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An International Journal of Semiotics Vol. 44 · January/ June 2021 · No. 1-3 Editors: Achim Eschbach (†) · Ernest W. B. Hess-Lüttich · Jürgen Trabant Review Editor: Daniel H. Rellstab KODIKAS / CODE is an International Journal of Semiotics and one of the leading European scholarly journals in this field of research. It was founded by Achim Eschbach, Ernest Hess-Lüttich and Jürgen Trabant in order to promote multidisciplinary approaches to the study of sociocultural semiosis in 1979, and has been publishing high quality articles, in-depth reviews, and reports on all aspects of sign processes from historical, theoretical, and empirical perspectives since then. On a regular basis, KODIKAS / CODE also publishes special issues, collections of refereed articles on timely topics, solicited by guest editors. Languages of publication are German, English, and French; all contributions handed in to the editorial board are subject to a peer review process. Please send manuscripts electronically to either of these addresses: Prof. Dr. Dr. Dr. h.c. Ernest W. B. Hess-Luettich (Prof. em. University of Berne, Hon. Prof. Tech. Univ. Berlin, Hon. Prof. Univ. of Cape Town) / Winterfeldtstr. 61 / D-10781 Berlin / luettich@campus.tu-berlin.de / hess-luettich@t-online.de Prof. Dr. Jürgen Trabant / Krampasplatz 4b / 14199 Berlin / Deutschland / trabant@zedat.fu-berlin.de Please send books for review to: Prof. Dr. Dr. Dr. h.c. Ernest W. B. Hess-Luettich / Winterfeldtstr. 61 / D-10781 Berlin Prof. Dr. Daniel Hugo Rellstab / Germanistik und Interkulturalität / PH Schwäbisch Gmünd / University of Education / Oberbettringer Straße 200 / D-73525 Schwäbisch Gmünd / daniel.rellstab@ph-gmuend.de Manuscripts should be written according to the Instructions to Authors (see last pages of this issue). Books will be reviewed as circumstances permit. No publication can be returned. An International Journal of Semiotics Narr Francke Attempto Verlag GmbH + Co. KG Dischingerweg 5 / 72070 Tübingen / Germany Tel. +49 (0)7071 97 97 0 info@narr.de / www.narr.de / narr.digital Anzeige? KODIKAS/ CODE An International Journal of Semiotics Volume 44 (2021) · No. 1 - 3 Themenheft / Special Issue: Achim Eschbach. Reflecting on Signs. Contributions to the History of Semiotics Herausgegeben von / edited by Anna-Viktoria, Nora & Viktoria Eschbach Forewords Anna-Viktoria Eschbach An infinite chain of signs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Ernest W. B. Hess-Lüttich The prelude. A semiotics journal is born. In memoriam Achim Eschbach . . . . . . . . . 7 Jürgen Trabant On Achim Eschbach's Habilitation. (Gutachten) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Viktoria Eschbach-Szabó You know my method! Achim Eschbach ’ s path as an academic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Henrik Dindas Humor in Science: A Tribute to Achim Eschbach and “ denkunmögliche Bastarde ” . 26 Selected Essays of Achim Eschbach Semiotic Notes on the Process of Understanding / Semiotische Anmerkungen zum Verstehensprozeß. Plädoyer für eine Deutungstheorie des Zeichens (1996) . . . . . . . . 33 Ex Occidente Lux: Continuity / Ex occidente Lux: Kontinuität. Überlegungen zur semiotischen Rekonstruktion der alteuropäischen Schrift. (1997) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Karl Bühler ’ s Axiomatics and the Axiom / Karl Bühler ’ s Axiomatik und das Axiomensystem (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Money as a sign: Georg Simmel, Kurt Singer, and Karl Bühler / Das Geld als Zeichen (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 Distortion / Verzeichnung (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 Karl Bühlers Concept of the Sign and its Relationship to Wittgenstein ’ s Late Philosophy / Karl Bühlers Zeichenbegriff und seine Beziehung zu Wittgenstein (1984) 114 Visual Language. Isotype and the Limits / Bildsprache. Isotype und die Grenzen. (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136 Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory / Charles W. Morris ’ dreidimensionale Semiotik & die Textheorie (1975) . . . . . . . . . . . 156 Jan Amos Comenius: Orbis sensualium pictus, or the Infinite Drift / Jan Amos Comenius ’ Orbis sensualium pictus oder die unendliche Abdrift (1996) . . 188 Curriculum vitae of Achim Eschbach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213 Bibliography of Achim Eschbach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215 Beiträgerinnen und Beiträger / List of contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229 Autorinnen und Autoren / Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230 Hinweise zur Gestaltung von Manuskripten / Instructions to Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . 232 Publication Schedule and Subscription Information The journal appears 2 times a year. Annual subscription rate € 138, - (special price for private persons € 104, - ) plus postage. Single copy (double issue) € 85, - plus postage. The subscription will be considered renewed each year for another year unless terminated prior to 15 November. Besides normal volumes, supplement volumes of the journal devoted to the study of a specialized subject will appear at irregular intervals. The articles of this issue are available separately on www.narr.digital © 2024 · Narr Francke Attempto Verlag GmbH + Co. KG P. O. Box 2567, D-72015 Tübingen All rights, including the rights of publication, distribution and sales, as well as the right to translation, are reserved. No part of this work covered by the copyrights hereon may be reproduced or copied in any form or by any means - graphic, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording, taping, or information and retrieval systems - without written permission of the publisher. Internet: www.narr.de E-Mail: info@narr.de Setting by: typoscript GmbH, Walddorfhäslach CPI books GmbH, Leck ISSN 0171-0834 ISBN 978-3-381-11911-0 K O D I K A S / C O D E 44 (2021) · No. 1 - 3 Gunter Narr Verlag Tübingen An infinite chain of signs Anna-Viktoria Eschbach From my earliest memories of my father, Prof. Dr. Achim Eschbach, Charles Sanders Peirce, Karl Bühler, Charles W. Morris, or Ferdinand de Saussure appeared in the stream of even everyday conversation. He discussed triadic sign relations at the breakfast table, and on the way to the bakery, he analyzed the manifestations of what he called the fundamental semiotization of the environment. No walk in the woods or expedition to a swimming lake in summer was free of semiotic insights. People think, speak, and act in signs. The human condition is to make sense of every process, and so, the “ chain of signs ” is nothing more than a synonym for mental activity viewed from a phenomenological perspective. But I would go one step further and say that for Achim Eschbach the meaningful interpretation of sign systems was his sine qua non; he lived and breathed semiotics. As a scholar, in addition to his original contributions to semiotic discourse, he saw his central task as identifying proto-traces of semiotics laid out by many thinkers in philosophy and other disciplines that could advance the theoretical development of semiotic science. He invested much energy in researching 19th and 20th-century thinkers to recover connections and insights largely ignored in contemporary semiotic discourse. Bernhard of Chartres ’ attribution nanos gigantum humeris insidentes - on the shoulders of giants - underscored his understanding of intellectual progress. For him, there was no fundamental difference between dialogue with his contemporaries and with predecessors such as Charles Morris or Charles S. Peirce. Perhaps his most important contribution in this regard was the role he played in reviving the international reputation of the Viennese psychologist Karl Bühler. With the help of the Bühler family and an international team of researchers, he reassembled the Bühler Archive. This collection was initially housed at the University of Essen and is today in Marbach and Vienna. This memorial volume contains a selection of Achim Eschbach ’ s semiotic writings, which are intended to provide insight into the development of his semiotic universe and to highlight certain leitmotifs in his understanding of semiotics. Peirce ’ s triadic model - where a representamen, the (not necessarily physical) form of the sign; an interpretant, the sense produced by the sign in the mind of the observer (this can be another sign); and an object, that to which the sign refers - underlies all acts of mediation and interpretation. Indeed, the triadic model identifies the conditions of sign constitution. Eschbach followed an immaterial understanding of the sign and process of interpretation and wanted to clearly distinguish himself from the dualistic, materialistic conception of the sign that is broadly accepted in communication theory. He follows the rebuttal of the “ Stoffdenkern ” (material thinkers) or “ Stoffentgleisung ” (material fallacy), the term coined by Karl Bühler for the attempt to infer a mind from a matter, or the erroneous endeavor to attribute material functions and fields to language that arises from a material understanding of signs. The triadic model also underpinned the “ Essen orientation ” in communication science. Communicative processes were analyzed and described as sign-mediated interactions where material and immaterial processes and performances are relevant to the explanation. This characteristic sets it apart from simplistic information and media theories that came to dominate media studies in Germany and the accompanying monoperspectival investigation of material, analogical conclusions. As well as the danger of an under-complex understanding of signs, Eschbach speaks at one point - mainly regarding formulations by Charles S. Peirce - of the danger in the attempt to declare the scientific research process completed at any point. However, continuous discussion within the research community is necessary for achieving an “ increase in concrete reasonableness ” within this process. In other words: following Peirce ’ s semiotics, if one assumes that all perception and cognition are to be characterized as a process of permanent sign interpretation, then such a position concerning the research process entails the realization that the promulgation of finally valid scientific truths must inevitably lead to intellectual stagnation and scientific impotence. This position has several consequences. Regarding the discussion of Peirce ’ s semiotics, it follows that the “ final interpreter ” of which Peirce speaks is to be regarded as a regulative ideal, not as a goal attainable within any research process, however limited. This is precisely the view Eschbach repeatedly takes in the texts reprinted here. For the practical procedure of the researcher, one of the questions that arise against this background is in what way he or she can contribute to this research process as effectively as possible and what kind of arguments he or she should use in this process. Already in his inaugural lecture in Essen, “ Ex occidente lux, ” one came to trace Bühler ’ s influence, even though he is mentioned by name only once in passing; the discussion there of various approaches to the “ reconstruction of ancient European writing, ” however, it is based essentially on the axiomatics of critical semiotics developed in conversation with Bühler. In his ‘ 84 axiomatic text, he still quoted Bühler ’ s discussion of “ taking up successful research ideas ” approvingly; the development of his argumentation shows the practical benefit resulting from the linking and continuation of Bühler ’ s approach. Two central texts that grew out of his Bühler research are intended to pay tribute to his efforts to rehabilitate Karl Bühler. Among the most extensive and essential texts in this book is the essay “ Karl Bühler ’ s Axiomatics and the Axiom System of Sign Theory. ” In the first part of this text, Eschbach examines Bühler ’ s notion of axiom in-depth, discussing it against the background of numerous other notions of axiom and relating it to the use of this notion by some other authors (Haig, Peirce, Gomperz, Gätschenberger). In the second part, he goes far beyond this historical-historiographical consideration and, following Bühler ’ s approach in his “ Axiomatics of Linguistics, ” outlines his axiomatics of critical semiotics. For those who wish to delve deeper into Karl Bühler ’ s writings, “ Karl Bühlers Sprachtheorie ” (1984), “ Karl Bühler Sprache und Denken ” (2014), and the two volumes of “ Bühler Studien ” (1984) published by Suhrkamp, are the best introductory works. Eschbach ’ s work on the future of semiotics gave rise to two conclusions: 4 Anna-Viktoria Eschbach First, a scientific discussion should be guided by its respective subject matter, and this also means as concrete a claim as possible, for which the “ small form ” of the scientific essay seems best suited. Secondly, as many researchers as possible should be included in a topic ’ s discussion. Inclusivity should not be confined to contemporary authors; instead, this demand must be understood so that the arguments of older and sometimes hardly known authors should be presented in discussing concrete problems. It seems that his constant efforts to find “ semiotic classics ” should be understood from this point of view, for, as a glance at the list of publications printed at the end of the book shows, he has devoted a considerable part of his efforts to rediscovering texts. For the practical consequences resulting from the interplay of the two aspects mentioned, the name of Otto Neurath may be cited as an example whom Eschbach used as a testing ground with his visual language “ Isotype ” throughout his writings. As someone for whom teaching has been an essential driver of his research activity, it is unsurprising that he also designed volumes decidedly for a new generation of semioticians as an entry point. For example, the volume “ Bausteine der Kommunikationswissenschaft ” (Building Blocks of Communication Studies) is a compilation of the source streams of communication studies, focusing on the striking characteristic of communication studies that no mono perspectival discussion is possible, but an interdisciplinary interaction is needed. It was precisely for this expansion of the readership that he also had in mind when he made the American founder of the “ iconic turn, ” W. J. T. Mitchell, one of the most critical voices in today ’ s discussion about the nature and function of images, accessible to a German audience through the translation of the anthology “ What do pictures want ” published by Beck Verlag. The idea of making accessible was also a driving force behind the founding of Kodikas/ Code 1979, which he continued together with Ernest Hess-Lüttich and Jürgen Trabant to promote multidisciplinary approaches to the study of sociocultural semiosis, and since 2009 of the online review journal rezensionen: kommunikation: medien (r: k: m), which was created in collaboration with Horst Pöttker. To quote Jürgen Trabant in his obituary of my father in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: “ Everyone in cultural studies knew what an icon, an index, a symbol is, what pragmatics, syntax and semantics, signifier and signified are, and thanks to Achim Eschbach also knows the dimensions of Bühler ’ s Organon model. ” To all those who had the privilege of listening to him in person as he delved into his remarks on semiotics, the history of science, and philosophy during his lifetime, I invite readers of this volume to continue the discussion with him. For all those approaching his work here for the first Scheme of the Organon model by Karl Bühler An infinite chain of signs 5 time, we have translated his writings from German into English to expand the circles his work will draw. 1 It will give Prof. Dr. Achim Eschbach particular pleasure to continue expanding the chain of readers in his research area. 1 For this volume, the texts were translated from the original German into English. The original bibliographical and other references were retained in the translation and not edited. 6 Anna-Viktoria Eschbach K O D I K A S / C O D E 44 (2021) · No. 1 - 3 Gunter Narr Verlag Tübingen The prelude A semiotics journal is born. In memoriam Achim Eschbach Ernest W. B. Hess-Lüttich Under the impression of the variety of sign-theoretically inspired or semiotically motivated approaches represented at the first world congress of the International Association for Semiotic Studies or Association Internationale de Sémiotique (IASS-AIS), inaugurated and opened by Umberto Eco in Milan in 1974, some of the participants who had come from Germany had the idea that such a society for semiotics should actually also exist in Germany as an expression of the academic institutionalization of a new transdisciplinary field of research. The young Germanist and linguist Roland Posner, who had just been appointed to the newly created chair of linguistics and semiotics at the Technical University of Berlin, took on the task of organizing the first Semiotic Colloquium in Germany, to which, as its host, he invited semiotically interested scholars from a wide variety of disciplines to the Technical University of Berlin in early October 1975. I had just started my first position as a research assistant for German linguistics at the Free University of Berlin, even before completing my doctorate with Hugo Moser in Bonn, and was fascinated by the openness with which the other participants discussed questions of common interest across all disciplinary boundaries. At that time, the reductionist selfrestrictions of my discipline had long since become too restrictive for my own research, for which I, therefore, found semiotics to be a theoretically and methodologically more suitable framework than the linguistics of the Germanists, which at that time focused primarily on system linguistics (phonology, morphology, lexis, syntax, semantics). Among the participants, I noticed a doctoral student of about the same age from Aachen, whose name I had already come across while working on my dissertation but whom I did not yet know personally: Achim Eschbach. He had already made a name for himself as a translator and editor of important texts by Charles W. Morris together with his fellow student Wendelin Rader. He contributed a short bibliography on the history of semiotics to the Semiotic Colloquium, which later appeared as an appendix to the keynote article on “ Semiotic Approaches in Modern Philosophy ” by the Zurich philosopher Elmar Holenstein in the conference volume published by Roland Posner (together with the musicologist Hans-Peter Reinecke) under the title Zeichenprozesse. Semiotische Forschung in Einzelwissenschaften at Athenaion. 1 In the same month after 1 Achim Eschbach & Wendelin Rader 1977: 355 - 367; Posner & Reinecke (eds.) 1977; Holenstein 1977: 331 - 354. The following remarks are based on my personal recollection. Other participants may remember differently. the colloquium, I received a letter from Achim Eschbach, which I found in my correspondence archive and which I take the liberty of quoting here in full length for biographical interest (but with silent correction of typos and insertion of some paragraphs). On October 29 th , 1975 he wrote me from Aachen: Dear Mr. Hess-Lüttich, I heard from Mr. J. Trabant at the Semiotic Colloquium that you are working on questions of theatrical semiotics. Since I am also addressing some questions of theater semiotics in my almost completed dissertation, I would be very interested in an exchange of views. First, however, I would like to introduce myself briefly: I have studied literature, linguistics, philosophy, sociology, and political science here in Aachen, but I was not particularly taken with what Aachen had to offer (the TH Aachen actually only has a philosophy faculty for the sake of completeness). I, therefore, soon withdrew from the institute and studied mainly Peirce and Morris (resulting in the two present Morris translations ‘ Zeichen, Sprache und Verhalten ’ (Signs, Language and Behavior) and ‘ Zeichen, Wert, Ästhetik ’ (Signs, Value, Aesthetics) and the work in progress with the provisional title ‘ Pragmatische Orientierung der Morris ’ schen Zeichentheorie ’ (Pragmatic Orientation of Morris ’ s Theory of Signs). In 1974 I completed the first volume of my semiotics bibliography; in the spring of 1976, the second volume should be finished. Finally, my dissertation, which so far goes under the title ‘ Pragmasemiotics and Art Analysis ’ . Very briefly I want to outline my approach there: A first, rather extensive chapter sketches a history of semiotics. The aim of this chapter is (i.) to prove the continuity of semiotic research since the Greek Philodemos; (ii.) an essential correction of the previous historiography of semiotics - namely, I have unearthed a theory of signs from 1831, which in important respects leaves later approaches ‘ behind ’ (communicative orientation; sign system concept vs. atomic sign; propositional determination vs. sign string etc.). 3. the demonstration that semiotic research leads to pragmatic, action-oriented ideas. A second shorter chapter discusses some basic features of pragmatics. This chapter has mainly a transitional function for the third chapter, where I try to arrive at a more useful sign typology from the action orientation, the development of a more adequate concept of text, and the discussion of some sign types traditionally claimed by aesthetics. This typology of signs (which, by the way, I present following T. Kowzan ’ s very readable considerations) is concretely developed as a typology of signs in the theater situation. I have related this investigation to the play by P. Weiss: Lusitanischer Popanz. The final chapter, which has yet to be written, examines the question of what interrelationships these various signs maintain. As you can see from this brief sketch, I am currently primarily concerned with the questions of what relationships exist between the various sign systems that occur in the theatrical situation. I would be very interested to know what problems you are working on. Perhaps there will be an opportunity to discuss some points, at least in writing. I look forward to your reply. Yours sincerely, sig. A. Eschbach But since memories are known to be deceptive, I have referred exclusively to the cited publications and the correspondence I archived from the period between 1975 and 1980 in order to reconstruct how the new journal Kodikas/ Code came about. 8 Ernest W. B. Hess-Lüttich Or in its original German version: Sehr geehrter Herr Hess-Lüttich von Herrn J. Trabant hörte ich auf dem Semiotischen Colloquium, daß Sie an Fragen der Theatersemiotik arbeiten. Da ich selbst in meiner fast abgeschlossenen Diss. einige Fragen der Theatersemiotik anspreche, wäre ich sehr an einem Meinungsaustausch interessiert. Zuerst will ich mich aber kurz vorstellen: ich habe hier in Aachen Literatur, Linguistik, Philosophie Soziologie und Politologie gehört, allerdings war ich nicht sonderlich angetan von dem Aachener Angebot (die TH Aachen führt die Philosophische Fakultät eigentlich nur der Vollständigkeit halber). Ich habe mich deshalb bald aus dem Institutsbetrieb zurückgezogen und vor allem Peirce und Morris studiert (daraus resultierten die beiden vorliegenden Morris-Übersetzungen ‘ Zeichen, Sprache und Verhalten ’ und ‘ Zeichen, Wert, Ästhetik ’ und die in Arbeit befindliche Schrift mit dem vorläufigen Titel ‘ Pragmatische Orientierung der Morris ’ schen Zeichentheorie ’ ). 1974 habe ich den ersten Band meiner Semiotik-Bibliographie fertiggestellt; im Frühjahr 1976 soll der zweite Band abgeschlossen sein. Schließlich dann meine Diss., die bislang unter dem Titel ‘ Pragmasemiotik und Kunstanalyse ’ firmiert. Ganz kurz will ich mein dortiges Vorgehen skizzieren: Ein erstes, recht umfangreiches Kapitel entwirft eine Geschichte der Semiotik. Ziel dieses Kapitels ist 1. der Nachweis einer Kontinuität semiotischer Forschung seit dem Griechen Philodemos; 2. eine wesentliche Korrektur der bisherigen Historiographie der Semiotik - ich habe nämlich eine Zeichentheorie von 1831 ausgegraben, die in wichtigen Hinsichten spätere Ansätze ‘ hinter ’ sich läßt (kommunikative Orientierung; Zeichensystembegriff vs. atomares Zeichen; propositionale Bestimmung vs. Zeichenkette etc.). 3. der Nachweis, daß die semiotische Forschung in pragmatische, handlungsorientierte Vorstellungen mündet. Ein zweites kürzeres Kapitel diskutiert einige Grundzüge der Pragmatik. Dieses Kapitel hat vor allem Überleitungsfunktion für das dritte Kapitel, wo ich versuche, aus der Handlungsorientierung, Entwicklung eines adäquateren Textbegriffes und der Diskussion einiger traditionell von der Ästhetik reklamierten Zeichenarten zu einer brauchbareren Zeichentypologie zu gelangen. Diese Zeichentypologie (die ich übrigens im Anschluß an T. Kowzans sehr lesenswerte Überlegungen vorstelle) wird konkret entwickelt als Zeichentypologie der Theatersituation. Bezogen habe ich diese Untersuchung auf das Stück von P. Weiss: Lusitanischer Popanz. Das abschließende, noch zu schreibende Kapitel untersucht die Frage, welche Interrelationen diese verschiedenen Zeichen unterhalten. Wie Sie aus dieser kurzen Skizze entnehmen können, beschäftigen mich zur Zeit vor allem die Fragen, welche Beziehungen zwischen den verschiedenen, in der Theatersituation auftretenden Zeichensystemen bestehen. Es würde mich sehr interessieren zu erfahren, an welchen Problemen Sie arbeiten. Vielleicht ergibt sich die Möglichkeit, einige Punkte zumindest schriftlich zu diskutieren. Ich freue mich auf Ihre Antwort. Mit freundlichen Grüßen sig. A. Eschbach My positive reply followed promptly, and this first exchange of letters was the prelude to a lively exchange that was to last for the next four decades. The Berlin Semiotic Colloquium thus already served as a preparation for the founding of a Deutsche Gesellschaft für Semiotik (DGS German Association of Semiotic Studies); working groups were formed which were The prelude 9 later to become sections of the future society. In one of the working groups, I had carelessly made a few research programmatic suggestions, which led to the participants immediately offering me the leadership of a future section on multimedia communication. I was actually only interested in overcoming the linguistic reductionisms in the empirical analysis of faceto-face direct interaction (i. e., in the analysis of conversation) and in taking into account the complex totality of the sign processes involved. Today, under the slightly modified title of ‘ multimodal communication, ’ this has long been standard, but in 1975 it was not exactly career-enhancing within the guild. Nevertheless, I boldly held on to the insight I had gained into the necessity of a semiotically integrated approach and worked out the sketch extemporized in Berlin into a work program that was to become the basis of the future DGS section and which was confirmed at the 2 nd Semiotic Colloquium 1978 in Regensburg and also put up for discussion at the Vienna World Congress of Semiotics (IASS) 1979 (Hess- Lüttich 1978; id. 1981; id. 1983). In response to his letter quoted above, I also sent Achim Eschbach the manuscript of my then almost completed Bonn dissertation (supervised, among others, by Hugo Moser), which appeared in 1976 as a university print and which he reviewed knowledgeably a little later in the renowned Zeitschrift für Linguistik und Literaturwissenschaft (vol. 7, no. 27 - 28, 1977: 28) (which was not only flattering but also a little embarrassing to me, because I had undertaken to completely revise the work again for printing at the Erich Schmidt publishing house). He then returned the favor at the beginning of 1977 with a copy of his dissertation on the topic of “ Pragmasemiotics and Theater, ” which I read very carefully and from which I gained many suggestions. In his accompanying letter of January 31 th , 1977, he responded in detail and constructively to my suggestions for organizing research work in the meanwhile founded DGS, especially in the section ‘ Multimedia Communication ’ . Shortly thereafter, I visited him in Aachen, where we decided to deepen our cooperation in an intensive exchange of ideas on February 19 th , 1977, and apparently already switched to the more familiar form of address ‘ Du ’ , as his letter of February 28 th , 1977, attests, in which he reported to me on his discussions with Klaus Oehler, Roland Posner, and Thomas A. Sebeok in Hamburg, which had dealt with the founding of a journal under the working title ‘ Semiotic Reports. ’ In my answer of March 10 th , I went into this in detail and already developed concrete proposals for the possible structure of such a journal. The following letters were initially devoted to mutual comments on our dissertations, which were enriched in many ways as a result. At the same time, I was in continuous contact with Roland Posner at the TU in Berlin and a regular participant in the meetings of his ‘ Semiotische Arbeitsstelle ’ , which had been established in the meantime. Thus, the plan to bring Achim to Berlin and to strengthen our small circle of semiotically engaged philologists, to which Jürgen Trabant, as a romanist and linguist, also belonged, arose quite automatically. Unfortunately, the decision about the assistantship at the TU (not least because of strange special votes against his employment) dragged on so long that Achim, to all our regret, lost patience and accepted another offer and moved to the University of Essen as an assistant to the art pedagogue Hermann Sturm. In April 1977 Achim told me about his stay in Greece, where he had met Haris Kambouridis, who published a semiotic journal called Kodikas in Thessaloniki and invited Achim to be a co-editor. 10 Ernest W. B. Hess-Lüttich In the course of the same year, Achim (together with Wendelin Rader) initiated several projects at the same time, such as a conference in Aachen on “ The Unity of Semiotic Dimensions ” or an anthology on literary semiotics, (including contributions by Jürgen Trabant, professor of Romance languages, Karl Eimermacher, professor of Slavic languages, as well as Götz Wienold and Winfried Nöth, both professors of English), and finally a followup volume to the semiotics bibliographies published by Fink and Syndikat. Negotiations for the publication of the anthology on literary semiotics with various publishers, not least because of its size, dragged on somewhat in the following year, 1978, until the project could finally be published in two substantial volumes by Gunter Narr. In the course of the year, in connection with this project, talks also flourished with the publisher Gunter Narr about the founding of an international semiotics journal, after Roland Posner had cleverly already arranged with the Athenaion publishing house for a journal of the freshly founded Deutsche Gesellschaft für Semiotik and, from 1979, published the German Zeitschrift für Semiotik. He appointed as co-editors Annemarie Lange-Seidl, the organizer of the Regensburg Semiotics Congress in 1978 on the topic of “ Sign Constitution, ” Tasso Borbé, the organizer of the 1979 IASS World Congress in Vienna ( “ Semiotics Unfolding ” ), and Klaus Oehler, the designated organizer of the third DGS Congress in 1981 in Hamburg ( “ Signs and Reality ” ), thus securing for his journal a long-term anchoring in the politics of the association. The first issue was then compiled by Martin Krampen from Ulm, who also joined the editorial team. Achim Eschbach now urged that the Greek journal Kodikas, which he had co-edited, be restructured as an international journal and established as a multilingual semiotics journal. As early as December 6 th , 1978, he signed a corresponding contract with Gunter Narr and sought to win Jürgen Trabant and me as co-editors - after two issues had been edited together with his Greek co-editor Haris Kambouridis. Since I was in continuous contact with Roland Posner and also a member of the Scientific Advisory Board of his journal, I tried to avoid any appearance of a competing enterprise. However, together with Jürgen Trabant, who had once studied with Gunter Narr under Eugenio Coseriu, we succeeded in convincing the publisher that a European journal published in three languages (English, German, French) with an alternative concept could certainly be placed on the market alongside and complementary to the Zeitschrift für Semiotik. On December 17 th , 1979, the three of us - together with the Romanian computer scientist Mihai Nadin (who Achim brought in at short notice), who at that time held a chair in computational design at the University of Wuppertal (and who soon left the editorial board due to his career change and professional differences) - signed a contract for the edition of a journal entitled Kodikas/ Code. An International Journal of Semiotics and the Kodikas Supplement Series, a book series in which the two already completed volumes on Literatursemiotik (literary semiotics and Achim ’ s dissertation on Pragmasemiotik und Theater (pragmasemiotics and theater) appeared in quick succession, as well as, in only three years, another ten volumes (including those by Winfried Nöth and Va č eslav V. Ivanov). By 2010, more than 30 books by renowned authors and editors had been published in the series. It was not until 2014 that the publishing contract was renewed and adapted to the now completely changed technical and structural conditions of the publishing house. This was The prelude 11 accompanied by a change in the external appearance of the journal, which is now soon to be edited and published by younger hands after more than four decades of uninterrupted publication. If one calculates the volume with an average of 400 printed pages, then in these 45 years approximately 18,000 printed pages of scholarly output on semiotics have been presented to a restricted circle of readers. This was not possible without a very intensive collaboration between the three editors and the close cooperation with the publisher. This collegial cooperation, even on controversial issues, and the resulting personal friendship over decades is one of the most gratifying experiences of my professional life. Achim Eschbach died on January 20 th , 2021. His daughters Anne and Nora have selected a number of central works from his extensive oeuvre for this volume and compiled them in his memory. References Eschbach, Achim & Wendelin Rader 1977: “ Kurze Bibliographie zur Geschichte der Semiotik ” , in: Posner & Reinecke (eds.) 1977: 355 - 367 Eschbach, Achim 1977: Rez. Hess-Lüttich 1976 als Teil eines Literaturberichts in: Rul Gunzenhäuser (ed.) 1977: Semiotik = Zeitschrift für Linguistik und Literaturwissenschaft 7.27/ 28 (1977): 28 Eschbach, Achim 1977: Pragmasemiotik und Theater, Tübingen: Narr Hess-Lüttich, Ernest W. B. 1976: Texttheorie und Soziolinguistik - Eine pragmatische Synthese. Entwürfe zur Anwendung linguistischer Literaturanalyse, Diss. phil., Bonn: Univ.-Druck, 678 pp. Hess-Lüttich, Ernest W. B. 1978: “ Semiotik der multimedialen Kommunikation ” , in: Tasso Borbé & Martin Krampen (eds.) 1978: Angewandte Semiotik, Wien: Egermann, 21 - 48 Hess-Lüttich, Ernest W. B. 1981: “ Zur Notation multimedialer Kommunikation ” , in: Annemarie Lange-Seidl (ed.) 1981: Zeichenkonstitution. Akten des 2. Semiotischen Kolloquiums Regensburg 1978, vol. II, Berlin/ New York: de Gruyter, 72 - 79 Hess-Lüttich, Ernest W. B. 1983: “ A propos de l ’ organisation multimedia lors d ’ un changement de locuteur ” , in: Tasso Borbé (ed.) 1983: Semiotics Unfolding (= Proceedings of the Second International Congress of the IASS Vienna 1979), Berlin/ New York/ Amsterdam: Mouton, 1655 - 1666 Holenstein; Elmar 1977: “ Semiotische Ansätze in der Philosophie der Neuzeit ” , in: Posner & Reinecke (eds.) 1977: 331 - 354 Posner, Roland & Hans-Peter Reinecke (eds.) 1977: Zeichenprozesse. Semiotische Forschung in den Einzelwissenschaften, Wiesbaden: Athenaion 12 Ernest W. B. Hess-Lüttich K O D I K A S / C O D E 44 (2021) · No. 1 - 3 Gunter Narr Verlag Tübingen On Achim Eschbach's Habilitation (Gutachten) Jürgen Trabant Berlin October 11 th , 1984 I have known Mr. Eschbach for many years through his scientific work and for some years also personally from the cooperation in the publication of the journal Kodikas/ Code as well as in the section “ History of Semiotics ” of the German Society for Semiotics. I have thus been able to follow Eschbach ’ s academic career continuously. Based on this familiarity with the person and the scholarly work of Achim Eschbach, the present review is essentially founded on rereading a large part of Eschbach ’ s published work. The numerous lecture manuscripts and publication announcements that Eschbach included in his bibliography have not been taken into account, as is customary for such appraisals. Eschbach ’ s published work is so extensive that there is no need for further documentation. The scientific physiognomy of Eschbach presents itself to me as follows. Achim Eschbach scholarly debut was not his dissertation, but rather a series of publications that immediately made Eschbach known to an audience interested in semiotics (the dissertation, completed in 1976, did not appear until 1979): semiotic bibliographies and bibliographical surveys which, at the beginning of the 1970s, fulfilled an important informational function providing an overview of publications in the hitherto relatively unknown field of semiotics. Special bibliographic compilations dedicated to film semiotics complemented two large general semiotic bibliographies. The bibliographical documentation is constantly being updated and will soon be published in another bibliographical volume. The second major area in which Eschbach presents himself to the scholarly public are his widely extended translating and editing activities. As far as the translations of semiotic literature are concerned, which are important contributions in themselves, I will deal here only with those that are connected to Eschbach ’ s independent studies, i. e. in particular with the translations of Smart and Morris. The translation and presentation of Smart ’ s sematology represents a real discovery of this English philosopher for the Germanspeaking world which has hitherto treated English common-sense philosophy stepmotherly. Especially important are the introductions to the works of Charles W. Morris, edited and translated by Eschbach. After Apel ’ s introduction to Morris ’ major work Sign, Language and Behavior (translated by Eschbach), Eschbach ’ s studies make Morris known in Germany. In these studies, Eschbach proves to be an exceptionally well-read and wellinformed commentator who is able to convincingly bring Morris ’ specific intellectualhistorical position and approach to a German audience. In particular, the introduction to the first Morris volume supervised by Eschbach does an excellent job of relating Morris' subject matter to current issues, most beautifully exemplified by the discussion of the “ aesthetic sign. ” Eschbach succeeds in conveying his own intellectual-historical context with the translated text. The introduction to the third Morris volume supervised by Eschbach, on the theory of mind, shows Eschbach as a philosophically well-versed author. In the sketch of the concept of “ experience ” it becomes clear that “ experience ” - precisely the point of the new, “ semiotic ” epistemology in confrontation with Kant - is altogether built on signs and mediated by signs, an idea that Peirce in particular (but also Humboldt) had developed in the wake of and in confrontation with Kant. Thus, it avoids a break between “ perception ” and “ cognition ” since also perception proceeds semiotically. Finally, in the introduction to the “ Morris-Studien ” Eschbach explains his critical distance to Morris. He makes Morris - or better a “ science business ” relying on Morris - responsible for the currently not particularly satisfying state of the discipline. Eschbach ’ s counter-position - essentially based on Peirce - is a critical semiotics in which the active synthetic constitution of the sign as an apagogic (abductive) creative procedure is essential. In Eschbach ’ s work on Morris, it becomes particularly obvious how Eschbach ’ s “ semiotic-linguistic-philosophical-scientific-historical ” focus emancipates itself from the translating and editing activities in the service of the tradition of semiotics and how his specific scientific profile crystallizes, thus perfectly fitting the designation of the venia legendi Eschbach is applying for. The dissertation of 1976 represents a first summary - from today ’ s point of view, an interim summary - of Eschbach ’ s semiotic efforts. The dissertation with the somewhat misleading title Pragmasemiotik und Theater (the theater is only mentioned in passing; the chapter on the theater is more of an excursus) contains a sketch of the history of semiotics (and an overview of the problems of semiotic historiography), it develops the main features of a semiotics based on action theory and the main features of a semiotic aesthetics. Eschbach ’ s interest will initially shift to the first issue, the history of semiotics; the development of a systematic semiotic position of his own is the focus of Eschbach ’ s current work (this is already becoming increasingly clear in the last Bühler works); and semiotic aesthetics is taken up again in the considerations on literary semiotics (in the introduction to “ Literary Semiotics ” ) and is always present as a perspective, as a starting point and a goal, of his semiotic quest. The following remarks refer primarily to the field of the history of semiotics. On the basis of his excellent knowledge of the history of semiotics, Eschbach has repeatedly drawn attention to forgotten figures and thus rediscovered them for semiotic reflection. This is quite visibly the case with Smart, already mentioned, but also with Weltring, Röder, Matzat etc.. I remember that even before the rediscovery of the “ idéologues ” in France Eschbach knew of their sign-theoretical importance, about which, in the essays on Maine de Biran and Prevost, he has only recently commented. Fundamental reflections on a historiography of semiotics have been made in his contribution to the anthology co-edited with me. These 14 Jürgen Trabant show that Eschbach is not only concerned with a naive collection of facts of the past, but that his work rests on a theoretical and methodological reflection of semiotic historiography itself. Originally, the work on Karl Bühler, which has increasingly occupied Eschbach in recent years and which seems to have moved to the center of his current work, was also the rediscovery of a “ forgotten ” author for semiotics. Eschbach is the editor of a multi-volume Karl Bühler edition that is in the process of being published. For this edition, he is not only drawing on Bühler ’ s works that have already been published, but also intends to publish extensive manuscript discoveries for the first time. He is also collecting the soon to be published “ Bühler-Studies ” , an event comparable to the “ Morris-Studies ” which will certainly meet with great interest among experts. However, here we are not dealing so much with the editorial achievements, which in themselves represent a pioneering feat, but with the studies Eschbach has presented on the subject of Bühler. I had before me the essay of 1981, his preface and contribution to the “ Bühler-Studies ” (1984), and the weighty essay on axiomatics. In these works, Eschbach is concerned with three things: First, with reconstructing a non-reductionist understanding of Bühler; second, with reconstructing the scientific-historical context of Bühler ’ s thought; and finally, with developing his own perspectives. Eschbach has shown this particularly well in the long essay on axiomatics. Here, after situating the problem, Bühler ’ s semiotic axiomatics is presented in a conceptual-historical way (section 2), then Bühler ’ s relation to other authors, e. g., the important relation to Hilbert (section 3) and to other semiotic axiomatics (esp. Gomperz) (section 4), thirdly, Eschbach presents his own attempt of a semiotic axiomatics. The ambitious sketch of a semiotic axiomatics is the sum of certain semiotic guiding principles hinted at here and there in Eschbach ’ s work, a sketch perhaps too brief here, which does not necessarily follow only from Bühler ’ s work. The fourth axiom, if I see it correctly, is much more likely to be developed in a Saussure study. The sociality assumption already underlies the preoccupation with the Mead context; interpretation, triadic relation and processuality spring from the Morris-Peirce context. This trait of cautiously “ picking up ” systematic features from the interpretation and the history of semiotics seems to be a quite characteristic trait of Eschbach ’ s work which gradually gains its axioms from the interpretation of great semioticians. As a basic characteristic of Eschbach ’ s semiotics, I would like to emphasize the fact that he does not conceive semiotics only as a descriptive language, a mere conceptual instrument that can be applied to all kinds of objects, but that he understands semiotics as what it always was in the course of its long history, namely as “ logic ” or as a “ fundamental critical method of reflection ” , i. e. as philosophy of language. In his presentation of Welby ’ s semantics, Eschbach ’ s basic semantic assumptions become clear once again (dynamization of meaning, apagogic, creative processuality of meaning). In his Peirce essay, which precedes the first volume of the series Foundations of Semiotics, he specifies his view of the basic structure of the history of science (cooperation vs. catastrophe, revolution) and clarifies the basic position of semiotics (logic as semiotics) as well as the basic belief that scientific thinking is to be developed from the history of science and that the “ community of investigators ” is to be understood not only synchronically as the community of scientists currently living and talking to each other, but also diachronically as a community between generations and centuries. On Achim Eschbach's Habilitation 15 After what has been said so far, there can be no doubt that the present work of Eschbach goes far beyond what is commonly demanded of a “ habilitation ” . The work is not only the equivalent of a habilitation thesis but corresponds in scope and content to several books. Thus, one could compile a Morris volume, a Bühler volume, a volume of studies on the history of semiotics, as well as reports on the state of the art. Of course, a “ Habilitationsgutachten ” has to conclude with some critical remarks (which do not diminish the applicant's achievements). For all the excellence in the core area of his scientific work which I have tried to present, Eschbach also has published some marginalia that do not quite correspond to the quality of his work in the core area. And the second critical remark concerns the historical approach. Of course, I appreciate the historical perspective, but I would like to see it somewhat toned down. The systematic drafts of Eschbach are so far too cautiously developed from the interpretation of authors and one is still curious about the systematic development of his semiotics. Eschbach applies for the venia legendi for art studies with a focus on semiotics, philosophy of language and the history of science. The semiotic problem of aesthetics is, as I have shown, the starting point and the continuously present perspective of Eschbach ’ s work. Semiotics is for Eschbach largely identical with the philosophy of language. Eschbach approaches this field predominantly in terms of the history of science. The triad of semiotics, philosophy of language, and history of science is therefore to be understood as a unity that characterizes the specificity of Eschbach ’ s approach. Achim Eschbach is so well known in the German semiotic scene (and beyond) that they would probably be surprised to learn that he has not yet been habilitated in the field of “ semiotics, philosophy of language, history of science ” . It is therefore time to grant him the venia legendi he has applied for. 16 Jürgen Trabant K O D I K A S / C O D E 44 (2021) · No. 1 - 3 Gunter Narr Verlag Tübingen You know my method! Achim Eschbach ’ s path as an academic Viktoria Eschbach-Szabó Budapest 1985 At the end of June 1979, several well-known semioticians went to Budapest to deal with questions of semiotic terminology and with the future direction of semiotics in a small and very illustrious setting before the second major international semiotics conference in Vienna. This pre-conference was organized by Vilmos Voigt of Eötvös Loránd University and György Szépe of the Academy of Sciences, who had already felt the fresh wind of semiotics at the groundbreaking first conference in 1974 in Milano. When I met Achim in Budapest in 1979, it was immediately clear to me from his talk that he would dedicate his whole career to semiotics. Achim Eschbach not only wanted to do research in the field, but he also drew up grand plans for how to shape the discipline. This included steps such as editing and publishing past and present authors, creating bibliographies, defining and translating the Canon, and building special series and journals. He awoke early every day and wrote down his ideas with pen and paper, and then, with many scholarly contacts in the East and West, he got down to business. As Jürgen Trabant, one of his comrades-in-arms, described it, the aim was to expand the subject matter of the humanities and not only to focus on highly cultural objects as signs (Trabant 2021). At the same time, semiotics as a science of hermeneutics, linguistics, cultural studies, communication studies, to name a few, should also be better grounded theoretically. The enthusiasm of many was to grow. Semiotics fed from very different branches of science and ideally asked for a forum to bring the brave new modern world of signs into the research of global communication. Achim wanted to develop his theory specifically on the ideas of philosophers of language to understand how signs are used, reinterpreted and reinvented. His enthusiasm probably also had to do with the fact that he could best combine the emotions and inspirations from his childhood and youth in this subject. Role models Joachim or Achim Eschbach was born as the second child of Dr. phil. Josef Eschbach, from Eschweiler, and Helga York, from Breslau, on October 20, 1948. What he received from his two parents was very different. His father was a former Jesuit, who earned a doctorate in literature at the University of Vienna during the war and lived a life for literature. He wrote many books under his own name for boys and under female pen names for girls. Later he became a bookseller and then a secondary school teacher, where he made contributions to education in the city of Eschweiler, including the promotion of education for disadvantaged children. As a Rhinelander, he felt at home in Eschweiler and was at ease to be able to speak in his native dialect. His wife Helga York came from a wealthy family from Breslau, who lost everything during the Second World War that several generations had built up. She had to adapt considerably in the Rhineland as a displaced person and as a Protestant. She spoke only High German and had an uncanny knowledge of flora and fauna. She passed this enthusiasm on to Achim. The most important hobby of Achim was, as of his mother, to make explorations in nature. His extensive knowledge about species, naming, and categorization impressed every forester or biologist. About his choice of profession he said that he could not study his Roland Posner, Achim Eschbach, Ferruccio Rossi-Landi and Jerzy Pelz in Vienna, 1979 Draft of a scientific discipline 18 Viktoria Eschbach-Szabó favorite subject biology because of the not so good Abitur results in Aachen at that time, so he finally decided to choose philosophy instead. But maybe the reason was that there was already a well-known researcher in the field of biology in the family. His father ’ s brother Dr. Walter Eschbach showed him how to live as a researcher. Professor Walter Eschbach was a professor of medicine in Rostock. At the same time, he worked as a gynecologist and cancer researcher at the Charité Clinic in Berlin Buch. After the experiences of the Second World War, he remained in the GDR after the construction of the Wall in order, as he used to say, to help those who had worse medical care. His struggle for recognition of his groundbreaking research findings on papilloma viruses were never duly acknowledged in the West, in his view. His fighting nature and his absolute identification with medicine determined his entire life. Medicine being the discipline that was originally considered the source of semiotics. His ambition and researcher ’ s ability to correctly interpret certain elements as signs made an indelible impression on Achim. He was also the one who personally introduced him to the philosopher Georg Klaus (1912 - 1974, Humboldt University), who was very innovative in many areas of semiotics (logic, systems theory, cybernetics, game theory, and Marxism). Picture of his car “ Silberpfeilchen ” You know my method! Achim Eschbach ’ s path as an academic 19 Besides concentrating on thinking, Achim also had a hobby of driving fast cars, which he also shared with his uncle. He even tried to become a professional racing driver for a while. He designed and had his own racing car built, which he christened “ Silberpfeilchen ” ( “ little silver arrow ” ). However, after several accidents, which he did not cause himself, he retired. I mention this only because he wanted to make advances in semiotics sometimes with perhaps too great a speed. Apprenticeship years and first beginnings His studies at the RWTH Aachen in German language and literature, philosophy, political science and sociology had fascinated him. In addition to his studies (1969 - 76), Achim had been intensively involved in politics as part of the generation of ‘ 68. The inner tension of this generation - the deeds of their fathers - was a preoccupation for him. One of the famous cases of Nazi perpetrators who made a career again under a new name also worked in Aachen, the literary scholar Hans Schwerte (1970 - 1973), alias Hans Ernst Schneider. Achim had come to know him well as a teacher and as a university rector. His identity was not unmasked until the 1990s. Achim also researched the past in his own family. In his family research, he discovered that Erich Maria Remarque was a family relation through Rheinish- Belgian kinship. Semiotics of the Social Achim ’ s methods developed alongside his studies. In the beginning it was the historical reappraisal of semiotics. In his Aachen symposium, in the ‘ Arbeitsgruppe Semiotik Aachen ’ , which formed a lively interdisciplinary discussion group, many of his ideas emerged. He wrote his dissertation, which dealt with social relations of signs, on the pragma semiotics of theater. At the same time he started translating and publishing great semioticians. For example, he established a contact with one of the most important representatives of behaviorism Charles W. Morris, from whom he translated some works into German. In order to finally finish his dissertation in 1976, he then retired to Saint Jean de Buegés in France, where he supported his research by working in the local vineyards. Forums for Semiotics While still a student, he also ventured to start his own journal. During his studies he had established a network of Greek contacts and the idea arose to start his semiotics journal in the country of origin of semiotics in Greece with Haris Kamabouridis in 1975 and to call it Kodikas in Greek. After the great earthquake in Thessaloniki in 1978 in which many publications and documents were destroyed, the remains were brought to Peter de Ridder Press and published in English as Kodikas/ Code, and then from 1980 with the new team of Jürgen Trabant, Ernest Hess Lüttich and, temporarily, Michai Nadin, published in German and in English by Gunter Narr. The cooperation with Jürgen Trabant and Ernest Hess- Lüttich ran successfully all these years, so that this semiotics journal achieved a global 20 Viktoria Eschbach-Szabó distribution and was recognized in the Anglo-Saxon world as a benchmark “ reference journal ” . Image from the anniversary party of Kodikas/ Code in Tübingen, 2003 Special positions for semiotics were established at that time in some technical universities. After applications for an assistant position with Max Bense in Stuttgart and with Roland Posner at the TU Berlin, he finally started to work in an art department. He became an assistant to the art scholar Hermann Sturm at the University of Essen in the spring of 1977. This newly founded university or college was a great opportunity for him, because at that time, it lacked the patriarchal constraints of more established institutions, and he could freely follow his own ideas and projects. Hermann Sturm and other designers and artists in Essen understood him as a professor, because they were also enthusiastic about the founding spirit of a newly formed university. Publication opportunities for semiotics All this time Achim had systematically searched for publication possibilities for old and modern semiotic research in the original and in translation in different book series. He made constant contacts and felt very comfortable with Suhrkamp Verlag in Frankfurt, with Gunter Narr in Tübingen, with the publishing couple John and Claire Benjamins in Amsterdam, then with Brockmeyer Verlag in Bochum, with Shaker Verlag in Aachen, to mention only a few of his publication partnerships. Later, until the end of his life, at Herbert You know my method! Achim Eschbach ’ s path as an academic 21 von Halem Verlag, he was very much at home. He also co-founded publishing houses, such as Syndikat Verlagshaus in Frankfurt and Rader Verlag in Aachen. At these and other unmentioned places he managed alone or with an editorial team the publication of about 200 volumes on semiotics. Semiotics and researching like Sherlock Holmes What the method mentioned in the title had been used for becomes visible from Achim ’ s topics and thesis that appear in this volume. The method and the title of this essay is taken from Achim ’ s translation of Thomas Seboek ’ s semiotic analysis, who explained the principle of abduction by means of Sherlock Holmes ’ research method. The connections between semiotic analysis and epistemology also, at this time, received a popular exposition in Umberto Eco ’ s In the Name of the Rose, perhaps, in part, a result of their friendship and shared interests. Achim searched for the secret with all his strength in the classics as he sought to develop semiotics further. Besides editing many classics of semiotics, like William Morris, Charles Sanders Peirce and Thomas Seboek, he is considered in the field above all as a connoisseur of Karl Bühler. This research is due to a historical coincidence, explained below, because Bühler was certainly not in the center of semiotic interest in the seventies. Together with Prof. Dr. György Szépe, Márta Dovala and Prof. Dr. Viktoria Eschbach-Szabó in Sweden, 1981 After Achim Eschbach visited Thomas Seboek in Bloomington and the Peirce Editions Project Indiana, he started looking for great figures also in semiotics in Europe. The idea to focus on Karl Bühler started actually from a passing recommendation by my stepfather György Szépe, a linguist, semiotician, and language advocate. When Achim came to Hungary in the 1980 summer semester to do research at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and on the history of semiotics, we discussed many topics. One conversation is then crucial to his work, which took place during a walk. In early summer we walked with György Szépe in the Budapest Castle and talked about Karl Bühler in connection with the Prague Linguistic Circle, who also had contacts with this group of researchers. Achim wondered 22 Viktoria Eschbach-Szabó why the sign model and other great ideas of Bühler hardly appear in the discussion. Szépe had an excellent historical knowledge of many disciplines and suspected that his work had been forgotten due to his expulsion to America. Szépe provided some subtle suggestions as to where certain materials might be located and sources that might be consulted. Achim immediately set about the task of sifting through Bühler ’ s estate, which was only possible using detective methods. In order to understand Bühler ’ s work more precisely and to trace his legacy, we planned a conference entitled “ Bühler Studies ” . In preparation for the Bühler Studies conference, we did a lot of research and tried to reconstruct what Karl and Charlotte Bühler did in Vienna and in America. We contacted his children and his former students and learned more and more. Achim ’ s interest grew as, in addition to his scientific interest, the historical events in the history of science increasingly preoccupied him. He also saw the work as making amends for the sins of his father ’ s generation in the Third Reich. In the process it became clear that the estate, like the life of Karl and Charlotte Bühler itself, had been torn apart and we tried to slowly reassemble it according to the traces. Through a tip from the Hungarian psychologist Lajos Kardos, who was a student of both Karl Bühler and Siegmund Freud, we were able to sift through Bühler ’ s special print collection in Budapest in the corridors of the Eötvös Loránd University in front of the Department of Psychology with the help of Csaba Pléh, the then full professor of psychology. Bühler had been able to bring this to safety shortly before his escape. The children of Karl Bühler, whom we were able to contact through Charlotte Schenk-Danziger, who had lived in Norway and in Stuttgart, had assembled the estate from what remained in Vienna and what was found in America, and made this available to Achim, in order to release the most important items for research purposes and for publication. The unforgettable Bühler conference took place in Essen in 1984 and was published by Suhrkamp-Verlag in 1984. Conclusion and new beginning in the realm of signs The years 1984 - 1985 were significant in Achim ’ s career, because besides his habilitation he was also elected president of the “ German Society for Semiotics ” and then organized the 5th International Conference under the framework theme “ Creativity and Tradition ” in Essen. After this great effort, he continued to work in Essen and became an associate professor in 1990. At this time the question arose for him how the semiotic method relates to existing and new disciplines and where he should set Together with Rolf Bühler in Stuttgart You know my method! Achim Eschbach ’ s path as an academic 23 his focus. During this time a surprise came to Achim. At the request of the Japanese semiotician Ikegami Yoshihiko, we both received a visiting professorship to Japan at Tokyo University in 1993. In this project, similar to Bühler ’ s, we were able to research a displaced person from Germany to Japan, and we put our skills together. We were greatly assisted by the work of Kurt Singer, an economist and cultural semiotician, who had to flee to Japan because of his ancestry. He worked at Tokyo University as an economist and wrote a significant book entitled Mirror, Sword and Jewel as a Cultural Semiotician. For me as a Japanologist, it was particularly interesting to understand German-Japanese relations in Japan before and during World War II. For Achim it was very interesting how much enthusiasm and knowledge about German philosophy and semiotics can be seen in Japan. His take on Kurt Singer ’ s cultural semiotics was again published in Japanese. At the same time, it was an interesting experience for Achim as a semiotician to move in a written culture circle where he could hardly recognize the pictures and letters. From this time on, he turned to the theories and archaeological evidence of the written word ’ s proto-history. Back in Essen in communication science His way to a position at a German university was enabled by a teaching position in Hungary. He spent a guest semester in 1994/ 95 at the Janus Pannonius University in Pécs for semiotics and communication science, where he received a titular professorship. Here he managed to lecture in Hungarian, which he had taught himself inconsistently, once he realized his students lacked sufficient knowledge of German or English. In 1997, he received a call to a professorship in communication science at the University of Duisburg-Essen. Achim worked, as always, very enthusiastically with colleagues and students. He always enjoyed the dialogue and the opportunity to encourage young people. According to the task now to work on a new applied discipline, he had tried to place semiotics in communication sciences properly. For the possibilities for young people to publish they started with Walter H. Schmitz the series Essener Studien zur Semiotik und Kommunikationsforschung 2000. Following the possibilities for reviews for semiotics, he later founded with Horst Pöttker (Dortmund, Hamburg) a review website Rezensionen für Kommunikation at Herbert von Halem Verlag. Harvesting and opportunities Parallel to these other activities, the Bühler research developed and the material was made ready. The publication of the complete works of Karl Bühler seemed, after the preliminary work with the support of Wolfgang Klein in Nijmegen at the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics and in Essen, slowly to become possible. Due to the scope of the material, not everything was able to be published, but despite this, I would claim that Achim ’ s efforts were successful in the sense that the estate was restored. Later, it was possible to find an appropriate place for the material in Marbach and in Vienna. Secondly, he had achieved the Bühler renaissance with his numerous activities and publications, and Karl Bühler was again established in the discourse as a classic. Of particular importance was certainly the English translation of The Theory of Language. Achim initiated and supervised, which he 24 Viktoria Eschbach-Szabó accomplished with Donald Goodwin. Perhaps the idea at that time also came from Achim ’ s time in Japan, as the Japanese translation had appeared in 1983. Achim discussed many Bühler issues with one of the translators with Ueda Yasunari from Hiroshima. Several translations into Western languages followed. In East Asia, Bühler also became well known, because in China the translation of The Theory of Language appeared in 2017. In his last years, Achim was even able to help shape the Chinese reception with Professor Wen Renbai in Xian. His race car driver method Achim continued to work on his projects in Essen after his retirement in 2014. He continued to research extensively and took great pleasure in compiling material in paper form. After formulating his thoughts in multiple iterations of tables of contents for a new essay or lecture, he would then sit down one morning with his Gitanes and then write the entire piece in pencil without any changes in very small letters. I know of very few people who can formulate such long texts with all the notes without corrections like a race driver at the track. Surely his race car driver training helped him, because as in a race car, any deviation from the track could have incalculable consequences for the train of thought. The only distractions Achim accepted were his children or the little birds on the windowsill. You know my method! Achim Eschbach ’ s path as an academic 25 K O D I K A S / C O D E 44 (2021) · No. 1 - 3 Gunter Narr Verlag Tübingen Humor in Science: A Tribute to Achim Eschbach and “ denkunmögliche Bastarde ” . Henrik Dindas “ That delightful animal man seems to lose his good-humor whenever he thinks well; he becomes … serious! And where there is laughing and gaiety, thinking cannot be worth anything: ” - so speaks the prejudice of this serious animal against all “ Joyful Wisdom. ” - Well then! Let us show that it is prejudice. (Friedrich Nietzsche) Born in 1948 in Eschweiler, Germany, Achim Eschbach was an outstanding communication scientist and semiotician who will be remembered not only for his significant contributions to semiotics but also for his unique sense of humor. As a scholar, Achim Eschbach made countless contributions to academia, and his research findings have significantly advanced the understanding of the meaning of semiotics. Professor Eschbach has been a major figure in the world of German-language semiotics and has contributed significantly to the (re) development and (re)discovery of this science through his process of “ congenial reading ” (Eschbach, 2013) and with his contributions to the theory and practice of this field, especially with his expositions of Karl Bühler ’ s and Charles Sanders Peirce ’ s theories of language and signs. As a professor, author, and researcher, he has worked for decades to promote semiotics and their application as a basic science in various fields (Dindas, 2021). The choice of semiotics as the overarching science can be justified by the fact that, according to Eschbach, semiotics must be considered the important basic fundamentals of all sciences because there can be no communication that is not mediated by signs, neither in theoretical nor in practical terms (Eschbach, 2003). In this commemorative volume, the life and work of Professor Achim Eschbach will be illustrated in excerpts, and, in particular, his contribution to semiotics and its historicallysystematically significant impact on communication science will be appreciated. Semiotics, nevertheless, is neither just science nor doctrine, but rather an anti-dogmatic “ critical theory of signs in action ” (Eschbach & Sturm, 1981, p. 57). However, Achim Eschbach left a deep mark not only as a researcher but also as a person. One of his most striking characteristics was undoubtedly his sense of humor, which is reflected, as one example, in his strong interest in Samuel Beckett ’ s Theater of the Absurd (Dindas & Eschbach, 2017), while also not always pleasing everyone and anyone, because in science humor is still an underestimated or even unaccepted factor, “ understand[ing] when one contradicts the thinking style of a thinking collective is rarely career-enhancing ” (Eschbach, 2013). In a (scientific) world that often focuses on facts and data, the value of humor and levity can be easily overlooked, in the sense of “ Why waste your space on humor? ” (Friedman, 1969, p. 223). Factors such as precision, logic, and systematicity are at the forefront of research and teaching and can lead to neglect of the human side of science. However, especially when dealing with complex topics, humor can be a valuable tool to connect to other people and thus to the subject matter, to resolve misunderstandings, and to create an atmosphere of openness and creativity so as not to end up as “ bastards incapable of thinking ” (denkunmögliche Bastarde) (Eschbach, n. d.). Humor is often defined as the “ ability and willingness to react cheerfully and calmly to certain things ” (Dudenredaktion, n. d.). It is thus regarded merely as a way of coping with the stress of everyday life and increasing general well-being. In science, humor is consequently considered inappropriate or irrelevant. However, a growing body of research and publications (e. g., Bankes, 2023; Weitze et al., 2021; Yeo et al., 2020; Reiser, 2019; Völzke et al., 2017) suggests that humor should have an important place in science, both in relation to individuals and communities, because humor is as much the “ linguistic, artistic, or similar expression of an attitude of mind determined by humor, nature ” (Dudenredaktion, n. d.). In addition to the Ig Nobel Prize awarded annually at Harvard University, which recognizes achievements that first make people laugh and then make them think (Abrahams, 2002), Martin et al. ’ s (2017) study, for example, addresses the relationship between humor and creativity. The study suggests that higher levels of humor correlate with higher creativity, and the authors conclude that humor may be an important factor in fostering creativity. When considering the range of topics covered by Achim Eschbach - also in this commemorative volume - the hypothesis presented in the study can only be confirmed. Also, the promotion of cooperation is another important contribution of humor, quite without “ a slight sniff ” (p. XX in “ Jan Amos Comenius ’ Orbis sensualium pictus ” ). For example, a study by Bippus et al. (2011) examines the relationship between humor and teamwork in the workplace and finds that humor facilitates and improves communication and collaboration within a team, as humor is a kind of “ lubricant of social interaction ” (Bippus et al., 2011, cited in Yuan, 2021, p. 9). This can be especially beneficial in science, where collaboration is a necessity. However, there are also critical voices. Some argue “ [ … ] with all the greater howl [ … ] ” (p. XX in “ Ex occidente lux ” ) that too much humor in science can lead to the fact that the actual goal of the research would be neglected and that humor in certain areas, can be seen as inappropriate: “ In science itself, laughter has no place. Simply because with the excessive laughter the spirit and the mental activity stops. That is simply so [ … ] ” (Liggieri, quoted from Hinrichs, 2013). Despite these discussions, it seems that the use of humor in science, if appropriate and adapted to the particular working environment, can have many advantages: “ The public relations task of science is [ … ] to rejoin science to the mainstream of life, to humanize it, to keep it in perspective: And humor is probably the major humanizing instrument ” (Friedman, 1969, p. 224). Thus, humor can also play an important role in knowledge transfer, confirms a study by Crawford et al. (2018), which examined the relationship between humor and the effectiveness of teaching methods. The study finds that humorous teaching methods can increase student interest and engagement and improve understanding of the subject matter (Crawford et al., 2018). Consequently, humor can help Humor in Science: A Tribute to Achim Eschbach and “ denkunmögliche Bastarde ” . 27 students remember and understand the content more actively. Furthermore, humor can create a positive learning atmosphere that makes learning and knowledge transfer more enjoyable and effective. At the same time “ captivate and inspire his listeners ” (p. XX in “ Karl Bühler ’ s Axiomatics and the Axiom System of Drawing Theory ” ). The findings presented earlier suggest that humor in science can be an important tool or “ organon ” (Bühler, 1934), as Bühler would have named it, for promoting creativity, collaboration, and general well-being, and can likewise improve learning processes and enhance students ’ understanding of the subject matter. Consequently, in the scientific world, the value of humor is often (still) underestimated. Achim Eschbach was a master of humor - his pointed tongue unique. Thus, his lectures and his writing were characterized by irony, wit, and sarcasm, which often could only be recognized at a second glance. His wordplay and how he made unexpected connections delighted and inspired many students in equal measure. His humor, however, was not limited to the surface. It had a deeper meaning and could help one better understand complex issues. He conveyed a sense of humanity and openness that is rarely found in the often formal and detached world of academia. Consequently, this commemorative volume is intended not only to remember Achim Eschbach as a person, but also the importance of humor in science. We can learn from him that research and academic life are not only about hard facts, but also about humanity, openness, and the ability to laugh. We can learn from him that humor is by no means a “ Stoffentgleisung (matter fallacy) ” (p. XX in “ Distortion ” ) in the manner of a sleight of hand, but an integral part of science that can help to improve understanding and cooperation between disciplines, because humor does not only have an effect on the counterpart, it also has an inward effect (Heinrich, 2021) and ultimately “ Humour [ … ] is a most serious business, not only for coping with science, but for coping with life itself ” (Friedman, 1969, p. 224). As Achim Eschbach himself could not have put it more accurately, we humans are “ [ … ] not bees that carry their samples to their hive mates [ … ] ” (Eschbach 2003, p. 376), but rather we transcend the framework of presentation and make use of representational mediation, for example in the process of understanding what constitutes a “ bell bag ” (p. XX in “ Semiotic Notes on the Process of Understanding. Plea for an Interpretive Theory of the Sign ” ). I am grateful to be able to introduce this memorial volume for my doctoral advisor, mentor, and friend Achim (and, coincidentally, former neighbor), who always managed to inspire me anew for semiotics. Thank you for the endless discussions, suggestions of ideas, and our irreplaceable absurd conversations, as well as my countless “ aha experiences ” (Dindas, 2017, p. 98). I hope that this memorial volume will help to honor Achim Eschbach ’ s legacy as a scientist and as a human being, and to remind us all that humor can be an important part of our lives - even in science. In this spirit, I invite you to sit down and remember Achim Eschbach and his wonderful sense of humor and, as you read this volume, to “ take note slightly irritated because of our deviating everyday experiences ” (p. XX in “ Semiotic Notes on the Process of Understanding. Plea for an Interpretive Theory of the Sign ” ) and perhaps to smile a bit a time or two, “ For such bastards as are incapable of thinking, colloquial language holds ready the telling expression ‘ wooden iron ’ [ … ] ” (Eschbach, n. d.). 28 Henrik Dindas References Abrahams, M. 2002: IG Nobel Prize: The Annals of Improbable Research, London: Orion Bankes, T. 2023: “ Laughing to love science: contextualizing science comedy ” , in: HUMOR 36,1 (2023): 75 - 94 Bippus, A. M., Young, S. L., & Dunbar, N. E. 2011: “ Humor in conflict discussions: comparing partners ’ perceptions ” , Humor Int. J. Humor Res. 24, pp. 1 - 24 Bühler, K. 1934: Sprachtheorie. Die Darstellungsfunktion der Sprache, Jena: Gustav Fischer Dindas, H. 2021: “ Kommunikationsmodelle, Zeichen und Verzeichnung - Semiotische Fundamente der Kommunikationswissenschaft ” , in: Kodikas/ Code. An International Journal of Semiotics 41.3 - 4, pp. 37 - 65. Dindas, H. 2017. Gelingen und Scheitern zwischenmenschlicher Kommunikation. Semiotische Analyse von Kommunikationsmodellen am Beispiel des Werks von Samuel Beckett, Konstanz: UVK | Köln: Herbert von Halem. Dindas, H. & Eschbach, A. 2017: “ Die Verbindung Oswald Külpes zu Samuel Beckett und Charles Sanders Peirce - eine denkpsychologische Begegnung ” , in: C. R. Krauss (Ed.): Discipline Filosofiche. La scienza del pensiero. Il realismo filosofico di Oswald Külpe, Macerata: Quodlibet, pp. 64 - 80. Dudenredaktion (n. d.) “ Humor ” . Retrieved on 22.02.2023, from https: / / www.duden.de/ rechtschreibung/ Humor_Stimmung_Frohsinn Eschbach, A. (n. d.). Zur Tieferlegung der Fundamente. Unveröffentlichtes Redemanuskript. Eschbach, A. 2013: Karl Bühler: Sprachtheorie. Retrieved on 22.02.2023, from https: / / www.rkmjournal.de/ archives/ 13222 Eschbach, A. 2003: “ Semiotik und Kommunikationswissenschaft. Über die Tieferlegung der Fundamente ” , in: H. Richter & H. W. Schmitz (Eds.): Kommunikation - Ein Schlüsselbegriff der Humanwissenschaften? , Münster: Nodus, pp. 371 - 377. Eschbach, A. 1989: “ Verzeichnung ” , in: H. Sturm (Ed.). Verzeichnungen. Vom Handgreiflichen zum Zeichen, Essen: Klartext, pp. 43 - 58. Eschbach, A. & Sturm, H. (Eds.) 1981: Ästhetik und Semiotik. Zur Konstitution ästhetischer Zeichen, Tübingen: Narr. Friedman, B. 1969: “ Respect, not awe, not reverence. The editor comments ” , in: impact of science on society. Vol. XIX, No. 3, The science of humour, the humour of science, July-September, pp. 223 - 224. Heinrich, C. 2021: “ Der beste Witz der Welt. Wer humorvoll ist, gilt als kreativ und intelligent, kann für Erleichterung sorgen und Kummer lindern. Was es für einen guten Witz braucht? Vor allem die Überraschung ” . Retrieved on 22.02.2023, from https: / / www.spektrum.de/ news/ humor-der-lautstudien-beste-witz-der-welt/ 1867510 Hinrichs, D. 2013: “ Wer hier lacht, macht Verdacht ” . Retrieved on 22.02.2023, from https: / / www. deutschlandfunk.de/ wer-hier-lacht-macht-verdacht-100.html Martin, A. J., Ginns, P. & Papworth, B. 2017: “ Motivation and engagement: Same or different? Does it matter? ” , in: Learning and Individual Differences, 55, pp. 150 - 162. Niemann, P. H., Bittner, L., Schrögel, P. H. & Hauser, C. 2020. “ Science slams as edutainment: A reception study ” , in: Media and Communication, 8.1 (2020): 177 - 190. Reiser, W. 2019: “ Witzischkeit und ihre Grenzen ” , in: Cicero 03, pp. 14 - 25. Völzke, C., von Hirschhausen, E. & Fischer, F. 2017: “ Medizinisches Kabarett als Instrument der Gesundheitskommunikation ” , in: Prävention und Gesundheitsförderung 2.12 (2017): 91 - 95. Weitze, M D., Goede, W. C., Heckl, W. M. 2021: “ Zum Einstieg ” , in: Weitze, M. D., Goede, W. C., Heckl, W. M. (eds): Kann Wissenschaft witzig? , Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Humor in Science: A Tribute to Achim Eschbach and “ denkunmögliche Bastarde ” . 29 Yeo, S. K., Anderson, A. & Cacciatoreet, M. A. 2020: “ Scientists as comedians: The effects of humor on perceptions of scientists and scientific messages ” , in: Public Understanding of Science 29.4 (2020): 408 - 418. Yuan Y. 2021: “ Leader - Employee Congruence in Humor and Innovative Behavior: The Moderating Role of Dynamic Tenure ” , in: Frontiers in Psychology 12: 579551. 30 Henrik Dindas K O D I K A S / C O D E 44 (2021) · No. 1 - 3 Gunter Narr Verlag Tübingen Semiotic Notes on the Process of Understanding. Semiotische Anmerkungen zum Verstehensprozeß Plädoyer für eine Deutungstheorie des Zeichens (1996) Abstract: Eschbach discusses in this unpublished text important aspects and elements of the Process of Understanding. Instead of following the widespread misconception that understanding is a quasi-natural activity similar to eating or sleeping, the essay gives vivid examples of acts of understanding. Eschbach underlines that the traditional, dyadic model of meaning is inadequate to describe our actual naming habits and must be replaced by a qualitatively different model. It defines in a graphic representation the sign process and its three relational foundations 1. the immediate object, 2. the representative, and 3. the immediate interpretant, so that the sign can be notated as a triadic relation. The essay summarizes with notes on the immediate and the dynamic object. The immediate object is the idea or thought on which the sign is directly based, the understanding in which it is founded. The dynamic object is the object of the sign, insofar as it is the thing or situation on which that idea or thought and the understanding rest. I. There is a widespread misconception that understanding is a quasi-natural activity similar to eating or sleeping. To this misconception have contributed in particular, lexicologists, semanticists, analytic philosophers, and semioticians, who since antiquity have employed a static, dyadic model of signs, as reflected in the Latin mnemonic aliquid stat pro aliquo. According to the dyadic approach, this signifies that something can be stated clearly and precisely in its scope of meaning. If the meaning of a certain sign escapes us at the moment, we open the tenth volume of the Großer Duden (German dictionary) and are instructed by this dictionary of meanings for a ‘ collection bag ’ or ‘ bell bag, ’ namely one with a small bell attached to a pole, in which church collections are gathered. Visually, this explanation of the term is supported in the style of the Comenian Orbis Pictus by the illustration of one such bag. The fact that there are also bell bags that do not have a bell, or not one attached to a pole in any case, and would be more correctly called baskets, might cause a degree of irritation because we have deviated in our everyday experiences, but we are also used to accepting Duden ’ s authority for the correct spelling of a word. The current discussion about the spelling reform 1 , however, as well as a look over the shoulders of the Duden 1 Note from the editor: 1996. Commission, proves that our lexicons can provide us with nothing more than a snapshot of linguistic habits, to which, in the best case, a specific statistical significance can be attributed, whereby no reasonable person today would still speak of the possibility of timedeprived definability of linguistic signs after the pragmatic turn led by Ludwig Wittgenstein, which gave us insights including that the meaning of a sign is to be sought in its usage. I would like to illustrate this with a short example: In early New High German, any adult person of the female gender was called ‘ wib, ’ whereas noble ladies were called ‘ frouwa. ’ This naming convention changed over time in that ‘ wib ’ underwent a narrowing of meaning and sank to a pejorative term in the form of ‘ weib ’ , while ‘ frouwa ’ underwent a broadening of meaning to become a neutral term for all adult females. What is the lesson of this example? The lesson is as simple as it is momentous: the traditional, dyadic model of meaning is inadequate to describe our actual naming habits and must be replaced by a qualitatively different model. Semiotic theory of meaning was long neglected because of being mistakenly thought of as trivial and settled. This was the case until Lady Victoria Welby, the self-taught correspondence partner of the founder of modern semiotics, Charles Sanders Peirce, asked a crucial question: ‘ What is meaning? ’ in her groundbreaking book of 1903. She gave a threefold answer, distinguishing between ‘ sense, ’ ‘ meaning ’ and ‘ significance. ’ This will inform our further discussion, since Lady Welby clearly showed that these three types of meaning asymptotically approached their goal, the determination of the meaning of a sign, in the process of progressive clarification of meaning, without ever quite reaching it. Lady Welby ’ s semiotics differs from all traditional, dyadic sign theories in one essential respect: Her semiotics is not an identification mechanism with the help of which something is determined or named as something, also referred to as nomenclature models, but a theory of permanent sign production, which puts her in agreement with the Charles S. Peirce. He made a decisive semiotic breakthrough with his novel relational-logical approach. Qualitatively, Peirce ’ s approach meant he no longer pretended to read signs from reality, but instead explicitly stated that he, as an interpreter, produced signs and sign relations that do not exist as such in reality. Because this aspect is critical, I would like to reiterate as did the great Geneva semiologist Ferdinand de Saussure and the linguistic psychologist Karl Bühler that one cannot observe signs as a natural scientist observes an object, but rather you need a “ pointe de vue ” as de Saussure said, which is applied to the object of thinking. The semiotic way of looking at things rids us of the fiction that one can pick up a sign prefabricated by whoever created it in whatever way, and would be accurately described as a model of sign constitution, in so far as in the sign process, the semiosis, as Peirce says, the sign is produced for the very first time. In order to not lose oversight, I would like to unite the essential elements of the sign process in a graphic representation at this point: This scheme is to be read as follows: In the act of attention, the sign interpreter will lift a particular piece out of the continuum of experience. Peirce knows that we can say nothing about things in and of themselves. Still, only saying something about things for us, this very first step of attentional focusing implies that we necessarily and invariably bring a particular way of looking at the object of our experience, what Jürgen Habermas elaborated on in his book Knowledge and Human Interests (Erkenntnis und Interesse) and what the largely unknown Polish philosopher Ludwik Fleck vividly brought out in his work Genesis 34 Semiotic Notes on the Process of Understanding and Development of a Scientific Fact ( “ Die Entstehung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache ” ) based on medical material. Without going into a multitude of other relevant references, I would nevertheless like to point out that the thesis of the theory-guidedness of observation has now been widely accepted by a philosophy of science. The dynamic object is subjected to interpretation in a primary act of interpretation. But because the objects of experience do not come directly into our head, or in other words, because there is no direct relation between the immediate object and the immediate interpretant, we have to basically and systematically apply as mediation a material representamen (like sound waves or chalk on the blackboard), which bridges the immaterial sign object (and/ or) and the immaterial interpretant. The sign process thus comprises relational foundations 1. the immediate object, 2. the representative, and 3. the immediate interpretant, so that the sign can be notated as a triadic relation of (0, R, I). The aspect which will concern us more intensively in the following, namely the aspect of the interpretant relation, appears to us - as indicated in the scheme - in three forms in Peirce, as immediate interpretant, as dynamic interpretant, and as final or logical interpretant. Peirce explains the three interpretant types, which represent distinguishable stages in the otherwise continuous, unfinishable process of interpretation, in the following way: “ I define a sign as anything which is so determined by something else, called its object, and so determines an effect upon a person, which effect I call its interpretant, that the latter is thereby mediately determined by the former. A sign thus has a triadic relation to its object and its interpretant. It is necessary to distinguish the Immediate Object, or the Object as the Sign represents it, from the Dynamical Object, or efficient but not immediately present Object. It is likewise requisite to distinguish the Immediate Interpretant, i. e. the Interpretant represented or signified in the Sign, from the Dynamic Interpretant, or effect produced on the mind by the Sign; and both of these from the Normal Interpretant, or effect that would be produced on the mind by the Sign after sufficient development of thought. ” (C. P., 8.343) II. Scientific hermeneutics is not a historically late and abruptly appearing art product of the human mind. It grows out of an anthropological heritage. The detachment of the drive from preformed motor activity, which is peculiar to the human species, and the associated weakening of biological unambiguity of behavior form the basis for the genus-typical ways Semiotic Notes on the Process of Understanding 35 in which humans deal with each other and with the world. Because of an open drive structure and a “ language which in turn fits it ” (Plessner, 1978: XVIII), humankind is characterized by biological ambiguity. This means: The biological ambiguity of behavior forces humans from the beginning to always interpret their environment, the behavior of their fellow humans, and their own behavior. Human perception and action are fundamentally accompanied by interpretation, shaped by a lack of biological unambiguity in human behavior, and forced to compare different possibilities of interpretation. They require the storage of one ’ s own and traditional, foreign experiences in memory - the formation of memory - and the choice of one of the identified possibilities of interpretation in current actions. Thus, every conception generated by external perception is a mixed product of the impressions forming in perception and of an indeterminately large number of elements of memory images that can be evoked and organized in different ways depending on the occasion, situation, mood, and other influences. Perception and interpretive activity are linked from the outset and before - often even without - these primary interpretive activities come into the realm of consciousness, which builds itself on this uncertain ground. Uncertainty - about the verifiability of one ’ s own experience - is for all individuals furthermore the social stock of knowledge handed down as allegedly secured prior knowledge, which each of us considers socio-historical apriori, into which he grows without noticing it at first and to which he refers in his actions. It is these traditional knowledge and orientation systems to which each of us refers in most of our actions and views. In contrast, only a very small part - the smallest part - of our knowledge of the world is based on personal experience. Most of our knowledge and actions are based on handed-down experiences which, on the one hand, expand our knowledge and embed it together with others in a knowledge community, but which, on the other hand, may well be stereotyped as far removed from reality or even elements of a collective delusional system that we have - for the time being - adopted. To the genus inheritance part belongs - likewise committed to the starting position shaped by biological ambiguity of behavior - the schooling and handing down of interpretation techniques and abilities in the primary socialization, but also beyond it: the everyday, regular interaction, of human individuals with their fellow human beings and their environment, is the result of this schooling, in which - primarily through learned language, but not exclusively through it - the socio historically handed-down patterns of interpretation and contexts of meaning are acquired, and in which each new member of the species rehearses both in a socially already interpreted world and in proven, routinized modes of interpretation of the particular community to which he or she belongs. Probably the most striking hermeneutic facts, which can be found equally in all times and all societies, are religions or religious interpretations of the world, in which not only different figures of interpretation, but also techniques of interpretation, traditions of interpretation, contents of interpretation, and the symbolic forms of these contents are practiced and passed on repeatedly. Despite this starting point, which is common to all people and societies, and despite the specialists in interpretation that can be found in all times and societies (in religions and/ or jurisprudence, among priests, magicians, kings, advisors, artists), what we 36 Semiotic Notes on the Process of Understanding call scientific hermeneutics today has a very specific origin that can be reconstructed in concrete historical terms. Over a long history, the ancient and Judeo-Christian interpretations of the world, constructions of reality, cultural products, ways of thinking, and social skills constitute the specific scientific horizon of interpretation of the term ‘ hermeneutics. ’ Like the occidental sciences, which are committed to the same cultural area and of which it is a product, it is simultaneously culture-dependent and universal in its claim. Hermeneutics as a technique, skill, and methodology of interpretation of symbolic human expressions, forms of expression, and products of action develops into a scientific procedure and scientific art of interpretation based on an elaborate system of writing and texts that can be written and handed down. Without this basis, and before its development, scientific hermeneutics was not possible. Their first formal preconditions are 1. discursivity, i. e. the material fixity and thus the tradability of symbolic or symbolically interpretable human utterances (this means all, not only the linguistic products of action); 2. the linguistic version, written fixation and thus the tradability of the interpretation of these symbolic utterances. Only through these preconditions can the objectives of scientific interpretation be achieved: the continuity of attention to a fixed object of interpretation - lifted out of the flow of action processes; based on this, the extensive interpretation of the object of interpretation, i. e. the search for and construction of all conceivable interpretations and thus of both the general potential of the meaning of the object of interpretation and the respective socio-historically conditioned horizon of interpretation of the interpreters; finally, the extensive verification of the fixed interpretations on likewise fixed text by the group of interpreters, which tends to be historically continuable and expandable. Scientific hermeneutics is thus the product of writing and written documentation of human actions, attitudes, and sensations. The development of written systems, for its part, represents a further evolutionary step towards the development, differentiation, and explication of human systems of action, orientation, meaning, and interpretation. Scientific hermeneutics has a decisive share in utilizing this potential of writing and textual documentation. It results from historical development and shows itself in a - not yet finished - history of development. It also constitutes historical thinking by the moment of the tradability of interpretations and by documentation of actions, events, and products. By fixing human expressions, it preserves them, documents them in their uniqueness, makes them distinguishable from other documents, places the documents and their interpretations ‘ in temporal order ’ and refers to the collection and stringing together of documents to change, and succession. The collection of historical documents and their interpretations represent at the same time 1. the material of history, 2. the historicity of interpretations, and 3. the constitution and development of historical thinking. The art theory of scientific understanding is necessarily an art theory of historical understanding. The formal presuppositions of scientific hermeneutics are based on the fixity and retrievability of the data to be interpreted and the interpretations. However, understanding and interpretation of human actions, products, and interpretations of actions have their roots in people ’ s everyday interactions with each other and their environment. Understanding and interpretation are not only historically but also systematically before any Semiotic Notes on the Process of Understanding 37 scientific attitude: they are performances of interaction and consciousness that are performed as a matter of course in everyday life - in any historical everyday world. These performances of understanding are intersubjectively unfolded from earliest childhood. I. e., understanding is at the same time genetically laid out and in its concrete formation a skill imparted in dependence on the general structure of human socialization and the culturally specific selective training of attention. At the same time, these prescientific comprehension skills - the so-called everyday hermeneutics - are quite complicated in structure and stratification. They have a phylogenesis, a phylogenetic history, a cultural and social history - and they have a historical, ontogenesis embedded in a sociohistorical a priori. These comprehensions, which have always accompanied and constituted human interaction and their conditions of origin and function, are normally not discussed as a problem in science, certainly not in everyday life. Instead, they are practiced as a matter of course in science and everyday life. As something always taken for granted, they do not come into the view of consciousness: Although they structure consciousness performances that guide action, they can hardly be brought into consciousness reflectively, even in everyday activities and pressure to act. In their acquisition and application, they are typified and routinized, whereby this routinization and typification of understanding performances and skills psychologically relieves those who act. At the same time, routinizations and typifications are the preconditions of every social interaction. They constitute the trust of the interaction partners that each of them performs the same services, participates in a common interaction repertoire, has the same formal competencies, and accordingly can follow and understand socially acceptable meanings. The problem of scientific hermeneutics thus consists primarily in the fact that it is an idealizing and at the same time case-specific oriented reconstruction of not only the interaction and the products of interaction, but also, in connection with this, of the prescientific, everyday achievements and skills of understanding and their premises, rules, and results. III. In everyday communication, we are usually spontaneously content with what we hear and only in rare cases have to ask how someone meant something. When confronted with written texts, it happens much more frequently that difficulties in understanding arise, and it doesn ’ t even have to be extraordinary texts that cause us to falter. I remember recently pondering over an elementary school report and having to ask an expert for advice to understand the conventionalized text. Semiotically, the question of the end of interpretation ‘ would ’ have to be answered differently again, because strictly speaking, the interpretation of a text only leads to a new text, which entails and demands a new interpretation ad infinitum. To bring this out of the thin air of theory onto the ground of facts, consider newly enacted laws. They are usually followed by regulations and a cascade of commentaries, which in turn give rise to new commentaries, until after some time, if necessary, there is an amendment to the law, which gives rise to new regulations and commentaries. The infinite interpretation could be proven and explained by numerous 38 Semiotic Notes on the Process of Understanding other examples. I would only like to take up the exegesis of the holy scriptures, which has led to an unmanageable flood of signs. To offer an inconclusive interpretation, the semiotically indispensable principle of permanence requires some explanations and clarifications to exclude possible misunderstandings. First, it should be pointed out in this context that the principle of permanent interpretation is a direct consequence of a certain semiotic axiomatic structure. According to common opinion, the meaning of a sign owes itself to a social convention or explicit positing. Apart from a few exceptional cases, however, this is not true, for the constitution of a sign does not, as a rule, take place in such a way that two or more people determine the meaning of a sign expressis verbis. It is somewhat true that we are born into an already existing community of interpretation and adopt its habits of signification. We have to imagine the acquisition of a semiotic competence not in the sense of a constantly growing lexicon but in the sense of the development of semiotic creativity, which enables us to reconstruct hitherto unknown signs in the categories of our cultural community of interpretation in a meaningful way and to create in an individually creative way new signs, which are novel to the members of our community of interpretation, but not close to them. To explain this semiotically elementary fact, I would like to refer to the so-called meaningful errors that children repeatedly make in the process of language acquisition. As a further example of semiotic creativity, I want to mention the wide field of artistic activities in which have developed principles of deviation, alienation, and reshaping to special mastery, without doing something particularly different from everyday communication. If, however, sign users in the free play of semiotic forces reconstitute signs in every semiotic act, which must then be reconstructed by communication partners using the same semiotic principle so that communication can succeed, it is no longer meaningful to assume a fixed lexically specifiable sign meaning. Instead, meanings should be considered vague and fuzzy, and instruments capable of mastering vagueness in the act of communication should be developed. The processuality and continuity of sign interpretation must also be considered from the perspective of another semiotic axiom, that all thinking is thinking in signs. This principle, which to my knowledge was first formulated by Charles Sanders Peirce in the course of his critique of intuitionism, states that our thinking is not presuppositionless or capable of creating something out of nothing, but always presupposes signs which it applies interpretatively to the respective situation of action, thereby changing it and insofar providing occasion and material for further interpretation. This principle of continuity ensures on the one hand that at least potentially all previous knowledge finds its way into our interpretations, which Merton put into the vivid metaphor “ We all stand on the shoulders of giants ” which in its original version goes back to Bernard of Chartres, and on the other hand ensures that the process of interpretation does not come to a standstill as long as humankind exists. The permanent process of interpretation thus very much acquires the character of an archaeology of knowledge, to take up an expression of Michel Foucault, without thereby losing its innovative impetus, insofar as each singular process of interpretation finds a specific situation that has never existed before in this form and will never return in this form again. Thus, interpreting is not a passive reaction to what already exists, but a creation of something entirely new. Our interest in understanding the world interpretatively is therefore the actual epistemological motor of our spiritual orientation. Semiotic Notes on the Process of Understanding 39 The principle inconclusiveness of sign interpretation has led various authors to overextend the process of interpretation fatally, considering the absence of a univocal meaning as a legitimation to postulate the equivocation of all meanings in free flotation from meaning to meaning, in associative rambling and reminiscences, fantasies, word games, etymologies, and image compositions. Two of these tendencies to let interpretation drift in an uncontrolled and uncontrollable way, namely so-called deconstructivism a la Derrida and hermetic semiosis of the mystics and alchemists have been examined in detail in Umberto Eco ’ s essential work The Limits of Interpretation. Since Eco has pointed out with greater clarity the errors of the principle of the deconstructionist and the alchemist approach, I do not wish to recount this critique here, but merely to refer to this excellent work and highlight the consequences that are fruitful for our context of the discussion. Rather than denying the existence of univocal meaning in the sense of the modern theory of drift, or asserting the universal linkage of everything to everyone in the sense of the Hermeticists, critical semiotics rests on the fundamental principle that a sign is something through the knowledge of which we learn more (cf. C. P., 8.2332). In contrast, Hermetic semiosis emphasizes that the sign is something through which we learn something else. In Peirce ’ s semiotics, “ to experience more ” means that in the process of interpretation, i. e. in the transition from one interpreter to the next, the sign is determined more and more precisely, both in terms of its extension and its intensity. So we may say that in the course of the sign process the interpretation approaches asymptotically the last, logical interpretant, which is why in an advanced stage of the process of cognition, a more exact knowledge of the sign object is attained than at the beginning of the interpretation. Every sign potentially contains the totality of the conclusions that can be derived from it, only as a possibility that could actualize itself under certain conditions as the reality of a sign. The in-principle infinite interpretation process is usually interrupted repeatedly by the need for action. Still, despite these interruptions, the rule is that in each phase of semiosis, one has more exact knowledge of the content of what is represented than in the preceding phase and at the starting point. In contrast to this understanding of unlimited semiosis, for modern theories of drift, a sign is not something through which we gain more knowledge, but something in which we are confronted with something else, repeatedly. Eco has defined drift as a case of connotative neoplasm. The connotative neoplasm lives from the fact that, precisely because of the denial of a fixed, unambiguous, identical signifier, virtually everything can be brought into the relation of similarity with everyone. Peirce explicitly warns against this, calling it an aberration: “ There is no greater nor more frequent mistake in practical logic than to suppose that things which resemble one another strongly in some respects are and the more likely for that to be alike in others. ” (C. P., 2.634). Vivid literary examples of infinite drift, which use, among other things, the exuberant similarity principle just criticized, can be found in Eugène Sue ’ s The Wandering Jew or in Umberto Eco ’ s Foucault ’ s Pendulum. I would like to take the liberty here of making a critical remark about Umberto Eco ’ s intellectually questionable path in his second novel, in that he exaggerates the free play of the signifiers into the grotesque and links and intertwines everything with everything so that in the end a gigantic world conspiracy of the Jews and Freemasons, the Rosicrucians and the KGB looks out. But what is meant as an intellectual game and criticism by boundless exaggeration could be taken seriously by other readers with terrible implications. The 40 Semiotic Notes on the Process of Understanding atrocious propaganda of the Nazis quite successfully used similar motifs of a Jewish world conspiracy. The pseudo-connotative infinite sign strings arising from a logical error named by Peirce are not to be made one with the infinite sign processes identified by Peirce. These occur like out-of-control cell division in the spreading of metastases, which occur according to the regulatory mechanism of intersubjective verification. If the control over the growth of semioticity is lost in the course of semiosis, the sign loses its normal function. That associative sliding from meaning to meaning, which is typical for the interpretative drift, arises in a comparable way to processes in metastasis. The infinite semiosis is therefore not to be equated with a boundless free, arbitrary interpretation. The transformation of signs into other signs, which are supposed to be better, i. e. more clarifying, than the initial sign, is not a solipsistic but a social action; concerning its validity, it is dependent on general acceptance, which must come sooner or later if it is to endure. However, this socially dimensioned semiotic meliorism, which manifests itself in belief, conviction, and assent, does not guarantee a factual reference and does not, by itself, lead to an ontology of the real, even in the long run. This was never the opinion of Peirce either, who did not hold at all that sign interpretation as such, the mere translation of signs into other signs leads to knowledge of the real or any progress in this knowledge. Sign interpretation understood as a mere, immanent clarification of concepts, for which the factually real appears only as utopian fiction, is precisely that sign idealism, which he did not tire of denouncing as nominalism, as a sin of modern philosophy, which makes it impossible for it to explain a fact of natural science. Instead, it is knocked into shape until it assumes the form needed for anominalistic purposes. There is no transition from the sign idealism of sign-immanent understood semiotic processes to sign-determined knowledge of reality. Proper signification differs from false signification in that it has not only a fundamentum in mente but also a fundamentum in re. Peirce expressed this fact terminologically by differentiating between the immediate and the dynamic object in the concept of the object of the sign. The immediate object is the idea or thought on which the sign is directly based, the understanding in which it is founded. The dynamic object is the object of the sign, insofar as it is the thing or situation on which that idea or thought and the understanding rest. To say that signs always refer only to signs as true and false at the same time, at least in need of supplementation by the additional statement that a sign linkage has truth value only because it has a fundamentum in re, which as such is not thought of to its full extent as a sign, but also as a sign ground, as a being in the mode of the sign. This is different from claiming that interpretation is merely the clarification of something in another and always involves other signs, whereby the something spoken of in each case is ultimately unfixable. Such an assumption remains in that epistemological idealism of signs, which constantly calls signs the conditions of the possibility of experience but does not show how experience and reality as a process of signs happen in concrete. This amounts to a plea for an interpretive theory of the sign in which the possibilities of epistemology, hermeneutics, and relational logic are fruitfully united. Semiotic Notes on the Process of Understanding 41 K O D I K A S / C O D E 44 (2021) · No. 1 - 3 Gunter Narr Verlag Tübingen Ex Occidente Lux: Continuity. Ex occidente Lux: Kontinuität. Überlegungen zur semiotischen Rekonstruktion der alteuropäischen Schrift. (1997) Abstract: This text reviews the recent history of archaeological research until ‘ 97. The archeological findings, based on a global body of research, are instrumentalized as examples of applied semiotics. The text builds on the abductive principle developed by Charles S. Peirce and gives an overview of theories and findings concerning the development of sign systems while positioning them in relation to semiotic theory. It discusses an essential problem in communication studies, namely, the genetic relation of verbal and nonverbal communication in general, and the relation of speech and writing in particular. Furthermore, this study on the emergence of writing systems is intended to illustrate that specific research problems cannot be grasped from the narrow perspective of individual disciplines, but only in an interdisciplinary way. I. It was just 141 years ago that Johann Carl Fuhlrott, a natural historian from Elberfeld, correctly determined that skeletal remains found in the Neander Valley near Düsseldorf were relics of an ice-age human being. Professor Fuhlrott, however, did not receive approbation of his conclusion, which was as bold as it was correct; instead, the experts of his time - first and foremost the Göttingen professor Rudolf Wagner and the famous physician and prehistorian Rudolf Virchow - poured scorn and derision on the outsider and variously assigned the remains to a cave bear or a member of the defeated Napoleonic Russian army. How can such gross misjudgments be made? Nowadays, when even elementary school students are familiar with the basic principles of evolution, it is difficult to understand that there should have been an epoch in which homo sapiens conceived of themselves as being at the unchanging pinnacle of creation, owing to the existence to a creatio ex nihilo, and that precisely this mystical conception not only determined the thinking of our forefathers but was destined to be celebrated in the merry rites that accompany the US-American controversy over whether Darwin ’ s theory of evolution can be taught in school or not. Today we are incomparably better informed about the prehistory and early history of humankind than we were 150 years ago: We know that human evolutionary history reaches back into the hard-to-imagine space of 4.5 - 5 million years; we know that the evolutionary paths of the pongids and hominids diverged about 6 million years ago; we know that the modern human, who long ago possessed elaborate tool technology and was naturally gifted with language, left Africa about 100 - 150,000 years ago to start conquering the entire world. We know that a characteristic feature of homo sapiens, now widespread worldwide, is its ability to exist in contradiction to its ecological context. However, we also know that, although countless human fossils have been found, we still need more than 99.99 % of the pieces in the puzzle of hominid phylogeny to prove our origin story. Suppose we have sufficiently mocked the ignorance of the 19th-century paleo-anthropologists. In that case, we can move on to the next scandal, initiated about 100 years later by the work of the two archaeologists, Marie König and Marija Gimbutas. Marie König, in her carefully documented studies, speaks of the sign language of early mankind (König 1973), and Marija Gimbutas summarizes her extensive research in the treatises The Civilization of the Goddess (Gimbutas 1996) and The Language of the Goddess (Gimbutas 1995), which have recently become available in German translation. Suppose we inquire into what the actual scandal of these works was about. In that case, we would have to air several interrelated motives: 1. Marie König documents a continuous interpretative tradition from Neolithic times to the Celts and Romans, where up to now the consciousness prevailed that there was no way back to prehistoric barbarian times, which is why it seemed permissible to deny any interpretative connection between early modern humankind and the present time. More radically put, in the sense of the progress paradigm, this would mean simply denying Neolithic man almost any cultural achievement. 2. Marija Gimbutas, based on extensive archaeological research in Southeastern Europe, came to the conclusion that thousands of years before the immigration of Indo-European tribes to Europe, the area between Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest, and Kyiv was inhabited by an early advanced civilization, which is now called Old European or Proto-Indo-European culture. 3. Even if the discovery of an early advanced civilization on European soil would be sufficiently significant in itself because this advanced civilization was completely unknown until the seventies and eighties, the astonishing achievements of ancient European culture do not only add up to a veritable scientific sensation, but also appear to have initiated a scientific paradigm shift: Long before the Neolithic agrarian revolution in the fertile Near Eastern Crescent, ancient Europeans lived in agrarian cities, undertook an astonishing degree of pre-industrial division of labor, manufactured their clay and metal products in serial production, and distributed them in long-distance trade. They possessed a rich religious life, developed humankind ’ s first writing system as far as we know today; and, as if all this were not enough, there is reason to believe that the ancient Europeans, who were not very warlike, lived in a horribile dictu matriarchy. The experts had probably taken note of Marija Gimbuta ’ s research results with benevolent approval as a broadening of knowledge and would have probably also accepted a shift in thinking about the origins of writing - from the orient to occident - were it not for the notion of an impossible matriarchy. Therefore, it is not very surprising that the experts - apart from Shann S. Winn, who carefully examined and documented the Vin č a script in his dissertation Minn 1995), as well as Harald Haarmann, who interpreted the Vin č a script Ex Occidente Lux: Continuity 43 in detail in his latest book - paid little attention to the actual cultural achievements of the first human civilization, yet pounced with ever greater howls on the matriarchal thesis, for which I would like to refer only to the Göttinnendämmerung (Dawn of Goddesses) of the three Freiburg archaeologists Brigitte Roder, Juliane Hummel and Brigitta Kunz (1996). In the following, I will only indirectly participate in the continuation of this, in my opinion, rather fruitless debate and instead single out the writing of the Vin č a culture and discuss it under the following perspectives: 1. The following discussion is to be understood as an example of applied semiotics; 2. Semiotic axiomatics, presented here as the axiom of continuity, are seen as a heuristic principle; 3. I will use the abductive principle developed by Charles S. Peirce, without explaining it in more detail in the present context; 4. The study of ancient European writing is intended to illustrate that specific research problems cannot be grasped from the narrow perspective of individual disciplines, but only in an interdisciplinary way; 5. I would like to discuss an essential problem in communication studies, namely the genetic relation of verbal and nonverbal communication in general and the relation of speech and writing in particular, from a semiotic point of view. II. An adequate understanding of the semiotic development of humankind has failed over a very long period of time because of the static prefabrication model that Jürgen von Kempski (1992: 21-43) has called the Zim-Zum principle: the creation out of nothing. “ In the beginning, God created heaven and the earth. And the earth was without form, and void, ” it says in Genesis 1.1. On the penultimate day of creation, the remarkably always speaking God created man in his image (Genesis, 1.2.5), so the fully formed man entered the earth speaking. Even if it is left to everybody to accept this account of creation literally or metaphorically or not at all, there can be no doubt that the word and the language in the sense of the occidental, logocentric tradition, determine the beginnings of the human race. There is no talk of writing for a long time here and in the following. Only after the reception of the ten commandments (Moses, 2.20 ff.) do we hear that Moses wrote down the words of the Lord; again, it should not be argued about a literal or metaphorical interpretation of this passage, as it is useless to think about the origin of Moses ’ sudden ability to write, because in the present context, as for the long following period, the only decisive factor is the fact that writing fulfills the function of a language-dependent, secondary system of tabulating what happened. Writing has always remained under the aegis of the linguistically composed thinking of our civilization in the subordinate function in which it appeared to us at the first historical encounter: as a secondary and derived notation system. From the point of view of the critical semiotics I represent, I have to reject the determination of writing as a notational system subordinated to language as fundamentally wrong, which I have justified in more detail in my treatise on the semiotics of writing (Eschbach 1993). The situation is not fundamentally improved even if we describe writing, with Elisabeth Feldbusch (1985), as an autochthonous system and promote writing to a 44 Ex Occidente Lux: Continuity position equal to language. We need a radically new, semiotic-communication-scientific perspective to justify that we need the graphic, the drawing, and the active gesture to reach language. Neither at the beginning of human history nor at the beginning of ontogenesis do we have the - innate - word at our disposal (no matter how much instinct theorists à la Pinker may lament), but only the indicative, deictic gesture. There seems to be no accidental peculiarity of the Indo-European etymology that in the etymon of ‘ deiknimi ’ = ‘ pointing ’ also ‘ fingers ’ and ‘ five ’ are contained. The bodily-apriorically bound to the pointing with the hand only allows us to mark a topomnestic space, as Karl Bühler (1934: 147 f.) states in his theory of language, and only after a long phase of speechless, though not soundless, pointing do we slowly get into the position of socially unfolding verbal language based on this original, gestural articulation, which is programmatically contained in Andre Leroi- Gourhan ’ s book The Evolution of Writing. Reviewing the recent history of archaeological research, we come across many remarkable, surprising facts that defy explanation by the standard anti-evolutionary model. I would like to present some of these surprising facts by way of example: 1. Recently, several throwing spears about 400,000 years old have been discovered in the lignite mining area of Schöningen by scientists of the Institute for the Preservation of Monuments of the Lower Saxony State Administration Office. The spears were each made from the trunks of thirty-year-old spruce trees in such a way that there was mainly hardwood at the tips. It is also remarkable that the proportions of the spears largely coincide with each other. As with a modern sports spear, the centers of gravity are at the end of the front third. With these finds, the previous view must be revised that organized hunting began only with the rise of anatomically modern man. 2. In the Coornamu Marshes in northern Australia, researchers have discovered a boulder covered with more than 6,000 rings about two centimeters in size that, taken together, form a kangaroo. With the help of suitable procedures, the Australian rock carvings could be dated to an age of 75,000 years. 3. A flute carved from a bone was discovered in a Slovenian cave in 1995. This musical instrument was determined to be 43,000 - 67,000 years old. The assumption is that the music-making human must have also possessed an articulated, vocal gesture. 4. 1994 saw the discovery of the stone-age Grotte Chauvet in the French Ardèche. With the help of the C14 method, the rock paintings of the Grotte Chauvet, have been found to have an unprecedented level of design. However, they are significantly older than all other cave paintings known so far, for example from Altamira, Lascaux, Cassis, or Niaux, which are dated back 32,410 years. 5. It has been known for some time that the creative will of Ice Age people not only manifested itself on the rock faces of their cow shelter caves but also found a remarkable plastic form of expression. For the most part, these are representations of women, which, due to their “ deformations, ” as Marie König writes, differ significantly from the contemporaneous, “ naturalistic ” rock drawings of, for example, the Grotte Chauvet. 6. In the so-called “ giant cave ” of the Brandberg on the eastern edge of the central Namib Desert on the border between Namibia and Angola, about 43,000 rock drawings have been preserved so far, aged around 27,500 years as determined using the C14 method. The Ex Occidente Lux: Continuity 45 human representations at the Brandberg partly show such an enormous detail that even conclusions about beard shaping are possible. 7. About 7,500 years ago, the ocean water level rose so strongly due to melting ice sheets that there was a breakthrough at the Bosporus in the direction of the Black Sea and a gigantic flood. With all necessary caution concerning the documentary content, one cannot help thinking about the catastrophic floods written about in the Bible, during the Gilgamesh epic. Those who were able to save themselves from the flood, which took around a kilometer of land every day, fled to southeastern Europe, carrying the achievements of the Neolithic revolution in the then flooded and salinated coasts of the Black Sea, to new settlements. 8. For a few years now, it has become common to consider the agrarian culture in Southeastern Europe, built by the “ flood ” refugees, as the first advanced human culture and call it Proto-Indo-European (PIE) or Old European culture. Besides numerous highly astonishing cultural achievements originating from the most important settlements of the PIE culture in Vin č a, Tripolje, Hódmez ő vásárhely, Sesklo, Karanovo, and Cucuteni, reported mainly by Marija Gimbutas (1995 and 1996), the first writing of humankind originated in this Old European, Occidental culture. In the sense of Peirce ’ s abduction, I consider the surprising facts presented under points 1 - 8 as the complex premise of a hypothetical conclusion. But if - as I have argued before - gestural-graphic articulation corresponds to a basic human need, there would be a reason to take PIE writing for granted. In the sequel, I will argue that the self-evidence of the previously formulated hypothesis is primarily supported, if not required, by the semiotic continuity axiom. When it comes to supporting the thesis of cultural continuity from the Paleolithic period to the recent past, numerous experts such as Marie König, James Mellaart, Marija Gimbutas, or Harald Haarmann can be named as authorities who unanimously emphasize that cultural development takes place in a continuous process: cultura non facit saltus! By the example of the net-like grid structures, convincing and evident proof can be given that specific structures and motifs have been preserved over a long period of time: Already in the oldest rock drawings, the grid structure appears. After many intermediate stations, which I do not document here, it still returns twenty thousand years later on numerous Celtic coins. Yes, we even find evidence for it on the Aachen imperial throne of Charlemagne. In the present context, this is undoubtedly an exciting finding, which remains so long in the superficial and decorative, until the question of the respective function and meaning does not receive a satisfying answer. To express this fact again a little more dramatically: If we come across a depiction of a deer in a French Ice Age cave and discover the image of a roaring deer in a living room in Essen, this coincidence does not justify any useful conclusions. In the search for the answer to the question of function and meaning, motif and style analyses and typologies must be transcended in the direction of a semiotic evaluation of the material at hand, as evidenced not least by Emmanuel Anati ’ s failed typologies in the Valcamonica project. My seventh semiotic axiom emphasizes the processuality of sign interpretation. The processuality of sign interpretation is characterized by being underpinned by delimitation and the transfer of what is already known. That is why there can be no presuppositionless 46 Ex Occidente Lux: Continuity sign interpretation in principle. Regarding the notorious issue of the origin of sign interpretation, I recommend with Peirce ’ s dictum of possible reflection that the beginning of sign interpretation is a process of beginning. In the semiotic interpretation of old European script, the axiom of continuity demands that we determine its preconditions and precursors to be able to grasp the specific interpretative progress that it achieved compared with earlier approaches. However, the continuation of the old European writing tradition must not be neglected either, because only in the demarcation of what is already known and the expansion to what is still unknown and therefore new, can the specific character of difference of the old European sign system emerge. What programmatically appears to be completely free of doubt and plausible raises quite considerable difficulties in practice, since we find ourselves in the most unfavorable starting position imaginable concerning the origin of Old European writing if we orient ourselves by the criteria of analysis systematized by I. J. Gelb (1952): 1. We do not yet know who spoke the ancient European language; 2. It is not yet known what language ancient Europeans spoke; 3. So far, no translation of an Old European text into another language or script is known from which certain conclusions for any reconstruction work. The various hurdles that stand in the way of the reconstruction of Old European writing require a whole bundle of interdisciplinary analytical steps, some of which I would like to present: 1. Genetic analysis of the PIE burials or a mitochondrial analysis (Gibbons 1993: 1249; cf. Forster 1995: 743-753) could in principle provide information about which ethnic substratum the PIE people belonged to. It would be conceivable, for example, that the PIE people were related to the few non-Indo-European ethnic groups that can still be traced in Europe today, namely the Raetians and the Basques. Should relevant data emerge from the genetic analysis, some promising linguistic hypotheses are likely to follow. 2. In a situation like the present one, in which neither the semantics nor the pragmatics of a linguistic community can be made in any significant way, it would make sense, following the example of the great typologist Joseph Greenberg, to bring order into the inventory of the characters of the Old European script with the help of a purely statistical procedure. Since Shann S. Winn in his exemplary dissertation has already worked up the entire character inventory of the old European script, nothing more stands in the way of the statistical script analysis. We must be aware, however, that this kind of analysis cannot transcend the narrow confines of syntax and morphemics until semantic and pragmatic data becomes available. If neither the PIE civilization nor the PIE script sank without trace, but instead were taken over by the Indo-European conquerors as well as by the Cretan Linear A and the Minoan Linear B and found their way into the Messapic script, there would be in principle the possibility of a back-transposition of the findings with the help of suitable procedures. The Germanist Derk Ohlenroth from Tübingen has just presented a stimulating study on this Ex Occidente Lux: Continuity 47 subject under the title Das Abaton des Lykäischen Zeus und der Hain der Elaia (Ohlenroth 1996), and promising investigations of the Messapic script, which Simona Marchesini Velasco is conducting at the Seminar for General Linguistics, also from Tübingen. In an idea-historical procedure, which Gert Meier (1988) not particularly happily calls ‘ language archaeology ’ , attempts have been made to reconstruct complex concepts linguistically, something carried out with ice-age people already. Concepts like space, ” “ time, ” “ life ” and “ death ” appeared to be behind the content of many cave paintings, convincingly demonstrated in a detailed line of evidence, which I must refrain from reproducing here. Language archaeology carries these proto-terms into early languages and tries on this bridgehead-like basis to form a continuous reading of written testimonies. The most adventurous theories have been put forward in the past for interpreting cave paintings and visual art of the Ice Age, ranging from shamanism to hunting magic to a visual historical archive. The Stone Age female statuettes have also been included in this interpretive swirl, and while some suspected early sexist pornographers at work (cf. e. g. Guthrie 1984), others diagnosed obesity as a result of an overabundance of animal food, and while still others celebrated the level of design of the Stone Age artworks, hardly anyone has come up with a cultural semiotic interpretation that is characterized as much by simplicity as by plausibility: The Neolithic people did not “ wallpaper ” their cult sites deep inside their sharks with murals and decorate them in a homely way, and they did not perform hunting magic there, even if some spectacular examples (see bison man) seem to invite such misinterpretations. It comes to an integral explanation only at the moment when the supposed art or decoration or magic character of the ice-age objects is moved into the background and the elementary semiotic question is examined, whether there is a semiotic function above or beside the sheer physicality or materiality of the ice-age objects, which may have been motivating behind this “ ice-age art ” not only in the sense of a surplus of meaning but of a constitutive force. If we let ourselves be guided by the thought that Neolithic man ordered his universe semiotically, and expressed it in a sacred script because for the time being no other form of expression was available to him, if we regard the Ice Age products like the writings of other cultures (such as the Chinese) as a semiotic manifestation of fundamental problems of human existence, i. e., if we interpret the Neolithic products as a worldviewreligious signature, we have taken a decisive step to leave behind material thinking and to open the door to a semiotic interpretation of the Ice Age worldview. The ice-age human knows only what can be expressed in a characteristic signature, and if we want to understand, we must strive to learn to read this signature. Michel Lorblanchet, director at the Centre National de Recherche Scientifique and author of the recently published handbook Cave Painting (Lorblanchet 1997b), has come to a decisive step closer to the semiotic interpretation of the Ice Age signature during his extensive and creative studies. Based on his experience with Australian Aborigines, Maître Lorblanchet tried a spraying technique in which certain dyes are chewed and then sprayed by mouth onto a rock wall. In a field test, the French scholar depicted the dotted horses of the Pech Merle cave and individual figures from the sharks of Lascaux and Chauvet in their original size. Michel Lorblanchet describes his work, which lasted several days, and the experience he gained as follows: 48 Ex Occidente Lux: Continuity The experiment fully confirmed the use of the spraying technique. It provided important information about the duration of the work, the number of people involved in it, the imprints and the traces on the ground, and about the light used. [ … ] Where he uses this technique himself, the pre-historian experiences it physically. It has been of extraordinary symbolic importance: Man ’ s breath breathes life into the wall, creating an animal or sign on the rock face. There is no more direct and close oneness between creator and work. The experiment means the closest possible approach to rock art: the prehistorian puts himself in the place of the Stone Age artist and repeats his gestures. In this way, he learns to better grasp the intention behind the gesture, the motivation behind the action, or, even more, the spirit and sometimes the symbolic context in which these works were created. The attempt refutes the prejudice according to which the mural was the only goal of the artist and the production in his eyes was a secondary matter. On the contrary, it is possible that in some cases the painting was only the trace of a process that was as significant or even more important than its result (Lorblanchet 1997a: 36; - A. E.). Elsewhere, however, also concerned with the cultural semiotic capture and explanation of the maximally foreign, namely in Kurt Singer ’ s Semiotics of Japanese culture, I have described this kind of sign-theoretical analysis as a form of participant observation. Insofar as I place myself symbolically in my object, performing the bodily gestures made in the original production, I have the possibility of going through the same bodily experiences as the original producer, which is why it seems legitimate to me to claim that in this way I can gain a first impression of what the original producer meant. The semiotic analysis will of course not remain on this level of sensual certainty or still speechless firstness, but - strictly according to Peirce ’ s category theory - will put these first findings in relation to related data. For example, the data obtained in the tracing production of some stone-age products can be put in relation to another group of bodily experiences, which arise, for example, when that posture is assumed which is described in the literature as the “ adorant posture ” and is attested by a significant number of twoand threedimensional objects. Here, too, however, as with the previously described spraying technique used by Michel Lorblanchet, it is not a matter of simply reproducing or imitating a physical activity, but rather it seems absolutely necessary to pay close attention to the situational context: Without being able to offer here already a complete or even satisfactory listing of the situational context of the “ adorant posture, ” I would nevertheless like to mention that this posture is often assumed by mask wearers and that the mask used in this case shows a striking resemblance to the physiognomy of the great (bird) goddess. For a more precise understanding, it would be essential to know who was authorized or obliged to appear with this posture; likewise, it would be clear at which time of day and season this posture was practiced and at which place it was exercised. I will refrain from giving further examples in the present context. An elaborated semiotic analysis, however, will not be able to be content with two traps, but will, on the contrary, strive to establish as dense a network of relations as possible between a more significant number of singular phenomena. Since Peirce ’ s category theory is not satisfied with a positivistic data collection but demands the interpretation or explanation of the collected data as a final step of the investigation, we will continue the investigation and screen the collected data for regularities and rules. In the formulation of the explanatory regularities and rules, we have to be guided by the fact that the graphic gestures are ordered according to a particular system because some recur again and again, and others are very rare. Despite great realism, Ex Occidente Lux: Continuity 49 all animal drawings are schematized according to a certain pattern, which is why we may conjecture that the Stone Age people encoded mythological, genealogical, and social references in complex sign systems, or, as Danielle Stordeur writes: The animal outlines, lines, circles, and tridents represent a ‘ mnemonic landscape, ’ which refers to drawn mnemonic markers that indicate the ancestors ’ path. The ancestors crossed the land on “ dream paths ” and mapped the world, animals, plants, families, and clans of people. The symbols presumably guaranteed them only the reality of the symbolized (Stordeur 1977: 36). This brings me to the end of my remarks, but there is still a lot left unsaid and the whole approach has more of a programmatic character than the presentation of finished results. I very much hope to come a little closer to realizing this program here in Essen in the next few years. Note The fact that occasional momentary discoveries of hitherto completely unknown sign systems could give ancient European writing a certain competition does not affect my argumentation in the least. Still, it can rather be regarded as a confirmation of my thesis on the fundamental necessity of graphic articulation and notation systems for the intellectual development of man. Such a prescriptural sign system, about 10,000 years old, has recently been discovered by a French archaeological team in Jerf el Ahmar, Syria. Although the zigzag lines, dashes, and animal-like and crescent-shaped engravings carved on stone tablets are not writing, they are a coherent sign system. The excavation director emphasizes: The same signs appear again and again. Their arrangement and repetition serve no decorative purposes, but information alone. But serpentine lines, hooks, and circular arcs do not form sentences. Instead, they are a brief summary of references to specific events or contexts, a symbolic pictorial history, and a textogram (Weber 1997: 36). Helmut Brinker and Roger Goepper report on an analogous, albeit 5,000 years more recent phenomenon in the catalog of the Berlin exhibition “ Art Treasures from China ” : A sensational phenomenon and an essential link between Banpo and Jiangzhai is the occurrence of simple incised marks on several painted ceramic vessels and fragments. The marks usually appear on the rim of the vessel and are sometimes carved into the still-moldable clay before firing, and sometimes carved into the body after firing or after a period of use. These marks occur only singly; however, some appear repeatedly on different pieces. Based on the examined Banpo material, 22 different types can be distinguished in 112 cases. Their meaning is still uncertain, but the fact that a certain uniformity in size and application, a deliberate regularity, and a simple, clear structural design can be observed, suggests that it could be an attempt to fix elementary ideas or events with standardized emblems. Perhaps we are dealing here, as Kwangchih Chang suggests, with workshop or potter ’ s marks or owner ’ s marks. It remains to be seen whether the research begun in China on this question will one day enable us to imagine the scribe marks of Yangshao pottery as the cue or even the timid beginnings of Chinese writing. After all, Guo Moruo and Li Xiaoding have meanwhile succeeded in convincingly demonstrating in some cases the close relationship between the ceramic characters on the one hand and various minerals and clansmen of the Shang dynasty on the other (Brinker/ Goepper 1980: 6 f.). 50 Ex Occidente Lux: Continuity References Bühler, Karl 1934: Sprachtheorie. Die Darstellungsfunktion der Sprache, Jena: Fischer. Cavalli-Sforza, Luca L. & Bodmer, W. F. 1971: The Genetics of Human Populations, San Francisco: W. H. Freeman & CO. Cavalli-Sforza, Luca & Cavalli-Sforza, Francesco 1994: Verschieden und doch gleich. Ein Genetiker entzieht dem Rassismus die Grundlage, Munich: Knaur. Chauvet, Jean-Marie et al. 1995: Grotte Chauvet bei Vallon-Pont-d ’ Arc. Altsteinzeitliche Höhlenkunst im Tal der Ardeche, Sigmaringen: Thorbecke. Eschbach, Achim 1993: “ Semiotik der Schrift ” , in: Kodikas/ Code 16,1 - 2: 29 - 53. Eschbach, Achim 1993: Kurt Singer und die moderne Semiotik. MS. Tokyo. Feldbusch, Elisabeth 1985: Geschriebene Sprache. Untersuchungen zu ihrer Herausbildung und Grundlegung ihrer Theorie, Berlin: de Gruyter. Gelb, I. J. 1952: A Study of Writing: The Foundations of Grammatology, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Gibbons, A. 1993: “ Mitochondrial Eve Refuses to Die ” , in: Science 259: 1249-1250. Gimbutas, Marija 1995: Die Sprache der Göttin. Das verschüttete Symbolsystem der westlichen Zivilisation, Frankfurt a. M.: Zweitausendeins. Gimbutas, Marija 1996: Die Zivilisation der Göttin, Frankfurt a. M.: Zweitausendeins. Haarmann, Harald 1990: Universalgeschichte der Schrift, Frankfurt a. M.: Campus. Haarmann, Harald 1996: Early Civilization and Literacy in Europe. An Inquiry into Cultural Continuity in the Mediterranean World, Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Kempski, Jürgen von 1992: “ Zimzum: Die Schöpfung aus dem Nichts ” , in: Ders.: Prinzipien der Wirklichkeit. Schriften 3. Ed. by Achim Eschbach. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp: 21-43. König, Marie E. P. o. J.1973: Am Anfang der Kultur. Die Zeichensprache der frühen Menschen, Frankfurt a. M.: Zweitausendeins [1. Edition 1973]. Kohn, Herbert 1971: Die Felsbilder Europas, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. Lorblanchet, Michel 1997: “ Kunst und Ramsch. Wer die Bilderwelt der Steinzeit verstehen will, kommt um den Selbstversuch nicht herum ” , in: Die Zeit 24. January 1997: 36. Lorblanchet, Michel 1997b: Höhlenmalerei. Ein Handbuch, Sigmaringen: Thorbecke. Leroi-Gourhan, Andre 1980: Hand und Wort. Die Evolution von Technik, Sprache und Kunst, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp. Mallory, J. P. 1989: In Search of the Indo-Europeans. Language, Archeology and Myth, London: Thames and Hudson. Markey, Thomas L. & Grappin, John A. C. (eds.) 1990: When Worlds Collide: The Indo-Europeans and the Pre-Indo-Europeans, Ann Arbor, Mich.: Karoma. Ohlenroth, Derk 1996: Das Abaton des Lykaischen Zeus und der Hain der Elaia: zum Diskos von Phaistos und zur frühen griechischen Schriftkultur, Tübingen: Niemeyer. Pörtner, Rudolf 1968: Bevor die Römer kamen. Städte und Statten deutscher Urgeschichte, Munich: Knaur. Renfrew, Colin 1972: The Emergence of Civilisation. The Cyclades and the Aegean in the Third Millenium B. C., London: Methnen. Roder, Brigitte, Hummel, Julian, Kunz, Brigitta 1996: Göttinnendämmerung. Das Matriarchat aus archäologischer Sicht, Munich: Knaur. Winn, Shann M. M. 1995: Heaven, heroes, and happiness: the Indo-European roots of Western ideology, Lanham, Md.: University Press of America. Ex Occidente Lux: Continuity 51 K O D I K A S / C O D E 44 (2021) · No. 1 - 3 Gunter Narr Verlag Tübingen Karl Bühler ’ s Axiomatics and the Axiom. Karl Bühler ’ s Axiomatik und das Axiomensystem (1984) Abstract: Eschbach examines Bühler ’ s notion of axiom in-depth, discussing it against the background of numerous other notions of axiom and relating it to the use of this notion by some other authors (Haig, Peirce, Gomperz, Gätschenberger). In his essay about Karl Bühler ’ s axiomatics and the axiom system of sign theory Eschbach adds to the equation of logic and semiotics another link, so that the equation now reads: logic = semiotics = general theory of representation. With this equation it is indicated, on the one hand, that the “ deepening of the foundations ” of linguistics must result in a general theory of representation or sematology, or, viewed actually the other way around, that the representational function of language, as the subtitle of Bühler ’ s main work on language reads, is a form of manifesting sematology. The research program of sematology is following Eschbach ’ s comments openly apparent, for if language is to be understood - as Bühler says - as an intersubjective representational device, i. e., as an organum for one to communicate something to another about things. It further follows that sematology, within the framework of this organon model, has to ask about the general principles of sign traffic, with logic at its disposal as an instrument. “ It, therefore, belongs to the understanding of every philosopher to know the unproved presuppositions from which he proceeds, and the aims, usually more guessed at than recognized, toward which his thoughts strive. ” (Bühler 1904: 58). “ Only a philosophy that is clearly aware of its axiomatic foundations, only an ‘ axiomatic philosophy ’ that is, is truly ‘ critical ’ and not dogmatic. ” (Austeda 1962: 5). Introduction All people who experienced Karl Bühler at lectures or talks unanimously report his great rhetorical talent (cf., e. g., Kardos 1983), with which he could captivate and inspire his listeners. Numerous elements of his oratory style can be found in his written texts, which can be explained not least by the fact that the published texts are often based on lectures. Bühler ’ s typical language style of face-to-face communication, involving the reader/ listener, as found especially in Theory of Language, very often had the undesirable side effect that the utterances were not taken word for word, which then understandably led to serious abbreviations and misunderstandings. Such abbreviations and misunderstandings not infrequently favored a reception that took up specific catchy formulations, such as that of the so-called organon model, and used them detached from their systematic context (cf. Fónagy 1983). It should be evident that such a reception is unsuitable to do justice to Bühler ’ s far-reaching designs. Another critical circumstance that may have contributed significantly to the fact that Bühler did not find the understanding that his work deserved is to be found in the fact that his entire approach was developed in a scientific climate that was alien or indifferent to his fundamental critical interests. Bühler himself, however, contributed significantly to the fact that his name was always associated with fierce and sometimes highly polemical attacks on the prevailing scientific paradigm, as evidenced, for example, by the Wundt-Bühler controversy that Bühler triggered with his habilitation thesis, or - a fortiori - the Crisis of Psychology, in which Bühler presented a cutting critique of association psychology, behaviorism, and psychoanalysis, not to mention the countless smaller disputes that Bühler conducted, as it were, in passing in notes or reviews. Karl Bühler could work and publish relatively undisturbed in Vienna until the early summer of 1938. If one were to measure his impact by the number of his doctoral students who came to his institute from all over the world, his success would certainly have to be highly rated. However, suppose one asks to what extent his entire, highly complex approach was taken up and further developed. In that case, a completely different picture emerges, since only a few publications address this difficult task. That this situation worsened considerably for Bühler after 1938 cannot be surprising insofar as he, rooted entirely in the European tradition of thought and teaching, came to a country strongly influenced by the behaviorist approach. In addition, Bühler was already sixty years old when he arrived in the U. S., his command of the English language was mediocre despite several stays in America, and the few university positions available were already occupied elsewhere. In addition, despite intensive efforts, it has not been possible to organize translations of his most important works into English; for example, there is still no translation of the Theory of Language - together with E. F. K. Koerner I am currently trying to remedy this deficiency - and the Axiomatics of Linguistics was only translated into American in 1982 by Robert E. Innis. This situation did not change after the end of the Second World War. Neither in psychology nor in the philosophy of language/ linguistics was there a link to Bühler; the synchronic approach of descriptive-structural grammar was not compatible with Bühler ’ s basic-critical thinking, and when Chomsky ’ s Syntactic Structures ushered in the era of generative transformational grammar in 1957, there was no longer any severe thought of basic-critical work for many years to come. Even though Bühler ’ s work was not intensively received in the German-speaking world or anywhere else after 1945, it should not be ignored that at least the Theory of Language, the Theory of Expression, the Krise der Psychologie, and the Axiomatics of Linguistics are easily accessible today in new editions. Axiomatics of Linguistics first appeared in 1933 in Kant- Studien and was reissued in 1969 with an introduction and commentary by Elisabeth Ströker. The claim has been made repeatedly that the axiomatics is nothing more than the socalled “ principles ” chapter from Bühler ’ s Theory of Language, which he merely left to the Kant Studies for pre printing. This view is false and misleading in at least two respects since it firstly assumes - unspokenly - that Bühler once developed his axiomatics, namely in Kant Karl Bühler ’ s Axiomatics and the Axiom (1984) 53 Studies, and later merely integrated it as chapter I into his Theory of Language. That this is by no means the case, however, becomes clear from the fact that not only do the texts differ considerably, but also the axioms are treated in a different order and weighting, which will be discussed in detail later. At this point, we shall only refer to the preface to the first edition of the Theory of Language, where Bühler noted: For the book I have rewritten them [the four guiding principles about language], rearranged them, and formulated them more prospectively, i. e., in anticipation of the chapters that will follow; moreover, the dichotomy ‘ speech action and speech formation ’ has been expanded into the richer four-field scheme of Guiding Principle C (Bühler 1934: X). The view is wrong and misleading in a second respect, as there are axiomatic considerations of Bühler before the publication of Kant Studies and after the publication of the Theory of Language. Hence, it seems advisable to assess Bühler ’ s axiomatics against the background of all his statements in this respect. Moreover, in the “ Erläuterung des Themas ” (Explanation of the Topic), which Elisabeth Ströker surprisingly did not include in the new edition, Bühler gave some essential hints which can help us very well here. Bühler ’ s primary concern in the “ Explanation of the Subject ” is a defense against exaggerated expectations that could be directed at his design of axiomatics, primarily rejecting the assumption that axiomatics can draw its dignity from the proof of its apriority. Instead, he characterizes his approach in the following way: We propose a way of dealing with axioms which may be called, in my opinion, a purely phenomenological explication or an epistemologically (and ontologically) neutral fixation of principles. They are principles to be obtained from the stock of successful linguistic research by reduction. D. Hilbert calls this procedure axiomatic thinking and demands it precisely in our sense for all sciences (Bühler 1933a: 22). Against the background of this declaration of intent, it makes sense when Bühler describes his axiomatics as several propositions “ which claim either to be regarded as axioms of linguistic research themselves or at least to serve as a starting point for progressive theoretical efforts to establish a closed system of such axioms ” (ibid.: 23). Another essential hint, found in the “ explanation of the subject ” , refers to the question of how the axiomatist arrives at the first propositions, which Bühler describes in the same section as “ constitutive, area-determining theses ” and as “ thoroughgoing ideas of induction ” (ibid.). To answer this question, Bühler refers to the preface to the second edition of Kant ’ s Critique of Pure Reason, where it is stated that all our knowledge begins with experience, without therefore being allowed to claim that it springs from experience. This reference to the critique of reason is reflected in the following work program for axiomatics: The highest terms and axioms must first be picked up and formulated from the linguistic sciences. We offer what we can, without claiming completeness. We explain terms and axioms in each other, as one finds them connected in the research enterprise and the result of linguistics. And yet, a sure foreshadowing of the structure, which is to be examined later, may already determine our list (ibid.: 24). As will be shown, the reference to the critique of reason is not a mere allusion or a rhetorical effort to gain authority: it will turn out that Bühler ’ s ‘ axiom concept ’ is to be understood precisely from the interrelation of experience and reason addressed by Kant. 54 Karl Bühler ’ s Axiomatics and the Axiom (1984) In contrast to previous years and decades, there has been an increasing tendency in the recent past to focus on historical-systematic research. This turn of tendency, which is favored by the fading of the euphoria of the transformation grammarians as well as by the growing insight into the urgent necessity of basic research, has also led to a sense of the fact that in the twenties and thirties of our century - not only in the German-speaking area - a multitude of highly significant works was produced, which were largely excluded from the discussion. However, they could orient us in their farsightedness, their profundity, and their modernity also and especially today. Just as the present volume will help to give a new voice to a study that is now fifty years old and carry it forward, several essays that reflect Karl Bühler ’ s work have recently been written. Two undertakings are particularly noteworthy in this context: A collection of twenty-five essays dealing with Bühler ’ s complete works will appear in 1983 under the title Bühler-Studien. In addition to the already published works, the complete edition will include Bühler ’ s extensive unpublished estate and a selection from his scholarly correspondence. A volume of materials accompanying the edition will contain, in addition to a biography of Karl Bühler and a bibliography of primary and secondary literature, an attempt to show the unity and rich filler of Bühler ’ s work, or in other words, an attempt to understand the multiplicity of Bühler ’ s works as the realization of a large research program. The fact that the view that Bühler ’ s work is under a unified research programmatic is not an idea brought to the work from the outside, but was repeatedly emphasized and explained by Bühler himself, will occupy us for a while since this question is also relevant for understanding the problem at hand. Bühler closes the second paragraph of the principles chapter of his Theory of Language, in which he treats axiom A about the organon model of language, with the remark: “ It [the thesis of the three language functions] will be verified as a whole when all three books about language required by the organon model have been written ” (Bühler 1934: 33). That this remark can by no means be a rather accidentally interspersed incidental fact can already be seen from the fact that Bühler closes the second paragraph with this statement. In addition, in the preface to the Theory of Language, Bühler retraces the path he has taken since 1907 to realize his research program, even if he does not even list all the important stations along the way in this tour d ’ horizon. Even more clearly than in the Theory of Language, there is repeated talk in the Krise der Psychologie about the uniformity of the research program. There it says: As to the history of these reflections, let us note that they go back more than two decades. I did not set out to reform psychology, but to find the axioms of language theory. A nearly completed book “ Theory of Language ” will give an exact account of it. It means anticipating the main results if I try to show here in abstract proof that one can understand the phenomenon of language scientifically only under the three aspects (Bühler 1927: 29). Bühler offers an even clearer description of his research program in the summary seventh paragraph of the second chapter of Crisis, where he emphasizes that the insights achieved are not the result of an ad hoc investigation, but the outcome of two decades of purely factual research on language (cf. ibid.: 57 ff.). Now, it could certainly be argued with some justification that Bühler had occasionally emphasized the unity of his research program, but that the third book on language had Karl Bühler ’ s Axiomatics and the Axiom (1984) 55 never been written; moreover, it was a research program declared post festum so that only very little weight could be attached to statements in this regard. The first objection can be refuted concerning many publications after 1938 and because of the manuscripts in Bühler ’ s estate. As far as the second objection is concerned, on the one hand, I would like to refer to a series of letters in which Bühler told some friends and colleagues about his research projects at different times; on the other hand, to explain my thesis of the uniformity of Bühler ’ s research program, I would like to quote at length from a letter that Karl Bühler wrote to his former Viennese collaborator Paul Lazarsfeld on August 24, 1953: ( … ) Now to the news: These are two articles about navigation (= guided location), which attack the control where it can be isolated best. I am sending you the first already printed article again and enclosing the second, which will be printed in September at Revesz in the manuscript. If you do not want to digest everything in it, please read the manuscript I., II., and III. chapter and then in the V. a constructive criticism by I. Loeb. My special question to you: Does what is said in V seem physically correct to you? And at the very end of V is hinted at what I am ultimately getting at. The syntaxes in animal control prepare for the syntactic control of human speech. The theory of language is in between and has prepared the analogy. There is the pointing field of language and the symbol field, the coordinate system. The ‘ arrow-moment in the landmark control ’ is what the pointing words do in the syntactic control of speech. The symbol field, of course, is demonstrable only in humans and is attached to the two great classes of syntactic devices which occur in all human languages. Think of the succession factor in English (even more so in Chinese) where parents love children and children love parents two quite different facts meet while Latin filius amat patrem und patrem amat filius meets the same. Or, since you are an excellent Latin speaker, think of Horace, where the second stanza of Integer vitae reads: Namque me Silva lupus in Sabina Nam meam canto Lalagen et ultra Terminum fines vagor expeditus Fugit inermen. And find out how the words come together to form a definitive sense of control. Conclusion: The evolution developed control means already in the controlled local movements of the insects. And comparable to it is present in the syntactic controls. As is known, there is also a logical syntax (Carnap). The whole thing with the ‘ overview from the insects (or amoebae) to the human being ’ is now forming a guide through comparative cybernetics. This idea, which I am obsessed with at the moment, meets the basic idea in Sherrington ’ s ‘ Man on his Nature ’ VII, p. 204 - 214 or so. First, I need only the controlled local movements, where the directional controls are directly observable. And secondly, I don ’ t need an aspect change for it. For I speak of mechanisms which in principle can be reproduced in ‘ guided missiles ’ and not yet like Sherrington on p. 213 of ‘ recognizable mind. ’ Do you like it? Please, tell me something about it, I need encouragement. And it needs two more articles like the enclosed to make what is said palpable to a readership. 56 Karl Bühler ’ s Axiomatics and the Axiom (1984) Good luck and progress in your own great company Yours sincerely Karl Bühler, Ph. D. So, suppose we have to start from the assumption that Karl Bühler strove for the realization of a unified research program throughout his life. In that case, we will have to look for an answer, at least to some extent, to the question of what ultimately motivated him to approach the axiom problem again and again and from the most diverse perspectives since his medical doctoral thesis, which I understand as an axiomatics of Helmholtz ’ s color theory. From what has been said so far it should have become clear that a simple and quick answer to this difficult question is impossible so we can only think of a comprehensive answer after discussing a number of constituent moments. Nevertheless, we can already state at this point that Bühler ’ s design of axiomatics could be linked to various strands of tradition, which will be discussed in the following discussion. However, it should already be recalled here that the doyen of German psychology, Wilhelm Wundt, wrote Die physikalischen Axiome und ihre Beziehung zum Kausalprinzip (The Physical Axioms and their Relationship to the Causal Principle), which appeared in its second edition in 1910 under the title Die Prinzipien der Mechanischen Naturlehre (The Principles of the Mechanical Theory of Nature.). Reference should also be made to the work of Bühler ’ s Freiburg teacher Johannes v. Kries - especially to General Sensory Physiology (V. Kries Allgemeine Sinnesphysiologie 1923) - from which Bühler drew not only with regard to the axiom problem (cf. Eschbach 1984b). Finally, before starting the discussion, it should be unmistakably pointed out that Bühler pursued his axiomatic studies in a foundation-critical interest, which he characterized in the Theory of Expression as follows: However, in order that the new experimentation and evaluation does not become a blind wandering and a journey without a compass into the shoreless, one must work with adequate energy on the axiomatics of the theory of expression. It seems appropriate and advisable to combine the research on principles with a renewed review of the history of the theory of expression (Bühler 1968: 1 f.). In the opposite sense, we can at the same time also note what Bühler did not aim at with his axiomatic work: He was neither interested in a formalization nor a mathematization of psychology or linguistics (for a contrary opinion cf. Lieb 1980: 301) since it was absolutely clear to him that a two-class system of the type of language eludes such an attempt. In an extremely important passage, which may well be read as an anticipatory critique of transformational grammatical and/ or information-theoretical efforts, Bühler states: A single-class system of global symbols of the type of ship signals is scientifically exhaustively determined if, first, the structure of the signals is specified and, second, for each signal the typical situation of use and in it the communication purpose which it has to fulfill is described. This is done in the case of artificially arranged flag signals by the code, a book with two chapters. [ … ] The scientific determination of a system of the type of language requires something different from a book on the type of code. One can only partially parallel phonology in the strictest sense of the word with the first chapter of the code. The lexicon, on the other hand, and grammar, which reflect the two classes of settings and entities in the realm of language, are, first, distinct among themselves and, second, distinct in essence from the code (Bühler 1933a: 69). Karl Bühler ’ s Axiomatics and the Axiom (1984) 57 Historical facts about the axiomatic method If one subjects the extensive literature on the concept of “ axioms ” and the ideas of the axiomatic method derived from it to a critical examination, one will very soon come to the irritating conclusion that two fundamentally different and mutually exclusive meanings are attributed to the concept. This area, which has often been collected by historians of science, philosophers, and mathematicians in a questionable etymologizing way, could easily be pushed aside in the present context as a problem concerning the philologist if the said duplication of the term ‘ axiom ’ did not at the same time provide the foil of two mutually exclusive strategies in dealing with the axiomatic method, which until today run side by side competitively (cf. Schüling 1969). In the following considerations, it shall not be a question of emphasizing one or the other reading of the concept of “ axioms ” as the only authentic and legitimate one, which very soon proved to be a futile undertaking since both traditions have existed factually for more than two millennia; instead, it shall be clarified in outlines, under which epistemological interests and in which scientific-systematic contexts the two traditions were built up. The contradiction between the two traditions becomes quickly obvious if one holds some dictionary entries for the keyword ‘ axiom ’ side by side. Kondakov ’ s Dictionary of Logic says: “ Axiom, meaning possessing, deserving attention, accepted, indisputable: true judgment, etc. true proposition, which is accepted as initial thesis in deductive construction of a theory, within a closed theory without proof and is taken as a basis for the proofs of all other theses of this theory ” (Kondakow 1978: 65). The Philosophical Dictionary writes: “ Axiom (validity, demand), principle: a proposition that cannot be proved, but also does not need to be proved, since it is immediately obvious as correct and therefore serves as a ‘ principle ’ for other propositions (deduction), or can also be agreed upon as such (conventionalism) ” (Schmidt 1974: 51). On the other hand, the Historical Dictionary of Philosophy states: “ Originally, the axiom was not a proposition which, neither capable of proof nor in need of proof, was generally accepted by everyone and admitted as correct, but on the contrary: Just that proposition was called axiom which only one dialogue partner wanted to base the discussion on as a correct assertion, while the other partner agreed with this endeavor only conditionally or not at all ” (Ritter, Vol. 1/ 1971: 738 f.). In the Dictionary of Philosophical Terms, one reads: “ Axiom, demand ” , in logic and mathematics since Aristotle and Euclid a principle whose truth is immediately obvious, which neither needs nor is capable of a reason of proof and is considered as a basis of proof for further propositions ” (Hoffmeister 1955: 101). Krug ’ s Allgemeines Handwörterbuch der philosophischen Wissenschaften differentiates as follows: Axiom (to appreciate, to judge, to hold true) means in a broader sense any judgment that one assumes to be true, but in a narrower sense an immediately certain judgment, which is therefore indemonstrable, i. e., neither capable of nor in need of proof ” (Krug 1969: 277). Finally, in the Encyclopedia Philosophy and Philosophy of Science, the following entry is found: “ Axiom, in the ancient technique of discussion and so also in Aristotelian topics a term for those propositions (axiomata) whose acceptance was demanded by one of the dialogue partners at the beginning of a dispute. [ … ] The term ‘ axioma ’ also denotes, at the latest in Aristotle, a proposition whose credibility [ … ] is generally admitted, because it is not capable of justification by reference to other 58 Karl Bühler ’ s Axiomatics and the Axiom (1984) propositions. Still, because of its evidence, it is also not in need of it ” (Mittelstraß 1980: 239 f.). Despite certain leitmotifs in common, these definitions show such serious differences that it is hard to imagine that the definiendum has not changed under the table. In order to expose the roots of this obvious contradiction, it is not sufficient to return to the term “ axiom ” by Greek mathematicians and logicians, for we have heard that Euclid and Aristotle have been called upon to be key witnesses of different conceptual fillings. We get a first clarifying hint from Árpád Szabó, who repeatedly dealt with the question of the meaning of the term ‘ axioma ’ . In Szabó ’ s opinion, all known ancient attempts to define the mathematical concept of ‘ axioms ’ can be traced back to Aristotelian influences (cf. Szabó 1960: 91). However, the concept of ‘ axioms ’ as a mathematical term was already in use in Euclidean and even pre- Euclidean times. If one asks for the origin of the mathematical term ‘ axiom ’ , one will notice that it borrows from dialectics, which is not surprising since a large part of the mathematical terms originates from dialectics. Thus, in order to take our conceptual explanation a step further, we need to examine how the ‘ axiom ’ concept was determined in dialectics. For this reason, Szabó recalls the situation of a dialectical argument between two interlocutors: The task of one partner in an argument is to get the other to admit a proposition he chose. For this purpose, he must find such premises which the partner considers correct and therefore will admit, and from which the final sentence that the partner does not consider correct and does not want to admit can be derived with logical necessity. Therefore, one participant in the conversation asks the other to base the argument on some initial proposition without proof as a correct assertion (Szabó 1960: 94). From this characterization of the opening situation of a dialectical argument, we may at least infer that the initial proposition, which is asked to be taken over, must be certain only for the first dialogue partner, whereas it remains completely open whether he will receive an agreement to this proposition from his opponent or not. Accordingly, the meaning of the term ‘ axiom ’ in dialectical terminology would be ‘ assertion ’ , ‘ assumption, ’ or ‘ request ’ . Request “ demand ” or “ opinion ” (cf. ibid.: 97). With this result, however, we have only half the truth, because even if it is to be regarded as clarified that Euclid used the term ‘ axiom ’ in the dialectical understanding, it must be considered at the same time that already in the Stoic use the old sense of the word has been forgotten and the axioms figure as self-evident truths. In Szabó ’ s opinion, this concept change is due to the fact that the essential implications of the Euclidean use of the term were very soon no longer understood. It said: Thus axioma became a truth that is ‘ naturally considered to be right. ’ [ … ] But even in the new meaning the word axioma still seemed uncomfortable in the Euclid text; therefore, instead of the old designation one soon preferred to write: koinai ennoia ‘ ideas common to all men ’ . In this way, the dialectical origin not only of the expression but also of the genre itself was almost completely concealed (ibid.: 105). Although Szabó ’ s considerations found approval by some historians of science, it seems to me that not all the arguments necessary to arrive at a satisfactory definition of the concept of ‘ axioms ’ have been presented, which is why I would like to join Hintikka ’ s critique of Szabó ’ s remarks, which boils down to the following position: “ The syllogistically rather Karl Bühler ’ s Axiomatics and the Axiom (1984) 59 than mathematically motivated character of an axiomatic theory according to Aristotle probably explains Szabó ’ s low opinion of Aristotle ’ s significance ” (Hintikka 1981: 138). Based on the assumption that Aristotle builds his entire view of an axiomatically organized science on the syllogistic model, Hintikka argues for distinguishing four types of basic presuppositions in Aristotle: 1. Axioms (in Aristotle ’ s narrow sense) common to all sciences 2. Atomic premises connecting two adjacent terms figuring in a minimal syllogistic premise 3. The widest premise of the science in question 4. Nominal definitions (ibid., cf. Wiener 1968: 166). Now Aristotle emphasizes in two places (An. Post. 11,3 90b 24-28) that the starting points of proof are definitions (cf. Scholz 1961: 29 f.): From the unmediated principles of a conclusion, I call these which one cannot prove, and not everyone already needs to have in mind who wants to learn something. [ … ] Of the theses, those which assume one of the two parts of the statement [ … ] are hypotheses, those which do not are definitions. For the definition is indeed a thesis (setting) [ … ], but not a hypothesis (An. Post., 72a 15- 30). Hintikka states that in Aristotle there is a twofold determination of the term ‘ definition ’ , the first one meaning the nominal definition mentioned in point (4), while according to the more comprehensive understanding the basic presuppositions (2)-(3) are meant. Hintikka ’ s thesis is now that the Aristotelian discussion of the different kinds of definitions would ultimately amount to a discussion of the different constituents of axiomatic theories (cf. Hintikka 1981: 139 f.). A problem arises, in Hintikka ’ s opinion, if the status of the basic presupposition (3) as the only unprovable existential assumption of a scientific theory ipso facto meant at the same time that it was the only unprovable predictive assumption of science. However, according to Hintikka, this kind of unprovability cannot be an apodeictic inability, but only a special form of deixis, which is why Hintikka asks: Is there in Aristotle some non syllogistic sense of proving or ‘ showing ’ in which the widest (and possibly also the narrowest) premise of each science, and only they, cannot be proved by the normal means that science operates with? (ibid.: 141). Hintikka sees a solution to this problem in An. Pr. II, 23, where Aristotle calls such a procedure apagoge, and which Hintikka characterizes as follows: Since it involves inverting one of the two premises of a syllogism, it involves terms that are prima facie wider or narrower than the extremes of the three syllogistic terms in question. Accordingly, it cannot be used to justify the widest premises (3) of an axiomatic science. They are therefore unprovable in a double sense for Aristotle. They are the only premises of an axiomatic science that carry irreducible existential assumptions, and they must (possibly together with the narrowest premises) be justified by direct intuition (noûs) rather than by the systematic procedure of epagoge or ‘ induction ’ through which atomic premises (2) are established (Hintikka 1981: 140). Although I can agree with Hintikka insofar as he identifies with apagogé the procedure which constitutes the particular form of deixis directed to the constitution of the basic assumption (3) and, if necessary, also of the basic assumption (1), I do not agree with him at all on the question of the non-syllogistic character of this form of deixis. In order to 60 Karl Bühler ’ s Axiomatics and the Axiom (1984) substance this objection, which is of essential importance for the determination of the status of axioms, I will in the following refer at length to the only logician known to me who has not only developed a completely novel view on this question but who, moreover, with his proposed solution provides the basis for a satisfactory clarification of the axiom problem. In the Lectures on Pragmatism Charles S. Peirce writes: In order to answer that question it is necessary to recognize three radically different kinds of arguments I signalized in 1867 and which had been recognized by the logicians of the eighteenth century, although those logicians quite pardonably failed to recognize the inferential character of one of them. Indeed, I suppose that the three were given by Aristotle in Prior Analytics. However, the unfortunate illegibility of a single word in his MS. and its replacement by a wrong word by his first editor, the stupid Apellicon, has completely altered the sense of the chapter on Abduction. At any rate, even if my conjecture is wrong, and the text must stand as it is. Still, Aristotle, in that chapter on Abduction, was even in that case groping for that mode of inference which I call by the otherwise quite useless name of Abduction. This word is only employed in logic to translate the apagoge of that chapter (C. P. 5.144). Peirce claims to have solved Kant ’ s knowledge problem more radically than the latter. Peirce clearly expresses the uncertainty of the objects of experience, which can only be extrapolated from Kant ’ s remarks, by saying that our percepts are conjectures. If Kant performs on the occasion of experience by applying the categories to Data, by which application the Data are ordered to objects of experience, he cannot - as he explains - make any statement about things in themselves. Thus, the objects of experience have a certain uncertainty, namely insofar as they do not show things in themselves. The emphasis on this uncertainty is the core of Peirce ’ s critique of knowledge. What Kant calls the object of experience, Peirce calls percept. One must be clear that the percept according to Peirce is the result of a mental operation that has a synthesis character; however, the percept does not reveal at first that it owes itself to a synthesis performance. To show the mediatedness of the percept, the remarks made in Peirce ’ s Lectures on Pragmatism are suitable. That a percept is mediated in itself is expressed by Peirce in his dictum that the beginning of cognition is a process of beginning. We find in Peirce the two names ‘ abduction ’ and ‘ perceptual judgment ’ for a mental operation. Since there are two names, it would be obvious to expect two mental operations. Abduction is a controllable and conscious process, perceptual judgment is a noncontrollable and non-conscious process- According to Peirce, both are the same mental process, which follows from the fact that Peirce shows that perceptual judgment is a borderline case and ultimately of the same character as abduction: “ Perceptual judgments are to be regarded as an extreme case of abductive inferences ” (C. P. 5.181). The only symptom by which the two can be distinguished is that we cannot imagine what it would mean to deny the perceptual judgment (cf. C. P. 5.186), i. e., Peirce ’ s so-called “ test of inconceivability ” (C. P. 5.187). However, it cannot be decided with ultimate certainty whether there is a perceptual judgment or an abduction; this corresponds to Peirce ’ s statement, “ that we never can be absolutely sure that judgment is perceptual and not abductive ” (C. P. 5.187). Thus, the possible uncertainty of whether it is one or two mental operations can be removed to the extent that we are justified and obliged to speak of a process. Perceptual judgments are “ operations of the mind which are logically exactly Karl Bühler ’ s Axiomatics and the Axiom (1984) 61 analogous to inferences excepting that they are unconscious and therefore uncontrollable and therefore not subject to criticism ” (C. P. 5.108). To clarify Peirce ’ s statements about perceptual judgment, I would like to cite a longer passage: The perceptive judgment is the result of a process, although of a process not sufficiently conscious to be controlled, or, to state it more truely, not controllable and therefore not fully conscious. If we were to subject this subconscious process to logical analysis, we should find that it terminated in what that analysis would represent as an abductive inference, resting on the result of a similar process which a similar logical analysis would represent to be terminated by a similar abductive inference and so on ad infinitum (C. P. 5.181). Peirce ’ s characteristic claim, then, is that percepts are the results of a process that, if controllable, would turn out to be of the character of the operation of abduction. Thus it is said that there are no immediate percepts. The conscious and controllable process of abductive judgment is invoked by Peirce to clarify the unconscious and uncontrollable process of perceptual judgment. The result of abduction is a hypothesis of the form: A surprising fact is observed; But If A were true, C would be a matter of course, Hence, there is a reason to suspect that A is true (C. P. 5.189). The hypothesis obtained by abduction corresponds to the percept obtained by perceptual judgment. “ The abductive suggestion comes to us like a flash. [ … ] The different elements of the hypothesis were in our minds before ” (C. P., 5.181). This flashiness of the hypothesis and its logical unfolding into an abductive judgment corresponds to the flashiness of the percept, which can be analyzed in its development into the mental operation called perceptual judgment by Peirce. The percept, which is the result of the perceptual judgment, is “ of course [ … ] not itself a judgment, nor can a judgment in any degree resemble to a percept ” (C. P. 5.54). Peirce emphasizes this fact in order to make it unmistakably clear that the percept is the result of a judicial process that takes the form of a synthesis of elements. To these crucial elements of thinking, with which working the operation of the perceptual judgment has a percept as a result, correspond the elements of the abductive judgment, which reaches as a result a hypothesis. Peirce shows by his assertion that percepts are connecting links between abductions and perceptions (cf. C. P. 5.183) that these perceptions, whose results are always percepts, are judgmental, precisely perceptual judgments; this corresponds to the equation of perceptions and perceptual judgments, which Peirce carries out expressis verbis: “ by direct perception that is in a direct perceptual judgment ” (C. P. 5.58). By this equation of perceptions and perceptual judgments, it is made clear that perceptions never ‘ receive ’ the mentioned elements of the perceptual judgment unprocessed. Elements of perceptual judgments are immediately ordered into percepts in these perceptual judgments, i. e., perceptions. Peirce ’ s percepts are analogous to Kant ’ s appearances, which also originate in a mental operation with the data corresponding to the facts of experience. Peirce says that facts of experience are given in direct perceptual judgments 62 Karl Bühler ’ s Axiomatics and the Axiom (1984) (cf. C. P. 5.54), as he speaks of facts of experience being “ premisses to us ” (C. P. 5.119). These are, in analogy to Kant ’ s data, processed in the perceptions, i. e., perceptual judgments, when they are given. Experiential facts are qua premises logically original, but are taken into consciousness only at the process of processing: We have already heard, the beginning of cognition is a process of beginning. As Kant, expressis verbis, cannot make any statements about things in themselves, Peirce - without expressing it specifically - cannot make any statements about that which is the basis of the percepts besides process, namely about the facts of experience explicitly called the premises. He simply calls it “ what is before his (sc. a person ’ s) senses ” (C. P. 5.115). In summary, against the background of these considerations, we can thus state that the constitution of our basic assumptions or axioms takes place judgmentally, i. e., by way of perceptual judgments, which have been identified as extreme cases of abductive reasoning. However, if axioms are forms of deixis to be characterized apagogically, it makes no sense to demand self-evidence, completeness, etc. from an axiomatic system. We may demand from axioms only that they show us the case. Verification of whether this demand is fulfilled or not, however, can no longer be conducted deictically, but only apodeictically. That this finding can not only be based on the work of C. S. Peirce but is also fully consistent with the position advocated by Bühler, is clear from the following passages: Perhaps it will serve further elucidation if we focus on the other, the sign function of the sense data in perception. We say signs, because of the content of the perceptual judgment, because the state of affairs, which we think to grasp in perception, always exceeds the area of sensory data (Bühler 1978: 78). A little later it says: We adult humans have our well-ordered world of perception. Into it, into this comprehensive system of determinations, the messages of the senses enter themselves. The sensed equips the things and events of our perceptual world with properties by virtue of the intentional relation; we see the “ red ” as a property of the apple and feel the “ warm ” as a property of the touched stove. This is the basis. But beyond that, the same sense of data functions as signs for this and that, what is to be said further about the things, what is expected further from them. That is the sign function of the sense data in our observations. So it is with us humans (ibid.: 78 f.). Models of Bühler ’ s Axiomatics In the interest of a comprehensive understanding of Karl Bühler ’ s axiomatic approach, it is appropriate to ask about the models on which he oriented himself. From the second edition of Axiomatik, edited by Elisabeth Ströker, an answer to this question can only be extrapolated, since she did not include the long first note on pages 22 f. in her new edition. Since this note, which recurs verbatim in the Theory of Language (Bühler 1934: 20), must significantly influence further understanding, I will reproduce it in full: D. Hilbert, Axiomatic Reasoning. Mathematische Annalen 78 (1918). Let ’ s take a closer look at a certain theory. We always recognize that constructing the framework of concepts is based on a few excellent propositions of the field of knowledge and that these alone are sufficient to build up the whole framework from them according to logical principles ” (406). Karl Bühler ’ s Axiomatics and the Axiom (1984) 63 One of the historically most interesting arguments about the problems towards which “ axiomatic thinking ” in the sense of Hilbert leads, are the few polemical remarks against W. Whewell in the induction theory of J. St. Mill. The “ Philosophy of Discovery ” of Whewell (the preface is from 1856, and the edition before me is from 1860) is inspired by Kant, so the dispute is between Mill and Kant. We can say: that what neither of them denies, that what Mill recognizes again and again as the correct core of Whewell ’ s conception, exactly is the research area of the axiomatics of empirical science. Note in Mill especially remarks like the following: “ The difficulty for the latter (it is the judge who has to make a judgment of fact) is not that he has to make an induction, but that (lay he has to choose it. ” In the axiomatics of the individual sciences, it is about first choices, so to speak, of fertile initial ideas. From which source of knowledge they are fed is a question that exceeds the framework of the axiomatics of the individual sciences (Bühler, 1933a: 22 f. note; emphasis mine - A. E.). To my knowledge, the only author who has not only taken these Bühlerian hints in due earnest but also made inquiries as to what it is that is not disputed either by Whewell or by Mill is Rudolf Kamp in his excellent and knowledgeable study Axiomatic Theory of Language (Kamp 1977), to which I will repeatedly refer in the following. For systematic reasons it further seems appropriate not to consider the models of Bühler ’ s axiomatics according to the order of their dates of origin, but - like Bühler himself - to start with Hilbert ’ s approach. David Hilbert ’ s Munich lecture, published in 1918 under the title “ Axiomatic Thinking ” (Reprint: Hilbert 1964), reflects in an extremely general and complex form the central moments of Hilbert ’ s axiomatics, to which Bühler repeatedly refers in various of his writings. Hilbert ’ s formulations in this essay are such that at first glance a transfer of this approach to contexts other than geometrical or mathematical seems legitimate, and indeed Hilbert states without restriction to any particular discipline: If we compile the facts of a certain more or less comprehensive field of knowledge, we soon notice that these facts are capable of an order. This order takes place each time with the help of a certain framework of concepts in such a way that to the individual object of the field of knowledge corresponds a concept of this framework and to each fact within the field of knowledge a logical relation between the concepts. The framework of concepts is nothing else than the theory of the field of knowledge (Hilbert 1964: 1). These statements, which in their globality leave a wide space for misunderstandings, Hilbert specifies in a summarizing remark to such an extent that there can only be disagreement about the redeemability of Hilbert ’ s program, but no longer about the intended direction: I believe everything that can be the subject of scientific thinking at all, as soon as it is ripe for the formation of a theory, falls into the axiomatic method and thus indirectly into mathematics. By advancing to deeper and deeper layers of axioms in the sense explained above, we also gain deeper and deeper insights into the essence of scientific thinking and become more and more aware of the unity of our knowledge. In the sign of the axiomatic method, mathematics appears to play a leading role in science in general (ibid.: 10 f.). Now, one could get the impression that in Hilbert ’ s approach, two axiomatic conceptions compete with each other, insofar as he articulates on the one hand the intention to justify the basic propositions of a theory, i. e., the axioms, by a “ deepening of the foundations ” (ibid.: 3) on their part, and the other hand “ to guarantee the dependence or independence of the 64 Karl Bühler ’ s Axiomatics and the Axiom (1984) propositions of the theory ” as well as “ the lack of contradiction of all propositions of the theory ” (ibid.: 3). independence of the propositions of the theory ” as well as the “ contradictionlessness of all propositions of the theory ” (ibid.), resp. to show “ that every time within a field of knowledge on the basis of the established axiom system contradictions are impossible at all ” (ibid.: 7). If we disregard some system-immanent implications of Hilbert ’ s approach (cf. Gabriel 1980), which need not concern us in the present context, we may nevertheless state that the “ lowering of the foundations ” and the “ independence and noncontradiction ” of the axioms were not presented alternatively by Hilbert, but necessarily follow each other. If Bühler, in his reference to Hilbert, confines himself only to the first condition but completely disregards the second aspect, such an approach would indeed have to be characterized by Kamp as “ a decisive truncation of Hilbert ’ s conception ” (Kamp 1977: 148). This reproach seems unavoidable insofar as Bühler has at no point distanced himself from Hilbert ’ s approach in a restrictive way, so that the axiomatics of linguistics would also be subject to the criticism to be levied against Hilbert ’ s approach. Kamp, however, believes - for good reasons, it seems to me - that Hilbert ’ s and Bühler ’ s axiomatic conceptions differ significantly. While there is some form of agreement between Hilbert and Bühler with respect to the emphasis on the reflective moment of axiomatics and, to a more limited extent, with respect to the definition of terms, the crucial difference results from the respective assessment of the validity of the axioms. Hilbert, in a letter to Frege, explicitly speaks of “ setting ” an axiom (cf. Gabriel 1980: 12), whereas - as we have already heard - Bühler emphasizes that axioms have to be “ sought. ” That this is not merely a minor difference in the choice of words is evident from the fact that Hilbert writes elsewhere: When it is a question of investigating the foundations of science, one has to establish a system of axioms that contain an exact and complete description of those relations that take place between the elementary concepts of that science (ibid.: 21, note 4; emphasis mine - A. E.), whereas Bühler emphasizes that the axioms have to be “ picked up ” from the linguistics (Bühler 1933a: 24). Kamp summarized this crucial difference as follows: Hilbert ’ s axioms function as a deduction basis and Bühler ’ s axioms as an induction basis. It is exactly in this sense that Bühler repeatedly refers to his axioms as guiding principles (Kamp 1977: 161). However, if Kamp then draws from this contrast between Hilbert and Bühler with regard to the question of the validity of axioms Bühler ’ s position negatively by criticizing ‘ traditional apriorism ’ as well as ‘ modern formalism ’ (cf. ibid.: 162) and positively by the key concept of the “ induction idea, ” which will be the subject of the following discussion, I can only agree with this opinion with respect to the key function of the “ induction ideas, ” because as the investigation of the previous section has shown, at least in Peirce ’ s interpretation of Aristotle, there can be no talk of ‘ apriorism ’ , since from a dialectical perspective, in the context of his investigation of the role of the apagoge, he came to the conclusion that the axioms had only the status of hypotheses. Suppose Hilbert ’ s axiomatic essay is to be used as a model for Bühler ’ s approach. In that case, this could only be done with a negative sign, because Bühler does not include Hilbert ’ s central demands, such as those for independence and freedom from contradiction, in his approach. In contrast, he introduces a condition Karl Bühler ’ s Axiomatics and the Axiom (1984) 65 under the keyword of the ‘ induction idea ’ , which is fundamentally contrary to Hilbert ’ s conception. Bühler calls it an urgent desideratum of linguistic science to “ uncover the logical first steps of induction of the linguistic researcher ” (Bühler 1934: 14), which should make it clear that a theory of language in the sense of axiomatics of linguistics is for Bühler the theory of linguistic induction ideas. In elaborating this idea, Bühler has been guided by the considerations of Whewell and Mill, or, more precisely, by those aspects of the two theoretical designs that seem compatible with each other, although it should not be overlooked that the argument is ultimately between Mill and Kant, since Whewell ’ s Philosophy of Discovery is occasionally nothing more than a literal translation of the Critique of Pure Reason, as Whewell himself points out. According to Whewell, two opposing elements can be distinguished in every act of cognition, which he calls concepts (ideas) and perceptions (perceptions). This fundamental antithetic of the process of cognition appears in manifold forms, such as in the oppositions of theory and fact or necessary and experimental truth, etc. According to Whewell, for cognition to become cognition at all, it must derive its character and nature from the respective first element of the fundamental opposition: The two elements which are essential to our knowledge in the above cases, are necessary to human knowledge in all cases. In all cases, knowledge implies a combination of Thoughts and Things. Without this combination, it would not be Knowledge. Without Thought, there could be no connection; without Things, there could be no reality; Thoughts and Things are so intimately combined in our Knowledge, that we do not look upon them as distinct. One single act of the mind involves them, and their contrast disappears in their union (Whewell 1967, I: 18). From this general epistemological maxim, Whewell derives the conclusion for the philosophy of science of the empirical sciences that we must approach the facts with the right induction idea in order to arrive at the truth. The induction ideas, which Whewell introduces under the name ‘ fundamental ideas ’ (cf. ibid.: 139 ff.), are thus the conditions of the possibility of scientific work: … the necessity and universality of the truths which form a part of our knowledge, are derived from the Fundamental Ideas which those truths involve. These ideas entirely shape and circumscribe our knowledge; they regulate the active operations of our minds, without which our passive sensations do not become knowledge. They govern these operations, according to rules which are not only fixed and permanent but may be expressed in plain and definite terms. These rules, when expressed, may be made the basis of a demonstration by which the necessary relations imparted to our knowledge by our Ideas may be traced to their consequences in the most remote ramifications of scientific truth. These enunciations of the necessary and evident conditions imposed upon our knowledge by the Fundamental Ideas which it involves are termed Axioms (ibid.: 66 f.). Whewell ’ s definition of the concept of axioms can be described as classical, insofar as he characterizes them as evidential conditions; at the same time, however, he points out that the insight into axiomatic truths depends on our prior knowledge, of the degree of clarity of the discipline they establish, and thirdly on the progress of knowledge in the history of science (cf. Kamp 1977: 166). The concept of axioms, however, is also the place where Whewell ’ s and Mill ’ s conceptions differ, for a while Whewell, as we have heard, regards axioms as conditions of experience and knowledge, while Mill conceives them as results of 66 Karl Bühler ’ s Axiomatics and the Axiom (1984) the process of knowledge, arrived at by way of generalizations from observations. This considerable conceptual difference prompts the question of where Bühler saw the common ground undisputed by both. The intersection of Whewell ’ s and Mill ’ s conceptions is, according to Kamp, to be found in the hypothetical character of descriptive-theoretical conceptions (cf. Kamp 1977: 177). Moreover, for Whewell as for Mill, the assumption holds that ideas of induction are in principle bound to linguistic mediation. This insight is expressed particularly clearly in a passage from Mill ’ s System of Deductive and Inductive Logic: If in the simplest observation, or in what counts for it, very much is not observation but something else, then in the simplest description of observation more is always asserted, and must always be, than is contained in the truth itself. [Consequently, it is impossible] to express a result of observation in words without committing an act that possesses what Dr. Whewell considers to be that which characterizes induction. Something is always introduced which was not in the observation; a conception common to the phenomenon with other phenomena with which it is compared. An observation cannot be expressed in the language without asserting more than one observation, without comparing it with other phenomena already observed and thus classifying it (Mill 1968, II: 209). Against this background, it becomes plausible why Bühler concludes the “ explanation of the topic ” with the already mentioned statement that he offers an intertwined discussion of concepts and axiomatics, whereby he separately emphasizes in the last sentence that “ certain premonitions ” had determined his conception of axiomatics (cf. Bühler 1933a: 24). But if every induction, and even more generally, every experimental research is preceded by the linguistically mediated identification of the object as an object, then the theory of induction ideas or axiomatics leads into a constitutional theory, which can manifest itself as an object-constituting as well as a domain-constituting theory. Kamp summarizes this result succinctly by means of an example: Kepler “ recognized “ identified “ constituted “ every single observed orbital point of Mars “ as “ a point of a geometrical figure, in this case, an ellipse. [ … ] Kepler “ conceived “ identified “ constituted “ the field of astronomical phenomena as a whole “ as ” a system of geometrical figures (Kamp 1977: 179 f.) Bühler clearly emphasized in several places that he wanted to follow Rickert ’ s considerations in his axiomatics (cf. Bühler 1933a: 20 f.; 1934: 5) so that a comprehensive understanding of Bühler ’ s approach is hardly possible without reference to Rickert. In his work, Kamp has taken up Bühler ’ s hint that an important model of the axiomatics of linguistics is to be sought in Rickert ’ s concept, and has compiled Rickert ’ s thoughts in the form of six sentences: 1. the theorem of the unmissability of everything real, 2. the theorem of the continuity of everything real, 3. the theorem of the heterogeneity of everything real, 4. the theorem of the irrationality of everything real, 5. the theorem of the rationality of everything real, or the theorem of transformativity of conceptual knowledge, 6. the theorem of the perspectivity of everything real or the theorem of the selectivity of conceptual knowledge (Kamp 1977: 126). Karl Bühler ’ s Axiomatics and the Axiom (1984) 67 Rickert explains the first theorem, which appears in Bühler ’ s pre-axiomatics as “ Mannigfaltigkeitssatz ” (multiplicity theorem), to the effect that the world of objects presents itself in a neither temporally nor locally limited manifold of quantitatively and qualitatively diverse things, without it being possible for the finite human mind to grasp all these phenomena. On the contrary: The more intensively and in more detail we delve into the immense multiplicity, the more multifaceted and multiform it becomes, which leads to the contradictory sound Behind, that an increase of the known is accompanied by an increase of the strange. If it is true that the given can neither be limited temporally nor locally, it follows that there can be no sharp boundaries either, but only flowing transitions. Accordingly, Rickert uses the old formula “ everything flows ” in his continuity theorem. The heterogeneity theorem is supposed to do justice to the fact that in principle there can be no process in the world that would completely correspond to a second one, which manifests itself, for example, in the non-repeatability of perceptual judgments. Kamp regards the irrationality theorem as a summary of the second and third theorems. This theorem is supposed to do justice to the fact that when the given turns out to be fundamentally heterogeneous we can always only recognize it diacritically, and when the given is integrated into a continuum that we cannot sharply segment, reality shows itself to us in a peculiar irrationality, since a heterogeneous continuum as such cannot be conceptualized. The transformativity theorem states that reality must appear irrational only to those who attempt to represent it as a heterogeneous continuum without transforming it. However, if we transform the heterogeneous continuum, offering the possibilities of transforming it into a homogeneous continuum or a heterogeneous discreteness, the possibility of rationally grasping reality opens up, although it must be added that both transformation procedures are simplifications. The perspectivity theorem, which concludes Rickert ’ s axiomatics, posits that in order to avoid arbitrary decisions in the transformation of the heterogeneous continuum, there is a need for an a priori fixed point of view, i. e., a prejudice, which orients all transformation steps. While Bühler follows Rickert ’ s propositions one to five, the perspectivity proposition can only be partially reconciled with his own position, which, in contrast to Rickert ’ s approach, is not deductively determined. However, the difference of opinion concerning the perspectivity theorem is not an irreconcilable contradiction, because what Bühler discusses under the term induction idea shows considerable similarity with Rickert ’ s perspectivity theorem, apart from the not insignificant difference that Rickert ascribes a priori validity to perspective. In contrast, Bühler wants to deduce the induction idea from the successful research business. The fact that Bühler did not only orientate himself on Hilbert ’ s, Whewell ’ s, Mills ’ , and Rickert ’ s preliminary considerations in constructing his axiomatics did not need to be specifically noted. However, it might be particularly worthwhile to determine more precisely the degree of agreement that exists between Bühler and Meinong. Such similarities can be inferred from a note in Krise der Psychologie (cf. Bühler 1978: 61). A 68 Karl Bühler ’ s Axiomatics and the Axiom (1984) detailed analysis of these correspondences, including the letters exchanged by the two scholars, must be reserved for another context. In a brief remark that will conclude this section, I would like to pursue the question of why Bühler did not bother with a word about the axiomatics developed by Weiss (1925) and Bloomfield (1926), whereas Weiss presented an axiomatics of psychology and Bloomfield an axiomatics of linguistics, which Bloch (1948: 3) assesses in a similarly wrong way as Lieb (1980: 299). Bühler has provided an answer to this question in the form of his sharp critique of the one-sidedness of the behaviorist approach, which he puts forward in The Krise der Psychologie (cf. Bühler 1978: 18-29). If one remembers that the “ subjectivist axiom ” in the preface to the second edition of the Krise der Psychologie determined self-observation as the only legitimate starting point of psychology, and if one compares this axiom with the remark: “ That behaviorism, in the course of its short history, behaves more and more rejectively toward everything that in psychological determinations comes from selfobservation, is just as understandable as it can become, and in part has already become, fatal for its basic concepts and axioms ” (ibid.: 22), it is clear why Bühler did not need to deal with the works of Weiss and Bloomfield in more detail. Alternative sematological axiomatics While Bühler could refer to a number of models in the field of general axiomatics, the situation is different in sematological axiomatics. In two cases at most, namely in Gomperz and Gatschenberger, there could be the talk of orientation to these alternative sematological axiomatics. At the same time, the other two drafts under discussion here, that of Haig and Bense, cannot be considered models. Nevertheless, I consider comparing these approaches useful in the present context as Bühler ’ s axiomatic method becomes clearer in its special character. In his 1869 work Symbolism or Mind-Matter-Language, the Scottish philosopher James Haig dealt with problems of axiomatics in two chapters, chapter IV being reserved for logical axioms, while Haig deals with questions of sign-theoretical axiomatics in chapter XIII. Haig ’ s semiotic study, which has been almost completely overlooked, at least by the continental European discussion, which applies to a number of semiotic texts written at the same time (cf., e. g., Smart ’ s Sematologie; Engl. Smart 1978), - the copy of Haig ’ s Symbolism belonging to the Frankfurt University Library had not even been cut open at the end of 1982 - is of great value to us because, analogous to Whewell ’ s and Mill ’ s approaches, it assumes the fundamental linguistic or semiotic mediatedness of the cognitive process: There are not two unities, but three unities - the object, the subject, and the word - or else your mouth is shut about them! There are three, not two, factors in every human cognition, and till the word is created or assumed, your cognition is incomplete, and your reasoning cannot begin (Haig 1869: 193). If, on the one hand, we have to assume as the three foundations of knowledge in every act of cognition the cognizing subject, the object of cognition, and the semiotic mediation between them, on the other hand, we must also take into account that there can be no science until we also assume fundamental categories, general concepts, and axioms (cf. ibid.: 192). Haig determines axioms as self-evident propositions (cf. ibid.: 194), whereby he considers it Karl Bühler ’ s Axiomatics and the Axiom (1984) 69 contradictory to ask about the evidence of axioms at all since the constitutional conditions of axioms already exclude such a question. The explication of this position, which at first sight seems traditional, will prove that Haig has taken an original semiotic conception with regard to the ‘ axioms ’ problem. If doubts about the validity of an axiom arise, then due to the self-evident character of axioms this doubt can only be resolved with reference to language and logic, since axioms as logically general things must be expressed linguistically. While the self-evidence of axioms is always referred back to the individuality of the subject of knowledge so that someone can only settle with himself whether he regards something as self-evident or not, a general consensus on the validity of an axiom can only be brought about linguistically (cf. ibid.: 203). But if we say that basically, every act of cognition depends on mediation by signs - which then of course must also apply to the individual act of cognition, and here there seems to be an inconsistency in Haig - then the semiotically conceived axiom cannot involve more than has been linguistically put into it. On the basis of this consideration it is then only logical when Haig regards a true axiom as a true explanation of the signs concerned: What are called axioms, are all, as I think, truly involved in the proper understanding of the words themselves; and they cannot be called truly axioms if they are not self-evident when the words are fully understood by our internal senses. But it takes time to revolve and settle the true meanings of words in our own minds, and that is a very laborious mental exercise for the conscientious thinker (ibid.: 211). From this explanation, it is evident that the axiomatic method, in Haig ’ s opinion, amounts to a program centered on the progressive clarification of the meaning of our signs, by which it is also said - incidentally - that this program has extensive parallels with Mauthner ’ s Sprachkritik. The procedure Haig proposes for realizing his program, and by which he intends to put the role of signs in the process of cognition to their adequate function, amounts to the comparison and reflection of the logical inferences and relations we derive from axioms. At this important juncture, Haig emphasizes that “ logical inference is always hypothetical in the form ” (ibid.: 217), opening up a perspective that implies extremely farreaching semiotic consequences, without himself dealing at length with the unfolding of those consequences. If it is true that, as Haig says, we can think about human actions only by means of and in terms of signs that produce and cause the actions. If it is true that we can approach both minds and matter only by means of linguistic signs, and if it is true, thirdly, that all inferences, i. e., also the inferences from signs, are hypothetical, then it follows that there can in principle be no such thing as fixed, definable word meanings, but only an indefinably long and difficult process of explaining the meaning. Haig summarizes his considerations on axiomatics as follows: But the conclusion which I wish the reader to admit is simply this: that it is not true or accurate language to speak or reason concerning scientific ideas, but only concerning scientific words; and that the axioms of every science must always be self-evident verbal propositions arising out of and involved in the scientific meanings of the words themselves, when carefully and conscientiously attended compared, and reflected on by the mind in thought. Of course, we might call these judgments or intuitions, or some other internal name no better than an idea, but we have rejected all such words not founded upon number as being inaccurate and beyond the true region of general 70 Karl Bühler ’ s Axiomatics and the Axiom (1984) human cognition. An axiom, therefore, is a necessary and self-evident relation between the scientific words employed in the axiom itself (ibid.: 219). While, to my knowledge, there is not a single place where Bühler refers to Haig ’ s axiomatics, so that the two approaches can only be made fruitful for each other in comparison, Bühler refers at argumentatively very important places of his axiomatics to the second volume of Heinrich Gomperz ’ s Weltanschauungslehre (Worldview teaching), which bears the title Noology and the subtitle Introduction and Semasiology. Already on the first page of the theory of language, he mentions Gomperz in the same breath as Plato, Humboldt, Wundt, Cassirer, Marty, and the Meinong school, to whom Bühler owes the main ideas of his book, as he explains. In the second passage, where Bühler discusses Gomperz, it becomes understandable why Gomperz is cited as a model since Bühler can draw on Gomperz ’ s semasiology in discussing the representational function that is central to his overall conception. The third passage is no less important because in this context Bühler discusses the principle of abstract relevance (cf. Bühler 1933a: 29 f.; 1934: 225). Gomperz develops four main propositions in his semasiology, which 1) concern the inconceivability of the propositional content, the fact of logical intercourse, and the propositional content as a mental fact; 2) Gomperz deals with the representational nature of propositions, the empirical reality of noetic objects, and the relation of meaning, matter, and consciousness; 3) Gomperz distinguishes between real and intelligible parts, discusses the fact as an intelligible part of the propositional basis, and treats the relation of conception and abstraction; 4) Gomperz deals with the members of the relation of designation and meaning, emphasizes the differences in essence between designate and mean, and presents ‘ mean ’ as ‘ represent ’ . In his investigation of the problem of meaning, Gomperz starts from the premise that thought must either possess a linguistic form or be sufficiently structured to assume such a form so that there can be any talk of meaning at all in the logical and noological sense. Thoughts that fulfill this condition are called statements by Gomperz (cf. Gomperz 1908: 54). From the observation that the same propositional content can be expressed by different propositional sounds and different propositional content by the same propositional sounds, Gomperz concludes that propositional content and propositional sounds cannot coincide. But since only the propositional sounds are perceptible, this results in the first main semasiological question, how the propositional content presents itself to consciousness (cf. ibid.: 91). Gomperz can only give an answer to this first question ex negativo, since he can only say that different rules apply to the propositional content than to the propositional sound and the propositional basis (cf. ibid.: 97). According to Gomperz ’ s opinion, the relation of expression prevailing between the content of expression and the propositional sound shows in several respects a similar relation to the relation of inherence existing between the substance and the qualities of a thing. This impression is reinforced by the fact that the statements, i. e., the complexes consisting of statement content and statement sounds, are experienced as unified and persistent when the statement contents remain the same so that one can say that the statements are experienced representationally just as things are. Against this background, Gomperz formulates the second main semasiological question, which investigates “ what we Karl Bühler ’ s Axiomatics and the Axiom (1984) 71 mean by the expressive relation between propositional content and propositional sounds in general, and what we mean by the representationality of propositions in particular ” (ibid.: 98). Gomperz justifies the third semasiological main question in the way that the relation of apprehension to be stated between propositional content and propositional basis has two peculiarities: First, different propositions, which can refer to the same propositional bases as their apprehensions, do not correspond to reality, but only to mentally distinguishable parts. Secondly, it must be noted that the relation of apprehension must also be in a relation of similarity to the relation of inherence since the complexes formed from propositional content and propositional basis appear to us representational, i. e., uniform and persistent. Accordingly, the third question is: Hence, the question arises of what we mean by intelligible parts, what we mean by the apprehension relation between propositional content and propositional basis, and what we mean by the concreteness of the propositional facts (ibid.: 121). The last semasiological main theorem concerns the relation between designation and meaning. In order to clarify this relation, Gomperz assumes, on the one hand, (that the designation relation existing between propositional sounds and the propositional foundation is merely mediated and purely external and is characterized by the fact that the existence of the second can be inferred from the existence of the first relational foundation. On the other hand, Gomperz determines the meaning relation existing between statement and stated fact as a proxy or representation relation. The fourth semasiological main question is then literally: The question, therefore, arises as to what we mean by the meaning relation between statement and fact (ibid.: 132). Gomperz ’ s axiomatics, built up from four main semasiological questions, shows, besides some obvious similarities, considerable differences to Bühler ’ s approach, because Gomperz also axiomatically foregrounds the sign nature of language, the question of elementarization, and the expressive and representational function, but, unlike Bühler, he chooses a purely linguistically oriented starting point, which manifests itself, for example, in the neglect of the appellative function. Significant differences are also found in that Gomperz does not provide for a differentiation equivalent to the linguistic four-field scheme, nor does he distinguish between a pointing field and a symbolic field. Nevertheless, Bühler ’ s axiomatics should be regarded as an elaboration and continuation of the semasiology envisaged by Gomperz, despite the aforementioned deviations. For Richard Gätschenberger ’ s sematological axiomatics, it cannot be claimed with the same certainty as for Heinrich Gomperz that Bühler chose it as a model for his own approach since he does not refer to Gätschenberger at any point that I know of. Even if at present it is not possible to speak of a direct relationship between the models of Gätschenberger and Bühler, there are a number of quite impressive indications suggesting such a direct relationship (cf. Preface to Gätschenberger 1983). Among the most important of these indications are, for example, the unusual terminological coinages - both Bühler and Gätschenberger speak of a ‘ sematological ’ axiomatics; the only author who has a 72 Karl Bühler ’ s Axiomatics and the Axiom (1984) corresponding terminology is Benjamin H. Smart (1978); furthermore, the fact that both Bühler and Gätschenberger, as psychologists, set out to design an axiomatic system, and thirdly, the fact that both Gätschenberger and Bühler were Schillers of Oswald Külpe and Gätschenberger practiced as a physician in Würzburg when the famous thought experiments of Külpe ’ s Würzburg School were carried out with Bühler ’ s substantial participation. Gätschenberger ’ s sematological axiomatics is characterized, on the one hand, by a much higher degree, of generality and variety of application, than was found in Haig ’ s or Gomperz ’ s work, and, on the other hand, by a certain aggressiveness that is reflected in sentences such as the following: The sematological field is closely connected from a central point with all the others; sematology interferes everywhere (Gätschenberger 1977: 144). Surprisingly, Gätschenberger also chooses an approach consisting of four axioms, to which he adds fifteen maxims. The axioms developed by Gätschenberger are: • Real (or thought to be real) can be symbolized by the signs for at least two unreal (or thought to be unreal) objects. • To create an artificial sign or symbol - To pontificate an object artificially. • One goal of sign-setting is parallelism between sign contexts and existing object contexts. • One goal of sign-setting is to form the necessary maximum of symbols with a minimum of signs (ibid.: 32-38). The following fifteen maxims, which I will not list in detail (cf. ibid.: 39-45), are rules of most different nature: On the one hand, they are sematological transfers of the identity, the contradiction, and the proposition of the excluded third party, which can also be seen as unfolding of a single axiom, which would then have to read: “ A is A and not Non-A and shall always remain A ” (cf. Austeda 1962: 34 ff.). On the other hand, Gätschenberger lists among the maxims such propositions that are very strongly reminiscent of the sincerity criterion of speech act theory and that admit the demand made by Mauthner (1980, I: 67) to revive the relation between axiomatics and axiology already known to the Ramists. Third, and finally, among the maxims appear those sentences that could perhaps be characterized as preserved principles of scientific work. Gätschenberger himself comments on his draft as follows: The first two axioms or laws of thought are sematological descriptions translated into the language of the signified and as such require a justifying connection with the other propositional objects. A second group of so-called axioms consists of generalizations of inner experiences. There are retrospections by which one states that one must and cannot do some things. Certainty about it or evidence exists only in each first, second, third case, and so on. That it is always true can only be justified if an ideal system can justify the generalization (Gätschenberger 1977: 143). From this latter statement of Gätschenberger, we can draw some important conclusions about his assessment of the role of the axiomatic method in general and of sematological axiomatics in particular, as well as about the question of the establishment of axioms. To answer the last question, we read him as saying: Conventionally, one demands from a system, that it begins with axioms, postulates, and supreme laws of thought. The demand is first unclear, secondly incomplete. By axioms, one understands Karl Bühler ’ s Axiomatics and the Axiom (1984) 73 secretly or openly gifts of reason, by laws of thinking laws of a thinking ability instead of the thought. Sematological demands are missing completely (ibid.). Reinforcing this tendency, it is said elsewhere: One can be of the opinion that sematological sentences do not belong to a system, but rather that one has to decide on the meaning and mode of use of the signs before their establishment and then only apply the signs correctly. This may be true for systems that deal only with limited areas. But the larger the area of a system becomes, the more the bad consequences of the decisions become apparent (ibid.: 142). If we interpret these two passages as a plea against the apriorism of more geometrico constructed axiomatics, however, the question immediately arises how then axiomatics should be conceived. Gätschenberger ’ s answer, which we have already encountered in a comparable way in Whewell and Mill, and which is also at the heart of Bühler ’ s thought, states: But the axioms do not speak in the language of the given of the retrospectively perceived, but in the language of the demanded for the sake of the given. Axioms are generalizations of retrospectively perceived things translated into the language of the demanded. [ … ] The retrospective perceptions form an exceedingly rich treasure of experiences, which is certainly not inferior to the ‘ external ’ perceptions and accomplishes just what is attributed to reason and still some more. These inner experiences, by not knowing anything about them, do not become less important for cognition than the outer ones (ibid.: 84). In short, then, axioms are generalizations of everyday experiences, which Gätschenberger expresses in this way elsewhere (cf. ibid.: 144). Against this background, an answer to the still open question about the role of sematological axiomatics is then possible: if axiomatics takes up the experiences of successful sciences - to speak with Bühler - and if axioms are translated sematological resolutions, without the axioms thereby becoming corollaries of the resolutions, then we may - according to Gätschenberger - “ put the axioms next to the sematological principles ” (ibid.: 144). I will try to show later that this conclusion of Gätschenberger ’ s must be corrected to the effect that axiomatic and sematological firsts are not in a symmetrical relation, but are to be set off against each other without remainder. Although Max Bense ’ s work Axiomatik und Semiotik is the latest and most comprehensive work in this field, I will only briefly discuss it, since Bense, on the one hand, directs his investigation towards a goal that is fundamentally different from ours - his considerations are directed towards “ mathematics and knowledge of nature ” . In contrast, here it is about the axiomatics of linguistics resp. the sciences of experience - which, on the other hand, explains his deductive procedure that proceeds via axioms to definitions, postulates, theorems, etc., whereas here an apagogic respectively the abductive procedure is chosen. Beyond these conceptual divergences with respect to the subject matter treated and the procedure adopted, which are, however, not negligible methodological differences of opinion, there are assumptions underlying Bensen ’ s understanding of semiotics that I cannot endorse: I see one of the decisive points of contention in Bense ’ s definition of semiotics as an “ operational theory ” (Bense 1981: 151), which I would like to counter without further discussion, which will be conducted elsewhere, with a conception that understands semiotics as a method of reflection critical of basic principles. 74 Karl Bühler ’ s Axiomatics and the Axiom (1984) Despite these divergences, I would like to take up three of Bense ’ s suggestions and examine them for their applicability in the present context. Bense starts from the assumption “ that certain decisive properties of dyadic representations on the logical level are already determined by corresponding or equivalent ones on the categorically lower semiotic level of triadic relations ” (ibid.: 152), from which he draws the conclusion that it is obvious to “ abandon the well-known requirements of completeness, independence, and freedom from the contradiction that is imposed on axiom systems of logical-mathematical provenance, pro-axiomatically, i. e., by correspondingly determinative demands on the semiotic level of representation ” (ibid.). Although Bense considers this conclusion obvious, it seems to me to imply at least three problematic aspects: The first issue, however, which already casts doubt on the premises of Bense ’ s conclusion, concerns the possibility or impossibility of ‘ dyadic representations. If this is not just a superficial way of speaking, which I would like to leave out of consideration, one would have to assume that there are representations that consist of only two relational foundations. What is a very common phenomenon from the point of view of relational logic turns out to be an impossibility of thinking from the perspective of the problem of representation. As, for example, C. S. Peirce and Bühler have shown in their detailed treatment of the problem of representation in the case of the scholastic formula “ aliquid stat pro aliquo ” , representation is precisely not of a dyadic nature but is only put into function when the representative is regarded as the representative of the represented, i. e., when the “ stare pro ” is systematically taken into account as a medium or third party (cf. Bühler 1934: 40). The second problem concerns whether the semiotic level is categorically deeper than the logical level. A satisfactory clarification of this question, to which the discussion will return later, would require a lengthy argument for which this is inappropriate. Instead of a detailed argument, I would like to counter Bense - again with reference to Peirce and Bühler - that semiotics cannot justify logic because they are not only on the same level but because logic should be conceived as semiotics (cf. Peirce C. P. 8.377), which also corresponds to Bühler ’ s opinion, who explicitly equates logic and sematology in the unpublished draft of his Axiomatik der Sprachwissenschaften (Axiomatics of Linguistics) (cf. Pre-Axiomatik: 27). The third disagreement stems from the attempt to transfer the requirements of completeness, independence, and non-contradiction from the logical-mathematical context to the semiotic level of representation. As nice as it may be to build up axiomatics along these three demands, such an attempt is at the same time inappropriate, for it would amount to a metabásis eis álio génos, as Bühler called such an attempt since mathematical axiomatics (more correctly geometrical axiomatics) has in principle different constitutional conditions than logical-dialectical-semiotic axiomatics, which is strikingly evident with respect to the hypothetical nature of the semiotic axioms, which never want to and can deny their origin in generalized judgments of experience. Idea and plan of Bühler ’ s axiomatics Even if Karl Bühler only published a paper in 1933 in the Kant Studies, which already dealt with the ‘ axiom ’ problem in its title, the impression would be completely wrong that the axiomatics of linguistics was the inclusion of a thought which was new for Bühler; Rather, Karl Bühler ’ s Axiomatics and the Axiom (1984) 75 Bühler dealt with this problem throughout his life, with the first approaches going back to his medical and his philosophical doctoral theses (Bühler 1903 and 1904), while the last studies, which are as yet unpublished, were made during the time of his American emigration. That this way of looking at the development of Bühler ’ s axiomatic thinking is not a post festum constructed unity or dynamic of the approach, but that such a way of looking at it is completely in accordance with Bühler ’ s self-assessment, can be gathered from the memoirs in the preface of the Theory of Language (Bühler 1934: X), in which Bühler reviews some of the most important stations on the way to his theory of language. In his opinion, his system “ was founded in 1907 after the discovery of the ‘ syntactic schemes ’ in speech thought [ … ] and in 1908 after the highlighting of the representational function of language in my collective lecture on the processes of understanding [ … ] ” (ibid.). He concludes his review of the development of his work so far with the statement: “ Since I have been able to think scientifically, my interests have revolved around the phenomenon of language ” (ibid.). However, it would be too little if we merely wanted to state that Bühler ’ s axiomatic model of 1933 or 1934 had precursors in his own work, just as there were still important developments after 1933. Bühler ’ s approach is only justified by Hilbert ’ s expression of the progressive deepening of the foundations, which Bühler interpreted not only as meaning that he elaborated, refined, and supplemented axiomatics once it had been designed; this expression also implied for Bühler the obligation to establish the foundations of the empirical sciences on his part, namely - as we will see - in axiomatics of the theory of signs. Before the publication of Axiomatics of the science of language, two directions of axiomatic thinking in Bühler can be distinguished, which at first seem to be mutually exclusive and only in the course of the twenties merge into a consistent system. In Bühler ’ s medical dissertation, which has already been described as an axiomatic of Helmholtz ’ s color theory, the starting point of the experiments is the assumption of the validity of the persistence and proportionality theorems established by J. v. Kries, from which Bühler deduces (cf. Bühler 1903: 10). His philosophical dissertation on the Scottish philosopher Henry Home is also oriented in a quite comparable way. In this case, he did not go to work experimentally, but endeavored in theoretical discourse to find the “ underived elements ” (Bühler 1904: 59) in Home ’ s thought. A third study, in which this view was practiced, determines the axiomatic method as the “ kind of deductive procedure beginning with axioms ” (Bühler 1922: 5). The first elaborated system of axioms comes in the Krise der Psychologie, first published in 1926, which, in Bühler ’ s opinion, is at once about the axiomatics and the method of psychology (cf. Bühler 1978: 1). Bühler sees the goal of this critical stocktaking in a deduction, i. e., a “ derivation of the three psychological aspects from the tasks facing our science and from the means of investigation at its disposal ” (ibid.: 57). But if one asks how the term ‘ deduction ’ is to be understood here, Bühler answers: The deduction presented is formally, logically a syllogism with the upper proposition, lower proposition, and conclusion. The upper proposition states that all three aspects are necessary to justify a theory of language. The subordinate clause subsumes the phenomenon of language under the objects of psychology. From this, it can be concluded that some things belonging to psychology require three aspects (ibid.: 57 f.). 76 Karl Bühler ’ s Axiomatics and the Axiom (1984) This explication of the concept of ‘ deduction ’ shows that the axiomatic approach hides Bühler ’ s basic question, which he poses in the following key passage: How is psychology possible? So Kant would ask in our situation. It is indeed incumbent upon the philosopher to reflect soon on the possibility, soon on the necessity of the given. And we need philosophical reflection on our axiomatics, their character, and viability. It is a transcendental deduction in Kant ’ s sense that is necessary and is sought here. Each of the three aspects is possible, and none is dispensable in the one science of psychology. Each of them demands the other two for their complement so that a closed scientific knowledge system comes into being. From each of them spring its own tasks, indispensable to psychology, which become meaningless or insoluble if abandoned. Thus, the initial object of psychology belongs to the experiences, the sensible behavior of living beings, and their correlations with the entities of the objective mind (ibid.: 29). With this formulation not only the actual concern of axiomatics is clearly stated, but also the system built up from three axioms is presented, which Bühler presented in an overview as follows: I Wherever there is genuine community life, there must be a mutual direction of the meaningful conduct of the community members. Where the points of the direction of the control are not given in the common perceptual situation, they must be mediated by a contact of higher order, by specific semantic devices. II If the self-need and the self-determination of the individuals involved in a community act are to be brought to bear in the mutual control, they must come to manifestation. III By assigning the expressive signs to the objects and facts, they gain a new dimension of meaning. Thus an incalculable increase in their efficiency as means of communication. The one through the other (ibid.: 50 f.). In the Krise der Psychologie, however, Bühler not only established these three axioms constituting the field, which in his opinion “ constitute the cosmos of pure language without remainder ” (ibid.: 51), but in the preface to the second edition of this book, written during his stay in America in 1928, he developed a model consisting of four axioms, in which the controversies of psychology are to a certain extent bundled (I quote from the manuscript, which differs from the printed version): 1. The subjectivist axiom: The only legitimate outcome of psychology is self-observation; its object is experience. 2. The atomistic axiom: The analysis of the experiences finds firmly circumscribed elementary contents of consciousness; the so-called entangled or higher phenomena are complexions from them. 3. The sensualistic axiom: Genetically original contents are only the sense data with the inclusion of the elementary feelings. (Feeling tones, of which there are only two: desire and dislike). 4. The mechanistic axiom: The formation of complexions and the course of experience are subject to the law of contiguity, the principle of association; there are simultaneous and successive cementations or both in one (MS of the preface to Bühler 1929: 1). Measured against the Krise der Psychologie, in which some scholars certainly not unjustifiably see Bühler ’ s most important work, Bühler ’ s Ausdruckstheorie, first published in 1933, is less productive from an axiomatic point of view, although this work is also axiomatically oriented in large parts since Bühler assesses the approaches of the various theorists of expression treated precisely in terms of the axiomatics on which they are based Karl Bühler ’ s Axiomatics and the Axiom (1984) 77 (cf. Bühler 1968: 3). Particularly noteworthy, however, are some remarks which are suitable to clarify and inculcate what has been said so far. The first group of these remarks concerns the logical status and dialectical origin of axioms, emphasizing their hypothetical character. For example, Bühler, like Meinong, speaks of axioms as “ general assumptions ” (ibid.: 74) and characterizes the first sentences as finder rules, regulae ad directionem ingenii (ibid.: 97), which can be understood as an elucidation of the concept of induction ideas introduced earlier. A second point of view that is significant for the present context of discussion concerns the question of how Bühler himself places his axiomatic studies in the history of dogma, i. e., the history of axiomatics (cf. ibid.: 195): He argues that there were phases in the scientific process that were primarily concerned with the unification and harmonization of the knowledge achieved (cf. ibid.), in order to be able to derive from it the direction of future work. Literally, it says: It is instructive to break down the knowledge possessions of today into aspects and to realize what future tasks await us in the field of axiomatics (ibid.: 195). The third and perhaps most important set of issues, which will occupy us in more detail later, relates to the leitmotif-recurring demand that the work of the theorist of science should not yet end with establishing axiomatics of linguistics. The deepening of the foundations must find its continuation in sign-theoretical axiomatics, or Bühler ’ s words: But a comprehensively new plan in these matters must be dominated and supported by deepened sematological axiomatics (ibid.: 88). The unpublished draft version of the Axiomatics of Linguistics, which I have called Pre- Axiomatics, cannot be reproduced here in extenso, but only in some particularly striking aspects. However, I would like to quote the complete table of contents of this draft, which already allows an insight into the later significant deviations in the printed version: The system of axiomatic sentences I The key theorem of the sign nature of language. II The decomposition theorem of speech acts and speech entities (aspects). III The manifold theorem from the structural model of language. IV The proposition of the logos-character of semantic synthesis and semantic synthemata. V The theorem of the three sense relations in language signs (representation, expression, appeal). VI Postponed is the sociological consideration. Unfulfilled is a thesis about the speech act. How closely Bühler follows the great Greek thinkers “ in matters of principle research ” can be seen from the fact that he derives the first two axioms directly from Greek thought developed in unsurpassed straightforwardness of approach: Where Plato in the Cratylus takes up the thinking of his contemporaries about the nature of human language and continues it in his own way, he firstly states the proposition that language is an organon, a device of mental intercourse, through which one is able to communicate something to the other about things. This is a definition of language from the point of view of its performance, a definition of performance. Secondly, he recommends that one should do the same in the research of this organon as one wants to obtain reliable information about the nature of any other tool. There is, for example, the weaver ’ s wheel, the loom. Go to the weaver, he knows how to handle the loom and has the most intimate knowledge of the properties of this organon from his craft practice. Or even 78 Karl Bühler ’ s Axiomatics and the Axiom (1984) better: Go to the one who made the weaver ’ s shuttle, the carpenter. There you will certainly learn the most reliable about the construction of the weaver ’ s chest. This is a methodical instruction for the philosopher. It is transferred to the language, applied to the object language, the recipe of the socalled Socratic induction (MS Pre-Axiomatics). Bühler did not think of simply borrowing his axiomatics from Plato and the Greek thinkers. Still, he had in mind a contemporary renewal of the classical approach, which above all should also take into account the rich results of successful linguistics in an appropriate way: My opinion in matters of linguistic theory is that a Plato redivivus today, after due insight into what has been accomplished in linguistic research, could take up his old scheme of thought, reinterpret it, and thus develop a clear and fruitful program of linguistic principles research (ibid.). The last-mentioned point of view, which frees Bühler ’ s conception from any suspicion of apriorism, he himself considered so important that he emphasized it again in a modified formulation: The philosopher of today can do nothing else than that he gets his information from the linguist of the subject. There in his theoretical workshop the Platonic Socrates would have to open his discussion of principles today. But the actual sense of the procedure can remain granted. In other words: the philosopher of today has every reason to assume that in the large-scale business of empirical linguistic research, which has now been going on for a century (continuously, in spite of all the twists and turns that have occurred in it) from success to success, that in this secular research business what the philosopher is looking for, the axioms of linguistic theory, are already alive. It is only a matter for him to find them in the bosom of linguistics, to formulate them exactly, and thus to raise step by step to the range of a system, which in general assumptions about language has always carried and fertilized empirical research. In the conception of the best empirical linguists, explicitly or implicitly, the axioms or some axioms of the theory of language are already contained. This is the assumption from which I start (ibid.). If, on the basis of these explanations, the procedure of Bühler ’ s research into principles is basically clarified, it only remains to discuss what Bühler meant when he spoke of the fact that everything else could be “ logically or semeologically deduced ” (ibid.) from the basic assumptions mentioned. He cautions not to be frightened by the word ‘ deduce ’ and explains his use of the word as follows: It does not mean that one can suck this knowledge from the fingers, that one can win it materially apriori. No, this ‘ deduction ’ is only the last step that belongs to every completed induction. Just as Kepler, once he had found the elliptical idea, was able to deduce the facts in a certain sense, in a certain whole, i. e., to make them logically coherent and transparent, the theory of language can and must if it is to be of any use, try to deduce certain basic results of comparative linguistic research (ibid). As clear differences between the axiom system of the Pre-Axiomatics and the later print version can be stated, as do the approaches developed in the Axiomatics of Linguistics, the Theory of Language, and the Paris Lecture of 1937 differ. Messing (1982: 60 f.) is even of the opinion that the axiomatics presented in the Krise der Psychologie does not necessarily lead to the organon model. A comparison of the axiom systems in question should answer the question of whether, despite certain differences, this is an elaboration of one system, or whether the rearrangements and accentuations ultimately lead to fundamentally different approaches: Karl Bühler ’ s Axiomatics and the Axiom (1984) 79 The system of axiomatics of linguistics, consisting of four axioms, includes the following propositions: A The organon model of language B Speech action and speech formation C The structural model of language D The scheme of speech functions In the Theory of Language the system, which is also built up of four axioms, has taken the following form: Axiom A exposes the basic structure of human language; Axiom B expresses the sign character of linguistic phenomena; Axiom C names the four different moments that can be distinguished in the overall object of linguistics; Axiom D characterizes language as a multiclass sign device (cf. Dempe 1935: 246 f.): A The organon model of language B The sign nature of language C Speech act and speech work; speech act and speech formation D Word and sentence. The S-F system of the type language The lecture Bühler gave on the third main theorem of language at the 11th International Psychological Congress in Paris in 1937 betrayed a view of linguistic axiomatics that had changed in essential respects: I know four main theorems of language theory. The first, the organon model of language, deals with the functions of the speech act; the second, the structural model of language, deals with the structure of the linguistic entities (la langue). The pair of terms function and structure is familiar to science and needs no explanation here. - The third main proposition deals with speech traffic and the fourth with speech work; this new pair of terms presents itself at the moment when one raises the question of the main uses of language (Bühler 1938: 196). If we now put the three systems in relation to each other, it very soon turns out that it is not only about the elaboration of a perspective that is uniform in its basic structure, but that on the one hand the three axiom systems are complementary to each other in several respects, whereas on the other hand there is also at least a serious change to be noted: 1. Language as a sign phenomenon 1933: Axiom A 1934: Axiom B 1938: Axiom A 2. Language as a relational phenomenon 1933: Axiom D 1934: Axiom A 1938: Axiom C 3. Language as a four-sided phenomenon 1933: Axiom B 1934: Axiom C 1938: Axiom D 4. Language as a two-class system 1933: Axiom C 1934: Axiom D 1938: Axiom B (cf. Kamp 1977: 202). Even this simple comparison shows that the three axiomatics, understood as constitutional schemes, are each directed at a different object: While the axiomatics of linguistics is primarily concerned with the constitution of the object of linguistic research in general, the axiomatics of Theory of Language is the constitution scheme of language linguistics, and the axiomatics of the Paris lecture is the constitution scheme of parole linguistics, or in other words, while the main interest in 1933 is the constitution of signs and meaning, in 1934 the structural and functional thought comes to the fore, whereas in 1938 the accent is on the 80 Karl Bühler ’ s Axiomatics and the Axiom (1984) speech traffic, the speech act and the actual use of linguistic signs. From the fact that this change of perspective can be achieved by a simple regrouping of the axioms, one can see that. Bühler in no way thought of rejecting the respective earlier drafts as wrong: Such a remark is nowhere in Bühler ’ s work. Instead, we must assume that the various axiomatic drafts were systematically developed by Bühler in order to do justice to the complex task of constituting the object of ‘ language ’ and its scientific treatment in a comprehensive sense. If further above, besides the complementarity of the three drafts, also a serious change was mentioned, this was meant to articulate the impression that has arisen during the screening of the three axiomatics: If one can say that. the axiomatics move from the general, abstract, and supra-individual to the particular, concrete, and individual, one could be inclined to evaluate this movement as a progressive pragmatization of Bühler ’ s approach, the consequences of which can only be pondered today. For Bühler himself, in the twenties and thirties the demand for the construction of linguistic pragmatics did not yet arise in the same way as it does today, since before this task could be accomplished, important preliminary work still had to be done: What is meant here is the double function of axiomatics, insofar as they should, on the one hand, reject or prevent threatening erroneous developments as critical theories, and insofar as they must, on the other hand, become active in a field-constituting way. The first point of view, which appears in a particularly concise way in the preface to the second edition of the Krise der Psychologie, does not contradict the second function; on closer examination, it turns out that the two functions are nothing else than the two sides of the same coin. Therefore, in the following, we will only deal with the question of which conclusions Bühler was prompted by the field-constituting function of axiomatics. In order to answer this question, we have to revisit the concept of the induction idea discussed earlier; now, however, we shall no longer be concerned with which theorists Bühler joined in adopting this concept, but rather with the extent to which the induction ideas may be regarded as formulations of Bühler ’ s research program. That this interpretation of the term “ induction idea ” is not only permissible but even necessary, is proven by a number of passages, which in their essence all boil down to the following view: When and as far as this [the question of whether the procedure of the experts in their structural recordings can be grasped from the highest, axiomatic guiding principle but the language as appropriate] succeeds, we gain a usable, i. e. scientifically fruitful answer to the question, which we can first of all put in general terms, following Kant ’ s well-known formula, like this: How is pure linguistics possible? Indeed, in the special field of linguistic research, a kind of basic research is conceivable, as Kant conceived and conceived it for the mathematical natural sciences. [ … ] We ask whether the three aforementioned pre-expectations of linguists can be brought into a connexus logicus, a mutual order of reasoning, e. g., can be regarded as the outflow of a single axiom about the structure of human language; this will suffice for the time being. Whether these pre-expectations of the linguists are to be regarded as the highest ideas of induction in the sense of an empiricist conception or whether they can be obtained epistemologically by other means, we leave completely undecided here. Well, if the theory of language is to be of any use and to bear the proud name of a theory with honor, then it must not stop at the gate to the last abstractions, but must resolutely think things through to the end just as the theoretical physicist or mathematician of today has long been accustomed to do in his field (Bühler 1932: 119 f.). Karl Bühler ’ s Axiomatics and the Axiom (1984) 81 Bühler ’ s axiomatics is thus directed at isolating the all-encompassing induction idea that programmatically guides the research business of linguistics, whereby he hastens to add every time he comes to speak of this idea that such an induction idea belongs to the trivialities of practical linguistic research (cf. ibid.: 98). But how must such an idea of induction be constituted, so that, on the one hand, it completely grasps the whole of language and its parts in a constituting way, on the other hand, it is at the same time fruitful from a research programmatic point of view and, thirdly, finally, it is to be regarded as a triviality of practical linguistic research? The only idea that Bühler considers capable of developing such a far-reaching inductive force is the induction idea of the sign nature of language, which at the same time also indicates how the research programmatic must be constituted. If the induction idea of the sign nature of language “ constitutes the cosmos of pure language without rest ” (Bühler 1978: 51), then a general sign theory or sematology must be developed for linguistics as well as for sociology and psychology, without sematology being derived from the mentioned sciences (cf. Bühler 1933a: 35). The consideration of the critical and area-constituting double function of Bühler ’ s axiomatics has led to the concept of the idea of induction, which has been interpreted as the establishment of a research program centered on the establishment of a general theory of signs. This last step of argumentation must now be clarified in order to be able to concretize the very general demand for the establishment of a theory of signs and to satisfy its content. Similar to Ferdinand de Saussure and other important sign theorists, Bühler has repeatedly emphasized the necessity of building up a general theory of signs, and he has also collected numerous important individual findings that are of decisive importance for the semiotics yet to be developed. Still, he has not presented a comprehensive theory of signs. In a few places, however, there are hints in Bühler ’ s work suitable for reconstructing the picture Bühler might have had of the sematology to be developed. Significantly, these clues stem from the context in which Bühler addresses the logos problem. (I do not want to conceal that in one of our last conversations before his much too early death, Gerold Ungeheuer pointed out to me that the roots of semiotics are hidden in the well-known double sense of logos). Bühler discusses the thesis to what extent it is permissible to describe language summarily as an instrument of logos, of logical “ mental functions ” (cf. Bühler 1933a: 62). That this thesis stands on shaky foundations is evident from the fact that Aristotle ’ s logic, including the table of categories, would undoubtedly have turned out differently if Aristotle had not accidentally “ grown up as a Greek, but as a Chinese, Eskimo, or Bantunean ” (ibid.: 63). Bühler ’ s proposed solution to this old controversy is as simple as it is original: He suggests to think through the proof process of those who have explained the concept of ‘ homo sapiens ’ in terms of language in reverse, in order to arrive at a new definition of the relationship between logic and language structure. In my opinion, Bühler ’ s own proposed solution contains in nuce the program of Bühler ’ s theory of signs, just as against the background of this proposed solution a redefinition of his main work on language in terms of scientific theory becomes necessary: I set in principle agreement with the respectful modern reform movement in the logic of the concept equation: Logic (in the broadest sense of the word) = general representation theory. If there should be any other problems in the research business of science, which should be counted to the logic, but not to the problems of representation, then we are not interested in that here, but it is only 82 Karl Bühler ’ s Axiomatics and the Axiom (1984) the “ element theory ” , which is important for our purpose. And this element theory of logic can be developed completely and purely as the general theory of representation with the help of symbolic sign systems (of the type of language). It does not contain a word about mental functions, which of course belong to the factual completion of representations, to dealing with the symbolic signs of representation. Psychic functions also belong to dealing with numbers and geometrical forms and yet the number theory and geometry keep themselves free of any statement about them. The same abstraction must be demanded of sematology and, within its framework, of the scientific treatment of linguistic entities (ibid.: 63 f.). If we summarize what has been said so far in a short formula, we have to add another link to our earlier equation of logic and semiotics, so that the equation now reads: logic = semiotics = general theory of representation. With this equation it is indicated, on the one hand, that the “ deepening of the foundations ” of linguistics must result in a general theory of representation or sematology, or, viewed the other way around, that the representational function of language, as the subtitle of Bühler ’ s main work on language reads, is a form of manifesting sematology. On the other hand, the research program of sematology is now openly apparent, for if language is to be understood - as Bühler says - as an intersubjective representational device, i. e., as “ an organum for one to communicate something to another about things ” (ibid.: 64), it follows that sematology, within the framework of this organon model, has to ask about the general principles of sign traffic, with logic at its disposal as an instrument. Further above I have made the claim that in Bühler ’ s work, there were only a few indications that allowed the reconstruction of his picture of the developed sematology. I would like to qualify this claim at the end of this section insofar as it refers only to the published texts. After 1938, i. e. after his emigration from Europe, Bühler consistently worked on the construction of a general theory of signs in a series of partly larger and without exception unpublished studies, which I will report on elsewhere (cf. Eschbach 1984c) and which will find their way into the Bühler-Werkausgabe. Bühler did not write an axiomatic theory of signs, but in scattered remarks, he gave a large number of suggestions for such an enterprise, which in the final part will be “ gathered up ” according to his pattern and connected to a system design. The axiom system of the sign theory Since Gödel ’ s incompleteness theorem makes it clear that the completeness of an axiom system cannot be decided system-immanently, axiomatics is forced to check its theorems elsewhere. In the following considerations, however, it is not primarily about the proof of the incompleteness or completeness of Bühler ’ s axiomatics, which would already be a futile undertaking insofar as he always expressed himself very cautiously on this point and always left the possibility of extensions open, but rather about a “ lowering of the foundations, ” i. e., about the substantiation of the axiomatics of linguistics in axiomatics of sign theory. One could ask oneself whether this further step of justification makes sense and whether, in a process that threatens to lead to an infinite regress, the axiomatics of the theory of signs should not be justified next. This is countered by the fact that if a justification seems Karl Bühler ’ s Axiomatics and the Axiom (1984) 83 conceivably possible, then this next justifying step should be taken because any other attitude would amount to a ‘ genetic fallacy. ’ Nevertheless, an extra-systemic justification of sematological axiomatics seems to be difficult to imagine, which is manifested, for example, in the fact that the aloe Stoa determined the semeion as an axiom (cf. Pohlenz 1978, I: 49). For the axiom system of sign theory presented in the following considerations, it is true to the same extent as for Bühler ’ s axiomatics of linguistics that it would be quite conceivable if this system consisting of seven propositions were supplemented by further propositions. However, a renunciation of one or more of these propositions does not seem to be possible, since each of them and all of them together are necessary for the constitution of the object of sign theory. In the long series of attempts to define man as a human being, man has been described, for example, as a rational being, or there has been talk of man being distinguished from all other living beings and from his environment by his gift of language. In a third respect, man appears as a working being; still, other questions make man appear as a zoon politikon, etc., etc. Each of these attempts at definition can claim a high degree of plausibility, and not a single one of the definitions mentioned would have to be rejected as false. In spite of their different emphases, the attempts at definition mentioned have one thing in common: they are all much too one-sided to be considered a definition of the essence of man. Instead, one could be tempted to arrive at the desired definition by combining all the above-mentioned definition attempts in one formula. However, this solution would be opposed by its heterogeneity and unwieldiness. We will therefore have to consider what underlies all the above-mentioned definition attempts and at the same time does justice to the complexity of the previous definition attempts in a comprehensive sense. The first and guiding idea I see in the specific sociality of humans, i. e., in the community life of humans, which I regard as the source point of all actions, be they of symbolic or nonsymbolic nature. With the axiom of sociality, I consider George H. Mead, Alfred Schutz, Ferdinand de Saussure, and Karl Bühler. Mead, in his philosophy, of sociality, as in mind, identity, and society, focused on the question of how an individual can conceive of himself as an individual, and he saw the answer to this question in the fact that the individual in the community of other individuals must at the same time distinguish himself from the others and learn to assume the role of the other. Karl Bühler also pointed out in the Krise der Psychologie that not the individual but the community is to be considered as the origin of all human activity, because no human being lives exclusively under his own skin, as Mead ’ s Chicago colleague John Dewey once formulated, which means for our present question that the transgression of one ’ s own perceptual situation, which of course requires appropriate means, i. e. the assumption of the perspective of sociality is the condition for the constitution of the ego identity of the individual. Throughout the history of philosophy, there have been attempts to isolate the initial and unmediated elements in the process of engaging with our environment. In order to lend at least a certain degree of plausibility to the idea of the unmediated elements of cognition, one has had to resort to nebulous concepts such as ‘ intuition ’ or the imputation of ‘ innate ideas ’ , which at the same time implies that one voluntarily leaves the realm of rational thought and is willing to engage in magical whispering. 84 Karl Bühler ’ s Axiomatics and the Axiom (1984) Since the works of Wilhelm Wundt, Charles S. Peirce, and Karl Bühler it has been proven beyond doubt that not only complex thought processes take place in the form of judgments, but that already on the level of perception and experience we can correctly speak only of perceptual judgments and experiential judgments. If, however, already the process of perception is to be described as the formation of perceptual judgments, which applies a fortiori to all higher activities, then it is also expressed that the question about the unmediated elements of mental human activity is in principle wrongly posed because such unmediated elements cannot exist in principle at all. Instead of continuing the vain search for the unmediated elements of cognition, I suggest changing perspective and to ask instead what it is that is responsible for the principle mediatedness of perception, experience and cognition. We have already heard that perception, experience and cognition take place in a judgmental way. Now a judgment is nothing else than a sign, so that we can say that. all perceiving, experiencing and thinking happens in signs. In analogy to an expression coined in the German philosophy of language, I therefore call the second axiom the axiom of the non-interpretability of signs. In the colloquial way of speaking we speak occasionally of dark clouds as a sign for rain, we call traffic signs signs, or an injury in the proximity of the heart is evaluated as sign of the near death, as we read with Sextus Empiricus. If, however, we ask more precisely what is supposed to be the sign in the examples given, we will notice very quickly that it cannot be clouds or tin signs or wounds that would have been transformed into signs in a peculiar process of transubstantiation; it is rather the case that a material appearance, or as Bühler said, “ a perceptible something hic et nunc ” assumes the role of a representative pointing to something else. From this last-mentioned determination we can infer that, besides the material sign-bearer or representamen, there must always be something that is represented, i. e., the signified object or state of affairs. In his perceptive analysis of the scholastic formula “ aliquid stat pro aliquo ” , Bühler has shown that we have not yet grasped the sign relation to its full extent if we merely assure ourselves of the material representamen and the signified object or state of affairs, because these two foundations of relation continue to diverge as long as we do not explicitly refer them to each other. If we call a dark cloud a sign for threatening rain, then we put the one as a sign for the other, i. e. we constitute in the act of the ‘ as if-observation ’ first of all the sign, which would not exist without this constituting act. We can therefore formulate the third axiom, which I call the axiom of interpretation: Only that is a sign which is interpreted as a sign. If a sign owes its constitution to an ‘ as if ’ relation, we must further ask how this process of constitution takes place. Again, it was Bühler who, with reference to Trubetzkoy, gave the decisive clues as to how the constitution of the ‘ as if ’ relation is to be thought. Other important suggestions in this context come from de Saussure and Peirce. Above we have stated that all thinking is thinking in signs. This insight resulted from the fact that perception and experience take place in the form of judgments. If something enters our perceptual space, we analyze it in a comparison as something known or as something still unknown. While in the first case the judging activity comes to rest after the formulation of a tautology of the form ‘ A is A ’ , in the second case, the conclusion to something still unknown, it is a question of a genuine extension conclusion, which proceeds in the form of a Karl Bühler ’ s Axiomatics and the Axiom (1984) 85 hypothetical judgment. Ferdinand de Saussure discusses the extension inference as a characteristic feature of the constitution of signs on the basis of the two fundamentally different relations ‘ simile - simile ’ and ‘ simile ’ whose common occurrence in an inference process is suitable for describing innovative movements. Gottlob Frege answers this question of meaning-constituting extension judgments almost casually when he writes that we can only move from one thought to another if the meaning of one thought also has a part of another thought. An example of such a movement could be: ‘ run: proceed as ask: x ’ . This analogical principle goes beyond what was said in the premises as the conclusion not only repeats or joins what is already known but opens up a new state of affairs not yet known in this way. However, since the extension stroke is a hypothesis that infers from fuzzy and incomplete premises, the judgment reached is in principle tentative. On the basis of these findings, we can formulate the fourth axiom of sign theory, which I call the diacrisis axiom: A sign can be determined only in demarcation from a second sign; the meaning of a sign is fuzzy. From what has been said so far it is clear that signs can only exist if there is the intention to refer to something else with the help of a medium, whereby the attention is not directed to the medium but to that to which the medium refers, which of course does not exclude that the perceptible medium is also specifically thematized. Furthermore, it was established that establishing a sign relation necessarily involves a material or immaterial object or state of affairs that is signified. Finally, the discussion has yielded the result that signs are independent of and inconceivable outside the performances of an interpretive consciousness. If we relate these three findings to each other in an integrating approach, we can say that any genuine sign relation is a three-figure relation characterized by some peculiarities. The first peculiarity is to be found in the fact that - as C. S. Peirce proved - a genuine triadic relation is not reducible to the sum of dyadic relations, which will not be further substantiated here. The second peculiarity of the sign can be explained by a simple example: While it makes sense to consider an ambassador as the representative of his country, it does not make sense to reverse this relation and refer to the country as the representative of the ambassador. Although in principle everything can be interpreted as a sign, this openness to designation then experiences a significant limitation once a sign relationship has been established, because it is then no longer possible to reverse the relationship. The fifth axiom of sign theory, called the relation axiom, thus reads: A sign is a non-reversible triadic relation. The diacrisis axiom takes into account the fact that a sign can be determined only in demarcation from a second sign. If one continues this line of thought, one arrives at the assumption of a plurality of signs, about whose relation to each other, however, nothing would be said yet. Parallel to this assumption, it also has to be taken into account that there are many different contexts in which signs play a decisive role. Since it would not only be uneconomical and technically hardly realizable to adapt to each sign its own specific regularity, but which would also disavow the function of the sign to fulfill its social role, and since man as the creator of signs is existentially dependent on bringing order into the chaos of the multiplicity of sense data in order to be able to orientate himself in his environment at all, the sixth axiom, which I call the system axiom, formulates that signs are systemically organized. 86 Karl Bühler ’ s Axiomatics and the Axiom (1984) Johannes v. Kries, Charles S. Peirce, and Karl Bühler have repeatedly pointed out that the possibilities of human experience are inextricably coupled with certain concepts of space and time, which are to a substantial extent neurophysiologically conditioned. beyond the biological conditions of human possibilities of experience, all the cultural parameters have to be taken into account which leads to the fact that people think the way they think. In summary, however, biological and cultural conditions cannot explain why the sign-based actions of humans are as they are until it is systematically taken into account that the interpretation of signs as signs is a process. If we also take into account that the interpretation of signs must always be based on the delimitation as well as on the transfer of what is already known, we can make the previous formulation more precise and characterize the sign process as a continuous process. 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Volume 1, Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Ritter, Joachim; ed. 1971: Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie. Volume 1, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. 88 Karl Bühler ’ s Axiomatics and the Axiom (1984) Schmidt, Heinrich 1974: Philosophisches Wörterbuch. Newly edited by G. Schischkoff, Stuttgart: Kroner. Scholz, Heinrich 1961: Mathesis Universalis. Abhandlung zur Philosophie als strenger Wissenschaft, H. Hermes et al. Basel/ Stuttgart: Schwabe. Schüling, Hermann 1969: Die Geschichte der axiomatischen Methode im 16. und beginnenden 17. Jahrhundert. Wandlung der Wissenschaftsauffassung, HiIdesheim/ New York: Olms. Smart, Benjamin Humphrey 1979: Grundlagen der Zeichentheorie: Grammatik, Logik, Rhetorik. Translated from English and with an introduction by Achim Eschbach, Frankfurt a. M.: Syndikat. Szabó, A. 1960: “ Was heißt der mathematische Terminus ,axioma ’ ? ” , in: Maia. Rivista di Letterature Classiche 12: 39 - 67. Weiss, A. P. 1925: “ One set of postulates for a behavioristic psychology ” , in: Psychological Review 32: 83 - 87. Whewell, William 1967: The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences. 2 vols. Need. by G. Buchdahl and L. L. Laudan. London: Cass. Karl Bühler ’ s Axiomatics and the Axiom (1984) 89 K O D I K A S / C O D E 44 (2021) · No. 1 - 3 Gunter Narr Verlag Tübingen Money as a sign: Georg Simmel, Kurt Singer, and Karl Bühler. Das Geld als Zeichen (1995) Abstract: Money, like few other human inventions, is suited to the documentation and reconstruction of the process of building civilization because it is a phenomenon that has characterised humanity since Greek antiquity, i. e., throughout the codified history of humankind. Money is designed to be passed on again and again and to anticipate new, higher forms of social movement and the development towards ever higher abstraction in value and money thinking is a basic feature of all cultural history. Here money is used as the springboard to developing the semiotics of money, the “ essence ” of money, and the function of signs in the process of creating a civilization. 1.0 Introduction When money is mentioned, certain phrases come to mind, such as: “ Money is the end of comfort ” ; “ Where you ring the bell with a coin, all doors open ” ; “ Money doesn ’ t stink ” ; “ A cash register makes you sensual ” ; “ Money corrupts character ” or “ Money rules the world. ” This list could be extended almost indefinitely. But here I do not want to talk about social prejudices - although this would also be an exciting and productive topic in terms of cultural semiotics - but about the semiotics of money, the “ essence ” of money, and the function of signs in the process of creating a civilization. Money, like few other human inventions, is suited to the documentation and reconstruction of the process of building civilization because it is a phenomenon that has characterized humanity since Greek antiquity, i. e., throughout the codified history of humankind. I would like to support this initial hypothesis with two literary references: The Hegel Prize winner Jacques Le Goff shows in his fabulous book The Birth of Purgatory (Le Goff 1991) the role money plays in changing worldviews in the Middle Ages, and the no less important social scientist Max Weber examines the function of money in the genesis of capitalism in his influential, if not uncontroversial, work The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Weber 1991). The results of these two studies converge in the thesis that only the invention of purgatory around 1170 finally paved the way for the modern monetary economy, which was vividly and impressively demonstrated by the Cologne exhibition ‘ Heaven Hell Purgatory ’ (Gezler 1994). 1.1 Sacred money and time thieves In the British Museum, you can find the oldest inscribed coin yet discovered, bearing the inscription “ phaenos eimi sema. ” This sign money refers to the Greek origin of money, about which we find valuable information in Bernhard Laum ’ s historical investigation of the sacral origin of the money (Laum 1924) and in Joachim Schacht ’ s cultural anthropology of money (Schacht 1967). The etymology of the concept of money shows the originally religious background of meaning, described as ‘ retribution, ’ ‘ substitution, ’ and ‘ sacrifice ’ . The Germanic term sacrifice (Opfer) is termed “ money ” (Geld) because it compensates for one ’ s benefactor ’ s services. In the Greek polis, the welfare of the state requires “ that the deities protecting the state be satisfied by allocating the gifts due to them. ” To “ distribute ” is “ nemein ” in German, corresponding to the noun nomos. Nomos, which was later used to refer to state law in general, originally indicated the “ order of distribution, ” and specifically cult law, because it laid out the distribution of offerings. In the sacral term nomos lies the beginnings of the state ’ s currency; for here first, the state determined a good and guaranteed its quality, and this good determined and guaranteed by the state serves as a valid means of payment ” (Laum 1924: 29). The official sacrificial good among Greeks, Romans, Indians, and Germanic peoples was cattle. Consequently, cattle acquired a value in monetary terms, or became money. However, not every animal is suitable for sacrifice; therefore, suitable sacrificial animals must be selected from the herd, for which binding standards and criteria are developed. For this purpose, animals of the same species are compared with each other, and from the comparison of their characteristics a norm is created, which from that moment on is considered a qualitative norm (cf. ibid.: 27). The validity of the cultic means of payment in ‘ livestock ’ is at first limited to exchange between gods and humans; but it does not take long at all for sacrificial money to transcend the cultic space and be used as a means of exchange in profane settings too. The next step in the development of chartal - state money - is taken when clay or metal animal idols or effigies take the place of real sacrificial animals. The substitution of the real sacrificial animals for idols without material value must be seen as a secondary act of semiotisation after the primary elementalisation, insofar as the value of animal symbols shifts from their materiality to the function they fulfill in communication between gods and humans; this function consists in being the solvent of a debt relationship (cf. ibid.: 90). To explain this semiotisation process, Laum gives the following example: First, Asclepius receives a real rooster as a sacrifice, then the image of a rooster, and this symbol is then stamped on the precious metal. The service of the god of salvation is thus first compensated by a good in kind, then by the coin; one can thus also speak of a sequence of stages in the sacrifice: economy in kind - money economy (ibid.: 147). We have already heard that the coin calls itself a ‘ sign ’ in an irritatingly anthropomorphic speech act. The expression ‘ sign ’ refers to sacral contents of which Plato speaks in the 17th chapter of his Cratylus when he characterizes the body (soma) as the grave (sema) of the soul. Schacht interprets this play on words and comments on the body as the prison of the soul, after whose death a better fate awaits it in the hereafter. Literally Schacht says: Money as a sign: Georg Simmel, Kurt Singer, and Karl Bühler (1995) 91 The “ tomb ” would thus signify the “ separated ” soul, distinguished from the body. Death and grave are dark backgrounds of a golden life, as mystery tremendum breaks in place of the ‘ whole-other ’ : a place of an epiphany of the numinous (Schacht 1967: 70). Schacht points out that “ sema ” also has a second meaning in Plato: Robe, as the material covering of the spiritual. The garment is for Greek thinking, a sign of what it covers. The deity ’ s living garment is a woven work that requires secret knowledge. Work is poiein: this was the work of the ‘ initiated ’ smiths: Hephaistos forged the net. The smiths carried out the preparation of the early coinage body as a ‘ sign ’ and garment (ibid.: 71). The originally vivid, sacred character of Greek coins quickly disappeared: money became an abstract, anonymous store of value, removed from time, whose sacred content sunk into the subconscious (cf. ibid.: 79). The impersonality of money is among the most important causes of the Christian church ’ s deep-seated aversion to capitalist impulses, sharing its aversion to monetary transactions, especially usury, with other religions. Schacht has undertaken an analysis of the church ’ s aversion to financial transactions, concluding: The monetary system uses the language of religion, but it hollows it out. As a sign-like object with latent-absolutist magical illusory freedom from time, money is the material-fictive, ‘ peel-off ’ image of an image of God ‘ invested ’ in an abstract material ‘ sealed ’ in it as in a ‘ tombstone. ’ In this respect, it is the death mask of God (ibid.: 152). Jacques Le Goff emphasizes the same fact when he asks: What then does he (the usurer) trade, if not with the time that elapses between the points at which he first lends and later receives the interest-bearing repayment? But time belongs to none other than God. As a thief of time, the usurer is a thief of God ’ s property. According to St. Anselmus and St. Peter Lombard, all contemporaries agree on this: the usurer does not lend the debtor anything that belongs to him, but only the time that belongs to God. Thus, he may not profit from lending other people ’ s property (Le Goff 1988: 40). As clear as the ecclesiastical prohibition of usurious interest may have been until the 13th century, this firmly established worldview was thoroughly shaken with the invention of purgatory, insofar as it opened up for the first time the possibility of buying oneself free of one ’ s sins by paying a sum of money determined by the clergy to be suitable so that the soul would jump out of purgatory. Without a doubt, Le Goff is to be agreed with when he says: The hope of escaping the hall allowed the usurer to drive the economy and society of the 13th century on their way to capitalism (ibid.: 97). But it is also undeniable that the ecclesiastical liberalization of monetary transactions and, in its wake, the rampant sale of indulgences by the Roman Church were among the sources of the Reformation, just as, in turn, it took only a few theological quibbles for the spirit of pragmatism to unfold from Calvinism. 1.2 Order and chaos: money, value, and language If we place the theological-cultural-historical discussion of the previous section in a more general framework, it becomes apparent quite quickly that money is a particular form of expression that people use to communicate about values and the relations between values. Because of a whole series of apparent homologies, ranging from the nature of primary 92 Money as a sign: Georg Simmel, Kurt Singer, and Karl Bühler (1995) elementarisation to the organization of human exchange relations to their universality, parallels between language and money have therefore been drawn early on. Thus, already Adam Müller (1816) calls money “ a kind of language ” and Foucault (1977: 112) emphasizes that Turgot drew the first systematic parallel between money and words in his, ‘ etymology ’ article for the Encyclopedia (which, however, is not true! ). Since then, numerous works have addressed the relationship between language and money. In the present context, they should concern us only to the extent that they shed light on the semioticity of the two exchange systems. H. Walter Schmitz (1986) and Marcelo Dascal (1987), citing Quintilian, Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Leibniz, de Bonald, South, Trench, and Bréal, have pointed out that the analogy of word and coin is based on a much older tradition than Foucault supposed. The controversy regarding the admissibility and epistemological fruitfulness of paralleling money and language is between, on the one hand, Chartalists, who want to derive the value of money from the authority of the state, which Georg Friedrich Knapp put into a pointed and definitive form at the beginning of our century in his much-discussed Staatliche Theorie des Geldes (Knapp 1908), and, on the other hand, conventionalists, who, in determining the meaning of linguistic signs, take recourse to clear and precise definitions (cf. Dascal 1987: 11). For the tertium comparationis of money and language, in Tönnies as well as in de Saussure the concept of value is used, so that words appear in Tönnies as “ signs of objects as ideas ” and money as “ signs of objects as values ” (Tönnies, cf. Schmitz 1986: 144). Provided that signs express a social will under the aforementioned premise, a perfect analogy of language and money would be set in motion (cf. Schmitz 1986: 146). Ferdinand de Saussure, in his discussion of the concept of value, made a direct analogy between linguistics and political economy, which seemed to him to be admissible insofar as both sciences are concerned with the establishment of a system that permits the comparison of dissimilar things: Labor and wages on the one hand, and signifier and signified on the other. To compare dissimilar things, de Saussure resorted to the relation of ‘ simile: dissimile ’ which is equally fruitful in value and sign theory. Literally, de Saussure states: To answer this question, we want to state first that, outside of language, all values are governed by this principle. They are always formed: 1. by something dissimilar, which can be exchanged for that whose value is to be determined; 2. by similar things, which can be compared with that whose value is in question. These two factors are necessary for the existence of a value. Thus, to determine the value of a five-mark piece, one must know: 1. that it can be exchanged for a certain quantity of another thing, e. g., bread; 2. that one can compare it with a similar value of the same system, e. g., a one-mark piece, or with a coin of another system, e. g., a franc (Saussure 1967: 137). Ferruccio Rossi-Landi has taken the semiotic homologisation of linguistics and political economy a bit further, since, based on the observation that words and messages do not occur in the natural environment, he considers it justified to conclude that they are products of human labor (cf. Rossi-Landi 1983: 36). On this premise, he states: Like the other products of human work, words, expressions, and messages have a use value or utility insofar as they satisfy needs, in this case, the basic needs for expression and communication with all the changing stratification that have historically grown up around them (ibid.: 50), and he continues: Money as a sign: Georg Simmel, Kurt Singer, and Karl Bühler (1995) 93 We could argue from this that the field of linguistic value corresponds entirely to that of meaning or, somewhat more concretely, that ‘ having a value ’ is the same as ‘ having a meaning ’ (that ‘ being worth something is the same as ‘ meaning-something ” ) (ibid.). Rossi-Landi ’ s resolute equation of ‘ having a value ’ and ‘ having a meaning ’ is countered by weighty arguments, just as the analogization of language and money must not pass without comment: As true and important as it is to liberate language from the odium of its supposed naturalness and to integrate it dialectically into the process of social action, it would be disastrous to let language appear as the product of a linguistic total worker who generates linguistic surplus value because this would ultimately imply a reversal to a pre-critical, unhistorical thinking about language, in which a group of beings not yet gifted with language invented language in much the same way that money was invented to enable a higher form of sign traffic in a pre-existing process of social, religious interaction. Citing Victoria Lady Welby, Walter Schmitz has assembled many concerns about bringing language and money too close together that are very useful in the present context: Unlike words, coins are not arranged according to stylistic, aesthetic, or rhetorical considerations; complexions cannot be formed from them; they cannot be abbreviated and do not consist of units which, like speech sounds, could be modified in sound and writing; coins lack the variety of varying associations of words among different persons and the ability to be mutually interchangeable, often individually, despite ‘ external ’ dissimilarity; Coins of a class are all objects of the same value, but words of a class are not; coins are signs of a standard unit of measurement, words are not; finally, there is no equivalent in money to the possibility of changing the meaning of words by warmth or coldness of tone, by crying, serious, or smiling face, or by underlining or grass printing (Welby 1901: 195; cit. after Schmitz 1986: 149). Pertti Ahonen adds the following point to the list of differences between language and money: Language is not predominantly quantitative, quantifying, and quantifiable like money. The reciprocal convertibility of the linguistic and social values conveyed by different natural languages is as complete as the convertibility of the monetary values carried by different monies. Although, the convertibility of monetary values is not complete even in the case of single money (Ahonen 1989: 6). Another objection to any far-reaching assimilation of the concepts of sign and money, to which Walter Schmitz again draws attention, can be derived from considerations of Karl Bühler and Georg Simmel, which I will discuss in more detail in the following: while the concrete word is to be regarded sematologically as a “ sign thing, ” money remains attached to goods, however much it may approach sign things in its paper form (cf. Schmitz 1986: 154): Correspondingly, Simmel had spoken out against the complete loss of the “ substantial counter value ” of money and the complete dissolution in its symbolic value, “ because with the absolute completion of this development, the functional and symbolic character of money would also lose its hold and its purposeful meaning ” (Simmel 1920: 149), which manifests itself vividly in the “ gold illusion ” alias “ cover delusion ” that is still rampant today (cf., e. g., Schmolders 1966: 221). The many concerns against a too far-reaching constriction of language and money make it advisable to renounce this kind of parallelization and instead look for cultural-semiotic 94 Money as a sign: Georg Simmel, Kurt Singer, and Karl Bühler (1995) criteria suitable for the determination of money as a sign that can pass muster in a critical examination. 2.0 Simmel, Singer, and Bühler on Money as a Sign It may seem a little arbitrary to bring together the cultural philosopher, and social scientist Georg Simmel (1858 - 1918), the national economist, Plato specialist, and Japanese expert Kurt Singer (1886 - 1963), and the linguistic psychologist Karl Bühler (1879 - 1963) in a comparative consideration of money as a sign, but several circumstances speak in favor of making this bold comparison. First and foremost, we have biographical motives: Kurt Singer, after all, studied for eight semesters with Simmel in Berlin, attended his Privatissime, and noted in his “ Abriss eines Lebenslaufes ” that it was “ Simmel ’ s Philosophie des Geldes (1900) that became my bridge to the theory of money ” (NL Kurt Singer: CH 1: 2). For the close relationship between Georg Simmel and Kurt Singer, it is probably also quite revealing that the two of them, accompanied by Walther Rathenau, visited the literary salon of Sabine Lepsius, which Stefan George, who was admired by Simmel and Singer, also occasionally frequented. For the time being, there is no useful data available on the comparably close relations between Karl Bühler and the other two, but this cannot be particularly surprising due to the difficult estate situation in all three cases 1 . Hence, in the present case, we have to rely on some circumstantial evidence and conjecture. Bühler may have become acquainted with the work of Georg Simmel during his time in Berlin as a research assistant to Carl Stumpf, which I would like to deduce from the simple fact that Simmel was the talk of the town in Berlin academic circles. That Bühler carefully studied Simmel ’ s Philosophy of Money is evident from several verbatim quotations scattered throughout Bühler ’ s published and unpublished work. Finally, one may assume bona fide that Bühler must not have missed the publication of Singer ’ s Hamburg habilitation thesis Das Geld als Zeichen (Money as a Sign) (Singer 1920) in his Jenenser publishing house Fischer. Another line of connection between the three scholars is Simmel ’ s student Ernst Cassirer, who was active in Hamburg at the same time as Singer. The cultural philosopher and semiotician Cassirer authored a decisive expert opinion that led to Singer being awarded the Walther Rathenau Prize. It can be assumed that Kurt Singer, keenly interested in relevant problems, participated at least passively in the German Society for Psychology Language Day organized by Karl Bühler in Hamburg, at which Ernst Cassirer was one of the speakers. Apart from the biographical and literary points of contact, however, it is above all the content-related aspects that suggest a comparison between Simmel, Singer, and Bühler. The works of Simmel, Singer, and Bühler stand out from the flood of money-theoretical studies of the time insofar as, in contrast to all other works, they approach the problem of money from a sign-theoretical perspective and in their semiotic studies aimed less or not at all at solving money-theoretical problems, but rather used the problem of money paradigma- 1 Large parts of Georg Simmel ’ s, Kurt Singer ’ s, and Karl Bühler ’ s estates have been lost and could not be determined until today despite intensive research. Money as a sign: Georg Simmel, Kurt Singer, and Karl Bühler (1995) 95 tically for their cultural-semiotic interests, which Simmel explained at the beginning of his Philosophy of Money: No line of these investigations is meant in national economic terms. The phenomena of valuations and purchase, of exchange and means of exchange, of forms of production and assets, which the national economy considers from one point of view, are here considered from another. [ … ] The first (part of the book) is intended to make it possible to understand the essence of money from the conditions and relations of general life, and the other, conversely, the essence and formation of the latter from the effectiveness of money (Simmel 1900: VIf). In accordance with this claim and intention, I will not undertake a - presumptuous - reconstruction of the complete works of the three theorists under discussion here but will limit myself to the treatment of the individual, albeit essential, moments that are suitable for sketching cultural semiotics of money, whereby I expressly take up Simmel ’ s position “ that one fixes the outlines, forms, and goals of a science out of the abundance of existing sciences and preserved theories before one goes to the actual construction of the same ” (Simmel 1890: 2), a position that Karl Bühler also advocated almost verbatim (cf. Bühler 1934: 21 f.). 2.1 Georg Simmel: Interactions In his Philosophy of Money, which I would have called Cultural Semiotics of Money, Georg Simmel provides convincing evidence that money represents the hidden object of modernity. Simmel arrives at this opinion because he recognizes money as a measure of value and a universal medium of exchange and identifies a significance that goes far beyond its economic function. Modern society is a money society not only because its economic transactions are based on money, but because the modern spirit finds its most perfect expression in money (cf. Frankel 1979: 20). Aldo Haesler (Kintzele 1993: 236) attributes the fact that money could become the perfect expression of modernity to a monetary Copernican revolution: “ Money no longer serves exchange transactions, but these serve money. ” This provocative formulation leads us to the semiotic roots of Simmel ’ s approach. Simmel sees the specificity of the economy as a special form of traffic and behavior “ not both in the fact that it exchanges values and that it exchanges values ” (Simmel 1900: 31 f.). Unlike Rossi-Landi, however, Simmel does not determine a value as a static property of an object, but rather derives the concept of value from the exchange relationship that two economic subjects enter into in giving up a sacrifice and pocketing a profit (cf. ibid.: 48 f.; cf. also: Pohlmann 1987: 74 f.): “ No matter how carefully one examines an object for its determinations, one will not find the economic value, since this consists exclusively in the reciprocal relationship that is established between several objects based on these determinations, each one conditioning the other and giving it back the meaning it receives from it ” (Simmel 1900: 61). Simmel ’ s concept of interaction, which not only plays a prominent role in the Philosophy of Money but in my opinion represents the decisive pivot of the entire approach, was originally developed as a counter-opinion to a monocausal view of history and society of historical materialism (cf. Becker 1971: 6), as Simmel explains his basic intention in the preface to his Philosophy of Money: 96 Money as a sign: Georg Simmel, Kurt Singer, and Karl Bühler (1995) In methodological terms, this basic intention can be expressed as follows: to build a floor under historical materialism in such a way that the inclusion of economic life in the causes of spiritual culture preserved its explanatory value, but those very economic forms themselves are recognized as the result of deeper valuations and currents of psychological, even metaphysical presuppositions (Simmel 1900: X), He must have been well aware that lowering the semiotic foundations transported by the concept of interaction did not fortify historical materialism, but rather turned it upside down, to use a not entirely unencumbered expression. Simmel, however, does not dwell long on this certainly not insignificant controversy, but draws his first conclusions from the insight that all social life is interaction: Since Simmel, from the perspective of his interaction concept, does not understand ‘ society ’ as a ‘ uniformly fixed ’ but as a ‘ gradual concept, ’ he consequently cannot let the process of cognition begin with it (cf. Hubner-Funk 1982: 75); instead, he refers back to the double category of “ I and Thou ” 2 , which had already been laid down in his Kant dissertation. the interrelation of which seems to him to be a suitable basis for the constitution of society, to which Friedrich Tenbruck notes: Simmel starts from the following conviction: ‘ The insight that man in his whole being and all his expressions is determined by the fact that he lives in interactions with other people - must, however, lead to a new way of looking at all so-called humanities. ( … ) We now believe in understanding the historical phenomena from the interaction and the cooperation of the individuals, from the summation and sublimation of innumerable individual amounts, and from the embodiment of the social energies in entities that stand and develop beyond the individual (Tenbruck 1958: 594). But suppose it is true that society must always be understood as the specific interrelation of exchanging subjects. In that case, we must systematically consider that interrelation always has a specific form, which is why the concept of society that follows the interrelation can always only be thought of as formed. If the respective specific interaction is to be considered a form of socialization, we must immediately ask about the historical expression of this relation. Simmel gives an unmistakable answer to this question, which is why I would like to let him speak at length: 2 If, in an area as central to the social sciences as the question of the constitution of “ I ” and “ Thou ” , community and society, a certain terminological and methodological relationship seems to be obvious, this does not necessarily indicate a theoretical dependence of the authors concerned. In the case of Georg Simmel and George Herbert Mead, however, things might be somewhat different, because in the interpretation of Mead ’ s social psychology, I think, the fact that Mead had come to Berlin via Leipzig, where he had listened to W. Wundt, to study with Dilthey and even to write a dissertation on Kant ’ s concept of space, has not yet been properly appreciated. If I put myself rightly in the mindset of an American student who had come to Berlin to study with one of Berlin ’ s best-known philosophers, it will be fair to assume (was not lost on this student) that Dilthey and Simmel were in constant personal contact and conflict, so it would stand to reason that Mead took note of Simmel ’ s works, especially since there were not that many other significant social scientists at the time and in the immediate vicinity who could have diverted his attention. In the absence of comprehensive evidence of Mead ’ s familiarity with Simmel ’ s thought, I must content myself for the time being with the albeit essential reference that George Mead reviewed Georg Simmel ’ s Philosophy of Money in 1900/ 01 in the Journal of Political Economy. Hans Joas, the editor of Mead ’ s Gesammelte Aufsätze, notes that this review was obviously limited, because of the place of printing, to the question of the significance of Simmel ’ s work for national economics (cf. Joas 1980: 41). Money as a sign: Georg Simmel, Kurt Singer, and Karl Bühler (1995) 97 As a visible object, it (the money) is the body with which the economic value abstracted from the valuable objects themselves has clothed itself, comparable to the word, which is an acousticphysiological occurrence but has its whole meaning for us only in the inner conception it carries or symbolizes. If now the economic value of the objects consists in the mutual relation, which they, as exchangeable, enter, then the money is therefore the expression of this relation, which has reached independence; it is the representation of the abstract asset, in that out of the economic relation, i. e., the exchangeability of the objects, the fact of this relation is differentiated and gains a conceptual - and for its part tied to a visible symbol - existence in relation to those objects (Simmel 1900: 87). Once money has taken over the role of the expressive function of social interrelations, the “ absolute character of the movement of the world ” (ibid.: 583) is not invalidated, but on the contrary, underlined: Quite in the sense in which for Simmel there can be no completed system of cognition, but always only an incomplete process of cognition (cf. Becker 1971: 73), which the American semiotician Peirce had certainly subscribed to in this form, money is designed to be passed on again and again and to anticipate new, higher forms of social movement. Günter Schmölders (1966: 35) succinctly states that the development towards ever higher abstraction in value and money thinking is a basic feature of all cultural history, which I have discussed elsewhere under the term ‘ Distortion ’ (Verzeichnung) (cf. Eschbach 1989), and Simmel explains: This is an increasing spiritualization of money. The essence of the spirit is to preserve unity to the multiplicity. In the sensual reality, everything is side by side, in the spirit alone there is a togetherness. Using the concept, and its characteristics, employing its judgment, subject, and predicate enter into a unity to which there is no analogy in the immediacy of the tangible. [ … ] That is why money, the abstraction of interaction, can only find a symbol in everything spatialsubstantial because the sensual juxtaposition of the same contradicts its essence. Only in the mail, in which the substance recedes, money becomes real money, i. e., that real interrelation and point of unity of interacting value elements, which can only be the act of the spirit (Simmel 1900: 190). But if money is to be addressed in progressive abstraction as a “ social function that has become substance, ” as Rammstedt (Kintzele 1993: 30) formulates, and if with money the “ function of exchange ” is “ crystallized into an entity that exists for itself ” (ibid.), then money replaces interaction, so that Simmel ’ s analysis of human exchange relations boils down to the punch line that money as a symbolization of all exchange relations in modernity has taken over the role of a symbol of all valuations (cf. Köhnke in Kintzele 1993: 152), which is why today a critique of the sign would no longer be called for, but a critique of political economy. 2.2 Kurt Singer: Validity As far as I know, Kurt Singer was the first German scientist to undertake a semiotic investigation at a German university. Singer ’ s habilitation thesis, published in 1920 under the title Das Geld als Zeichen (Money as a Sign), argues, unlike Simmel ’ s philosophy of money, for long stretches quite national economic, but since he developed his moneytheoretical investigations based on a semiotic methodology that differs from and complements Simmel ’ s considerations in certain respects, it is certainly helpful to pay some attention to Singer ’ s approach. To properly assess Singer ’ s approach from the outset, it is far from sufficient to recall the beginnings of his studies with Simmel; of at least equal importance for Kurt Singer would be 98 Money as a sign: Georg Simmel, Kurt Singer, and Karl Bühler (1995) Die Staatliche Theorie des Geldes (The State Theory of Money) by Georg Friedrich Knapp, to whom Singer went with a recommendation from Gustav Schmoller after his studies still in Strasbourg. How deeply Singer was impressed by Knapp ’ s theory of money is expressed in his “ Abriss eines Lebenslaufs ” (Outline of a resume) mentioned earlier: Since the publication of Georg Friedrich Knapp ’ s Die Staatliche Theorie des Geldes (1905), it was clear to me that I had to devote my best professional energies for quite some time to the interpretation, defense, and further education of the then almost completely unrecognized work (NL Kurt Singer: CII 1: 2). After his doctorate, in which he dealt with the problems of Indian monetary reform, Singer worked as an assistant to the Hamburg banker Friedrich Bendixen, who maintained a longstanding intensive correspondence with Knapp on the latter ’ s theory of money. In this context, it remains to mention that Kurt Singer edited the correspondence between Bendixen and Knapp on the state theory of money from his Australian exile in the 1950s through the mediation of the first German president, Theodor Heuss (cf. Singer 1958), who was married to Elli Heuss-Knapp, the daughter of Singer ’ s doctoral supervisor. Singer, like Simmel, starts from the premise that money arose from the needs of exchange, which is why a theory of money must be grounded in a theory of exchange (cf. Singer 1920: 3). Singer ’ s answer to the question of the specificity of human exchange, however, does not aim at an interdependence theory of human interactions as in Simmel, but strictly chartalistically at the validity of a certain order of the system of payments, as reflected, for example, in paragraph 1 of the Münzgesetz of 1873: “ The gold mark applies in the German Reich. ” According to this concept of validity, the gold mark would be nothing more than a name for that quantity of metal that is contained in cash in accordance with the applicable coinage: Payment transactions then mean the handing over of goods in exchange for certain quantities of metal and the measurement of the value of the goods against the value of the currency (ibid.: 63). This understanding of money, which is oriented toward the concept of validity, is plausible only under the condition that the monetary constitution guarantees the redemption of every valid means of payment (i. e., coins and banknotes) in the form of monetary metal, as was the case in Germany until the beginning of the First World War. With the replacement of the gold currency, a new explanation must be sought as to how even irredeemable means of payment can fulfil their monetary function if they do not guarantee to possess a certain quantity of gold. This question, which was already discussed during the First World War and even more intensively at the beginning of the Weimar Republic, is solved by Singer in the following way: The concept of money presupposes the concept of the unit of value and the concept of the community of payment and at the same time the recognition of the basic fact that money is a socialstate, supra-individual institution: a thing that does not depend on the will of the individual, but is regulated by groups or institutions, a thing in the use of which the individual is dependent on the norms and measures of a somehow defined totality, which need not necessarily take the form of an association, but which has regularly taken on the form of one in recent centuries (ibid.: 65 f.). Means of payment as bearers of value units are not selected because they fulfill some human need with material value, but because they are suitable for use in payment transactions: Money as a sign: Georg Simmel, Kurt Singer, and Karl Bühler (1995) 99 Money is not regarded by the payer as useful for use, but as one suitable for payment: not as the bearer of a value, but as the embodiment of a validity. [ … ] Pieces whose validity is established not by weighing but by proclamation we call chartal means of payment, charto (mark) meaning a movable shaped thing which is conceived by the legal system as carrying a certain meaning (ibid.: 72 f.). In an important historical aside, Singer points out that Plato, in the second book of the Politeia, referred to money as a “ symbollon ” and always understood it to mean something concrete that represented something else, “ which is not to be considered a real value in itself, but for which a real value is exchanged ” (ibid.: 78). In this context, we should also briefly recall Freyer ’ s cultural semiotics, whose Theorie des objektiven Geistes (Freyer 1928) had a lasting influence not only on Büher. Freyer described signs as a form of objective mind whose meaning content essentially points beyond itself, i. e., is not centrically but vectorially structured. This means that signs do not derive their sense from themselves, but through their directedness towards other persons, objects, facts, or behavioral expectations (cf. Heinemann 1969: 49). The historical reference to Plato makes it unmistakably clear why Singer called his treatise Das Geld als Zeichen, for his theory of money is a pragmatic theory of the use of monetary signs in a system of means of payment whose validity owes itself to a norm or set of the state or the community: The value, i. e., the measure of economic significance that a monetary sign has for the economic agent, is based on the ability of the monetary sign to serve for the fulfillment of obligations in the amount of the validity conferred on it by proclamation - and therefore also to be usable for the purchase of goods. The so-called ‘ value of money ’ is nothing but the value of the goods that can be bought for it; it is a reflex phenomenon. One does not accept money when selling goods because it supposedly has exchange value, ’ but money has value for the individual because he can buy goods with it (Singer 1920: 89). Without any doubt, it would be conceivable to exchange goods for goods in direct transactions without any intermediary function of money, as we know from historical examples of the economy in kind as well as from current traps in which the intermediaries, which have become insecure, are dispensed with in times of hyperinflation. The temporary renunciation of the intermediary services of money does not, however, disprove its actual purpose, which Aristotle already saw in making the values of things comparable to each other, measurable against each other, which could not be completely exchanged without a standard of value in force, since things are incomparable in themselves and are only made commensurable for exchange through the mediating activity of money, so that Singer can claim that it is only through money, valid based on a state norm, that the community of exchangers is made possible in the true sense (cf. ibid.: 187). 2.3 Karl Bühler: Imprint Unlike Georg Simmel and Kurt Singer, Karl Bühler has only occasionally and marginally expressed special sematological considerations on the problem of money, if one disregards the unpublished text “ Das Geld als Zeichen ” (Money as a Sign), which was written as a lecture manuscript while in exile in America. However, since Bühler ’ s considerations touch on an aspect that seems suitable for bringing about a sematological differentiation of “ trafficked things ” such as brand names, coins, and words, the discussion of Bühler ’ s approach undoubtedly belongs in the present context. 100 Money as a sign: Georg Simmel, Kurt Singer, and Karl Bühler (1995) The manufacturers of cigarettes, detergents, chocolate, soft drinks, cars, etc. provide their products with trademarks that they have legally protected and which at least fulfill the double function of guaranteeing a constant standard of quality ( “ Persil remains Persil ” ) and which secondly - despite the ban on comparative advertising in Germany - are supposed to ensure differentiation from competing products and, if possible, semantically more or less dressed up superiority over the competing products ( “ The new Astra. There are already enough half-measures. ” “ That only works with Malaysia Airlines. ” “ The lead is growing: WirtschaftsWoche ” ). The consistent quality of brand products is carefully monitored and constantly subjected to strict controls, for which white-clad experts are preferably brought forward to assure seamless laboratory monitoring; occasionally, well-known company owners also appear to vouch for the house brand with their “ good names ” . In the case of coins and banknotes, such quality control does not take place in everyday transactions to the same extent as for branded articles; rather, in ordinary business transactions, users essentially rely on the agreement that “ a dollar is a dollar, ” although, in the age of the color photocopier, one increasingly encounters equipment in gas stations, exchange offices and banks that makes it possible to check authenticity quickly and discreetly. However, whether a freshly minted coin, a freshly printed banknote, or a banknote showing clear signs of use, is placed on the counter does not change the nominal market value. Whereas branded articles come with quality guarantees and coins and banknotes, beyond the unconcerned act of purchase, have an imprint of the mint and - depending on the attractiveness of the currency - more or less refined signaling (in German banknotes, for instance, the watermark, the silver stripe, and the numbering), in linguistic traffic one may well afford a phonematically poorly minted word coin if the recipient can only guess what this poorly minted word coin is supposed to mean. Bühler points out that in case of doubt, the recipient makes a “ correct ” coinage as a form of protection from misunderstandings or to instruct the speaker, “ as all language teachers do professionally towards their students ” (Bühler 1934: 61). Generalizing from this, Bühler states: It is the phonematic imprint on the sound image of a word, to which, comparable to the trademark and the coinage, a traffic convention is attached! (ibid.). After pointing out the similarities of trafficked things, however, it is a matter of working out the special features “ to fully grasp the peculiarity of the linguistic traffic signs ” (ibid.). In broad agreement with Simmel and Singer, Bühler emphasizes the special semiological nature of the language. In contrast, regardless of its historical manifestation (coin, banknote, bill of exchange, check, check card), money may approach signs asymptotically, but ultimately remains attached to goods. This sematological difference between word and coin has already been mentioned repeatedly, but must now be explicitly stated: while money owes itself to a more or less static, dyadic substitution relation, in which one material represents another, i. e., a certain quantity of goods and this substitution relation is also reversible if necessary, the linguistic sign arises from a dynamic, triadic representation relation, in which a material, phonematically imprinted something at the sound image, establishes an interpretation-requiring and irreversible relation between a signified object and its meaning. Elsewhere, Bühler writes: Money as a sign: Georg Simmel, Kurt Singer, and Karl Bühler (1995) 101 For now, however, the sign-like, used in intersubjective intercourse, can be characterized as an orientation device of community life (Bühler 1934: 48). As elementary as this distinction between the material-bound semiosis of money and the material-debound semiosis of language may be, it has been criminally disregarded repeatedly. It has provoked all kinds of “ material fallacy, ” which Bühler never tires of criticizing. As self-evident as it should be that one cannot develop linguistics from physical and physiological data, but that linguistics must constitute the core of a general sematology (cf. ibid.: 9), it should also be clear in the opposite sense that a well-understood causal view is also unavoidable in the overall framework of linguistic analysis: Signs presuppose the psychophysical systems of humankind. Such systems are used as detectors. Otherwise, signs do not become manifest in world events. [ … ] In chemistry, the sign factor is omitted for the scientific determination of the processes; in linguistics, however, it is indispensable, with it the principle of abstract relevance (ibid.: 273). References Ahonen, Pertti 1989: Tracing the Meaning of Money, Masch. Helsinki. Becker, Heribert J. 1971: Georg Simmel - Die Grundlagen seiner Soziologie, Stuttgart: Enke. Bühler, Karl 1934: Sprachtheorie. Die Darstellungsfunktion der Sprache, Jena: Fischer. Dascal, Marcelo 1987: “ Language and Money. A Simile and its Meaning in 17th Century Philosophy ” , in: Dascal, Marcelo: Leibniz, Language, Signs, and Thought, Amsterdam/ Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Eschbach, Achim 1989: “ Verzeichnung ” , in: Sturm, Hermann (ed.): Verzeichnungen. Vom Handgreiflichen zum Zeichen, Essen: Klartext: 43 - 58. Foucault, Michel 1977: Die Ordnung der Dinge, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp. Frankel, Herbert S. 1979: Geld. Philosophie und Psychologie des Geldes, Wiesbaden: Gabler. Freyer, Hans 1928: Theorie des objektiven Geistes, Leipzig: Teubner. Heinemann, Klaus 1969: Grundzüge einer Soziologie des Geldes, Stuttgart: Enke. Hübner-Funk, Sibylle 1982: Georg Simmels Konzeption von Gesellschaft. Ein Beitrag zum Verhältnis von Soziologie, Ästhetik und Politik, Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein. Hübner-Funk, Sibylle 1994: Himmel Hölle Fegefeuer. Das Jenseits im Mittelalter, Munich: Fink. Jetzler, Peter (ed.) 1994: Himmel Hölle Fegefeuer. Das Jenseits im Mittelalter, Munich: Fink. Kintzele, Jeff & Schneider, Peter (eds.) 1993: Georg Simmels Philosophic des Geldes, Frankfurt a. M.: Hain. Knapp, Georg Friedrich 1905: Staatliche Theorie des Geldes, Munich: Duncker & Humblot. Knapp, Georg Friedrich & Bendixen, Friedrich 1958: Zur Staatlichen Theorie des Geldes. Briefwechsel von 1905 - 1920, hrsg. von Kurt Singer. Tübingen: Mohr. Laum, Bernhard 1924: Heiliges Geld. Eine historische Untersuchung über den sakralen Ursprung des Geldes, Tübingen: Mohr. Le Goff, Jacques 1988: Wucherzins und Höllenqualen. Ökonomie und Religion im Mittelalter, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta. Le Goff, Jacques 1991: Die Geburt des Fegefeuers. Vom Wandel des Weltbildes im Mittelalter, Munich: dtv. Mead, George Herbert 1980: Gesammelte Aufsätze, Band 1, hrsg. von Hans Joas, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp. Müller, Adam 1816: Versuche einer neuen Theorie des Geldes, Leipzig. 102 Money as a sign: Georg Simmel, Kurt Singer, and Karl Bühler (1995) Pohlmann, Friedrich 1987: Individualität, Geld und Rationalität. Georg Simmel zwischen Karl Marx und Max Weber, Stuttgart: Enke. Saussure, Ferdinand de 1967: Grundfragen der allgemeinen Sprachwissenschaft, Berlin: de Gruyter. Schacht, Joachim 1967: Die Totenmaske Gottes. Zur Kulturanthropologie des Geldes. Ein Versuch, Salzburg: Müller. Schmitz, H.Walter 1986: “ Sind Worte für bare Münze zu nehmen? Ferdinand Tonnies über Geld als Zeichen und Zeichen als Werte ” , in: Kodikas/ Code 9, 1 - 2: 137 - 154. Schmölders, Günter 1966: Philosophie des Geldes, Reinbek b. Hamburg: Rowohlt. Simmel, Georg 1900: Philosophie des Geldes, Munich: Duncker & Humblot. Simmel, Georg 1890: Das Geld in der modernen Kultur, in: Georg Simmel Gesamtausgabe, Band 5, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp 1992: 178 - 196. Singer, Kurt 1920: Das Geld als Zeichen. Jena: Fischer. Singer. Kurt: Estate (NL), Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg. Tenbruck, Friedrich H. 1958: “ Georg Simmel (1858 - 1919) ” , in: Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 10: 587 - 614. Weber, Max 1991: Die Protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus, Gütersloh: Siebenstern. Money as a sign: Georg Simmel, Kurt Singer, and Karl Bühler (1995) 103 K O D I K A S / C O D E 44 (2021) · No. 1 - 3 Gunter Narr Verlag Tübingen Distortion. Verzeichnung (1988) Abstract: In the essay “ Distortion ” Eschbach is not aiming to set a definitive framework of discussion. It describes the cultural semiotic approach that is a way to define the term ‘ distortion ’ . This allows an ample scope to discuss the phenomenon and permits to explore fully the socio-historical, cultural-political, and aesthetic dimensions of the term. Eschbach sees the term ‘ cultural semiotics ’ as being best represented by the concept of the so-called ‘ secondary model-forming systems ’ of the Tartu School. The essay defines four main findings: 1. Distortion does not seem to be an inevitable consequence of any drawing process, but rather the result of a deliberate or negligent shortening of semiosis. Mainly deriving from short cuts and reductions of the semiotic triad. 2. In order to avoid shortcuts of the Semiotic triad, a Semiotic critique of signs is necessary, which, however, must not end with Mauthner ’ s skepticism, but should point out possibilities and limits of the traffic in signs. 3. Possibilities and limits of sign traffic cannot be determined in the style of many conventional sign theories by typologizing and formalizing, but rather require on the one hand a general sematology as a basic science and on the other hand a critical sociosemiotics that closes the gap between sign production, product, and reception that still exists today. 4. In order to meet this latter requirement, a high degree of semiotic research curiosity is necessary. My contribution to “ The distorted Prometheus ” symposium, titled ‘ Distortion ’ , was not designed to set out a definitive framework for discussion. This was neither the intention of the organizer nor was it within my capacities. I also had no wish to present an idiosyncratic understanding of the sign ‘ distortion ’ , as it rarely or never occurs in everyday language, and this would hardly contribute to getting closer to the phenomenon in question. Moreover, a definition or explication of the term ‘ distortion ’ in the sense of a setting or fixing is forbidden by fundamental considerations of linguistic philosophy and semiotics, as such an approach violates the Wittgensteinian postulate of permanence in linguistics. It is equally incompatible with the basic semiotic maxim of the process of interpretation developed by Peirce and others, according to which a linguistic sign is subject to continuous change and clarification in semiosis. This process has been used with pleasure and success in many contexts, discovering for example historical ways of using the term in question. One thinks, for example, of passage B203 in Kant ’ s Critique of Pure Reason, where the concept of distortion is used in the investigation of the axioms of Anschauung - in order to ascertain, by way of conceptual-historical and/ or etymological analysis, a current understanding. Here, however, we cannot apply this process, because we are not concerned with a term ’ s history but with its meaning. Reservations to certain ways of defining the term ‘ distortion ’ leave us with the cultural semiotic approach. This gives us ample scope to discuss the phenomenon and will permit us to explore fully the socio-historical, cultural-political, and aesthetic dimensions of the term. When we speak here of ‘ cultural semiotics ’ , we are not talking about the mechanical counterpart to ‘ natural semiotics ’ , if there is such a thing. The term ‘ culture semiotics ’ , like the term ‘ pragmatics ’ at an earlier point in time, has the function of a waste paper basket into which one may safely stuff everything that cannot be accommodated in a meaningful way elsewhere. I see the term ‘ cultural semiotics ’ as being best represented by the concept of the so-called ‘ secondary model-forming systems ’ of the Tartu School, insofar as secondary systems of religion, myth, law, art, and science unfold based on the primary constitution of signs - with gestural, mimicked, proxemic and above all, signs, of natural language. Such a conception can dispense with traditional, artificial dichotomies, such as between the natural sciences and the humanities, while also explaining specific semiotic achievements on the basis of an integral theory of signs. Cultural semiotics in this sense is a holistic concept, just as the concept of signs itself can only meaningfully develop holistically. The 19th-century philosophy of science, which is committed to the scientific ideal of which we are today ’ s heirs, has encouraged tendencies that accord with the principle of psychophysical parallelism. This assertion can be substantiated in a particularly striking way by looking at the effects of the principle since this is a way of looking at things that has a long chain of antecedents, yet also persists in the current crisis in semiotics. The psychophysical mechanists were confronted with the problem of having to make statements about psychic phenomena without being able to subject these psychic phenomena to their quantitative methods. If one does not want to call it a parlor trick, then one must at least call the chosenway out very daring. The shift from physical to the psyche, from material to immaterial sign bearer does not owe itself to a proper analysis but to a dialectical empty shell, a metabasis eis allo genos or ‘ Stoffentgleisung ’ (material fallacy), as Karl Bühler aptly characterized this cardinal error of thought. The substitution theory of the sign, which is already completely inadequate in itself, is thus further reduced and emptied of meaning. Charles W. Morris carried this procedure under the banner of behaviorism far into the realm of modern semiotics, absolving in advance traffic sign theorists, Wau-wau semioticians, and substance thinkers who wanted to limit their attention to observable reactions to certain stimuli. It is precisely this view that is largely responsible for the inflationary expansion of semiotics, for according to this universally applicable conception, not only do all human activities fall within the scope of semiotics, but so do zoosemiotics, and phytosemiotics. This global perspective lends itself to application in the semiotic study of contact between machines or between people and machines. It would be very hard to justify why, for example, the reaction of two chemical elements or the collision of boulders in a landslide could not be considered semiotic events. The only problem with such an expansion of semiotics is that it Distortion (1988) 105 is inversely proportional to the meaningfulness of semiotic analysis. Under this trend, only vague analogizing remains possible. The phenomenon of hypostasis is closely related. The phenomenon related to the material sign bearer is the distortion by which a phenomenon is marked that can be presented as a characteristic of the current crisis of semiotics. People have been thinking, speaking, and acting with the help of signs ever since they became human. People record their environment since it is a human trait to want to understand every process, interpret it meaningfully, and orient in relation to it intentionally. In this sense, ‘ distortion ’ is nothing other than a synonym for human intellectual activity. Even if one focuses on the unproblematic and mundane process of semiotization of the environment, an aspect of distortion comes to light that deserves our attention: what is on the one hand a completely normal semiotic process of representation, turns out to be a socio-culturally remarkable phenomenon of progressive autonomy and the self-dynamics of the sign, a phenomenon in recent French semiology. Jürg Altwegg states in this regard: Both the ‘ deconstruction ’ of structuralism and semiology as a science, indeed a worldview of signs, are more strongly under Heidegger ’ s spell than one might think. In Jacques Lacan as well as in Jacques Derrida, the traces are directly traceable, and in Michel Foucault, the effect can also be traced (Altwegg 1988: 17). Bernhard Waldenfels, who noticed the same thing, emphasizes: Finally, Heidegger ’ s destruction of metaphysics has not stopped at the classical phenomenological texts. The interpretation of Husserl was transformed into destruction and diagnosis by J. Derrida, G. Granel, and their successors. What was gained here in terms of exegetical meticulousness and textual skill was the flip side of a movement that replaced the motto ‘ Back to the things ’ (zurück zu den Sachen) with the slogan ‘ Back to the texts ’ (Zurück zu den Texten) - with the intention of finding the ‘ things ’ in the texts (Waldenfels, quoted from Altwegg 1988: 17), which indicates a close connection to our problem. Every form of dealing with signs - as Charles Peirce compellingly demonstrated - presupposes other signs to which the current sign process refers, in interpreting, commenting or correcting manner. The original object-binding of the sign recedes into the background so that the boundaries of representation that can be legitimized by the object are blurred and the representational performance of the sign, which is necessary for thought, demands the autonomization of the sign in due course. The triadic sign scheme helps us summarize this. Since we cannot say anything about the ‘ pure object ’ , which is a thing in itself, the object finds its way into the semiotic process only in the form of the immediate object. Peirce, who made these differentiations, emphasizes the necessity of distinguishing the immediate object, by which he understands the object as represented by the sign, from the dynamic object, which he defines as the object that actually takes effect but is not immediately present (cf. Peirce, C. P. 8.343). We see, then, that the source point of semiosis can be described as a process of beginning. On the basis of his semiotic analysis, Peirce not only arrived at a distinction between the immediate and the dynamic object but also considered a threefold distinction of the interpreter. With the concept of the immediate interpreter, he described an interpreter who is represented or signified by a sign. The dynamic interpreter characterizes the impact of the sign on the interpreting consciousness. The logical interpreter, which I would call the regulative idea, characterizes, according to 106 Distortion (1988) Peirce, the effect that is achieved by the sign in the interpreting consciousness, when a process of thought is sufficiently advanced by acommunity of researchers (cf. ibid.). In the phenomenon of distortion, then, the fact is manifested that in the process of representation, the designated, unmediated object is extended by the sign, since the sign as a sign, i. e. in its triadic relationality consisting of the relation (0, R, I), adds the designation to the object in such a way that a naturally non-existent relation to the the interpreter is established for the first time. In the process of designation, therefore, we see a semiotic surplus or surplus value that is available to the user of the sign in the same way as a commodity. It is precisely at this point that it is necessary and meaningful to speak of distortion. Then, and precisely then, when the social surplus value of signs is thematized, when the characteristic relations of sign and value are analyzed, and when the political economy of the exchange of signs is under discussion (cf. Baudrillard 1972), we must speak of distortion. Distortion is thus not primarily meant to express the fact that the world is populated by more and more signs, although today there may well be talk of semiotic environmental pollution, but rather than characterize the processing of the sign into a commodity. But if it is true that all intellectual and artistic acts are indispensably dependent on signs, and if it is also true that the process of representation has an unavoidable tendency to become distorted, so that sign-mediated object manipulation is replaced by sign-mediated sign manipulation, then the analysis of the political economy of the sign must become a central task, or what I call ‘ critical ’ semiotics. My late friend Ferruccio Rossi-Landi addressed this problem in a whole series of publications and especially in his “ Theory of Sign Residues ” (Rossi-Landi 1977). In a lecture given in August 1977 on the occasion of the Third Austrian Semiotics Symposium, he examines the relationship between sign systems and social reproduction, guided by the basic principle that ‘ social reproduction ’ must be conceived of as a model concept encompassing the whole of human reality, within which sign systems are a constant factor. Without going into Rossi Landi ’ s argument in detail here, his main conclusions can be summarized as follows: If one or more elements of the sign are isolated from the semiotic triad, one destroys, willingly or unwillingly, the all-encompassing signifying potency of the triadic sign, which alone is capable of doing justice to the socio-historical reality of man. If, for example, one reduces semiosis to the sign-bearer, if one restricts this sign-residuum to its mere materiality, then one cuts it off from the social work that was necessary to declare naturally existing matter or energy, or an artifact in a secondary process of production, to be a bearer or representative. Likewise, other abbreviations of semiosis are conceivable, by Distortion (1988) 107 radicalizing the interpretant function and separating it from its material basis. One might be inclined to parallel such abbreviations with certain traditional styles of thought, insofar as both mechanical materialism and subjective idealism seem to propose just such totalizations. When we describe the problem of signification in the categories of certain philosophical histories, however, the dangers involved should rather be minimized or concealed, because the conceptual camouflage does not make it adequately clear that significations of this kind do not mean a somewhat reduced but ultimately acceptable signifying process, but rather highly aggressive forms of totalitarianism. This finding is in close correspondence with the reflections that Edmund Husserl developed in his famous lectures on the crisis in European science. The crisis, which Husserl spoke about in 1936 at the invitation of the European Cultural Association in Vienna, was the gap between human experience and reality that presented itself to the sciences of the 19th century. Instead of attuning humankind to its reality, scientism led to ever greater alienation. A schism between the life-world of the human and the world as an object of scientific thought developed. Too often are questions about the why and wherefore suppressed in favor of the engineering question, how. In this way, however, science in its scientific guise has lost the actual function of science, which is to theoretically penetrate relations between the human and its environment. It has lost its own function of meaning. This is the fact that Husserl calls critical.The situation is not critical, however, for science that is committed to the scientistic ideal, since it can flourish undisturbed in its self-woven and self-elected cocoon. The situation is critical, however, for modern humankind as the subject of this science, because, due to the loss of the scientific function of meaning, he runs the risk of foregoing science and its inherent rationality altogether and creating irrational fetishes for himself, or, as has already been said, of substituting sign-mediated manipulation of signs for sign-mediated manipulation of objects. This state of affairs is reminiscent of an observation by Milan Kundera, who points out in an essay on Federico Fellini that Franz Kafka has ingeniously captured the ‘ essence of technology ’ in his novels. (cf. Haller 1988: 214): The world in the castle is archaic, and yet technology reigns in it: in this world, man is dominated by forces he can no longer cope with. Husserl ’ s analysis of the crisis in European science arose little more than fifty years ago. And despite a change in circumstances, they retain an almost frightening degree of timelessness. Husserl recognizes the tendency of people to fall back regressively behind their own possibilities in order to submit to the power of the natural sciences. The idea of not having to surrender to the real world, which is only possible at the price of surrendering to the myths of irrationalism, for example in the form of the new inwardness or the seductive whispering of new-age apologists is nourished by the modern cult of the information society. If before there was talk of voluntary surrender to the myth of irrationalism, the evidence for this could justifiably have come from history. I recall a decidedly shameful example: when the first Jewish rector of a German university, Professor Ernst Cassirer of Hamburg, met the first Nazi rector of a German university, Professor Martin Heidegger of Freiburg. Benedetto Croce wrote to his friend and colleague Karl Vossler on August 30, 1933, that 108 Distortion (1988) Germany was now bound to Heidegger (cf. Schneeberger 1962: III), whereas Ludwig Englert noted euphorically: The difference between the two scholars (i. e. Cassirer and Heidegger) lies in the different final basic positions that we were able to experience in that unique working community, which, with necessity, led to a difference in their conception and opened up in their attitude towards man as a finite being. For Cassirer, man ’ s sphere of action is only the point of departure, the ‘ terminus a quo ’ from which he progresses to the symbolic space situated above it, the autonomous and free realm of the spirit; only through this detachment from the world of preoccupying action does man gain the possibility of comprehending himself in his world and the world in himself; for this, he needs that symbolizing and spontaneous energy which is to be distinguished in principle from every mere vital force. Based on Uexküll ’ s theory, Cassirer developed the concept of ‘ human space ’ in contrast to ‘ animal space ’ , the first is the mythical world, followed by the artistic space of representation and the mathematical-physical space of meaning. Of fundamental importance for Cassirer is the grasp of the phenomenon of language. For it is a language that makes the step from the world of action to objectification possible for him. The last keystone of Cassirer ’ s elaborations was the discussion of the problem of death. In it, he developed that man is indeed finite, but at the same time also that finite being that knows about its finitude and in this knowledge, which itself is no longer finite, rises above finitude. In this sentence lies the last and sharpest contrast to Heidegger, which came to light even more clearly than in the lectures in a working group. While Cassirer ’ s approach focuses on the autonomous realm of the spirit, Heidegger ’ s thinking is primarily directed towards the world of concerned action, towards dealing with what is at hand. For him, it is a matter of being - as a problem of existence, his philosophy is quite existential, not formal, and while Cassirer ’ s thinking is strongly functionally directed, Heidegger ’ s appears more static (Englert, quoted by Schneeberger 1962: If.). It is now quite understandable that people use their regular way of “ handling available stuff ” to think creatively about their lives on this planet, as the constant hunt for the worrier and its surrogates confuses them about the limits of human possibility. Critical reflection has been replaced by a flood of unmanageable information, presented with the claim that it makes our lives easier. The abundance of potentially available data means that the question of the relevance of our actions no longer arises. The threatening loss of thought covered by the alluring myths of the computer age, which finds its most terrifying expression in the loss of the freedom of the imagination, is the core problem with the notion of distortion. What presents itself as a progressive virtuality in the handling of data sets turns out, on closer analysis, to be the replacement of sign-mediated object manipulation by signmediated sign manipulation. In a particularly intrusive way, this principle comes to the fore in the garish colorfulness and squiggly playfulness of so-called postmodern architecture. What appears to be greater freedom and virtuosity in the use of an exuberant repertoire of forms lacks the functional commitment of the exterior to the interior. This styleless architecture renounces the interaction between the community and the environment it builds, to chat about itself. Postmodern architecture does not develop out of mutual social communication, but out of the one-sided entertainment our media has accustomed us to. We Distortion (1988) 109 expect TV stars and sports celebrities to have a suitable outfit - think pop stars and athletes at the Olympic Games - and therefore settle into the functionless extroversion of the façade world. Postmodern architecture, which is based on the empty principle of pre-substitution, is self-deception in a dangerous sense. At the end of his essay on the false perception of postmodernism, which is well worth reading, Dieter Koll formulates this as the rift between being and wanting to be can be read in the increasing willingness to “ let the present disappear behind the façades of history ” (Koll 1987: 62). A similar complaint was made recently by the American writer James Michener, who, when asked about the reasons for the approval of Ronald Reagan ’ s policies by so many Americans, replied that this understatement was “ a result of the fact that the American people are not in favor of Ronald Reagan ’ s policies. The fact that the conservatives did not agree deeply with his policies, but rather that “ we are content with symbols as long as they radiate hope and the optimistic message is presented in a pleasant tone ” (Michener 1988: 198). The controversy between Cassirer and Heidegger referred to above was not only intended to remind us of one of the most disastrous chapters of the German past; nor was it intended merely to provide a historical foil to an otherwise novel phenomenon: Rather, this controversy shows with all clarity the abyss into which the delivery of the available stuff must inevitably steer! However, instead of tracing the terrible entanglements of large parts of German science in national socialism, I would like to present some implications of Cassirer ’ s position, because this important thinker, who is one of the very few modern German philosophers, who have recognized and understood the necessity and fruitfulness of critical-semiotic thinking, has provided valuable guidance on how to counter the apparent automaticity of the process of distortion. Previously we have heard that Cassirer, following von Uexküll, developed a semiogenetic model that takes the world of action into the world of symbolic forms, where he assigns a prominent role to language. In this context, it may be of interest to note the connection to statements by Jost Herbig, developed in his book Im Anfang war das Wort (Herbig 1984). I would also like to refer to André Leroi Gourhan ’ s work Hand und Wort (Leroi-Gourhan 1980), in which he reconstructs the evolution of technology, language, and culture in an analogous way. To conclude this short list of affirmative references, I refer to the cultural semiotic work of Jurij Lotman, who developed the very fruitful concept of the semiosphere. In a lecture he gave in 1987 in Helsinki in German, Yuri Lotman explained that the ‘ semiosphere ’ was about: The treatment of semiotic facts, which goes back as far as Saussurean linguistics, can no longer satisfy the present state of semiotics. After 20 years of semiotic research, we can now assume that strictly bounded and functionally unambiguous systems, taken in and of themselves, cannot function in isolation. They function only within a semiotic continuum filled with heterogeneous images at different stages of development. Such acontinuum - according to the concept of biosphere elaborated by V. I. Vernadsky - we call the semiosphere. The semiosphere is such a semiotic space, outside of which even the existence of semiosis is impossible (Lotman 1987: 1). Central to this understanding of the semiosphere is the limits of homogeneity of sign systems and the inequality of these systems at the structural level, insofar as the hierarchy of texts and languages is constantly violated. Lotman explains this concept as follows: 110 Distortion (1988) Let us imagine a museum hall, where exponents from different epochs are displayed in shop windows, signatures in known and unknown languages, instructions for deciphering, the explanations worked out by the Methodist, a touring scheme, and rules for visitors are gathered, let us add visitors ourselves and this results in something resembling real semiosphere (ibid.: 8). I would like to focus on another aspect of Cassirer ’ s approach, namely the role of language in the construction of the world of objects, which he examined in his contribution to the Hamburg Sprachtag of 1931. Starting from a critique of the image theory of cognition, which in the end is not even capable of repeating the determinations inherent in the object, and referring to the Copernican turn that Kant made when he stressed the innovative character of the synthesis of the manifold, which can only be performed by the subject itself. Cassirer emphasizes that: If we still continue to see in knowledge, in art, in language, as mere mirrors of the world, we must always remain aware that the image produced by each of these mirrors does not depend on the nature of the reflected object alone, but on our own nature, that it does not merely repeat a preliminary drawing already given in the object, but that it contains within itself an original act of preliminary drawing. It is therefore never a mere copy, but the expression of an original-forming power. The spiritual mirroring of the universe, which we possess in knowledge, in art, and in language, are therefore - to use a Leibnizian term - ‘ living mirrors ’ : miroirs vivants de l ’ Univers ’ . They are not merely passive receiving and recording apparatuses, but they are acts of the spirit. - and each of these original acts builds up for us its own and new environment, a certain horizon of objecthood. They do not simply come from the finished object, but they lead to it and towards it; they are constitutive conditions of its possibility (Cassirer 1932: 135). Decades earlier, the American semiotician Charles S. Peirce, who, like Cassirer, was oriented towards Kant, had already developed the only epistemological conclusion, abduction, which was popularized by Umberto Eco in his novel The Name of the Rose, in which Eco presented it as a prototypical case of a full semiosis. It was Peirce, however, who invested all efforts to distinguish abduction from the ultimately static, mimetic induction, which is good for nothing other than confirming what is already known, i. e. one ’ s own prejudices. But how is one to evade the mere repetition of the pre-drawing already given to the object? How can the existing dangers of distortion be avoided? Peirce answered this question on the one hand with a scientific-ethical appeal not to block the path of research and his conception of the permanent discourse of the research community, and on the other hand, developed his incomplete semiotic hypothesis theory. Another participant in the Hamburg Language Day, the psychologist Karl Bühler, who, like Cassirer, was convinced of the necessity of a semiotic answer to the questions under discussion, sketched a conception in his Theory of Language of 1934 which he called the organon view of language (Organonbetrachtung der Sprache (cf. Bühler 1934: 24££.)). Bühler previously didn ’ t see the necessity to talk about the origin of the language, because he equated being a human and the control over an orientation device for community life (cf. ibid: 48) in the same place. In his own words: The fact that language [ … ] belongs to the ‘ devices ’ or, in Platonic terms, that it is an organon, means nothing other than to consider it in relation to those who deal with it and are its doers. In the axiom of the sign nature of language, linguistic research thus encounters the thought model of homo faber, a maker and user of devices (ibid.). Distortion (1988) 111 But have we not, with Bühler ’ s organon view of language, arrived again precisely at Heidegger ’ s accessible stuff criticized by Cassirer? Let us, for the sake of clarity in order to answer this question, Bühler will have his say once again: Plato explains in the Cratylus that one must go to the weaver in order to find the principles of weaving, and to the carpenter who made the loom in order to explore the ‘ principles ’ of the organon ‘ loom ’ . Should he who wants to find the principles of linguistic research enjoy a course with the weaver and be spared a trip to the carpenter? That is what I do not believe. The correct analog to the course at the carpenters is the study of the intersubjectively regulated conventions of language. It is true that, like everything else we have inherited from our fathers, ‘ language ’ also wants to be received and must live out its resurrection in the monadic space of the speaker. But reception and self-creation (extraction and setting- Entnahme und Setzung) are two different things; to setting belongs the Husserlian freedom of the meaning-conferring acts, so as a limit to this freedom and correlative to it belongs the limitation of extraction, in extraction. To use linguistic entities in intersubjective intercourse or for the construction of a unique linguistic work, to use them like all other linguistic comrades, is one thing; and to give them the precision of meaning provided for in the construction of language itself, from case to case, and beyond that, here and there, a uniquely modified meaning, is another thing. And because these are two things, it is not possible, as logical investigations attempt to do, to account for the whole of the doctrine of meaning from the act. [ ] The theory of entities derived from the genuine organon model of language and thus from the objective view of language in the old way, and with it the social moment of language, must be described as logically prior to, or at least logically equivalent to, a subjectrelated theory of acts. Anything else would be individualism and subjectivism insufficient in relation to language (ibid.: 68 f.). In relation to the problem of the recording, a series of related consequences can be drawn in a preliminary summary, the appealing character of which should not be missed: 1. According to the findings so far, distortion does not seem to be an inevitable consequence of any drawing process, but rather the result of a deliberate or negligent shortening of semiosis, whereby the most diverse epistemological, aesthetic, ideological, etc. presuppositions can motivate this shortening. The overpowering object orientation, which Cassirer characterized as a pre-signification, could be distinguished from the fetishized role of the representative name, which is discussed here under the heading of distortion, and a hypertrophied emphasis on the function of the interpreter led to the individualism and subjectivism criticized by Bühler. Taken as a whole, however, all three reductions are shortcuts of the semiosis triad, which, from the point of view of relational logic, cannot even be forcibly dissolved into dyadic relations. 2. In order to avoid shortcuts of the Semiotic triad, whether they occur in the form of presigning, signification, or the one-sided emphasis on the interpretant relation, a Semiotic critique of signs is necessary, which, however, must not end with Mauthner ’ s skepticism, but should point out possibilities and limits of the traffic in signs. 3. The possibilities and limits of sign traffic cannot be determined in the style of many conventional sign theories by typologizing and formalizing, but rather require on the one hand a general sematology as a basic science and on the other hand a critical sociosemiotics that closes the gap between sign production, product, and reception that still exists today. 112 Distortion (1988) 4. In order to meet this latter requirement, a high degree of semiotic research curiosity is necessary. I think that Umberto Eco ’ s Lector in fabula (Eco 1987) has already pointed the way for further research. References Altwegg, Jürg 1988: “ Heidegger in Frankreich - und zurück? ” , in: Altwegg, Jürg (ed.): Die Heidegger Kontroverse, Frankfurt a. M.: Athenäum: 14 - 25. Bühler, Karl 1934: Sprachtheorie. Die Darstellungsfunktion der Sprache, Jena: Fischer. Cassirer, Ernst 1932: “ Die Sprache und der Aufbau der Gegenstandswelt ” , in: Kafka, Gustav (ed.): Bericht über den XII. Kongreß der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Psychologie in Hamburg vom 12. - 16. April 1931, Jena: Fischer. Eco, Umberto 1987: Lector in fabula. Die Mitarbeit der Interpretation in erzählenden Texten, Munich: Hanser. Herbig, Jost 1986: Im Anfang war das Wort. Die Evolution des Menschlichen, Munich: DTV. Husserl, Edmund 1976: Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaft und die transzendentale Phänomenologie, ed. By Walter Biemel, 2. Edition, Den Haag: Nijhoff. Kant, Immanuel 1976: Die Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp. Koll, Dieter 1987: “ Hochbetrieb im Leihaus der Geschichte. Anekdoten am Bau oder: Das falsche Aufsehen der Postmoderne - Verwirrte Flucht aus der Eintönigkeit der Nachkriegs-Architektur ” , in: Die Zeit, No. 46: 62. Leroi-Gourhan, André 1980: Hand und Wort. Die Evolution von Technik, Sprache und Kunst, Frankfurt a. M. Suhrkamp. Lotman, Jurij 1987: Über die Semiosphäre. Lecture at the university of Helsinki on June 4 th , 1987. Michener, James 1988: “ Es ist eine furchterregende Entwicklung ” , in: Der Spiegel 42 (1988): 198 - 205. Peirce, Charles Sanders 1979: Collected Papers. Vols. 7 and 8. Ed. By Arthur W. Burks. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Rossi-Landi, Ferruccio 1977: Towards a theory of sign residues, Masch. Schneeberger, Guido 1962: Nachlese zu Heidegger. Dokumente zu seinem Leben und Denken, Bern: selfpublished. Distortion (1988) 113 K O D I K A S / C O D E 44 (2021) · No. 1 - 3 Gunter Narr Verlag Tübingen Karl Bühlers Concept of the Sign and its Relationship to Wittgenstein ’ s Late Philosophy. Karl Bühlers Zeichenbegriff und seine Beziehung zu Wittgenstein (1984) Abstract: This essay is an attempt to draw from the historical-comparative discussion of Bühler ’ s sign concept clues of the reconstruction of his integral theory of signs. Eschbach first traces the development of Bühler ’ s concept of the sign in published works until 1938 and then details their development in unpublished works during and after WWII. It focuses on the manuscript “ What is a sign? ” and a treatise on the concept of sign; this leads to a comparison of Karl Bühler ’ s and Ludwig Wittgenstein ’ s reflections on the concept of sign, which illuminates the similarities in their two approaches. 1 Introduction To try to reconstruct Karl Bühler ’ s theory of signs from the sparse fragments of a theory which, detached from the name of their author and anonymous like folklore, have become basic elements of modern semiotic thought (cf. Fónagy 1984), could be compared to the attempt to extrapolate the complexity of Peirce ’ s semiotics from his letters to Lady Welby. The fragmentation of Karl Bühler ’ s comprehensive theory of signs into a few splinters of thought, such as the Organon model together with the resulting types of signs symbol, symptom, and signal, the principle of abstract relevance and, if applicable, the remarks on deixis, reveals serious reception deficiencies on various levels: The scope and unity of Bühler ’ s theory of signs are just as little taken into account as the critical function of Bühler ’ s sematology as basic science; the sources of Bühler ’ s theory of signs are passed over as well as the great synthesis he arrived at; in the assessment of Bühler ’ s theory of signs, important works from the time before the publication of his much-cited theory of language (Bühler 1934) are neglected in the same way as his publications after 1934 - not to mention Karl Bühler ’ s estate. It would be presumptuous to try to make up for all the omissions in the context of an essay; instead, we shall attempt to draw from the historical-comparative discussion of Bühler ’ s sign concept, to derive clues for the reconstruction of his integral theory of signs. I will first trace the development of Bühler ’ s concept of the sign until 1938; this will be followed by an investigation of Bühler ’ s unpublished works on sign theory, which will focus on the manuscript “ What is a sign? ” and a treatise on the concept of sign; the conclusion will be a comparison of Karl Bühler ’ s and Ludwig Wittgenstein ’ s reflections on the concept of sign, which I will carry out with the intention of a mutual illumination of the two approaches. 2 The development of Bühler ’ s concept of the sign until 1938 In the so-called “ principles chapter ” of his Theory of language, 1 Bühler develops his ideas of the three Bühler ’ s considerations based on the following: the meaning functions of language phenomena, the sign nature of language, and the four-field schema which unites speech act and speech work, speech act and speech formation. As a starting point for his reflections, Bühler chooses Plato ’ s Kratylos, where it is said that language is an organum to communicate something about things to one another (cf. Bühler 1934: 24). In this enumeration, which reveals the social character of language, which Bühler elsewhere says is logically prior to or at least logically equivalent to a subject-related act theory in Husserl ’ s sense (cf. ibid.: 69), no less than three relational foundations can be distinguished. If we now assume that there is usually an acoustically or optically perceptible phenomenon that maintains relations to all three distinguished foundations, we can graphically illustrate this first finding as follows (cf. ibid: 25): However, Bühler by no means intends to explain human language traffic in the style of Ferdinand de Saussure ’ s “ cycle of speech ” , widely known in 1934, in which a psychophysical system A, stimulated by a stimulus source, shows a reaction that in turn becomes the stimulus source of a psychophysical system B. In his view, the shortcomings of this approach can be remedied only by means of a consistently sign-theoretic or, as he puts it, sematological approach. One of the first facts that a sematological approach has to take into account is that human linguistic intercourse can be represented neither as a stimulus-response chain nor as a mere act of representation in the sense of the scholastic formula “ aliquid stat pro aliquo ” since the sender is formative and the receiver segregative. Bühler formulates this state of affairs in his Axiomatik der Sprachwissenschaften as follows: “ With the signs, which carry meaning, it is thus the case that the sense thing, this perceivable something hic et nunc does not have to enter into the semantic function with the whole fullness of 1 Incidentally, reference should be made to two larger collections of essays: The first volume is a discussion following Karl Bühler ’ s Axiomatik der Sprachwissenschaften (Graumann and Herrmann (eds.) 1984), while the second collection of essays attempts to do justice to the complexity of Bühler ’ s approach from very different perspectives (Eschbach (eds.) 1984). A considerable facilitation and intensification of Bühler research should come when the edition of the Gesamtausgabe of Karl Bühler ’ s works, which is being worked on in Essen under my direction, is completed. The complete edition, which will be published by Suhrkamp-Verlag in Frankfurt a. M., will include, in addition to Karl Bühler ’ s previously published works, his extensive unpublished estate, his scholarly correspondence, and a bibliography. The recent increased interest in the work of Karl Bühler is also manifested in the two Bühler symposia which will be held in 1984 alone: In August 1984, a “ Karl Bühler Seminar ” will be held in Kirchberg as part of the Ludwig Wittgenstein Congress, and in November 1984, a Karl Bühler Symposium will be held at the University of Essen to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the printing of Karl Bühler ’ s main work, the Theory of Language. Karl Bühlers Concept of the Sign and its Relationship to Wittgenstein ’ s Late Philosophy (1984) 115 its concrete properties Rather it can be that only this or that abstract moment is relevant for its profession to function as a sign. This is put in simple words, the principle of abstract relevance. ” (Bühler 1933: 31 f.) In view of this fact, Bühler sees himself compelled to recast the formulation of the Platonic Organon model of language referred to at the beginning and to conceive it as a scheme of sign constitution capable of elevating the concrete sound phenomenon to the rank of a sign in three different ways. Bühler laid down this insight in his famous Organon model of language (Bühler 1934: 28), which achieved a high degree of recognition, at least in Germanspeaking countries: Explaining this model, he wrote: The sides of the drawn triangle symbolize these three moments. In one respect, the triangle encloses less than the circle (principle of abstract relevance). In another direction, it reaches beyond the circle to suggest that the sensually Given always an apperceptive complement symbolizes the semantic functions of the (complex) speech sign. It is a symbol by virtue of its association with objects and facts, a symptom (sign, individual) by virtue of its dependence on the sender whose inwardness it expresses, and a signal by virtue of its appeal to the hearer whose external or internal behavior it controls like other traffic signs (ibid.). On the basis of this formulation of Bühler ’ s concept of sign, the following discussion will be conducted against the background of the thesis that Bühler needed the concept of sign in the process of the progressive deepening of the theoretical foundations of linguistics not for its own sake, but because of its medial constituting function of actions (cf. Eschbach 1984). As in many other cases, Bühler was guided in his exploration of the constituting conditions of actions by considerations of his Freiburg teacher Johannes von Kries 2 who had introduced the term “ margin ” 2 in his treatise on the principles of probability theory (von Kries 1886). This term, which recurs in the Theory of language in the inconspicuous - but therefore no less important - a form of the principle of the “ displacement ” of the self in space and time, had already received a coinage in one of Karl Bühler ’ s most successful works, his study Die geistige Entwicklung des Kindes (Bühler 1918), in the concept of “ role exercise ” borrowed from Karl Groos, which not only superficially recalls the conception of George H. Mead, with whom Bühler was to meet on the occasion of “ his Chicago guest professorship eleven years later. 3 Accordingly, it will be necessary to examine in more detail which reflexive and/ or regulative functions signs perform in social actions in which and which individuals maintain various kinds of relationships. 2 Thus it is interesting to note that Wittgenstein ’ s concept of Sprachspiel also seems to go back to von Kries (cf. von Wright 1982: 147) 3 However, very important suggestions for Bühler ’ s theory of action also came from his friends and colleagues of the so-called Würzburg School around Oswald Külpe, which will be discussed elsewhere 116 Karl Bühlers Concept of the Sign and its Relationship to Wittgenstein ’ s Late Philosophy (1984) A key passage that succinctly summarizes this entire complex issue is found in Die Krise der Psychologie (The Crisis of Psychology): We follow a proposition often pronounced out of intimate knowledge of things, but never methodically fructified completely, if we look for the origin of semantics not in the individual, but in the community. Also, the logical realization that Kundgabe and Kundnahme are correlative terms, that to the sign giver belongs a sign receiver, if otherwise semantics is to have a meaning, points us to the same source point of language. We thus make the hypothesis, as simple as it is far-reaching, that semantic facilities are from the outset in the service of an ordered community life, and we add that we do not want to think of them as a luxury facility arising secondarily from an already existing community life, but much more deeply and necessarily connected with it: semantics is not a byproduct but a constitutive factor of any animal or human community life. (Bühler 1927: 38 f.; cf. ibid.: 48). In his Theory of language, Bühler - as already mentioned - describes the social moment of language as logically prior to or at least equal to a subject-related act theory (cf. Bühler 1934: 69), from which he draws the consequence and places the fact of intersubjective sign traffic at the top of the investigation (cf. ibid.: 231). If the sociality of human beings is to be regarded as the source point of semantics, we will have to ask how the concept of community is to be characterized in Bühler ’ s opinion. Bühler ’ s answer, which Ungeheuer dealt with in his essay of 1967, which is enormously important for Bühler ’ s research, is content to emphasize as the only characteristic “ that the meaningful behavior of the community members is subject to mutual control ” (Bühler 1927: 39). Explaining this idea, Bühler emphasizes that a factual concordance of the behavior of the community members is not sufficient to establish a community, but that a hic et nunc demonstrable regulation must be present, to which the assertion is linked that such a regulation would not be possible “ without semantics, i. e. means of understanding ” (ibid.), 4 or expressed differently: In the intercourse of people, linguistic signs function as means of controlling practical behavior; they are signals in the service of community life. (Bühler 1931: 104). This idea, which should be evaluated as the pragmatic basis of all further elaborations of Bühler ’ s sematology, finds a preliminary final formulation in the Theory of language: That the human language [ … ] belongs to the devices or platonically spoken, that it is an organon, means nothing else than to consider it in relation to those who deal with it and are its agents. Thus, in the axiom of the sign nature of language, linguistic research encounters the thought model of homo faber, a maker and user of gears [ … ]. In the meantime, however, the sign-like, which is used in intersubjective intercourse, can be characterized as an orientation device of community life. (Bühler 1934: 48) Against the previous explanations, the objection could possibly be raised that, in addition to the area of sign-mediated actions, there would be a second area, the area of the common perceptual situation, in which the attitude of the community members takes place without words and gestures. Of course, there is nothing against the assumption of an area of the common perceptual situation. 4 Furthermore, it is clear from this quotation that the Organon view of language can be reduced to a causal relation only with a very superficial interpretation. Karl Bühlers Concept of the Sign and its Relationship to Wittgenstein ’ s Late Philosophy (1984) 117 Bühler occasionally even refers to this situation as the basic case from which we must start (cf. e. g. Bühler 1927: 39). However, Bühler (as well as other sign theorists) repeatedly and vigorously rejected the idea that there could be perceptions that impose themselves on the perceiver directly, unmediated and freed from the need of interpretation (cf. e. g. Bühler 1927: 73 ff.). Literally, in The Krise der Psychologie, he states: Furthermore, in the theory of perception, one must never forget that even the simplest qualities, such as “ red ” and “ warm ” do not function for themselves, but as signs of something else. As signs for qualities of perceived things and events. (ibid.: 97) Similar formulations recur scattered throughout Bühler ’ s work, although one of these passages deserves our special attention because it directs interest to the origin of sign production: It turns out that the biological source point of the sign production is to be found everywhere and only there in the higher community life of the animals, where a social situation demands the extension of the horizon of the joint perceptions. If one of the individuals involved in the cooperation has more of situationally important perceptual or memory data, from this fund the communication is contested. (Bühler 1934: 38) In my opinion, it is precisely this passage, i. e., the discussion of the source point of sign production, where Bühler has taken semiotic research a decisive step forward by introducing the “ dislocation ” notion and incorporating the concept of role-taking, and has eliminated a number of dichotomous monstrosities. With reference to Hildegard Hetzer ’ s Viennese dissertation, which is still groundbreaking in many respects today (Hetzer 1926), Bühler summarizes the discussion so far: If we see, for example, how strikingly early the child is able to understand the symbolic actions of others with whom he is in mental contact and to act as if he were another, to take on roles in a community play, and to act correctly in these roles, if we see, on the other hand, that it is language in which symbolism emerges earliest, then both facts point to one and the same thing. It is community life in the service of which symbolism emerges. (Bühler 1927: 211) If we are willing to accept the view that it is community life in the service of which symbolism emerges, we can by no means conclude the investigation, since it is still unclear how we are to imagine the emergence of symbolism. Older dichotomous models of explanation were content at this delicate point with the terse hint that differentiation of I and non-I would be carried out ‘ in order to secure the identity of the self by this way of negation, but they forgot with nice regularity to indicate what could and would make this surprising step possible; instead of tangible explanations, one preferred to descend into metaphysical, biologistic and/ or dialectical highs in this semioticepistemological question of decision. As in numerous other cases, it was Bühler ’ s way of thinking, captivating in its appropriate simplicity, that cut the Gordian knot of primary mediatization. If in Geistige Entwicklung des Kindes he still noted cautiously that the acquisition and formation of sign consciousness must be of great importance for the child (cf. Bühler 1918: 230), in Krise der Psychologie the bold step into new territory has already been taken, throwing off the ballast of dispensable assumptions; there it is said: 118 Karl Bühlers Concept of the Sign and its Relationship to Wittgenstein ’ s Late Philosophy (1984) Our approach contains almost no assumptions about any processes of consciousness, it does not start from the one-system of experiential psychology, but from the indispensable two-ness of signgiver and sign-receiver. Are we now obliged, for the sake of its purity, to derive this two-ness first somehow? From the I a non-I and the Thou, in order to conclude with the assertion that everywhere where this semantic two-ness exists, the differentiation of consciousness must already have progressed to the I and Thou? (Bühler 1927: 42 f.) That the question posed is only a position taken for rhetorical reasons is evident from the question raised elsewhere as to how one should ever arrive at a Thou by derivation if one wanted to be content with the I and a strictly solipsistic coordinate system at the beginning (cf. ibid.: 100). Against this background it becomes understandable why Bühler emphasizes not the disjunction but the correlation of I and Thou and is guided by the assumption that the I and the Thou are categories that can be found in reality thinking like other categories, so that they are to be regarded as constitutive moments and not as products of thinking (cf. ibid.: 99): 5 I am inclined to think that in the very primitive ‘ Zumute-sein ’ , which one might ascribe to the newborn, all that we later see emerging from it, the divorce of I and Thou and the divorce of I and object, the intentional moment in contrast to the self centeredness of the experiences, might somehow already be laid out. (ibid.: 101) Even then, if the view Bühler advocates seem spontaneously more sympathetic or plausible than the dichotomous explanatory strategies, we will not be able to avoid going deeper into the “ somehow ” , whereby Bühler himself again gives us the decisive clues with his interpretation of Max Scheler ’ s thesis of the perceptibility of the foreign experience in mental contact: If one is in contact with a situation partner, one understands his behavior as if he were not another at all, but oneself: One puts oneself fictitiously in the position of the other in order to understand him. The image had to be even more intimate for many cases. [ … 1 Conversely [ … ] the activity and leadership of the other determines our own experience, our primarily I-like experiences, in such a way that we are able to read from them how the partner is feeling. (ibid.: 84) Summarizing the discussion so far, we can state that Bühler ’ s two-entity thesis boils down to the fact that we understand to interpret the perception of the other as a sign because and only because we are able to take over the role of the other, so that the “ foreign ” perception becomes an “ own ” perception, i. e. by transforming what is foreign to us into what is familiar to us on the basis of assumed uniformity. If we already attest to the newborn ’ s ability to interpret itself as well as its environment on the basis of the meaningfulness of the ‘ perceptions by applying the principle of role-taking, we must not forget about this that despite far-reaching similarities between the sign function of sense data and the symbol function of linguistic signs there are also considerable differences, which Bühler tries to do justice to with the help of his principle of dislocation. “ Dislocations ” is described by Bühler in his Theory of language as an immensely subtle game, hardly noticed by us adults, whenever we demonstrate linguistically at the phantasm (cf. Bühler 1934: 138). 5 The accuracy of Bühler ’ s assumptions is demonstrated by recent studies in developmental psychology, which, after a long period of inactivity, pick up where the fruitful work of the 1920s and early 1930s left off. Karl Bühlers Concept of the Sign and its Relationship to Wittgenstein ’ s Late Philosophy (1984) 119 The wording, which might seem like an occasional game, takes on a general character a short time later when it says: Man is only able to present what is absent to another in a phantasm by linguistic means because there are displacements (ibid.: 139), which Bühler parable-like distinguishes into two cases “ that Muhammad goes to the mountain or the mountain comes to Muhammad ” (ibid.: 134), conceivably taking into account as a third case the transitional situation in which both protagonists maintain their position. Displacements, which Bühler also calls unbinding means of linguistic utterances (cf. ibid.: 374), not only allow for temporal leaps but equally allow for local, personal, or modal changes of the scope. This principle of dislocation by means of linguistic signs allows the speaker, on the one hand, to forget from where he has been dislocated (cf. ibid.: 375), as, on the other hand, he uses the positional indicator words here, there 1, there 2, and the directional indications front, back, right, left just as much at the phantasm as in the primary perceptual situation (ibid.: 137). However, it would be a mistake to assume that dislocations can only be found in the range of the examples given here: The primary function of the examples is to prove that even phantasmic pointing does not lack natural pointing aids; 6 secondarily, however, it should become clear that the linguistic unbinding device of dislocation establishes and follows rules of its own kind: When the need arises to free the representational content of a linguistic utterance from its entanglements in the current pointing field, this need can only be satisfied by a transposition, i. e. a field change from the pointing field to the symbol field. However, what the speaker gains in freedom from the constraints of the current field of pointing in the transfer, he simultaneously loses again through the new order to which the symbols are subject that receive their field values in the symbol field, insofar as they come under the codetermining influence of the systematic environment (cf. ibid.: 372). Against this background, it becomes understandable why Bühler occasionally refers to the symbols as role indications (cf. ibid.: 381), which are capable of ensuring a dislocation from the events of the conversational situation, but which, on the other hand, cannot do without deictic markings in order to represent the role play linguistically. 7 If it already became apparent in the discussion of symbolically mediated dislocations that even on the level of linguistic signs by no means inconsiderable remnants of developmentally earlier types of signs have an effect, this dynamic aspect of Bühler ’ s theorizing becomes even more essential in the context of his investigations of the role of play for the 6 Thus, towards the end of the language theory, it is consequently stated: “ Strictly speaking, therefore, no Indo- European sentence with a finite verb is completely free of pointing, but always has a pointing sign in the form of the personal suffix to the verb ” . (Bühler 1934: 381) 7 Without pursuing the idea any further at this point, it should merely be pointed out that this concerns what Bühler calls the “ basic fact ” of the principal vagueness of linguistic signs, which he also characterizes as the “ fact of the principle openness ” and need for supplementation of every linguistic representation (cf. Bühler 1934: 255). Literally: “ We have here again the basic fact before us that natural language everywhere only indicates what and how it is to be done, and leaves open margins for contextual indications and material aids ” (ibid.: 320). Analogous statements can also be found in many places in Wittgenstein ’ s work. 120 Karl Bühlers Concept of the Sign and its Relationship to Wittgenstein ’ s Late Philosophy (1984) child ’ s mental development more clearly. 8 With repeated reference to the important works of Karl Groos Die Spiele der Menschen (Groos 1899) and Die Spiele der Thiere (Groos 1896), Bühler emphasizes, how, for example, in the human child, starting with the simplest bodily movements (kicking, grasping, babbling), step by step all bodily and mental functions up to the imagination, thinking and willing come into the sphere of action of the practicing play and how the child thus acquires, without having any idea of the deeper biological meaning of the matter, the basic capital of bodily and mental skills necessary for life. (Bühler 1918: 458) These still quite general characterizations of the playful grasp of the environment, which largely coincide with Piaget ’ s views (cf. Piaget 1969: 21 - 52), will certainly be agreed with; nevertheless, two restrictions or clarifications are still necessary in order to be able to isolate Bühler ’ s concept of play in the required sharpness. Games could generally be defined from the perspective of their pleasure-occupied character. However, while an activity that is guided by the desire for satisfaction finds its conclusion in the achievement of the object of desire - has a braking effect, as Bühler says - and, at least for the time being, does not entail any further consequences, and while activities out of the desire for activity would be a pure waste for pure instinct animals (cf. ibid.: 459), games that are characterized by the desire for function act as an incentive to ever new activity (cf. ibid.). Secondarily, it seems necessary to, imitation games in direct connection with sensory impressions are to be distinguished from role-playing games (cf. Piaget 1969: 119 ff.), in which it can already be observed with smaller children that they themselves play a role and/ or attribute a role to the animate and inanimate objects of their environment, into which they themselves can also slip (cf. Bühler 1918: 330 ff.). On the basis of these differentiations, Bühler arrives at his formulation of the concept of play, which reads: We want to call an activity that is endowed with functional desire and is maintained by this functional desire directly or for its sake play, no matter what else it may accomplish and in what context it may be built in. (ibid.: 461) If we include this formulation in the previously obtained characterization of symbolic signs as role signs, only a few steps are needed to do justice to Bühler ’ s theory of speech acts as well as to Wittgenstein ’ s conception of language play. Already in the axiom of sociality, which essentially determined the human use of signs as a communal action, Bühler had drawn attention to the area in the interest of which signs first obtain their function. In the Krise der Psychologie, Bühler sharpens this determination when he emphasizes that no one is able to define the concept of the sense of language par excellence: The ‘ sense in itself ’ , apart from a linguistic community for which it is valid, would be no less an incomprehensible concept than, for instance, ‘ money in itself, apart from an economic sphere in which it has a course. (Bühler 1927: 126) If, however, the sense of language cannot be defined in isolation, but always already refers to community life and marks the realm of rational activities in the context of the other 8 With the restriction to Bühler ’ s investigations of the function of play in the child ’ s mental development is, of course, not intended to give the impression that this problem area has been neglected by others; the opposite is true, which is why a comparative discussion of different views of the function of play will be reserved for another study. Karl Bühlers Concept of the Sign and its Relationship to Wittgenstein ’ s Late Philosophy (1984) 121 meaningful ways of human action (cf. Bühler 1931: 96), it should be clear that a theory of signs must be developed as a theory of actions, since, on the one hand, every animal and human action is controlled by signs, and, on the other hand, signs were functionless when detached from their action-constituting and action-mediating role. Bühler specifically points out that the concept of action, which he regards as the key concept in modern theorizing (cf. Bühler 1933: 149), in the full scope of the Aristotelian concept of praxis (cf. Bühler 1934: 52). One of the most important passages for the methodological approach, which at the same time also builds a bridge between Bühler ’ s earliest works and his last monograph Das Gestaltprinzip im Leben des Menschen und der Tiere (Bühler 1960), is found in his theory of expression: Whoever not only says ‘ action ’ but also thinks it, means certain units of events. The α and the ώ of an action theory of expression are questions and answers about the wholeness character of the action. The observer must become clear about and account for how and why he is able to grasp this and that as wholeness out of the flow of visible events; that is the (methodological) a. And last but not least, answers are demanded to the question about the real reason of the unity of an event, which we call to action; that is the (factual) w. And in between, there are all sorts of other things to consider. (Bühler 1933: 197) Actions, which Bühler had already determined in his axiomatics of linguistics from a historical perspective, fundamentally take place in a field of action whose sources of determination are need and opportunity (cf. Bühler 1934: 56). Beyond the breakdown of the field of action into its present determinants, sufficient historical knowledge of the agent himself is required to understand the duplicity of the field of action and the fact of the basis of reaction or action that can only be grasped historically (cf. ibid.). Accordingly, the analysis of action would have to amount to an investigation of the “ infield ” and the “ environment ” of the action in order to arrive at an understanding of the concrete history of the act against this background. The Gestalt principle, which Bühler describes “ as a mediator between sensory perception and conceptual cognition ” (Bühler 1960: 88), on the one hand, ensures the holistic character of actions, just as, on the other hand, in its mediating function, it represents the source point of judgments that constitute the sign nature of actions and enable the agent to establish relations and interpret perceptions as signs. Bühler presents the genesis of judgments in such a way that the earliest demonstrable memories are to be regarded as additions to given perceptual situations, so that the sense of a new situation is understood according to the analogy of the insightfully grasped sense of other situations (Bühler 1918: 406). Bühler regards this principle of analogy, which is based on the fact that certain procedures are applied to what recurs in individual cases when the material changes, as the root of the earliest derivations of judgment. It is interesting in this context that Ferdinand de Saussure and Charles S. Peirce, in their investigations of the constitution of sign and meaning, also came to the conclusion that the sign-constituting judgment of perception, of which we are speaking here, is based on the inference from similar to similar, which is based on the assumption of the uniformity of life (cf. Eschbach 1980: 54 f.). Without doubt, beyond the establishment of a relation of similarity, it must also be clarified what distinguishes the new perception from the hitherto known, in order to be able to draw an extension conclusion on the basis of the relation “ Simile ” - “ Simile ” , which includes hitherto foreign things into the treasure of experience; this extension judgment on 122 Karl Bühlers Concept of the Sign and its Relationship to Wittgenstein ’ s Late Philosophy (1984) the basis of the relation “ Simile ” - “ Dissimile ” is, however, only conceivable if the perceptions have already been interpreted as signs. Now it could seem as if there is a stage in the mental development of the child in which sense data are received and stored unprocessed, so to speak, in order to be processed into signs only at a later time. This impression is fundamentally wrong since in Bühler ’ s opinion there can be no talk of perception until the sense data are grasped in their function as signs for this and that which is to be said about things. If we recall that Bühler had essentially determined the concept of play by the functional desire that is responsible for maintaining the activity, we find an analogous situation in the realm of primary judgments, because the sign function of sense data, “ the content of the perceptual judgment and the state of affairs that we think we grasp in perception, always transcends the realm of sensory data ” (Bühler 1927: 78). If the relations “ Simile ” - “ Simile ” and, “ Simile ” - “ Dissimile ” are regarded as the basis of every perceptual judgment, we may also regard this process as the perception of relations or as relational cognition, as Bühler explicitly points out with reference to Klages (cf. Bühler 1933: 166). Of course, Bühler does not conceive of the perception of relations as if the relations simply migrated with the sensations into the experience. Already in 1918, he had instead emphasized the first main theorem in the doctrine of comparison, according to which there can be no relation perception without the function of display (cf. Bühler 1918: 188). But if there is no other way of relation perception than the one that leads via signs, and if there is no more direct perception of relations than the one that leads via perceptual judgments, then the universal principle inherent in all human purpose acts as a moving force. Accordingly, it would be appropriate to regard Bühler ’ s theory of signs as a theory of relational cognition, or, with emphasis on the interpretation of sense data functioning as signs, as an interpretive theory of signs, as he himself proposes: What I call ‘ interpretation ’ , the drawing out of and basing of a relation judgment on signs, contains the ‘ application of a concept ’ and the ‘ referring gaze ’ of which older relation theorists speak. In comparing simple sense data, the “ dimension ” of the difference will emerge more or less clearly (ibid.: 196). If we compare the results of our discussion so far with the old familiar formulation of the Organon model of language (Bühler 1934: 28), it will be clear without further comment that this memorable formulation, while not contradicting our results at any point, does not specifically address many of the aspects recognized as important, so that the impression might arise that they are not of primary importance. This impression is wrong, however, insofar as in Bühler ’ s opinion the concept of sign can neither stand at the beginning of the argumentation nor be introduced by definition, but represents the final abstraction which emerges as a dynamic principle at the end of the investigation. 3 The Concept of the Sign in the Unpublished Works of Karl Bühler As announced at the beginning of this essay, in this section we will be concerned with the two texts “ The Concept of Sign ” and “ What is a sign? ” . The first source we have consulted is an undated manuscript of 57 pages, which was obviously intended as a chapter of a book Karl Bühlers Concept of the Sign and its Relationship to Wittgenstein ’ s Late Philosophy (1984) 123 publication, possibly of the planned abridged version of the theory of language; this partly typewritten and partly handwritten text bears the heading: “ Der Zeichenbegriff ” . An approximate dating of this text to the year 1929 results from some references in this treatise. This dating gains plausibility from the fact that Bühler had already presented his theory of language during his visiting professorship at Harvard in 1927/ 28, and at this Harvard lecture he did not use the entire 418-page text, but an abridged version, as can be seen from the “ class notes ” available to me. The second text, which I have in slightly different handwritten and typewritten versions, is entitled “ What is a sign? ” and comprises 47 pages in English. A note in the typewritten version indicates that this text was to be published in the Pocket Book on Practical Semantics that Bühler was working on in 1942. The texts under discussion, which do not overlap at any point, are previously unpublished and are published for the first time in Karl Bühler ’ s Gesamtausgabe. Instead of referencing the two texts in their argumentation as a whole, I will content myself in the present context with treating those aspects which have not yet been addressed in this form in the published version of Bühler ’ s Sematology, so that they can be regarded as preliminary studies or further developments, respectively. At the same time, in the absence of a currently generally accessible text, I will quote the treated passages very extensively. Somewhere at the beginning of its enterprise, sematology will have to strive for the purely logical matter of an analysis of the concept of sign, because otherwise, it runs the risk of getting into a thicket of misunderstandings and pseudo-problems (cf. Bühler 1929: 1). Although there is no disagreement on the necessity of this first step, opinions differ on the “ how ” of the beginning, as some are concerned about want to speculate about the source point and the circumstances of the first sign traffic, while others want to put a technical definition of the sign concept at the beginning of the science of signs. Bühler ’ s view on this question differs fundamentally from the positions mentioned above since he considers such speculations to be nonsensical. Even though he himself did not use the term, it seems to me that his view is best characterized by the maxim of the nonsubstantiability of signs, which, on closer examination, enables the sign theorist to make statements about signs in the first place: We have determined the sphere in which our thinking moves and looks around by free choice and will also resist any temptation to reach beyond it. Once again: The empirical linguist finds himself and what he wants to investigate together in the world; when he opens his eyes and ears, he encounters sensually perceptible things, which claim to be considered according to their sign nature and to be scientifically determined, because they are put into the world as signs by the producers and are received as signs by the ( “ consumers ” one is tempted to write) recipients. What lies decided in this claim is the simple and only question we ask. The emphasized because once again indicates the freely chosen limits and framework of the whole enterprise. Dealing with signs is presupposed as a fact; the practice of sign-making and sign-taking steins us before we begin to reflect as theorists. And when we do, the whole effort is directed to determine logically exactly the plain sense of this dealing with signs. One should correctly assess the scope of such a task from the very beginning. The meaningful completion, the fitting and satisfying answer, which we seek, cannot and must not begin like the Gospel of John with any of the “ In the beginning was …” conceivable in our field. If we only knew what was in the beginning! Maybe the Logos, maybe Fichte is right and with him Cassirer and it was the creative function (energy) of the punctuation and Goethe ’ s Faust should write to German “ In the beginning was the deed ” . But even if we would 124 Karl Bühlers Concept of the Sign and its Relationship to Wittgenstein ’ s Late Philosophy (1984) know this or are ready to believe this with whole fervor, so this answer does not get into our context. This context says: Sign-like was found and taken up in the world. Whoever begins to reflect as a logician on what this means, must not answer as an epistemologist. If he had the luck to gain an insight into what and how it was ‘ in the beginning ’ , he must put this insight aside for the time being, simply because his revelation would have to remain misunderstood in the given context. And this is true not only for every positive revelation, but also for every negative revelation, e. g. for the one which wanted to proclaim the “ being a sign ” as a lie and deception from the beginning. This also exists; in the course of the nominalism awakening in the Middle Ages there were such first radical iconoclasts and they have reappeared on the scene today. For the time being, we have nothing in common with all the revelators but the one request, that before the veil is finally pulled away, one should allow the naive eye to determine in peace what it thinks to see before any unveiling. One must not, one should not, deny in any field the undemanding priority of pure, i. e. epistemologically and ontologically neutral or ignorant, phenomenology. (Bühler 1929: 1 ff.) I have quoted this long quotation unabridged because it seems to me to express the starting point of Bühler ’ s sematological reflection like hardly any other and because the considerations laid down in this passage are in my opinion highly suitable to give fresh impulses to the modern semiotic discussion and to immunize it against the hollow assumptions of the biological resp. evolutionary epistemologists. One of the most difficult semiotic questions is without doubt the clarification of the relationship between sign and meaning. As old as this question is, as numerous are the proposed solutions that have been worked out in the course of the history of semiotics. Despite the far-reaching differences between these answers, three recurring patterns can be distinguished, insofar as, first, the question of the relation between sign and meaning is answered in terms of the presentational model so that the sign appears as a representative of (abstract) meanings, as suggested by the scholastic mnemonic “ aliquid stat pro aliquo ” or John Locke ’ s formula “ words are signs of ideas ” ; according to the second explanatory strategy, the distance between sign and meaning is completely abolished, so that the relation between the two instances appears as a relation of identity; the third proposed solution is even more radical, since it rejects the question of meaning as meaningless, but can accomplish this only at the price of the complete emptying of meaning from the sign, which is left with no other task than the material carrier function. Right at the beginning of his treatise “ What is a sign? ” Bühler states unequivocally that he considers all three of the proposed solutions to be false and misleading, since none of these positions is capable of explaining the factual role of signs in processes of understanding and webs of interaction, because they come up with technical reductions, instead of taking the social function of signs as their point of departure, and because they can be accused of a “ lack of substance ” because they do not distinguish with sufficient precision the perceptible in signs from the “ soul of signs ” , as Peirce and Husserl called it. Of course, Bühler does not want to prevent anyone from considering perceptible events as signs, as it happens every day in astronomy or meteorology, for instance. However, if we are concerned with the logic of signs and not with the order of things, it must be clear once and for all that “ sematology is not interested in material data ” (Bühler 1942: 13). If we account for objects of what kind we have before us, if we speak of something else on which abstraction is accomplished, we must answer that we are dealing with abstracts, with “ conceptual somethings ” (Bühler 1929: 4), Karl Bühlers Concept of the Sign and its Relationship to Wittgenstein ’ s Late Philosophy (1984) 125 which do not occur for themselves, but only entered the concretis (cf. ibid.). If this is the case, however, we need not worry about their fate of being, if they are thought detached. This energetic assertion, which must embarrass all “ material thinkers ” (Stoffdenkern) who confuse columns, design objects, or weathercocks with signs, was not only put forward by Bühler as a thesis delimiting the territory but at the same time with the interest of being able to venture a fruitful new beginning in the determination of the relationship between sign and meaning, which he projects as follows: Now the so-called problem of meaning in the realm of words is up for discussion and I recommend certain indispensable distinctions to get out of the phase of the stew. Think first of the Organon model of the language! And close beside it to the hammer and the hammering. From the organon model of language it can be deduced that a word (every word) occurring in speech traffic can bring along three valences and in fact also brings along, valences of which soon the first, soon the second, soon the third can be worked out and stand in the foreground. And to what do the expressive and appellative valences adhere on the one hand, and to what does the nominal valence adhere on the other? Every speech situation is complex and unique. The valences of the word used are colored by the situation and sometimes the color is the most important thing. (Bühler 1929: 28) So instead of mixing “ sign ” and “ meaning ” into a contourless mishmash or rejecting the question of meaning as meaningless, Bühler opens his article “ What is a sign? ” with the terse remark: First and foremost, we expect a sign to have meaning. A sign without meaning is like a numb nut. It is like a chaff without wheat. Sign and meaning are correlative terms like parent and child. Just as there are no parents who have not begotten or given birth to children, nothing that has no meaning is a sign. (Bühler 1942: 1) This almost Münchhausian turn of clarifying the relationship between sign and meaning would leave the semiotician at a loss if there were no indications of how this correlation should be analyzed. In three interdependent considerations, Bühler develops the analytical framework of a general theory of signs which, in his view, is still in its infancy (cf. Bühler 1942). 9 If the world is not populated by material entities aka signs, which would merely have to be identified as such, a radical change of perspective is required, because then at the beginning of all sign-theoretical research must be the question of the constitution of signs and meaning. To answer this question, Bühler examines the function of signs in social intercourse, coming to the conclusion that the signs are there for us and not we for the signs (cf. ibid.). This banal-sounding remark, however, entails far-reaching consequences, for if signs do not exist without the sign-constituting, social individual, and if the function of the sign results from its mediating activity, then it follows with necessity “ that a sign is what we make of it ” (ibid.). However, because, in Bühler ’ s view, there are nowhere clearly distinguished classes of or types of signs exist, since one and the same perceptible thing can be used as a symptom or signal or symbol or in all three respects at the same time, Bühler proposes “ a kind of factor analysis ” (ibid.) to find out what a sign is. To illustrate this 9 In the essay on the concept of the sign, Bühler writes: , “ Let me first say a general word freely. When I began to do linguistic theory, the concept of meaning in concrete linguistics was in a desolate state from a purely logical point of view, and even today it has not yet become day everywhere. ” (Bühler 1929: 27) 126 Karl Bühlers Concept of the Sign and its Relationship to Wittgenstein ’ s Late Philosophy (1984) proposal, Bühler refers, as he did in his theory of language (Bühler 1934: 68), to a passage from Plato ’ s dialogue Kratylos, where it states: “ One must go to the weaver to explore the principles of weaving, and to the carpenter who made the heddle to explore the ‘ principles ’ of the organon ‘ heddle ’” (ibid.). If the meaning of the weaver ’ s means is to be clarified from their use, why should the organon “ sign ” be any different? To whom, however, should we turn to obtain expert information about the organon “ sign ” ? Bühler ’ s answer is: We will be careful to examine and destroy a certain modern half-truth about symbolic actions. It does not take an actor on stage or screen to produce symbolic actions. We produce countless kinds of symbolic acts even in our ‘ real ’ lives. Of course, there is a difference between the fictional world of theater and our so-called real life. There can be no doubt about the fact that stage and screen and statues and pictures are nothing but a make-believe world, a fictional world, that much is true anyway. Fighting fists on stage do not hurt and gunshots do not kill. However, there is a difference between ‘ being fictitious ’ and ‘ being symbolic ’ , which we want to clarify completely, because otherwise, one would not understand a number of important facts. No, pictures are pictures and symbols are signs, whether in a fictional or in the real world. (Bühler 1942: 34) But if it is true that no expert is needed to answer the question about the factorial nature of the organon “ sign ” , since we all have daily, expert dealings with signs, it is only consistent when Bühler considers as the guiding maxim of the constitution of sign and meaning the use we make of our signs: Let us imagine that in a legal text the word ‘ clock ’ was used, and lawyers came to the conclusion that this term ‘ clock ’ needed a definition. The legislator did not give one anywhere, because it is a common word and everybody knows what it means. Now, in a public competition, everyone should be given an opportunity to say what he understands it to mean. I assume that thousands of definitions will be received. Only a portion of them will be shortlisted for the thousand dollar prize. If I had a say, the prize would be awarded to one of those who immediately puts his finger on the use we make of watches. They ‘ show ’ the time or ‘ keep ’ the time, they help us keep time; such was the use described. [ … ] This should be the fixed point of a definition. (Bühler 1942: 10) Even if the constitution of sign and meaning has in this way been given a pragmatic basis from which sign analysis can proceed in an action-oriented way, the previous maxims are not yet sufficient to arrive at a comprehensive sign analysis, for the analysis cannot be limited to eliciting the respective use in a multitude of singular cases. The next step, which in Bühler ’ s opinion must follow with necessity, consists in abstracting from the perceptible data hic et nunc to the meaning. First, wherever we speak of representation, an order (ordo rerum) can be stated in which the two constituents, the representative and the represented, occupy the same place. They are to be said to be identical in place within the framework of this order. And there is, secondly, to each mode of representation a mode of perceptible happening, a mode of processes in which hic et nunc the concrete act of representation takes place. (Bühler 1929: 6) But in order to be able to conclude from a perception to its meaning, at least two things must be guaranteed: 1) In order to be able to conclude from something to something else, we must have observed the first as a fact that is in some respect surprising, different, unfamiliar, striking, strange, and that captures our attention (cf. Bühler 1942: 13 ff.). 2) Since we cannot do anything with what is strange and unfamiliar to us as long as we have not at least Karl Bühlers Concept of the Sign and its Relationship to Wittgenstein ’ s Late Philosophy (1984) 127 partially familiarized ourselves with it, we have to look for a procedure that opens the way to the strange. Bühler explains his ideas of this way vividly by means of the procedure of a legal circumstantial evidence, discussing in great detail the two historical criminal cases “ Bayly ” and “ Landru ” : In the trial, the prosecutor ties together the evidence gathered into a narrative of what occurred. Our question is in what way the meaning of the signs supports the accusation. In conjunction, these ‘ mute and stubborn witnesses ’ will either corroborate or weaken or otherwise alter the overall evidence. (Bühler 1942: 19) From the legal examples used by Bühler, one can learn for sign analysis that it is neither about the individual sign in a specific use nor about the mere sum of the individual sign findings: General sign theory is interested in learning how the set of singular references is organized into a corpus of evidence. (Bühler 1942: 19) We can thus say that Bühler ’ s pragmatic semiotics leads to a system or context theory of signs that ties in with his early gestalt theoretical work. Against the background of these considerations, Karl Bühler can then devote himself to the problem, important in sign theory, of clarifying the principles of representation in general and (symbolic) representation in particular. Large parts of the treatise on the concept of the sign are reserved for the discussion of this complex, whereby Bühler ’ s argumentation repeatedly refers critically to Singer ’ s book Das Geld als Zeichen (Singer 1920). Whenever there is talk about any form of substitution, the meaning analysis of this talk will come across some kind of order or rule within the framework of which the act of substitution takes place. A vivid example of this state of affairs would be, for instance, our decadal arithmetic system, in which the Arabic numerals, lined up next to each other, are given a certain status. Bühler expresses the conjecture that to every such order belongs a specific mode or modes of substitution (cf. Bühler 1929: 9). As evidence for this thesis, he cites legal representation in court, which is fundamentally different from “ show representation ” on stage, and both of which are to be differentiated from a third mode of representation about which Bühler writes: In dishes, sometimes saccharin is used ‘ instead ’ of, as a ‘ surrogate ’ for sugar. [ … ] It is in the taste order of things that saccharin is able to substitute for sugar. Because both taste sweet, saccharin can be used as a substitute for sugar. (ibid.: 13) The list of such forms of representation could be extended considerably; nevertheless, it is not even remotely conceivable to put the functions of a symbolic representation, i. e. a linguistic sign, on the same level with those of a surrogate or those of an actor or lawyer in all important respects. Accordingly, it would have to be justified what the similarities and the differences of the surrogates and the surrogates on the one hand and of the symbolic representation, on the other hand, consist of. To this end, Bühler pursues the question of where and why the money appears. If this question is to be answered in the style of an organon view, then the performance of money must be recognized, for which one must analyze the economic-social situation and the economic-social happening, the exchange (cf. ibid.: 1.2). What is the theory of language the output of the asemantic mutual control of 128 Karl Bühlers Concept of the Sign and its Relationship to Wittgenstein ’ s Late Philosophy (1984) partners of a social event is and achieves, 10 that is and achieves in the theory of money the output of the moneyless economy. One can mark out in both areas first of all a range of situations in which there the language and here the money is superfluous and therefore does not occur. Occurs - the word taken in the sense of its timeless present meaning. For it is not, or at least not primarily, about the hypothetical construction of a pre-linguistic and pre-money historical phase in the developmental course of mankind, but about situations that one still finds today and can study in concrete cases. (ibid. 23) If in the Theory of language, the theorem of the transcendence of the mutual perceptual situation by means of dislocation holds, then, by analogy, in the theory of money it must be the transcendence of the immediate mutual property exchange situation, i. e., of direct exchange. Although it might seem that the comparison of language and money amounts to an exact parallel, Bühler takes pains to demonstrate that a proposition of the sign nature of money analogous to the proposition of the sign nature of language would be false, since money functions as a proxy, but not as a sign in the same way as a language but makes the claim that its proxy is recognized as a special mode of being a proxy and is distinguished from the mode of being a sign in the language (cf. ibid.: 15). Accordingly, the proxy function of money must not be understood in such a way that the appropriately implied sign functions occurring in it are regarded in the same way as in language as that for whose sake money is there: For the purpose of examination, take a banknote in your hand, any piece of that sort or type of money which one is accustomed to call materially worthless or sign money, and ask yourself the question whether there is anything to be found on it or on it which betrays a form of being a sign not to be found elsewhere. [ … ] Everything that can be discovered in or on the banknote in terms of sign moments, a very rich and diverse, ingeniously conceived apparatus of signs, is completely borrowed from other sign areas and only artfully assembled for the special needs on the piece of paper here or already entered into it in the paper mill. The number or the numeral word is repeatedly written on it in the word picture. And some other linguistic signs, by which the type of the note is designated and the act of conferring value on it is documented and (possibly) its representative function is defined. “ The Reichsbank pays … in gold …” , it used to say. All this, I repeat, in a snarling national language. And what else is to be found are either easily recognizable diacritics to distinguish it from other notes and pieces of paper, or else it belongs to the epitome of features which one provides in heaps for the practically so important authenticity test and the individual identification of the piece of paper. (ibid.: 18 f.) If we continue this chain of thought and include cash substitutes such as checks, money orders, bills of exchange, credit cards, and the like in the discussion in their dominant role today, a developmental step becomes clear that must be accepted in all its consequences and thought through to the end two insights Bühler considers to be particularly important for divorce in this developmental step of “ representation ” and “ representation ” : 1) in the field of linguistic signs, i. e. symbolic representation, this step is far behind us; 2) it is the step from magical thinking to the literal conception of the pure sign function of language. The theory of signs has made this step with the establishment of the real concept “ science ” and the reflection of the means of development and formation of logic (cf. ibid.: 37). 10 Bühler does not claim that the meaningful behavior of community members can be explained exclusively by means of mutual control. However, he is of the opinion that mutual attitude and understanding result with necessity from the constitutive function of signs (cf. Bühler 1927: 42). Karl Bühlers Concept of the Sign and its Relationship to Wittgenstein ’ s Late Philosophy (1984) 129 In summary, Bühler once again highlights the key points of his argumentation: The philosophically boldest construction, which was ever carried out with the idea of representation, is present in the Leibnizian monad doctrine. It is known that in it several historical movements, and currents converge, and several schemes of thought are put into one by a great synoptist. We highlight two of them and ask the question of whether it is possible to put them into one in the sphere in which we move. Whoever wanted to grasp the problem in the Kantian or Schopenhauerian terminology would find himself with one step in the middle of the post- Leibnizian discussion of the causal principle. I propose a somewhat different version, which seems to me equally justified after the historical antagonisms of Leibniz ’ s synthesis. In a nutshell. Wherever there is a pars pro toto or a pars pro parte, is it to be said generally and uniformly that it can only be a matter of representation, or does the empiricist have the right and the duty to describe the connexio rerum he finds differently in the first instance? (ibid. 44) Based on what we have heard so far, it should be obvious what the answer should be. 4 Bühler and Wittgenstein Concerning direct and/ or indirect relations between Karl Bühler and Ludwig Wittgenstein, there have been repeated speculations in recent years, all of which resemble each other in one point: Since, due to the restrictive and secretive editing policy of the administrators of the Wittgenstein estate, concrete evidence, for instance in the form of explicit quotations, epistolary contacts, etc. - if they exist at all - has not been made available to scholarly discussion so far, these attempts rely on more or less dubious circumstantial evidence, which, taken as a whole, however, seems to suggest that the relationship between Baeder and Wittgenstein did in fact exist. For example, Bartley (1974) argues that the so-called Austrian school reform brought Bühler and Wittgenstein into contact with each other, while Toulmin (1969) sees psycholinguistics as the link between the two authors, and Kaplan (1984), commenting on Toulmin ’ s work, suggests the possibility that Wittgenstein might have been familiar with the research results of the Würzburg School, which was significantly influenced by Bühler, as both researchers had had a neo-Kantian background, which, however, is doubted by other scholars (cf. e. g. Haller 1981). Such speculations could easily be extended and taken to extremes, for example, Wittgenstein ’ s nephew Thomas Stonborough received his doctorate from Bühler in 1928, when Wittgenstein was busy building a house for his sister Margarete Stonborough at Kundmanngasse 19 in Vienna, which also housed the Pedagogical Institute of the City of Vienna, where Bühler had his psychological laboratory and also held lectures and seminars. It has also been pointed out on various occasions that Bühler ’ s gestalt theoretical orientation may have influenced Wittgenstein (cf. Gier 1981: 99 and 111). Others have considered it worth mentioning that Karl and Charlotte Bühler were present at the home of Margarete Stonborough, the mother of Thomas Stonborough when Moritz Schlick and Ludwig Wittgenstein first met in person; on the other hand, it is rumored that Wittgenstein considered Bühler a charlatan (cf. Engelmann 1970: 960; 11 which is in strange contradiction to the view that Bühler was the single thinker who could have caused Wittgenstein to turn 11 As an aside, it should be noted that those who report Wittgenstein ’ s supposed assessment have to admit, when asked, that they do not know who Karl Bühler was and that they have not read his works. 130 Karl Bühlers Concept of the Sign and its Relationship to Wittgenstein ’ s Late Philosophy (1984) away from the ideas of the Tractatus (cf. Billing 1980: 27), although Wittgenstein himself explicitly points out the influence of two other persons. Instead of encouraging such or similar speculations, in the interest of clarifying this important question, I will not conduct the following discussion from the perspective of which books Wittgenstein may have read and with whom he may have met on some occasion; Instead, on the basis of authentic texts by Wittgenstein, I will try to prove the thesis that the central motifs of Wittgenstein ’ s late philosophy were laid down long before the publication of the Philosophical Investigations, that Wittgenstein had set down these insights in writing at the latest in 1931 during his summer vacation in Austria, and that, thirdly, these insights can be read down to the letter in Bühler. In other words, the intention of the following discussion can by no means be to cast doubt on the genius of Wittgenstein ’ s approach to late philosophy, but solely to shed light on the congeniality of two thinkers who at the same time in the cultural milieu of the same city arrived at converging linguisticphilosophical-sematological conceptions. Ludwig Wittgenstein ’ s Tractatus logico-philosophus was completed in the manuscript at a time when Karl Bühler was engaged in his famous experiments in thought and working on the first volume of his Gestaltwahrnehmungen. Although Bühler already gave logic lectures during his professorship in Dresden, hardly anything speaks that he got to know Wittgenstein ’ s Tractatus before he followed the call to the University of Vienna. Even if the Tractatus and Bühler ’ s early writings have, at most, certain common source points, the findings change - if one disregards the different addressees and the differences in the types of texts - if one includes Bühler ’ s work Die geistige Entwicklung des Kindes (The Intellectual Development of the Child), which was first published in 1918, since this treatise not only anticipates central motifs of the Theory of language published in 1934 but also corresponds to the basic assumptions of Wittgenstein ’ s late philosophy, which, by the way, Kaplan already pointed out some time ago (cf. Kaplan 1984). In order to substantiate this strong claim, in this chapter I will take up some of Wittgenstein ’ s thoughts and compare them with those considerations which have been identified in the two previous chapters as integral parts of Bühler ’ s approach. In 1931 at the latest, Wittgenstein, with explicit and repeated reference to Plato ’ s Cratylus and Theaetetus, arrived at the concept of meaning to which he has persistently adhered ever since: To understand the meaning of a word is to know, to understand its use (Wittgenstein 1931: 12), or as it says elsewhere in the same manuscript: But why do I rack my brains over the term ‘ language ’ instead of using language (ibid.: 188)? These two terse formulations, found toward the beginning and end of Wittgenstein ’ s remarks on philosophy, are situated in a context that has great relevance for the question at hand: In the first case, it is about marking the origin or starting point of linguistic pointing, and in the second case, it is about the question of what it has to understand a sentence. Wittgenstein ’ s marking of the origin of linguistic pointing is not done with a genetic intention but corresponds completely to Bühler ’ s deictic considerations concerning the marking of the origo of the pointing field. While Bühler explained: Karl Bühlers Concept of the Sign and its Relationship to Wittgenstein ’ s Late Philosophy (1984) 131 Two lines on the paper, intersecting perpendicularly, are supposed to indicate to us a coordinate system, 0 the origo, the coordinate starting point: I claim that three pointing words must be put in the place of 0 if this scheme is to represent the pointing field of human language, namely the pointing words here, now, and I (Bühler 1934: 102), noted Wittgenstein: The words here, now, etc. denote the origin, and starting point of a coordinate system: like the letter “ 0 ” , but they do not describe its position in relation to the objects in space ( … ) they do not stand for the descriptions of the position of the point 0 in relation to spatial objects. They do not stand for the description of a spatial situation. (Wittgenstein 1931: 12). Wittgenstein answers the second question about the conditions of understanding a proposition in the sense of the thesis of the non-interpretability of signs, as he sees on the one hand the test of understanding always going further from the proposition (cf. ibid.: 183), as he emphasizes on the other hand that no sign and also no argument leads us beyond itself (cf. ibid.: 186). Literally, he states: When we say a sentence is any sign by which we mean something, one might ask: What do we mean and when do we mean it? While we give the sign, etc., etc.? And there it becomes clear again that this meaning, if it is to be relevant, must belong to the process of the symbol. (ibid.) As can already be seen from the Plato-oriented organon definition of language and from the definition of meaning as sign interpretation, it seems appropriate to Wittgenstein to speak of understanding only “ where we understand one thing in contrast to something else. And this contrast is expressed by signs ” (ibid.: 149), with which Bühler ’ s principle of abstract relevance returns in a reformulated form. At the same time, however, this formulation also echoes the idea that Victoria Lady Welby, e. g. in What is Meaning? (Welby 1983), but also in “ Sense, Meaning and Interpretation ” and in Significs and Language (Welby 1984), that the process of sign interpretation is to be characterized as a process of translation. 12 In Wittgenstein ’ s manuscript, this thought sounds as follows: The sense, however, is what seats that are translatable into each other have in common. Sentences, however, can be translated into each other only within their language. (Wittgenstein 1931: 174) If meaning constitution and sign interpretation are related to each other in this way, it becomes plausible when Wittgenstein, in order to further clarify the situation, compares the activity of giving signs with other forms of activity and at the same time examines the extent to which “ giving signs, ” “ using a language, ” and “ playing a game ” show similarities (cf. ibid.: 188). Like Bühler, Wittgenstein sees the basis of the comparison in the fact that “ giving signs, ” “ making use of a language, ” and “ playing a game ” is apparent. However, apart from obvious and important similarities, they differ from each other in other essential respects. In order to trace the differences between the three types of action, Wittgenstein, like Bühler, draws on the comparison of language and money. Whereas Bühler, in his discussion of Singer ’ s book Das Geld als Zeichen (Money as a Sign), had rejected a parallelization of the propositions of the sign nature of language and the sign 12 Here it is appropriate to point out that this is with a certain probability not a coincidence, but a commonality mediated by Lady Welby ’ s temporary assistant and translator of Wittgenstein Tractatus C. K. Ogden. For more details cf. the introduction by H. Walter Schmitz to the volume Signifies and Language by Lady Weiby (1984). 132 Karl Bühlers Concept of the Sign and its Relationship to Wittgenstein ’ s Late Philosophy (1984) nature of money, since in his view the respective modes of representation show significant differences, we read in Wittgenstein: If language can be compared to money, to which nothing is attached in and of itself, but which is only indirectly significant, because it can be used to buy objects that have meaning for us; it can be said that here, in the use of the words l, here, now, etc., barter enters into the money trade. (ibid.: 108) The supposed contradiction between Bühler ’ s and Wittgenstein ’ s assumptions concerning the sign nature of language and money can then be resolved if we examine more closely what, for instance, we use the linguistic sign for now. Wittgenstein ’ s answer to this question is that the use of this linguistic sign results from its diacritical function with respect to other linguistic signs such as in an hour, 5 minutes ago, etc. so that we can say that now does not denote a system but belongs to a system. Like Bühler, Wittgenstein also emphasizes that the linguistic sign does not work magically (ibid.), but acquires its meaning as a move in a game regulated by rules, i. e. cannot be of interest in its suggestive, advertising, material role, but only as a member in a system that is independent (that has its meaning in itself) [ … ] that is self-meaning (ibid.: 111). In the interest of clarifying this important thought, with which Wittgenstein once again sides with Bühler, the following passage may also be consulted: The awkwardness with which the sign, like a mute, tries to make itself understood by all sorts of suggestive gestures disappears when we realize that what is essential about the sign is the system to which it belongs, and its remaining content falls away (ibid.: 112 f.). If, however, the essential thing about the sign is the system to which it belongs, one must immediately look for the nature and the characterizing features of this system, which Wittgenstein also underlines with his demand to care only about what lies in the signs and their rules (cf. ibid.: 66). While we had previously heard that the meaning of linguistic signs is to be sought in the use we make of them, disregarding their material appearance, this characterization is given a higher degree of precision by the fact that Wittgenstein assigns to signs, in the sense of the Organon model of language, the function of representing and expressing the contrast or difference that occurs “ where we understand one thing in contrast to something else ” (ibid.: 149). This specification, like considerations, addressed earlier, refers both to the (game) space within which the sign obtains and performs its function and to the (game) rules that clarify the reciprocal relations of the players. If this were not the case, i. e., “ if meaning were not determined by the signs and rules, there would be no understanding and nothing we could call the language ” (ibid.: 3). According to this, it is not only permissible to link the functioning of linguistic signs to the rules of use governing them, but it is absolutely necessary, because otherwise there would be no possibility to designate something as something as distinct from a second. If, however, the determination of the function of linguistic signs boils down to the analysis of the rules of use to which they are subject, the analyzer cannot be satisfied with the mode of use of an isolated sign, since a sign can only be used meaningfully in relation to the system to which it belongs, or, to put it more precisely: something is a linguistic sign only in the system of a language. If, then, we ask about the rules of use of linguistic signs, this question Karl Bühlers Concept of the Sign and its Relationship to Wittgenstein ’ s Late Philosophy (1984) 133 amounts to an analysis of the relations which, on the one hand, are conceivably possible within this system and which, on the other hand, shape the current, system-immanent relation of the signs under discussion. Wittgenstein ’ s determination of the use of the meaning of linguistic signs thus boils down to the analysis of the rule-dependent relations of the signs, which paraphrases the perhaps most important idea of Bühler ’ s Theory of language, which I would like to mention again because of its importance at the end of these considerations: Plato explained in the Kratylos, one must go to the weaver, in order to find the principles of weaving, and to the carpenter, who has made the weaving shuttle, in order to explore the ‘ principles ’ of the organon ‘ weaving drawer ’ . Should he who wants to find the principles of linguistic research be satisfied with a course with the weaver and be spared the trip to the carpenter? That is what I do not believe. The correct analogue to the course at the carpenter is the study of the intersubjectively regulated language conventions. (Bühler 1934: 68) References Bartley III, William W. 1974: “ Theory of Language and Philosophy of Science as Instruments of Educational Reform: Wittgenstein and Popper as Austrian Schoolteachers ” , in: Cohen, Robert S. and Wanofsky, Max W. (eds.), Methodological and Historical Essays in the Natural and Social Sciences. Dordrecht/ Boston: Reidel: 307 - 337. Billing, Hans 1980: Wittgenstein ’ s conception of language play, Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann. Bühler, Karl 1918: The mental development of the child, Jena: Fischer. Bühler, Karl 1927: The crisis of psychology, Jena: Fischer. Bühler, Karl 1929: Der Zeichenbegriff, MS, ca. 1929. Bühler, Karl 1931: Das Ganze der Sprachtheorie, ihr Aufbau und ihre Teile, in: Report on the X11. Kongress der deutschen Gesellschaft für Psychologie 1931, Jena: Fischer: 95 - 112. Bühler, Karl 1933: Ausdruckstheorie. Das System an der Geschichte aufgezeigt, Jena: Fischer. Bühler, Karl 1934: Die Sprachtheorie. Die Darstellungsfunktion der Sprache, Jena: Fischer. Bühler, Karl 1942: What is a Sign? MS, ca. 1942. Bühler, Karl 1960: Das Gestaltprinzip im Leben des Menschen und der Tiere, Bern/ Stuttgart: Huber. Bühler, Karl 1969: The axiomatics of linguistics. Introduction and commentary by Elisabeth Stroker, Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann. Engelmann, Paul 1970: Ludwig Wittgenstein. Briefe und Begegnungen. Ed. Brian McGuinness, Vienna/ Munich: Oldenburg. Eschbach, Achim 1980: “ Semiotics ” , in: Althaus, Hans P et al. (eds.): Lexikon der Germanistischen Linguistik, 2nd, completely revised and expanded edition, Tübingen: Niemeyer: 47 - 57. Eschbach, Achim 1981: „ Wahrnehmung und Zeichen. The sematological foundations of Karl Bühler ’ s theory of perception ” , in: Ars Semeiotica IV,3: 219 - 235. Eschbach, Achim (ed.) 1984: Bühler-Studien, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp. Eschbach, Achim 1984: “ Karl Bühler ’ s axiomatics and the axiom system of sign theory ” , in: Graumann, Carl F. and Herrmann, Theo (eds.): Karl Bühler ’ s Axiomatics of Linguistics, Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann: 46 - 97. Fónagy, Ivan 1984: “ Language functions and language development. Variations on Karl Bühler ’ s Functional Model ” , in: Eschbach, Achim (ed.): Bühler-Studien, Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp. Gier, Nicholas F. 1981: Wittgenstein and Phenomenology. A Comparative Study of the Later Wittgenstein, Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, Albany: State University of New York Press. 134 Karl Bühlers Concept of the Sign and its Relationship to Wittgenstein ’ s Late Philosophy (1984) Graumann, Carl F./ Herrmann, Theo (eds.) 1984: Karl Bühler ’ s axiomatics of linguistics, Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann. 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With an introduction by Hans Aebli, Stuttgart: Klett. Singer, Karl 1920: Money as a sign, Jena: Fischer. Toulmin, Stephen 1969: “ Ludwig Wittgenstein Revisited ” , in: Encounter 31: 58 - 71. Ungeheuer, Gerold 1967: “ The Cybernetic Basis of Karl Bühler ’ s Theory of Language ” , in: To Honor Roman Jakobson. Essays on the Occasion of his Seventieth Birthday, vol. III, The Hague: Mouton: 2067 - 2086. Welby, Victoria Lady 1983: What is Meaning? Studies in the Development of Significance. [1903]. With an introductory essay by Gerrit Mannoury and a preface by Achim Eschbach, Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Welby, Victoria Lady 1984: Significs and Language. With an introduction by H. Walter Schmitz, Amsterdam: John Benjamin. Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1931: Remarks on philosophy, MS 1931. (W 111). Wright, Georg H. von 1982: Wittgenstein, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Karl Bühlers Concept of the Sign and its Relationship to Wittgenstein ’ s Late Philosophy (1984) 135 K O D I K A S / C O D E 44 (2021) · No. 1 - 3 Gunter Narr Verlag Tübingen Visual Language. Isotype and the Limits. Bildsprache. Isotype und die Grenzen. (1996) Abstract: Otto Neurath ’ s pictorial language, ISOTYPE, is used to dive deeper into the relationship between language and image. It reiterates the complete set of axiomatics regarding the pictorial language that Otto Neurath presented. It then also sheds light on the collaborators that were crucial for Neurath with their input to a pictorial language such as the artist Gernd Arntz. The paper then expands the circle of collaborators by crediting the historic predecessors of pictorial languages like Egyptian hieroglyphs, the orbis pictus by Jan Comenius, the Raimundus Lullus, and the general theory of signs by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. All these examples serve the purpose to counter the myth of the well-definedness of the linguistic sign with a seemingly clear, distinct, and fixed meaning, and the myth of the analogisability of text and image. 0. Introduction I have chosen Otto Neurath ’ s pictorial language ISOTYPE as the subject of my reflections because the relationship between language and image can be developed in a particularly clear way in this example and brought to a new kind of solution. In this way, I want to show that the definition of the concept of the image in semiotic categories can help us overcome art science ’ s linguistic forgetfulness and offer semiotic analytics. To carry this out, I have divided my text into four parts: • Part 1 introduces Otto Neurath ’ s conception of a pictorial language; • Part 2 deals with the pictorial and universal language tradition; • Part 3 formulates the semiotic critique of Neurath ’ s approach, • Part 4 marks a new approach to the semiotics of the image. 1.0 Otto Neurath and the conception of his visual language ISOTYPE 1.1 Otto Neurath in Vienna After the collapse of the Munich Soviet republic, Otto Neurath (1882 - 1945) was arrested and sentenced to one and a half years in a fortress for his significant involvement in the socialisation measures of the Soviet government. Through the intervention of his Austrian friends, to whom he had telegraphed a short time before in an exuberance of revolutionary feeling: “ Come on, everybody, socialize! ” he was released from prison early and deported as an undesirable foreigner. Neurath arrived in Vienna in the midst of a politically and economically tense situation. The end of the First World War had ended the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and refugees were streaming into Vienna from all parts of the empire. The result was famine and a significant housing shortage, as the first Austrian republic groaned - as did the German Reich - under the harsh reparation demands of the victorious powers. From a political point of view, Austria ’ s already difficult situation was complicated by the unnaturally bloated capital city of Vienna, where a third of the population lived, being governed by the Social Democrats, while the rest of the country was under bourgeois-conservative administration. Due to his expulsion from Germany, Neurath spared little thought of continuing his university career, which began under Max Weber in Heidelberg. Instead, he devoted himself to communal projects with his typical fervor, pursuing the ambitious goals of transforming economic and social conditions, peaceful unification, the renewal of schooling and education in the sense of the “ scientific worldview ” of the Vienna Circle, and the establishment of unified science (cf. Stadler, 1982: 98). As a direct consequence of Neurath ’ s activities in the Viennese cooperative and settlement system and on his initiative, the Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftsmuseum (Museum of Society and Economy) (in the following abbreviated as GWM) of the municipality of Vienna was founded in 1924, and Otto Neurath was appointed its director. 1.2 The Vienna Museum of Society and Economy The founding of the Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftsmuseum was entirely in line with socialist cultural policy in the “ red ” Vienna of the 1920s and 1930s, based on the idea that an education that could reach the masses, would familiarize wide circles of the population with fundamental social and economic contexts (cf. Koberstein, 1969: 2) and take emancipatorydemocratic results beyond its own enlightenment. Disillusioned with the possibilities of language, which Neurath believed led to perpetual deceptions and distortions, he found a new, unencumbered medium to convey the enlightenment message. Still, unlike Fritz Mauthner or Ludwig Wittgenstein, who wanted to find a solution to epistemological problems through different language critiques, Neurath held the view that the age of the dominance of language was over once and for all and that the image had to take its place. As Eckhart Gillen stated: The method of picture statistics developed by O. Neurath is the consequent application of (his) positivistic principles of science. Corresponding to the idea of a physical unified language, Neurath strives for an international picture language, which encyclopedically summarizes all sensually perceptible phenomena (physical objects of knowledge) according to plan and independent of language and writing, and claims to be able to convey the fundamental connections of human coexistence in this way (Gillen 1975). Neurath attributed great importance to the image, believing that images were not subject to provide immediate insight and rapid information, being not the systematic deceptions of language. Moreover, the image seemed more suitable than any other means of commu- Image 1 Visual Language. Isotype and the Limits.Bildsprache. Isotype und die Grenzen. (1996) 137 nication for transcending national or linguistic boundaries. Against the background of this conviction, it can only be described as logical that Neurath and his colleagues endeavoured to design an innovative form of expression and representation for the realization of the GWM ’ s clarification work, which at the beginning of the work was still programmatically called the “ Viennese method of image statistics ” . The GWM, however, served not only to disseminate scientific knowledge, but to provide those tools of thought that could contribute to an improvement of the situation in life, or as Neurath put it: The social museums have precisely man as a social being as their object; here is where the methodology of the visual representation of social contexts is cultivated (Neurath 1927: 130). Until its closure in 1894, the GWM produced a large number of exhibitions that were highly frequented regionally and attracted international attention, which, taken as a whole, led to a highly differentiated visual language. 1.3 The Axiomatics of the Visual Language Nowhere in his extensive work did Otto Neurath present a complete set of axiomatics regarding his pictorial language. Hence, the following remarks are to be understood as an attempt at reconstruction. The axiomatic of Neurath ’ s visual language consists of 1) several general didactic rules of thumb and 2) many rules of formation and transformation. Among the didactic rules of thumb for the development of visual language I recall the one saying that it is better to remember a simple picture than to forget many complicated pictures. In the same category belongs the expression that a good teacher knows how to abstract from the unessential. Neurath precedes the few explicitly formulated rules of formation and transformation with the maxim reminiscent of Wittgenstein; “ What one can show through a picture, one should not say with words ” (Koberstein 1989: 60). As a first rule, Neurath repeatedly emphasized that figurative language must reflect the number of objects to be depicted by the relationally corresponding number of signs, rather than representing a more significant number by a larger sign. The second rule states that pictorial signs, reduced to the essential features of the object to be depicted, should be simple, typical, and characteristic. The third rule is that the same sign should always be used for the same thing, avoiding “ interesting ” variation, and that the same form should be repeated at the same size. Image 2 138 Visual Language. Isotype and the Limits.Bildsprache. Isotype und die Grenzen. (1996) Image 3 The fourth rule prescribes that the standardized pictorial signs must be self-evident and bring the depicted object directly to your eyes. In other words, for informative clarity, pictorial signs should be “ speaking ” or “ self-explanatory ” signs. The fifth and last rule is that Image 4 Visual Language. Isotype and the Limits.Bildsprache. Isotype und die Grenzen. (1996) 139 the aim should not be a representative reproduction of the object. Still, a direct depiction, so that the pictorial sign does not appear as an ornamental appendage of statistical magnitudes, but expresses the objects and their relationships clearly and unambiguously. Suppose these five rules are observed, then, in Neurath the following process takes place: A picture that applies the system ’ s rules well gives all the important facts in the pictorial representation of a statement. At first glance, one sees the most important, at the second the less important, at the third details, and at the fourth nothing more - if one still sees something, the teaching picture is bad (Neurath, 1980: 23). The Viennese picture language needs only two transformation rules, iteration and complexion rules. The iteration rule states that the elementary pictorial signs should be such that they permit both a series of signs that are always the same and an addition of two or more elementary pictorial signs. The complexion rule clarifies the construction of composite, complex signs in such a way that the complex pictorial sign for “ miner ” is generated from the pictorial sign for “ man ” and an occupational prop such as “ hammer and mallet. ” In listing the rules of formation and transformation of Neurath ’ s pictorial language, it should be pointed out, at least in passing, that after an initial restriction to black and white pictorial signs, color was also assigned a systematic function, without, however, ever allowing the functional dominance of form to recede into the background. 1.4 Gerd Arntz, Cologne ‘ Progressives ’ and Viennese visual language Suppose the conception of this is legitimized by the idea and plan of this enterprise that originated exclusively with Neurath. However, his visual language would never have become so expressive and successful if he had not found so many competent and committed collaborators who offered their support in realizing the visual language, as Neurath emphasized time and again. In addition to Marie Reidemeister, later Otto Neurath ’ s wife, who worked in “ transformation ” in the pedagogical department of the GKM, preparing objects and facts that would be depicted, it was above all the employees of the museum ’ s graphic technical department who had a lasting influence on the appearance of the Viennese visual language. Without diminishing the achievements of the other staff members, the role of Gernd Arntz (b. 1900) deserves special mention. After an apprenticeship in the book trade and years of training in Düsseldorf, Gerd Arntz, who was born in Remscheid, came into contact Image 5 140 Visual Language. Isotype and the Limits.Bildsprache. Isotype und die Grenzen. (1996) with the socially committed Group of Progressive Artists ” in Cologne, that gathered around Franz Wilhelm Seiwert, Heinrich Hoerle, Hans Schmitz, Augustin Tschinkel, Peter Alma, Otto Freundlich, Stanislaw Kubicki, among others. Characteristic of the works of the Cologne group, in which Seiwert exercised a formative influence, was the development and construction of “ readable ” pictures that were intended to convey insights into social contexts, or as Katrin Sello writes: To learn from the works of the “ progressives ” and to learn with pleasure, one has to ask about the practical artistic task they set themselves: to put the complex social interrelationships, their basic principles, and development into the picture (Sello 1975). Committed to the constructivist program, but without, in contrast to the Russian constructivists, leaving the realm of the representational, the Cologne group was in search of a method that made it possible, not to shorten the political insights gained to the depiction of individual symptoms, but to make the context itself vivid (cf. ibid). A statement by Franz Wilhelm Seiwert may be representative of the program of the Cologne group: I try with this picture form to represent a reality stripped of all sentimentality and coincidence, to make visible its function, legality, relationships, and tensions within the picture frame and its regularity (Politische Konstruktivisten, 1975) Image 7 Image 8 Image 6 Visual Language. Isotype and the Limits.Bildsprache. Isotype und die Grenzen. (1996) 141 Even if it is correct to emphasize the intellectual and systematic affinity between Gerd Arntz and the Cologne “ Progressives, ” this affinity says little about the independent will for form and expression that Arntz had already brought with him to Cologne and which he not only retained but was able to develop further in an original way in the years that followed. In 1926, Otto Neurath and Gerd Arntz met at the “ GESOLEI ” health exhibition in Düsseldorf. By his admission, Neurath immediately recognized that in Gerd Arntz he had found precisely the graphic artist he had been looking for for years. Arntz accepted Neurath ’ s offer to follow him to the GWM; after a year of loose collaboration, Arnzt moved to Vienna and became head of the museum ’ s graphics department, where, together with Otto Neurath and Marie Reidemeister, he set to work to put the concept of the Viennese visual language into practice. 1.5 Realization of the Viennese Visual Language Since it is completely impossible with the required brevity to even begin to present the enormous creative enthusiasm of the GWM staff, I would like instead to demonstrate the realization of the Viennese pictorial language with a selected example. Image 9 The chart illustrates how many working days were lost to strikes and lockouts in Great Britain, France, and the German Reich between 1913 and 1928. Each fist represents 10 million working days lost. If we start reading the chart, we will notice at first glance significant differences between the left and right halves of the chart, as well as different intensities in the different years. A second glance teaches us that one hundred and sixty million working days were lost to strikes in Great Britain in 1926, while there were no statistically relevant losses in France and the German Reich. In contrast, the ratio was reversed in 1927 and 1928, albeit significantly less. Finally, in a third respect, what we have seen will lead us to ask many questions, which might relate, for example, to the disproportionately greater propensity of the British to strike in relation to the French, 142 Visual Language. Isotype and the Limits.Bildsprache. Isotype und die Grenzen. (1996) and to the causes of the different failures in the various years in the various countries. The principle, however, should be clear: 1) equal phenomena are represented by equal signs; 2) a set of signs appears corresponding to the set to be depicted; 3) statistically significant deviations show up most conspicuously at the central axis of the chart. 1.6 The Further Fate of the Viennese Visual Language and the GWM Otto Neurath and his Viennese collaborators had only a few years to think through and develop their pictorial language concept. In addition to numerous activities in Austria, there were exhibitions in many European countries, the founding of museums based on the model of the Vienna GWM, among which I would like to mention in particular the MUNDANEUM in The Hague, as well as the commission from the Soviet Union to demonstrate the goals and results of Soviet economic policy to the population at the newly founded Moscow ISOSTAT Institute through the Viennese visual language. At the beginning of the so-called Dollfuss dictatorship in Austria, which brought in various repressive measures against Austrian social democracy as early as 1934, Neurath and some of his collaborators were in Moscow, escaping the threat of arrest. Since the GWM was closed and there was no thought of continuing his work in Austria, Neurath first emigrated to the Netherlands, where he worked at the MUNDANEUM on the consistent development and internationalization of his visual language. The changed linguistic context and the more international orientation also demanded a renaming of the Viennese visual language: At Marie Reidemeister ’ s suggestion and in analogy to C. K. Ogden ’ s BASIC- English (British-American-Scientific-International-Commercial), the new name ISOTYPE was coined; this acronym for International System of Typographic Picture Education also became the program for the further work of the Neurath team. 2.0 The pictorial and universal linguistic tradition Otto Neurath was by no means the first to attempt to design a universally valid and comprehensible language. Even the figurative approach was without models, which Neurath always remembered to emphasize. If the tradition of figurative and universal language is to be examined in more detail, this is done less with the archaeological interest of naming predecessors. Still, primarily with the scientific-historical intention of better understanding its specifics, special achievements, and characteristic weaknesses by contextualizing Neurath ’ s approach, I will further distinguish between two strands of tradition: that of figurative language and that of universal language. I will limit myself to a few striking examples. 2.1 The pictorial language tradition 2.1.1 Egyptian Hieroglyphs When reconstructing the development of the ISOTYPE, Otte Neurath remembered that he got the first ideas for it while looking at Egyptian hieroglyphs in Viennese museums. The Egyptian hieroglyphs developed under different influences from pure idea writing to a pictorial system of concept word signs. Visual Language. Isotype and the Limits.Bildsprache. Isotype und die Grenzen. (1996) 143 Image 10 Without going into more detail, some principles can be seen in the following illustration, which we already got to know during the elaboration of the ISOTYPE axioms: Image 11 Egyptian pictographic writing refrains from employing an individual design and concentrates instead on characteristic standard features. Specifications of mass imagery are achieved, as in ISOTYPE, by adding various props; for example, the figure standing between the statue and the train crew is identified as the commander by the sign for “ lead ” that he holds in his hands. The pitcher poured by the person below indicates the time of work, namely the cool hours of the day before sunrise, and so on. 144 Visual Language. Isotype and the Limits.Bildsprache. Isotype und die Grenzen. (1996) Image 12 As with ISOTYPE, Egyptian pictorial messages allow us to gain quick information about how many people managed the transport of this statue and how many soldiers the train crew guarded. 2.1.2 Battle illustrations Neurath also inspired the formulation of ISOTYPE from the tradition of battle illustrations. Image 13 Again we find 1) the principle of the so-called quantity pictures, i. e., the series of uniform figures to units. If one knows the divisor applied in each case, the number of soldiers facing each other can be indicated quickly and precisely. 2) Props such as pennants, and specific weapons provide information about the type of weapons owned by individual units, just as the information conveyed by signs also provides information about the mobility of enemy armies and indirectly about the probable chances of victory. Visual Language. Isotype and the Limits.Bildsprache. Isotype und die Grenzen. (1996) 145 2.1.3 The orbis pictus by Jan Comenius Among the closest relatives to the Viennese pictorial language is the orbis pictus of the humanist Jan Komensky (1592 - 1670), called Comenius. In a situation quite similar to Neurath ’ s, namely the end of the Thirty Years ’ War and as a member of the persecuted Czech Protestant Brotherhood, Comenius developed a comprehensive program on how to improve the state of society at that time: with a guarantee of peace and international understanding aided by general education, scientific reform, reform of religion in the spirit of tolerance, and by creating a universal language and utilizing administrative reform. To ensure each person attains the highest possible level of education, he conceived his orbis pictus as a visually supported translation manual from scholarly Latin into the vernacular. Image 14 Despite the proximity to Neurath ’ s ISOTYPE, some significant differences can also be observed: 1) Neurath considered ISOTYPE not only as a mediator between the scholarly and the vernacular language, but as a language sui generis and a full-fledged substitute for natural language: 2) Neurath did not use ISOTYPE for the iconic representation of concretes, but for the representation of abstracts; 3) While the orbis pictus tries to account for the diversity and heterogeneity of what is depicted in action pictures, Neurath ’ s ISOTYPE aims at the generalizability and transferability of pictorial information, which explains the diversity of the chosen graphic means. 146 Visual Language. Isotype and the Limits.Bildsprache. Isotype und die Grenzen. (1996) 2.2 The universal language tradition 2.2.1 Raimundus Lullus Similarly, as in the treatment of the figurative tradition, the discussion on universal linguistic history must be brief; and more so than in the previous part, I must limit myself to a selection of sources. In the life of the Franciscan Raimundus Lullus (1232 - 1818), a native of Palma de Mallorca, three objectives played a special role: 1) to develop an “ art ” that would be suitable for converting unbelievers; 2) the desire to found schools to teach and learn languages for the same purpose, and 3) ‘ the desire to die as a martyr ’ (cf. Lohr 1971: I). In the Ars brevis of 1308, the most widespread writing of Lullus, we find the clearest version of his universal language approach, This universal language tries to reach its goal through the method of ascent from the created world to the contemplation of God, This ascent gets its movement from the fact that the artist, i. e., the user of the Ars, seeks reflections of the divine life in the created world. Image 15 The Ars lulliana - in modern terms - understands itself to bea system. Heuristic, it develops through nine fundamental questions (utrum, quid, de quo, quare, quanta, qualis, quando, ubi, quomodo/ cum quo), which addresses the nine different levels of subject (instrumentativa, elementativa, vegetativa, sensitiva, imaginativa, ratiocinativa, caelestis, angelica, and divina), the nine absolutes (bonitas, magnitudo, aeternitas, potentia, sapientia, voluntas, virtus, veritas, gloria) and the nine relative principles of being (differentia, concordantia, contrarietas, principium, medium, finis, aequalitas, maioritas, minoritas). Each of these Visual Language. Isotype and the Limits.Bildsprache. Isotype und die Grenzen. (1996) 147 methodological elements - i. e., the subjects, the absolute and relative principles, and the fundamental questions - is assigned a letter from B to K. By the systematic combination of the different constellations always new questions arise, which altogether in the sense of the deductive Aristotelian syllogistic lead to a complete coverage of all particular conceivable fields of knowledge. 2.2.2 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646 - 1716), whose enormous work could only with great effort be brought to a summarizing formula, was concerned throughout his life with the draft of a characteristica universalis or general theory of signs. The thought guided Leibniz that if he could determine the basic concepts in every possible existence, every possible truth would be deductible. “ In Philosophia, ” Leibniz wrote in his third letter to Duke Johann Friedrich of Brunswick-Lüneburg, have ich ein mittel gefunden, dasjenige was Cartesius und andere per Algebram et Analysin in Arithmetica et Geometrica getan, in allen scientien zuwege zu bringen per Artem Combinatoriam, welche Lullus und P. Kircher zwar excolirt, bey weiten aber in solche deren intima nicht gesehen. Dadurch alle Notiones compositae der ganzen weit in wenig simplices als deren Alphabet reduziert, und aus solches alphabets combination wiederum alle Dinge, samt ihren theroematibus, und was nur von ihnen zu invertieren müglich, ordinata methodo, mit der zeit zu finden, ein weg gebahnet wird (Leibniz 1880: 4). This excerpt from the letter contains in nuce the entire program of Leibniz ’ s universal language. At the center of the characteristica universalis is the assumption that all concepts can be reduced to basic atomic factors; if the analysis has isolated the characteristic atoms or characters sought, the synthesis leads by way of the logical calculus to all possible complex content. Image 16 148 Visual Language. Isotype and the Limits.Bildsprache. Isotype und die Grenzen. (1996) If the isolated characters are assigned letters and subjected to syllogistic-oriented combinatorics, necessary consequences and truths result, which depend on the onceassumed characters, but are nevertheless true, since they obey the rules of inference. This also results in the epistemic interest in Leibniz ’ s universal language: By the way, for me, the combinatorial art is specifically that science - or also, as it might be called in general - that characteristic or art of designation which treats the forms or formulas of things in general, that is, of their quality in general, or the relation of the similar and dissimilar in them (Leibniz 1904: 50). 2.2.3 John Wilkins John Wilkins (1614 - 1672) provided in his Essay towards a Real Character and a Philosophical Language, which was published in 1668, the knowledge of Leibniz ’ s considerations, but familiar also with the universal language designs of J. J. Becher, A. Kircher, G. Dalparnes, et al., with the aim of a comprehensive classification of his reality a systematization of all objects and concepts differentiated into 40 classes that he called “ genera. ” The actual sign language, which Wilkins considered to be universally understandable, readable in any language, short, simple, clear, regular, and easy to learn, arises from the fact that Wilkins assigns universal characters to the 40 “ genera ” corresponding to all concepts in two different notation systems: On the one hand, symbols composed of basic shapes, dots, and dashes, on the other hand, strictly regulated letter combinations reflect the conceptual nature appropriate to an object, which in turn is determined by its respective place value in the system. Summarizing the objectives of all three universal linguistic approaches addressed here, and as a conclusion to this brief overview, I would like to quote a passage from John Wilkins ’ Mercury. The Advantages proposed by this Philosophical Language were facilitating mutual Commerce among the several Nations of the World: the improvement of Natural Knowledge; and the Propagation of Religion (Wilkins 1984: 171). 3.0 The Limits of Visual Language: Semiotic Criticism Before discussing individual criticisms in more detail, I want to clarify that a universal language cannot exist because of practical difficulties and insurmountable theoretical hurdles. The wish to transcend the boundaries of language is indeed as old as the history of mankind. Still, this wish must remain forever unfulfilled, since transcending the boundaries of language would have to be paid for with the loss of the constituent moments of historicity and, above all, of the sociality of language, which is why I can only agree with Wilhelm von Humboldt ’ s assessment, who called the dream of a universal language a “ foolish delusion ” (cf. v. Humboldt 1985: 20). I will take the path of semiotic criticism to critically assess the figurative language approach in general and Neurath ’ s figurative language in particular. From this approach, which is new in the present context, I expect on the one hand deeper insights into the limits and possibilities of pictorial language approaches, and on the other hand suggestions for the formulation of pictorial semiotics, which I will discuss in the final part of my remarks. Visual Language. Isotype and the Limits.Bildsprache. Isotype und die Grenzen. (1996) 149 3.1 The Myth of Well-Defined Linguistic Signs We encounter the myth of the well-definedness in large parts of linguistic-linguisticsemiotic literature. With astonishing frivolity, the insinuation is that the linguistic sign - say “ tree ” - possesses a clear, distinct, and fixed meaning. If this meaning should have slipped our minds, we can open a dictionary and read the definition of the keyword “ tree. ” If we take a closer look at what we do when we call something a tree, we have to admit that its signification is not only considerably more complex than assumed, but also fundamentally different. Image 17 As can be seen from the sign model that I advocate following Charles Peirce, it is not “ the ” objects or “ the ” trees that I am talking about, but rather, sign objects. But sign objects owe themselves to a preceding selection or sign process, or, in other words, to a conscious elementarisation of the continuum of experience. However, since there are signs in themselves as little as there are things in themselves, we should always only consider these signs for us. Since we, as social beings, constitute and use signs intentionally, we must continue to take into account the necessary interpretation of our sign objects into account. This does not mean, however, that the sign process must degenerate into autistic introspection, but only that we must say goodbye to the myth of the well-defined stable meaning of the linguistic sign and look for a new theory of meaning, which critical semiotics has long since provided with the logic of vagueness. 3.2 The Myth of the Reconstructibility of Semiosis from Lexicon and Grammar Recently I read the following statement: The victory of images is unstoppable ( … ) One begins to understand that there is a language behind the image, ( … ). Only gradually is the realization gaining ground that this pictorial language is by no means characterized by arbitrariness, but obeys its grammar, which can certainly do justice to the most demanding logic. The mastery of its rules ensures the optimal form of communication. The strictly scientific basis for the grammar of the figurative language is provided by semiotics, the theory of the sign process. As a semiotician, one should be pleased with this high opinion of the theory of signs, but unfortunately, the position represented here needs to be corrected! Even more, it is dangerous, because it assumes that semiotics can be reduced to a syntactic schematism, 150 Visual Language. Isotype and the Limits.Bildsprache. Isotype und die Grenzen. (1996) which proceeds according to the following recipe: Take a set of signs, formulate a set of rules, manipulate the signs according to the rules, and the sign process is finished. Now this position is not only represented in the statement just quoted but was also the basis of Neurath ’ s pictorial language, as we have heard before. But what is wrong with this position? Essentially, three objections have to be raised to the cited opinion and thus against Neurath: 1) If, as we have seen before, there are no meaning-stable sign-atoms, it is also impossible to come to meaning-complexions on the way of iteration, which, by the way, early Gestalt theory already had to do. 2) If semiosis is not about the recognition of meaning-fixed signs, but about the theory of the mobility and dynamics of continuous sign constitution, then a strict grammar in the usual understanding of the term is not able to do justice to the principal variability of the sign, which of course does not exclude a rule-fixing formulated according to semiotic criteria. 3) If semiotics is not to be considered a reconstruction of an acommunicative private language, but a theory of signs in use, the self-chosen boundaries of syntactics must be transcended in the direction of a theory of action. This means no more, but also no less, than an orientation towards the results of modern pragmatics, one of whose basic insights in the philosophy of language is that the sign ’ s meaning is to be determined by its respective use. 3.3 The myth of visible, speaking signs One of the most important demands Neurath made on his visual language was that “ speaking ” signs should be created, and clear and simple signs should vividly present the message. This demand remains in play today, for example, when we demand that a traffic sign makes the traffic situation immediately visible to us, or when we expect a pictogram to lead us to a sports facility without linguistic explanation. Apart from a conceptual vagueness and a more than latent anthropomorphism, the myth of the “ speaking ” signs reveals one of the most momentous semiotic errors of thought, because what we see in the traffic sign or pictogram is not the sign at all, but its material substrate, the representamen. No matter how hard we try, we can never see the sign, because the sign is an immaterial relation. If, however, the sign can be accurately described only as an immaterial, mental performance, it is also futile to continue to preserve the myth of the “ speaking ” signs. The destruction of the myth of the “ speaking ” sign entails a farewell to the universal linguistic idea, but not at the same time a farewell to semiotics. Still, it demands a radical change of perspective: If it is not the signs that speak to us, and if it is still indisputable that cognition and communication are indispensably linked to signs, then it follows conclusively, in my opinion, that it is we who make the signs speak. Critical semiotics, which in this point is in line with classical maieutic concepts and agreement with modern hermeneutics, tries to do justice to this process of making signs speak with its theory of the continuous process of interpretation. 3.4 The Myth of the Analogisability of Text and Image I have saved one of the most delicate problems in the present context for the conclusion of this part: the treatment of the myth of the analogisability of text and image. What is meant here will sound more familiar if I explain it by the terms ‘ vivid thinking ’ or ‘ visual intuition ’ . What does this mean? The text-image analogy ultimately boils down to the following Visual Language. Isotype and the Limits.Bildsprache. Isotype und die Grenzen. (1996) 151 structuralist argument: 1) The equivalence of text and image is asserted because one believes, especially as an artist, in seeing visual concepts intuitively without resorting to language-dependent thinking. 2) Texts and images are structured and consequently structurable; thus, text and images have a central commonality. 3) If the first two conditions are true, one is entitled, because of the structural relationship of texts and pictures, to transfer the elaborated methods of linguistics to the non-linguistic, i. e., pictures, of analytical interest. Of course, you will have long noticed that this conclusion has feet of clay; at the same time, however, you will grant me that the attitude described here corresponds to a widespread and readily practised practice. Since a more detailed discussion of intuition seems superfluous, I will limit myself to a semiotic critique of the above mentioned position. For many years, the discussion in art history was paralyzed by the linguistic-analytical dogma of the non-substantiability of language, since every attempt to transcend the boundaries of language inevitably brought with it an accusation of irrationalism. However, this fixation could only come about because of a hypostasis of language that violated the axiom of the sign nature of language. Suppose one returns language in a critical semiotic reflection to its indispensable role in cognition and communication. In that case, a new starting position arises, which I would like to describe with the concept of the nonsubstantiability of the sign. In the concluding part of my reflections, I will discuss to what extent a new starting position emerges from the perspective of the non-substantiability of the sign and how this new semiotic approach offers a partial solution to the problem of visual language. 4.0 Prolegomena of Semiotics of the Image Various attempts have been made very early on to remedy the above-mentioned difficulties of the picture-language approach regarding the neo-positivist philosophy of science in general. I would like to address two proposed solutions since they continue to have an impact today. Otto Neurath ’ s friend from the days of the Vienna Circle, the logician, and mathematician Rudolf Carnap, had written a kind of credo of the Viennese neo-positivist theory of science with his book Die logische Syntax der Sprache. His argument, in short, was that a metaphysics-free scientific analysis, freed from superfluous entities, could only be achieved if it was limited to the formal relations in protocol sentences. Carnap, however, soon found himself forced to go beyond his logical syntax in the direction of semantics, to eventually consider pragmatic components as well. However, the gradual expansion and reworking of the original purely syntactic approach could never do justice to the specific semioticity of human action. Only the complete reversal of the approach, which relates to Carnapian syntactic atomism as Wittgenstein ’ s late philosophy relates to the Tractatus, can claim to become adequate to the pragmatics and intentionality of human action. The second attempt at specification explicitly refers to the subject matter of images under discussion from the American semiotician Charles William Morris, another close friend of Neurath. Morris claimed that pictures consisted exclusively, or at least primarily, of iconic signs that were in a relationship of resemblance with the depicted object, thus reproducing 152 Visual Language. Isotype and the Limits.Bildsprache. Isotype und die Grenzen. (1996) nothing more than an old, art-scientific motif, not to say prejudice; Morris himself acknowledged that his thesis faltered precariously. The fact that Morris ’ s original approach continues to have an effect today can be seen, for example, in the fact that the iconicity of the image forms a central argument in Umberto Eco ’ s successful Introduction to Semiotics. If, however, no satisfactory solution can be achieved either by reworking the neopositivist approach or by recourse to the old prejudice of the iconicity of images, there is, in my opinion, no other possibility than to think fundamentally anew about the specific character of the image. 4.1 The semiotic connection between the problem of images and the problem of language The discussion has so far shown that developing a semiotics of the image from the perspective of allegedly superior linguistic signs leads us just as astray as the languageforgetting approach, which is guided by the assumption of pictorial intuitions that cannot be justified by anything. The only conceivable alternative between the two extreme positions, either to completely subordinate the image to language or to completely detach it from language, consists in the precise determination of the semiotic connection between image and language problems. In transcendental analytics (KrV A 120 f.) and especially in the chapter on schematism (B 179 - 182) of his Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant pointed to the performance of the ‘ productive imagination ’ in the production of epistemic images. Kant states: The first thing that is given to us is appearance. ( … ) But because every appearance contains a variety, consequently different perceptions are scattered in the mind and encountered individually, a connection of them is necessary ( … ). Therefore, there is an active faculty of synthesis of this diversity in us ( … ). The power of imagination is to bring the manifold of perception into a picture (KrV A 120). But if - to argue further in this sense - the general procedure of the imagination consists in “ providing a concept with its image ” (ibid., B 180), then we may define the image as a mediator between thought and language, or, put it differently: only through the mediation of the image does reason become an image. Only through the mediation of the image, is reason brought to language, just as the mediation of the image teaches reason to see. But the image is correctly determined as the mediator between thinking and language. In that case, it is said at the same time that the process of cognition has always already referred to the path of interpretation, since - as we have heard - the multiplicity of sense data led to a specific synthesis that requires explanation. You have surely already noticed that the definition of the concept of the image unites all relevant conceptual moments of the concept of the sign. Gerold Prauss has offered a perceptive analysis that Kant did not discuss anything else under the concept of the “ appearance of appearance ” than what was owed to the same categories in semiotics as a triadic concept of the sign. It follows compellingly that a theory of the image can only be developed as a theory of the sign. Even if it is true that image and sign are subject to the same categories, we must not be content to say that images are signs in the same sense as language. To take a step forward in constructing image semiotics, I propose a different procedure that should give us Visual Language. Isotype and the Limits.Bildsprache. Isotype und die Grenzen. (1996) 153 information about the special sign nature of the image. Seven criteria are necessary to distinguish pictorial and linguistic signs from each other. 1. Natural language I know can only designate its object by considering temporal-modal parameters. In contrast, spoken language is largely free of local fixations. We have to state the opposite finding for the pictorial sign: The image is locally bound and temporally-modally released. (Stations of the Cross, time jumps in the film per subtitle); 2. The second constitutive characteristic of the linguistic sign is to be sought in its linearity. In the sound stream of speech, the only measurable extension of the linguistic sign is its time-dependent, linear dimension, since its elements cannot occur other than successively. The figurative sign has at least one further dimension to simultaneously entirely present what is to be signified. 3. The third distinguishing characteristic of linguistic and pictorial signs I see in the pair of characteristics is “ continuity vs. discontinuity. ” While the linguistic sign is given momentarily in the sound stream of speech and is already gone again with the articulation, the pictorial sign has a significantly higher degree of stability and continuity, because it allows the observer to dwell for an arbitrarily long time. 4. With the principle of so-called double articulation, I would like to continue the development of the criteria catalog for the distinction of linguistic and pictorial signs. This principle (cf. Martinet 1949 and 1963) prompts the distinction of such sign systems, whose signifiers are not combined, from sign systems whose signifiers are significant, i. e., the sign can be analyzed in articulable, non-significant but distinctive features. Thus, while at the linguistic sign, a phonetic level must be distinguished from a phonological level, the pictorial sign does not know this double articulation, since it cannot be analyzed in analogous units of meaning. 5. A fifth criterion of differentiation of linguistic and pictorial signs is the ability to build secondary model-forming systems (cf. Lotman 1973: 22 ff.). The ability to build secondary model-forming systems of myth, religion, cosmology, or law is understood as constructing complex structures based on linguistic signs. Although pictorial signs can certainly have a share in this or that secondary model-forming system, purely pictorial secondary model-forming systems would be unthinkable, since the pictorial interpretation of pictorial signs as the last metalanguage requires a natural language. 6. From the perspective of field-theoretical considerations, we note a sixth, twofold feature of linguistic and pictorial signs. The linguistic sign proves to be deficient compared to the figurative sign, insofar as there is no painting field in the language (cf. Bühler 1934), which even the notorious reference to the existence of isolated onamatopoetics cannot change. In the opposite sense, the figurative sign proves to be deficient in relation to language, as it is not capable of anaphoric pointing. 7. The seventh and last point of differentiation results from the relationship between linguistic and pictorial signs and the realm of value. In the case of linguistic signs, the terms ‘ value ’ and ‘ elementarisation ’ are intimately connected, for thought and speech would be contourless masses if they were not determined by the formation of mutually effective units of meaning. This process of mental and linguistic elementarisation is nothing else than the socially mediated value setting. As we have heard, the pictorial sign 154 Visual Language. Isotype and the Limits.Bildsprache. Isotype und die Grenzen. (1996) is also an intermediate between thought and speech. Still, it chooses its means from a different reservoir: whereas the linguistic sign, from the point of view of value, ensures a social mediation of the synchronic and diachronic axes, the pictorial sign realizes the no less important individual shaping of the same relationship. Among numerous other consequences which still need to be considered, the most important result may be that a semiotically satisfying treatment of the sign in its mediating function can only succeed if assigned its pictorial-linguistic dual role. References Bühler, Karl 1934: Sprachtheorie. Die Darstellungsfunktion der Sprache, Jena: Fischer. Gillen, Eckhart 1975: “ Von der symbolischen Repräsentation zur Neukonstruktion der Wirklichkeit. Das Verhältnis von Bildstatistik und politischer Grafik bei Gerd Arntz ” , in: Neue Gesellschaft für bildende Kunst (Hrsg.): Politische Konstruktivisten. Die “ Gruppe progressiver Künstler ” , Cologne. Exhibition catalogue. Berlin. Humboldt, Wilhelm von 1976: Über die Sprache. Ausgewählte Schriften. Edited with an epilogue and commented by Jürgen Trabant, München: DTV 1985. Kant, Immanuel: Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Ed. by Wilhelm Weischedel, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Roberstein, Herbert 1969: “ Wiener Methode der Bildstatistik ” und “ International System of Typographic Picture Education ” (ISOTYPE). Informative Graphik und Bildhafte Pädagogik, Diss. Hamburg. Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 1880: Die philosophischen Schriften, Vol. 4. ed. by C. J. Gerhardt, Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung. Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 1904: Hauptschriften zur Grundlegung der Philosophie, Reviewed with introductions and explanations by Ernst Cassirer. Bd. 1, Leipzig: Meiner. Lotman, Jurij M. 1973: Die Struktur des künstlerischen Textes, Edited with an epilogue and with an index by Rainer Grübel, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Lullus, Raimundus 1971: Logica Nova. Logicalia Parva, De quinque praedicabilibus et decem praedicamentis. With an introduction by Chr. Lohr. Reprint of the Palma de Mallorca edition 1944, Frankfurt: Minerva. Martinet, André 1949: “ La double articulation linguistique ” , in: Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague 5 (1949) 30 - 37. Martinet, Andre 1963: Grundzüge der Allgemeinen Sprachwissenschaft. 3rd ed., Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. Neurath, Otto 1980: Internationale Bildersprache. A facsimile reprint of the English edition (1936) with a German translation by Marie Neurath, University of Reading. Neurath, Otto 1927: “ Bildliche Darstellung gesellschaftlicher Tatbestände ” , in: Die Quelle 77: 1 (1927) 130 - 136. Sello, Katrin 1975: “ Das herausgenommene Ich ” , in: Neue Gesellschaft für bildende Kunst (Hrsg.): Politische Konstruktivisten. Die “ Gruppe progressiver Künstler ” Cologne. Exhibition catalogue. Berlin. Stadler, Friedrich 1982: Vom Positivismus zur wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung, Vienna: Locker. Wilkins, John 1984: Mercury: Or the Secret and Swift Messenger. Showing how a Man may with Privacy and Speed communicate his Thoughts to a Friend at any distance. With an introductory essay by Brigitte Asbach-Schnitker. Reprint der 3. Aufl. 1708, Amsterdam-Philadelphia: John Benjamins. Visual Language. Isotype and the Limits.Bildsprache. Isotype und die Grenzen. (1996) 155 K O D I K A S / C O D E 44 (2021) · No. 1 - 3 Gunter Narr Verlag Tübingen Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory. Charles W. Morris ’ dreidimensionale Semiotik & die Textheorie (1975) Abstract: In its essay, Eschbach describes the collection of essays of the great American philosopher and psychologist C. W. Morris on pragmatically oriented semiotics and aesthetics, in conjunction with the ‘ third part ’ of the major work. This collection provides for the first time a well-rounded impression of his extensive studies on semiotics and axiology. He describes in detail the main assumptions and development in Morris ’ work. Eschbach presents it as much more appropriate to Morris ’ s approach to a threedimensional semiotics to value the characterization of certain artworks by iconic features as an additional justification; other components of three-dimensional semiotics, mentioned in the essay are pushed into the background by the concept of iconicity, are thereby more satisfactorily taken into account, so that the actual, further-reaching contributions of Morris ’ s semiotics come to the fore. Regardless of individual difficulties and necessary clarifications, however, it has become clear that the comprehensive Morris approach and the constant effort to verify obtained results against reality have had great theoretical and practical significance for a variety of scientific disciplines and, with more careful study of the writings that are only now slowly becoming known, will continue to have so in the future. 1.1 Characterization of the writings of C. W. Morris already available in German language This collection of essays on pragmatically oriented semiotics and aesthetics, in conjunction with the ‘ third part ’ of the major work of the great American philosopher and psychologist C. W. Morris, provides for the first time a well-rounded impression of his extensive studies on semiotics and axiology. Although S. Ceccato ’ s Italian translation of Signs, Language, and Behavior (Morris 1949) appeared as early as 1949, and F. Rossi-Landi ’ s translation and commentary of Foundations of the Theory of Signs (Morris 1963) appeared in 1963, it is only today that the importance of Morris ’ s work is generally recognized in the international philosophical and social science literature. As K. O. Apel states in his introduction to the German edition of Signs, Language, and Behavior (Morris 1973), one reason why Morris ’ semiotic considerations did not find an immediate entry into the contemporary discussion is primarily to be found in the “ program of a synthesis of the logical empiricism spread by the emigrants of the ‘ Vienna Circle ’ in America, which he himself temporarily brought to the fore, with the native pragmatism represented by G. H. Mead and J. Dewey in Chicago ” (ibid.: 9). Moreover, with his three-dimensional semiotics, inaugurated in 1938, Morris primarily intended to complete the “ empirical ” aspects of the syntactically and semantically oriented analysis of scientific language, which had been neglected by the logical positivists. Only the hierarchization of the three semiotic dimensions syntactics, semantics and pragmatics and thus the turning away from the restriction of a merely descriptive analysis of scientific language led in 1946 to the expansion of the semiotic field of investigation and to the construction of a pragmatically integrated semiotics. Today, Morris ’ s position as the most important representative of twentieth-century semiotics is widely recognized, as reflected in the increasing interest in comprehensive analyses of signs in a variety of studies across a wide range of disciplines. Here, linguistic and communication studies are to be mentioned above all; Morris ’ s considerations, however, also found their way into film, radio, propaganda, advertising, and architectural analyses and strongly influenced the discussion about a semiotic aesthetics (cf. Eschbach 1974). In 1972, Foundations of Sign Theory appeared together with the essay Aesthetics and Sign Theory (Morris 1972). This first programmatic writing of only 70 pages, in which Morris for the first time presented his ideas about the structure of a general sign theory in a systematic form, established Morris ’ s reputation as an outstanding sign theorist. As before, the foundations of sign theory form the starting point of all semiotic work. Morris introduces in this paper, besides the processual definition of the sign influenced by the Chicago pragmatists, the division of semiotics into the three dimensions syntactics, semantics and pragmatics, which has since become indispensable from the semiotic discussion. He writes: On the one hand, one can investigate the relation between signs and the objects to which they are applicable. This relation we call the semantic dimension of the sign process, [ … ] Or one makes the relation between sign and interpreter the object of investigation. This relation we call the pragmatic dimension of the sign process [ … ]. One important sign relation is still to be mentioned: the formal relation of signs to each other. [ … ] We call this third dimension the syntactic dimension of the sign process (ibid 24 f.). Morris conceives these three dimensions of semiotics merely as aspects of equal importance in a unified sign process, which, however, he subordinates in praxi to the primacy of semantic relation by abstracting the pragmatic aspect. This reduction of the more comprehensively conceived scheme to the syntactic and semantic analysis of scientific language, which has long been pursued by scientific logicians, and which is considered the starting and reference point of later, only limitedly relevant applications to “ psychological ” empirical problems, falls behind already gained insights of early pragmatism, which are only caught up in 1946 in Signs, Language and Behavior by the pragmatic foundation in behavior (action; cf. below section 2.3.). The conception of semiotics represented in this first formulation of his theory of signs is determined by its relation to the encyclopedia initiated under the decisive influence of the Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) 157 logical positivists. Semiotics is conceived both as a single science among other sciences and as a means of all other sciences. The most important function of semiotics as a science would be to provide a suitable basis for the integration of the sciences via the concept of signs. As a means of the other sciences, semiotics would become an organon. As already mentioned, Morris subscribes here to Carnap ’ s notions “ that the study of science can be completely absorbed in the study of the language of science ” (ibid.: 19). Certainly, it should be noted here by way of explanation that Morris, in making this statement, assumes a communicatively conceived concept of language, which not only addresses formal structures, but by definition also addresses the relationship to the designated objects and the language users; this conception of the three irreducible and equally important perspectives of semiotics to be taken into account in the respective research process, whose integrating moment would be a more comprehensive pure and descriptive semiotics, however, does not allow for a “ concrete notion that, for instance, the syntactic and semantic rules of theory languages point back to a pragmatic foundation in the actions of the community of scientists through the underlying conventions and the possible empirical interpretations ” . In the essay Aesthetics and Sign Theory, published together with the Foundations of Sign Theory, Morris argues that a semiotics conceived in terms of the Foundations of Sign Theory is significant for art and aesthetics in the same way as for other sciences, for the signtheoretical conception of aesthetics, which as a subfield of general semiotics itself consists of the three dimensions of aesthetic syntactics, aesthetic semantics, and aesthetic pragmatics, conceives of the work of art as an aesthetic sign whose analysis is merely a special case of general sign analysis. 1 As is also evident in this understanding of semiotic aesthetics, ultimately the unified science envisioned in the Encyclopedia should result from the study of linguistic relations between the scientific languages of the various individual sciences and their integration, and not from the discovery of universally valid regularities in reality, to the validity of which all sciences are subject. In his 1946 book Signs, Language, and Behaviour (which went through four editions in America alone by 1950), Morris revisits the discussion of signs begun in Foundations of the Theory of Signs and systematically examines how a science of both linguistic and nonlinguistic signs can be developed and the function of semiotics in relation to other sciences. In his effort to provide a unified language for discussing sign phenomena from a wide variety of fields, Morris takes a more strongly behavioral approach than in Foundations of Sign Theory. Signs, Language, and Behavior, however, represents not only a more careful elaboration and realization of various program points formulated earlier. In this work Morris makes some essential modifications to his first conception, which K. O. Apel points out in his introduction to the German edition. The connection between semiotics and axiology addressed in the Fundamentals of Sign Theory and especially in Aesthetics and Sign Theory in connection with the discussion of the 1 For a more detailed discussion of the problems of iconicity, the aesthetic sign, and the understanding of semiotic aesthetics, see section 2.7 below.) 158 Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) aesthetic sign undergoes a more detailed elaboration. In 1939 Morris had determined the aesthetic sign as an iconic sign whose designatum is a value. It must be particularly emphasized in this conception that in a complex aesthetic sign, which is by definition iconic, “ at least some individual sign carriers must be iconic signs and at least partly of the same character as the complex sign itself ” (Morris 1972: 100). Morris modifies this conception in Signs, Language, and Behavior to remove the previous restriction of the iconic sign to the appraisive mode of signification. Morris still describes a work of art primarily as an icon composed of iconic signs, but these partial signs can also signify in the designative, prescriptive, and formative modes of signification (Morris 1973: 295). The stronger emphasis on value theory - which, however, finds its actual version in his explicitly value-theoretical writings and in Signification and Significance - and the differentiation in designation mode and application form of signs leads him to abandon iconicity as an absolute criterion of the arts (ibid.: 297) and to seek the common characteristic of the arts of different linguistic media primarily “ in their valuative use of signs ” (ibid.), “ designating their target objects with the additional requirement that the manner of sign use must awaken its own positive evaluation of the target objects ” (ibid.). In this context, no sign is aesthetic per se, as Morris had assumed in Aesthetics and the Theory of Signs, but it is determined by its particular use. 2 In addition to this change in the functioning and place of iconic signs within the framework of semiotic aesthetics, which will be discussed below in the larger context of his further pronouncements on aesthetics, Morris undertakes a far-reaching revision of his three-dimensional semiotics in Signs, Language, and Behaviour. On the one hand, Morris wishes to distance himself from some of the uses of these subdivisions that he believes obscure rather than illuminate problems; on the other hand, he wishes to clarify his own definitions based on later analyses. Most importantly, Morris lifted the restriction of semiotics to studies of language; “ the study of the structure of languages other than scientific ones must be made possible, modes of signification other than designative ones must be treated in semiotics and this in turn requires certain modifications in the formulation of pragmatics ” (Morris 1973: 327). Since Morris sets the stage for a pragmatically oriented semiotics with this reformulation of the three dimensions of semiotics, it will be quoted at length: Pragmatics is that part of semiotics which deals with the origin, uses, and effects of signs in particular behavior; semantics deals with the denotation of signs in all denotations; syntactics deals with combinations of signs without considering their specific denotations or their relation to the particular behavior (ibid.: 326). This new conception emphasizes the unity of semiotics to a much greater extent than the first formulation in the Fundamentals of the Theory of Signs and deliberately places the abstraction of individual aspects for the purpose of special investigations in the background (cf. also Resnikow 1963: 105). 2 (Cf. note 5 on p. 297 of Signs, Language, and Behavior, where Morris is critical of his stance taken in Aesthetics and Sign Theory. Among other things, he writes: “ My present stance is more general, since the determination of the arts by valuative sign use does not require that signs in the arts be iconic or belong to the appraisitive mode of signification. Iconic and appraisative sign are still of primordial importancs in arts. ” Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) 159 Parallel to this reorientation of his semiotics runs the increasingly communicationtheoretical orientation, which - in addition to an explicitly interdisciplinary working method, which was only taken up again in this form many years later - leads to a definition of “ language ” supported by five criteria: 1) a language consists of a multiplicity of sign types; 2) language participants have common sign designations; 3) language participants must be able to produce the signs, with the same designation for speaker and hearer; 4) the signs of a language must be applicable in a multiplicity of situations, and 5) the signs of a language must be organized by a combination system (cf. ibid.: 113 ff.). In addition to this far-reaching definition of language, which will be examined elsewhere, it remains to mention the increased emphasis on the concept of discourse. Morris arrives at his proposal of classifying different language specializations by combining the modes of signification and forms of sign application. According to him, one of the four modes of signification (designative, appraisative, prescriptive, and formative) turns out to be dominant in every text; likewise, a text is characterized by the primary use of one of the four possible forms of sign application (informative, valuative, incisive, and systemic). The union of these two coordinates leads to his well-known scheme of the 16 main types of discourse, which he by no means understands as definitions, but as attempts and suggestions for problem-solving (cf. ibid.: 215 ff.). 3 1.2 Some remarks on the selection of texts in this volume present volume For an easier overview of Morris ’ s extensive work, it is best to divide it into semiotic and axiological writings. The semiotic works as a whole, show a high degree of coherence; nevertheless, it must not be overlooked that Morris emphasized different aspects to different degrees in the course of his long research work, that there are not only gradual differences between the early statements on semiotics and the “ third part ” of his semiotic main work Signification and Significance, and that Morris also uses different terminologies in his various writings. Here it will be suggested that the semiotic studies be divided into three main sections: 1. the writings up to the formulation of the foundations of sign theory 2. the writings up to Signs, Language, and Behavior and 3. the writings after Signs, Language, and Behavior: up to The Pragmatic Movement in American Philosophy (cf. also Geckeler 1971). To the first part belong some reviews, such as that of G. Lanoe-Villène: Le Livre des Symboles (1927), or of A. Spaier: La Pensée Concrète: Essai sur le symbolisme intellectuel (1929); besides the essay The Concept of the Symbol of 1927, reprinted in the present volume, some essays on the theory of mind and especially the monograph Six Theories of Mind (1932) are to be mentioned. In 1935, the essay Semiotic and Scientific Empiricism appeared in the 3 This classification and extraction of possible text types entails a multitude of problems, which will be addressed in section 2.6. G. Klaus has made several attempts to use this Morrisian description model for the analysis of agitation and propaganda (cf. Klaus 1969a and Klaus 1971; cf. also Breuer 1971). Resnikov overlooks the fact that Morris ’ s conception of the types of discourse is not concerned with a typology of signs, but with the mode of action and use of signs in specific contextual situations (cf. Resnikow 1963: 115)). 160 Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) Congress Acts of the International Congress of Scientific Philosophy, and was reprinted in 1937 in the collection of essays Logical Positivism, Pragmatism and Scientific Empiricism. Prior to the publication of The Foundation of the Theory of Signs (1938), Morris wrote the introduction to G. H. Mead ’ s Mind, Self and Society. From the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist (1934) as well as an extensive introduction to G. H. Mead ’ s The Philosophy of the Act (1938). This first phase is further marked by the essay Aesthetics and the Theory of Signs (1939), already available in German, and the widely disregarded Science, Art and Technology. Most of these essays and reviews only marginally address the semiotic question that later became the focus of interest. They are interesting, however, because they already reflect the wide circle of later research work, these early works provide the closest insight into Morris ’ s efforts to synthesize the work of the Chicago pragmatists and the European empiricists, and finally they provide information about which influences (e. g. the editions of Mead ’ s lectures) were applied. Between the years 1939 and the first edition of Signs, Language and Behavior in 1946, Morris dealt with a variety of problems and engaged in extensive research that led, as far as semiotics was concerned, to the essays Semiotic, the Socio-Humanistic Sciences, and the Unity of Science (1940), an appreciation of the American painter Raymond Jonson and a discussion of the relationship between painting and semiotics in the essay The Search for a Life of Significance (1941), a discussion of content analysis in the commentary on A. Kaplan ’ s essay Content Analysis and the Theory of Signs (1943), and a discussion paper on the relation of linguistics and semiotics in Linguistics and the Theory of Signs (1946). This second phase finds its mark in the highly successful work Signs, Language, and Behavior. In the third section of his work, Morris is primarily concerned with the application of his proposed procedures. In a number of smaller essays, Morris primarily examines the relationship between painting and semiotics and reviews his proposed analyses of the “ aesthetic sign. ” Likewise, he attempts to clarify his descriptive model of the 16 possible major types of discourse proposed in Signs, Language, and Behavior. The third aspect of his work during this period is the intensified effort to arrive at a more adequate version of the problem of aesthetics in a synthesis of axiology and semiotics, following a more mature formulation of his ideas of axiology in Varieties of Human Value. The conclusion of this phase, supported by increased empirical research, is his book Signification and Significance and the essay Aesthetics, Signs and Icons (1965). This chronological overview of Morris ’ s semiotic works, which can be completed by a look at the bibliography, was primarily intended to illuminate, in a flashlight-like manner, the periphery of Morris ’ s three main semiotic works. As has already been indicated several times, his work is by no means limited to semiotic investigations. Much space is taken up by philosophical works on pragmatism, logical and scientific empiricism, efforts for a unified science and aesthetic studies, which in turn are directed towards semiotic and axiological studies or are based on them. The present collection of selections endeavors to achieve three main goals: 1) to give an impression of Morrisian development through the essays drawn from all three phases; 2) the essays have been selected from the perspective of showing the most essential components of the third major semiotic work in their interrelatedness; and 3) the present selection intends to make some corrections to previous Morris reception, which has all too often been limited to the basics of sign theory or signs, language, and behavior, neglecting denotation and Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) 161 meaning as well as the multiplicity of essays, and thus very often producing a distorted picture. The essays and Designation and Meaning printed in the present volume have been arranged in chronological order. In the essay The Symbol Concept, ten years before the foundations of sign theory, Morris discusses the sign problem for the first time in largely behaviorist terms. After a detailed critique of the older behaviorist position, he defines the symbol from the standpoint of a pragmatically determined radical empiricism as follows: “ A symbol is some given or experienced vicarious stimulus which leads to a reinstatement of the original stimulus in a form observable only from the self-inclusive view ” (Morris 1975: 89 f.), i. e., a symbol is “ some set of experiences which has become a proxy or memory of some other set of experiences. ” Thus, by overcoming the introspectionism verdict of the older behaviorism, the goal of this symbol definition is, on the one hand, to capture the dynamic character of the symbol in a processual definition and, on the other hand, to retain observable consequences, i. e., symbols are tied to social interaction but need not necessarily result in observable responses by the individuals using the symbol. The treatment of the symbol is very closely related to the discussion of ‘ sense ’ . Morris gives an impression of his view on the connection of ‘ sense ’ , ‘ designation ’ and ‘ meaning ’ in the fifth section of the concept of symbol. In doing so, he determines the stimulus object, of which the symbol is a proxy, to be the sense of the symbol. Morris substantiates and extends this notion in the following paper, The Concept of Meaning in Pragmatism and Logical Positivism. Here he endeavors to seek out the historical sources of pragmatism and empiricism, in order to explore their complementary aspects. Using the concept of meaning, which he understands only in the sense of designation and not of meaning, he directs attention to the questions of the extent to which ‘ meaning ’ is determined by individual or social factors, and what relations exist between the formal and empirical aspects of ‘ meaning ’ . In his view, the formal and biological-empirical aspects are essentially correlative and complementary explanations. Meaning is then conceived not as an event but, in the tradition of the Chicago pragmatists, as a functional process. In the essay Semiotics and Scientific Empiricism, Morris attempts to demonstrate that a semiotically based empiricism, which he elsewhere calls scientific empiricism, can unite the essential merits from formalism, traditional empiricism, and pragmatism. After a detailed review of the history of older empiricism, which finds a pragmatic counterpart in the work of Peirce, James, Mead, and Dewey, and is complemented by the formal sciences, Morris concludes that grounding these three historical components of empiricism in a behavioral semiotics will lead to interesting results. Morris elaborates this notion in the following section, where he follows up on his earlier reflections on the concept of symbol and meaning and determines the “ total ” meaning of a sign as the sum of the three dimensions of meaning (existential dimension, pragmatic dimension, and formal dimension). Only the exploration of all three dimensions of sense constitutes semiotic science, which Morris calls in this essay “ the novum organon of the special sciences and the philosophy of scientific empiricism. ” In Peirce, Mead, and Pragmatism, Morris pursues three main interests. In a detailed discussion, he attempts to arrive at the formulation of his characteristic understanding of ‘ pragmatism ’ by comparing Peirce ’ s views with those of his teacher G. H. Mead. In doing so, 162 Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) Morris emphasizes 1) the sign-theoretical foundation of his understanding of pragmatism; 2) the relation of sign and thought; and 3) the relation of thought and social action. These three significant features lead to his broader understanding of empiricism formulated elsewhere. Morris clarifies in Signs about Signs about Signs some terminological issues that arose in the reception of his work Signs, Language, and Behavior. (These issues will be taken up in the following point.) Furthermore, in this essay Morris takes the opportunity to include various critical contributions to the discussion of his book Signs, Language, and Behavior, or to clear up some ambiguities and apparent misunderstandings. As the subtitle to Morris ’ s third major semiotic work, “ An Inquiry into the Relations of Signs and Values, ” indicates, after years of study of semiotics and axiology, an attempt is made here to combine these two areas of research from the perspective of Mead ’ s theory of action. The concept of meaning, which has already been dealt with in detail in earlier writings, undergoes the final explanation under the semiotic-axiological approach that the bipolar concept of meaning is differentiated into a (semiotic) designation aspect and an (axiological) meaning or value aspect of what is designated. The clarification of designation and meaning and their mutual dependencies in the overall context of human behavior takes up large parts of this book. The reason why designation and meaning is referred to here as the third and with the foundations of sign theory and sign, language and behavior equal independent tell of the semiotic research work of C. W. Morris is to be sought in the fact that again some farreaching changes or pointings are made to the existing model. The sign process is again more closely tied to the philosophy of action of G. H. Mead, latent in the earliest conception but relegated to the background in Signs, Language, and Behavior. This reorientation leads to changes in the terms ‘ designation ’ and ‘ sign behavior ’ and takes up the objections to the formative mode of designation expressed in some reviews of Signs, Language, and Behavior. The extensive axiological studies lead to some changes or reweightings to the earlier conception of semiotic aesthetics. The differentiation of the various forms of values, the emphasis on the involvement of art in the process of social, human behavior, and the demonstration of some experimental analytical procedures make this new conception possible. Finally, it should be noted that Morris, in addition to his considerations of sign and value theory, also examines the question of what role signs play in personality disorders. Already in Signs, Language, and Behavior he devoted a separate section to this question. In the following years, a number of interesting research reports appeared, which Morris takes up and deepens in Designation and Meaning. The essay Aesthetics, Sign, and Icon concludes the present collection. This essay is of special interest because it takes up the considerations of 1938 - 39 (with the inclusion of Science, Art, and Technology) and resumes the discussion of the iconicity of the “ aesthetic sign ” against the background of the discussion of art that has since passed. Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) 163 1.3 The Morris Terminology Certainly, G. Klaus is right when he writes that the translation of Morris ’ s terminology into German must necessarily contain elements of conventional fixing (Klaus 1969a: 64). The translation work is further complicated by the fact that the terminology varies in the different works. The present edition largely follows the terminology chosen in the translation of Signs, Speech, and Behavior. However, this consistency is abandoned in three main places. Undoubtedly, Morris strove to build a consistent language of science whose terminology leaves the existing language of science behind in order to arrive at a more adequate and unambiguous description of the subject matter by means of a variety of neologisms. As R. Posner points out in the preface to Grundlagen der Zeichentheorie and W. Altenhoff to the German translation of Zeichen, Sprache und Verhalten, there are often no corresponding terms in the existing German language of science. On the other hand, however, it should be pointed out that Morris ’ main aim with his terminology was to organize his own thoughts and only secondarily thought of opening research perspectives with his neologisms. 4 But where there are common expressions in the semiotic discussion, it is not clear why the creation of difficult-to-understand equivalents modeled on the English terms should unnecessarily complicate the reception. Therefore, in the present work we speak of ‘ signification ’ , ‘ to signify ’ , ‘ significance ’ , ‘ meaning ’ , ‘ denotation ’ , ‘ importance ’ and ‘ sense ’ . 5 The choice of the term ‘ social science ’ instead of the term ‘ behaviorism ’ used in Signs, Language and Behavior was based on the fact that the latter term is too close to 4 Rossi-Landi writes about this “ A critiche del genere Morris risponde the non è possibile classificare con i termini vaghi del linguaggio quotidiano ogni nova tecnica deve pur crearsi una sua terminologia. Il principo è sano; ma la terminologia di Morris è scarsamente entrata nell ’ uso, the anzi l ’ autore stesso sembra averla lasciata perdere: ciò sembra confermare the essa rispondesse più al bisogno di mettere ordine che a scoperte, nuove e destinate a rimanere, nel senso della profondità. Aggiungiamo però che essa può servire tuttora come utile base di discussione e raffinamento ” (Rossi-Landi 1953a: 28 f.). 5 The decision for this terminology, which does not correspond in every point with the common usage, is based on the term ‘ significance ’ , which also implies the concept of being valuable in German and thus seems to be a suitable term for describing a state of affairs axiologically intended by Morris (cf. Stiehl 1970: 71). The parallel semiotic term ‘ Bezeichnung ’ , which indicates the relation of the (linguistic) sign to reality, is preferred to the term ‘ Signifikation ’ chosen in Zeichen, Sprache und Verhalten. On the background of these decisions, which can be based on Bochenski 1956: 25 ff. and e. g. the Habermasian terminology in Erkenntnis und Interesse, we speak of ‘ meaning ’ when both designation and the resulting interpretant are the subject of discussion. Morris writes in a July 29, 1974 letter to the author “ If used technically terms such as Sinn and Bedeutung need clarification. To me ,meaning is as questionable a term as ,meaning - which I do not use as a primitive term for semiotic. ” In the same letter, he refers to pages 2 to 11 of Bezeichnung und Bedeutung for clarification of terminological problems (cf. such Eco 1972: 70 ff.). In the second volume of this Morris edition, which is expected to be presented in the summer of 1976 and will essentially deal with Morris ’ works on pragmatism, we want to discuss these terminological questions also in connection with the scholastic , Tractatus de modis significandi, whereby we do not aim at finding Morris ’ semiotics ,again in the works of the scholastic modists, but we want to record the largely unknown fact that - with almost entirely different intentions - a strikingly similar terminological structure has developed. The comparison turns out to be not only illuminating for Morris ’ s theory, but also an interesting indication for the history of semiotics, which is still to be written in (cf. Schnelle 1962: 20). 164 Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) ‘ behaviorism ’ , and it would be a serious misunderstanding of Morris to label him as a behaviorist. As will be discussed in 2.4. below, Morris ’ s position is much more accurately captured by the broader conception of a behavioral science inaugurated by Tolman and Hull and by Mead ’ s social philosophy of action. Thus, the term ‘ behavioristics ’ used by Morris should be oriented towards practice, human activity in general. The term “ social sciences ” used here seems to correspond more to these demands (cf. Rossi-Landi 1973: 18). In fixing his terminology, Morris has deliberately chosen the endings on ‘ um ’ , ‘ or ’ and ‘ is ’ , which are prominent in the English language. These endings in, for example, ‘ denotatum ’ , ‘ formator ’ and ‘ semiosis ’ have often been overlooked or neglected. In Signs about Signs about Signs Morris explains his decision by pointing out that the ‘ or ’ and ‘ um ’ endings are used to distinguish what is signified from what is signified. The ‘ is ’ ending in ‘ Semiosis ’ chosen by Morris in Signs, Language, and Behavior overlooks the German translation; the Germanization ‘ Semiose ’ undercuts the explicitly processual aspect that the ending is intended to suggest already in the linguistic form. Thus, it is by no means only a matter of “ cumbersome endings ” , which W. Altenhoff thinks he can omit without further ado, while he writes elsewhere: “ In the choice of suitable German terms, therefore, some considerations must be taken into account which have led to the German text appearing at first glance perhaps more difficult to read than it should ” (Morris 1973, Preface: 67). Obviously, this statement refers only to the neologisms he suggests, such as ‘ Behavioristik ’ / ‘ behaviorism ’ or ‘ Appreziation ’ / ’ appreciation ’ , while elsewhere, as indicated above, he proceeds very inconsistently and discards aids offered by Morris. 2.1 Semiotics, Axiology and Scientific Empiricism In his more than fifty years of research, C. W. Morris has been concerned mainly with two questions: the construction of a general semiotics and the elaboration of a comprehensive axiology. These two areas of research, which Morris strove to integrate early on, however, represent only the culmination of psychological, philosophical, sociological, biological, psychopathological, aesthetic, anthropological, religious considerations. From these manifold interests results a semiotic-axiological model of description, which, due to its broad approach, wants to claim to become an instrument of all sciences. Morris can be considered today as the most important representative of semiotics of the twentieth century. This comprehensive signand value-theoretical research approach has made Morris known “ far beyond the borders of his subject and country ” (Morris 1972, epilogue: 128), which cannot mean, however, that his considerations could be accepted in the desired way. Rossi-Landi hints at these difficulties in his latest essay: “ Morris surpassed the environment in which he happened to live; he was ahead of his time. Precisely because of this he was so much attacked and disturbed in his work - especially by philosophers, who by their ontological nature are quarrelsome, intolerant, and above all always terrified by new and creative ideas ” (Rossi-Landi 1973: 30). Certainly, however, not all criticism against Morris ’ s system can be dismissed as unjustified. The later passages of the introduction will take up some specific problems; at this point, some of the sources that influenced Morris ’ s philosophy or were taken up, modified, and developed by him will be visited. Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) 165 After years of study at the University of Wisconsin and Northwestern University, where Morris began studying engineering and later turned to biology, psychology, and philosophy, he studied at the University of Chicago from 1922 to 1925, when A. W. Moore, J. H. Tufts, E. S. Ames, and especially G. H. Mead and J. Dewey formed the “ Chicago Pragmatist School, ” as W. James and C. S. Peirce called these social-psychological-philosophical thinkers. This name suggests a homogeneity of interests, which actually consisted only in the general orientation towards the broad field of cultural phenomena; the processual analysis of social interaction pursued in many respects represented the actual basis of integration. J. Dewey is considered the real leader of the pragmatic movement. Morris, however, was influenced to a much greater extent by his teacher G. H. Mead, whose philosophical version of social psychology he later compiled, annotated and edited from lecture notes in collaboration with some Chicago colleagues (Mead 1968 as well as Mead 1938). If the Chicago pragmatists were oriented to the general trend of Dewey ’ s way of thinking, their independent, constructive work should not be overlooked. In his extensive philosophical work, Dewey had dealt primarily with ethical questions; Moore examined primarily logical problems; Tufts was specifically interested in ethical and aesthetic problems; and Ames is best described as a philosopher of religion. Morris attended lectures and seminars by all four philosophers, but focused his studies on Mead ’ s philosophy of action, the importance of which is only now generally recognized. It has often been overlooked in the literature that Morris did not become acquainted with Peirce ’ s philosophy until later in life. His actual starting point is Meadian philosophy, besides which the influence of the other Chicago philosophers and C.L Lewis became especially valid; in the following years Morris dealt with C. S. Peirce and. R Carnap. Mead, who had studied with W. James and in Berlin, among others, taught psychology and philosophy in Chicago, with his social psychology as the central focus. Mead ’ s comprehensive cosmological orientation had a lasting effect on Morris ’ s later attitude. Without being able to go into the philosophical-psychological implications of Mead ’ s social philosophy more intensively at this point, however, it can be stated that Morris gained his pragmatic orientation during these Chicago years, which is to be characterized by its comprehensive sociological interest, its processual interaction analysis, and its cosmologically oriented semiotics and axiology. 6 The particular Morrisian philosophy, scientific empiricism, is based on another philosophical current, namely, the ‘ philosophy of language ’ in the broadest sense, developed in the thirties of the twentieth century. The analytic philosophy of the Cambridge school, the Vienna circle, but also the Lviv and Warsaw schools of logic can be characterized on the basis of their common interest in logical analysis of language and the common endeavor to formulate all problems in (natural) scientific language (or to declassify them to ‘ pseudo-problems ’ in case of failure of this method). In the Vienna Circle, which was under the particular influence of M. Schlick and R. Carnap, three main tendencies can be distinguished: a) early empiricism, as advocated by Hume, Mill, and Mach; b) symbolic logic; and c) the logical analysis of language, pursued especially by G. Frege, B. Russell, A. N. Whitehead, and L. Wittgenstein (Kraft 1968). 6 Cf. for a more detailed account of the “ Chicago Pragmatist School ” Morris 1970 and SMITH 1952. 166 Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) Characteristic of the Vienna Circle is thus the connection of (natural) scientific-experimental research with the construction of a scientific language conceived according to logical rules, which should serve as an instrument of linguistic integration of the sciences in the direction of a unified science. In addition to this movement toward the ‘ unity of science ’ , A. Tarski ’ s semantic studies and L Wittgenstein ’ s linguistic analyses must be mentioned in order to understand Morris ’ s attempt to fuse American, pragmatic philosophy with European, logical empiricism in a unified doctrine, scientific empiricism. The goal of this scientific empiricism, too, is to arrive at a unified science based on the language of science, but tied to and verified in reality through sociological and biological investigations and controls of pragmatism. Morris ’ s contribution to the construction of scientific empiricism, which wants to become a new science of man, is to be found above all in his fundamental work on sign theory and value theory and in his active efforts at the philosophers ’ congresses of the 1930s or his collaboration as editor of the “ International Encyclopedia of Unified Science ” and vice-presidency of the Institute for “ Unified Science ” . His behavioral semiotics is therefore based on a theory of language that he drew from logical positivism in his early writings Morris, however, did not limit his work to a descriptive account of the language of science, but established a general theory of signs in use. His behavioral approach lets him understand the communicative situation from the functional context of linguistic signs and the sign behavior motivated (but not determined) by them. Habermas points out that. In his early writings Morris turns against G. H. Mead ’ s theory of language insofar as “ the equality of meaning of symbols presupposed for linguistic communication is not already fulfilled by the uniformity of the reactions per se, but only by the mutual anticipation of the same response behavior ” (cf. Habermas 1970: 150 ff.). Morris overcomes this weakness of the foundations of sign theory and also still of sign, language and behavior in his third, and in this respect most important, semiotic major work Denotation and Meaning where he states that sign theory and value theory are to be investigated in the terms of action or behavior theory as it has essentially been developed by G. H. Mead (Morris 1975: 195 f.). The comprehensive behavioral approach has often led to the misunderstanding that Morris wants to use the instrument of his sign theory “ to judge forms of society on the basis of their mode of communication. The control of the means of communication is thus declared to be the criterion in the assessment of a form of government. Morris wants to read off the democratic content of a community from the degree of private opinion formation ” (Neubert 1962: 75; cf. also Albrecht 1959: 135) 7 . Neubert ’ s criticism of the global claim of the Vienna Circle and the exaggerations and misjudgements of the “ General Semantics ” is certainly justified. However, he overlooks the fact that the relation of language and society is a dialectical relation. Words, once created, develop a relative autonomy and in turn influence the future actions of people. The ,General Semanticist confines his attention exclusively to the empirical relation between words and things, and can therefore grasp only a fragment of the broader relations and more fundamental laws; but it was Morris who determined this word-thing relation as one part of 7 Resnikow also argues that Morris ’ s “ fetishization of signs ” shows his strong influence by general semantics (cf. Resnikow 1963: 114). Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) 167 the three integral elements of the signifying process. Moreover, in his opinion, sign behavior is only one form of human behavior; sign difficulties Morris mentions, in his opinion, arise much more from man ’ s other (social) problems than they cause them (cf. Morris 1973: 288 - 324 as well as Morris 1975: 304 ff.; cf. also Klaus 1969a: 30 ff.). 2.2 Basic lines of Morris ’ s research work Morris has devoted years of research to a critical analysis of logical positivism, traditional empiricism, and pragmatism; pointing out the essential defects of these specific directions and positions led him to a view he calls scientific empiricism. In his view, traditional empiricism suffers from 1) a lack of consideration of the formal sciences (logic and mathematics); 2) an inability to epistemologically combine an empirical theory of meaning with a naturalistic cosmology; and 3) a clear tendency toward individualistic subjectivism. As will be addressed below, these deficiencies run parallel to the neglect of one of the three dimensions of meaning required for a comprehensive analysis of meaning. Pragmatism, in the course of its development, became particularly receptive to the biological sciences, while logical positivism concentrated its efforts mainly on the logical analysis of language, making use of mathematical logic and physics. The scientific empiricism envisaged by Morris was to fulfill the function of clarifying convincingly for the first time the relation between the logical and the biological. 8 Despite apparent divergences and real differences between pragmatism and logical positivism, Morris sees in an empirical analysis of meaning a possibility of integration that would “ include the results of socially cooperative science and do justice to the logical, biological, and empirical aspects of the symbolic process ” (Morris 1975: 112). His conception of scientific empiricism is thus based on expanding the two tendencies ‘ logical analysis of language ’ and ‘ empirical theory of meaning ’ and orienting them to scientific methods and results. 9 This scientific empiricism is based on a three-dimensional semiotics, which unites the most important results from formalism, traditional empiricism 8 In this context, it should also be noted that Morris does not seek to identify semiotics and philosophy. Although Carnap vigorously asserted that “ all philosophy is ‘ linguistic criticism, ’” Morris distances himself from this view in note 11 on page 344 of Signs, Language, and Behaviour ” . In the Grounds of the Theory of Signs I spoke on p. 88 of the ‘ identification of philosophy with the theory of signs and the integration of science by its orientation to the more general and systematic points of view of pure and descriptive semiotics-an identification which now seems to me doubtful on the grounds here given. ” Storer suggests that the reason Morris wanted to reject the identification of philosophy and semiotics is to be found in the realization that his characteristic semiotics can be developed and formulated in behavioral terms and therefore falls entirely within the realm of scientific discourse. This identification had to be rejected already because Morris does not want to see philosophy constricted by an empiricist criterion of meaning. Cf. such: designation and meaning, chap. 3, § 6: Semiotics, Axiology, and Philosophy: it need only be pointed out here that these various conceptions of philosophy can be expressed in semiotic and axiological terms, and that philosophical inquiry is itself to be the source (though not the only source) of semiotic and axiological development. ” 9 The integration of the formal sciences into a. scientific empiricism by no means implies the abolition of the distinction between formal and natural sciences. The formal sciences founded by semiotics are understood as specializations in the general context of the study of meaning, their special function being the demonstration of possible accepted symbol combinations (cf. Morris 1975: 122). 168 Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) and pragmatism; 10 semiotics understood in this way endeavors to correct the errors of traditional empiricism by the other two subfields, without breaking with the empirical tradition. Only a comprehensive sign science will be able to provide the general frame of reference to systematize the various detailed investigations and research perspectives and to subject them to a unified concept. Based on this conviction, Morris, after identifying the three possible types of relations that a sign can maintain, formulated the scope of work of the three sub-disciplines: the study of the relation of signs to objects (the analysis of semantic languages) he assigns to the natural sciences and traditional empiricism; the relation of signs to their producers and users (the analysis of colloquial language) is studied by pragmatists, i. e. psychologists, biologists and social scientists; the third type of relation between signs and other signs (the analysis of formal languages) represents the scope of work of logicians, mathematicians and linguists.The third possible relation between signs and other signs (the analysis of formal languages) is the domain of logicians, mathematicians and linguists (cf. Morris 1975: 127). It should be emphasized that none of the three fields of research can describe “ the ” meaning of signs in its totality, but each group of relations covers only one dimension of meaning. The meaning of a sign is only encompassed by a sum of the three dimensions of meaning formed in the sense of scientific empiricism. Semiotics conceived in the perspective of scientific empiricism has two essential functions. On the one hand, as an autonomous science, it provides insight into the variety of possible sign processes. From the perspective of the unified science program, semiotics as a basis of integration enables the systematization of scientific knowledge (Morris 1973: 332 f.). For its part, this integration process has two aspects: semiotics takes on the task of unifying separate fields under a comprehensive perspective in the course of the research process; in the second insight, decisively influenced by the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle, integration between the terms of the individual sciences and the laws of these sciences is pursued. Semiotics is supposed to consider the following four main points: “ the relation of the ‘ formal sciences ’ to the ‘ natural sciences ’ , the relation of psychology to the biological and physical sciences, the relation of humanistic studies to science, and the relation of philosophy to systematized knowledge ” (ibid.: 334). 11 However, if one takes into account the criticisms expressed by N. Chomsky in his Skinner review, which Morris largely endorses in his commentary on Skinner ’ s Verbal Behavior, the frequently quoted passage on the relation of semiotics and philosophy in the context of the possibility of a unified science appears in a different light: Semiotics (which includes logic), in its extended form, becomes the essential organon of philosophy, for if philosophy is to adequately perform its task of comprehensive systematization, it needs the most adequate knowledge of signs that it can obtain. Semiotics is therefore 10 In his essay Science, Art and Technology, Morris had attempted to describe these three domains through the three primary types of discourse (scientific, aesthetic, and technological discourse), which stand in correspondence to the three functions of signs: 1) relation of the sign to denoted objects; 2) emphasis on the structure of the sign itself; and 3) investigation of the efficacy of signs in the practice of users, 11 Cf. also the criticism of the idea of a unity of science promoted via language structure expressed by K. O. Apel in the preface to the German edition, as well as: Albrecht o. J. Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) 169 fundamentally important material for philosophy, but philosophy is not limited to semiotics, since its discourse is not limited to scientific discourse. And semiotics, for its part, is not a subdivision of philosophy but of science, philosophical language itself being only a part of the subject area it explores. Since semiotic terms are applicable to philosophical language, scientific knowledge about philosophy can be incorporated into a system of unified science (Morris 1973: 349). 12 In his preface to Signs, Language and Behavior, K. O. Apel referred to the program of a “ pragmatically integrated semiotics ” first developed by Morris in 1946. This program, first intended as a complement to Tarski ’ s and Carnap ’ s ideas, starts from the basic social structure of the language situation, which shapes the syntax and semantics of an utterance. While R. Carnap or R. M. Martin relates pure and descriptive pragmatics to language systems and natural languages, respectively, for Morris the distinction seems to stem more from the language or language system itself in which the pragmatic theory is embedded. He conceives descriptive pragmatics as pragmatic metalanguage over a specific language system, and pure pragmatics in the more general reference to all object languages (Martin 1959). This Morrisian differentiation accounts for the two basic semiotic functions, the communicative function and the autonomous function, i. e., as Morris points out by emphasizing the pragmatic aspect in particular, language serves not only to transmit information, but language serves equally to “ direct, in a very direct sense, the whole social behavior of man ” (Hartung 1969: 488). The recognition of the social nature of the linguistic sign demands the transgression of the narrow limits drawn by the logical positivists of the merely syntactically or, in later times, also semantically oriented language analysis in the direction of the investigation of the “ relation between social consciousness, individual consciousness and language ” (ibid.: 493). Recent (text) linguistics has arrived at a similar descriptive model via the detour of communication theory, so that M. Scherner can write: “ we recognize the informationtheoretical-linguistic model of communication between sender (speaker) and receiver (listener/ reader) L.]. Thus the dimension of pragmatics [ … ] becomes foundational for any text analysis ” (Scherner 1972: 61). The significance of three-dimensional semiotics and Morris ’ s conception of discourse types for textual analysis will be addressed below; here attention is directed to two further problems. Habermas reproaches the empirical pragmatics developed by Morris in the context of his behavioral semiotics for being characterized by “ the fact that it introduces the general structures of speech without reference to pragmatic universals, although it must 12 Resnikow denies that a semiotics conceived in the Morrisian sense has this possibility. He writes: “ From this [from the understanding of semiotics as a general science of signs - A. E] Morris concludes that semiotics is a superior science in, which sees above philosophy. Conceited that he has brought about a radical turnaround in the world ’ s outlook, Morris pretentiously declares that semiotics represents a challenge to all previous philosophies and is the introduction to every future philosophy. But it is quite obvious that, for all the importance of the doctrine of sign systems, the doctrine itself can be developed scientifically only on the basis of a true gnoseology, such as the dialectical-materialist epistemology is ” (Resnikow 1963: 114). Cf. also Morris, C. W.: Science, Art and Technology, section 8; Morris, C. W.: Semiotic, The Socio-Humanistic Sciences, and the Unity of Science. Morris sees in the meta-linguistic semiotic approach the possibility to cover all fields of scientific research without narrowing the special character and scope of these disciplines. 170 Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) presuppose the non-objectified sense of these expressions at the level of theory formation ” (Habermas/ Luhmann 1971: 110). 13 The second problem arises from the conception of three-dimensional semiotics, already mentioned several times, that the full meaning of a text can only be elucidated from the analysis of all three dimensions and their mutual relations. Morris has not made a sufficiently clear hierarchization of these three dimensions, even though he repeatedly stresses the importance of the pragmatic dimension. However, if one takes into account the effect and function of language in social life, a hierarchization of the relations of the linguistic sign is necessary, whereby the relation between the sign and its users is the most comprehensive and has a decisive influence on the other two relations of signs (cf. Klaus 1969a: 16 ff.). One cannot even fully understand Morris ’ own semiotics if one does not at the same time take into account his theory of values. This demand becomes especially clear in connection with Morris ’ statements on aesthetics since he holds the opinion that the denotata of aesthetic signs are values or denote value properties. A value, following Perry and Mead, is conceived as a property of an object in relation to an individual interested in it. This formulation of ‘ value ’ takes into account the social embeddedness or pragmatic orientation of values, because values do not exist prior to any human experience, but develop and change in society. The tendency of a value to complete an action by achieving the required object emphasizes the close relation of values and reality. Morris by no means wishes to discuss any abstract problems of value, but his behavioral approach directs him to practical contexts in which valuations are made. Thus, using a semiotic approach, he can state that values are organized by behavioral families that direct a common preference behavior toward specific objects, i. e., that the sign user assigns or denies values to a property or object in the evaluation process. F. Rossi-Landi shows that the approach chosen by Morris also raises some serious problems, because the value-theoretical investigation understood in this way must, in his opinion, be limited to what people utter; what is not uttered cannot be investigated. Rossi-Landi believes that from this restriction to actual utterances it must ultimately follow that the value domain remains essentially unexplored, because with the help of this approach it is not possible to fully get at what was going on in people before they said anything (Rossi-Landi 1953b: 107). These four essential aspects of Morris ’ s theory experienced a very different reception. It is significant that Knilli, in his afterword to. the Foundations of the Theory of Signs, refers to Morris as the first sign theorist “ who has become known as such far beyond the boundaries of his discipline and country ” (Morris 1972: 128). As emphasized in the present section, however, Morris ’ s theory cannot be accurately described without his extensive work on value theory (cf. Bense 1971: 68 ff. as well as Schulz 1972: 70 ff.). The direct or indirect references to his theory of signs mentioned by Knilli all too often refer exclusively to the first two main works or even consider only the basics of the theory of signs An adequate assessment of his extensive work on the theory of signs, however, can 13 Habermas is obviously referring to the two earlier semiotic works in making this statement, but he overlooks (that the notion of a relationless empirical pragmatics in denotation and meaning has been largely abandoned in favor of a more general sign reference system. Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) 171 only be made if, in addition to the in many respects modified and more far-reaching writing Bezeichnung und Bedeutung, his essays and reviews are also included in the discussion. Only in more recent times, apart from three-dimensional semiotics, to which, in our opinion, the consideration of Morris ’ s work is largely limited, other aspects find their way into the discussion. Here we should mention G. Klaus ’ analyses of the language of politics, in which he makes a special effort to specify the types of political and propagandistic discourse, following Morris ’ proposed division into 16 possible main discourse types; A. Müller ’ s dissertation, which is mentioned in the following section, deals with some serious ‘ problems of behaviorist semiotics ’ . As a glance at the bibliography shows, the Italian reception of Morris ’ s work differs substantially from the German one. Besides the early translations, there are a number of informative essays by S. Ceccato, F. Fano, A. Galimberti, and others, as well as F. Rossi- Landi ’ s extensive studies on Morrisian axiology and semiotics and, above all, his monograph Charles Morris, which set the trend for the reception of Morris. 2.3 Problems of behaviorist semiotics All pragmatic inquiry is behaviorist in some sense. Reiwald thinks that behaviorism, which has been so successful in America, is rejected in Europe because of a misunderstanding: “ There has not been a sufficient distinction between behaviorism as a scientific method of inquiry and behaviorism as a scientific insight or even a worldview ” (Segerstedt 1947, editor ’ s preface). This view is taken up by the thesis that something is communicated with every behavior, or conversely, that nothing can be communicated without some behavior (Rossi-Landi 1973: 24). However, a theory of signs or a theory of values is usually a theory for someone. Therefore, it is certainly impossible to build a sign theory or a value theory under complete abstraction of psychology. The great importance of Morris ’ s research work is therefore to be sought in the fact that it has awakened interest in anthropological and sociological moments in the speech process and has emphasized the action side of language in addition to the recognition side ” (Schmidt 1969: 27). In examining the factors involved in the communication process, i. e., in emphasizing the aspects observable in the communication situation, behaviorism overlooks the fact that only certain parts of human behavior can be explained in terms of stimulus and response; other aspects cannot be interpreted in these terms. Rossi-Landi, for example, points out that the processes by means of which, for example, human values are produced are not observable, or that no necessary relation can be established between them and the subsequent observable behavior of the producing creature (Rossi-Landi 1953b: 109). Only the results of these processes are observable. Insofar as the manifestations of these processes are of a linguistic nature, Morris is certainly right to emphasize the influx of certain wolters on behavioral control, because in contrast to R Römer (1972: 25) 14 we assume that the words we hear exert certain effects on us (cf. Klaus 1969n 36 ff. as well as 52). 14 She concludes her essay with the sentence: “ On closer inspection, all linguistic effects (sic! ) dissolve into nothing. ” 172 Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) On the other hand, the tendency of behaviorism to reduce thinking to language cannot be denied. From the behaviorist point of view this reduction must seem reasonable, because he considers consciousness to be a fiction or wants to replace statements about consciousness by statements about observable behavior. Some kinds of signs are certainly explainable within the framework of this theory - e. g. signals and so-called signs which often lead to a direct, certain behavior. Language signs, however, cannot be adequately described by the simple stimulusresponse model, because every intentional act, every information storage, and especially every more abstract thought process and conceptual generalization are based on generalization patterns that ensure the relation between reality and human consciousness. This orthodox behaviorist position, such as that taken by L. Bloomfield, 15 criticizes Morris. In his view, it is wrong to identify a sign with a stimulus that elicits the same response as something else. Likewise, Morris distances himself from the view that a sign is something that affects the response to a stimulus that is not present at the moment. This would make the concept of sign so indeterminate that one could also call a drug a sign (cf. Spang Hanssen1954: 80 ff.). The critique of the early behaviorist position, as well as the recognition that there can be meaningful utterances that do not elicit observable responses in the hearer, and that observable responses can take on a wide range of variation without changing meaning, motivated Morris to refine and develop the behaviorist theory of meaning. In his view, the sign must be conceived as a preparatory stimulus that provides in the living being the conditions necessary for a specific action; manifest behavior, however, will occur only when further conditions are added in the form of need tension and additional stimulus properties. A. Müller mentions some difficulties that even this improved theory cannot resolve. A closer examination of the signifying process would reveal that the conception which regards the interpreter merely as something latent neglects the fact that the signifying process is not a mere construction of a potentiality; the living being can fall back on developed patterns which allow it to use signs in a meaningful way without resulting in later observable reactions. Alston asks himself which semantically relevant dispositions are evoked by historical statements. He is of the opinion that the criteria of “ firstness ” and “ credibility of the source ” must also be included in the canon of conditions, because only if the listener receives information for the first time and also believes that his informant is giving him correct information, he will show the willingness to behave in the way intended by the listener (Alston 1964: 29 ff.). Understanding the interpretant in terms of muscular or glandular activity also obstructs the possibility of subsuming perceptions to the interpretant concept that do not entail motor activity. Likewise, considerable difficulties arise when the behavioral scientist tries to determine the meaning of signs as dispositions to certain reactions. A. Müller points out that a disposition to certain reaction sequences constituted by a sign S confronts a group of 15 Bloomfield writes that “ the meaning of a linguistic form … is … the situation in which the speaker utters it and the response which it calls forth in the hearer ” (Bloomfield 1962: 237). Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) 173 controlling observers with the insoluble problem of ascribing to S a meaning “ which is binding for all of them and which they accept ” (Müller 1970: 20 ff.). An additional problem would be to determine the living being ’ s behavior as a meaningful action and to distinguish it from drug-influenced and reflex behavior. “ The enumeration of adequate conditions for the existence of a corresponding disposition that gives S meaning ” (ibid.: 29) is endless. But if one wants to provide a valid list of the necessary criteria for meaning, the meaning of the sign S must be known in advance to the observers. Now, however, the utterances accessible to communicative experience are products generated on the background of more general speech structures, which can be determined as meaningful only by recourse to the linguistic competence of the behavioral scientist (cf. Habermas/ Luhmann 1971: 102 ff.). Now it hardly happens by chance that the interpretant concept has met with such vehement rejection by so many scholars who try to twist it by misunderstanding (interpretant = interpreter or message receiver) 16 . This interpretant concept, in fact, implies a view that fixes semiotics to the study of cultural phenomena and detaches it from the metaphysics of the referent (cf. Eco 1971: 25 ff.). Certainly, the behaviorist view that meaning can be identified with the behavior of a living being is valid only in very limited, pre-linguistic situations. Social interactions, which can no longer be interpreted on the basis of the simple stimulus-response scheme, require more differentiated procedures, which must be based on a comprehensive analysis of the linguistic situation (cf. Schaff 1969: 241 ff.). In Denotation and Meaning, Morris addresses some - though not all - of the above criticisms by extending the basic semiotic conceptuality to include the context in which signs occur. This context, which has relevance as a reference quantity of every designation process, imposes in this third semiotic major work the condition that every specific action must be examined in a specific situation in order to be able to determine the specific designation dimensions of the signs occurring in this action (Morris 1975: 200). K. O. Apel, in his preface to Signs, Language and Behavior, addresses the “ principal impossibility ” of resolving “ on the basis of methodological behaviorism the problem of understanding (or misunderstanding) action-intentions and sign-meanings ” (Morris 1973, Editor ’ s Preface: 27). At this point it is necessary to quote a somewhat lengthy passage from The Pragmatic Movement in American Philosophy, which should clarify Morris ’ s concept of behavior: There are problems in the relations of the terms ‘ action ’ , ‘ behavior ’ and ‘ conduce ’ . Currently the term “ behavior ” is widely employed (as in the phrase “ the behavioral sciences ” ), but a growing number of psychologists object to its application to man. The early pragmatists more often used the terms ‘ action ’ or ‘ conduce ’ . Where a distinction is not important, ‘ behavior ’ and ‘ action ’ will be here employed interchangeably. But it must be carefully noted that use of the term ‘ behavior ’ does not involve a commitment to the ‘ behaviorism ’ of John B. Watson. [ … ] The behavioral (or actional) emphasis long antedated Watsonian behaviorism. [ … ] As a student of Mead I came to employ the term ‘ behavior ’ in his sense, and to use it freely. If the present-day reader is bothered by the terms 16 Cf. for example Dewey 1946: 85 - 95). 174 Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) ‘ behavior ’ and ‘ behavioral ’ he can substitute in what follows the terms ‘ action ’ and ‘ action ’ (Morris 1970: 43). Certainly it has to be emphasized that a behaviorist reduction of the pragmatic interpretation and language theories of C. S. Peirce and G. H. Mead falls short. The basic deficiencies of the behaviorist position, however, are definitively left behind by Morris when he interprets his term ‘ reaction disposition ’ , introduced in Signs, Language and Behavior, in terms of expectation or change (Morris 1975: 280 f.). In his earlier statements on sign theory, Morris did not discuss how the linguistic sign differs essentially from those sign varieties of those living beings that do not have language. His earlier sign theory was content with generalizing non-linguistic sign situations and pointing to the conventional character of linguistic symbols labeled as lan signs. This concept of conventionality, which Morris deliberately avoids because of possible errors concerning the origin of language, is, however, included in Morris ’ s concept of sign in the broadest possible interpretation. A differentiation criterion could be developed via the five constitutional conditions of language, which separates signals and symbols sufficiently clearly; this - applied - sign reference system, to which Morris must necessarily refer in signs, language and behavior, finds a clear expression in designation and meaning. Having sufficiently clarified the notion of signal, Morris can state that the lower limit of linguistic sign behavior “ becomes an empirical problem after one has decided on the criterion for sign behavior ” (ibid.). However, what A. Schaff calls “ fetishization of the sign ” (Schaff 1969: 240) is not abolished. This problem will be dealt with in point 2.6. 2.4 Problems of the designation and meaning process Morris has refined his conception of the signifying situation over the course of his three major semiotic works. In the Foundations of the Theory of Signs, the signifier, 17 the interpreter, the interpretant, and the designatum constitute the sign process Sign, Language, and Behavior replaces the term ‘ designatum ’ and differentiates into designation and denotation. Finally, in denotation and denotation the context is introduced as a general reference quantity and the term ‘ sense ’ , which has deliberately remained unconsidered so far, is made more precise to the extent that it includes both denotation and the interpretant resulting from it. Whereas traditional semantics focused its attention only on the empirical relation between word and thing, three-dimensional semiotics allows for an approach that recognizes this word-thing relation as only one of the three integrating elements of the overall signifying process; i. e. in the meta-linguistic conception of semiotics, it is impossible to talk about the object language in the meta-language without considering all three semiotic dimensions at the same time. The distinction between significatum and denotatum is intended to do justice to the difference between object and object property. The signifier is determined as a “ class ” of conditions, properties or characteristics or as a “ kind ” of object. However, what is meant by ‘ class ’ or ‘ kind ’ is functional or symbolic object or functional or symbolic situation with 17 Cf. for the definition of this and the following terms the glossary in Morris 1973. Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) 175 object properties. If one does not interpret the concept of class used by Morris in terms of complex symbolic functions, difficulties arise in distinguishing it from Platonic ideas (cf. Gentry 1944: 376 - 384). In Designation and Meaning, Morris takes up this objection: Designations are not “ entities in any erroneous understanding, but [they are] certain describable aspects of complex behavioral processes in the natural world ” (Morris 1975: 201). Morris therefore starts his differentiation of designation (extension) and denotation (intension) from the following premise: These two aspects are not equivalent, but the denotation carries the final determination. Therefore, denotation must precede designation, but is thereby determined by denotation. Denotation then turns out to be the sign process directed towards the object to be denoted, 18 while denotation 19 can be described as interpretation (cf. Stiehl 1970: 37) 20 of a sign that has previously fulfilled its denotation function (cf. Bense/ Walther 1973: 18 ff. as well as 89). From this assumption follows that every sign must have a designation, but not every sign has a denotatum. The decision whether a sign merely designates or also denotes can only be verified in practice, because what a sign designates is not given by a ‘ referent ’ , but acquires its validity only in the concrete interpretation process of the sign user. Any attempt to determine the “ referent ” of a sign requires the definition of the “ referent ” in terms of a cultural convention. Accordingly, denotation could be understood as the modality of designation freed from the ‘ referent ’ . 21 Therefore, the comparison between designation and designated reality “ gives the meaning to the linguistic sign in the last instance, practice verifies the meaning, practice changes the meaning of linguistic expressions according to scientific, cultural, production, etc. needs ” (Klaus 1969b: 110). 18 If the empirical conditions necessary for the prediction of a signified object are known to the interpreter, one can say that the denotation of this object is known to the sign interpreter. The denotation process thus establishes the relation between the particular sign carrier with the action tendency of the sign interpreter (cf. Habermas 1970: 151 ff.). 19 Besides the property of the object and the contextual conditions, which together influence the sign interpreter, the meaning. however, is also constituted by “ the internal mental conditions they encounter and which “ refract ” the stimulus properties on the background of pre-existing individual and sociocultural experiences (cf Rubinstein 1968). One could extend Morris ’ s concept of designation and meaning in this respect without thereby abandoning its characteristic features. 20 In determining the denotation of a sign as a two-digit relation, Stiehl overlooks the fact that the sign interpretation must be carried out by an interpreter, i. e. it must be at least a three-digit relation: Z denotes 0 for M (cf. Klaus 1969a: 13). 21 A. Nehring argues that “ the sign receiver does not need to ‘ interpret ’ the sign. For if it is to fulfill its purpose, the sign-recipient must know its meaning as well as the sign-giver ” (Nehring 1963: 27) It is certainly true that sign-makers as well as sign-recipients must be members of a communication community; but now by no means all signs are interpersonal signs or com-signs, but receive their current communicative valence only in the respective communication process, which must prove through communication whether the physical signals can assume sign character for the sign-user or not. The meaning of a sign is not an identifiable, objective thing that can be isolated from the sign in any way. Only the interpreter has the sense in his interpretation, but not the isolated sign, i. e. the sign-interpreter decides whether to regard an object as a sign or not. This decision proceeds independently of whether a sign denotes or not. 176 Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) Denotation is therefore not a fixed, unchanging basic meaning. The denotation of a sign can only be inferred from the dynamics of the current speech situation, because any notion that assumes a rigid word meaning overlooks (that it is a special case when the noun assumes denotation function. A third component must be added to the designation and denotation process in the form of character usage rules, which must be assigned to each character A character usage rule, which can also be called a meaning criterion, must be present in each character in addition to its designation. Being “ meaningful ” and “ denoting ” are not identical. According to this understanding, ‘ sign ’ , ‘ semiosis ’ and ‘ sense ’ each illuminate one of the three dimensions of sense; however, ‘ sense ’ also includes the relations of the special sign carriers, interpreters and interpreters in the discussion, in addition to ‘ designation and denotation aspects ’ (cf. Rossi-Landi 1973: 41 f.). Eco proposes that the meaning of a sign be conceived as the interpreter of a sign carrier, understood as a cultural entity identified in the context of other entities expressed by other sign carriers. He writes: Actually a cultural unit is not isolated merely by the running of the interpretants. It is defined in as much as it is ‘ placed ’ in a system of other cultural units which are opposed to it or circumscribe it. A cultural unit subsists and is recognized to the extent to which there exists another one which bears a differential value. It is the relationship between the various terms of a system of cultural units which takes from each one of the terms what is conveyed by the others (Eco 1971: 27). Accordingly, the range of variation and changeability illuminates from the linguistic context in which the linguistic sign fulfills its sign function; this ‘ linguistic context ’ , which is determined by factual factors, but always also by individual, emotional experiential values, must not be isolated from the social context which determines the word meaning in each case for a specific behavior in relation to a real, social situation. Therefore, denotation must be determined as the position that a sign occupies in a system on the basis of contextual conditions. The concretization of this paradigmatic understanding of denotation is done on the background of the specific sign usage rules in order to determine the respective position in the semantic field with the help of the denotation. 2.5 Sign concept and semiosis Semiotics deals with signs in a social context. According to their content, signs are already historically conditioned, “ i. e. they carry a social, societal character ” (Albrecht 1961: 365). Linguistic signs are furthermore distinguished by the fact that they are not bound in their effect to the circumstances in which they originated (Denk 19: 126). In Signs, Language, and Behavior, the following conditions are listed for something to be called a sign: If anything, A, is a preparatory stimulus that, in the absence of stimulus objects that tend to initiate response sequences of a particular behavioral family, causes a disposition in an organism to respond under certain conditions by response sequences of that behavioral family, then A is a sign (Morris 1973: 84). Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) 177 Morris emphasizes that this formulation of conditions is not a sign definition, 22 and he also leaves open the question of whether there are signs that do not meet these conditions. Any communication that transports messages from a sender to a receiver must use certain characters to convey them. A sign must be represented at least as a four-digit relation: A denotes an object B to an interpreter C in a context D ’ , because signs do not refer to isolated objects in reality; signs exist only in relation to people who are members of a social group, and who use signs in an unbounded sign process. 23 This sign functions in the sign process determined as a five-digit relation: ‘ v, w, x, y, z - in which v evokes in w the disposition to respond in a certain way x to a certain kind of object y (which then does not act as a stimulus) under certain conditions z. ’ In the cases where this relation holds, the v ’ s are signs, the w ’ s are interpreters, the x ’ s are interpretants, the y ’ s are designations, and the z ’ s are the contexts in which the signs occur ” (Morris 1975: 200). Morris recognizes two different types of signs: signals and symbols. Signals and symbols are signs because they both have the function of representing a state of affairs to a sign user. Symbols can be understood as ‘ signals of signals ’ . Signals are mainly linked to animal behavior, while symbols are essentially human performances. Signals and symbols also differ in the degree of reliability. While signals are often an empirical relation between objects, the conventional (where conventional is used here in the sense of ‘ based on rules of formation and transformation ’ ) symbol has a much higher reliability, which is bound to the existence of the sign function. A symbol 24 must fulfill the additional requirement of being a sign producible by its interpreter, acting as a substitute for other signs with which it is synonymous (ibid.: 101). Now, the condition of being producible by its interpreter by no means establishes that it is a “ linguistic ” sign, for this also requires the relation to the context in which this sign operates to be established. Finally, linguistic signs must be interpersonal 25 in order to fulfill their communicative function. The division 22 Cf. ibid.: 31; Apel there calls this formulation of the sign process a ‘ quasi-definition ’ because Morris allegedly claims to have “ formulated the sufficient conditions for establishing a sign-function and to that extent to have fulfilled the basic requirement of a behaviorist semiotics. ” Cf. also Black (1949: 175), who acknowledges that. Morris specifies only the sufficient conditions, he nevertheless expresses the assumption that, “ in practice, Morris does use his defining criteria as both necessary and sufficient. ” In Signs about Signs about Signs, Morris again explains his intention; it is only the mention of necessary as well as sufficient conditions that Morris understands as definition; Morris calls the specification of sufficient, but not necessary, conditions partial analysis of a term. He particularly emphasizes that ‘ sign ’ was only partially analyzed, but not defined (Morris 1975: 164; cf. also Morris 1973: 86, note 7). 23 E. Walther is of the opinion that also “ an arbitrary single sign, selected as a means from a repertoire, denotes something and means something to someone (Walther 1971: 423). Cf. also George (1964: 85); he writes: “ in fact this very confusion may well be the result of -thinking of word signs ( … 1 as being prior to sentence signs, since there is a great deal to be said for the view that sentences in behavior are prior to words, and that sense and meaning really apply to senores rather than wads (emphasis mine - A. E.). This means that in so far as words lace ‘ fire ’ or ,help , for example are meaningful in isolation, they are so merely because they are shorthand for sentences. ” Cf. on this such: Klaus 1969b: 83; Klaus determines the term sign as a three-digit relation: ,x into a sign for y in the language system Z. 24 Nehring finds it surprising that Morris cannot detect any difference between his and the traditional conception of a symbol (Nehring 1963: 79). Morris, however, speaks of symbols in the passage cited by Nehring, but of iconic signs, which form a subclass of symbols (cf. Morris 1973: 103). 25 Certainly Nehring is mistaken in assuming that in principle every sign must be “ interpersonal ” because its task is precisely to “ establish a contact between two or more persons ” . Mostly it is possible to determine the designation of a special sign for a certain interpreter, and in this respect there are hardly any completely 178 Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) of the existing signs into linguistic and non-linguistic signs is already important because communication is also carried by non-linguistic signs and not all non-linguistic, communicative signs (gestural, mimic signs etc.) can be formulated with the help of linguistic signs (cf. Stiehl 1970: 35). In a further differentiation Morris distinguishes between sign carrier and sign family, which is introduced following Peirce ’ s distinction of ‘ type ’ and ‘ token ’ : “ A single physical event - such as a particular sound, point, or motion - that is a sign is called a sign carrier. A group of similar sign carriers that have the same signifiers for a given interpreter is called a sign family ” (Morris 1973: 96). Spang-Hanssen sees in the differentiation into ‘ sign-bearer ’ and ‘ sign-family ’ the reason why this sign-classification, which determines signs in relation to their denotata, only leads to the “ irrelevant and misleading question of empirical truth ” (Spang-Hanssen 1954: 88f). In his opinion, the sign should be determined in relation to its signifiers, which would allow a differentiation into natural and arbitrary signs. However, the differentiation into ‘ natural signs and arbitrary signs ’ exists only for the respective interpreter, because in order to be able to speak of natural signs, they must also be social; they can be called natural only because their sign bearers occur in nature and have not been produced by man. Spang-Hanssen also overlooks the fact that there are two uses of ‘ sign ’ , the confusion of which is based on an epistemological error. First, it is used to designate physical entities - sound waves, printer ’ s ink on paper, chalk mounds on the blackboard - and second, it is used to designate the abstraction class of such physical signals. Morris corresponds to these two meanings of ‘ sign ’ with his differentiation. 2.6 Text concept and communication The traditional notion of sign, which focuses on the relation of a single sign to the object it designates and is also essentially limited to the study of so-called conventional signs, proves to be useless in clarifying the function of the use of signs by sign interpreters in a socially 26 determined sign process, because the demonstration that a linguistic expression refers to some state of affairs captures only one function of this linguistic expression (cf. Alston 1964: 15). But since language, by its very nature, was created by and for communication, which strives to cope more adequately with reality, communication analysis has to start from this relation of language to reality, i. e., the communicator ’ s communicated knowledge of the world and the overarching, objective structures (cf. Oller 1972: 45). Therefore, one must “ primarily place signs and sign use in the framework of a strategy pursued by sign users in a society. And such goals link to roles of producers and recipients or roles of different kinds of recipients in processing processes of signs and sign agglomerates. Accordingly, such a dynamic or strategic notion of sign will be more able to address communication via text [ … ] ” (Wienold 1972: 204). An analysis of the complex process of communication is thus subject to at least six conditions, which Morris largely mentions in personal signs. But every note written in a private secret writing, every “ unchangeable ” sign of a mentally ill person, or every sign in the process of language acquisition should not necessarily be called interpersonal. 26 Neubert states that “ the language of the community first creates the conditions for the thinking and feeling of the individual ” (Neubert 1962: 78 f.). Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) 179 his definition of language mentioned earlier. 1) there must be a speaker and a listener 27 involved in the communication process who 2) use objective, physical signs; 3) the physical signals must be repeatedly realizable by the members of the communication community (cf. Schmidt 1966: 19 as well as Habermas 1970: 150 ff.); 4) the signs must refer to the sign object (denotatum); 5) there must be rules in the social communication situation that establish a relation between sign and denotatum. The relations between the sign and the denotatum are largely the result of social actions. Now, by no means all rules of constitution have been socially established, and there are elements that are not yet socially determined (cf. La Drière 1957: 94). This latter aspect, that the realization of meaning is essentially based on a rule, i. e., the regulation of the uses of signs, has been elaborated especially in Signs, Language, and Behavior (cf. Antal 1963: 26). 6) language is a system of signs that has emerged in and with the history of individual and social consciousness (cf. Schmidt 1966: 12). 28 The constitution of meaning by the text user is based on the assumption that a text is not a 29 completed, once given, meaning-bearing game, but it only becomes active in the respective realization by the recipient, so that ‘ text ’ is always to be understood in the sense of ‘ text realization ’ (cf. Scherner 1972: 53 f.). This understanding of the text is firstly determined by the insight mentioned above that a single sign is meaningless 30 and only attains meaning in the context of the overarching sign structure; 31 the communicative situation as the second essential criterion for the constitution of the text does not assume a rigid basic meaning of a single word that can only be received by the respective communicant, but determines the function and the value of the single sign from the overall structure of the communicative act, i. e. from the non-linguistic surrounding features that Morris addresses by the attributes ‘ pre-linguistic ’ and ‘ postlinguistic ’ 32 , the addressed object characteristics, the specific interests of the sign user and the expectations of the recipient (cf. Morris 1975: 104). 27 The inclusion of a ‘ sign ’ -analysis and the consideration of the intentions of the sign-giver, which A. Nehring demands for an adequate description of sign-processes and sign-behavior, both of which he misses in Morris, are explicitly mentioned in Morris ’ definition of language: ‘ language ’ wind defined in terms of lanagram systems, which are distinguished by the fact that they are built up of com sign families, which the members of the interpreter community can produce and determine with common signifiers, whereby in linguistic communication the produced signs, com symbols (a special class of interpersonal signs) directed from a communicator to a communicant, meet specific expectancies and evoke certain action tendencies (cf. Morris 1973, Glossary: s. v. com sign, sign use, interpersonal sign, interpreter, communication, communicator, communicant, lan sign system, semiosis; and Morris 1975: 219 ff. and 283 ff.). 28 This language constitution condition mentioned under point 6) is largely neglected by the Morris definition. However, since language is also understood by Morris as a social, dynamic system, it is necessary to explicitly include this historical component in the definition (cf. also Neubert 1962: 78f). 29 For a contrary view, cf. Pos 1947/ 48: 284. 30 If only isolated words with rigid meanings were available to the communicating individual, language could not be considered an instrument of interpersonal relations. 31 P. Hartmann has therefore proposed a new definition of the concept of sign, which determines as “ original linguistic sign ” not the individual word, but the text. (cf. Hartmann 1968: 205 - 222). 32 Morris only hesitantly takes note of the fact that signs are not only used in an actual communication situation, but furthermore activate subvocal side effects in human consciousness, which need not necessarily be reflected in observable behavior (cf. Wiener 1970: 10). A more comprehensive theory of signs would have to develop this hitherto largely neglected component. 180 Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) This pragmatic, processual definition of text, which is reflected in Morris ’ s concept of discourse, does justice to the twofold orientation of any expectation, which is precisely not only directed at an object, but also includes the social and individual-emotional attitudes in the consideration. Only this second, individual-socio cultural aspect of the current piece of speech, which abandons the static, merely object-related concept of text in favor of a dynamic understanding of text integrated into the communication situation, enables a more adequate analysis of understanding and interpretation (cf. Morris 1973, editor ’ s preface: 27 ff.). On the basis of this processual understanding of text, Morris proposes his differentiation, already mentioned above, of the various specializations of language into sixteen possible main types of discourse. This text type classification, which assumes that language not only has an informative character, but also addresses emotions, wants to initiate valuations, determines social behavior, in short covers the entire field of social behavior (cf. Hartung 1969: 488), takes place on the basis of a categorization according to the sign usage prevailing in this text process and the primary designation dimension of the signs represented in it. From the principle twofoldness of the signification process and the orientation of the semiotic process to superordinate patterns of reference it becomes clear that a specific sign already because of the subjective component in the process of understanding cannot condition a causal, unambiguously predictable effect, but “ the words trigger a whole series of programs which overlie the process of understanding, which modify it, slow it down, speed it up or steer it in a certain direction. These programs take the form of attitudes, evaluation systems, judgment systems, and also prejudice systems ” (ibid.). In summary, the pragmatically conceived concept of discourse in Morrisian semiotics, which has been taken up and extended in modern text linguistics, represents a significant contribution to a more precise analysis of sign behavior. 33 2.7 The conception of a semiotic aesthetics We have seen that the analysis of any semiotic process necessarily implies recourse to the existence of an integrating system (Mayenowa 1967: 61). However, the consideration of the structural core of a work of art, fixed in the manifest piece of text, the dramaturgical instruction, the specific composition of colors, surfaces, figures, etc. in painting or in related phenomena, constitutes only one essential component in the process of analysis. With a broad understanding of the concept of text, which, abstracting from the respective materiality, also includes the picture, the film, the sculpture, etc., the analysis of art also has to answer the question of the constitution of the work of art via the actualization of the characteristics of meaning and designation (cf. Schmidt 1971). The art analysis, which is 33 Rossi-Landi suggests abandoning the term sign-hooking, because it suggests that there must be something like non-sign-behavior (cf. above, section 2.3.). “ An examination of the situation convinces us instead that all behavior is, in different ways, sign-behavior; so that what Morris was really trying to do was to individuate a particular type of sign-behavior ” (Rossi-Landi 1973: 44). If one then understands this more localized signbehavior in terms of language-behavior in general, whereby this latter term encompasses both interpreters and sign-relations established on the basis of conventions, one arrives at an understanding of the sign-process that corresponds to the maxims mentioned by Wienold (cf. also such Wienpahl 1949: 253). Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) 181 oriented towards the understanding of the work of art and which proves to be a communicative problem with regard to the mediation aspect, places the contemporary art theory in the larger context of a more comprehensively conceived communication analysis (cf. Bense 1967: 18). The far-reaching Morrisian approach can do justice to these two integrating components of art analysis because this theory is fundamentally discursively oriented and not, like e. g. Saussure, on the basis of a statistical concept of language structure, has to understand concrete texts (als ‘ parole ’ ) as a mere emanation of the pre-ordered system Furthermore, with his interpretation of the work of art in terms of a supericon, Morris has created an instrument - albeit not unproblematic - that can look back on a certain success, since it is “ one of the most convenient and obviously satisfactory attempts to define an image semantically ” (Eco 1972: 200). Morris ’ s conception of semiotic aesthetics has provoked extensive discussion, 34 highlighting some difficulties in this understanding that will be addressed below. In his 1939 essays (Aesthetics and Sign Theory and Science, Art and Technology), Morris conceived of the work of art as an iconic sign that also denotes value. Morris abandoned this extreme position in Sign, Language, and Behavior (230 ff. and 194 ff.), where he states that iconicity is not an absolute criterion of the arts, although some works of art are particularly distinguished by a high proportion of iconic features. The earlier position is also abandoned insofar as the signs of the work of art need not belong exclusively to the appraisitive mode of designation, but can also designate designatively, prescriptively, and formatively. This extension takes into account the insight that no type of sign is aesthetic per se; the common characteristic of the arts formulated in Sign, Language, and Behavior is accordingly based on the valuative use of signs (Wimsatt 1946: 180 - 185). 35 Designation and meaning revisits the discussion of art that was only marginally addressed in Zeichen, Sprache und Verhalten and inquires into the part that semiotics and axiology can play in the analysis of art. The signification aspect is explored through an analysis of the designative, appraisitive, and prescriptive dimensions of signification. The differences between operational, imagined, and object values are relevant to the meaning of an artwork. Furthermore, Bezeichnung und Bedeutung retracts the statement that an iconic sign occupies a special position insofar as the sign carrier exhibits those properties that are designated. 36 Extending and specifying the earlier position, Bezeichnung und Bedeutung strives above all to clarify the relation of the artwork to values. In this context, a differentiation is to be made between a mediated representation or embodiment of the value by the sign and an unmediated one by the sign bearer. Furthermore, in this context, an attempt could be made to grasp “ aesthetic perception ” 34 Cf. the bibliography in Morris 1975. 35 Wimsatt considers this emphasis on the intentions of the sign user to be a step backward from the earlier formulation. This seems an unfortunate step away from whatever was objective in the earlier formulation. The earlier view of art signs as iconic appraisers would seem to have done more justice to the fact that art signs are esteemed as signs successful in some general way, not in the limited and personal way that somebody ’ s intention is accomplished upon somebody else, but in some way related to the properties of the world of denoted objects ” (Wimsatt 1946: 184). 36 For a detailed discussion of the iconic sign cf. Eco 1972: 200 ff. 182 Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) in the categories of Mead ’ s philosophy of action; the relation of sign and values then proves to be an open question; semiotics and axiology could assume a mediating function in this investigation. Aesthetics, Signs, and Icons takes up again the discussion of art begun in 1939 and examines above all the question of whether a work of art can be conceived as a sign at all. The possibility, already mentioned in Bezeichnung und Bedeutung, of linking the indirect and immediate aspects of aesthetic experience by means of the distinction between signs and sign carriers already made in Grundlagen der Zeichentheorie finally leads to the discussion of the problematic concept of iconicity, which will be taken up below. The concept of iconicity is undoubtedly useful in aesthetics, but it must be subjected to extensive analysis and specification, just as the specific objects of study in aesthetic syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics must be more precisely defined. Thus, the topic of semiotic research must remain to investigate the place and possibilities of sign-theoretic-valuetheoretic analysis for a more adequate grasp of aesthetics. In his work on aesthetics, Morris has always endeavored to design a model of description that does not merely capture isolated aspects of a specific work of art, or that attempted to claim the entire realm of aesthetic phenomena as the domain of semiotics, but rather the meta-linguistic approach of his semiotics aims at a three-dimensional analysis, which for methodological reasons can be subdivided into aesthetic syntactics, aesthetic semantics, and aesthetic pragmatics, and which is aesthetic insofar as it is applicable to the domain of aesthetics. Most accurately, his work could be described as ‘ semiotic aesthetics ’ , since the attempt is made to apply general research results of sign science to the specific field of aesthetics (cf. Rossi-Landi 1973: 12 f.). This sign analysis, understood in this way, can start from the premise that the art object in modern aesthetics is primarily conceived as the conscious generation of artistic forms over a repertoire of material elements. The elements used in this production process, such as the artistic form achieved, are to be regarded as signs open to sign analysis (cf. Bense 1971: 49 f.), whereby in a semiotic approach it is by no means material elements, but rather qualitative, content-related features of the physical sign carriers pointing beyond them that form the object of investigation. The specifically aesthetic aspect of such an approach to the art object does not follow from any kind of elemental quality, but is determined as a textual function (Schmidt 1971: 23). From these first determinations of the aesthetic, it is not yet completely clear what makes the respective message a work of art. Undoubtedly, further factors are involved here: the recipient of the artistically intended message, which already stands out from other messages by, among other things, a greater degree of freedom, i. e. greater unpredictability or the possibility of ‘ also being able to be different ’ (Schmidt 1966: 43), must show the willingness to expect a work of art and to place it in an ordering context, which influences this particular message by its typical, media-related characteristics. This special form of communication between artist and art recipient, which can be called ‘ aesthetic communication ’ , and which is especially studied by aesthetic pragmatics, thus stands next to the ‘ autonomous ’ (cf. Mukarovsk ỳ 1936: 1069) sign functions. Like any communication process, the particular ‘ aesthetic communication ’ is involved in the context of social phenomena reflected in the work of art. Not only does the social community have an effect on the respective communicative expression, but this aesthetic message also has an effect on the community. The socio- Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) 183 cultural aspects of aesthetic communication institutionalize and sanction particular modes of representation and insist on the consideration of specific interests, which find their expression in modes of production, habits of seeing, patterns of interpretation, object preferences, etc. (cf. Metz 1968: 207). The close connection between semiotic and axiological factors already results from the iconic side of the artwork, for all icons take on value characteristics in the process of aesthetic communication insofar as the value 37 of the iconic sign is given by its similarity to the object represented. When we perform an evaluation, we assign or deny a value to a particular piece of text on the background of socially mediated value categories. Values ’ are therefore not objective properties of the evaluated objects, but exist only in relation to the evaluator (are objectiverelative), are directed at an object, and require suitable instruments for the evaluation process, which have the character of signs. The possibility of being able to evaluate artistic objects at all - like all other objects of reality - is based on the principally comparative character of each value, which can constitute axiological relations between objects depending on the respective evaluator (cf. Hartung 1969: 489 f.). 38 The emphasis on the axiological side of art analysis, however, does not want to reduce art to the mediation of any values. 39 If we had been able to state above in general that the text only reaches actuality in the respective realization by the recipient, then in the special case of art production the aesthetic text is based on the “ aesthetic reading ” (cf. Trabant 1970: 16) or, more generally, the “ aesthetic reception ” . It follows that outside and independent of this aesthetic reception or generation, there can be no elementary and interpreter-independent aesthetic signs, just as there is no ‘ text ’ , but only ‘ textual realisates ’ . The aesthetic text realisate, which in this understanding presents itself as the interpretive result of the aesthetic reception of the respective text user (cf. Schmidt 1971: 12 f.), 40 arrives at historical validity and valence in this creative constitution of meaning of the object by historical individuals. 41 37 It remains to be clarified what value is to be accorded to the ambiguity of the concept of value (value in the sense of ‘ valuable ’ ‘ significant ’ and value as a quality of positional difference). 38 Hartung writes that positive or negative attributes that people have made in their individual experiences with the signified are applied to a certain state of affairs, so that this state of affairs receives positive or negative evaluation. 39 Kondratov fears that Morris ignores the gnoseological function of art as well as the actual aesthetic side, “ i. e., what actually distinguishes art from science, ordinary language, etc. ” (Kondratow 1964: 524). In his opinion, the language of art becomes aesthetic in the proper sense only “ when to all this is added the orientation of the representation of art to the communication itself ” (ibid.). This position seems to fall short due to considerations already mentioned, which do not want to see the work of art limited to the autonomous aspect. 40 The radicalization of this position, however, which ties the aesthetic completely to the respective mode of reception, renounces in consequence the possibility of an art analysis. 41 Segal represents the static concept of the text, especially when it is restricted by the one-dimensional relation of the work of art to the object, when he writes: “ At this level, the meaning of the object consists in the fact that it exists par excellence and possesses the property of ‘ meaning ’ . This property is far more comprehensive than the object itself; it is in principle infinite. At the same time, this meaning is exclusively and solely [emphasis mine A. E.] oriented to the object itself ” (Segal 1968: 844; on this, see Schmidt 1972: 95 - 127). 184 Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) The constitution of meaning of the art product for the text user, determined by the process of aesthetic text realization, finds an analytical instrument in the “ aesthetic function of use ” of signs, to which Bense (cf. on this and the following Bense 1971: 109 f.) draws attention. While Morris no longer holds, as he did in his earlier essays on semiotic aesthetics, that all works of art can be called iconic signs, iconic signs still perform such an eminently important function that the concept of iconicity must be subjected to more detailed consideration. For something to become an icon for a sign user, the interpreter must know that it represents this depicted object. Furthermore, the interpreter must know in what respect this sign represents the object (cf. Burks 1948/ 49: 676). But since every sign represents a certain number of qualities and relations, it must be stated in what way the iconic sign differs from the ordinary signifying process. The similarity relation between object and icon presents itself rather as an empirical and therefore not a priori sustainable relation; the character of the sign is thus not established on the basis of a conditional similarity to the object, but because this partial similarity does not fully secure the relation. The iconic sign cannot already designate on the basis of similarity to anything else, but an object that resembles another in certain respects fulfills a designating function only with respect to a specific interest of an interpreter of the sign (cf. Amyx 1947: 55 ff.). Thus, it is at least necessary to state the parameters of similarity, since without this naming a relation of similarity can be asserted or denied between any object- ‘ pair ’ . Moreover, similarity is a symmetrical relation. If an icon I resembles its denotatum D, then D resembles I in the same way, which is why without additional criteria the decision becomes impossible what is to be sign and what is to be denoted object. However, one can establish similarity between two objects without having to claim that this similarity relationship forms the appropriate basis for declaring one of the two similar objects to be the sign of the other. Moreover, some guidelines must already be in place in order to make the determination that two objects are in some sense alike. This recourse to general, indirect patterns of reference, however, bursts the concept of iconicity, which is supposed to be supported, among other things, by its immediacy. An obvious similarity between the sign and the depicted reality is a valuable additional clue which has proven its high practical value in art analysis. However, the task of art cannot be (or only on the background of a special, limitedly valid art programmatic) to achieve a reproduction of reality as faithful as possible. In addition to the problems mentioned above, the concept of iconicity, which has been successful in many respects, has a number of other problematic aspects that make it questionable whether this term can continue to be considered a basic semiotic concept. It would be much more appropriate to Morris ’ s approach to a three-dimensional semiotics to value the characterization of certain artworks by iconic features as an additional justification; other components of three-dimensional semiotics, mentioned above but pushed into the background by the concept of iconicity, are thereby more satisfactorily taken into account, so that the actual, further-reaching contributions of Morris ’ s semiotics come to the fore. Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) 185 Regardless of individual difficulties and necessary clarifications, however, it has become clear that the comprehensive Morris approach and the constant effort to verify obtained results against reality have had great theoretical and practical significance for a variety of scientific disciplines and, with more careful study of the writings that are only now slowly becoming known, will continue to have so in the future. References Albrecht, E. 1959: Contributions to epistemology and the relation of language and thought, Halle/ S. Albrecht, E. 1961: “ The epistemological problem of the linguistic sign. Zur Auseinandersetzung mit der idealistischen Sprachwissenschaft ” , in: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 9. Albrecht, E. o. J.: Darstellung und Kritik der erkenntnistheoretischen Grundlagen, der Kausalitätsauffassung und der Ethik des Neopositivismus, Diss. Rostock. Alston, W. P. 1964: Philosophy of Language, Englewood Cliffs. Amyx, C. 1947: “ The Iconic Sign in Aesthetics ” , in: Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 6. Antal, L. 1963: Questions of Meaning, The Hague. Bense, M. 1962: Theory of texts. An introduction to recent views and methods, Cologne. Bense, M. 1967: Semiotik Allgemeine Theorie der Zeichen, Baden-Baden. Bense, M. 1971: Zeichen und Design, Baden-Baden. Bense, M. u. Walther, E. 1973: Dictionary of semiotics, Cologne. Black, M. 1949: “ The Semiotic of Charles Morris ” , in: Language and Philosophy. Ed. by M. Black New York. Bloomfield, L 1962: “ Linguistic Aspects of Science ” , in: International Encyclopedia of Unified Science 1, 2nd ed. Chicago. Bochenski, Lid. 1956: Formal logic, Freiburg/ Munich. Breuer, D. 1971: Vorüberlegungen zu einer pragmatischen Textanalyse, Munich. Burks, A. 1948/ 49: “ Icon, Index, Symbol ” , in: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 9. Denk, F. ? : The sign. Attempt at an Anthropomorphism-Free Definition. Dewey, J. 1946: “ Peirce ’ s Theory of Linguistic Signs, Thought and Meaning ” , in: Journal of Philosophy 43. Eco, U. 1971: A Semiotic Approach to Semantics. Li: Versus. Quaderi di Studi Semiotici 1. Eco, U. 1972: Introduction to Semiotics, Munich. Eschbach, A. 1974: Zeichen Text Bedeutung. A Bibliography on Semiotics. Geckeler, H. 1971: Strukturelle Semantik, München. Gentry, G. 1944: “ Some Comments on C. W. Morris ’ s Class Conception of the Designatum ” , in: Journal of Philosophy 41. George, F. H. 1964: Semantics, London. Habermas, J. 1970: Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften, Frankfurt a. M. Habermas, J. and Luhmann, N. 1971: Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie, Frankfurt a. M. Hartmann, P. 1968: “ On the concept of the linguistic sign ” , in: Journal of Phonetics 21. Hartung, W. 1969: «The effect of language as part of the pragmatic aspect ” , in: Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Pädagogischen Hochschule Potsdam, Gesellschafts- und sprachwissenschaftliche Reihe 13. Klaus, G. 1969a: The power of the word. An epistemological-pragmatic treatise, 5th ed., Berlin. Klaus, G. 1969b: Semiotics and epistemology. Klaus, G. 1971: Sprache der Politik, Berlin 1971. Kondratow, A. 1964: “ Semiotics and Art Theory ” , in: Art and Literature. 186 Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) Kraft, V. 1968: The Vienna Circle. The origin of neopositivism. Vienna. La Drière, C. 1957: “ Structure, Sound, and Meaning ” , in: Frye, N. (ed.): Sound and Poetry, New York. Martin, R. M. 1959: Toward a Systematic Pragmatics, Amsterdam. Mayenowa, M. R. 1967: “ Semiotics Today: Reflections on the second international conference on semiotics “ , in: Informations sue les sciences sociales 6. Mead, G. H. 1938: The philosophy of the act, Chicago. Mead, G. H. 1968: Mind, identity, and society. Ed. by C. W. Morris. Frankfurt a. M. Metz, C. 1968: “ Problems of denotation in the feature film ” , in: Language in the Technical Age 27. Morris, C. W. 1949: Segni, Linguaggio e Comportamento. Translated by S. Ceccato. Milan. Morris, C. W. 1963: Lineamenti di una teoria dei segni. Introduced, translated and commented by F. Rossi-Landi. Turin/ Milan/ Padua Morris C. W. 1970: The Pragmatic Movement in American Philosophy, New York. Morris, C. W. 1972: Foundations of sign theory. Aesthetics and the theory of signs. Translated by R. Posner with the collaboration of J. Rehbein. With an afterword by F. Knilli. Munich. Morris; C. W. 1973: Signs, language and behavior. Edited and with an introduction by K. O. Apel. Translated by A. Eschbach and G. Kopsch. Düsseldorf. Morris, C. W. 1975: Sign value aesthetics. Edited and translated by A. Eschbach. Frankfurt a. M. Mukarovsk ỳ . 1936: L ’ Art Comme Fait Semiologique. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie 8. Müller, A. 1970: Problems of behaviorist semiotics, Diss. Frankfurta. M. Nehring, A. 1963: Sprachzeichen und Sprechakte, Heidelberg. Neubert, A. 1962: Semantic positivism in the USA, Halle/ S. Oller, J. W. Jr. 1972: “ On the Relation between Syntax, Semantics, and Pragmatics ” , in: Linguistics 83. Peirce, C. S. 1931 - 34: Collected Papers, Cambridge, Mass. Pos, H. J. 1947/ 48: “ The Foundation of Word-Meanings. Different Approaches ” , in: Lingua. Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) 187 K O D I K A S / C O D E 44 (2021) · No. 1 - 3 Gunter Narr Verlag Tübingen Jan Amos Comenius: Orbis sensualium pictus , or the Infinite Drift. Jan Amos Comenius ’ Orbis sensualium pictus oder die unendliche Abdrift (1996) Abstract: Eschbach gives a detailed account of Jan Comenius ’ life and work up to his opus magnum the Orbis sensualium pictus. With the Orbis pictus, Comenius not only presented a new instructional work, which was to serve for instruction in Latin, as a picture book for the beginnings of instruction in the family, a mother tongue textbook for pupils of elementary school but also explored new methodological territory. The essay is demonstrating how the Orbis pictus is designed as a work of hermetic semiotics. It is therefore only superficially directed to the reconstruction of the hermetic-semiotic tradition; primarily, it is concerned with the ex negativo proof of the positive capabilities of critical semiotics. 1 Preliminary remark Since I did not want to answer the invitation to contribute to the Festschrift György Szépe by reaching into the drawer where long published or justifiably unpublished texts slumber, and since I also did not want to deliver an article that hardly touches on the interests of those celebrated, I spent some time looking for a suitable topic, one I believe I have found in the Orbis sensualium pictus of Jan Amos Komensky, or Comenius, to use his Latinized name. At first, it was rather peripheral reasons that tipped the scales in favor of this theme, such as the Hungarian origin of his paternal family Szépe or the fact that the Orbis pictus was written during his four years of activity in Sárospatak, more detailed studies revealed a wealth of parallels between Jan Amos Comenius and György Szépe, which far exceeded the normal measure of biographical similarities between any two scholars. Of course, first and foremost, both were teachers in the service of improving humankind, a highfalutin expression that means nothing more, but also nothing less, than providing better education to the broadest possible circle of people. Comenius lived during the Thirty Years ’ War and suffered from the subjugation of his homeland; Szépe experienced the trauma of the Second World War and the failure of the 56th Uprising; both traveled to fulfill their missions; both were involved in the establishment of colleges or universities; both were peace activists. The list goes on. One could call the Orbis sensualium pictus, with a slight sniff, an illustrated language textbook for children. This would grasp at least one essential aspect of the extraordinarily successful work. To my knowledge, the second aspect of this work has not yet been treated anywhere in the literature: I would like to demonstrate in the following that the Orbis pictus is designed as a work of hermetic semiotics, which is why a suitable approach can lead to completely new insights and contexts. 2.1 Jan Amos Comenius: curriculum vitae On March 28, 1592, Jan Komenský 1 was born as the son of Martin Komenský and his wife Anna. As unclear as his exact origin is to this day - at least three birthplaces (Nivnice, Komna, and Hungarian Brod) 2 and at least five surnames (1. Komenský after his father ’ s origin; 2. Comenius as a Latinized form of the aforementioned name; 3. Nivnicensis, Nivnicenus, Nivanus, Nivnicky after his birthplace; 3 4. Szeges (Seges) from the surname of his Hungarian father; 5. Foytu (Vogt) after the official name of Jan ’ s grandfather and greatgrandfather (cf. Polisensky, 1973: 21 f.), it should be indisputable that Komensky influenced the religious, political and scientific fate of the 17th century like few other contemporaries and that his - especially pedagogical - effect reaches until today, or to put it correctly: that his actual importance has only been fully grasped after centuries. This is essentially due to the dramatic circumstances of life during the Thirty Years ’ War, in which Comenius lost everything dear to him so that until the mid-thirties of our century it had to be assumed that in the destruction of Leszno, the pansophical works on which Comenius had worked for decades were also burned. Due to important manuscript finds in St. Petersburg, Halle a. d. S. and London (Hartlib Papers), the research situation today has fundamentally changed, insofar as we no longer have to assume unfinished projects and completed but unpublished and destroyed manuscripts, but rather an impressive oeuvre, which in the Opera omnia edition comprised 60 volumes. Jan Komenský came from a family of the Bohemian Brotherhood, which meant that his life path was predetermined in essential respects. The biographical data of Jan Komenský ’ s youth is incomplete; what is known, however, is that Komenský lost both his parents and two of his sisters as a child in rapid succession and spent his adolescence with an aunt in 1 Josef V. Polisensky reports that Comenius ’ grandfather, and perhaps already his great-grandfather, was the head of the municipal administration and the estate administrator of the Lords of Komna. The grandfather bore the surname Szeges; later he and his children were called Foyto (Vogt) after his official title but later returned to the surname Szeges (cf Polisensky 1973: 21). 2 Josef Zemanek (1990: 21) resolves the dispute about the birthplace of Comenius in favor of Uhersky Brod: “ The relationship of the town of Uhersky Brod to the name Komensky has existed for almost five hundred years. It began with the stay of his ancestors in our town, the Seges family, which was proved here already at the end of the 15th century: In the first half of the 16th century, one of them, Jan Seges, had acquired the office of a bailiff in the village of Komna, where he then settled. After him, this office was taken over by his eldest son Stanek, while the second son, Martin, went to Uhersky Brod. Since he came to this town from Komna, people called him Komnensky or Komenksy. Quite quickly he joined the group of rich and influential burghers, and by the turn of the century (16th/ 17th century) he already enjoyed a significant position. He owned a burgher ’ s house, fields, meadows, and vineyards, and he also leased the farm of the former Dominican monastery. As the owner of a burgher house, he had the right to serve wine. This Martin Seges had four daughters; his youngest son was called Jan. ” 3 Anton Vrbka (1892: 15-25) cites several significant pieces of evidence for the birthplaces of Nivnice and Hungarian Brod, but without being able to make a definitive decision. Jan Amos Comenius: Orbis sensualium pictus, or the Infinite Drift (1996) 189 Stráznice and a guardian in Hungarian Brod, where he received a not particularly careful education. It was only after a relatively long delay that he acquired, with considerable effort, the knowledge that would enable him to begin his studies in 1611 at the newly founded Calvinist college in Herborn, where the Bohemian Brotherhood preferred to send its offspring for education. Occasionally (cf. e. g. Floss 1973: 173), the Herborn mentality is portrayed as schoolmasterly, uncreative, relatively barren, and bigotedly Protestant; de facto, however, Komenský received in Herborn and after his studies in Heidelberg from his revered teachers Johann Heinrich Alsted, Johannes Piscator (Fischer), and David Pareus many of the stimuli that gave him a lasting orientation in his thinking. In Herborn, Komenský adopted the additional first name Amos; the Latinization of his family name also falls into this period. Although I have found little useful information in the literature, I count eight or nine languages that Comenius was familiar with 4 : 1. his Bohemian (Czech) mother tongue; 2. Latin; 3. Greek; 4. Hebrew; 5. Hungarian (cf. Blekastad 1969: 485; Bakos 1972: 393); 6. German; 7. Polish; 8. Dutch; 9. English. I conclude on Polish language skills because of his sixteen years of exile in Leszno. Comenius learned Dutch by living in Amsterdam for fourteen years. Most uncertain are conjectures about English, while Comenius ’ German and Hungarian must have been quite good since he entertained at some point the idea of translating his Orbis pictus into German himself. His Hungarian language skills will certainly not have been acquired purely during his four-year stay in Sárospatak. Rather, the roots are likely to be found in his multilingual homelife as a youth, and, on top of that, his first wife was Hungarian. After completing his studies, Komenský returned to his homeland in 1614 and worked as a teacher at the Latin school in Prerov, which he had graduated from a few years earlier and where he was ordained as a priest of the Brotherhood in 1616. Two years later he married Magdalena Vizovska, whom he had met in Hungary when he bought beehives for his Prerov parish to teach them beekeeping. 5 In 1618 - 1621, Comenius served as a teacher and preacher in Fulnek. This was when the infamous defenestration of Prague occurred, later counted among the decisive moments of the Thirty Years ’ War. In 1620, with the defeat of the Winter King at the Battle of White Mountain, the catastrophe of the Bohemian Brethren Unity took its course. Like the French Huguenots, the Czech Brethren were persecuted and hanged by the victorious Catholics. Jan Komenský had to go into hiding, found temporary protection and shelter at Brandeis Castle with Charles of Zerotin, lost his wife and two sons, and finally led his congregation into Polish exile in Leszno. In 1624 Comenius married Dorothea Cyrillova in his second marriage, the daughter of the brother bishop Jan Cyrill, who had crowned Frederick V, Elector Palatine, king, which the Catholic Habsburg Emperor naturally interpreted as open indignation. In exile in Leszno, Comenius again earned his 4 Heinrich Geissler is even more generous in his assessment of J. A. Comenius ’ linguistic skills. He writes: “ We know of him that he was so proficient in Czech, Polish, German, and Hungarian that he wrote books in these languages. In addition, he understood English, French, and Russian. He also had a complete command of Latin and was at home in Greek and Hebrew ” (Geissler 1959: 47). Comenius did not know French (cf. Reber 1895: 6) and I have doubts about the knowledge of Swedish claimed by Geissler; otherwise I recognize a pleasing overall agreement of the findings. 5 In Zoubek it says: “ Faint hints suggest that the bees did not come from Hungary alone, but also Comenius ’ bride came with them from Slovakia. ” 190 Jan Amos Comenius: Orbis sensualium pictus, or the Infinite Drift (1996) living as a teacher, although he preferred to devote himself to his scientific research and publications. Through his teaching and his concern for the community of about a thousand souls, a rich scientific work was produced, but Comenius could only do this by working practically day and night, which had the inevitable consequence that he often suffered from exhaustion and insomnia. In any case, from now on his (language) textbooks, his didactic works, and his preliminary pansophical studies were written in rapid succession: The Bohemian Didactics (Didactica, 1628 - 1632), The Open Language Door (Janua linguarum reserata, 1629 - 1631), The Informatorium of the Mother School (Informatorum skoly materske, 1629 - 1632), The General View of Physics (Physicae Synopsis, 1630 - 1632), and The Great Didactics (Didactica magna, 1633 - 1638). Among the first pansophical works are the Preludes to Pansophical Endeavors (Praeludia, 1634 - 1636), the Precursors to Pansophy (Prodromus Pansophiae, 1634 - 1639), the Illumination of Pansophical Endeavors (Dilucidatio, 1638 - 1639), and the Fleshing Out of Pansophy (Pansophiae Diatyposis, 1639 - 1641). Above all, his language textbooks, which were an extraordinary success, spread his reputation worldwide through numerous translations. It will be discussed later what enabled Comenius to build such an innovative doctrinal edifice out of the supposedly dull orthodoxy of Herborn; at this point, it should only be noted that two essential items are still missing from the above workload: 1. an intensive and broad study of literature, so that Comenius was comprehensively informed about the state of science, which in the 17th century, only two hundred years after his death, was not possible. 2. a very intensive and extensive correspondence, which bound him into a whole network of scientific contacts, which he knew to arrange extremely skillfully for his various projects. With his growing international reputation, Comenius hardly had the necessary time for the conscientious execution of his plans. In 1641 and 1642, his travels took him to England, Holland, and Sweden. In London, in the circle of influential friends and patrons, Samuel Hartlib, John Dury, and Bishop John Wilkins, who was inspired by Comenius to develop a universal language (cf. Wilkins, 1984), he held pansophical consultations, which - as so often in the life of Comenius - ultimately failed due to adverse external circumstances, in this case, the outbreak of civil war, but at least indirectly contributed to the foundation of the Royal Academy. How much his advice was already in demand at that time can be seen from the fact that he was invited by Cardinal Richelieu, who was otherwise not suspected of any Protestant inclinations and who had just starved the Huguenots in La Rochelle, to continue his pansophical studies in France. Harvard University also sought out Comenius, as did the Swedes, whose commission to develop language textbooks he finally followed. To be close to his Swedish patrons and not lose contact with his community, Comenius lived from 1642 to 1648 in Elbing, Sweden, where he tried to fulfill his mission with the financial means of his great patron Lodewijk de Geer and the support of a small circle of collaborators. This work resulted in the publication of The latest language method (Methodus linguarum novissima) in 1649. The year before, 1648, on completion of the Swedish mission, Comenius suffered public and private disasters: Although the Peace of Münster and Osnabrück ended the Thirty Years ’ War, the interests of Bohemia and Moravia had been shamefully betrayed to their Swedish ally, so that hopes of a peaceful return home were quashed, as the exile became abruptly permanent. Comenius, elected leading bishop of the Bohemian Brotherhood in 1648, foresaw correctly that the Peace of Westphalia would end his Brotherhood, Jan Amos Comenius: Orbis sensualium pictus, or the Infinite Drift (1996) 191 which he expressed in his 1650 Bequest to the Dying Mother, the Brotherhood. Finally, in 1648, his second wife died when the youngest of their four children was just two years old. Comenius did not collapse under the depressing blows of fate and married Johanna Gajusova in 1649. From the various international offers to continue his studies, he accepted the invitation of the Transylvanian Prince Sigismund Rákóczi to reform the local Latin school in Sárospatak, one of the seats of the princely family, according to pansophical principles. In 1650 Comenius moved with his family to Sárospatak, where he led the most important project of his career for four years; we will discuss it in more detail below. In addition to his practical pedagogical activities, Comenius continued to publish and research with his usual intensity. Among the outstanding moments of the four-year stay in Hungary was without a doubt the development and realization of the publication that was to make Comenius world-famous: the visible world in pictures, better known by its Latin title Orbis sensualium pictus, which was first published by Endter in Nürnberg in 1658, shortly after the end of his activity in Sárospatak. The end of the Sárospatak school experiment is much more like an abortion than a completion; once again Comenius had failed due to adverse circumstances: the death of his principal, the obstruction of his colleagues, the laziness, immorality, and unwillingness of his Hungarian shills, and last but not least the counterreformation activities of the Catholics, especially the Jesuits. Deeply disappointed, he returned to Leszno for his last stay, only to see his refuge burn down in the aftermath of the 1656 Swedish-Polish war, and with Leszno, saw not only his refuge but also the work of decades go up in flames. He got away with just his life intact. The homeless refugee wandered through Europe until he found a new shelter for the rest of his life in Amsterdam with Laurentius de Geer, the son of his deceased patron. With an almost incomprehensible stamina, Comenius set to work again in Amsterdam and not only completed the edition of his Complete Didactic Works (Opera didactica omnia, 1657) but also resumed his pansophical studies, the results of which had been lost to the flames in Leszno. Whether Comenius was able to rely on text fragments recovered from Leszno must remain an open question for the time being; in any case, it is a fact that during his Amsterdam years, he drew up an almost unbelievable seven-volume sum of his pansophical endeavors, which has been available to us in its entirety since it ’ s fortunate rediscovery in the form of the Consultatio Catholica. This extremely concise curriculum vitae would remain incomplete in one essential respect if the publication of prophecies under the title Lux e tenebris (1657) did not point to the obscurantist tendencies that Comenius followed throughout his life and which must not be ignored in the assessment of his life ’ s work (cf. Wittmann 1973: 82). Early on, he had made friends with the seer Christoph Kotter; later on, he even took the seeress Christina Poniatowska into his household, and to his former classmate, the seer Nikolaus Drabik, who finally had to pay for his wild fantasies with his head, he kept a hardly comprehensible loyalty to Nibelung, when his charlatanry had long become obvious (cf. Beisswanger 1904: 56). We have here a striking example of the fact that this great reformer and innovator Comenius had something of a split personality, and could not consistently maintain a balancing act between scholastic antiquity and early Enlightenment modernity. This irrationalism, which was not a one-time aberration, as his lively interest in Johann Valentin Andreae ’ s Fama fraternitatis rosae crucis and similar obscurantisme vividly demonstrates 192 Jan Amos Comenius: Orbis sensualium pictus, or the Infinite Drift (1996) and as will be examined in detail below, and his obtuseness, articulated in particular in the fact that he published Lux e tenebris despite the most severe criticisms (cf. Hofmann 1976: 68) and dismayed reactions of his friends ten years later, did great harm to himself and his cause. Towards the end of his life, the last bishop of the Bohemian Brotherhood became a bit lonely, which was probably due not least to his previously mentioned esoteric inclinations, but also to the fact that he had outlived many of his friends and relatives by decades at a time when people on average did not live beyond thirty years of age. On November 15, 1670, Jan Amos Comenius died in Amsterdam. He found his final resting place in the Walloon Church in Naarden near Amsterdam. 2.2 Comenius in Sárospatak (1650 - 1654) Before the happy rediscovery of the Consultatio Catholica, Comenius ’ four-year stay in Sárospatak could have been considered a more insignificant and ultimately unsuccessful episode in his career: “ Today, however, when Komenský ’ s omniscience (pansophy) has come with such urgency to the forefront of the study of his thought and work, any disdain for his stay there must cease. It is now known that this seemingly short epoch was decisive in forming his main work, ‘ De rerum humananim emendatione consultatio catholica ’” (Brambora 1972: 36 f.). 6 In addition to the content-related arguments, which underline the enormous importance of the first practical school experiences in Sárospatak for the further development of Pansophy, the more private motives that guided Comenius in his decision to accept the invitation to Hungary must also be taken into account. First and foremost, after the catastrophes of 1648, I see the welcome opportunity to participate in an extremely promising project in a completely new environment. Geréb, 1958: 7 draws attention to a second essential connection: “ That Comenius came to Hungary undoubtedly had political reasons: He expected a war of liberation to be waged by the Rákoczi dynasty against the Habsburgs and thus also for the concerns of the Czech people. ” If it was not just the expectation of a war of liberation led by Prince Rákoczi, Comenius certainly appreciated that so many of his countrymen had found refuge and support in Hungary. In the decision to invite Comenius, a dispute between Puritans and Orthodox Christians, reported by Geréb in 1958, may have also played a significant role. Lajos Orosz writes: “ In this situation, the invitation to Comenius, the greatest authority on pedagogy in the whole of Europe, who was neither a Puritan, nor expressly anti-Presbyterian, was not simply a compromise, but a tertium datur which satisfied all opposing parties ” (Orosz 1973: 103). Prince Sigismund of Rákoczi had written to Comenius in March 1650 in his name and the name of his mother, the princely widow Susanna Lorantfy, requesting a conversation about 6 Milada Blekastad (1969: 184 ff.) points out the fundamental role of the image of the wheel in the composition of De rerum humanarum emendatione consultatio catholica. A separate study would be required to adequately appreciate this universally disseminated image. Jan Amos Comenius: Orbis sensualium pictus, or the Infinite Drift (1996) 193 improving schools in Hungary. Kvacala (1913: 11) reports that the letter of invitation from Prince Rákoczi was accompanied by a letter from Janos Tolnai, the principal of the Sárospatak school. Tolnai was a long-time friend of Samuel Hartlib, who emphatically accepted the prince ’ s invitation. This letter was preceded by a development of the school, which Lajos Dezs ő , (1883: 173) knowledgeably describes: “ The school at Patak originated in 1531 from a Minorite monastery. Its first teacher was Stefan Kopácsi, a Franciscan, and one of the first Hungarian reformers. Initially, the school was only a trivial school. Only in 1549, after Kopácsi ’ s return from Wittenberg, was it transformed into a larger one, where teachers and clergy were educated. The owners of the dominion of Patak were the patrons of the school; these Protestant noblemen found it necessary to raise the intellectual power of Protestantism through good schools. From 1618, the Rákóczi family owned the dominion of Patak. George Rákóczi the First (ruling prince of Transylvania from 1630 - 1648), an enlightened man who guided the education of his two salines with exemplary wisdom and deep pedagogical insight, showed much favor to the Protestant schools in Hungary. He felt particularly moved to raise the school in Patak, located in his dominion, to the position where the princely school in Gyula-Fehérvár (Alba-Julia), founded by Gabriel Bethlen (his predecessor), stood. Also, his widow, Susanna Lorántfy (d. 1660), and his younger son Sigismund Rákóczi (M.) sacrificed a lot for the school in Patak, which was called the Rákóczi school at that time and was in its first flourishing period. ” At the meeting with the prince in Tokaj in May 1650, Comenius was asked to give an expert opinion “ on how the provincial school in Patak could be set up as well as possible according to the laws of philosophy ” (Lindner 1902: LV). Under the title, “ Illustris patakinae scholae idea, ” Comenius delivered his expert opinion, which later found its way into his collected didactic writings. After Prince Rákóczi had approved Comenius ’ plan of a pansophical school, he explained the mutual expectations in his appointment document: “ We appoint you for the purpose that you may give us sacred assistance in improving our schools at Patak, and that you may supply here with us a true, full, and clear image of your method, which is already beginning to spread everywhere. We have by no means the intention to deprive you of your more important studies, to which you want to devote your old-age years for the general good, by calling you to the toils of the school dust, but that under your guidance our scholars, the principles of this our school and the teachers may give you pleasure by progressing in the desired reorganization and by carrying out your efforts for the teaching method ” (quoted from Lindner 1902: LVI). The pansophical school that Comenius wanted to establish in Sárospatak was conceived of as a seven-class gymnasium, divided into a lower and an upper class according to the following scheme: Class: The Vestibulum (Vestibule). Class: The Janua (entrance) Lower level with additions Class: The Atrium (hall) linguistic character Class: The philosophical class Class: The logical class High school with additions Class: The political class With factual character Class: The theosophical class 194 Jan Amos Comenius: Orbis sensualium pictus, or the Infinite Drift (1996) In the pansophical school, children from the nobility, the bourgeoisie, and talented peasants were to be taught. The subject matter was considered in stages, through observation, experience, and self-affirmation by the scholars. This methodical measure resulted from the progressive intention of the Pansophical school not to be run merely as a language school (Latin school), but to give equal importance to the subject matter. Each school year was to have its textbook, to which the teachers and students were to be completely subordinated. Each textbook should have a threefold division into 1. lexicon, 2. grammar, and 3. text, to grasp the whole language during the three-year lower school. Each of the seven classes was to have its teacher, headed by the rector, who would visit all the classes daily to ensure everything was running smoothly. Comenius did not forget to demand a decent salary for class teachers so that they would not give up easily, nor did he fail to include in the eighthour daily teaching load the necessary rest breaks (cf. Lindner 1902: LVII - LXI). Of the original plans that Comenius had developed vis-à-vis Prince Rákóczi, less than half could be realized, which was due, among other things, to the fact that at the beginning of the school experiment, sufficient numbers of textbooks and well-trained personnel were not available. Moreover, the school experiment would have had to be sustained over a much longer period of time to become implanted completely and have a chance of survival. Moreover, the time in Sárospatak was not without conflict, as seen from various written statements. For example, Comenius complains in a letter to the prince ’ s widow: “ Nothing happens here that is worthy of my presence, rather I have to endure ridicule with my didactic efforts and will suffer even greater if I stay longer. My whole method aims to turn the school fronts into games and amusements. Nobody here wants to understand this. The youth is treated quite slavishly, even the young nobility; the teachers base their reputation on scowls, harsh words, and even blows, and would rather be admired than loved. So often I have rebuked publicly and privately that this is not the right way 1st, but always in vain. Also, from the very beginning, I advised to introduce any theatrical games, in possession of a certain experience that there are no more effective means to drive away mental sluggishness and to spur on lively activity ” (Antochi 1984: 47). Dietrich (1995: 96) says the Sárospatak mission failed all around, despite undeniable successes in which he agrees with Hermann Gottsched (1879: 5), who brusquely claimed that Comenius was driven away from his model school at Patak by “ Hungarian dullness and intolerance, ” which finds an echo in Comenius ’ former Herborn teacher Bisterfield, who wrote, “ In the whole world one can rather take up a better method and pansophical studies than among this people ” (J. R. 1913: 228). Gustav Adolf Lindner, in his insightful and knowledgeable biography of Comenius, struck a much more conciliatory tone: “ If one looks at the actual successes which Comenius achieved with the pansophical school in Sáros-Patak, the distance between idea and success, plan and execution, strikes one very unpleasantly. ( … ) Comenius was aware of the obstacles he faced in implementing his designs. These are books, teachers, and pupils. In various places of his school writings, Comenius places the highest emphasis on producing appropriate textbooks; from them, he expects the salvation of his method. The production of a textbook, in which the entire subject matter of a whole school class would be concentrated in such a way that neither teacher nor pupil would need to go beyond it, is such an ideal that its realization cannot possibly be entrusted to an individual, least of all to a person ‘ whom old age has already broken and to whom death sits in the rikken ’ , as Comenius says of himself. ( … ) Regarding teachers and co-workers, Comenius did not fare any better than Pestalozzi Jan Amos Comenius: Orbis sensualium pictus, or the Infinite Drift (1996) 195 did later. He, too, had to struggle with the Lernaean snake of indifferentism and inertia on the part of teachers and learners. ( … ) The students also caused him many difficulties, as he complained about their ‘ wild nature ’ and their ‘ rough manners ’ of them, as well as about the jealousies between the nobles and the commoners. ( … ) Where there is merit, there is also envy. Jealous of the growing reputation of Comenius, those who were to be his collaborators opposed him with envy and passive resistance, so that it may not have seemed undesirable to him when the death of Prince Sigismund Rákoczi and the ecclesiastical conditions in Lissa interrupted the further expansion of the Pan- Sophic school. Comenius took leave of Hungary in 1654, leaving a valuable memento of his earlier stay. This is the most popular of Comenius ’ works, the one in which the main idea of his educational reform was typically expressed, and which alone will be sufficient to wrest his name from oblivion. We mean the Orbis pictus - the world in pictures ” (Lindner 1902: LV). This assessment essentially coincides with the detailed investigation of the Sárospatak seminary director Lajos Dezs ő (1883), who considerably expanded our knowledge of the background of the Pansophic school experiment and its abortion: “ We know that the impetus for Comenius ’ appointment to Patak came from Joh. Tolnai. The prejudice, however, which the deans Tarczali and Simandi and the Patak clergy harbored against Tolnai, was most probably also transferred to Comenius ’ school reforms; so that Comenius, apart from the members of the Rakoczi family, apart from Joh. Tolnai and Paul Megyesy (the court preacher) paid hardly any sincere friends among those who possessed any influence in this matter. Under such circumstances, a spirit of opposition soon arose among teachers and students. ‘ It soon became apparent ’ - says Comenius - ‘ that my endeavor would not reach its goal, for reasons it is more appropriate to conceal. I saw that the pansophical studies found no ground where almost everyone was content with fragments, where impatience prevailed, etc. ’ It is probable that the patrons also did not lend Comenius the proper support. It is also probable that Comenius was an eye-witness to the fierce performances of the professors, even though he had to weather some storms. He must have had bitter experiences that he wrote: ‘ If there is any place under the sun where discord, gloating and envy prevail, where people ruin themselves with secret hatred and hostility, this is the place. ’ Under such circumstances, Tolnai not without reason expressed his fear that after the departure of Comenius, everything would return to the old track, and not without reason Comenius said to the trustees: ‘ God grant that you may be permanently united in your intentions and plans. God grant that your efforts in maintaining concord among the teachers may have the desired success: for I confess it, I fear ruin from this silk ’ . Under such circumstances, there was no thought of carrying out the plan as early as the time of Comenius, and of improving and maintaining it after his departure ” (Dezs ő , 1883: 290 f.). Although the opinions expressed so far on the success or failure of the Sarospatak school experiment address some objectively existing problems, they are all too pessimistic, so I will let Josef Bramobra have his more favorable say at the end of this section: The whole result of this four-year Sárospatak stay is imposing, even in quantity: the pedagogical harvest is - in terms of volume - equal to the yield of the previous twenty-two years. It contains, first of all, three compilations of theoretical statements, which were published in Sárospatak one after the other: ‘ Primitiae laborum Patakinorum ’ (1650 - 1651, ‘ Laborum scholasticorum in illustri Patakino gymnasio continuatio ’ (1651 - 1652) and ‘ Laborum scholasticorum Patakini obitorum coronis ’ (1654). ( … ) The concise programmatic writing ‘ Illustris patakinae scholae idea, ’ which was written right after the first talks with Prince Rákoczi, he expanded the following year into the well-known writing ‘ Schola pansophica ’ and after another two years, he also conceived the organizational plan of this 196 Jan Amos Comenius: Orbis sensualium pictus, or the Infinite Drift (1996) school ( ‘ Leges scholae bene ordinataes ’ ). All these writings were produced in Sárospatak and were published there ” (Brambora 1972: 34 f.). 2.3.0 Orbis sensualium pictus: illustrated language textbook The Thirty Years ’ War devastated Central Europe; entire regions were depopulated by the effects of war and epidemics, customs were shredded, and education fell to an all-time low. In this bleak situation, Comenius wrote his Orbis sensualium pictus with the firm conviction that he could contribute significantly to improving human relations through a better school education for all children, writing not as an educator, but foremost as a theologian. With the Orbis pictus, Comenius not only presented a new instructional work, which was to serve 1. in the initial instruction in Latin, 2. as a picture book for the “ mother school ” , i. e. for the beginnings of instruction in the family, and 3. as a mother tongue textbook for pupils of elementary school (cf. Vidrascu 1891: 15 f.), but also entered new methodological territory, insofar as language teaching was not detached from the real world as pure text teaching, but was to profit from one ’ s own contemplation and experience in dealing with things, or in other words: the pictures function neither as mere illustrations and loosenings, nor are they mnemonic aids, but they establish the vivid link between language and factual teaching (cf. Schaller 1970: 123), since the most important thing is that understanding, handling and language are practiced together from youth on, because they form the links of a chain (cf. Liese 1903: 13). What sounds like a banality, hardly worthy of such a fuss, is nevertheless at the heart of the pedagogical approach. The Bochum Comeniologist Klaus Schaller stated: “ Not in knowledge (scientia - theoria), not in conscience (conscientia - praxis), but in the action of man (usus/ fruitia - chresis) his humanity is shown. Not the knowing, but the acting man is the true man; only the one deserves to be called truly man who fearlessly stands up for the improvement of all that is entrusted to men in this world (rerum humanarum emendatio), for the realization of the truth inscribed by God in creation. Thus, it is no wonder that from the early writings to the late work of Komensky - modernly speaking - a theory of action is the central theme (Schaller 1985: 205). 2.3.1 Structure and intention of the Orbis pictus Comenius unfolds a panorama of the world and its inhabitants on 150 plates. The literature repeatedly claims that this pictorial work was framed by the plates I. God and CL. The Last Judgment. However, if one wants to be accurate, one would have to frame it a bit wider, because of the “ Lecture to the Reader, ” the “ Introduction ” and a “ Living Alphabet ” from the beginning. At the same time, a “ Resolution ” follows at the end. This further frame is extremely important for the interpretation of the Orbis pictus, because here the author Comenius explains his intentions and, especially in Resolution, makes clear that he has not presented a universal register in the textbook, but a selection worth knowing; literally: “ Ita vidisti summatim Res omnes quae ostendi .poterunt ” (Comenius 1991: 309; emphasis mine, A. E.). Deviating from the accompanying German translation by Siegmund von Birken, a church hymn writer and zealous collaborator of the Fruchtbringende Gesellschaft in Nürnberg (cf. Jan Amos Comenius: Orbis sensualium pictus, or the Infinite Drift (1996) 197 Pilz 1967: 40), I translate: “ So you have seen only the main things according to all things that can be demonstrated. ” This “ resolution ” corresponds to Comenius ’ frequently repeated intention “ to teach everything to everyone. ” While he did indeed want to teach all children, i. e., especially girls, in school, which was just as unusual in his time as his disregard for socalled class distinctions, the “ everything ” easily led to misunderstandings, because Comenius naturally did not want - like no reasonable pedagogue - to cram every child with the entirety of the knowledge of his time. What he understood by “ everything ” was ” everything necessary, ” as explained in the introduction. Incidentally, in the “ Resolution ” the teacher urges his pupil: “ Continue now and diligently learn other good books so that you may become learned and pious, ” which would not be a very sensible request if the pupil already knew “ everything ” after completing the Orbis pictus. A schematic summary of the topics covered in the Orbis pictus will give an overview of the 150 panels: “ God, the world, the sky, the four elements (fire, air, water, earth), then on several plates the mineral kingdom, then the plant kingdom, then already in more detail the animals, finally in figure 35 the human being, first the bodily side: limbs, viscera, bone structure, sense organs, etc. under it also the soul, represented as an only dotted human figure - then the human crafts: gardening, agriculture, animal husbandry, etc. Tailor, cobbler, carpenter, etc., then the arts, oratory, music, philosophy, etc., then ethics with the virtues embodied in allegorical female figures: Prudence, industriousness, temperance, stout-heartedness, good-naturedness, justice, gentleness, and then, in more detail, the representation of social and state life, and finally, in conclusion, the religions: Paganism, Judaism, Christianity, the Mahometan faith, Providence, the Last Judgment ” (Bollnow 1950: 147). For a correct understanding of the intention pursued by Comenius, special attention must be paid to the organizing principle of his textbook. As already said, the whole world is presented between the two absolute poles ‘ God ’ and ‘ Last Judgement, ’ so that in this great metaphysical conception, every earthly phenomenon - and consequently humankind as well - appears in its assigned place as a member of the objective world context. This divine world order corresponds to the motto of the title copy: “ Omnia sponte fluant. Absit violentia rebus. ” This is not a call for a non-violent education (for then Comenius would contradict himself, for example, in plate XCVII, where it says: “ Some gossip and show themselves wanton and indolent: they are chastised with the bacel and the ruhte. ” ), but the reflection of the divine order: everything should develop according to the natural, i. e., divine order, which should not be violated violently, i. e., against the will of God. Only about 10 percent of the Orbis pictus is devoted to theological and moral subjects. In comparison, natural history comprises about 40 percent. Crafts, trade, and other professions make up more than 20 percent (cf. Geréb, 1958: 8), so Alt is strongly reminded of the style of the Ständebücher (cf. alt, 1970: 40), one will do well to take the Christian world order as a basis but to look for the actual intention in another direction. In my opinion, two overlapping intentions can be distinguished: On the one hand, Comenius offers factual information, which he draws mainly from the primary child ’ s world of experience, which seems to me to be far more urban-bourgeois than the rural-peasant world of experience; on the other hand, as a teacher of language, he pursues the intention of creating a connection between visual and acoustic comprehension (by reading aloud): 198 Jan Amos Comenius: Orbis sensualium pictus, or the Infinite Drift (1996) “ By looking at the pictures, the student was supposed to acquire the respective heading and, after leafing through the book several times, to be able to read it without too much effort. In principle, this was nothing other than an ingenious conception of the well-known holistic method for that time ” (Kunstmann 1957: 377 f.). 2.3.2 The mode of representation of the orbis pictus Robert Alt claims that Comenius in his textbooks helped realistic illustration, which hardly ever occurred before the 16th century, breakthrough (cf. Alt 1970: 17). This assertion is at least for a part of the illustrations inaccurate and - as I will discuss in more detail in the next chapter - could put the whole Orbis pictus in a completely wrong light. In order not to merely parry assertion with counter-assertion, I would like to cite some concrete cases which refute Robert Alt: I. Plate XXI shows, among other things, the “ vigilant ” crane holding a stone in one raised foot, to perk up on guard duty if it should fall asleep and drop the stone. Of course, this is not a realistic representation but comes from the circle of animal legends. 2) Plate XLII shows the soul of man as a dotted silhouette; it takes some audacity to call such a representation realistic. 3. plates CX - CXVII show the virtues in allegorical female figures; again, no trace of a realistic depiction. 4 Unicorns, dragons, and basilisks on plates XXVIII - XXX populate fairy tales rather than the animal world. 5 Also the providence in plate CXLIX corresponds to old emblematic representation conventions (cf. Wamcke 1987), without therefore a claim to realism. A representation can often be better characterized by what it omits and conceals than by what is presented. In the case of the Orbis pictus, it is immediately obvious that the central event of the 17th century, the Thirty Years ’ War, does not appear expressis verbis. Comenius, two years after the Peace of Westphalia, will not have already forgotten or repressed this horrible war, which had robbed him of everything important to a human being, which leaves only one plausible answer to its absence from the book: Comenius did not want to speak of war, but of peace. He presents to children a peaceful, industrious, Godpleasing world, which does not exist de facto in this way, but which is to become so (cf Harms 1970: 531 1.): This is the great irenic message of the Orbis pictus. This peaceful pedagogical intention manifests using the circle, tree (cf. Van Vliet 1992: 257 ff.), and garden metaphor. Erwin Schadel writes on circle symbolism (6): “ For circle symbolism, i. e., for the view that the moving world revolves - in a similar way as the wheel revolves around its fixed axis - around the unmoved divine center, he was inspired by Cusanus or by the Speculum intellectuale, a Cusanus anthology published in 1510 by the Nuremberg physician Ulrich Pinder. The tree metaphor, which suggests that what is visible in this world grows out of invisible ‘ roots ’ and which brings an ‘ organic ’ aspect into Comenius ’ encyclopaedic ideas, he received from Jakob Böhme, who in the first chapter of his Aurora speaks of the ‘ spring tree of the world ’ (Schadel 1989: XXV f.). But he could have also - perhaps more obvious for a bishop of the Bohemian Brotherhood - simply opened the bible and found their many examples of the tree metaphor (cf. Cervenka 1969: 80 ff.). Klaus Schaller (1992: 210) has devoted some attention to the garden metaphor and has explained the vignette text of the title copy as I have tried to do above. Jan Amos Comenius: Orbis sensualium pictus, or the Infinite Drift (1996) 199 The rich imagery of the Orbis pictus suggests, in my opinion, an analysis of this extremely successful textbook in terms of image and drawing theory; to my great surprise, I have searched in vain for such an analysis in the extensive Comenius literature. Apart from a few tentative hints, such as perhaps the coloring book for preschool children, 7 it was not taken sufficiently seriously as such. 2.3.3 Models and impact of the Orbis pictus Occasionally the Orbis pictus has been presented as the first picture book or as the first textbook that makes use of pictures (cf. e. g., Vidrascu 1891: 25), without any real basis (cf. Capkova, 1970: 7). Indeed, this could only be claimed by someone who had read Comenius very inattentively and, moreover, had no idea of the history of (picture) pedagogy. Heinrich Geissler (1959: 111) points out in this context that Comenius occasionally called his Orbis pictus Lucidarius = Lightbringer (the first proof of 1653 bears the title Vestibuli et Januae Lucidarium, cf. Blekastad 1969: 514), with which he not only took up an idea originating from mysticism but also borrowed - certainly not unconsciously - the title of the oldest medieval German textbook. The fact that Comenius used templates, and in some cases even took them over literally, was always clearly stated. For example, in the eighth chapter of the Methodus Linguarum Novissima, he names no less than 22 literary sources (cf. Liese 1903: 87), which include pedagogues, theologians, and philosophers of outstanding importance, such as Vives, Lubinus (cf. Richter 1893), Vossius, Melanchthon, Ratichius, Bodinus, Andreae, Helvicus, Alsted, Jungius, Campanella, Murner, Bacon, Erasmus, and so on. A detailed reference would have to be even more extensive and worked with about the same care as Milada Blekastad ’ s great Comenius study, which she modestly calls an attempt despite its great wealth of detail. Even if most of the pedagogical and didactic measures that Gerhard Michel (1992) identifies in his careful analysis of the Orbis pictus should have been known before Comenius, Michel can be agreed that it was Comenius who took up these diverse suggestions, organized them, and realized them in a homogeneous work. 8 The Orbis sensualium pictus is undoubtedly a successful textbook; Pilz (1967) in his great work determined that there had been 244 editions of this extraordinary book, translated into all languages of the world and spread over centuries. Almost notorious in Comenius literature are references to Goethe ’ s judgment in the 14th book of Dichtung und Wahrheit (Poetry and Truth), where, in comparison with Basedow ’ s elementary work, he speaks of the “ sensual-methodical merits ” that he “ must ascribe to the work of Amos Comenius. ” Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Johann Gottfried Herder expressed themselves just as approvingly and appreciatively on the Comenian work as did the Swedish chancellor Oxenstierna, whereby primarily his peace pedagogical and language didactic efforts found 7 However, it is difficult to imagine how a little book with the dimensions of 94 x 153 mm in the original edition of 1658 should serve as a coloring book for small children. 8 Wendelin Toischer (1913: 193) sourly criticizes that no new ideas were realized in the Orbis pictus, because at least Eilhard Lubnius had long before “ guessed ” what was then executed in the Orbis pictus (cf. Bohlen, 1906: 64). Unfortunately, it seems to have escaped the revered author that between a piece of advice and its execution can lie worlds. Furthermore, it would be a severe abridgment to reduce the Orbis pictus to the realization of Lubinic advice for the creation of a Latin language book, because then, for example, the entire Irenean as well as the entire Pansophic complex to name only two important concerns that Comenius also pursued in his Orbis pictus would have remained completely unconsidered. 200 Jan Amos Comenius: Orbis sensualium pictus, or the Infinite Drift (1996) acclamation. At the same time, the pansophical studies met with incomprehension or rejection (cf. Vrbka 1892: 143 ff.). There is, however, no lack of the most severe criticism: Christian Weise counted Comenius among the “ worst arch-fools in the whole world ” because he burdened the students with an excessive abundance of useless words; Pierre Bayle expressed himself in a similarly derogatory manner in his Dictionnaire historique et critique (1741) and Johann Christoph Adelung in his Geschichte der menschlichen Narrheit (1785), which, however, need not be of further interest because their spiteful remarks neither reflected general opinion nor were sufficiently factually substantiated (cf. Aron 1895). 2.4.0 Orbis sensualium pictus: Hermetic Semiotics Comenius did not write semiotics that could be compared with roughly contemporaneous approaches (e. g. John Locke ’ s Essay Concerning Human Understanding of 1690); even less were his reflections echoed in the great semiotics of the 19th and 20th centuries (e. g. Charles Sanders Peirce, Ferdinand de Saussure, Charles William Morris); not even significant terminological echoes would legitimize stylizing Comenius as a semiotician avant la lettre, even if Gerhard Michel (1984: 18 f.) can show that Comenius in the last chapter of the “ Mundus artificialis ” of Pansophie as Artes Signorum: Physiognomica, Semeiotica, and Cabala, which were probably familiar to him from the logic of Ramon Lull. My attempt to explain aims in a completely different direction: I would like to introduce Comenius as an important representative of the hermetic semiotics, which for centuries has discredited its twin sister, the critical semiotics because again and again from the aberrations of the hermetic sister - inadmissibly - to the behavior and ability of its critical sister is concluded and then immediately the whole clan with a ban is put. My interest is therefore only superficially directed to the reconstruction of the hermetic-semiotic tradition; primarily I am concerned with the ex negativo proof of the positive capabilities of critical semiotics. In pursuit of my semiotic interests, moreover, I am not interested in discrediting Comenius in any way; on the contrary, I hope that my attempt at explanation will contribute to an adequate understanding of Comenius; I am merely surprised that my path has not long since been trodden by Comeniologists. 2.4.1 Pansophy: Two Ways of Natural Philosophy Since his years of study in Herborn, Comenius incessantly strived to build his theologicalpedagogical-philosophical system on a pansophical basis. After a long series of preliminary stages, which have now been made accessible in the large edition of his works, he finally arrived during his Amsterdam years at the mature formulation of his Pansophy, which forms the centerpiece of the seven-volume work De rerum humanarum emendatione consultatio catholica. The term ‘ Pansophy ’ was not coined by Comenius, but adopted from various sources. He refers to the Pansophia sive paedia philosophica published by Petrus Laurenberg in Rostock in 1635. However, since his pansophical studies can be shown to date back to the 1920s (cf. Novak 1895: 242 - 252), the use of this term by his teacher Johann Heinrich Alsted may have been more decisive for him. The term also appears in the Rosicrucian writings of Johann Jan Amos Comenius: Orbis sensualium pictus, or the Infinite Drift (1996) 201 Valentin Andreae, who had a formative influence on Comenius: Will-Erich Peuckert (1956: 369) calls Pansophy the world formula, the new law that the Rosicrucians had to proclaim; finally, Jakob Bohme also makes use of this expression in his Mysterium Pansophicum of 1628 (cf. Mahnke 1931: 271) and, as will be shown, it was precisely the mystical tendencies represented by Andreae and Boehme that were decisive for Comenius ’ orientation. Since Comenius does not speak of ‘ philosophy ’ to characterize his approach but chooses ‘ Pansophy, ’ it should be asked what his particular concern was. Pansophy aims at an ‘ allknowing, ’ the ‘ cognitio rerum universalis, ’ the means the knowledge of ‘ natural ’ things as well as the knowledge of ‘ artificial ’ things, created by human beings, and includes ‘ revealed ’ things (cf. Hornstein 1968: 81). In an essay on the political pedagogy of Comenius, Klaus Schaller (1972: 72 ff.) summarizes the central concern of Pansophy in four points: 1. the questioning of the subjectivity of the human subject; 2. the doctrine of the threestage nature of human knowledge; 3. the ars character of thought, speech, and action and their unity in the triertium; 4. the identity of the figure of thought and the figure of action. Ad 1: The subjectivity of the human subject must be questioned, according to Comenius, who posts that when a man turns in the wrong direction, he elevates himself to the principle and regulative of his inner-worldly action: “ If he seeks himself in God and things (pansophia), then he reaches that place where he is what he is ” (Schaller 1972: 73). Ad 2: Three-stage is the doctrine of Pansophic knowledge, insofar as Comenius is not content with the what-determination of a thing, but continues to search for the “ through-what ” and the “ to-what. ” The two further questions concern the position of a thing in relation to the whole, not, however, in the sense of a topographical fixation, but in the interest of determining the function that results from the position of the individual in relation to the whole. Ad 3: In the “ Trigonus Sapientiae, ” Comenius summarizes the three human gifts cogitatio, sermo, and operatio, which are related to res in the three artes logic, grammar, and pragmatics. On the unity of the three artes rests the ethical conduct that enables man to perform good and useful works. Ad 4: The universal harmony of thought, speech, and action reflected in the “ Triertium Catholicum ” justifies the transfer of the laws of thought to the orientation of behavior: the logical syllogism becomes in the course of this transfer the syllogism practicus. Klaus Schaller explains: “ To the pansophist, who is familiar with the basic masses of the whole through the formula ‘ a Deo - per Deum - ad Deum ’ and who knows how to orient his actions according to them, the given (also the political situation) arranges itself into antecedent and consequent propositions, from which follows with logical-pragmatic certainty the final proposition, which is then also to be enforced in political action ” (Schaller 1972: 75). Although Theodor W. Adorno (1994: 328) urgently warned against the “ contamination of spirit and Dasein ” as the “ cardinal sin of occultism, ” which he incidentally reviled as “ the metaphysics of dumb guys ” (ibid., 325), I nevertheless hope to be able to show in the following that pansophy is “ far more than a (cranky) artifice of didactics ” (Mahnke 1931: 97). To this end, it will be necessary to distinguish, alongside the geometric-causal natural philosophy of Descartes, Hobbes, and Spinoza, a second, organic-teleological path of natural philosophy that has been “ quite unduly neglected by the history of philosophy ” (ibid., 270). 202 Jan Amos Comenius: Orbis sensualium pictus, or the Infinite Drift (1996) The natural philosophical doctrine of Comenius, which in universal harmony deals with everything under itself and is liberally (related to itself, knows the three methods of induction, deduction, and syncrisis. 9 To fulfill the universalistic claim to knowledge of Pansophy, it is necessary to use the syncritical method in conjunction with the inductive and the deductive, because only by linking the ascending and the descending methods and simultaneously using the comparison (i. e., the syncrisis) the knowledge of the whole can be achieved because what is not sufficiently known from itself can be known from similar things because similar things are always made according to the same idea: “ Thus, through comparison of the similar, the ‘ ultima ratio ’ is revealed ” (Schaller 1962: 45). Gustav Beisswänger (1904: 41) comparably expresses himself: “ The analytical method is to be applied where it is a question of fathoming the constituent parts, the synthetic, the connection of things; the third is no longer used by philosophers without reason, and yet it is highly important. For only it uncovers with its comparison the basic forms and laws common to things, and thus grasps to the full knowledge and understanding of things. ” With the syncritical method, we have not only come on the track of the characteristic approach of Pansophy, but in this universal comparison of everything with everything, the Semiotics of Comenius is also indicated. For this I would like to cite a passage in Dietrich Mahnke (1931: 277): “ For since Pansophy, as the highest structure of human art, must be an exact ‘ representation ’ of nature ” a living image of the universe, ’ but since the real world again corresponds completely to the divine world of ideas (omnino proportionata), everything in Pansophy, as in the latter, must be connected in universal harmony. ” This concept of representation, which betrayed its Neoplatonic origin, is not the concept of representation of the rationalist semiotic tradition, in which the sign is the means of knowledge of something else, still unknown, but belongs to the Hermetic tradition, in which the sign in principle cannot exceed the circle of similarities, because everything harmonizes with everything: “ An image is ( … ) a thing which, by similarity, represents another thing. As the picture stands for another thing and represents the other, it fulfills ‘ repraesentatio. ’ So it is also determined by Comenius as a kind of ‘ repraesentatio. ’ But what distinguishes the image from other kinds of ‘ repraesentatio ’ is the similarity: ‘ similitudo, ’ understood as a partial agreement of the image with the depicted. From this correspondence, it follows that in the image one can see that Other whose image it is. Thus, an image is a vivid ‘ repreasentatio, ’ and the behavior with which an image wants to be received is looking at it (spectare). Comenius now transfers the concept of the image thus conceived from the optical sphere, to which it originally belongs, to speech. ( … ) Thought is the image of the things the mind has in mind, but speech is the image of the thoughts that the mind has in itself ” (Kraemer 1977: 27). Klaus Schaller (1962: 29) calls panharmony “ one of the most important ‘ inventions ’ (inventa) of the whole Comenian system, it is a key through which the universe opens 9 Lindner (1902: LXVIII f.) in himself when calls syncrisis an analogical inference and a “ not yet fully appreciated and exploited counterpart of the celebrated method of induction. ” The counterpart of induction is deduction! Syncrisis, in contrast, is a comparison floating from similarity to similarity (cf. Bellerate, 1972, 46). Jan Amos Comenius: Orbis sensualium pictus, or the Infinite Drift (1996) 203 up to knowledge from itself. ” One may agree or disagree with this assessment; in any case, this is probably the reason why classical philosophy gives Hermeticism a wide berth: “ For it answers the core questions of philosophy completely mythologically, i. e., unscientifically. Knowledge and science are not sought through pure reason activity, not through principles, concepts, and general propositions, but through intuition ” (Cervenka 1970: 128). The actual basis of Comenian Pansophy is thus the doctrine of the unrestricted parallelism of microcosm and macrocosm, which unmistakably reveals the affiliation of Pansophy to Hermetic philosophy. 2.4.2 The Hermetic Context There is no lack of indications of the close intellectual relationship between Comenius ’ pansophy and Hermetic philosophy; the only astonishing thing is the cautious way this fact is dealt with. The impression must arise that either no special weight is to be attached to this relationship or that one would tacitly approve of this proximity. However, since I do not consider it a scientifically acceptable attitude to pass over with polite silence premise errors which are capable of corrupting an entire approach and since, secondly, the premise errors in the present case are semiotic in nature, I would like to deal with them in some detail. Comenius was deeply involved in the hermetic context, so leaving aside his incredible naivety in dealing with various soothsayers and prophets, if we do not poke around in the Rosicrucian history, and if we do not go into the extent to which Comenius is rightly counted among the founding fathers of Freemasonry (cf. e. g. Staedke 1930: 69; Lion, 1922: 151), formally established in England soon after his death, enough delicate questions remain, of which I would like to pick out three: 1. the doctrine of signatures; 2. universal language and 3. the syncritical method. In a system in which everything is connected with everything according to the principle of universal harmony, individual aspects can only be separated from each other by using some force, which is why it must be admitted in advance that the phenomena discussed in isolation in the following merge into each other in Comenius in many ways. Among the constantly recurring figures in the Comenian work is the book metaphor, which usually occurs in the following form: “ Three books are given, in which we read and know everything by reading: the world, the mind, and the Holy Scriptures. ” Of crucial interest here, of course, is how this reading is to proceed. To answer this question, it should be recalled that during his time in Herborn, Comenius had studied the Cursus philosophiae encyclopaedia of his teacher Alsted, which contained a physiognomy based on the doctrine of signatures. The other source, which gained decisive importance for distorting Comenius ’ natural philosophical system (cf. Cervenka 1970: 64), was Hermeticism, the philosophy of alchemy propagated by Paracelsus. Cervenka states: “ The ( … ) views of Cusanus, the reading of the writings of Andreae and the Paracelsian-oriented Rosicrucians, and finally the acquaintance with German, especially Boehmean mysticism, brought him ever closer to the ‘ chemical ’ worldview ” (Cervenka 1970: 65). For the mystic Jakob Bohme, every use of language is the revelation of secrets in which God lets man participate insofar as it is in his eternal counsel. Because of the Fall, man lost his 204 Jan Amos Comenius: Orbis sensualium pictus, or the Infinite Drift (1996) natural language, in which names and things were not yet separated, so that before the Fall man could look into the heart of all things, i. e., had immediate access to them. Although man is excluded from direct communication with God and things because of the Fall, there is nevertheless a possibility of understanding: all external appearances of the world have a symbolic meaning, they are signatures of the inner world. He who understands how to read the signatures is in God, while everything spoken without knowing the signature is dumb and without understanding (cf. Bohme 1980: 331). “ Reading ” man can read the signatures by observing them in contemplation. The “ reading ” of the three books, which Comenius speaks of, is therefore not an intellectual activity that can be described in rational categories, but a spiritual one. Kurt Quecke describes the doctrine of signatures as “ a rather arbitrary application of the conclusion by analogy ” (Quecke 1955: 41) and explains: “ It was claimed that nature labeled its products, whether by shape, color, taste, line, number, form, the relation of parts to one another, smell, consistency, or grain, indicating by what means a remedy was effective. With the help of the ‘ art signatum ’ one tried to decipher the secret code of nature ” (ibid., 41 f.). Paracelsus speaks at great length about signatures; however, to illustrate the doctrine of signatures, two brief examples will suffice in the present context: “ Know further that also many roots, herbs, etc., have received their names. Thus one says: The herb heals eyebright, therefore because it is comforting and helpful to the evil eyes of the sick. The bloodroot has its name because it stops blood better than other roots ” (Paracelsus 1988: 182). These two examples illustrate that the theory of signatures had to seek out the signature inherent in each thing, i. e., its particular properties and characteristics, and from there to infer its hidden meaning and function. Edighoffer emphasizes that the unity of the perceptible external signature and the hidden internal meaning is based on the Paracelsian and Rosicrucian thesis of the unity of all life, or as Comenius puts it, the togetherness of microcosm and macrocosm (cf. Edighoffer 1995: 23). When Paracelsus says: “ All things are hidden in all things ” (Paracelsus 1988: 201), then it becomes clear that panharmony is not merely naive name magic from the circle of naturopathy, but makes much higher waves: “ The signs of the heavenly bodies bring with them prophecies, oracles, and the like_ They indicate the supernatural powers and virtues of things. They give true signs and judgments in Geomantia, Chiromantia, Physionomia, Hydromantia, Pyromantia, Necromantia, Astronomia, Berilistica, and the like astral arts ” (ibid., 157). It should have become clear that with Pansophy we have left the ground of science and - to speak with Peuckert (1956) - have entered into the white and black Magic. In Comenius, with regard to language, we encounter irritating duplicity of attitudes and efforts: On the one hand, we find his lifelong efforts to improve language textbooks and language teaching, achieving great and lasting successes with sometimes fundamentally novel means (and demands such as mother-tongue teaching), and on the other hand, we are confronted with his pansophical-inspired designs for a universal language, which eventually found expression in the Panglottia of the Consultatio Catholica. The design of a world language, “ one of the great dreams of the wishful 17th century ” (Geissler Jan Amos Comenius: Orbis sensualium pictus, or the Infinite Drift (1996) 205 1959: 150), had already preoccupied Comenius when he held pansophic consultations with his English friends, and amazingly, we learn from Benjamin DeMott 1955: 1071: Yet it must be said that there were no signs of interest in England in constructed languages before Comenius wrote, and there are some indications that Comenius may have introduced to their field of research the Englishmen who were to become reformers of language. Particularly significant evidence here is that while no book on universal languages appeared in England before Comenius ’ visit to London in 1641, several came out shortly thereafter; that the most vigorous supporter of work on new Languages, Samuel Hartlib, was for years in correspondence with Comenius about linguistic schemes and was instrumental in bringing him to England; and that the first attempt to create a new language in England was made at the bidding of a clergyman who was a financial backer of Comenius ’ ecumenical movement. But in addition, there are links between Comenius and Wilkins, whose Essay was the principal English text in the field. Of course, one goal of the universal linguists was to facilitate and speed up international communication; but this should not detract from the essential second goal of using the universal language to contribute to the demand for religious harmony and to the mission of the Gentiles, which links Comenius in intention and method directly to Ramon Lull (cf. Beisswanger 1904: 79), whose work Comenius had become acquainted with early on. Again, it was his theological intentions and commitments that destroyed his fruitful (linguistic) scientific approaches: Because he did not want to admit and, according to the knowledge and judgement of languages at that time, could not admit that a language has a living life of its own, he undertook (with his draft of a universal language) the impossible. His demand that the individual linguistic expression completely agrees with the essence of the thing denoted is an idea originating in mysticism, to which reality does not correspond. Comenius thus missed the essence of the linguistic, which is to be sought in the constant struggle for expression, in the unfinished and dynamic. Therefore he had to involve himself in insoluble contradictions (Geissler 1959: 158). Although Comenius contributed remarkable arguments to deny language the attribute of naturalness (cf. Kraemer 1977: 60) and regarded it as a purely human affair (cf ibid., 61), he then nevertheless endeavors to create a planned language as similar as possible to the “ natural ” language (of Paradise), which, freed from all idiosyncrasies (cf. ibid., 63), should enable improved international communication. That Comenius, who developed so much linguistic sensitivity in the conception and realization of his language textbooks, fell into all the pitfalls of the universal language idea can only be explained by the fateful dream of being able to grasp, order, and name the entire universe encyclopedically. Enough has been written on the necessary failure of any universal-language approach, so it is not necessary to spread this criticism here again. If Comenius had maintained his linguistic, creative gesture, which he demonstrated impressively in his Latin works (and which, significantly, provoked the most severe criticism of conservative-purist Latinists), it would have been obvious to him, already based on his insight into the mutability of languages, that a universal language represents an interdictio in adiecto. It would be an unreasonable demand to ask from a man of the 17th century the way of thinking of a linguistic pragmatist of the 20th century; nevertheless, I would like to claim that Comenius with his Panglottie fell far behind his own earlier insights 206 Jan Amos Comenius: Orbis sensualium pictus, or the Infinite Drift (1996) because, in his young years, he had still declared that he wrote Bohemian because he would write for his people; for whom then was the Panglottie intended? We have heard before that the pansophic harmony of everything with everything, i. e., the parallelism of things, had led Comenius to develop his pansophic method of syncrisis, which was to enable the comparison of similar things. Behind the syncritical method is the view, typical of Comenius and his time, that in the unified universe ordered by rational laws, the smallest microcosm reflects the lawfulness of the macrocosm (cf. Peuckert 1928: 29; Edighoffer 1995: 68): This is the thought behind the pansophic life-work of Comenius, as well as behind Descartes ’ mathesis universalis and Leibniz ’ s scientia generalis: a scientific system can exhaust the totality of nature and of the spirit -a hope that has determined the educational idea again and again until the turn of the last century (Flitner 1954: 228). Also mentioned before was the parable of the tree, which I now, however, do not merely want to repeat, but in agreement with Jaromir Cervenka, to interpret as the key to the whole Pansophic conception: The parable of the tree occurs already in the early writings of Comenius. In the Labyrinth of the World of 1623, the guide leads the pilgrim to a place in the middle of which there is a large tree with many branches, leaves, and fruits. The tree is called Natura. The world-tree parallel is much more detailed in the Centrum Securitatis of 1625. ‘ The world has grown out of God, ’ says Comenius here, ‘ like a tree out of its root. ’ As the tree grows up from its root, unfolding into branches and twigs, from which again spring leaves, blossoms, and fruits, which, despite their diversity, are all connected together like a chain in which one link hangs on another. Each of these links draws from the root, employing another, the life-sustaining moisture, so that all together form the unity of the tree, so all things of the world have sprouted from their root, from God. From Him, they draw the animating power and form in all their diversity a huge organism in which everything is connected chain-like (Cervenka 1969: 80). The multiplicity of the meanwhile consulted concordant passages now allows the thesis that in the great analogy of the tree metaphor without any doubt the origin of the hermetic semiotics of Comenius is to be sought. In essential respects, the hermetic semiotics goes back behind already reached sign-theoretical positions: 1. If in the sense of the syncrisis, it is permissible, even necessary, to compare everything with everything, it is no longer meaningful to maintain the difference between sign and signified, just as it makes no sense to call the freight the sign of the tree (or vice versa); the only statement still possible concerns the present similarity relation. 2. a cognition in the differentiating, rationalistic sense is neither meaningful nor possible because the hermetic semiotics does not ask for differences, but for similarities. 3. a change of the existing conditions is excluded insofar as the entire universe is built up according to a uniform, fixed plan and is hermetically closed and should not be changed by force: absit violentia rebus! 2.4.3 The infinite Drift The principle inconclusiveness of sign interpretation has led various authors to overextend the process of interpretation disastrously, considering the absence of a univocal meaning as a legitimation to postulate the aquivocation of all meanings in free flotation from meaning to meaning, in associative wandering in reminiscences, fantasies, prophecies, puns, Jan Amos Comenius: Orbis sensualium pictus, or the Infinite Drift (1996) 207 etymologies, pictorial compositions. Two of these tendencies to let interpretation drift in an uncontrolled and uncontrollable way, namely the so-called deconstructivism a la Derrida and the hermetic semiotics of the mystics and alchemists, have been examined in detail in the recent past by Umberto Eco in his important work The Limits of Interpretation and by Klaus Oehler in an essay entitled “ On Limits of Interpretation from the Perspective of Semiotic Pragmatism. ” Since Eco and Oehler have principle errors of the deconstructivist and the alchemist approach with great clarity, I do not want to repeat this criticism, but merely to refer to these two important works and to emphasize the consequences fruitful for our context of the discussion. Rather than denying the existence of univocal meaning in the sense of modern theories of drift, or asserting the universal linkage of everything to everything in the sense of the Hermeticists, critical semiotics rests on the fundamental principle that a sign is something through the knowledge of which we learn more (cf. Peirce C. P. 8. 332). In contrast, Hermetic semiotics seems to emphasize that the sign is something through which we learn something else. In Peirce ’ s semiotics, “ to experience more ” means that in the process of interpretation, i. e., in the transition from one interpreter to the next, the sign becomes more and more precisely determined both in terms of its extension and its intention. In the process of sign interpretation approaches asymptotically the final, logical interpreter, which is why at an advanced stage of the process of cognition one has acquired a more exact knowledge of the sign object than at the beginning of the interpretation. Ludwik Fleck ’ s (1980) Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact is a very good illustration of this process of knowledge extension. Every sign potentially contains the totality of conclusions that can be deduced from it, only as a possibility, which, however, under certain conditions could actualize itself as the reality of a sign. The in-principle infinite process of interpretation is normally interrupted repeatedly by the need for action. Still, despite these interruptions, the rule is that in each phase of semiosis, one has more exact knowledge of the content of the representative than in the preceding phase and at the starting point. In contrast to this understanding of unbounded semiosis, for modern theories of drift, a sign is not something through whose knowledge we learn more, but through which we are confronted with others, with others again and again, and so on. Eco has therefore defined drift as a case of connotative neoplasm. The connotative neoplasm lives from the fact that, precisely because of the denial of a fixed, unambiguous, identical signifier, virtually everything can be brought into the relation of similarity with everything. At the same time, Peirce explicitly warns against this as an aberration: “ There is no greater and more frequent error in practical logic than the assumption that things which are very similar in some respects are therefore all the more likely to be similar in other respects ” (C. R. 2. 634). Vivid literary examples of the infinite drift, which use exuberant similarity principles, can be found in Eugene Sue ’ s The Eternal Jew, in the Orbis pictus of Jan Amos Comenius, or Umberto Eco ’ s The Foucault Pendulum. I would like to take the liberty of remarking in passing that Eco has taken an intellectually highly questionable path with his second novel by exaggerating the free play of signifiers, so that in the end a gigantic world conspiracy of the Jews and Freemasons, the Rosicrucians and the KGB emerges. But what is meant as an intellectual game and criticism of how infinite drifting through excessive exaggeration could become deadly serious were used by the Nazis in their atrocious propaganda quite successfully. 208 Jan Amos Comenius: Orbis sensualium pictus, or the Infinite Drift (1996) The pseudo-connotative infinite strings of signs, which arise due to the logical error named by Peirce, are not to be in line with the infinite sign processes identified by Peirce. These occur like the out-of-control cell division in the spreading of metastases, these take place according to the regulating mechanism of intersubjective overprivation. If the control over the growth of the semioticity is lost in the course of semiosis and the sign loses its normal function, then that associative sliding from meaning to meaning is typical for interpretative drift and is comparable to processes of metastasis, arises. Infinite semiosis, then, is not to be equated with limitless free, arbitrary interpretation in the style of signature theory. The transformation of signs into other signs, which are supposed to be better, i. e., more clarifying, than the initial signs, is not a solipsistic but a social action; concerning its validity, it is dependent on general acceptance, which must come sooner, or later if it is to endure. This socially dimensioned semiotic meliorism, which manifests itself in belief, conviction, and agreement, does not, however, in itself guarantee a factual reference and does not by itself lead, even in the long run, to an ontology of the real. This was also never the opinion of Peirce, who did not at all hold the view that a sign ’ s interpretation as such, the mere translation of signs into other signs, leads to cognition of the real or to progress in cognition. Sign interpretation understood as mere, immanent clarification of concepts, for which the factually real appears only as utopian fiction, is exactly that sign idealism, which he did not tire of denouncing as a fall from grace, as that fall from grace of modern philosophy, which makes it impossible for it to explain a fact of natural science, which it instead knocks into shape until it assumes the form it needs for its nominalistic purposes. There is no transition from the sign idealism of only sign-imminent understood semiotic processes to sign-determined knowledge of reality. Proper signification differs from false signification in that it has not only a fundamentum in mente but also a fundamentum in re. Peirce expressed this fact terminologically by differentiating between the immediate and the dynamic object in the concept of the object of the sign. The immediate object is the idea or thought on which the sign is directly based, the understanding in which it is founded. The dynamic object is the object of the sign, insofar as it is the thing or situation on which that idea or thought and the understanding are based. To say that signs always refer only to signs is true and false at the same time, at least in need of supplementation by the additional explanation that a sign linkage is true only because it has a fundamentum in re or such a fundamentum is claimed for it, which as such is not thought of to its full extent as a sign, but also as a sign ground, as a being in the mode of the sign: “ The answer of the mystic to our question comes from a completely different world: Words are images for him, which really reflect things if they are used in the right relationship to the world of God. They can then reach a congruence with things. Nomenclatura and imago are more than a symbol; it is not only representative. It is the thing itself. And Comenius can exclaim: ‘ O man, gather into the unity of language that is scattered in multiplicity ’” (Giessler 1959: 107). 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Comenius, Jan Amos 1991: Orbis sensualium pictus, Reprint of the first edition Nürnberg: Endter 1658, Dortmund: Harenberg. Demott, Benjamin 1955: “ Comenius and the Real Character in England ” , in: Publications of the Modern Language Association 70 (1955): 1068 - 1081. Dezs ő , Ludwig 1883: “ J. A. Comenius in Ungarn ” , in: Pädagogische Blätter für Lehrerbildung und Lehrerbildungsanstalten 12 (1883): 273 - 294. Dietrich, Veit-Jakobus 1995: Johann Amos Comenius, Reinbek: Rowohlt. Eco, Umberto 1992: Die Grenzen der Interpretation, München: Hanser. Edighoffer, Roland 1995: Die Rosenkreuzer, München: Beck. Fleck, Ludwik 1980: Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Földes, Éva & Mészáros István (eds.) 1973: Comenius and Hungary. Essays, Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó. Geissler, Heinrich 1959: Comenius und die Sprache, Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer. Geréb György, 1958: “ Comenius in Ungarn ” , in: Schule und Nation 4 (1958): 6 - 8. Gottsched, Hermann 1879: Die pädagogischen Grundgedanken des Amos Comenius, Diss. Jena 1879. Harms, Wolfgang: “ Wörter, Sachen und emblematische ‘ res ’ im ‘ Orbis sensualium pictus ’ des Comenius ” , in: Hofmann, Dietrich (ed.): Commemorative volume for William Foerste, Cologne: Böhlau 1970. 531 - 542. Hofmann, Franz 1976: Jan Amos Comenius. Lehrer der Nationen, Cologne: Pahl-Rugenstein. Hornstein, Herbert 1968: Weisheit und Bildung. Studien zur Bildungslehre des Comenius, Düsseldorf: Schwann. Kisch, Egon Erwin 1969: Prager Pitaval. Spate Reportagen, Berlin: Aufbau. Klein, Wolf Peter 1992: Am Anfang war das Wort. Theorie- und wissenschaftsgeschichtliche Elemente frühneuzeitlichen Sprachbewusstseins, Berlin: Akademie Verlag. Kraemer, Gerrit Bert 1977: Sprache und Sprachbildung in der Sicht des Comenius, Diss. Tübingen. Kunstmann, Heinrich 1903: “ Die sichtbare Welt Comenii ” , in: Die Welt der Slaven 2 (1957): 377 - 393. Liese, Ernst: Des J. A. Comenius Methodus Linguarum Novissima. Inhalt und Würdigung, Diss. Erlangen. Lion, C. Theodor 1922: “ Comenius und die Freimaurerei ” , in: Geisteskultur und Volksbildung 31 (1922): 151 - 156. Mahnke, Dietrich 1931: “ Der Barock-Universalismus des Comenius ” , in: Zeitschrift fur Geschichte der Erziehung und des Unterrichts 21: 3 - 4 (1931): 97 - 128; 253 - 279 sowie 22 (1932) 61 - 90. Maller, Sándor 1973: “ In Memory of Comenius ” , in: Földes, Éva & Mészáros, István (eds.): Comenius and Hungary, Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó. Michel, Gerhard 1985: “ Komenskys Studien in Herborn und ihre Nachwirkungen in seinem Gesamtwerk ” , in: Schaller, Klaus (eds.): Comenius. Erkennen-Glauben-Handeln. Internationales Comenius-Colloquium Herborn 1984, St. Augustin: Richarz. Novak, Joh. V. 1995: “ Das älteste pansophische Werk des Comenius ” , in: Monatshefte der Comenius- Gesellschaft 4 (1995): 242 - 252. Oehler, Klaus 1994: “ Über Grenzen der Interpretation aus der Sicht des semiotischen Pragmatismus ” , in: Simon, Josef (ed.): Zeichen und Interpretation, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 57 - 72. Orosz, Lajos 1973: “ Comenius ’ School Reforms at Sárospatak ” , in: Földes, Éva & Mészáros, Istvan (eds.): Comenius and Hungary, Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó. Paracelsus, Theophrastus 1988: Der Himmel der Philosophen, Nördlingen: Greno. Peuckert, Will-Erich 1928: Die Rosenkreuzer. Zur Geschichte einer Reformation, Jena: Diederich. Jan Amos Comenius: Orbis sensualium pictus, or the Infinite Drift (1996) 211 Peuckert, Will-Erich 1956: Pansophie. Ein Versuch zur Geschichte der weißen und schwarzen Magie, Berlin: Schmidt. Peirce, Charles Sanders 1979: Collected Papers, Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press. Pilz, Kurt 1967: Die Ausgaben des Orbis Sensualium Pictus. Eine Bibliographie, Nürnberg: Selbstverlag der Stadtbibliothek. Pilisensky, Josef V. 1973: “ Comenius, Hungary and European Politics in the 17th Century ” , in: Földes, Éva & Mészáros, István (eds.): Comenius and Hungary, Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó. Quecke, Kurt 1955: “ Die Signaturenlehre im Schrifttum des Paracelsus ” , in: Beiträge zur Geschichte der Pharmazie und ihrer Nachbargebiete 1 (1955) 41 - 52. J. R. 1913: “ Eine neu aufgefundene Schrift des Comenius. ” In: Monatshefte der Comenius-Gesellschaft 22 (1913): 227 - 229. Reber, Joseph 1895: Johann Amos Comenius und seine Beziehungen zu den Sprachgesellschaften. Denkschrift zur Feier des vierteltausendjährigen Bestandes des Pegnesischen Blumenordens zu Nürnberg, Leipzig: Fock. Richter, Albert 1893: “ Zwei Bilderbücher für den Unterricht vor dem Orbis pictus ” , in: Monatshefte der Comenius-Gesellschaft 2 (1893): 167 - 177. Schaller, Klaus 1962: Die Pädagogik des Johann Amos Comenius und die Anfänge des pädagogischen Realismus im 17. Jahrhundert, Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer. Schaller, Klaus (ed.) 1970: Jan Amos Komensky. Wirkung eines Werkes nach drei Jahrhunderten, Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer. Schaller, Klaus 1972: “ Die politische Pädagogik des J. A. Comenius ” , in: Acta Comeniana 3 (1972) 67 - 77. Schaller, Klaus (ed.) 1985: Comenius. Erkennen-Glauben-Handeln. Internationales Comenius-Colloquium Herborn 1984, St. Augustin: Richarz. Schaller, Klaus 1985: “ Komenskys Handlungstheorie ” , in: Schaller, Klaus (ed.): Comenius. Erkennen- Glauben-Handeln. Internationales Comenius-Colloquium Herborn 1984, St. Augustin: Richarz. Schaller, Klaus 1992: “ Die Gartenmetapher bei Comenius ” , in: Capkova Dagmar & Frijhoff, Willem (eds.): Jan Amos Comenius 1592 - 1670. Special issue of Paedagogica Historica 28: 2 (1992). Schorb, Alfons 1958: “ Bildwelt und Weltbild ” , in: Ruperto-Carola 10: 23 (1958): 102 - 108. Staedtke, Hildegard 1930: Die Entwicklung des enzyklopädischen Bildungsgedankens und die Pansophie des I. A. Comenius, Leipzig: Klinkhardt. Toischer, Wendelin 1913: “ Zur Entstehungsgeschichte des Orbis pictus ” , in: Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Erziehung und des Unterrichts 3 (1913) 169 - 193. Van Vliet, Pauline v: “ Echos des Werkes von Comenius ” , in: Capkova., Dagmar & Frijhoff, Willem (eds.): Jan Amos Comenius 1592 - 1670. Special issue of Paedagogica Historica 28: 2 (1992). Vidrascu, Petru 1891: Comenius Orbis Pictus. Charakteristik und Würdigung desselben, Diss. Leipzig. Vrbka, Anton 1892: Leben und Schicksale des Johann Amos Comenius. Mit Benützung der besten Quellen, Znaim: Fournier & Haberler. Warncke, Carsten-Peter 1987: Sprechende Bilder - sichtbare Worte. Das Bildverständnis in der frühen Neuzeit, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz. Wilkins, John 1984: Mercury: Or The Secret and Swift Messenger. With an introductory essay ed. by Brigitte Asbach-Schnitker, Amsterdam/ Philadelphia: Benjamins. Wittmann, Tibor 1973: “ The Image of the New World in the Didactic Works of Comenius ” , in: Földes, Éva & Mészáros, István (eds.): Comenius and Hungary, Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó 1973.79 - 88. Zemanek, Josef 1990: “ Uhersky Brod und Comenius ” , in: Schaller, Klaus (ed.): Zwanzig Jahre Comenius Forschung in Bochum, St. Augustin: Richarz. 212 Jan Amos Comenius: Orbis sensualium pictus, or the Infinite Drift (1996) K O D I K A S / C O D E 44 (2021) · No. 1 - 3 Gunter Narr Verlag Tübingen Curriculum vitae of Achim Eschbach 20.10.1948 Born in Eschweiler as the second child of Dr. Josef Eschbach (bookseller and writer) and Helga Eschbach born York 1955 - 1959 Attended elementary school in Eschweiler 1959 - 1964 Attended the municipal high school in Eschweiler 1964 - 1969 Attendance at the modern language Einhard-Gymnasium in Aachen and matriculation examination 1969 - 1976 Studies at the RWTH-Aachen (German studies, philosophy and six semesters of political science and sociology) with a concentration on questions of semiotics, philosophy of language, aesthetics and communication theory Establishment and participation in the “ Working Group Semiotics Aachen ” Since 1975 Founding of a semiotics journal “ Kodikas ” with Haris Kamabouridis in 1975, from 1980 with the new team of Jürgen Trabant, Ernest Hess Lüttich and temporarily Michai Nadin in German and in English as “ Kodikas/ Code - Ars Semeiotica: An International Journal of Semiotics ” with the publishing house Gunter Narr 1976 Doctoral examination with a pragmasemiotic study of the theatre with the supervisors Prof. Dr. Christian Thiel (philosophy), Prof. Dr. Hans Glinz (German Linguistics) and Prof. Dr. Helmut Schanze (German Literature) 1976 Co-founder of the publishing house Syndikat in Frankfurt a. M. 1977 - 1980 Scientific assistant at the Essen University with a focus on “ General Communication Theory and Semiotics ” with Prof. Hermann Sturm in the Department of Art and Design Education Winter 1977/ 78 - 1980 Lectureship at the PH Aachen (Institute for Art and Design Education), at the RWTH Aachen (Institute for Art History/ Architectural Theory and Institute for Philosophy) Since 1978 Participation in academic self-administration - library representative, member of the department council, member of several appointment committees, member of the permanent doctoral and habilitation committee Since Sept. 1978 Head of the “ History of Semiotics ” section of the German Society for Semiotics Nov. 1978 Colloquium “ Aesthetics and Semiotics ” in Essen 1979 Marriage to Prof. Dr. Viktoria Eschbach-Szabó Spring 1980 Working on the Morris Edition in Bloomington and Chicago Summer 1980 Guest researcher at the Hungarian Academy of Science Since 1980 Start of planning and execution of the Bühler Editions project Autumn 1980 Transition to the position of university assistant Co-organizer of the colloquium “ Aesthetics and Utopia ” in Essen Since Nov. 1982 Substitute for the compulsory subject in the main study design theory / communication theory Autumn 1983 Co-organizer of the colloquium “ Aesthetics and Experience ” in Essen May 1984 - May 1985 Habilitation in Essen with the venia legendi: “ Art Studies with a focus on semiotics, philosophy of language and history of science ” August 1984 Organizer of the seminar “ 50 years of Bühlersche Sprachtheorie ” within the framework of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society Oct. 1984 Election as President of the “ German Society for Semiotics ” Nov. 1984 Organizer of the “ Karl Bühler Symposium ” at the University of Essen Nov. 1985 Appointment as C 2 professor for the subject “ Semiotics ” 1986 Co-founder of Rader Verlag in Aachen 1986 - 1989 Grant from the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics in Nijmegen for the complete edition of Karl Bühler ’ s works Oct. 1987 President of the 5th International Congress of the DGS under the general topic “ Creativity and Tradition ” in Essen 1987 Birth of his daughter Anna-Viktoria Eschbach Since Winter 1990 Representative of a C 4 professorship for communication theory with special consideration of audiovisual mass media at the University of Essen 1990 Birth of his daughter Nora-Sophia Eschbach 1993 Visiting professor at the University of Tokyo 1994/ 95 Guest professorships at the János Pannonius University of Pécs 1997 until his retirement in 2014 He accepted a professorship for semiotics in communication science at the University of Duisburg-Essen Since 2000 In cooperation with Walter H. Schmitz, the series “ Essen Studies on Semiotics and Communication Research ” was published Since 2009 Co-founder of the platform r: k: m (Rezensionen aus Kommunikation und Medien) at Herbert von Halem Verlag in Cologne in cooperation with Horst Pöttker 20. January 2021 He passed away in Essen 214 Curriculum vitae of Achim Eschbach K O D I K A S / C O D E 44 (2021) · No. 1 - 3 Gunter Narr Verlag Tübingen Bibliography of Achim Eschbach Monographs 1. Eschbach, Achim 1974: Zeichen Text Bedeutung. Eine Bibliographie zu Theorie und Praxis der Semiotik, Fink. Munich. 2. Eschbach, Achim & Rader, Wendelin 1976: Semiotik-Bibliographie I., Syndikat. Frankfurt. 3. Eschbach, Achim & Rader, Wendelin 1978: Film Semiotik. Eine Bibliographie. Verlag Dokumentation Saur KG. Munich. 4. Eschbach, Achim & Rader, Wendelin 1979: Pragmasemiotik und Theater. Ein Beitrag zur Theorie und Praxis einer pragmatisch orientierten Zeichenanalyse, Narr. Tübingen. (= printed edition of the dissertation, Aachen 1976). 5. Eschbach, Achim & Eschbach-Szabo, Viktoria 1986: Bibliography of Semiotics, 1975 - 1985. 2 vols. Benjamins. Amsterdam/ Philadelphia. Magazines and Series 1. Founder and Chief Editor of the Magazine SEMA SEMIOTIC ABSTRACTS 1988, John Benjamins (Amsterdam/ Philadelphia) and since 1999 Narr, Tübingen. 2. Founder and Chief Editor of the Magazine 1979: KODIKAS/ CODE. An International Journal of Semiotics. Narr. Tübingen. Since IV/ V (1982) KODIKAS/ CODE. ARS SEMEIO- TICA. An International Journal of Semiotics, Narr & John Benjamins. Tübingen/ Amsterdam/ Philadelphia. 3. Founder and Chief Editor of the Series 1979: KODIKAS/ CODE SUPPLEMENTS IN SEMIOTICS Vols. 1 - 17, Narr. Tübingen: a. Eschbach, Achim & Rader, Wendelin (eds.): Literatursemiotik I. Methoden - Analysen - Tendenzen. b. Vigener, Gerhard: Die zeichentheoretischen Entwürfe von F. de Saussure und Ch. S. Peirce als Grundlagen einer linguistischen Pragmatik. c. Eschbach, Achim: Pragmasemiotik und Theater. d. Wilss, Wolfram (ed.): Semiotik und Übersetzen. e. Nöth, Winfried: Literatursemiotische Analysen zu Lewis Carrolls Alice-Büchern. f. Nadin, Mihai: Zeichen und Wert. g. Eschbach, Achim (ed.): Zeichen Über Zeichen Über Zeichen. 15 Studien über Charles W. Morris. h. Hess-Lüttich, Ernest W. B. (ed.): Multimedia Communication. Vol. I: Semiotic Problems of its Notation. Vol. II: Theatre Semiotics. i. Nadin, Mihai (ed.): New Elements in the Semiotics of Communication. j. Hess-Lüttich, Ernest W.B: Kommunikation als ästhetisches Problem. Vorlesungen zur angewandten Textwissenschaft. k. Kiefer, Klaus H.: Ästhetik - Semiotik - Didaktik. Differenzierte Wahrnehmung als Prinzip ästhetischer Erziehung - Ein Problemaufriss. l. Mukarovsky, Jan: Schriften zur Ästhetik, Kunsttheorie und Poetik. m. Ivanov, Vjaceslav Vsevolodovic: Einführung in allgemeine Probleme der Semiotik. n. Fühlau, Ingunde: Die Sprachlosigkeit der Inhaltsanalyse. Linguistische Bemerkungen zu einer sozialwissenschaftlichen Methode. o. Bentele, Günter: Zeichen und Entwicklung. Vorüberlegungen zu einer genetischen Semiotik. p. Koch, Walter A.: Poetry and Science. Semiogenetical Twins. Towards an Integrated Correspondence Theory of Poetic Structures. q. Preusche, Andrea: Geometrische Form als semiotisches Phänomen. Prolegomena zu einem kreativen Diagramm Bildung mit geometrischen Formen (Konnotographie). 4. Eschbach, Achim, Hess-Lüttich, Ernest W. B. 2022: Special Issue KODIKAS / CODE vol. 25.3/ 4/ 2022. Das Geld als Zeichen. 5. Founder and Chief Editor of the Series 1981: Foundations of Semiotics Vols. 1 - 23, John Benjamins. Amsterdam/ Philadelphia. a. Peirce, Charles S. (ed.): Studies in Logic by Members of the Johns Hopkins University (1883). b. Welby, Victoria Lady: What is Meaning? Studies in the Development of Significance. c. Gätschenberger, Richard: Grundzüge einer Psychologie des Zeichens. d. Hoffbauer, Johannes Christoph: Tentamina Semiologica, sive quaedam generalem theoriam signorum spectantia (1789). e. Welby, Victoria Lady: Significs and Language. f. Wilkins, John: Mercury: or the Secret and Swift Messenger etc. (1707). Tog. with an abstract of Dr. Wilkin ’ s Essay towards a Real Character and a Philosophical Language. g. Eschbach, Achim & Trabant, Jürgen (eds.): History of Semiotics. Proceedings of the working group on the history of semiotics held at the 3rd Conf. of the German Society of Semiotics, Hamburg 1981. h. Ikegami, Yoshihiko (ed.): The Empire of Signs. Contributions by Japanese semioticians. i. Pharies, David A.: Charles S. Peirce and the Linguistic Sign. j. Dascal, Marcelo: Leibniz. Language, Signs and Thought. k. Ekstein, Rudolf: The Language of Psychotherapy. l. Busse, Winfried & Trabant, Jürgen (eds.): Les Idéologues. Sémiotique, philosophie du langage et linguistique pendant la Révolution française. m. Fónagy, Ivan: Languages within Language. An evolutive approach. n. Deledalle, Gérard: Charles S. Peirce, phénoménologue et semioticien. o. Morris, Charles W.: Symbolism and Reality. A Study in the Nature of Mind. p. Martin, Richard M. (ed.): Logical Semiotics and Mereology. q. Kevelson, Roberta: Charles S. Peirce ’ s Method of Methods. 216 Bibliography of Achim Eschbach r. Deledalle, Gerard (ed.): Semiotics and Pragmatics. s. Kobernick, Mark: Semiotics of the Drama and the Style of Eugene O ’ Neill. t. Tobin, Yishai (ed.): From Sign to Text: A Semiotic View of Communication. u. Eco, Umberto & Marmo, Constantino (eds.): On the Medieval Theory of Signs. v. Schmitz, Walter: Essays in Significs. Papers presented on the occasion of the 150th anniversary of the birth of Victoria Lady Welby (1837 - 1912). w. Marty, Robert: L ’ Algèbre des signes. 6. Founder and Chief Editor of the Series 1984: Aachener Studien zur Semiotik und Kommunikationsforschung vols. 1 - 22, Rader. Aachen. a. Faltin, Peter: Bedeutung ästhetischer Zeichen. Musik und Sprache. b. Brunt, Richard J. & Enninger, Werner (eds.): Interdisciplinary Perspectives at Cross- Cultural Communication. c. Jäger, Ludwig & Stetter, Christian (eds.): Zeichen und Verstehen. Akten des Aachener Saussure-Kolloquiums 1983. d. Paetzold, Heinz: Modelle für eine semiotische Rekonstruktion der Geschichte der Ästhetik. e. Eimermacher, Karl (ed.): Semiotica Sovietica. f. Deely, John: Semiotik. Die historischen Grundlagen der Zeichenlehre. g. Juchem, Johann G.: Der notwendige, konfliktfreie Charakter der Kommunikation. Ein Beitrag zur Kommunikationsemantik. h. Hanke, Michael: Der maieutische Dialog. Kommunikationswissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zur Struktur und Anwendbarkeit eines Modells. i. Petschar, Hans: Kulturgeschichte als Schachspiel. Vom Verhältnis der Historie mit den Humanwissenschaften. Variationen zu einer historischen Semiologie. j. Allert, Tilman: Die Dynamik der Interaktionstriade. Eine Fallstudie zur Struktur der sozialisatorischen Interaktion. k. Cremers, Ehrhardt: Grenze und Horizont. Protosoziologische Reflexionen zu einer Phänomenologie und Soziologie sozialer Grenzen. l. Ungeheuer, Gerold: Kommunikationstheoretische Schriften I: Sprechen, Mitteilen und Verstehen. m. Ungeheuer, Gerold: Kommunikationstheoretische Schriften II: Historische Studien zur Kommunikationsforschung und Semiotik. n. Ungeheuer, Gerold: Kommunikationstheoretische Schriften III: Die Kommunikationstheorie. o. Goetze, Jürgen: Ohrenmerk. Psychoanalytische Kommunikation und Interpretation im Erstinterview und im Alltag. p. Peirce, Charles S.: Schriften über die Semiotik der Kosmogenie. q. Krallmann, Dieter & Pape, Martin (eds.): Handbuch der kommunikationswissenschaftlichen Grundbegriffe. r. Juchem, Johann G.: Kommunikation und Vertrauen. Ein Beitrag zum Problem der Reflexivität in der Ethnomethodologie. s. Schäfer, Rolf: Ästhetisches Handeln als Kategorie einer interdisziplinären Theaterwissenschaft. Bibliography of Achim Eschbach 217 t. Knobeloch, Heinz: Sprache und Kunst. Über die Sprachkritik der neueren Kunsttheorie. u. Wichelhaus, Barbara: Semiotische Grundlagen der Themenbildung. Kunstwissenschaftliche. Grundlagen der Thema-Generierung auf semiotischer Basis. 7. Founder and Chief Editor of the Series 1988: DIE SPRACHE. STUDIEN ZU IHRER THEORIE UND GESCHICHTE. vols 1 - 10, Rader. Aachen: a. Gätschenberger, Richard: Symbola. Anfangsgründe einer Erkenntnistheorie. b. Külpe, Oswald: Die Realisierung. Ein Beitrag zur Grundlegung der Realwissenschaften. c. Mauthner, Fritz: Die drei Bilder der Welt. Ein sprachkritischer Versuch. d. Schmitter, Peter (ed.): Die Anfange der Semasiologie: Reisig, Haase, Heerdegen. e. Lazarus, Moritz: Geist und Sprache. f. Marty, Anton: Zur Sprachphilosophie. Die ‘ logische ’ , ‘ lokalistische ’ und andere Kasustheorien. g. Stern, S.: Vorläufige Grundlegung zu einer Sprachphilosophie. h. Wenzel, Gottfried Immanuel: Neue auf Vernunft und Erfahrung gegründete Entdeckungen über die Sprache der Thiere. i. Hoffmann, Ernst: Die Sprache und die archaische Logik. j. Limann, Otto & Plaut, Paul (eds.): Die Lüge in psychologischer, philosophischer, juristischer, pädagogischer, historischer, soziologischer, sprach- und literaturwissenschaftlicher und entwicklungsgeschichtlicher Betrachtung. 8. Founder and Chief Editor of the Series 1984: VIENNESE HERITAGE / WIENER ERBE, John Benjamins. Amsterdam/ Philadelphia: Wittgenstein, Karl: Politico-economic writings. Ed. by J. C. Nyiri. Eschbach, Achim (ed.): Karl Bühler ’ s Theory of Language. 9. Co-Editor 1985 des JAHRBUCH FÜR ÄSTHETIK, Rader. Aachen. 10. Member of the Publishers Council of the series 1984: BOCHUMER BEITRÄGE ZUR SEMIOTIK, Brockmeyer Bochum. 11. Member of the Publishers Council of the series 1984: BOCHUM PUBLICATIONS IN EVOLUTIONARY CULTURAL SEMIOTICS, Brockmeyer. Bochum. 12. Member of the Editorial Board of the magazine: Zeitschrift für Sozialpsychologie und Gruppendynamik, Spitzy & Seiser. Vienna. 13. Co-founder of the platform 2009: r: k: m (Rezensionen aus Kommunikation und Medien) at Herbert von Halem Verlag in Cologne in cooperation with Horst Pöttker. Editions 1. Resnikow, L. O. 1977: Zeichen Sprache Abbild. With an introduction edited by A. Eschbach. Translation from Russian by H. & H. Siegel, Syndikat.Frankfurt. 2. Literatursemiotik vol. I & II. 1980: Methoden - Analysen - Tendenzen. With an introductory comment edited by Eschbach, Achim & Rader, Wendelin, Tübingen. Narr. 3. Zeichen Über Zeichen Über Zeichen. 15 Studien über Charles W. Morris 1981: With an introductory comment edited by Eschbach, Achim, Narr. Tübingen. 218 Bibliography of Achim Eschbach 4. Ästhetik und Semiotik 1981: Edited by Hermann Sturm & Eschbach, Achim, Tübingen. Narr. 1981. 5. Peirce, Charles S. Studies in Logic, 1983. With an introduction ed. by A. Eschbach, John Benjamins. Amsterdam/ Philadelphia. 6. Welby, Victoria Lady What is Meaning? 1983 With an introduction ed. by A. Eschbach. John Benjamins. Amsterdam/ Philadelphia. 7. History of Semiotics 1983: With a foreword ed. by A. Eschbach & J. Trabant. John Benjamins. Amsterdam/ Philadelphia. 8. Bühler-Studien 1984: With a foreword ed. by A. Eschbach, 2 volumes, Suhrkamp. Frankfurt. 9. Logic of Relations 1983: With an introduction ed. by A. Eschbach, Max H. Fisch, John Benjamins. Amsterdam / Philadelphia. 10. Zeichen und Bedeutung, 1974: Beitrage zum Konstitutionsproblem in den Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften. With an introduction by Achim Eschbach, Fink. Munich. 11. Der frühe Briefwechsel Otto Neuraths. A. Eschbach & H. Walter Schmitz (eds.), Suhrkamp. Frankfurt. 12. A Plea for Cultural Semiotics, 1987. Achim Eschbach, & Walter A. Koch (eds.). Brockmeyer. Bochum. 13. Semiotics and the Philosophy of Language, 1988: Special issue of Degrés. Revue de synthèse à orientation sémiologique. Achim Eschbach (ed.), Fondation universitaire. Brüssel. 14. Karl Bühler ’ s Theory of Language, 1988: Proceedings of the conferences held at Kirchberg, August 26, 1984 and Essen, November 21 - 24, 1984. Achim Eschbach (ed.), John Benjamins. Amsterdam/ Philadelphia. 15. Die Tücke des 0bjekts, 1986: Anniversary Publication for the 50th birthday of Hermann Sturm. Edited by Hans Brög & Achim Eschbach, Rader. Aachen. 16. Kempsky, Jürgen von: Schriften I - III. vol. 1: Brechungen. Kritische Versuche zur Philosophie der Gegenwart. Vol. 2: Recht und Politik. Studien zur Einheit der Sozialwissenschaft. Vol. 3: Prinzipien der Wirklichkeit. 1990, Achim Eschbach (ed.), Rader. Aachen. 17. Semiotik im deutschsprachigen Raum im ersten Drittel des 20. Jahrhunderts, 1986, Achim Eschbach & H. Walter Schmitz (eds.), Narr. Tübingen. 18. Theoretische und praktische Relevanz der Semiotik, 1988: Jeff Bernard, Werner Enninger, Achim Eschbach & Gloria Withalm (eds.), Rader. Aachen. 19. Gätschenberger, Richard: Grundzüge einer Psychologie des Zeichens, 1987. Edited with a preface by Achim Eschbach, John Benjamins. Amsterdam/ Philadelphia. 20. Karl Bühler, Werke 4. Die Krise der Psychologie, 2000: Achim Eschbach, Jens Kapitzky (eds.), 2000: Velbrück. Weilerswist. 21. Theory of Language: The Representational Function of Language, 2011: Bühler, Karl/ Goodwin, Donald Fraser (Translator)/ Eschbach, Achim (Contributor), John Benjamins Co.Amsterdam/ Philadelphia. 22. Bausteine der Kommunikationswissenschaft, 2012: Eschbach, Achim; Eschbach, Nora (eds.), Königshausen & Neumann.Würzburg. 23. Interkulturelle Singer-Studien, 2012: Eschbach, Achim; Eschbach-Szabó, Viktoria; Ikeda, Nobuo (eds.), Iudicium Verlag. Munich. Bibliography of Achim Eschbach 219 24. Audiatur et altera pars - Kommunikationswissenschaft zwischen Historiographie, Theorie und empirischer Forschung. Festschrift for H. Walter Schmitz, 2008: Eschbach, Achim; Halawa, Mark A.; Loenhoff, Jens (eds.). 25. Karl Bühler: Sprache und Denken, 2014: Eschbach, Achim, Herbert von Halem Verlag. Cologne. 26. Soziosemiotik. Grundlagentexte, 2015: Eschbach, Achim, Herbert von Halem Verlag. Cologne. 27. Karl Bühler. Schriften zur Sprachtheorie, 2021: Eschbach, Achim (ed.), Mohr Siebeck. Tübingen. Translations 1. Morris, C. W.: Zeichen, Sprache und Verhalten 1973, with an introduction by Karl Otto Apel, Translation from American by Achim Eschbach & Günther Kopsch, Schwann. Düsseldorf. (Paperback, Ullstein, Berlin 1980). 2. Morris, C. W.: Zeichen Wert Ästhetik 1977, with an introduction and translation from American by Achim Eschbach, Suhrkamp. Frankfurt. 3. Morris, C. W.: Pragmatische Semiotik und Handlungstheorie 1977, with an introduction and translation from American by Achim Eschbach, Suhrkamp. Frankfurt. 4. Smart, B. H.: Grundlagen der Zeichentheorie: Grammatik, Logik, Rhetorik 1978, with an introduction and translation from American by Achim Eschbach, Syndikat. Frankfurt. 5. Sebeok, T. A.: „ Einige Lehrstücke vom klugen Hans. ” 1979 In: Festschrift for Helmut Gipper. Edeltraud Bülow & Peter Schmitter (eds.) Translation from American by Achim Eschbach, John Benjamins Pub Co.Amsterdam/ Philadelphia. pp. 729 - 763. 6. Sebeok, T. A.: Geschichte und Theorie der Semiotik 1979, Translation from American by Achim Eschbach, Rowohlt. Reinbek bei Hamburg. 7. Heckscher, W. S.: “ Die Genesis der Ikonologie. “ 1979, Translation from English by Achim Eschbach: In: Bildende Kunst als Zeichensystem I. Kaemmerling (ed.), DuMont. Cologne. 112 - 165. 8. Damisch, H.: “ Semiotik und Ikonographie. ” 1979, Translation from English by Achim Eschbach: In: Bildende Kunst als Zeichensystem II. Kaemmerling (ed.), DuMont. Cologne. 9. Gombrich, E. H.: “ Morris ’ Signs, Language and Behavior. ” 1979, Translation from English by Achim Eschbach, In: Bildende Kunst als Zeichensystem II. Kaemmerling (ed.), DuMont. Cologne. 10. Steiner, W.: “ Ein Beispiel unklaren Denkens: Die Neokritizisten gegen Charles Morris. ” 1981, Translation from American by Achim Eschbach (ed.): In: Zeichen über Zeichen über Zeichen, Narr. Tübingen. 11. Rossi-Landi, F.: “ Über einige nach-Morrissche Probleme. ” 1981, Translation from American by Achim Eschbach (ed.): In: Zeichen über Zeichen über Zeichen, Narr. Tübingen. 12. Mounin G.: “ Die Semiotik von Charles Morris. ” 1981, Translation from French In: Zeichen über Zeichen über Zeichen, Narr. Tübingen. 13. Sebeok, T. A.: “ Karl Bühler ” 1981, Translation from American by Achim Eschbach In: Krampen, M. et al. (eds.): Die Welt als Zeichen. Berlin: Severin & Siedler, pp. 205 - 233. 220 Bibliography of Achim Eschbach 14. Morris, C. W.: Symbolik und Realität. 1981, with an introduction and translation from American by Achim Eschbach, Frankfurt. Suhrkamp. 15. Szépe, Gy. & Voigt, V.: “ Semiotische Alternativen. ” 1981, Translation from French by Achim Eschbach in: Kodikas 3: 2, Tübingen. Narr. 16. Sebeok, Thomas A.: “ Du kennst meine Methode ” . Charles S. Peirce und Sherlock Holmes, 1982, Translation from American by Achim Eschbach, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. 17. Baer, E.: “ Das Symptom bei Bühler und Freud. ” 1984, Translation from American by Achim Eschbach in Bühler Studien, edited by Achim Eschbach, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. 18. Kaplan, B.: “ Einige Betrachtungen zu Einflüssen auf Wittgenstein. ” 1984, Translation from American by Achim Eschbach In: Bühler Studien, edited by Achim Eschbach, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. 19. Dolezel, L.: “ Ein Schema der literarischen Kommunikation. ” 1984, Translation from American by Achim Eschbach in Bühler Studien, edited by Achim Eschbach, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. 20. Fónagy, I.: “ Funktionen und Evolution. ” 1984, Translation from French by Achim Eschbach in Bühler Studien, edited by Achim Eschbach, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. 21. Vachek, J.: “ Karl Bühler und die Prager Linguisten Schule. ” 1984, Translation from English by Achim Eschbach in Bühler Studien, edited by Achim Eschbach, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. 22. Horalek, K.: “ Karl Bühler und die Phonologie der Prager Schule. ” 1984, Translation from English by Achim Eschbach in Bühler Studien, edited by Achim Eschbach, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. 23. Innis, R.: “ Bühler und Gardiner. ” 1984, Translation from English by Achim Eschbach in Bühler Studien, edited by Achim Eschbach, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. 24. Kaplan, B. & Werner, H.: “ Uber den Charakter der Sprache als autonomes Medium. ” 1984, Translation from English by Achim Eschbach in Bühler Studien, edited by Achim Eschbach, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. 25. Luelsdorff, P.: “ Einstellung als ein Faktor des erweiterten Organon-Modells der Sprache. ” 1984, Translation from English by Achim Eschbach in Bühler Studien, edited by Achim Eschbach, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. 26. Veltrusky, J.: “ Bühlers Organon-Modell und die Semiotik der Kunst. ” 1984, Translation from English by Achim Eschbach in Bühler Studien, edited by Achim Eschbach, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. 27. Koerner, E. F. K.: “ Karl Bühlers Zeichentheorie und Saussure. “ 1984, Translation from English and edition by Achim Eschbach in Bühler Studien, edited by Achim Eschbach, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. 28. Bühler, Ch.: “ Karl Bühler. Eine biographische Skizze. ” 1984, Translation from American by Achim Eschbach in Bühler Studien, edited by Achim Eschbach, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. 29. Toulmin, S.: “ Bühler, Wittgenstein und die Psycholinguistik. ” 1984, Translation from American by Achim Eschbach in Bühler Studien, edited by Achim Eschbach, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. 30. Deely, John: Einführung in die Semiotik. 1990, Translation from American by Achim Eschbach. Aachen: Rader. Bibliography of Achim Eschbach 221 31. Bühler, Karl: Theory of Language. 1990, Translation from German by Donald in cooperation with Achim Eschbach & Robert E. Innis. Amsterdam/ Philadelphia: Benjamins. 32. Mitchell, W. J. T.: “ Das Leben der Bilder ” 2008, Translation from English by Achim Eschbach, Anna-Viktoria Eschbach and Mark Halawa. C. H. Beck Verlag, Munich. 33. John Dewey. Liberalismus und gesellschaftliches Handeln 2010, Translation from English by Eschbach, Achim; Eschbach, Nora, Mohr Siebeck. Tübingen. Reviews 1. Brög, H. (ed.): Probleme der Semiotik unter schulischem Aspekt. In: Kunst und Unterricht 49 (1978) 13 - 14. 2. Sebeok, T. A.: Contributions to the Doctrine of Signs. In: Kodikas 1: 2 (1979) 188-192. 3. Dahlhaus, C. (ed.): Beitrage zur musikalischen Hermeneutik. In; Kodikas 1: 2 (1979) 187 - 188. 4. Bailey, R. et al. (eds.): The Sign. Semiotics Around the World. In: Kodikas 2: 1 (1980) 114 - 117. 5. Fischer-Lichte, E.: Bedeutung. In: Kodikas 2: 2 (1980) 219 - 222. 6. Nordhofen, E. (ed.): Physiognomien. Philosophen des 20. Jahrhunderts in Portraits. In: AC-Literaturbrief 3 (1981). 7. Krampen, M. et al. (eds.): Die Welt als Zeichen. Klassiker der modernen Semiotik. In: Kodikas 3: 4 (1981) 318 - 384. 8. On some totally unbelievable novelties from the semiotic warehouse: Epskamp, C.P and Boeren, A. J. H. M.: Semiotics. A Literature Survey from a Social Scientist ’ s Point of View. In: Semiotica 60: 3 - 4 (1986) 276 - 287. 9. Deely, J.: Introducing Semiotic. Its History and Doctrine. In: Kodikas IV/ V: 3 - 4 (1982) 369 - 372. 10. Kigogaku-Kenkyu - Studia Semiotica. Journal of the Japanese Association for Semiotic Studies. vol. 1 (1981) und vol. 2 (1982). In: Kodikas IV/ V: 3 - 4 (1982) 373 - 376. 11. Alt, Jürgen A.: Die Frühschriften Poppers. Der Weg Poppers von der Pädagogik und der Psychologie zur Spätphilosophie. In: Kodikas VI: 1 - 2 (1983) 167 - 170. 12. Bühler, Karl: Sprachtheorie. Die Darstellungsfunktion der Sprache. In: Kodikas VI: 1 - 2 (1983) 171 - 175. Articles & Lectures 1. Eschbach, A.; Faltin, P.; Krampen, M. & Reinecke, H.: “ Bibliographia semiotica. Semiotische Arbeiten in deutscher Sprache. ” In: Versus. Quaderni di studi semiotici 10: 5 (1975) 97 - 114. 2. Eschbach, A. & Rader, W.: “ Bibliographie zur Geschichte der Semiotik. ” In: Posner, R. & Reinecke, H. P. (Hrsg.): Zeichenprozesse - Semiotische Forschung in den Einzelwissenschaften. Wiesbaden: Athenaion 1977. 3. Eschbach, A. & Rader, W.: “ Literaturbericht zur Semiotik der Literatur. ” In: LiLi 7: 27/ 28 (1977) 15 - 29. 222 Bibliography of Achim Eschbach 4. Eschbach, A. & Rader, W. 1977: “ Ist die ‘ linkshändige Frau ’ trivial? Überlegungen zur literarischen Wertung. ” In: LiLi 7: 27/ 28, pp. 104 - 117. 5. Eschbach, A. 1978: “ Zur Eröffnung des 1. Aachener Semiotik Colloquiums. ” In: Arbeitsgruppe Semiotik Aachen (ed.): “ Die Einheit der semiotischen Dimensionen. ” Tübingen: Narr, pp. 7 - 11. 6. Eschbach, A. 1978: “ Drei unbekannte deutsche Zeichentheoretiker: Weltring, Roeder, Matzat. ” Lecture at the 2nd Congress of the German Society for Semiotics, Regensburg. 7. Eschbach, A. 1978: “ Semiotik und Geschichte. ” Lecture at the Philosophical Seminar of the University of Hamburg. 8. Eschbach, A. 1978: “ Semiotik und Wissenschaftstheorie. Sprachphilosophische Überlegungen zu einem handlungstheoretisch eingeführten Wissenschaftsbegriff der Linguistik. ” Lecture at the Sociological Institute of the University of Düsseldorf. 9. Eschbach, A. & Rader, W 1979: “ Semiotik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland ” . “ Theoretische Ansätze zu einer Semiotik. ” In: Zeitschrift für Semiotik 1: 1, pp. 93 - 108. 10. Eschbach, A. 1979: “ Semiotik in Amerika und Deutschland. Einige Gesichtspunkte theoretischer Wechselbeziehungen und Einflüsse. ” Lecture on the congress: Semiotic Terminology and Its Historical Evolution, Budapest, 28.6. - 1.7. 11. Eschbach, A. 1979: “ Konstitution und Funktion des triadischen Zeichens bei Karl Bühler, Charles S. Peirce, Ferdinand de Saussure, Benjamin H. Smart und Victoria Lady Welby. ” Lecture on the 2. International Congress of the International Association for Semiotic Studies, Vienna, 2.7. - 6.7. 12. Eschbach, A. & Nadin, M. 1979: “ Zwei Kongresse zur Semiotik. Budapest, 28.6. - 1.7.1979; Vienna, 2.7. - 6.7.1979. ” In: Zeitschrift für Germanistische Linguistik 7: 3, pp. 354 - 359. 13. Eschbach, A. & Nadin, M. 1979: “ Semiotic Terminology and Its Historical Evolution / II. Congress of the International Association for Semiotic Studies. ” In: Kodikas 1: 4 , pp. 395 - 399. 14. Eschbach, A. 1979: “ Versuch einer Gliederung der Entwicklungsgeschichte der Semiotik. ” Lecture on the Workshop “ Systematik, Geschichte und Terminologie der Semiotik ” 17. - 22.9.1979 in Berlin. 15. Eschbach, A. 1979: “ Bemerkungen zum Zeichenbegriff in der Sprachlogik des Thomas von Erfurt. ” Lecture on the Workshop “ Systematik, Geschichte und Terminologie der Semiotik ” 17. - 22.9.1979 in Berlin. 16. Eschbach, A. 1979: “ Bericht über die Arbeitstagung ‘ Systematik, Geschichte und Terminologie der Semiotik ” 17. - 22.9.1979 in Berlin. In: Kodikas 1: 4, pp. 401 - 402. 17. Eschbach, A. 1981: “ Wahrnehmung und Zeichen. Die sematologischen Grundlagen der Wahrnehmungstheorie Karl Bühlers. ” Lecture at “ Essener Arbeitskreis Semiotik und Ästhetik ” and at “ Arbeitsgruppe Semiotik Aachen ” . Extended printed edition in: Ars semeiotica IV: 3, pp. 219 - 235. 18. Eschbach, A. & Rader, W. 1980: “ Vorbemerkungen. ” I (eds.): Literatursemiotik, vol. I & II. Tübingen. Narr. 19. Eschbach, A.: Entries for below listed definitions in Encyclopedic Dictionary of Semiotics. Ed. by Th. A. Sebeok et al.: Organisations, National and International in Semiotics; Periodical in Semiotics; Deixis Bibliography of Achim Eschbach 223 20. Eschbach, A. 1980: “ Semiotik. ” In: Lexikon der Germanistischen Linguistik. M. P. Althaus et al. (eds.). Updated and extended Volume 2 Tübingen: Niemeyer, pp. 41 - 57. 21. Eschbach, V. & Eschbach, A. 1980: “ Medienkonstitution als Semiotisierung der Umwelt - Semiotisierung als Entmedialisierung. ” In: Papier als künstlerisches Medium. Hrsg. von D. & M. Gerhardus. Saarbrücken: Galerie St. Johann, pp. 20 - 24. 22. Eschbach, A. 1981: “ Die objektive Relativität von Perspektiven, oder: Möglichkeiten und Grenzen ihrer ästhetischen Semiotik. ” In: Sturm, H. & Eschbach, A. (Hrsg.): Ästhetik und Semiotik. Tübingen: Narr, pp. 29 - 40. 23. Eschbach, A. & Eschbach, V. 1980: “ Das sog. dritte Axiom der Sprache. Karl Bühler vs. Gyula Laziczius? ” Lecture on 5. Annual Meeting Societas Linguistica Europaea, Budapest. 24. Eschbach, A. 1980: “ Das Programm der behavioristischen Semiotik. ” Lecture at the department of theoretical physics at RWTH-Aachen 31.10.1980. 25. Eschbach, A. 1986: “ Signifiant und Signifie. Einige Bemerkungen zu einer relationslogischen Interpretation des Zeichenbegriffs bei Ferdinand de Saussure. ” In: Jager, L. & Stetter, C. (eds.): Zeichen und Verstehen. Aachen: Rader, pp. 97 - 108. 26. “ Wahrnehmung(surteile), Erfahrung(surteile) und Erkenntnis. “ unpublished lecture. 27. Eschbach, A. 1981: “ Role-Playing from the Semiotic Point of View. The Formation of the Human Self. ” Lecture on Congress “ Semiologie du Spectacle ” , Brussels, 22. - 25.4.1981. Printed Edition in: Degres (1984). 28. Eschbach, A. 1981: “ LES-EN-AIX zum sechsten Mal. ” In: AVZ 20.6.1981. 29. Eschbach, A. 1982: “ Semiotik als Grundlage einer Handlungstheorie. ” In: Neue Zürcher Zeitung. 30. Eschbach, A. (ed.) 1984: “ Einleitung. ” Bühler-Studien. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. 31. Eschbach, A. 1984: “ Verstehen und Interpretation. Karl Bühlers synchytische Begriffe und Ludwig Wittgensteins Familienähnlichkeiten. ” In: Bühler-Studien. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. 32. Eschbach, A. 1982: “ Zum Problem der Integration von Fachwissenschaften, Fachdidaktik und Gestaltung. ” Lecture in Essen 15.5.1982. 33. Eschbach, A. 1983: “ The History of Semiotics and Charles S. Peirce. ” In: Peirce, Ch. S.: Studies in Logic. Ed. by A. Eschbach. Amsterdam/ Philadelphia: John Benjamins. XXXIII - LIII. 34. Eschbach, A. 1983: “ Significs as a Fundamental Science. ” In: Welby, Victoria Lady: what is Meaning? Ed. by A. Eschbach. Amsterdam/ Philadelphia: John Benjamins. IX - XXXII. 35. Eschbach, A. & Trabant, J. 1983: “ Foreword. ” In: History of Semiotics. ed. by A. Eschbach & J. Trabant. Amsterdam/ Philadelphia: John Benjamins. IX - XVI. 36. Eschbach, A. 1983: “ Prolegomena einer möglichen Historiographie der Semiotik. Die Entstehung einer semiotischen Tatsache. ” In: History of Semiotics. ed. by A. Eschbach & J. Trabant. Amsterdam/ Philadelphia: John Benjamins, pp. 25 - 38. 37. Eschbach, A. 1981: “ Das sprachliche Zeichen als zentrale Kategorie der linguistischen Schule von Kopenhagen. Einige historisch-vergleichende Überlegungen zu einer in Mode geratenen Kategorie. ” Lecture on 6. Annual Meeting der Societas Linguisticae Europaea, Kopenhagen. 38. Eschbach, A. & Sturm, H. 1982: “ Aspekte der Kultursemiotik. ” Guest Lecture in Bochum 15.12.1982. 224 Bibliography of Achim Eschbach 39. Eschbach, A. 1982: “ Kritik der ästhetischen Erfahrung. Ästhetische Wissenschaft versus wissenschaftliche Ästhetik? ” Lecture on Colloquium “ Kunst und Wissenschaft ” 17.12.1982 at Kölner Kunstverein. In: Kunst und Therapie 5 (1984) 150 - 165. 40. Eschbach, A. 1986: “ Notes sur la Note sur l ’ influence des signes de Maine de Biran. ” In: Busse, W. & Trabant, J. (eds.): Les Idéologues. Sémiotique, philosophie du langage et linguistique pendant la Révolution française. Amsterdam: John Benjamins, pp. 59 - 72. 41. Eschbach, A. 1983: “ Einige kritische Notizen zur neuesten Bühler-Forschung. ” In: Historiographia Linguistica X: 1 - 2, pp. 149 - 158. 42. Eschbach, A. 1984: “ Karl Bühlers Axiomatik und das Axiomensystem der Zeichentheorie. ” in: Graumann, Carl F. & Herrmann, Theo (eds.): Karl Bühlers Axiomatik. Frankfurt: Klostermann, pp. 53 - 104. 43. Eschbach, A. 1983: “ The Characteristics of Karl Bühler ’ s Pragmatically Integrated Theory of Signs. ” Lecture on Congress “ Sémiotique et Pragmatique ” , Perpignan. 44. Eschbach, A. 1983: “ Semiotik und Design. ” In: VDID RG Information, pp. 5 - 8. 45. Eschbach, A. 1984: “ Karl Bühlers Zeichenbegriff und seine Beziehung zu Wittgensteins Spätphilosophie. ” In: Zeitschrift für Semiotik 6: 4, pp. 397 - 420. 46. Eschbach, A.1984: “ Der moderne Mensch: Durch Zeichen gelenkt, von Zeichen abhängig. Grundfragen der Semiotik. ” Lecture in Essen, 15.2.1984. 47. Eschbach, A. 1985: “ Das Fremde als Problem der ästhetischen Erfahrung. ” In: Jahrbuch für Ästhetik 1, pp. 101 - 115. 48. Eschbach, A. 1985: “ Karl Bühlers Wirken an der Universität Wien. ” In: Albert, Dietrich (ed.): Report on 34th Congress German Society for Psychology in Vienna 1984. Göttingen: Hogrefe, pp. 80 - 88. 49. Eschbach, A. 1988: “ Karl Bühler und Ludwig Wittgenstein. ” In: Eschbach, A. (ed.): Karl Bühler ’ s Theory of Language. Amsterdam/ Philadelphia: John Benjamins, pp. 385 - 406. 50. Eschbach, A. 1986: “ Richard Gätschenbergers Sematologie. ” In: Kodikas/ Code 9: 1 - 2, pp. 227 - 240. 51. Eschbach, A. 1987: “ Archäologie, Kriminalistik und Wissenschaftsgeschichte: Der Fall Karl Bühler. ” In: Schmitter, Peter (Hrsg.): Geschichte der Sprachtheorie. vol I. Tübingen: Narr. 52. Eschbach, A. 1986: “ Überlegungen im Anschluss an Georg Jonathan Hollands ‘ Abhandlung über die Mathematik, die allgemeine Zeichenkunst und die Verschiedenheit der Rechnungsarten ’ von 1764. ” In: Dutz, K. D. & Schmitter, P. (eds.): Geschichte und Geschichtsschreibung der Semiotik. Münster: Maks, pp. 151 - 162. 53. Eschbach, A. 1986: “ Basistheorien der Semiotik. ” Contribution to Bochumer Symposium “ Semiotik und Wissenschaftstheorie “ , 6. - 7.6.1986. 54. Eschbach, A. 1986: “ Denken. Der semiotische Ansatz der Würzburger Schule. ” Contribution to Stuttgart Congress “ Denken und die Repräsentation von Wissen “ , November 1986. 55. Eschbach, A. 1986: “ Charles W. Morris und Gerrit Mannoury - ein Vergleich. ” Contribution to Bonn Symposium “ Signifik, Mathematik und Semiotik ” , November 1986. 56. Eschbach, A. 1987: “ Histoire de la Sémiotique. ” In: Auroux, Sylvain (ed.): Histoire des idées linguistiques. Vol. III. L ’ institution du savoir universitaire. Liège: Margada. 57. Eschbach, A. 1987: “ Johann C. Hoffbauer ’ s Tentamina semiologica, sive quaedem generalem theoriam signorum spectantia in the context of eighteenth century semiotic Bibliography of Achim Eschbach 225 inquiry. ” Introductory essay to the edition of Hoffbrauers Tentamina semiologica. Ed. by A. Eschbach. Amsterdam: Benjamins. 58. Eschbach, A. 1987: “ Salomon Maimons Abhandlung über die symbolische Erkenntnis im Lichte der Geschichte der Semiotik. ” In: Festschrift Hüllen. Tübingen: Narr, pp. 470 - 484. 59. Eschbach, A. 1987: “ Edmund Husserl (1859 - 1938) und Karl Bühler (1879 - 1963). ” Lecture held at IKP Bonn, 5.2.1988. In: Kodikas 10: 3 - 4, pp. 301 - 315. 60. Eschbach, A. 1987: “ The Crisis of Semiotics. ” In: Eschbach, A. & Koch, W. A. (eds.): A Plea for Cultural Semiotics. Bochum: Brockmeyer, pp. 45 - 52. 61. Bühler, Karl 1987: “ Psychologie. ” Ed. by Achim Eschbach & Gabi Willenberg., In: Conceptus 21: . 53 - 54, pp. 115 - 124. 62. Eschbach, A. & Willenberg, G. 1987: “ Karl Bühler. ” Lecture at the conference “ Vertriebene Vernunft ” in Vienna on 20.10.1987. In: Stadler, Friedrich (ed.): “ Vertriebene Vernunft II. Emigration und Exil österreichischer Wissenschaft. ” Vienna & Munich: Jugend und Volk 1988. 297 - 305. 63. Eschbach, A.1988: “ Hermann Paul (1846 - 1921). “ In: Nerlich, Wilhelm Wundt 1832 - 1890, in ibid 182 - 194 64. Eschbach, A. & Willenberg, G. 1987: “ Sprache und Psychologie oder: Die neue Psychologie Karl Bühlers. ” Vortrag im Max-Planck-Institut für Psycholinguistik in Nijmegen am 8.12.1987. Publiziert unter dem Titel: “ Karl Bühlers neue Philosophie der Psychologie. “ In: Conceptus 21: 53 - 54, pp. 103 - 114. 65. Eschbach, A. 1988: “ Einige kritische Bemerkungen im Anschluss an James Haigs Symbolism or Mind-Matter-Language as the Elements of Thinking and Reasoning and as the Necessary Factors of Human Knowledge von 1869. ” In: Freiheit und Verbindlichkeit. Festschrift Kohn. Ed. by Heinz Knobeloch. Aachen: Rader. 66. Eschbach, A. 1988: “ Karl und Charlotte Bühler - Leben und Werk. ” In: Zeitschrift für Sozialpsychologie und Gruppendynamik 13: 2, pp. 8 - 21. 67. Eschbach, A. 1988: “ Verzeichnung - ein Begriff wofür. Lecture at Symposium: Der verzeichnete Prometheus. Kunst, Design , Technik. Zeichen verändern die Wirklichkeit ” . Essen, 21. - 23.10.1988. 68. Eschbach, A. 1989: “ Über Annahmen. Kommunikationstheorie zwischen gestern und morgen. ” Lecture Essen. 69. Eschbach, A. & Willenberg, G. 1989: “ Karl Bühler über Aphasieforschung. ” Lecture Vienna 27.5.1989. 70. Eschbach, A. 1991: “ Auf der Suche nach der vorlaufenden Zeit: Verzeichnung. ” Lecture, Essen. 71. Eschbach, A. 1992: “ Gegen Rassismus. Muttersprache und Vaterland. ” Lecture, Dortmund. 72. Eschbach, A. 1992: “ Sprache und Kommunikation im Anschluß an Karl Bühler. ” Lecture, Darmstadt. 73. Eschbach, A. 1992: “ Die Koketterie der Sprachlosigkeit oder: Der Wurm muß dem Fisch schmecken, nicht dem Angler. ” Lecture, Essen. 74. Eschbach, A. 1993: “ Über vier Unvermögen des Menschen. ” Lecture Berlin. 75. Eschbach, A. 1994: “ Das Kreuz als Zeichen. Ein semiotischer Versuch. ” Lecture, Dortmund. 226 Bibliography of Achim Eschbach 76. Eschbach, A. 1995: “ Das Geld als Zeichen: Georg Simmel, Kurt Singer und Karl Bühler ” in Wichelhaus Barbara; Sturm, Hermann (ed.) anniversary publication for Hans Brög; Viersen. Julian, pp. 138 - 152. 77. Eschbach, A. 1995: “ Die Grenzen der Kommunikation ” Lecture, Essen. 78. Eschbach, A. 1995: “ Abundanzphänomen in der Semiotik ” Lecture, Pécs. 79. Eschbach, A. 1995: “ Semiotische Anmerkungen zum Verstehensprozess ” Lecture, Tübingen. 80. Eschbach, A. 1996: “ Das Geld, die Zeichen und der Tod. Weltbildwandel im Mittelalter. ” in Bolz. Norbert et al (eds.): Riskante Bilder. Kunst - Literatur - Medien. Anniversary publication for Hermann Sturm. München: Fink, pp. 219 - 238. 81. Eschbach, A. 1996: “ Jan Amos Comenius. Orbis sensualium pictus oder die unendliche Abdrift ” , in Terts, István (ed.) Nyelv, nyelvész, társadalom. Anniversary publication for György Szépe. 2 Vols. Pécs: Janus Pannonius Tudomanyegyetem, pp. 35 - 60. 82. Eschbach, A. 1996: “ Semiotik als Interface. Beiträge der Semiotik zur interdisziplinären Weiterbildung. ” Lecture, Tübingen. 83. Eschbach, A. 1997: “ Der innere und der äußere Kreis der Kommunikation: Würzburg, Wien, Dublin and Paris. ” Lecture. Essen. 84. Eschbach, A. 1997: “ Deixis. ” In Yamanaka. K. & Ohori, T. (eds.): The Locus of Meaning. Papers in Honor of Yoshihiko Ikegami. Tokyo: Kuroshio, pp. 115 - 122. 85. Eschbach, A. 1997: “ Ex occidente lux: Kontinuität. Zur Rekonstruktion der alteuropäischen Schrift. ” Lecture, Essen. 86. Eschbach, A. 1997: “ Scienza nuova und Semiotik ” Conference Contribution for “ International Kurt Singer Symposium ” , Essen. 87. Eschbach, A. 1997: “ Herme neutik, Semiotik, Informatik. ” Conrtribution for Conference Hermeneutik, Semiotik, Informatik at Berlin-Brandenburgischen Akademie. 88. Eschbach, A. 1998: “ Gerold Ungeheuers. Bühlerstudien. ” In: Kralhnann, Dieter and Schmitz, H. Walter (eds.): Perspektiven einer Kommunikationswissenschaft. Vol 2 Münster: N odus, pp. 329 - 340. 89. Eschbach, A. 1998: “ Der Quellpunkt der Semantik. Das eine durch das andere. ” In: Weisen der Welterzeugung. Die Wirklichkeit des Konstruktivismus II, Heidelberg. 90. Eschbach, A. 2000: “ The Chicago Four and the Nature of the Linguistic Sign. ” In: Recherche Semiotique/ Semiotic Inquiry. 91. Eschbach, A. & Kapitzky, J. 2000: “ Nachwort zu Karl Bühlers Krise der Psychologie. ” Köln: Velbrück. 92. Eschbach, A. 1994: “ Kaisetsu Kuruto Jingaa to gendai kigouron. ” 解説 クルト・ジン ガアと現代記号論 In: Singer, Kurt Sanshuu no shingi. Tokyo Kodansha, pp. 252 - 278. 93. Eschbach, A. 1996: “ Bildsprache. ISOTYPE und die Grenzen ” . In: Neurath. Zeichen. Bernard, Jeff; Withalm, Gloria (eds.). Vienna 1996, pp. 15 - 49. 94. Eschbach, A. & Kapitzky, J. 2000: “ Karl Bühler: Sprachtheorie. Die Darstellungsfunktion der Sprache (1934) ” . In: Klassiker der Psychologie. Helmut E. Lück, et al. W. Kohlhammer, pp. 156 - 162. 95. Eschbach, A. 2000: “ Der Quellpunkt der Semantik: das eine durch das andere ” . In: Wirklichkeit und Welterzeugung. In Memoriam Nelson Goodman. Fischer, Hans Rudi; Schmidt, Siegfried J. (eds.), pp. 235 - 144. Bibliography of Achim Eschbach 227 96. Eschbach, A. 2001: “ Vorüberlegungen zur semiotischen Rekonstruktion der alteuropäischen Schrift ” . In: Színes eszmék nem alszanak. (Szépe György 70. születésnapjára). Lingua Franca, Pécs, pp. 291 - 307. 97. Eschbach, A. 2012: “ Karl und Charlotte Bühler - Leben und Werk. In: Krise und Chance der Psychologie. Beiträge der Bühler-Symposien ” . Zucha, Rudolf O. (Hrsg.). Wieser Verlag, pp. 20 - 36. 98. Eschbach, A. 2019: “ Kodikas - Schicksalsjahre einer Semiotikzeitschrift ” . In: Vernarrt in Wissen. Jubiläumsband. Narr Verlag, pp. 197 - 203. 99. Eschbach, A. 2003: “ Semiotik und Kommunikationswissenschaft. Über die Tieferlegung der Fundamente ” . In: Helmut Richter/ , H. Walter Schmitz (eds.): Kommunikation - Ein Schlüsselbegriff der Humanwissenschaften? Münster: Nodus, p. 371 - 377. 100.Eschbach, A. 2013: “ Karl Bühler: Sprachtheorie ” . Abgerufen am 22.02.2023 von https: / / www.rkm-journal.de/ archives/ 13222 101.Dindas, H. & Eschbach, A. 2017: “ Die Verbindung Oswald Külpes zu Samuel Beckett und Charles Sanders Peirce - eine denkpsychologische Begegnung ” . In C. R. Krauss (Hrsg.). Discipline Filosofiche. La scienza del pensiero. Il realismo filosofico di Oswald Külpe. Macerata: Quodlibet, p. 64 - 80. 102.Eschbach, A. 2018: “ Über die Zerstreuung, Zusammenführung und Auswertung des Bühler-Nachlasses ” . In: Travaux du cercle linguistique de Prague, vol. 7. Karl Bühler, une théorie du langage redécouverte. OPS, Kanina, Prague, pp. 193 - 209. This list reflects the status of processing Achim Eschbach ’ s estate in 2021. 228 Bibliography of Achim Eschbach K O D I K A S / C O D E 44 (2021) · No. 1 - 3 Gunter Narr Verlag Tübingen Beiträgerinnen und Beiträger / List of contributors Editors, Translation and Proofreading Anna-Viktoria Eschbach Nora-Sophia Eschbach Prof. Dr. Viktoria Eschbach-Szabo Translation and Proofreading Heather Mowbray K O D I K A S / C O D E 44 (2021) · No. 1 - 3 Gunter Narr Verlag Tübingen Autorinnen und Autoren / Authors Prof. Dr. Henrik Dindas works as a full Professor of Higher Education Didactics at FOM University of Applied Sciences in Essen, Germany, as well as a moderator, speaker, and systemic coach in his own company (www.hd-coaching.de) with over 10 years of experience in the fields of higher education didactics, science communication, university development, quality management and evaluation. He has teaching experience at various universities in Germany and the USA and received his doctoral, master ’ s and bachelor ’ s degrees from the University of Duisburg-Essen, Germany. At FOM, he heads the Competence Centre for Didactics (KCD) and, as the Rector ’ s delegate for university-wide didactics, supports the development, testing, and evaluation of didactic teaching and learning methods, as well as innovative concepts for academic teaching. As a repeated Vice-Chair in international accreditation processes (Finnish Education Evaluation Centre), he regularly strengthens his expertise in international higher education didactics and quality development. Anna-Viktoria Eschbach is a German-Hungarian curator and writer who has been active in China for almost a decade, developing projects that stimulate dialogue and experimentation between creative disciplines and cultures. Currently she is a researcher at the Curatorial Research Collective at TU/ e Eindhoven and at the Art History Department at Kunstuni Linz with the topic “ Power, Politics and the Building of Contemporary Art Museums in China ” . She has been working on projects for documenta fifteen, Kunstmuseum Wolfsburg, Artspace Sydney, CAFAM Beijing, and the Ludwig Museum Budapest. From 2014 - 2020 she built up the curatorial office and residency program, I: project space, in Beijing around topics of urbanization, gender concepts in the Asia Pacific, independent space practice, new media, and digital art. From 2015 to 2022, she was working on the long-term curatorial research platform Beijing22, documenting Greater Beijing ’ s urban transformation. As part of the Swiss Chinese publishing house tria, she has published numerous books around art, theory, urban development, and China. Anna has received grants from Getty Foundation, Deutsche Bank, and Forum Scientiarum, and has had residencies at Artspace, Sydney and nBK, Berlin. Nora-Sophia Eschbach boasts a decade-long tenure in Corporate Banking, specializing in the Swiss, German, and French markets. Her academic background includes a dual major in Political Science and Philosophy from the University of Vienna, complemented by a comprehensive professional journey encompassing banking, consulting, and policy analysis. This unique blend of education and experience equips her with a distinctive perspective on contemporary macroeconomic issues. Moreover, Nora Eschbach has contributed to the academic field through translations of seminal works such as John Dewey ’ s “ Liberalismus und gesellschaftliches Handeln ” and the development of methodological publications like “ Bausteine der Kommunikationswissenschaft ” . Prof. em. Dr. Viktoria Eschbach-Szabo is a Japanologist and linguist. She taught as Professor of Japanese Studies at the Asia-Orient Institute of the Eberhard Karls University of Tübingen from 1992 to 2023. From 1975 to 1980, Eschbach-Szabo studied German, Slavic, Sinology and Japanese at Eötvös Loránd University (Budapest), from which she graduated with a master ’ s degree. In 1984, she received her doctorate in Japanese linguistics from the Ruhr University in Bochum. From 1983 to 1990, she worked at the Faculty of East Asian Studies in Bochum on the Philipp Franz von Siebold Project. From 1990, she taught at the University of Trier for three semesters and was appointed Professor of Contemporary Japanese Studies. In 1993 she was invited with her husband Achim Eschbach as a Visiting Professor at Tokyo University working on the Philosopher and Economist Kurt Singer. Her main research in Japanese linguistics is about narrative perspectives, concept of person and names, the history of Japanese linguistic studies and semiotics of Japanese outside of Japan. Since 1993, she has worked at the Tübingen Center for Japanese Language and Culture at D ō shisha University in Ky ō to. Eschbach-Szabo held the presidency of the European Association for Japanese Studies from 2005 to 2008. Between 2006 and 2009, she participated in the Global Risks and Attitudes research project (Tübingen University. Dôshisha University and Sheffield University). At ETH Zurich, she taught on the cultural and scientific history of East Asia from 2007 to 2017. In 2009, she was a curator at the Hungary Festival in Japan with the exhibition “ Nukumori wa kawaranai - Intimacy Remains Unchanged. ” From 2015 to 2018, Eschbach-Szabo worked on various projects such as the German- Japanese-Korean project “ Colonial Memories ” , the German-Japanese project “ Social History of Manuals for a Meaningful Life ” , and the international study “ Cross-linguistic Modelling of Speech Data for Hesitation Type Disfluency ” . In addition to her teaching and research activities in East Asian Studies, she served for many years as organizer of the linguistics section and most recently as president of the European Association for Japanese Studies. In the context of her professorship in Japanese linguistics at the Eberhard Karls University of Tübingen, she is also committed to making knowledge about Japanese culture, society, and language accessible to a broader audience. In 2019 she was invited from Tokyo College at Tokyo University as an International Fellow. Her research interest is now focusing on Japanese language, linguistic position and historical and postmodern identity in the digital age. Autorinnen und Autoren / Authors 231 Hinweise zur Gestaltung von Manuskripten Beiträge für die Zeitschrift K ODIKAS / C ODE (ca. 10 - 30 S. à 2.500 Zeichen [25.000 - 75.000], Times od. Times New Roman 12., 1.5-zeilig, Rand 2 - 3 cm l/ r) sind dem Herausgeber in elektronischer Form (Word- oder rtf-Datei) und als Ausdruck auf Papier einzureichen. Abbildungen sind getrennt vom Text in reproduzierbarer Form (mind. 300 dpi, schwarzweiß) beizufügen. Nach dem Titel des Beitrags folgt der Name des Autors (der Autoren) mit Angabe das Dienstortes. Dem Text (in deutscher, englischer, französischer oder spanischer Sprache, ggfs. gegengelesen von native speakers) ist eine kurze Zusammenfassung (abstract) in englischer Sprache voranzustellen (1-zeilig petit 10.). Die Gliederung des Textes folgt dem Dezimalsystem (1, 2, 2.1, 2.1.1). Auf separatem Blatt sind ihm die Anschrift des/ der Verf. und eine kurze bio-bibliographische Notiz (3 - 5 Zeilen) beizufügen. Zitierweise In der Semiotik gibt es eine Vielzahl konkurrierender Zitierweisen, die alle ihre Vor- und Nachteile haben. Für K ODIKAS wird hier eine in vielen Disziplinen (und anderen semiotischen Zeitschriften) international verbreitete Zitierweise empfohlen, die sich durch Übersichtlichkeit, Benutzerfreundlichkeit, Vollständigkeit der Angaben und Sparsamkeit der Zeichenökonomie auszeichnet. Wörtliche Zitate werden durch normale Anführungszeichen kenntlich gemacht ( “…” ). Wenn ein Zitat die Länge von drei Zeilen überschreitet, wird es links 0.5 eingerückt und 1zeilig petit (11.) geschrieben: Ich bin ein Blindtext und bin blind geboren. Es hat lange gedauert, bis ich begriffen habe, was es bedeutet, ein blinder Text zu sein. Man macht keinen Sinn. Man wirkt hier und da aus dem Zusammenhang gerissen. Oft wird man gar nicht erst gelesen. Aber bin ich deshalb ein schlechter Text? Ich weiß, dass ich nie die Chance habe im S PIEGEL zu erscheinen. Aber bin ich darum weniger wichtig? Ich bin blind! Aber ich bin gerne Text. Und sollten Sie mich jetzt tatsächlich zu Ende lesen, dann habe ich geschafft, was den meisten “ normalen ” Texten nicht gelingt. Ich bin ein Blindtext und bin blind geboren … (Autor Jahr: Seite). Zitatbeleg durch Angabe der Quelle gleich im Text mit einer auf das Literaturverzeichnis verweisenden bibliographischen Kurzangabe (Autor Jahr: Seite): “ [ … ] wird für die Herstellung des Zaubertranks die Beigabe von Dracheneiern empfohlen ” (Gaukeley 2006: 387). Wenn das Zitat im Original über eine Seite hinausgeht, wird entsprechend ein “ f. ” (= folgende) an die Seitenzahl angefügt (387 f.). Alle Auslassungen und Hinzufügungen in Zitaten müssen gekennzeichnet werden: Auslassungen durch drei Punkte in eckigen Klammern [ … ], Hinzufügungen durch Initialien des/ der Verf. (EHL). Hervorhebungen werden durch den eingeklammerten Zusatz “ (Hervorh. im Original) ” oder “ (Hervorh. nicht im Original) ” bzw. “ (Hervorh. v. mir, Initial) ” gekennzeichnet. Wenn das Original einen Fehler enthält, wird dieser übernommen und durch ein “ [sic] ” (lat. so) markiert. Zitate innerhalb von Zitaten werden in einfache Anführungszeichen gesetzt ( “… ‘…’ …” ). Auch nicht-wörtliche Zitate (sinngemäße Wiedergaben, Paraphrasen) müssen durch Verweise gekennzeichnet werden: Auch Dracheneier werden für die Herstellung eines solchen Zaubertranks empfohlen (cf. Gaukeley 2001: 387). Gundel Gaukeley (2001: 387) empfiehlt den Gebrauch von Dracheneiern für die Herstellung des Zaubertranks. Objektsprachlich gebrauchte Wörter oder grammatische Formen werden kursiviert: “ Die Interjektion eiapopeia gilt als veraltet. ” Die Bedeutung eines sprachlichen Elementes steht in einfachen Anführungszeichen: “ Fähe bedeutet ‘ Füchsin ’ . ” Standardsprachlich inkorrekte Formen oder Sätze werden durch Asterisk gekennzeichnet: “ *Rettet dem Dativ! ” oder “ *der Dativ ist dem Genitiv sein Tod. ” Fußnoten, Anmerkungen Auf Anmerkungen und Fußnoten wird im Text durch eine hochgestellte Zahl verwiesen: [ … ] verweisen wir auf Gesundheitsgefahren, die mit regelmäßigen Geldbädern einhergehen. 2 Vor einem Satzzeichen steht sie möglichst nur dann, wenn sie sich direkt auf das Wort unmittelbar davor bezieht (z. B. die Definition eines Begriffs angibt). Fußnoten (am Fuße der Seite) sind gegenüber Anmerkungen am Ende des Textes vorzuziehen. Fußnoten (Anmerkungen) werden einzeilig petit (10.) geschrieben, mit 1.5-zeiligem Abstand zwischen den einzelnen Fußnoten (Anmerkungen). Bibliographie Die Bibliographie verzeichnet alle im Text genannten Verweise. Bei Büchern und Editionen: Nachname / Komma / Vorname / ggfs. Herausgeber (ed.) / ggfs. Auflage als Hochzahl / Jahreszahl / Doppelpunkt / Buchtitel kursiv / ggfs. Punkt bzw. Satzzeichen / ggfs. Untertitel / Komma / Ort / Doppelpunkt / Verlagsname: Gaukeley, Gundel 2001: Das kleine Einmaleins der Hexerei. Eine Einführung, Blocksberg: Hexenselbstverlag Duck, Dagobert (ed.) 4 2000: Wie verdiene ich meine erste Phantastillion? Ein Ratgeber, Entenhausen: Disney Bei Aufsätzen in Zeitschriften oder Sammelbänden (dort ggfs. mit Kurzverweis auf einen eigenen Eintrag des Sammelbandes), wird der Titel in Anführungszeichen gesetzt, dann folgen die Angaben mit Seitenzahlen: Gaukeley, Gundel 1999: “ Verbesserte Rezepturen für Bombastik-Buff-Bomben ” , in: Vierteljahresschrift des Hexenverbandes 7.1 - 2 (1999): 27 - 41 Duck, Donald 2000: “ Wie leihe ich mir einen Taler? Praktische Tips für den Alltag ” , in: Duck (ed.) 4 2000: 251 - 265 Duck, Dagobert (ed.) 4 2000: Wie verdiene ich meine erste Phantastillion? Ein Ratgeber, Entenhausen: Disney Gibt es mehrere Autorinnen oder Herausgeber, so werden sie in der Reihenfolge aufgeführt, in der sie auch auf dem Buchrücken oder im Titel des Aufsatzes erscheinen, verbunden durch “ und ” oder “ & ” (bei mehr als drei Namen genügt ein “ et al. ” [für et alii] oder “ u. a. ” nach dem ersten Namen). Dasselbe gilt für mehrere Erscheinungsorte, getrennt durch Schrägstriche (bei mehr als drei Orten genügt ein “ etc. ” ): Hinweise zur Gestaltung von Manuskripten 233 Quack, Primus von & Gustav Gans 2000: Untersuchungen zum Verhältnis von Glück und Wahrscheinlichkeit, Entenhausen/ Quakenbrück: Enten-Verlag Duck, Dorette und Daniel Düsentrieb (eds.) 1999: Ente, Natur und Technik. Philosophische Traktate, Quakenbrück etc.: Ganter Wenn ein Buch innerhalb einer Buchreihe erschienen ist, kann der Reihentitel und die Bandnummer hinzugesetzt werden: Duck, Tick et al. 2001: Ordens- und Abzeichenkunde für Fieselschweiflinge (= Schriftenreihe des Entenhausener Pfadfinderverbandes 13), Quakenbrück etc.: Ganter Duck, Tick u. a. 2001: Ordens- und Abzeichenkunde für Fieselschweiflinge, Quakenbrück usw.: Ganter (= Schriftenreihe des Entenhausener Pfadfinderverbandes 13) Auch sog. ‘ graue ’ Literatur - Dissertationen im Uni- oder Reprodruck ( “ Zürich: Diss. phil. ” ), vervielfältigte Handreichungen ( “ London: Mimeo ” ), Manuskripte ( “ Radevormwald: unveröff. Ms. ” ), Briefe ( “ pers. Mitteilung ” ) etc. - muss nachgewiesen werden. Innerhalb des Literaturverzeichnisses werden die Autor(inn)en in alphabetischer Reihenfolge aufgeführt. Gibt es mehrere Veröffentlichungen derselben Person, so werden sie in chronologischer Reihenfolge aufgelistet (innerhalb eines Jahres mit Zusatz eines kleinen lateinischen Buchstabens zur Jahreszahl - entsprechende Angaben beim Zitieren im Text): Duck, Daisy 2001 a: “ Enten als Vorgesetzte von Erpeln. Einige Beobachtungen aus der Praxis ” , in: Entenhausener Zeitschrift für Psychologie 7.1 (2001): 47 - 67 Duck, Daisy 2001 b: “ Zum Rollenverständnis des modernen Erpels ” , in: Ente und Gesellschaft 19.1 - 2 (2001): 27 - 43 Internetquellen Zitate aus Quellen im Internet müssen stets mit vollständiger URL inklusive Transferprotokoll (http: / / oder ftp: / / etc.) nachgewiesen werden (am besten aus der Adresszeile des Browsers herauszukopieren). Da Angaben im Internet verändert werden können, muß das Datum des Zugriffs in eckigen Klammern hinzugesetzt werden. Handelt es sich um einen innerhalb eines eindeutig betitelten Rahmens (Blogs, Onlinezeitschriften etc.) erschienenen Text, so wird genauso wie bei gedruckten unselbständigen Arbeiten zitiert: Gans, Franz 2000: “ Schon wieder keinen Bock ” , in: Franz Gans ’ Untaten. Blog für Arbeitsscheue, im Internet unter http: / / www.franzgansuntaten.blogspot.com/ archives/ 00/ art07.htm [15.01.2009] Trägt die Website, aus der ein zitierter Text stammt, keinen eindeutigen Titel, so wird der Text ähnlich wie eine selbstständige Arbeit zitiert: Klever, Klaas (o. J.): Wer wir sind und was wir wollen, im Internet unter http: / / www.entenhausenermilliadaersclub.eh/ organisation/ index.htm [15.01.2009] Ist der Verfasser nicht zu identifizieren, so sollte stattdessen die jeweilige Organisation angegeben werden, die für die angegebene Seite verantwortlich zeichnet: Entenhausener Onlineportal (ed.) 1998: Einbruch bei Dagobert Duck. Panzerknacker unter Verdacht, im Internet unter http: / / www.eopnet.eh/ aktuell/ lokales/ 980315/ art21.htm [15.01.2009] 234 Hinweise zur Gestaltung von Manuskripten Instructions to Authors Articles (approx. 10 - 30 pp. à 2 ’ 500 signs [25.000 - 75.000] line spacing 1.5, Times New Roman, 12 pts) must be submitted to the editor both on paper and in electronic form (wordor rtf-file). Figures (graphics, tables, photos) must be attached separately (300 dpi minimum, black and white). The title is followed by name(s) of author(s), affiliation and location. The language of the text, preceded by a short summary (abstract) in English, must be German, English, French, or Spanish. The outline follows the decimal system (1, 2, 2.1, 2.1.1). On a separate sheet, the postal address(es) of the author(s), including e-mail address, and a short bio-bibliographical note (3 - 5 lines) is to be attached. Quotations Quotations are referred to in the text with author (year: page) and indicated by normal quotations marks “…” (author year: page), unless a quotation is more than three lines long, in which case its left margin is - 0.5, in single spacing and petit (11 pts): I am a blind text, born blind. It took some until I realised what it meant to be a blind text. One doesn ’ t make sense; one is taken out of context; one isn ’ t even read most of the times. Am I, therefore, a bad text? I know, I will never have a chance to appear in Nature or Science, not even in Time magazine. Am I, therefore, less important? Okay, I am blind. But I enjoy being a text. Should I have made you read me to the end, I would have managed what most of the ‘ normal ’ texts will never achieve! I am a blind text, born blind … (author year: page). The short bibliographical reference in the text refers to the bibliography at the end. All deletions and additions must be indicated: deletions by three points in square brackets [ … ], additions by initials of the author. If there is a mistake in the original text, it has to be quoted as is, marked by [sic]. Quotations within quotations are indicated by single quotation marks: “… ‘…’ …” . Paraphrases must be indicated as well: (cf. author year: page) or author (year: page). Foreign words (nota bene) or terms (the concept of Aufklärung) are foregrounded by italics, so are lexical items or grammatical forms (the interjection gosh is regarded as outdated); the lexical meaning is given in single quotation marks (Aufklärung means ‘ Enlightenment ’ ); incorrect grammatical forms or sentences are marked by an asterisk (*he go to hell). Footnotes (annotations) Footnotes are indicated by upper case numbers (as argued by Kant. 2 ). Footnotes at the bottom of a page are preferred to annotations at the end of the article. They are written in single spacing, with a 1.5 space between them. Please avoid footnotes for mere bibliographical references. Bibliography The bibliography lists all references quoted or referred to in alphabetical order. They should follow the form in the following examples: Short, Mick 2 1999: Exploring the Language of Poems, Plays and Prose, London: Longman Erling, Elizabeth J. 2002: “‘ I learn English since ten years ’ : The Global English Debate and the German University Classroom ” , in: English Today 18.2 (2002): 9 - 13 Modiano, Marko 1998: “ The Emergence of Mid-Atlantic English in the European Union ” , in: Lindquist et al. (eds.) 1998: 241 - 248 Lindquist, Hans, Steffan Klintborg, Magnus Levin & Maria Estling (eds.) 1998: The Major Varieties of English (= Papers from M AVEN 1997), Vaxjo: Acta Wexionensia No. 1 Weiner, George 2001: “ Uniquely Similar or Similarly Unique? Education and Development of Teachers in Europe ” , Plenary paper given at the annual conference, Standing Committee for the Education and Training of Teachers, GEC Management College, Dunchurch, UK, 5 - 7 October 2001. http: / / www.educ.umu.se/ ~gaby/ SCETT2paper.htm [accessed 15.01.09]. 236 Instructions to Authors Special issue: Achim Eschbach. Reflecting on Signs. Contributions to the History of Semiotics edited by Anna-Viktoria, Nora & Viktoria Eschbach Forewords Anna-Viktoria Eschbach: An infinite chain of signs Ernest W. B. Hess-Lüttich: The prelude. A semiotics journal is born. In memoriam Achim Eschbach Jürgen Trabant: On Achim Eschbach's Habilitation. (Gutachten) Viktoria Eschbach-Szabó: You know my method! Achim Eschbach’s path as an academic Henrik Dindas: Humor in Science: A Tribute to Achim Eschbach and “denkunmögliche Bastarde” Selected Essays of Achim Eschbach Semiotic Notes on the Process of Understanding (1996) Ex Occidente Lux: Continuity (1997) Karl Bühler’s Axiomatics and the Axiom (1984) Money as a sign: Georg Simmel, Kurt Singer, and Karl Bühler (1995) Distortion (1988) Karl Bühlers Concept of the Sign and its Relationship to Wittgenstein’s Late Philosophy (1984) Visual Language. Isotype and the Limits (1996) Charles W. Morris’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) Jan Amos Comenius: Orbis sensualium pictus, or the Infinite Drift (1996) narr.digital