“ perhaps/ I am the Both which has just come about ” . (Non-) Identity as Critique in Brecht ’ s Man equals Man Susanne Schmieden (Lucerne) The connection between crisis, identity, and criticism, I argue, plays an important role in the theatre of Bertolt Brecht. As a “ theatre of a-identity ” (Müller-Schöll 2002), it is constantly on the threshold of identity and crisis, it both negotiates and criticizes their interaction and interdependence. Brecht ’ s theatre confronts both the language and the means of the theatre with their possibilities and limitations in the light of their potential to constitute identity, thus placing them in permanent modes of crisis, i. e. they are involved in contradictions, paradoxes, and ambiguities and - not least - staged as a practice of criticism. Galy Gay from the early play Man Equals Man, I argue, is the theatrical setting and answer to the question of how “ desubjugation ” and “ desubjectification ” (cf. Butler, Foucault) can be set in motion, and to this extent, a literary figure, who anticipates a large amount of later (critical) social and cultural theory avant la lettre, and literally breathes life into Foucault ’ s description of criticism as “ art ” . Desubjugation and desubjectification, understood as the form and practice of liberating the subject, are accompanied by de-identification in a radical sense, which can provide answers - not just historically, but also within contemporary discourses - to the question of what theatre as criticism could mean in general and in particular in the present day. Preliminary considerations Today, flexibility, mobility, and adaptability seem to be the most important character traits of a person. Barely anything is more common than the unopposed opinion that these are values per se and that every individual needs to be trained in skills and manners, which correspond with these attributes, although they paradoxically represent the absence of any firm attribute. 1 At first sight, the ideal contemporary subject should therefore discard both the idea of a stable identity as well as that of personal identity. However, the exact opposite is the case: Contemporary culture is obsessed with questions and issues of personal identity and identity politics in particular. Consequently, the constantly proclaimed imperative of ‘ change ’ in so many areas goes along with its antipode: the frantic search for stability and identity. Rarely do these opposed characteristics call each other into question. Instead, the goal is to increase one ’ s flexibility and adaptability, while simultaneously finding a genuine identity and becoming more and more ‘ authentic ’ . Against this background, the conjunction of theater and critique goes beyond the conventional notion of theatre as an institution of critique, a place where critical subjects are able to play different kinds of roles in order to criticise society as a whole, or to criticise theatre itself as an institution. Today, the conjunction of theatre and critique could rather mean that theatre itself literally takes a ‘ critical ’ standpoint insofar as the primal scene of theater seems to be dissolving. The flexible and adaptable subject desired by today ’ s standards shall ‘ play ’ not only different but constantly changing roles without reflecting upon them properly. From this Forum Modernes Theater, 29/ 1-2 (2014 [2018]), 28 - 36. Gunter Narr Verlag Tübingen point of view, nearly every situation in which two or more people come together could be signified as ‘ theatrical ’ in some way, and sometimes this really is the case. However, if theatre were simply two people breathing the same air, it would be indistinguishable from everyday life. Nor is the occasional nature of theatre what makes it distinctive: a lecturer and her audience, a politician and a crowd, a preacher and a congregation also breathe the same air, and yet none of them make theatre, exactly. Rather, the essence of theatre is the agreed-upon assumption that one of the two parties in the room is not quite herself - and the only reason the other party has shown up is because they are interested in the thing or the person or the idea that the first party represents, in full knowledge of the fact that representation is in some sense profoundly untruthful. 2 “ The agreed-upon assumption that one of the two parties in the room is not quite herself ” and therefore also the logic of representation are exactly those premises which are no longer clear when nearly everything can be ‘ theatrical ’ . If the idea of personal identity as both something limited and limiting is replaced by the idea of fluid, permanently changing, and not at least replaceable subjects in seemingly undefined situations, then it is no longer possible to distinguish between role-play and assimilation. For political reasons, this cannot be desirable. Eradicating the boundary between personal identity and role-play only neutralizes all transgressive elements inherent to the stage. When everything is theater nothing is. 3 Desubjectifications: Brecht, Foucault, Butler If these considerations are sound, Bertolt Brecht and his early plays especially might still be illuminating in regard to our present age and some of its ongoing and forthcoming developments. Brecht ’ s (early) play Man equals Man from 1926/ 1938 is, as the subtitle says, about The transformation of the porter Galy Gay in the military cantonment of Kilkoa during the year nineteen hundred and twenty five. 4 It is about a man, a worker living with his wife, who one day leaves his house to buy a fish and never returns or merely returns as a different person. When he meets three soldiers, who have just lost a fourth comrade, he is decided to replace him because, in accordance with the regime of the military logic, man equals man. 5 Obviously, Man equals Man is often read as a somewhat critical play about ‘ losing ’ one ’ s identity and about the leveling down of people in war or in military contexts. 6 This is true, with no doubt, but I want to claim that the play is even more than that: Firstly, it asks the question what identity means at all. Secondly, it projects a concept of identity that is inherently connected to the understanding of critique later developed by Michel Foucault and recoined as virtue by Judith Butler. The coherence between identity and critique shown in Brecht ’ s play is meaningful in a way that is almost contemporary. My claim is that in Brecht ’ s theatre and paradigmatically in his play Man equals Man there is a constant contestation between not only different identities but between different concepts of what it means to have or to ‘ be ’ an identity. As a representative of the theater of a-identity 7 outlined by Nikolaus Müller-Schöll, it alternates constantly between identity and non-identity. Hence, it is in a literal sense ‘ critical ’ . Michel Foucault ’ s understanding of critique which he develops in his talk “ What is Critique? ” from 1978 and Judith Butler ’ s examination of it are helpful to understand why the questioning of identity and critique in this specific meaning are linked, and how 29 “ perhaps/ I am the Both which has just come about ” . (Non-) Identity as Critique in Brecht ’ s Man equals this is paradigmatically reflected in Brecht`s play. 8 In his talk, Foucault defines critique as “ the art of not being governed so much ” 9 . This phrase grasps Galy Gay ’ s strategy concerning his identity well and so it can be seen as an inherently theatrical practice of this kind of ‘ art ’ . The question I am particularly interested in is if Galy Gay ’ s apparent acceptance and affirmation of his new identity not only means submission but also liberation. Furthermore, it might be understood as what Foucault calls desubjectification and what Butler later broadens by focusing on the subject of virtue. My aim is not to read Brecht ’ s play through the lenses of Foucault and Butler. Instead, it is my understanding that all these works equally represent both a specific kind of art as well as a questioning of ‘ critique ’ itself, which places them in one line of political thought. Furthermore, I also want to establish a critical look on Foucault and Butler themselves for not sufficiently taking into account the concrete conditions for critique beyond the subject and its attitude. Although their thoughts must be understood as being political, they disregard the concrete limitations of “ the art of not being governed so much ” 10 . However, it is my assumption that critique can only be articulated concretely beyond the sphere of philosophy. Theatre might be the ideal facilitator of this dimension of critique. Being the Both as primal scene of theater and critique Galy Gay ’ s monologue, which is part of a play within the play, is crucial when discussing the concepts of identity and critique as they are developed by Man equals Man. Here Galy Gay finally transforms into the lost soldier Jeraiah Jip in five acts. This formal imitation of a classical tragedy is part of the greater Lustspiel and not least shows that a tragic hero is not possible in modern theatre anymore. In the fifth act of the imitated tragedy, laconically titled “ Number V ” , Galy Gay gives the following speech: I could not, without instant death Gaze into a crate at a drained face Of some person once familiar to me from the water ’ s surface Into which a man looked who, as I realise, died. Therefor I am unable to open this crate Because this fear is in the both of me, for perhaps I am the Both which has just come about On our earth ’ s transformable top surface: A chopped-off batlike thing hanging Betwixt rubber trees and hut, a night bird A thing that would gladly be cheerful. One man equals no man. Some one has to call him. [. . .] By what sign does Galy Gay know himself To be Galy Gay? Suppose his arm was cut off And he found it in the chink of a wall Would Galy Gay ’ s eye know Galy Gay ’ s arm And Galy Gay ’ s foot cry out: This is the one! ? Therefore I am not looking into this chest Moreover in my opinion the difference Between yes and no is not all that great. And if Galy Gay were not Galy Gay Then he would be the drinking son of some mother who Would be some other man ’ s mother if she Were not his, and thus would anyway drink. And would have been produced in March, not in September Unless instead of March he had Been produced only in September of this year, or already In September the year before Which represents that one small year ’ s difference That turns one man into another man. And I, the one I and the other I Are used and accordingly usable. 30 Susanne Schmieden (Lucerne) And since I never gazed at that elephant I shall close an eye to what concerns myself And shed what is not likeable about me and thereby Be pleasant. 11 In this central monologue Galy Gay establishes a notion of identity that is essentially paradoxical: While (personal) identity can be described as a seamless relation between me and myself, Galy Gay identifies himself with something that even grammatically is impossible both in English as in the German original text. 12 He calls himself ‘ the Both ’ , or more precisely, he tries to justify his inability “ to open this crate/ Because this fear is in the both of me, for perhaps/ I am the Both which has just come about ” . From a psychological viewpoint, one could assess the self-description articulated in the monologue as a manifestation of a crisis insofar as crisis literally means a decision or a separation. What is interesting is that the identity of the speaking subject “ has just come about ” . It is in other words not something that is given and static but emerges exactly in the critical moment when Galy Gay is expressing his paradoxical identity by saying: “ I am the Both. ” This means, he is the one and only, and he is both the one and the other one. Only because he is “ one I and the other I ” , he is able to reflect upon himself as somebody who can say “ I ” . Furthermore, he also refers to the myth of Narcisse earlier when he says: “ I could not, without instant death/ Gaze into a crate at a drained face/ Of some person once familiar to me from the water ’ s surface/ Into which a man looked who, as I realise, died. ” However, although he describes the typical narcissistic scenario, he himself cannot be seen as a Narcisse, who died after mistaking his reflection for another person. In fact, it is just the other way around: He fully realizes that he himself is separated, while at the same time being the person lying dead in the crate. Although Galy Gay might identify with this primal scene of both mythology and psychology, he himself has already transcended these contexts. Therefore, I want to describe his crisis as the primal scene of theatre. In this primal scene of theatre, a subject which is ‘ both ’ and at the same time itself and another self speaks to an audience that is fully aware of this division. Consequently, the audience is able to concentrate on the representation of this division rather than the person who merely represents it. Simultaneously, the question if there is any ‘ truth ’ to this division is suspended. Theatre as it is reflected in the play within the play thus teaches the audience to distinguish between the seeming and the real. It is in this sense far more about concentration than about distraction. This might just be a typical Brechtian view, but the primal scene is universal and a necessary condition of theatre, because “ the essence of theatre is the agreedupon assumption that one of the two parties in the room is not quite herself ” . 13 What Galy Gay, or more precisely, what the entire play shows us, are the problems which arise when either the subject or the audience do not know that they are part of an enactment, or when they are forced to believe in the identity of representation and the subject that represents. Consequently, the play is about soldiers in war, because a depersonalized soldier is not capable of representation in the theatrical sense for he lacks the distance that would enable himself to act ‘ as if ’ . Nevertheless, Man equals Man is a Lustspiel and produces several possibilities to dissociate oneself from the play. The gap between acting and performing the impossibility to act is therefore particularly emphasized. Of course, one could counter that these considerations are the keynote of Brecht ’ s Epic theater. However, I would claim that Galy Gay ’ s crisis is more profound and touches the theatrical situation per se. This is what 31 “ perhaps/ I am the Both which has just come about ” . (Non-) Identity as Critique in Brecht ’ s Man equals makes Brecht so important in the context of theater as critique. Going back to the monologue, we learn that the “ fear is in the both ” of Galy Gay and that he is of course suffering because he himself did not choose to play the role i. e. to be ‘ the Both ’ . This shows that he is fully aware of his state. Therefore, he does not identify himself with the soldier he is supposed to be. This is important: If he was the soldier he is meant to be, he would not be able to articulate his crisis as he does in his monologue, because he would not be able to remember his preexisting self. What he represents in the monologue is the impossibility of representation in the context of war and every other totalitarian logic. It prevents representation insofar as it operates with only one valid reality and one single logic, which is the law of identity. Therefore, it prohibits acting and role-playing. Representation in the theatrical sense is only possible where the subject is granted enough space between his ‘ inner self ’ and the role he is able to play in a situation that confronts him, because this alone prevents him from losing his very own identity. Theatre in general can be seen both as the art and as the institution where this is done professionally. Galy Gay might remind us of that fact as well as of the political danger of its deprivation. By being both, being ‘ the Both ’ , Galy Gay finally does not transgress the limits of what we would call an identity. Instead, he transgresses the limits of language and of what can be said about himself and his identity in the language which constitutes the new identity given to him by force. Insofar, he is performing a critical practice. He is ‘ critical ’ in the literal sense of the word, and that leads us over to Foucault ’ s and Butler ’ s notion of ‘ Critique ’ and their questioning. Questioning Critique When we say that Galy Gay, who questions a lot of things and most of all himself, is performing a critical practice, we have to notice that Foucault tries to address the subject of critique by posing a question himself, namely: “ What is Critique? ” As it later turns out, the act of asking a question itself is the crucial critical practice for him, beginning with the central question of the Enlightenment: “ What is Aufklärung? ” 14 Because “ critique only exists in relation with something other than itself ” , it is, as Foucault argues, “ an instrument, a means for the future or a truth that it will not know and that it will not be ” . 15 One could also say that it is a kind of medium that is always related to the ‘ something ’ that is criticized, and that due to this relation, it can never be the aim of critique to achieve a state of literally ‘ absolute ’ freedom. Furthermore, Foucault claims that the ‘ art ’ which corresponds with critique is, as mentioned in the beginning, “ the art of not being governed so much ” 16 . This specifically does not mean the art of not being governed at all. Instead, Foucault aims at a “ critical attitude ” as a kind of reluctance, resistance, or even only guardedness when faced with a power that is able to govern. 17 In his own words: Critique will be the art of voluntary inservitude, of reflective indocility. The essential function of critique would be that of desubjectification in the game of what one could call, in a word, the politics of truth. 18 By his own admission, Foucault adopts the “ politics of truth ” as a regime and power which governs the subject and insofar has to be criticized by the subject from the definition Kant gave of Aufklärung. For Foucault, the form of the question therefore is not only the main technique of establishing a relation 32 Susanne Schmieden (Lucerne) to the world but it also represents the kind of self-relation critique and Aufklärung stand for. Insofar it consequently has to lead to a questioning of critique itself. Viewed in this light, critique - as well as theatre as a regime of representation - implies self-limitation in order to uphold its significance and to distinguish itself from the ‘ politics of truth ’ . Going back to Galy Gay ’ s monologue, we remember that there are also some questions in the middle of the later version from 1938, namely: By what sign does Galy Gay know himself To be Galy Gay? Suppose his arm was cut off And he found it in the chink of a wall Would Galy Gay ’ s eye know Galy Gay ’ s arm And Galy Gay ’ s foot cry out: This is the one! ? 19 These questions do not target the essence of something, of Galy Gay himself in this case, rather they ask for reliable signs and definitions by which he could know for sure who he really is. So, the question here is not: “ Who is Galy Gay? ” , or: “ What is my own identity? ” , but: “ By what signs does the one I know that it is the other I? ” According to this, self-relation is not based on an interrogation of the self but on signs, on something superficial and visible for others. Obviously, the answer, that is not given but shown, is that there are no reliable signs of this kind, only arbitrary attributions and names. This neither means that there can be no identity in the sense that every subject is always already fragmented nor does it mean that the ‘ real ’ identity lies inside the self. It is just the opposite: Limitations are indispensable for evolving an identity and these limitations need to be extrinsic and recognized by the outer world, although they are not naturally given. Asking for signs therefore means to demand a shared sense of reality, which actually does not exist in this situation. By demonstrating the dissent between the one and the other, between being Galy Gay and Jeraiah Jip, Galy Gay insists on the indivisibility of what one could call his personality. Against this backdrop, the practice of critique and the theatrical practice of critique in particular confront the reality given by the politics of truth with another, possibly inferior reality. Thereby theatre discloses inconsistencies without trying to eliminate them - something the politics of truth are inclined to do because as a rational power, they prohibit to go beyond the law of excluded middle. Practices of virtue Judith Butler ’ s reading of Foucault in her lecture from 2000 in which she wants to show “ that both his aesthetics and his account of the subject are integrally related to both his ethics and politics ” 20 leads on to another important issue for my reading of Brecht`s play, namely the practice of virtue. Butler calls attention to the fact that “ paradoxically, self-making and desubjugation happen simultaneously when a mode of existence is risked which is unsupported by what he [Foucault, S. S.] calls the regime of truth. ” 21 Her focus lies on the concreteness of critique and its dependency on its objects, and she concludes that critique “ should bring into relief the very framework of evaluation itself. ” 22 If we reconsider Galy Gay ’ s monologue, we get a more precise understanding of what he is doing: By speaking as an individual and by taking into account and reflecting upon this kind of concrete act, he is able to show the contradictions and inconsistencies in apparent tautologies like “ Man equals Man ” . His claim of being ‘ the Both ’ insofar is nothing else than a questioning of the very framework of evaluation that is at work here. This framework of evaluation does not include a 33 “ perhaps/ I am the Both which has just come about ” . (Non-) Identity as Critique in Brecht ’ s Man equals man who is ‘ the Both ’ and is even able to articulate it. Nor does it relate to someone who is able to reflect upon these contradictions by depicting the contradictions between different attributions that are given to him by different parties and that do not correspond with his self-conception. Because he himself “ has just come about ” , we can say that Galy Gay ’ s situation is paradigmatic for the simultaneity of selfmaking and desubjugation. The mode of existence he is risking is nothing more than life itself, at least from his point of view from where it is literally impossible to face his own death: I could not, without instant death Gaze into a crate at a drained face Of some person once familiar to me from the water ’ s surface Into which a man looked who, as I realise, died. Therefor I am unable to open this crate Because this fear is in the both of me, for perhaps I am the Both which has just come about [. . .]. 23 In Butler ’ s reading of Foucault, it is finally the aspect of virtue as a critical practice that is crucial for her interpretation and her own point. “ And virtue is not only a way of complying with or conforming with preestablished norms. It is, more radically, a critical relation to those norms, one which, for Foucault, takes shape as a specific stylization of morality. ” 24 She is not only talking about “ a ‘ right ’ to question ” in the context of critique and virtue but also posing a lot of questions herself, concrete questions, which are very often examples for the concreteness of critique I mentioned before, even so she herself is not concrete in a political sense here. 25 One of the questions is: “ What counts as a person? ” 26 Not only is this a good example but the central question in Man equals Man and also in our today ’ s engagement with the ‘ flexibility ’ of a person. Practices of virtue indeed demand “ a moment of ethical questioning which requires that we break the habits of judgement in favor of a riskier practice that seeks to yield artistry from constraint ” , 27 but also, I would like to add, to recognise the limits of this kind of critical practice and of any other ‘ risky practice ’ . It is just not always possible to “ yield artistry from constraint ” for there can be constraint to an extent that inhibits any opportunity for action. Insisting on being the Both Critique as a practice of virtue can of course be articulated in different ways, for example literature, theater, essay, theory and so on, but if it is always an art, the “ art of not being governed so much ” , then theater might be its favored form because it is able to include other forms. In this sense, it has maybe become clear by now, why I did not want to interpret Brecht ’ s play with the help of the theoretical writings of Foucault and Butler, but to put it just the other way around: In a properly avant la lettre manner the play shows and somehow practices the kind of critique which is later formulated as and claimed to be a practice. In Man equals Man this has already been done before Foucault and Butler. The text shows us how this critical practice might look like. Not at least, Man equals Man is a play not only about the transgression of given limits, but also about the importance of recognized limits. The very last sentence of the play spoken by Galy Gay suggests even a literal transgression: “ We are now crossing the frontier of frozen Tibet. ” 28 Even so, to cross a frontier one needs to know where exactly the frontier is located, and moreover, it is not always evident if there is freedom beyond or war, as the end of the play suggests. After all, 34 Susanne Schmieden (Lucerne) a transgression is not the same as the dissolution of boundaries. However, today ’ s claim for flexibility is certainly the opposite of a critical standpoint in any way. A concrete practice of virtue in these days might be the questioning of this flexibility by insisting on being both oneself and not always oneself. Theatre, probably more than philosophy, might help a lot to develop such a kind of critical attitude. Notes 1 Due to the omnipresence of this opinion - one could go so far as to call it an ideology - , I refrain from giving concrete examples. However, this notion can be found in any context from employment ads and educational plans to products of pop culture and advertisement. It is my assumption that this thought is just part of our everyday world to an extent that it influences the way we look at others and ourselves even if we are fully aware of its dubiousness and its inconsistencies. 2 Holger Schott Syme, “ How to Kill a Great Theatre: The Tragedy of the Volksbühne ” , in: dispositio.net (http: / / www.dispositio.net/ archives/ 2452) [accessed 20 May 2017]. 3 Syme ’ s phrasing of “ being not quite herself ” does not even go far enough, because he seems to have in mind Eric Bentley ’ s formula: “ The theatrical situation, reduced to a minimum, is that A impersonates B while C looks on. ” See Eric Bentley, The Life of the Drama, London 1966, p. 150. For my own argumentation, the important difference does not lie in the difference between “ being not quite herself ” and role-play, but in the awareness of an artificial situation and the possibility to make a distinction between A and B on the one side, and the elimination of B on the other side. My interpretation of Syme ’ s phrasing, in other words, comes to the conclusion that he is in fact talking about role-play and wants to distinguish it from a blurred concept of theater where more or less everything can be denoted as ‘ theater ’ and where we have only A looking on C. 4 Bertolt Brecht, “ Man equals Man ” , translated by Gerhard Nellhaus, in: John Willett and Ralph Manheim (eds.), Collected Plays: Two, London 1994, pp. 1 - 76. The central passage for my argumentation, Galy Gay ’ s monologue, was edited in the later version from 1938 and the translation refers to that later edition. 5 The translation I am working with does not reflect the formal logic of the German title “ Mann ist Mann ” that in fact means “ man equals man ” as well as “ a man is a man ” but most importantly imitates the law of identity and its symbolic representation, “ A=A ” . 6 See especially Klaus-Detlef Müller, “ Mann ist Mann “ , in: Walter Hinderer (eds.), Brechts Dramen: Neue Interpretationen, Stuttgart 1984, pp. 89 - 105; Lothar van Laak, Medien und Medialität des Epischen in Literatur und Film des 20. Jahrhunderts. Bertolt Brecht - Uwe Johnson - Lars von Trier, München 2009, p. 188. 7 Nikolaus Müller-Schöll, Das Theater des „ konstruktiven Defaitismus “ . Lektüren zur Theorie eines Theaters der A-Identität bei Walter Benjamin, Bertolt Brecht und Heiner Müller, Frankfurt a. M./ Basel 2002. 8 Michel Foucault, “ What is Critique? ” , translated by Kevin Paul Geiman, in: James Schmidt (eds.), What is Enlightenment? Eighteenth-Century Questions and Eighteenth Century Answers, Berkeley 1996, pp. 382 - 398; Judith Butler, “ What is Critique? An Essay on Foucault ’ s Virtue ” , in: David Ingram (eds.), The Political: Readings in Continental Philosophy, London 2002, pp. 212 - 226. 9 Foucault, “ What is Critique? ” p. 384. 10 Ibid. 11 Brecht, “ Man equals Man ” , pp. 60 - 62. (Scene 9, Number V). 12 The Metzler Lexikon Literatur- und Kulturtheorie describes it under the lemma “ Identität, persönliche ” as “ relationaler Begriff (etwas kann nur identisch mit etwas sein) ” . Stefan Glomb, “ Identität, persönliche ” , in: Ansgar Nünning (eds.), Metzler 35 “ perhaps/ I am the Both which has just come about ” . (Non-) Identity as Critique in Brecht ’ s Man equals Lexikon Literatur- und Kulturtheorie, Stuttgart/ Weimar 2013, p. 324. 13 See Syme, “ How to Kill a Great Theatre: The Tragedy of the Volksbühne ” , 2017. 14 Foucault actually uses the German word ‘ Aufklärung ’ even in the French original text, because he wants to refer back especially to the German Enlightenment and Kant ’ s manner of questioning something, especially to his article on the question Was ist Aufklärung? See Immanuel Kant, “ Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung? [Berlinische Monatsschrift, Dezember 1784, S. 481 - 494.] ” , in: Immanuel Kant, Was ist Aufklärung? Ausgewählte kleine Schriften, edited by Horst D. Brandt, Hamburg 1999, pp. 20 - 27. 15 Foucault, “ What is Critique? ” , p. 383. 16 Ibid., p. 384. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid., p. 386. 19 Brecht, “ Man equals Man ” , p. 61. 20 Butler, “ What is Critique? An Essay on Foucault ’ s Virtue ” , p. 214. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 23 Brecht, “ Man equals Man ” , p. 60. 24 Butler, “ What is Critique? An Essay on Foucault ’ s Virtue ” , p. 215. 25 Ibid., p. 219. 26 Ibid., p. 220. 27 Ibid., p. 226. 28 Brecht, “ Man equals Man ” , p. 76. 36 Susanne Schmieden (Lucerne)