. Notes 1 I cite Kant by volume and page from the Werksausgabe, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel; my emphasis. 2 Fritz Breithaupt has also shown how the drunken soldier who disobeys the order not to drink and fails to carry out his errand does so not as subversion but in fact because of successful programming at a deeper level: the Schläge (strokes/ strikes) of the bell are like the physical discipline of the Prussian army. See Breithaupt, «Wie Institutionalisierungen Freiräume schaffen.» 3 I cite Heinrich von Kleist in the four volume edition: Heinrich von Kleist, Sämtliche Werke und Briefe, ed. Ilse-Marie Barth et al. 4 «The Prussian Army and the German army led by Prussia from 1813 through the early part of World War II furnished the classic example of a military organization that had repressed radically the idea of the partisan» (Schmitt, Theory of the Partisan 33). 5 http: / / avalon.law.yale.edu/ 21st_century/ gbush2.asp 6 Wendy Brown’s Regulating Aversion studies the ideological dynamic of such positions. William Rasch takes apart the notion of the just war that is used by advocates of hard and «soft» power following Habermas. See Rasch, Sovereignty and Its Discontents, 57. 7 In the first chapter of The Sleepwalkers, Christopher Clark presents a detailed account of the evolution of Serbian national ideology and how it fed into the situation that ultimately brought about the First World War. CG_45_2_s113-208_End.indd 197 14.07.15 20: 41 198 Joseph D. O’Neil 8 Like other forms of aestheticization of political and historical discourses, this irony serves here as a point of retreat from the polemical and litigious discourse that Handke practices when his critics take up the gauntlet and meet his media critique and claims of fact with the same. In a study of Handke’s various accounts and literary representations of incidents and episodes in and concerning Bosnia and Kosovo, Theodore Fiedler cites Handke’s treatment of the journalist Lawrence Weschler, particularly Weschler’s essay on the work of the Hague Tribunal and his interview with a judge who sought relief from horrors of which witnesses testified by visiting a museum and looking at Vermeer paintings, with their idyllic motifs created in the aftermath of the Thirty Years’ War and in another time of war. Among other of Handke’s caricatures of the process and personnel of the tribunals judging accused war criminals from the former Yugoslavia, this one is striking because Handke transfers the journalist’s discussions of art and history onto the judge and treats the very idea of «inventing peace» as the work of «artists» onto the Tribunal itself as a body that fabricates the illusion of a neutral third point from which to judge (Fiedler 310-13). 9 Kant defines duty in the Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten as follows: «Pflicht ist die Notwendigkeit einer Handlung aus Achtung für das Gesetz» (Kant 7: 26). Works Cited Breithaupt, Fritz. «Wie Institutionalisierungen Freiräume schaffen: Kleists Marquise von O…, Die heilige Cäcilie, und einige Anekdoten.» Kleist Lesen. Ed. Nikolaus Müller-Schöll and Marianne Schuller. Bielefeld: Transcript, 2003. 209-42. Brown, Wendy. Regulating Aversion: Tolerance in the Age of Identity and Empire. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton UP, 2006. Bush, George W. Second Inaugural Address of George W. Bush; January 20, 2005. The Avalon Project at Yale Law School. http: / / avalon.law.yale.edu/ 21st_century/ gbush2.asp. 30 October, 2014. Clark, Christopher. The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914. New York: Harper Perennial, 2014. Fiedler, Theodore. «A Question of Justice? Peter Handke and the Hague Tribunal.» Crime and Madness in Modern Austria: Myth, Metaphor and Cultural Realities. Ed. Rebecca Thomas. Cambridge, England: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008. 304-42. Handke, Peter. Eine winterliche Reise zu den Flüssen Donau, Save, Morawa, und Drina, oder Gerechtigkeit für Serbien. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1996. Kant, Immanuel. Werkausgabe. 12 vols. Ed. Wilhelm Weischedel. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1977. von Kleist, Heinrich. Sämtliche Werke und Briefe. Ed. Ilse-Marie Barth et al. 4 vols. Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1991-1997. Rasch, William. Sovereignty and its Discontents: On the Primacy of Conflict and the Structure of the Political. London: Birkbeck Law Press, 2004. Schmitt, Carl. Theory of the Partisan. Trans. G.L. Ulmen. New York: Telos Press, 2007. CG_45_2_s113-208_End.indd 198 14.07.15 20: 41