Institution - Apparatus - Dispositive: Searching for a Reflexive Dramaturgy Tore Vagn Lid (Oslo) In this article I argue that the critical potential of Bertolt Brecht ’ s concept of Verfremdung is no longer reserved for artistic works alone, but facilitates a reflexive sociological insight into a hegemonic theatre-apparatus. The artist gains awareness of the institution not as an “ empty shape ” which can be filled with new (political) intentions, but as content itself. If Verfremdung can be understood as a specific form of aesthetic Selbst-Verfremdung or self-estrangement, the art apparatus ’ s self-confrontation “ from without ” as it were, it is not at all that paradoxical that other supporting pillars for a reflexive dramaturgy are also to be found at quite a distance from the typical discourses and references of traditional aesthetics and theatre research. Foucault, by emphasizing dispositive as “ [t]he said as much as the unsaid ” , points to forces connected to the apparatus - like architecture, images, procedures etc. - which are working behind, or outside, the discursive language, but still are highly influential and powerful. From here a critical thread becomes visible, reaching from Foucault and Agamben ’ s “ dispositif ” back to Durkheim and Weber ’ s views on how institutions create behaviour, but even more so, the young Brecht and his concept of critique are revitalized. Prelude In the aesthetic theory of Theodor W. Adorno the philosopher should neither stand above, nor outside of the art. Rather, theory should descend - meaning, take one step down from its philosophical chair hidden behind the academic desk, and instead expose itself to or confront contemporary art and its complex manifestations. Moreover, theory needs to transform itself - to change its forms - in meeting with the arts. In this sense the very notion of critique - in “ critical theory ” - implies the self-critique of aesthetics as theoretical praxis. Aesthetic theory needs the ability to open up and to adapt. Only then can it be possible for art to say what art would say if art could say it. 1 Time and again, Adorno demonstrates the fruitfulness of his theoretical programme. And in his ability to hear Arnold Schönberg ’ s music, to read Samuel Becket ’ s novels and to see Paul Klee ’ s pictures, he largely sets a “ goldstandard ” for a method of close-reading or even close-listening, which has become significant and highly influential for an understanding of the relation between art and art theory to this day. However, no matter how important and fruitful Adorno ’ s approach still is, I will argue that it embodies a potential problem: For if theory ’ s main task should be to open up - to adapt, or to become responsive - to art, an asymmetrical relationship between art and art theory may arise. If given the role of “ the responsive ” - the one that should listen to and “ learn from ” art - theory could in fact lose its critical - or even dialectical - potential as an “ outside eye ” . From here it stands the risk of losing its own potential as a real critical - and hence productive - activity; as a medium that could counterpoint art, asking questions which often can be hard to ask from inside a theatre production, or even inside a large opera house, an orchestra or theatre institution. Forum Modernes Theater, 29/ 1-2 (2014 [2018]), 20 - 27. Gunter Narr Verlag Tübingen Reflexive dramaturgy: When the artist wants what the institution cannot provide It is exactly this mutual dialectical potential which necessitates a search for a reflexive dramaturgy. Or rather, this is the theoretical background to this article. The practical or artistic background, however, lies in more than fifteen years of experience of how the artist often seems to want what the institutional structures cannot provide. Time and again, I have witnessed how good artistic ideas for a new performance and visionary ambitions on how to work and what to create have been obstructed by forces of gravity, powerful enough to override even the strongest of concepts. For example, I have witnessed how modernist conceptions of the “ pure ” or the “ absolute ” musical composition still hinder the musician ’ s ability to think of theatre as an expanded audio-visual room, and hence to compose with theatre as a whole. I ’ ve experienced how the different Stanislavsky traditions, psychological methods to achieve realism or naturalism on stage, at the same time obstruct the actors ’ abilities to realise more choristic, physical and stylistic expressions. I ’ ve witnessed how hard it can be for an actor to combine her “ inner psychological processes ” or “ motivated tasks ” with, for instance, playing an instrument, performing rhetorical shifts in acting styles, or involving herself - as herself - in a real discussion with a contemporary audience. And I ’ ve experienced how these forces tend to manifest themselves even when the musicians or the actors (or even the theatre managers) themselves explicitly aim to move away from - or to break out of - these constraints in order to free themselves of these prerequisites. Reflexive dramaturgy and institutional ‘ subtexts ’ For these prerequisites, these constraints can be seen as kinds of “ gravity forces ” 2 which cannot be reduced to mere material or practical limitations, or identified solely as spatial, temporal or economic structures or preconditions. Rather these special forces of gravity bring along their own (meta)narratives, narratives that actuate their own dramaturgies, strong enough to transform an entire performance, opposing the artistic intentions and concepts planned by the theatre-maker years in advance. Moreover, these are structures with enough power to override the content of a play, to undermine a whole production, and often with a paradoxical result. I see this as one main reason why we time and again can observe how progressive concepts just ‘ do not make it ’ , or performances where the structures “ backstage ” openly contradict the thing going on “ on stage ” . For instance, how shows questioning hierarchical structures in society become hierarchical themselves, or how humanistic or even anti-capitalistic ambitions are contradicted by cynicism in marketing and casting. And as importantly, these are forces, or fields of gravity, which themselves are often not part of the selfconception of the theatre and theatre-maker; forces that tend to fall in the blind spot of the traditional dramaturgy, which exist outside the professionalized dramaturgy, but which nonetheless are crucial in determining the dramaturgy of the performance itself. Hence it is here - so to say when structures cannot do what the theatre-agents want - that it is necessary to (re)think and to expand, the notion of dramaturgy as a specific reflexive dramaturgy, and to call for a type of critical theoretical practice which constantly tries to locate or to become aware of actions of gravity which are highly influential, but still 21 Institution - Apparatus - Dispositive: Searching for a Reflexive Dramaturgy are not sufficiently articulated and made transparent. So this notion of critical practice cannot limit itself just being ‘ open ’ and ‘ responsive ’ to what is going on in the field of art. In order to be able to contribute to the artistic process itself, this practice of dramaturgy needs to engage in a mutually productive and dialectical dialogue with the artistic work, the artistic research. Therefore, the subject or discipline of dramaturgy cannot be restricted to a mere question of how a show is built, a composition is structured or a cast of actors is organized. Instead it must track its roots back to the original Greek meaning of the word, where the term dramaturgy can be understood as actions that work, or actions that have an influence or evoke an effect. Hence a reflexive dramaturgy must be able to explore the dramaturgical forces that are at play beyond or “ outside ” - but that nevertheless have an influence on - the dramaturgy of the artistic process and the artistic work as such. This will require an expanded concept of dramaturgy that needs to be able to understand and to clarify the intimate relationships that always have and will exist between art-form and organizational form. A psychoanalysis of the institution: Brecht ’ s “ Verfremdung ” and its potential for institutional criticism In my book titled Gegenseitige Verfremdungen 3 , I argued for the necessity of psychoanalysis of the (theatre) institution itself. In other words, a reflexive search for why, and how, certain types of dramaturgical “ fields of power ” are able to appear and consolidate over time. Inspired by strategies related to a psychoanalytic tradition, which is dynamically shifting its focus between detailedoriented ‘ here and now ’ -investigations and a search for long-term historical connections, I see a type of critique that neither reduces artistic work to sociological ‘ epiphenomena ’ , nor loses sight of structures and historic-institutionalized dispositions. Here I also argue that rudiments and entrances related to a reflexive dramaturgical practice in fact can be traced within the aesthetic project of the young Bertolt Brecht. Looking at the relationship between Brecht ’ s theoretical practice on the one hand, and the development of the musical Lehrstücke (learning plays) on the other, a distinctive figure of institutional critique - or a reflexive logic - can be located and reconstructed. The core of this reconstruction is what can be spotted as a double movement within the Brechtian concept of Verfremdung (estrangement). The term Verfremdung is, for Brecht, inseparably connected to an understanding of art ’ s potential as a critical human enterprise. In his ongoing development of a concept of Verfremdung, he seeks to understand (and further dramaturgically recreate) phenomena in which the “ obvious ” ceases to be obvious, the “ natural ” ceases to be natural. Wir neigen dazu, den Zustand der Ruhe für das ‘ Normale ’ zu halten. Ein Mann geht jeden Morgen zu seiner Arbeitsstätte, das ist das ‘ Normale ’ , das versteht sich. Eines Morgens geht er nicht [. . .] das bedarf der Erklärung [. . .] nun, das ist eine Störung, da gab es einen Eingriff in den Ruhestand, und dann herrscht wieder Ruhe, indem kein Mann mehr zu Arbeit geht. 4 In the dialectical moment of estrangement, when the immediate loses its immediateness and the natural loses its naturalness, Brecht sees that a reflexive surplus is released in which humans can regain themselves as actively participating actors confronting their social and natural surroundings. 5 Here, when the movement itself creates a standstill and the standstill creates movement, the critical point is the reflexive 22 Tore Vagn Lid (Oslo) moment and vice versa. This dialectic between standstill and movement makes it possible to understand why Brecht ties Verfremdung and criticism to a dramaturgical model in which the dramatic theatre ’ s ideals of organic unity and “ flow ” are replaced by fractures and interruptions: die selbstverständlichkeit, d.h die besondere gestalt, welche die erfahrung im bewusstsein angenommen hat, wird wieder aufgelöst, wenn sie durch den v-effekt negiert und dann in eine neue verständlichkeit verwandelt wird. eine schematisierung wird hier zerstört. die eigenen erfahrungen des individuums korrigieren oder bestätigen, was es von der gesamtheit übernommen hat. der ursprüngliche findungsakt wird wiederholt. 6 An aesthetic-philosophical strategy, in which Verfremdung requires fractures and interruptions, shows just how closely Brecht ’ s critical theatre is connected to the Greek word for criticism - krínein - which can be translated by the active verbs “ to split ” or “ to separate ” . In precisely this light, Brecht ’ s dramaturgic appeal of “ Trennung der Elemente ” (separation of elements) 7 can be understood as a motto for his concept of his critical or philosophical theatre: “ Sätze von Systemen hängen aneinander wie Mitglieder von Verbrecherbanden. Einzeln überwältigt man sie leichter. Man muß sie also voneinander trennen ” . 8 However, the common understanding of Verfremdung as a more or less specific artistic strategy also finds its parallel in Verfremdung as a superior strategy for the relationship between art and art theory, between artistic practice and theoretic-dramaturgical practice. An adequate interpretative encircling of Verfremdung does not, for me, only apply to - as often understood - the development of strategies aiming to evoke the critical reflection of an audience faced with a specific content of a play. Equally, Verfremdung manifests itself within the young Brecht as a reflexive strategy to break loose from the gravity forces of the theatre organization as such. From his double position as an art-practitioner and artcritic, Brecht manages to realize theory and theoretical practice as a form that I will call an institutional ‘ Selbst-verfremdung ’ or ‘ selfestrangement ’ : In the same way that Verfremdung is a strategy to provoke an audience to think over - not only along - a course of staged actions, this meta-level of Verfremdung becomes the strategy of the artist herself to reflect both upon the theatre - and the theatrical organization - so to say, from a self-opposed “ inside-outside ” position. In this way, Brecht can articulate structures that are in play in the theatre, but which are themselves not adequately part of the theatre ’ s self-awareness. And it is from this double strategy of Verfremdung, that Brecht as early as around 1930 identifies the theatre as, and articulates what he himself calls an Apparat, or an apparatus. For Brecht this is an apparatus with an aesthetic, political “ self-upholding agenda ” , a silent, invisible - but still powerful - structure which paradoxically could function as a meta-dramaturgical force by itself. Brecht ’ s understanding of (aesthetic) form as not only shaping reality, but also unconsciously producing certain orders of society, is here transformed into a critical articulation of the institution as “ agent ” . Brecht states: Die Künstler denken meist nicht daran, den Apparat zu ändern, weil sie glauben, einen Apparat in der Hand zu haben, der serviert, was sie frei erfinden, der sich also mit jedem ihrer Gedanken von selbst verändert. Aber sie erfinden nicht frei; der Apparat erfüllt mit ihnen oder ohne sie seine Funktion, die Theater spielen jeden Abend, die Zeitungen erscheinen xmal am Tag; und sie nehmen auf, was sie brauchen; und sie brauchen einfach ein bestimmtes Quantum Stoff. 9 23 Institution - Apparatus - Dispositive: Searching for a Reflexive Dramaturgy Hence, the critical potential of Verfremdung is no longer reserved for artistic works alone, but opens up a reflexive sociological insight into a hegemonic theatre-apparatus. The artist gains awareness of the institution - not as an “ empty shape ” which can be filled with new (political) intentions - but as content itself. Where a philosopher like Hegel would locate the critical-dialectical moment at the point where consciousness breaks out of its immediacy - its self-affirmative circularity - Brecht introduces a selfcriticism, in which the apparatus itself is turned into content or an object for criticalpolitical art. But, contrary to later and more postmodern criticism of institutions, Brecht ties this “ meta-reflection ” to criticism of capitalism and to art-apparatuses as instruments for the hidden class struggles of the bourgeoisie. 10 It is no coincidence that Brecht expresses these thoughts about the apparatus in a text titled Über die Verwendung von Musik für ein episches Theater (On the use of music for epic theatre). For it is the role of music in theatre, or more precisely, Brecht ’ s ritual analysis of the abuse of music in the theatre, that becomes a catalyst for Brecht - both for his diagnosis of the theatre as an ideologically effective apparatus, and further in his attempt to re-function this apparatus in an effort to re-think and to re-organize music and musical dramaturgy as such. The premiere of the first Lehrstück at the contemporary music festival in Baden Baden in the summer of 1929 already revealed some important elements: The orchestra is visibly seated and transparent on stage; a wreck of a plane on one side of the podium is flanked by a radio on the other; author (Bertolt Brecht) and composer (Paul Hindemith) sit side by side on a desk, facing the audience; notes are projected on a large canvas and in the very moment the conductor Hindemith sets the tempo, it is the audience which is invited to a sing-along; across the podium the director has placed a large banner, with the slogan “ Besser als Musik hören, ist Musik machen. ” 11 (Making music is better than listening to it). By means of a conscious dramaturgic approach along diverse parameters, this early Lehrstück tries to highlight and hence activate the traditional concert ritual as a selfconscious social space of human practices and actions. The provocation highlights a plan, which will be developed and strengthened in the coming learning play - Die Massnahme (1930). When Brecht first handed over the text sketch for Die Massnahme to be read through for the Baden Baden music festival, it was rejected by the jury and returned to the sender due to formal inferiorities in the text 12 . But, here lies the problem, a problem that I discovered when I had the opportunity to stage Die Massnahme for The Bergen International Festival in 2007, and for The Salzburg Festival the year after. For Die Massnahme is in fact not a theatre play by Bertolt Brecht, neither is it libretto material. What it is, is a shared composition for the theatre venue, composed step by step, moment by moment, by the composer Hanns Eisler, the director Slatan Dudow and Brecht. Hence, the score is the play, or the other way around, the play is the score. And the score is in fact a music-dramaturgic entity and at the same time a performative - almost actionist - plan, in which actors, musicians and chorists, poetic structures and musical structures merge into - and discuss each other - as a strange kind of dialectical oratorium, not for - but with the audience. Verfremdung as an institutional self-Verfremdung I could go into more detail about the transcending implications of this musicdramaturgical experiment, but here I will just briefly present an argument developed 24 Tore Vagn Lid (Oslo) further in my book Gegenseitige Verfremdungen. Brecht ’ s aesthetic diagnosis, his critique of a dominating dramaturgical praxis - where automated forms render both the artist and the audience passive - finds itself counterpointed by the first radical approaches towards Die Lehrstücke ( ‘ The learning plays ’ ) as an artistic model for transcending institutionalized alienation. Therefore it is interesting that Adorno - both in his Aesthetic Theory and in his Philosophie der neuen Musik - remains almost blind to the revolutionary aesthetic and music-dramaturgical potential of Die Massnahme. Against Adorno ’ s credo on aesthetic theory as a kind of ‘ reading with the Art ’ , I would argue that Brecht presents us with some crucial tools for an alternative theoretical strategy, that is Verfremdung not only as an artistic method, but as an option for the art/ artist to use theory to confront itself and its apparatus. Simultaneously it becomes a method for transforming these insights into material or content for modern art itself. In this way, Brecht can be said to open up some important gates and entrances for a reflexive dramaturgy. Still, these entrances are historic fragments from an epoch quite different from the field of gravity created by today ’ s institutions and art organizations. So the question is: If the ambition is to develop a reflexive dramaturgy of our time, how should we then expand or supply our theoretical framework? If Verfremdung can also be understood as a specific form of aesthetic Selbst-Verfremdung or self-estrangement, the art apparatus ’ s self-confrontation “ from without ” as it were, it is not at all that paradoxical that other supporting pillars for a reflexive dramaturgy are also to be found at quite a distance from the typical discourses and references of traditional aesthetics and theatre research. Institution - apparat - apparatus The fundamental substantive and methodological problem of economics is constituted by the question: how are the origin and the persistence of the institutions of economic life to be explained, institutions which were not purposefully created by collective means, but which nevertheless - from our point of view - function purposefully. This is the basic problem of economics. (Max Weber 13 ) Institutions create behaviour: this motif runs like a thread through the works of the German sociologist Max Weber. In other words, the agents do not only create their institutions, but the institutions themselves reflexively create their agents. Max Weber ’ s concept of institution here echoes a French sociologist - Emile Durkheim. This is illustrated by an analysis of what could be called the autonomous lives or actions of houses and buildings. Durkheim writes: For instance, a definite type of architecture is a social phenomenon; but it is partially embodied in houses and buildings of all sorts which, once constructed become autonomous realities, independent of individuals. [. . .] Social life, [. . .] acts upon us from without. 14 At this point these two pioneers of social philosophy open up for a sociological view - also on theatre and on dramaturgy - which in productive ways complements Brecht ’ s suspicion concerning the Apparat. Moreover, because Weber and Durkheim ’ s sociological notions of institutions are still productive when it comes to understanding how slow historic and materialized structures work, not least when it comes to a complex machinery such as the theatre or the opera, often demanding considerable human and financial resources in order to make substantial changes. These are slow-moving structures in which agreements, contracts and infrastructure - together and over time 25 Institution - Apparatus - Dispositive: Searching for a Reflexive Dramaturgy - have been able to shape the gravity fields of today ’ s art institutions. Furthermore, this understanding of the theatre institutions can also be supplied and updated by related and more recent French concepts of the “ dispositif ” , often translated by the term - echoing Brecht - “ apparatus ” . The contribution of the French philosopher of science, Gaston Bachelard, is highly relevant, but almost overlooked here. According to Bachelard, a dominating science holds its position as a self-confirming tracery; a closed self-referring circle, which determines what at a given point it is possible to sense and to experience. Only by what Bachelard calls epistemological breaks 15 , are new aspects of reality allowed to emerge. When the philosopher Louis Althusser, in the 1960 s and early ’ 70 s, revitalizes Bachelard ’ s thoughts - within a Marxian tradition - he links the Bachelardian self-referring circle to a specific production of political ideology. When Althusser uses the word apparatus, a Brechtian leitmotif from the 1930 s is once again brought to life. Because what Althusser calls Apparatus produces not only behaviour, but a specific type of behaviour - reflecting the Marxian notion of a ruling class. For the Marxist Althusser, the Apparatus is in fact an ideology-producing one. Here, Apparatus does not represent an “ empty ” institutionalized “ structure ” or framework, but instead bears a specific ideological content - or to quote Althusser himself: “ An ideology always exists in an apparatus, and its practice or practices. This existence is material ” . 16 These are the ideas which will be developed and corrected both by the French philosopher Michel Foucault, and later by the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben. But I will here just leave it with Michel Foucault ’ s attempt to encircle his own interpretation of the French term “ dispositif ” - here translated by Agamben as “ apparatus ” . In his essay “ What is an Apparatus? ” , Agamben quotes Foucault: What I'm trying to single out with this term is, first and foremost, a thoroughly heterogeneous set consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral, and philanthropic propositions-in short, the said as much as the unsaid. Such are the elements of the apparatus. The apparatus it self is the network that can be established between these elements . . . 17 Postlude Foucault, by emphasizing dispositive as “ [t]he said as much as the unsaid ” 18 , points to forces connected to the apparatus - like architecture, images, procedures etc. - which are working behind, or outside, the discursive language, but still are highly influential and powerful. Here a critical thread becomes visible, reaching from Foucault and Agamben ’ s “ dispositif ” back to Durkheim and Weber ’ s views on how institutions create behaviour, but even more so, the young Brecht and his concept of critique are revitalized. From this perspective, it is exactly when art and artists start fetishizing “ the free ” , “ the spontaneous ” and the “ natural ” , that the unconscious dramaturgy of the apparatus or the “ dispositive ” itself can maintain its position. Hence, critique from this perspective can first be made possible through a reflexive self-critique, a self-Verfremdung from the side of the theatre apparatus. Thus, from fear of “ the academic ” , of “ academic thinking ” , deeply rooted in an artistic tradition cultivating spontaneity, authenticity and emotionality a danger occurs: Because these prejudices can in fact prevent the artist from understanding and articulating the aesthetic-dramaturgic forces of gravity that tend to slip under the radar of the everyday discursive logics of theatre. 26 Tore Vagn Lid (Oslo) Forces that, no matter how, will influence what in the long run can be organized, produced and communicated on/ from the stage. Therefore, to talk about aesthetics without talking about sociology is just as problematic as separating art form from organisational form. The question of a reflexive dramaturgy should therefore not be located outside - nor above - artistic practice, but is in fact a crucial part of this practice itself. Notes 1 “ Deshalb bedarf Kunst der Philosophie, die sie interpretiert, um zu sagen, was sie nicht sagen kann [. . .] ” . (Theodor W. Adorno, Ästhetische Theorie, Frankfurt a. M. 1973, p. 113) “ Therefore the art needs a philosophy of interpretation to say what it can not say itself. ” (my translation). 2 Tore Vagn Lid, Gegenseitige Verfremdungen, Theater als kritischer Erfahrungsraum im Stoffwechsel zwischen Bühne und Musik, Frankfurt a. M. et al. 2011. 3 Cf. ibid. 4 Bertolt Brecht, Notizen über die Dialektik auf dem Theater, in: Bertolt Brecht, Über experimentelles Theater, Frankfurt a. M. 1970, p. 152. 5 Brecht ’ s concept of a “ Theater des Menschen ” , as presented in his Dialoge aus dem Messingkauf (Frankfurt a. M. 1963), hence works as a counterpart to the ideologies and artistic strategies of naturalism, to the piscatorial documentarism and to the Lukàcs-version of “ socialist realism ” . 6 Bertolt Brecht, Arbeitsjournal 1938 bis 1942, Frankfurt a. M. 1973/ 1970, p. 138. 7 “ Der große Primatkampf zwischen Wort, Musik und Darstellung [. . .] kann einfach beigelegt werden durch die radikale Trennung der Elemente. ” Brecht, Arbeitsjournal 1942 bis 1955, Frankfurt a. M. 1993/ 1970, p. 558. 8 Bertolt Brecht, “ Behandlung von Systemen ” , in: Bertolt Brecht, Gesammelte Werke in 20 Bänden (Werkausgabe), Vol. 12, Frankfurt a. M. 1967, pp. 471 - 472, here p. 471. 9 Bertolt Brecht, “ Über die Verwendung von Musik für ein episches Theater ” , in: Bertolt Brecht, Gesammelte Werke, Vol. 15, pp. 472 - 482, here p. 478. 10 “ Wer von unsern nur ästhetisch geschulten Kritikern wäre imstande, zu begreifen, dass die selbstverständliche Praktik der bürgerlichen Kritik, in ästhetischen Fragen in jedem einzigen Fall den Theatern gegen die Produktion Recht zu geben, eine politische Ursache hat? ” Brecht, Gesammelte Werke, Vol. 15, p. 136. 11 In: Stephan Hinton, Weill ’ s musical theater, Stages of reform, University of California Press 2012, p. 183. 12 “ Am 12. Mai 1930 schrieb Brecht einen offenen Brief an die Festivalleitung. Er erschien leicht verändert am 13. Mai 1930 im Berliner Börsen-Courier und wurde im Dezember 1932 in Versuche, Heft 4 aufgenommen; unter der Unterschrift ergänzte Brecht dort den Satz: ‘ Es blieb jedoch bei der Abhaltung des Musikfestes und der Ablehnung einer Aufführung der › Maßnahme ‹ › wegen formaler Minderwertigkeit des Textes ‹ . ’” , http: / / www.suhrkamp.de/ download/ Sonstiges/ Brecht_Notizbuecher/ Brecht_Notizbuecher_NB_24_EE_Anhang. pdf, p. 59 - 61 [accessed 19 January 2018]. 13 Max Weber, “ Economy and Society ” , in: Richard Swedberg and Ola Agevall (eds.), The Max Weber Dictionary, Stanford 2005, pp. 75 - 77, here p. 76. 14 Émile Durkheim, Suicide - A study in sociology, London/ Paris 1951, p. 278. 15 The concept of epistemological ruptures is developed by the French science philosopher Gaston Bachelard (1884 - 1962), for example, Bachelard 1976. For a short definition, see: http: / / www.oxfordreference.com/ view/ 10.1093/ oi/ authority.20110803095755104, [accessed 26 September 2018]. 16 Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays, New York 2001, p. 112. 17 Giorgio Agamben, What is an Apparatus - and Other Essays, Stanford 2009, p. 2. 18 Agamben ’ s translation of an interview with Michel Foucault from 1977 in ibid. 27 Institution - Apparatus - Dispositive: Searching for a Reflexive Dramaturgy