Lambert’s Semiotics: Memory, Cognition, and Communication Ernest W.B. Hess-Lüttich & Gesine Lenore Schiewer 1 Memoria and ratio Memoria: a great subject with a long tradition. For many years it has experienced a boom in a number of disciplines. In the meantime, the flood of relevant literature in history, philosophy, linguistics, semiotics, cognition theory, neurophysiology, computer technology, and media science has become immense. Recently Harald Weinrich has set an impressive counterpoint on the topic: Lethe - Kunst und Kritik des Vergessens (Weinrich 1997). Actually he had also wanted to write a history of memoria and remembrance, as he admitted in a Spiegel interview at the book’s publication (Weinrich 1997a: 194). But it would have became the reconstruction of a decline in which the Enlightment played a major role. It turns around questions formulated in the tradition of ancient rhetoric regarding ars and techné of memoria toward sources and limitations of knowledge and reason. The 18th century brings the decisive change in the debate between memoria and ratio, rhetorical mnemology and cognitive recognition theory. That is the starting point for Weinrich student Regina Freudenfeld (1996), raising the question anew about the status of memory in the German and French Enlightenments before the background of contemporary thought on reason and at the same time with an eye on the roots of contemporary reflections on memory. The outreach study on stations of the struggle between reason and memory leads her to the question of their signs and media. Mnemonic accentuated sign theories were already discussed in the mid-17th century when the logic of Port-Royal emerged. They both understand the sign as a memory image. Because of that, the otherwise hardly noticed sign theory of Johann Heinrich Lambert came into view. It had introduced a term taken over from John Locke, semiotics, into usage in German philosophical terminology (cf. Arndt 1979: 306). Freudenfeld dedicates the closing chapter of her study (1996: 196 -220) to his major philosophical work, edited by Hans Werner Arndt, Neues Organon oder Gedanken über die Erforschung und Bezeichnung des Wahren und dessen Unterscheidung vom Irrthum und Schein (1764). His terminology aims at the sign’s function as an imaginary picture binding mnemonic and cognitive aspects. The sign’s recognition role here is to renew past experience through its materiality which cannot be sensed immediately yet is linked empirically to its memory anchorage. The renewal of terms as images of reason requires a memory connection by means of signs, because “das Zeichen erinnert uns an den Begriff [the sign reminds us of the term].” 1 Thus it is the memory that creates a link between sign and term on one hand and sign and sign on the other through associative linkage which transforms itself into the linearity of speech or sentences. Freudenfeld (1996: 203) tries to grasp this relationship in a modern sense, using Roman Jakobson’s terms similarity and contiguity. It is the “Erinnerungsfunktion K O D I K A S / C O D E Ars Semeiotica Volume 25 (2002) No. 1-2 Gunter Narr Verlag Tübingen Ernest W.B. Hess-Lüttich & Gesine Lenore Schiewer 146 der Zeichen [the memory function of signs]” (Hubig 1979: 337) which brings both into context. For his part Christoph Hubig had reconstituted Lambert’s problem-oriented sign classification with great clarity and hence proved the importance of linearity of speech and writing in time and the hypothetical in language to resolve “Mißhelligkeiten in der Wortverwendung [problems in word usage]” (ibid. 341). With this pragmatic criterion of language usage, Lambert goes beyond the Lockean criteria of experience as well as the Wolffean Verbindungskunst [art of linkage]. According to Lambert, communicative oddities or shortcomings are due to a lack of verbal expressions, thus the limitation of vocabulary versus the unlimited nature of things to be named, but also a lack of signs used as memory images to the extent that their relationship to signals is arbitrary or simply symbolic. This tension between similarity and difference also determines Lambert’s famous definition of signs: Ein Zeichen bedeutet schlechthin die dadurch vorgestellte Sache, so fern es willkürlich ist, das will sagen, so fern es mit der Sache keine solche Aehnlichkeit hat, daß es ein sinnliches Bild derselben wäre. 2 The consequences for the language-theory concept are far-reaching and is surprisingly modern, incidentally also for the modern communications-theory interest in Lambert. If the degree of similarity is low, language becomes purely a matter of memory. 3 If it is high, language becomes the means of gaze or observation, 4 which requires less mnemonic effort. In this way the matters mentioned to be lacking above can be removed by the concept of tropicalizing natural language (cf. Schmitz 1985: 251-253). Gerold Ungeheuer (1979/ 1990) has dealed with this concept in great detail, for example in his article on the principle of the “Hypothetischen in der Sprache [hypothetical in language]” and introduced it as an approach to formulate “Konditionen für die Wahrheit des Satzes wie auch für seine Verständlichkeit” [conditions of both the truth of a sentence and its comprehensibility] (Ungeheuer 1979: 84). His communication-theory interest in Lambert - Freudenfeld introduces him casually (1996: 198) as a Germanist, which he never was - may deserve a somewhat more precise justification in a brief background aside before we turn back to the semiotics of Lambert himself. 2 Interest in Communication Theory Gerold Ungeheuer’s interest in interpersonal understanding has always avoided categorizing within a traditional system of disciplines. Arrangement of his basic theory in established research sectors was always secondary to him: “a pseudo-problem” (Ungeheuer 1972: 168). 5 What mattered to him was a clearly formulated problem definition and observation of basic maxims for scientific work. He knew from training and inclination to link mathematically logical natural science with historical, hermeneutic, and humanities-related thought and to emancipate himself in this way from the traditional battle formations of antagonistic scientific cultures. As a natural scientist he inspected more closely - and the object of his interest was always too complex to permit straightening things out so as to fit into prefabricated categorical boxes of his liking. As a scientist of the humanities he inspected more closely, and what human beings did if they tried to get their ideas across to each other clearly overstepped in his opinion the chiseled borders of an ethical communications postulate of “counterfactual” regularities which some philosophers and sociologists are convinced should arouse interest in Lambert’s Semiotics 147 the careless, constantly changing diversity of de facto understanding - but it did not also lose itself in the unlimited sign world about which some semiologists whisper when they speculate on the intertextually woven traces and textures of understanding. The pseudo-precision of the system and pragmalinguistic reductionism approaches made him as skeptical as the all-too-embracing air of signs which slink away into the night of communications theory in which all semiotic cats turn gray. His interest aimed much more at solving “practical” problems. Communication was to him in a fundamental sense “problematic”. 6 He was interested in how “kommunikative Interaktion als Sozialhandlung spezifischer Struktur aufgebaut [ist] und nach welchen Regularitäten […] sich ihre Verwirklichung in Abhängigkeit von gesellschaftlichen Bedingungen [ändert] [communicative interaction [is] designed as social action on specific structure and according to which regularities […] their realization [changes] depending upon social conditions]”. 7 To more than a few who hoped for a coherently designed communication theory based on to his systematic problem diagrams, the historic and semiotic studies which Ungeheuer dedicated himself to increasingly in his last years appeared to be detours if not wild goose chases. They might have totally misunderstood his way of thinking. 8 Due to his exacting demands for precision, he searched the terrain constantly to ensure knowledge of the best, which though already found previously had been forgotten again, and to remain abreast of the current state of knowledge relevant to solving problems he had formulated. And in view of the rich and solidly-based dish he could serve us, the broth warmed up for us by some of today’s linguists, speech theoreticians, speech philosophers, and communications sociology chefs seems somewhat thin. It is thus only logical that Ungeheuer again and again examined the work of Johann Heinrich Lambert (1728 -1777). The writings of this mathematician, physicist, and philosopher, expressed in crystalized scientific prose, proved a treasure trove for Ungeheuer. Lambert had not only founded photometry, expanded trigonometry, proved the irrationality of pi, and formulated laws to calculate planetary movements. He had also extended Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s approaches to language philosophy and proposed his epistemological approach on an explicitly semiotic basis. Ungeheuer could create from this, certainly, as we believe, out of his interest in history of science but even more out of fascination with communications theory. In the centre of this interest stood the repeated lectures of the two most important philosophical works of Lambert: a Neues Organon der Gedanken über die Erforschung und Bezeichung des Wahren und dessen Unterscheidung vom Irrthum und Schein (Leipzig 1764) and the Anlage zur Architectonic oder Theorie des Ersten und des Einfachen in der philosophischen und mathematischen Erkenntnis (Riga 1771). The following accounts are aimed at reconstructing Lambert’s semiotic position. In doing so, we will at the same time take a closer look paricularly at those aspects which motivated Ungeheuer in his intensive discussion with this author: the communicative aspect of speech, advanced by Lambert alone in his era 9 ; the deficiency of natural speech as a medium and vehicle of scientific cognition; the position of language theory related to the acting subject; language as one among many sign systems of varying structure, effectiveness, and modality; the cognitive foundations of the formation of scientific concepts . The well-known turn of phrase from §109 of Leibniz’s Unvorgreiflichen Gedanken, betreffend die Ausübung und Verbesserung der teutschen Sprache has become an axiom: “Doch der Gebrauch ist der Meister”. It stands for Lambert’s (and Ungeheuer’s) skepticism towards the possibility of a completely rule-governed language; for his (their) interest in Ernest W.B. Hess-Lüttich & Gesine Lenore Schiewer 148 language as a system of functional signs used by fallible individuals as a means of fallible understanding. This also implies a profound skepticism about (today’s) theoretical consensus positions of communication theory, because problems of communicative agreement, the state of two subjects “being one” through understanding, lies justified in their medium and semiotic mode in which at the same time (in ways to be specified) the source of de facto “Wortstreite [verbal battle]” becomes inherent; these are only to be decided by explaining complex communication in “einfachen Begriffen [simple terms]” which for their part are beyond dispute as gained from common opinion and shared knowledge. The terminological hierarchy developed in the “Theorie der Wortstreite [theory of verbal battle]”, and the skeptical considerations critical to speech and to the possibility of communication linked to it, verify for Ungeheuer the fundamental importance of Lambert’s interest in the practical use of signs in processes of verbal communication. 10 3 Lambert’s Semiotik 3.1 Outlining the Problem In the Vorrede [preface] to his Neues Organon (1764) Johann Heinrich Lambert formulated the principle orientation of his interest in terms of sign theory: In the case of semiotics, it concerns studying the influence of language and signs in general in recognizing truth, which according to his outlook is “einförmig und unveränderlich [uniform and unchangeable]”, and it is natural for the human being to look for it. 11 Thus it is presumed by Lambert that human understanding and cognitive activity per se depends on use of signs, especially of words and hence of natural language. 12 Beside careful examination of the possibly negative effects which signs could exert on cognition, Lambert also considers it necessary to reflect on the possibilities of how sign systems should be designed so that they are not only appropriate for scientific cognition but even advance it. The second task of Lambert’s semiotics consists herein. The third book of Neues Organon is dedicated to the science of semiotics, the necessity of which becomes apparent to Lambert based on an analysis of possible sources of human cognitive errors. 13 The complete title already includes a definition: Semiotik oder Lehre von der Bezeichnung der Gedanken und Dinge. Here Lambert concentrates essentially, in accord with the Vorrede [preface], on the study of natural language regarding those aspects considered relevant in recognizing truth. The general sign-theory principles on which the study is based, which can serve as a standard in the following examination, are particularly dicussed in detail in the first chapter or “Hauptstück”. Lambert justifies his concentration on the sign system of natural language in the Vorrede with references to assuming the necessity of language for thinking, its complexity, and with the arguments that natural language also occurs with all other types of signs and that they always remain “das allgemeine Magazin unserer ganzen Erkenntniß [the general storehouse of our total cognition]” which obviously includes “wahres, irriges und scheinbares ohne Unterschied [truth, error, and counterfeits without distinction]”. 14 This accent on human language in the Semiotik refers to a certain prioritizing of natural language in comparison to other signs which despite the immediately relevant reference to their complexity requires an explanation if one wants to get across the fact that Lambert regards language as by no way the best possible sign system concerning the requirements of Lambert’s Semiotics 149 scientific cognition. A position critical of language is already to be gathered from the formulation cited that one meets truth as well as error in languages, since precisely the possibility of recognizing truth is what matters to Lambert. Actually Lambert represents a clearly anomalistic viewpoint 15 - and, even considering the idea of the “great scholars” 16 of creating an artificial standard based on simple and completely regular language, he expresses the deepest pessimism with the reasoning that inevitably “der Gebrauch zu reden [usage in speech]” must lead to irregularities in a language system. 17 Yet this skeptical assessment of the possibility of a “Lehre einer allgemeinen Sprache [notion of a general language]” 18 surprises one all the more, since Lambert can be classified as the last important representative of the idea of a mathesis universalis 19 in the tradition of Leibniz, who for his part had pursued the idea of an ars characteristica all his life. Finally Lambert establishes that natural language formulated by him on a sign-theory basis in the Semiotik also suffices only under specific conditions, as is presented in detail in the 3rd volume of Neues Organon. This basis means that signs only meet scientific standards if they can operate within the theory of signs instead of the theory of objects 20 , i.e., that such signs should enable attaining a reliably correct gain in recognition due to sign operations alone, without resorting to the (natural) object affected. Just as for Leibniz in this context, the model for Lambert is obviously mathematics. 21 The exposed treatment of natural language in the Semiotik is therefore only completely clear if the arguments offered - that they occur in all other types of signs and that they are the general storehouse of all cognition - can be explicitly stated. With this aim in mind, Lambert’s observations in the first two books of Neues Organon must be consulted, since here, in discussion of possible usages other types of signs, the limitations of (artificial) sign systems are illustrated. 22 3.2 Foundations of cognitive theory: Lambert’s “mathesis universalis” The first book is Lambert’s logic: Dianoiologie. While this is dedicated mostly to the laws or the form of thought, his Alethiologie oder Lehre von der Wahrheit places “die Wahrheit selbst [truth itself]” 23 in the centre with the study of “Materie [matter]” or “Stoff [material]”, i.e., the objects of thought, because: Die Bedingungen, welche die Theorie der Form voraussetzt, müssen folglich einmal categorisch werden, das will sagen: Man muß sich versichern, daß das, wobey man anfängt, wahr sey, damit die Wege, die uns sonst auch von Irrthum zu Irrthum führen können, wie dieses bei der Deductione ad absurdum geschieht, (Dianoiol. §. 348 -371.) uns von Wahrheit zu Wahrheit führen. 24 Lambert’s entire cognitive theory draft lays its foundation on a terminology theory based on attribute logic. 25 This underpins the draft of his mathesis universalis. Its starting point is thus the principle of empirical dependence upon human understanding and cognitive activity which Lambert subscribes to; in this regard Lambert explicitly ties on to the empiricistsensualist tradition of John Locke. 26 Sensual impressions are considered as a prerequisite for creation - from both a phylogenetic and ontogenetic perspective - of first terms of understanding which result due to use of mostly verbal signs. Immediate sensations of the so-called “gemeinen Erfahrung [common experience]”, i.e., everyday perceptions, thus lead to what Lambert categorizes as “Erfahrungsbegriffe [empirical terms]”. 27 Ernest W.B. Hess-Lüttich & Gesine Lenore Schiewer 150 Owing to their ability to be experienced, their potential as such stands beyond doubt for Lambert. Yet they are “individual, sowohl in Absicht auf die Sache, die wir empfinden, als in Absicht auf das Bewußtseyn jeder einzelnen Eindrücke, die die Sache in den Sinnen macht [individual, both in regard to the object perceived and to the conscience of each and every impression which the object evokes in the senses].” 28 Therefore, they are not scientific. Yet, based on common discovery, following Lambert’s logic, general and abstract terms can be created, since comparison of several sensations with one another leads to classifying things for which perception triggers sensations to types and species. 29 However, the terms acquired in this manner - and especially in case of abstract terms - remain indefinite regarding the scope of their attributes. For Lambert this means that the attributes of the terms in question and their linkage cannot be called clear-cut, which again leaves their scientific standards unfulfilled. 30 By contrast the class of so-called “Lehrbegriffe [theoretical terms]” favour the possibility that the composition of attributes constituting these complex terms could be proved without resort to experience. Theoretical terms are therefore regarded by Lambert as a priori terms, and they meet scientific demands as a result. Yet to the extent that they are not completely removed from experience, as “Lehrbegriffe und Erfahrungsbegriffe in einander verwandelt werden können, wenn man nämlich zu den letzten den Beweis findet, erstere aber durch die Erfahrung gleichsam auf die Probe setzt [theoretical terms and empirical terms can be transformed into one another, if one finds the proof for the latter, but examines the former by experience and experiment].” 31 Owing to a study of the attributes constituting it and its combinability, the specific empirical term can therefore receive the status of a general theoretical term; for its part, this must prove itself in a test of its agreement with experience. The principally complex theoretical terms and potentially complex empirical terms are finally placed by Lambert opposite the “Grundbegriffe [basic terms]” or “einfache Begriffe [simple terms]” which can be gained by analysis of the constituents of complex terms. They should embrace one attribute precisely and therefore be free of contradictions. Their potential results inevitably in this manner. However, this in no way involves purely theoretically based analytical components of complex terms. Rather it also lays its foundation upon a base sensation or image characterized as “durchaus einförmig [thoroughly uniform]”, even if Lambert did not determine if, for instance, the terms of colours and tones quoted as fitting examples by Locke, 32 were simple. The fundamental difference between so-called “einfachen oder für sich denkbaren Begriffen [simple or terms conceivable per se]” and “zusammengesetzten Begriffen [compound terms]” is central for the Alethiologie in which the essential features of Lambert’s mathesis universalis are drafted. 33 The goal of the study of “einfachen oder für sich denkbaren Begriffen [simple or terms conceivable per se]” is to be clarified according to this draft: […] woher wir die erste Grundlage zu unsern Begriffen haben, und wiefern etwas einfaches darinn ist, welches sich sodann als a priori ansehen lasse. Dieses macht, daß wir bey den schlechthin klaren Begriffen, die wir durch unmittelbare Empfindungen erlangen, stehen bleiben, und sie theils durch ihre Namen, theils durch ihre nächsten Verhältnisse und verwandte Begriffe suchen, kenntlich und im folgenden brauchbar zu machen. Denn da unsre Begriffe oder wenigstens das Bewußtsein derselben, durch Empfindungen veranlaßt werden, so müssen wir, wenn wir unsre Erkenntniß wissenschaftlich machen wollen, anfangs immer wenigstens so weit a posteriori gehen, bis wir die Begriffe ausgelesen haben, die einfach sind, und die sich folglich, nachdem wir sie einmal haben, sodann als für sich subsistirend ansehen lassen (Dianoiologie §. 656.) Hiezu aber sind unstreitig die Begriffe, so uns die unmittelbare Empfindung giebt, die dienlichsten, weil wir sie am wenigsten weit herzuholen haben. 34 Lambert’s Semiotics 151 Following Lambert’s line of thought, scientific discoveries are characterized by being a priori in the sense that they can be drawn systematically from simple terms. Accessible knowledge content is designated in this way as a priori: […] da sich die Möglichkeit eines Grundbegriffes zugleich mit der Vorstellung aufdringt, (§. 654.) so wird er von der Erfahrung dadurch ganz unabhängig, so, daß, wenn wir ihn auch schon der Erfahrung zu danken haben, diese uns gleichsam nur den Anlaß zu dem Bewußseyn desselben giebt. Sind wir uns aber einmal desselben bewußt, so haben wir nicht nöthig, den Grund seiner Möglichkeit von der Erfahrung herzuholen, weil die Möglichkeit mit der bloßen Vorstellung schon da ist. Demnach wird sie von der Erfahrung unabhängig. Und dieses ist ein Requisitum der Erkenntniß a priori im strengsten Verstande (§. 639.) 35 However, it does not suffice “einfache Begriffe ausgelesen zu haben, sondern wir müssen auch sehen, woher wir in Ansehung ihrer Zusammensetzung allgemeine Möglichkeiten (Dianoiol. §. 692. seqq.) aufbringen können [to have picked simple terms; we must also see from whence we can introduce general possibilities by looking at their composition (Dianoiol. §. 692. seqq.)].” 36 Since simple terms allow rules and modifications as well as show relationships among each other which can be found by comparing terms, these terms lead further to bases and postulates which point out the potential of the compositions. 37 According to Lambert, the importance of the bases and postulates arises from the fact that such simple terms, which exclude each other, cannot be composed in too complex a manner: they determine “die Möglichkeit der Zusammensetzung der Begriffe a priori, allgemein und genau [the potential for composing terms a priori, general and precise]”. 38 The concept of his mathesis universalis is therefore determined in the following way: Da die einfachen Begriffe die erste Grundlage unserer Erkenntniß sind, und bey den zusammen gesetzten Begriffen, so fern wir sie uns sollen vorstellen können (§. 9.), sich alles in solche auflösen läßt; so machen diese einfachen Begriffe einzeln und unter einander combinirt, zusammen genommen ein System aus, welches nothwendig jede ersten Gründe unserer Erkenntniß enthält. Von diesem Systeme läßt sich eine wissenschaftliche Erkenntniß gedenken (§. 71.), und die Sprache beut uns dem buchstäblichen Verstande nach die Wörter Grundlehre, Grundwissenschaft, Architectonic, Urlehre &c. als Namen dazu an. 39 3.3 Natural versus artificial sign systems Yet all these operations would now be independendent of usage signs only “wenn der menschliche Verstand seine Erkenntniß nicht an Wörter und Zeichen binden müßte [if human understanding did not have to bind its discovery to words and signs].” 40 But since this is a given, according to his view, Lambert undertakes in the Alethiologie a differentiated evaluation of the meaning relationships between various types of terms and the words signifying them. In the case of simple terms the “gemeine Bedeutung der gebrauchten Wörter [common meaning of the words used]” 41 , i.e., their primary use in everyday language, is considered as sufficiently exact, even for scientific purposes. Lambert emphasizes that those words which are used for simple terms indicate by comparison the greatest clarity and the least change in meaning. Therefore, a definition of such words would lead to “einen logischen Zirkel [a logical circle]” 42 , because it would have to fall back on such words which are for their part notably less definite in their meaning and changable to a higher degree, so that such a procedure would be completely impractical. Ernest W.B. Hess-Lüttich & Gesine Lenore Schiewer 152 Since on the other hand such complex terms which do not recur to an object given as an entity, a number of varying compounds are possible where more or less characteristics are combined; they are, in other words, “gleichsam willkührliche Einheiten [arbitrary units]” 43 , which make a definition necessary. 44 It turns in this way: […] daß die Wörter, wodurch man solche zusammengesetzte Verhältnißbegriffe ausdrückt, von sehr veränderlicher Bedeutung sind, und theils vieldeutig werden, theils auch mit der Zeit ihre Bedeutung ganz ändern, und zu Wortstreitigkeiten häufigen Anlaß geben. 45 Lambert explains this with a hint that a language could not provide a sufficient number of words to cover the total potential of combinations of characteristics with one expression. For this reason ambiguities must arise so that meanings of such words are not clearly determinable, since otherwise no more terms could be indicated than words are available for them. 46 The central importance of combined terms for scientific discovery - in that the combined terms concern abstract or generic terms - on one hand and the inevitability of sign use on the other induce Lambert into a further discussion of the designation problem. Lambert assumes that there should be “figürliche Vorstellungen von Begriffen […], die ganz abstract sind [figurative images of terms which are totally abstract].” 47 Such a “figurative” means of representation accords with Lambert’s ideal scientific sign system, since here an iconic relationship based on similarity is available between the corresponding object, its terms, and the sign. 48 Lambert introduces various examples of such representational options such as the genealogical family tree 49 , tables 50 , as well as use of “precise metaphors” 51 which can illustrate an abstract term as a specific expression in a metaphorical sense. He also develops his own figurative diagrams to illustrate simple sentences 52 , referring to this kind of representation as translations, since it concerns the “Verwechslung gleichgültiger Redensarten, nämlich der figürlichen und solcher, die nicht figürlich sind. […] weil die figürlichen Redensarten als eine besondere und zur Zeichnung dienende Sprache angesehen werden können [confusion of two equally valid ways of signifying, i.e., the figurative and the non-figurative, because the figurative way of speaking can be seen as a special language signifying by similarity between sign and its object].” 53 Therefore, the basic principle of all these forms of representation is the principle of “doppelte Übersetzung [dual translation]”, which Lambert stresses explicitly: Die Data sind eine Frage über ein vorgegebenes Object, und zwar mit eigenen Wörtern ausgedrückt. Das Quaesitum ist, eben diese Frage mit logischen Wörtern oder durch logische Begriffe dergestalt vorzustellen, dass man vermittelst derselben die Methode zur Auflösung der Frage finden, und folglich dieselbe wirklich auflösen könne. 54 These comments now clarify the argument introduced by Lambert in the Vorrede that language occurs in all other types of signs: It remains the basis of sign usage also in the scientific context in which “figürliche Darstellungen [figurative depictions]” assist the task of problem solving. This does not yet explain, however, why natural language cannot be dispensed with completely here. In the discussion on the line diagram introduced by him Lambert already offers the decisive assumption which must be considered a condition of a consistent use of iconic means of representation: Man sieht aus allem diesem, daß die hier angegebene Zeichnungsart eben so weit geht, als unser Erkenntniß bestimmt ist, und uns überdies noch augenscheinlich zeigt, wie und wo sie anfängt unbestimmt zu werden, und wo wir die fernere Bestimmung aus der Natur der Sache selbst noch Lambert’s Semiotics 153 erst herleiten müssen. Ferner sehen wir gleichfalls daraus, daß, wenn man diese Bestimmungen vollständig machen könnte, unsere Erkenntniß figürlich und in eine Art von Geometrie und Rechenkunst verwandelt werden könnte. 55 Here Lambert immediately relates to Leibniz’ outline of an ars characteristica and an ars combinatoria. Yet he shifts the problem of their introduction from the difficulty of discovering such signs, which are, in an ideal manner, characteristic, to the level of the “matter” of recognition. 56 It has already been pointed out that realization of Lambert’s a priori ideal of science depends on whether complex terms can successfully be broken down to basic terms in a way […] daß unsre wissenschaftliche Erkenntniß ganz und im strengsten Verstande (§. 639.) a priori seyn würde, wenn wir die Grundbegriffe sämmtlich kenneten und mit Worten ausgedrückt hätten, und die erste Grundlage zu der Möglichkeit ihrer Zusammensetzung wüßten. 57 To the extent that basic terms and their combinability among each other in a science are completely known, it is possible to form complex terms a priori with which the scientific nature would be guaranteed in all respects. Then according to Lambert, the corresponding words to designate basic terms could be considered as pure “Benennungen [designations]” which only serve to distinguish between basic terms. It is only to be presumed that “jeder von allen Menschen mit einerley Namen benennt (werde) [each is named in the same way by each human being]”, as Lambert later specifies. 58 This allows to combine “anschauende Erkenntniß mit der figürlichen [cognitive gaze or visual recognition with the figurative]”: 59 Denn wäre dieses, so wären wir auch nicht mehr so an die Wörter gebunden, und könnten, wie in der Algeber, statt derselben, wissenschaftliche Zeichen annehmen, und die ganze Erkenntniß auf eine demonstrative Art figürlich machen (§. 114.173.). 60 Thus, according to Lambert, this desirable goal has only been attained in a few mathematical and natural science disciplines such as algebra, geometry, and phoronomics, which are largely independent of natural languages. But here the simple terms are conditioned by correspondingly simple subjects which considerably simplifies discovering them. 61 However, in most sciences simple terms are in no way fully known and determined in a clear manner, 62 so that the “material” basis of scientific recognition cannot be called secured. Yet this would be the unconditional assumption to attain scientific recognition by means of pure sign operations. For this reason - and it must follow from the last citation noted - it is impossible to do without natural languages and to replace them with scientific signs, even though in regard to scientific requirements, as Lambert is totally aware, this fact has to be considered a problem. This now clarifies the formulation that language is the general storehouse of all knowledge: besides the “gemeinen Erkenntnis [common knowledge]” it must also include the scientific. Moreover, the cited Lambert comment - that it includes “wahres, irriges und scheinbares ohne Unterschied [truth, error, and counterfeit without distinction]” - also refers to detailed examination in the “Semiotik des Metaphysischen, des Charakteristischen, des Willkürlichen [semiotics of the metaphysical, the characteristic, and the arbitrary]” in language which requires that, on one hand, it displays aspects which can be described as figurative and therefore suffices to meet scientific demands and, on the other, can be designed with purely arbitrary structures. Ernest W.B. Hess-Lüttich & Gesine Lenore Schiewer 154 4 Ungeheuer’s reading of Lambert For Ungeheuer, Lambert stands in the tradition of language scepticism. 63 Ungeheuer (1990 a, 101) cites programmatically from the Vorrede the basic issue of the Semiotik (the title may be traced to Locke’s “Essay concerning Human Understanding”): “ob die Sprache, in die [der menschliche Verstand] die Wahrheit einkleidet, durch Mißverstand, Unbestimmtheit und Vieldeutigkeit sie unkenntlicher und zweifelhafter mache, oder andere Hindernisse in den Weg lege? ” - and he agrees with Lambert’s answer, the insight into the crucial fallibility of natural language. Lambert’s solution to the problem, in short, is the mathesis universalis; his demand “die Theorie der Sache auf die Theorie der Zeichen [zu] reduciren” 64 serves the goal of making language (as an everyday means of understanding) suitable for its scientific usage. What interested him was “was in den Sprachen willkührliches, natürliches, nothwendiges und zum theil auch wissenschaftliches vorkömmt, und wie sich das metaphysische in den Sprachen von dem characteristischen und bloß grammatischen unterscheide”. 65 The programme of the Lambertian sign theory is thus formulated, but nowhere is it systematically worked out. Its reconstruction remains on the agenda despite the elements dutifully collected by Ungeheuer. Lambert has his eye on “Gebrauch der Sprache [language use]”, thus the “kommunikative Praxis [communicative practice]” and “die Verständnisschwierigkeiten bei der Mitteilung von Wissen [the difficulties of understanding in relaying knowledge]”. 66 Due to the terms’ and meanings’ dependency on individual experiences of subjects communicating, the “Wortstreite [battle of words]” ensues. We set up hypotheses about what the other person meant to say to the extent that s/ he is not immediately clear or understandable, due to the “figurative”, i.e., indisputable and mutually verifiable similarity to related signs pointing to the significatum. Thus understanding is always approximate, due to the given share of natural language’s “arbitrary” structural traits and the hypothetic character resulting from them. At the same time the hypotheses go “immer über die Bedeutungssetzungen des jeweiligen Kommunikationspartners. Dieses Einbeziehen der anderen am Kommunikationsakt beteiligten Personen macht ein wesentliches Stück in der Bestimmung des Begriffs aus.” 67 The insight into this basic dialogue structure of communication and semiosis must still be defended today against the often one-sided speaker-oriented mainstream concept of language and communication theory approaches. 68 According to the “maxims of hermeneutic plausibility” - the formulation of which anticipates something from communications and sign theory, what in modern discourse research comes up again in concepts such as the triadic structure of mutual idealizations (Alfred Schütz: triadische Unterstellungsstruktur) or the essential vagueness condition of everyday communication practice (Harold Garfinkel: essentielle Vagheitsbedingung) - understanding works despite its mainly hypothetical character within an everyday practice and (automated) routine without complication, at least up to the point “als bis der eine von den Unterredenden anfängt, zu vermuthen, es müsse Mißverstand in den Worten und Ausdrücken versteckt liegen, vor dessen Aufklärung man nicht sehen könne, ob man in der That nicht einerley Meynung sey.” 69 These points relevant for formulating the metacommunicative problem (or, with Fritz Schütze, for the “symbolic reinterpretion” in case of metaphoric speech, corresponding to Lambert’s second class of words) are by no means distributed arbitrarily in the flood of words (in the communication process), but semiotically motivated. Ungeheuer reconstructed the reasons and foundations in view of the sign term’s composition, using the example of the “semantischen Tektonik des Wortschatzes [semantic tectonic of lexicon]” as a universal Lambert’s Semiotics 155 principle. 70 By using his trichotomic lexical classification on the “Theorie der Wortstreite [theory of word battling]”, Lambert (Sem. §§ 336ff., 204ff.) deduces the presumption that problems of communicative agreement depend on semiotic modality of the significandum, i.e., are to be described on the axis between iconicity and symbolicism: where word, term, and object are closely linked, the probability of conflict is low. This is because agreement can be reached more easily at the impression level over meaning of similarities in the “physical world” than over metaphorical usage routines from signs drawn on “tertii comparationis” (instead of literal meaning) or even over signs of the “intellectual world” needing definition which affects the choice and will (Kur, Willkür) and agreement (convention) and always represent a “source of prejudices” “die von der Auferziehung und Umständen jeder einzelner Menschen herrühren, und die sodann in ganze philosophische Systeme einen augenscheinlichen Einfluß haben.” 71 Accordingly the probability of word battles rises at the transition from first to second to third word class - and actually an increase in frequency of word battles can be observed empirically in this direction. 72 On the contrary, the criteria to determine lexicosemantic classes - that is, indexicality (Ostension), similarity (physical world/ intellectual world), definition (nominalism) - can serve as procedures for discovery or perhaps even settlement of communication conflicts. 73 Nevertheless they are unavoidable because they are rooted in all individual conditions of human experience and recognition. Ungeheuer cites this at a highlighted point (the end of his essay): 74 “Erfahrungen […] machen wir entweder selbst, oder wir haben sie von andern. Erstere sind eigen, letztere fremd. Zwischen beyden Arten findet sich ein vielfacher Unterschied, […]. Einmal sind fremde Erfahrungen in Absicht auf uns allzeit hypothetisch, […].” (§ 560 Dianoiologie). “Die eigentliche Klarheit ist individual, und demnach ist unsere ganze allgemeine Erkenntnis schlechthin symbolisch, ungeachtet die klaren Vorstellungen, und besonders die einfachen Begriffe die Grundlage dazu sind.” (§ 9, Architectonic) “Hier liegt”, Ungeheuer adds (ibid.) “das grundsätzliche Problem, das Lambert beschäftigt hat, und hier liegt es für uns heute noch.” Anmerkungen 1 Johann Heinrich Lambert 1764: Neues Organon oder Gedanken über die Erforschung und Bezeichnung des Wahren und dessen Unterscheidung vom Irrthum und Schein, 2 vols., Leipzig (reprographic later edition of vol. 1 = Writings I, 1965; reprographic later edition of vol. 2 = Writings II, 1965), vol. 2, Semiotik, § 8, 9. Cited in the following by detailing the respective book of the Neues Organon, i.e., Dianoiologie and Alethiologie (vol. 1) as well as Semiotik and Phänomenologie (vol. 2). 2 Semiotik, § 61, 39. 3 Semiotik, § 110. 66. 4 Semiotik, § 58, 36f. 5 See Ungeheuer 1972: 168; for the following see the introduction of H.W. Schmitz (Schmitz 1990) to the edition of Ungeheuer’s writings (Ungeheuer 1990). 6 For the term “problematic communication” (with special consideration of literary communication) see Hess- Lüttich 1984, especially the introduction, but also Hess-Lüttich 1981, particularly Chapter 2.4. 7 Ungeheuer 1987: 85; see Schmitz 1990: 12. 8 However, for a reasonable classification of the historic-semiotic studies in Ungeheuer’s complete works, see Schmitz 1990. 9 See Schmitz 1990: 20. 10 See Ungeheuer 1990a: 117. Ernest W.B. Hess-Lüttich & Gesine Lenore Schiewer 156 11 Neues Organon, preface, 1f. (unpaginated). 12 See the justification of this assumption and the special emphasis on language’s importance for human cognition in the first major piece, §§ 6ff, 8ff. of the Semiotik. The communication function of natural language and other signs are mentioned by Lambert only marginally. See Semiotik, § 13, 11. 13 See the corresponding questions and discussion on them in: Neues Organon, preface, 3ff. (unpaginated). 14 See Neues Organon, preface, 11 (unpaginated). 15 This has been stressed by Ungeheuer in his study on Lambert’s importance for Klopstock’s Gelehrtenrepublik as one of Lambert’s and Klopstock’s shared viewpoints. See Ungeheuer 1990 b [Lambert in Klopstock’s Gelehrtenrepublik], in: Ungeheuer 1990: 144f. 16 See Semiotik, § 2, 6. 17 See Semiotik, §§ 1f., 5f. Ungeheuer has meticulously reviewed Lambert’s central formulation of verbal usage in this context as the “tyranny” of language in studying the originality of Klopstock’s Gelehrtenrepublik. See Ungeheuer 1990 b: 152-160. 18 Semiotik, § 70, 44. 19 See Hans Werner Arndt’s introduction to the first volume of the Philosophischen Schriften Lamberts, X, edited by him. 20 See Semiotik, §§ 23f., 16. 21 See Semiotik, §§ 35ff., 23f. 22 Gerold Ungeheuer has indicated that Lambert’s observations on sign theory are not limited to the Semiotik but are spread over the entire work. See Ungeheuer 1990 c [Lamberts semantische Tektonik des Wortschatzes als universales Prinzip], 171. Yet this is not to be explained only by the quite apt comment that development of Lambert’s thoughts “jump rather from chapter to chapter, meditating in spiral fashion” in a continually progressive course but instead also has a systematic background which emerges from the comments above: Lambert’s sign theory is conducted from interest in cognitive theory and thus flows into his observations on logic and truth theory at the corresponding point. The thought process in the Semiotik can no more be replaced by Lambert’s sensualist-empiricist basic assumptions than through rationalism, as is shown particularly in the word classification of the Semiotik’s ninth major piece, which is based on the principle of comparability between the “corporal world” and the “intellectual world”. Gerold Ungeheuer has also dedicated special attention in various essays to this aspect of Lambert’s Semiotik. 23 Alethiologie, § 1, 453. 24 Alethiologie, § 1, 454. 25 See the entire vol. 1, major piece, of the Dianoiologie. 26 See the corresponding Lambert references in the preface to the Neuen Organon, 5 - 8 (unpaginated). 27 Dianoiologie, § 646, 416f. 28 Dianoiologie, § 647, 417. 29 See Dianoiologie, § 647, 417f. 30 See Dianoiologie, § 9, 7. 31 Dianoiologie, § 652, 420. 32 See Locke, John 4 1981: Versuch über den menschlichen Verstand, vol. I, Meiner, Hamburg, 130. 33 See especially the first and third major pieces of the Alethiologie. 34 Alethiologie, § 21, 466. 35 Dianoiologie, § 656, 421f. For Lambert’s concept of a priori see the 1980 published work of Gereon Wolters, Basis und Deduktion, and Gesine L. Schiewer’s (1996) investigation into the reception of this concept by Herder. 36 Alethiologie, § 29, 472. 37 See Alethiologie, § 124, 519. 38 Architectonic, vol. 1, § 20, 16. 39 Architectonic, vol. 1, § 74, 57. 40 Neues Organon, preface, 4 (unpaginated). 41 Alethiologie, § 119, 516. 42 Alethiologie, § 121, 517. 43 Alethiologie, § 142, 526. 44 See Alethiologie, § 144, 528. 45 Alethiologie, § 137, 524. Lambert’s Semiotics 157 46 See particularly Alethiologie, § 156, 536, and Dianoiologie, § 103, 64, and the annotated comments with examples in the Alethiologie, §§ 149 -158, 530 -537. 47 Dianoiologie, § 114, 73. 48 See the examination of Lambert’s concept of sign by Ungeheuer (1990 a) in his study Über das ‘Hypothetische in der Sprache’ bei Lambert 1979, in: Ungeheuer 1990: 105. 49 See Dianoiologie, § 113, 72f. 50 See Dianoiologie, § 114, 73. 51 See Dianoiologie, § 113, 72f. as well as Schiewer 1996: 104 -113. 52 See Dianoiologie, §§ 173 -194, 109 -120. See also Ungeheuer 1990f. [Der Tanzmeister bei den Philosophen], in: Ungeheuer 1990: 244 -280, especially 267f. 53 Dianoiologie, § 232, 141f. 54 Dianoiologie, § 446, 288f. It should be recalled that in the 18th century one worked with traditional logic and that it was only in the 19th century that formal logic was introduced. 55 Dianoiologie, § 194, 119. 56 Leibniz actually limited the usefulness of his approach explicitly to the form level first of all, since he had to operate for the time being with only characteristic signs: “Ich machte nämlich die Fiktion, jene so wunderbaren charakteristischen Zahlen seien schon gegeben, und man habe an ihnen irgend eine allgemeine Eigenschaft beobachtet. Dann nehme ich einstweilen Zahlen an, die irgendwie mit dieser Eigentümlichkeit übereinkommen und kann nun mit ihrer Hülfe sogleich mit erstaunlicher Leichtigkeit alle Regeln der Logik zahlenmäßig beweisen und zugleich ein Kriterium dafür angeben, ob eine gegebene Argumentation der Form nach schlüssig ist. Ob aber ein Beweis der Materie nach zutreffend und schlüssig ist, das wird sich erst dann ohne Mühe und ohne die Gefahr eines Irrtums beurteilen lassen, wenn wir im Besitze der wahren charakteristischen Zahlen der Dinge selbst sein werden.” Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 3 1966: Zur allgemeinen Charakteristik, in: Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm : Hauptschriften zur Grundlegung der Philosophie, translated by A. Buchenau, edited and with introduction and commentary by Ernst Cassirer, vol. I, Meiner, Hamburg, 3 1966, 37f. 57 Dianoiologie, § 656, 421. 58 Dianoiologie, § 686, 438. 59 Dianoiologie, § 656, 422. 60 Dianoiologie, § 700, 450. 61 See Dianoiologie, § 686, 438. 62 See Dianoiologie, § 696, 445. Lambert points out further here that the second condition of a priori perception is not fulfilled either, since signification by words within a language community is by no means homogeneous. 63 For the tradition of language philosophy of scepticism, see Taylor 1992; for a critical discussion, see Hess- Lüttich & Lüscher 1993. 64 Semiotik, §§ 23, 24; see Ungeheuer 1990 a: 101 and 121, footnote 14. 65 Neues Organon, preface, 9 (unpaginated); see Ungeheuer 1990 a: 104. 66 See Ungeheuer 1990 a: 108. 67 See Ungeheuer 1990 a: 119. 68 For the theoretical basis of analyzing dialogue, see the habilitation thesis on the Grundlagen der Dialoglinguistik (Hess-Lüttich 1981) which was stimulated by Ungeheuer (supervised by Helmut Richter et al.). 69 Semiotik, § 334, 203; see Ungeheuer 1990 a: 115. 70 Ungeheuer 1990 c (Tektonik des Wortschatzes): 168 -179. 71 Semiotik, § 374, 211; see Ungeheuer 1990 a: 117. 72 Ungeheuer 1990 c (Tektonik des Wortschatzes): 177. 73 Ungeheuer 1990 c (Tektonik des Wortschatzes): 176. 74 Ungeheuer 1990 c (Tektronik des Wortschatzes): 178. 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