K O D I K A S / C O D E Volume 41 (2018) · No. 3 - 4 Gunter Narr Verlag Tübingen Peirce ’ s Semeiotic and its Relevance for a Science of Culture Elize Bisanz (Lubbock, Texas) Abstract: Charles S. Peirce, devoted many of his writings to the foundation of science, which would embrace the study of relations found in natural and human interaction; by doing so he bridged the gap between natural sciences and humanities. A strong example of this approach is found in his manuscript titled On the Logic of Drawing History from Ancient Documents, especially from Testimonies, in which Peirce establishes his method for scientific study in humanities, understood as an objective and testable method of knowledge acquisition. - The following study investigates the links, agents, and routes of how the quintessence of Peirce ’ s “ objective method, ” elaborated in the manuscript, was migrated to Europe and stimulated a fertile environment for a paradigm shift within humanities which led to a modern Science of Culture. Keywords: Semeiotic, Kulturwissenschaft, Science of Culture, Charles Peirce, Pragmaticism. 1 Theories of Signs and the Science of Culture, a Prolog Culture is the breeding sphere of creative forces, a living body of human activity, and, as such, attains its form through evolution. Within the cultural universe individuals articulate and implement their ideas in signs, systems, and structures; societies organize and thrive through developing communities with the help of sign and communication structures, cultures persist by storing and transferring their experiences and memories through forms such as rites, history, symbolic systems, and knowledge from generations to generations. Hence, dynamics, movement, energy, forces, in all their various forms, more than static categories such as space and territory, build essential components of a healthy and vibrant cultural presence. Accordingly, a science of culture understood as the study of the cultural body by experimental methods needs, to emphasize culture ’ s evolutionary character that emerges from historically grown distinctive processes of rationality and sensuality. Furthermore, culture as a living body should be studied as a web of material and semantic layers held together by both regularities and unpredictable outbreaks of new forms of expression, wherein cultural forms, mostly symbolic forms, stabilize the flow of permanent change. Therefore, a science of culture relies also on tools, which would study both the creation of new forms and meaning as well as the forces, which lead to it. Scientific methods deriving from sign theories imply and equally confirm the evolutionary structure of culture. Hence, to capture the complexity of cultural processes, it would be worthwhile to consider the numerous definitions of a sign, developed throughout the long history of humanities, not as competing, but as study-models of different phases of cultural evolution. For instance, since Plato, the triadic division of the sign body, between the sign “ semainon, ” the “ semainomenon ” the content and the “ pragma, ” the interpretant, has formed the matrix of the sign discourse; within the interaction of these elements, the different definitions of the sign originate from the competing observations of the relations between its elements such as sign, concept, and designated object. Nevertheless, beyond the diversity of the sign models, the overruling feature is determined by a central bonding figure, the dynamic reality of semiosis, as a reality in action at the center of sign-processes. For as long as signs are connected with ideas exemplified in bodies via activities, semiosis remains the critical drive of cultural evolution. Furthermore, the long history of theoretical dispute on sign-relation-constructions contributes to the richness of its instrumental logic. Since the earliest declaration of the primacy of the common over the particular, a moment of conflict has been marked, as ideas are both products of individuals as well as of a community and cannot be reduced to one or another. Ideas are rooted in the semeiotic triadic relation, the eternal alliance of cultural production and development. Accordingly, the sphere of communication of the cultural output arises in the structuring of arbitrary, necessary, and natural signs. Theories of signs as a reflection on the nature of signs, which the human mind implements to understand and to communicate its knowledge to others, thus assume an overarching and integrative function. 2 Peirce ’ s Semeiotic and the Paradox of Scientific Observation Charles S. Peirce, devoted many of his writings to the foundation of science, which would embrace the study of relations found in natural and human interaction; by doing so he bridged the gap between natural sciences and humanities. A strong example of this approach is found in his manuscript titled On the Logic of Drawing History from Ancient Documents, especially from Testimonies, (written in 1901 and originally envisioned as a short book of about 150 pages) 1 in which Peirce establishes his method for scientific study in humanities, understood as an objective and testable method of knowledge acquisition. The following study reconstructs the story of the manuscript ’ s impact on the theoretical developments within the Warburg School. It investigates the links, agents, and routes of how the quintessence of Peirce ’ s “ objective method, ” elaborated in the manuscript, was migrated to Europe and stimulated a fertile environment for a paradigm shift within humanities. The high relevance of the manuscript for interdisciplinary studies engaged in scientific problems is understandable, as it discusses several fundamental methodological issues and shows how to develop problem-solving models to link natural sciences and humanities. Furthermore, within a single manuscript it gives for Peirce ’ s work an unusually concise 1 The manuscript is only accessible in its entirety as MS 690 and 691 and was partially included in the Collected Papers, the Essential Peirce and a book titled Historical Perspectives on Peirce ’ s Logic of Science: A History of Science, edited by Carolyn Eisele (1985). 164 Elize Bisanz (Lubbock, Texas) concept of a methodological masterpiece by demonstrating the very same steps of the premises, fact-checking, connecting, and abducting with subsequent implementation on different examples of fields of study. The overall question it begins with is how to open humanities for more empirical and experimental methods, and accordingly, what are equivalent categories and methodological steps between that could be compared? Two thought-models play a leading role in the manuscript: the comparison between the terms documents in humanities and instruments in natural sciences combined with their consequent features and functions, and a specific situation of a paradox of scientific observation, a core methodological problem of the relation between the inquirer and the inquiry, or the relation between the instrument and the experiment. As a treatise on Peirce ’ s scientific method, it is also a revised summary of his abduction theory, including detailed examples of its implementation, a feature, which makes it a uniquely complete and comprehendible piece of intellectual work. At the very beginning of the manuscript, Peirce explains, “ Ancient history is drawn partly from documents and partly from monuments. ” Nevertheless, he considers the intentions and procedures of their interpretations within humanities as logically wrong and he develops a model that is a “ true logical method of treating ancient historical documents. ” And he proposes “ to set this new theory in a clear light by applying it to two or three examples, including a case where the testimonies are comparatively strong and another where the testimony is at best very feeble ” (Peirce 1901: 1). The overall objective of the manuscript, as mentioned above, is the attempt to cross the divisive border between, or even merge natural sciences and humanities. By doing so, like many of Peirce ’ s writings, he pushes humanities a further step towards scientific observation. The object of observation the manuscript focuses on is the historic “ document, ” history representing the branch of humanities; moreover, documents represent any kind of item subject to study within humanities, such as artworks, literary works, judiciary documents. The method follows the rules of his logic of abduction, a path that starts by collecting and proving facts by deduction, proceeding through induction, and reaching to the ultimate truth by abduction. Beyond their specific contextual function, documents could be applied as scientific tools to enhance knowledge by treating them as testimonies, as memory transmitters. To achieve these, a scholar has to begin by using the first step of objective observation: The use we should desire to make of ancient history is to learn from the study of it, and not to carry our preconceived notions into it, until they can be put upon a much more scientific basis than at present they can (Peirce 1901: 36). Writing in 1901, the first year of the 20th century, Peirce was undoubtedly not the first and the only scholar working enthusiastically on an objective scientific method in humanities through an interdisciplinary approach. Especially in Europe, the project had already developed strong dynamics, a shift of paradigms paving the way for the establishment of new schools. Prominent examples among them are the works of scholars such as the members of the Warburg Group, philosophers Ernst Cassirer, Aby Warburg, art historians Erwin Panofsky or Edgar Wind, as well as the early phase of the famous Vienna Circle. Humanities became a study laboratory, a field for new solutions across disciplinary borders, Peirce ’ s Semeiotic and its Relevance for a Science of Culture 165 even for rethinking disciplines such as art history or philosophy by coining new names for the new approaches such as “ Kulturwissenschaft, ” redefining Humanities as the science of culture. Also, in the case of art history, the focus shifted to its symbolic value, enabling a new role to its multiple layers of meaning processing. To put Peirce ’ s work within this frame highlights the relevance of his efforts to find truth through a “ universal ” scientific method by studying the relations of sign elements. The purpose of any science is to find the truth, not a truth detached from its originated context, but a truth, which is inscribed in its logic. This fact implies that, each scientific logic embodies a different purpose, hence pursues different truth. The different sciences deal with different kinds of truth; mathematical truth is one thing, ethical truth is another, the actually existing state of the universe is a third; but all those different conceptions have in common something very marked and clear. We all hope the different scientific inquiries in which we are severally engaged are going ultimately to lead to some definitely established conclusion, which conclusion we endeavor to anticipate in some measure (Peirce 1901: 50). 2 As the primary purpose is to develop a universal science, the first problem to solve is to tackle the issue of “ truth diversity. ” Peirce argues, each science has its truth, which is inscribed in its logic, which in its turn has a purpose; to study its logic, one has first to determine what its purpose is. To study different purposes deriving from different logical concepts, Peirce chooses two examples, one each from natural science and from humanities (which he also describes as psychic science). In Physics and Ancient History, Peirce positions Ancient History among psychical sciences analogous to Astronomy among physical sciences, where History is the description “ of what is distant in the world of mind, as [Astronomy] is a description of what is distant in the world of matter ” (Peirce 1901: 36). A further justification, which Peirce sees in the importance of the scientific study of History, is its immediate relatedness to the mind, a relation which he assigns higher scientific relevance than any relatedness to matter. 3 The Function of Testimonies The first step Peirce suggests, to begin with the study, is to determine the scientific objects and tools of each field. Both physics and ancient history have their specific ethics as to how to use different objects as testimonies to collect data for their studies; whereas physics uses instruments, ancient history uses documents, and each has a different approach to use them as testimonies. Peirce proceeds to explain in detail the specific features of testimonies, to find commonalities between them as well as to confirm their fundamental role in constructing meaning. Among these features are the following: - testimonies transferred through history are mostly based on likelihood, - they are historically confirmed and are rarely scrutinized, 2 Ernst Cassirer discusses an equivalent model in his Zur Logik der Kulturwissenschaften and in general in Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, where he uses the term logic instead of truth. 166 Elize Bisanz (Lubbock, Texas) - they are virtual, as it is not possible to observe them in real-time, - they store knowledge but don ’ t contribute to its enhancement, and - testimonies transfer facts. In the case of History, the facts are transmitted by manuscripts, and they are documentary, which means they are assertions; in this case, they are interpretations of testimonies.With this observation, Peirce questions the validity of the testimonies based on likelihoods, he writes: What I attack is the method of deciding questions of fact by weighing, that is algebraically adding, the feelings of approval produced in the mind by the different testimonies and other arguments pertinent to the case. I acknowledge that this method is supported, under abstract conditions, by the doctrine of chances, and that there are cases in which it is useful. But I maintain that these conditions are not often even roughly fulfilled in questions of ancient history; so that in those investigations it commonly has no value worth consideration (Peirce 1901: 15 - 16). The fact that testimonies are historically mostly confirmed, sometimes due to our need to experience regularity or to endorse an opinion we find truthful, blocks the way to new insights, to discovering new relations and observing facts. Peirce ’ s proposal to avoid these is as always, to follow logical patterns by the method “ reasonable guessing, ” which is as he explains the method of Abduction combined with the preceding processes of Deduction and Induction of collecting facts and subsequent verification. The significant move Peirce makes in this manuscript is that he includes the circumstances, which provide an explanation of a logical phenomenon. Peirce writes, “ the work of reason consists in finding connections between facts, ” and this can begin by the isolation of the facts, as some facts need an explanation, and some don ’ t. A fact must be explained, hence rationalized, if it emerges without being expected: “ A hypothesis then, has to be adapted, which is likely in itself, and renders the facts likely. This step of adapting a hypothesis as being suggested by the facts, is what I call abduction ” (Peirce 1901: 76). Also, chance can have its place in scientific observation, but it needs to be explained, rendering a fact to be a conclusion from what is already well known. Peirce calls this step regularization, a process also known as naturalization; both explanation and regularization constitute the two types of rationalization. Hence, the process of abduction or abductive reasoning begins with deduction, which is as Peirce puts it, necessary reasoning having probability as its subject matter, it moves from one fact to the next to evaluate the conditions for the fulfillment of truth-seeking. Once the facts are sufficiently known, the study leads to Induction, which deals with the relation between the facts, it also projects to a conclusion with a determined and definable knowledge. Despite their significant difference between the case of Abduction (seeking for theory) and of Induction (for facts), they stay connected with a strong reasoning bond: the first being the beginning of scientific reasoning and the second its the concluding step, both relying on hypothesis. We would now ask how can a hypothesis be a reliable tool for a scientific method? Peirce has a set of guidelines to make the right choice, such as its compatibility with experimental testing, ability to explain unexpectedly occurring facts, or its practical feasibility regarding cost, as well as its effect upon other projects. Peirce ’ s Semeiotic and its Relevance for a Science of Culture 167 In the process of abduction, the facts suggest the hypothesis based on resemblance, derived from previous experiences, which is the resemblance of the facts to the consequences of the hypothesis. In contrast, within the process of induction, it is the experiment, which suggests the hypothesis, in this case, by contiguity, that information is memorized on specific conditions of the hypothesis that could be realized in certain experimental ways. 4 Peirce ’ s Immediate Impact The above summary of the manuscript ’ s methodological features aims to put forward two of its main achievements, each one historically unique in its nature. The first concerns its originality within Peirce ’ s work; besides a detailed methodological overview, the text also elaborates its implementation through several examples. The testimonial feature of documents, as introduced in the manuscript, is verified by its broad impact. The combination of theory and experiment, which Peirce applies with refreshing clarity and practicability that is uncommon within humanities, finds its way across borders and disciplines. Furthermore, the manuscript exemplifies and testifies how historical documents carry the beliefs and ideas acquired throughout cultural evolution, and how this specific feature defines them as instruments for scientific observation, as means for access to information on a given culture as the embodiment of ideas. The idea of Interdisciplinary research towards more experimental and empirical humanities enjoyed popularity in scholarly circles such as the Aby Warburg circle established in Hamburg; the focus of their studies was the media of transmission and conservation of cultural memory across time and space. Similar to Peirce ’ s ideas, they considered documents as an equivalent to instruments; they argued that to access the meaning embodied in artifacts and to be able to understand the realities transferred by them, they have to be treated and observed as documents and testimonies. Also, the Warburg school scholars oriented their studies to methods of how natural sciences applied instruments within experiments in exploring natural realities. Warburg and his colleagues advocated for the study of cultural documents, based on scientific observation, which included experimentation and representation. This approach was an unusual perspective, as traditionally humanities studied documents as narrations, which were rather subject to varying interpretations. Consequently, with experimentation and the category of representation, two entirely objective perspectives were introduced into the field of the study of humanities, redefining existing disciplinary areas. For instance, for Aby Warburg, the founder of the Warburg Institute (first established in Hamburg and later moved to London to save it from the Nazis) artefacts as cultural documents were considered as agents of meaning that unfold a sphere of reflection between the beholder and the work of Art. Hence, to study them, one should include the study of their context as well as the dynamic processes involved within the meaning sphere, or in other words, the semeiosis. Edgar Wind, on the other hand, a professor of art history at the University of Chicago before he established the first chair for Art History at Oxford University, advocated for a theory of embodiment or symbolic representation in Art. He explained the aesthetic experience as an objective reality, which should be observed and 168 Elize Bisanz (Lubbock, Texas) analyzed through models and verified by experimentation within an evolving cosmological reality. Similarly, Wind ’ s dissertation mentor, the art historian Erwin Panofsky, emphasized the testimonial feature of artworks. His seminal paper, “ The History of Art as a Humanistic Discipline, ” gives fascinating insights into the transition of art history towards a scientific study of images coined as iconology of cultural representations, later also known as a branch of Bildwissenschaft (Image Science). Also, the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, established by Ernst Cassirer, applies the conception of Thirdness not only to aesthetic forms but to every kind of cultural representation. Especially Cassirer ’ s writings and persisting efforts on bridging the gap between humanities and natural sciences lead to the birth of the new humanities coined as Kulturwissenschaft, the Science of Culture. It is a unique experience to read the works of these scholars parallel to Peirce ’ s papers. The deeper we navigate through the texts, the clearer we see the similarities between these three and Peirce ’ s work. They all merge into one big field of scientific cross-disciplinary study with Peirce ’ s method at its core. Research gives us enough evidence to trace the direct access of Warburg School members to selected Peirce papers. Some of them like Edgar Wind acknowledged him in their writings explicitly, others implicitly by references such as “ an intellectually stimulating American. ” It would be worthwhile to understand the motivation behind the long-lasting and yet vibrant silence around these encounters; not necessarily for the sake of scholarly justice or correctness to give credit to Peirce ’ s work, but for a better understanding of the profound impact of Peirce ’ s work, meaning in general Pragmaticism, on contemporary European thought. It seems likely that it has been much more thoroughly implemented in these circles, as mentioned earlier, or at least by these scholars, than any American contemporary scientific discipline. The links and conceptual overlapping between Peirce ’ s manuscript - hence the method of Semeiotic applied by Pragmaticism - and those of Wind, Panofsky, Cassirer, or Warburg, can only be called to attention at a second glance and by a thorough study of their original writings. However, we now can display a genuine case of Peirce ’ s core argument on the testimonial value of documents for scientific studies in humanities and attempts to solve the problem concerning the elements involved in the process of scientific research, in this present article named as the paradox of scientific observation (the proposal that there is no theory-free observation.) Peirce ’ s manuscript uses and develops specific terminology to pinpoint the scientific value of the method; these very same terms emanate such a powerful message that they find their way through space and time to reinforce science. Among the Warburgian scholars, the immediate connection to Peirce ’ s work was initiated by Edgar Wind; he had started his academic career as an art historian, was introduced to Peirce ’ s work by Morris Cohen in 1924. (Cohen had just published the volume Chance, Love, and Logic.) Then changed to philosophy, logic, and mathematics during his years in the USA 1924 - 28, and combining these disciplines as mentioned, he advocated for a theory of embodiment and symbolic representation in art history. Erwin Panofsky was Wind ’ s dissertation mentor and Ernst Cassirer was the second consultant of Wind ’ s Habilitation. The early phase of Peirce ’ s impact on Edgar Wind ’ s work is already documented in his 1924 presented paper presented at the 6th international American philosophical congress at Harvard University under the title “ Experiment and Metaphysics, ” which might be Peirce ’ s Semeiotic and its Relevance for a Science of Culture 169 considered as an attempt to implement Peirce ’ s ideas as a fresh approach to solve problems within humanities of the old world. The importance of this paper lies in the fact that it was written as a preview for his first book publication, also titled “ Experiment and Metaphysics. Towards a Resolution of the Cosmological Antinomies ” in which he includes a quote from Peirce ’ s chapter “ How to make our ideas clear. ” At the very beginning of the introduction Wind writes: In the context of cosmological questions, the maxim of Charles Peirce, more than fifty years old now, has retained its validity: ’ Though in no possible state of knowledge can any number be great enough to express the relation between the amount of what rests unknown to the amount of the known, yet it is unphilosophic to suppose that, with regard to any given question (which has any clear meaning), investigation would not bring forth a solution of it, if it were carried far enough (Wind 1933: 6). 3 Note that, Wind wrote this in his Habilitation in 1933, which was nine years after the article was published; this implies that he has been studying Peirce and advocating for his ideas for a decade. The following examples show how profound Peirce ’ s impact was on the works and the developments in modern humanities. 5 Toward a Science of Culture The concept of studying Instruments and documents and their role as testimonies, along with the above-mentioned instance of the paradox of scientific observation, serve as a gravity center for the new general and interdisciplinary science sought by Wind and his colleagues. In his article “ Experiment and Metaphysics, ” Edgar Wind discusses a similar paradox in physical inquiry concerning the role of instruments, and their reciprocal dependency from physical laws. During an experiment, he explains, in our attempt to qualify physical objects as measuring instruments, we overlook the fact that what we observe is a relational process in which every element is subject to change. As we study bodies empirically and within a given space, we perceive them through geometrical properties, which we have developed by axiomatic demonstration. Here emerges the problem of accuracy, as the choice of instruments can neither be justified by pure reasoning, nor it can be determined by observation. Wind shifts our attention to another feature of the process, its contextual relation, which he considers as an act of symbolic representation, being both arbitrary and purposive: arbitrary, as it imposes upon a physical body the function of representing a metrical scheme, purposive because through this procedure the physical coincidences between the specific body and others are converted into indications of metrical correspondences. The ultimate question to be solved is how to lead all these steps to a unified reality? Here too, Wind ’ s answer is nearly identical with Peirce ’ s: by the experimental method. His demonstration of its solution reads like a summary of Peirce ’ s theory of abduction. Wind begins with the question: what is it that an experiment intends to test? “ What really is tested is the physical presupposition (hypothesis) on the ground of which the outcome of 3 Ernst Cassirer discusses an equivalent model in his Zur Logik der Kulturwissenschaften and in general in Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, where he uses the term logic instead of truth. 170 Elize Bisanz (Lubbock, Texas) the measurement has been demonstrated in geometrical terms. ” The paradox lies in the illogical task, which is to use a means of inquiry identical with the objects of inquiry. This assumption, seemingly irrational in itself, is common in two sciences, which in respect to their methods, are understood to be opposed: physics and history. At this point of Wind ’ s elaboration, the Peircean terminology is fully adapted: What has proved to be true of the physical instrument can be shown to be true also in historical document. ” [He specifies further] “ Just as the physical instrument is a physical object and, therefore, effected by the laws which intends to test, the historical document is, itself, an object of historical inquiry; for it participates in the historical life which it helps to investigate ” (Wind 1933: 219). The subsequent steps to prove the validity and accuracy of the method is a redefinition of the relation of the part to the whole by “ preconceiving ” (deduction) ” by ordering the knowledge, which has previously been gathered, ” which is identical with Peirce ’ s factcollecting, and then to conclude by individual observation. We can preconceive it only by ordering the knowledge which has previously been gathered, into a system. That is: we must make some primary (axiomatic) assumptions which enable us to correlate individual observations in a systematic fashion, and we must suppliment the sum of these observations by some secondary (hypothetical) assumptions which help to fill missing links. If now, on the basis of such a system, we construct an instrument or interpret a source, the outcome of the experiment or the information derived from the source, can either confirm or contradict the system presupposed (Wind 1933: 220). Edgar Wind continues to develop these ideas in the following years. 1936 he publishes a paper titled “ Some points of contact between History and Natural Sciences ” in which he discusses the relation between inorganic matter and organic life and the question of transformation from a state of nature to a state of conscious control. Here again, he refers to the scientific method as the reinforcement of human knowledge and experience in which interpretation of historical documents requires far more complex psychology than an immediate experience with its direct appeal to a state of feeling. The following quote in the paper testifies to the connection to Peirce: who wrote in a draft to psychology of the development of ideas: “ it is the belief men betray, and not that which they parade, which has to be studied ” (Wind 1936: 258). Besides the instruments/ documents terminology set and the paradox of scientific observation, Edgar Wind also chose identical fields of study as mentioned in Peirce ’ s manuscript, such as physics and history. Wind elaborates his choice by the following arguments “ A set of instruments is being inserted, and the given constellation is thereby disturbed. The physicist disturbs the atoms whose composition he wants to study. The historian disturbs the sleep of the document that he drags forth from a dusty archive. ” He specifies further that “ disturbance ” has to be taken literally, as every intervention introduces a new perspective and readjusts the meaning of the document. (Wind 1936: 261) Furthermore, discoveries within the domain of the ‘ external world of physics ’ may lead to technical innovation, which eventually leads to changes in our behavior. Wind was firmly convinced of the long term and enduring impact that all of these factors would have on cultural bodies. As both experimental and documentary knowledge form our Peirce ’ s Semeiotic and its Relevance for a Science of Culture 171 culture and lives, both should be studied scientifically. This step, he believed, could be achieved by a unified science of humanities and natural sciences. Wind ’ s claim to overcome the antinomy is identical to Peirce ’ s concept of the scientific method explained in his MS On the Logic of Drawing History from Ancient Documents, especially from Testimonies. Scientists use instruments to discover and establish the laws of nature, a step that presupposes the existence of natural laws. Like Peirce, Wind sees a solution of the paradox problem by developing experiments to test our hypothesis, and also like Peirce, by establishing empirical observation and experimentation as constitutive parts of the scientific process. The discussed chain from the Warburg circle leading to Peirce was triggered by a rereading of Erwin Panofsky ’ s article titled The History of Art as a Humanistic Discipline from 1943, (translated to English and republished as the introduction for the volume Meaning in the Visual Arts). Readers familiar with Peirce ’ s manuscript discussed here would be amazed by the similarities of the use of terminologies; moreover, Panofsky also pursues a similar approach as Peirce to unify natural sciences and humanities for the foundation of a scientific method within humanistic disciplines such as Art History. Two excerpts should exemplify Peircean concepts in Panofsky ’ s work and testify to the above hypothesis. The first one is Panofsky ’ s reference to the signifying processes and his classification of man as the only creature who keeps records: Man ’ s signs and structures are records because, or rather in so far as, they express ideas separated from, yet realized by, the processes of signaling and building. These records have therefore the quality of emerging from the stream of time, and it is precisely in this respect that they are studied by the humanist. He is, fundamentally, a historian (Panofsky 1943: 5). Also, note the parallels with Wind ’ s terminology. Even in the case of the second example which deals with the “ Paradox of scientific observation, ” the terminological overlapping is far too obvious: In both cases the process of investigation seems to begin with observation. But both the observer of a natural phenomenon and the examiner of a record are not only confined to the limits of their range of vision and to the available material; in directing their attention to certain objects they obey, knowingly or not, a principle of pre-selection dictated by a theory in the case of the scientist and by a general historical conception in the case of the humanist. It may be true that ‘ nothing is in the mind except what was in the senses ’ ; but it is at least equally true that much is in the senses without ever penetrating into the mind. We are chiefly affected by that which we allow to affect us; and just as natural science involuntarily selects what it calls the phenomena, the humanities involuntarily select what they call the historical facts (Panofsky 1943: 6). Paragraphs like these testify that Panofsky was engaged in a vigorous dialogue with Peirce ’ s writings. But yet, there is no mention of Peirce, at least not in this seminal and programmatic writing. Further research confirms the hypothesis, as in another article titled “ On the Problem of Describing and Interpreting Works of the Visual Arts. ” Panofsky writes: After all, just as the degree of politeness in lifting a hat is a matter of the will and consciousness of the person doing the greeting, but it is not in his power to control what message about his innermost nature others may take from his gesture, so likewise even the artist knows only “ what he 172 Elize Bisanz (Lubbock, Texas) parades ” but not “ what he betrays ” , to quote an intellectually stimulating American (Panofsky 2012: 408). 4 By “ the intellectually stimulating American ” Panofsky refers to Charles Peirce, whose work Panofsky ’ s student Wind had studied in the 1920 s, and the quote is from Peirce ’ s Monist article Issues of Pragmaticism: “ it is the belief men betray and not that which they parade which has to be studied ” (Bisanz 2009: 270). It is evident that Panofsky has read Peirce extensively, not only the Issues of Pragmaticism; as we study his theory of Meaning in the visual Art, we realize how far Peirce ’ s Method of Abduction can be implemented for the study of artworks. In their scientific study of culture, Panofsky, as well as Wind, Warburg, and Cassirer, were all unified explicitly or implicitly by the Peircean triadic approach to the symbolic order, which culminated in the scientific study of culture, to Kulturwissenschaft. Aby Warburg was one of the pioneers to emphasize the importance of the relationship between aesthetics and the new science of culture Kulturwissenschaft, which he considered as based on three main elements: on the concept of imagery, on the theory of symbols and the theory of expression by mimesis, and the use of tools. His protégé and assistant Edgar Wind was intensively involved in the conception and the setting of the famous Warburg Institute, where he advocated for a critical study of individual works, the study of the aesthetic value they embodied, and the reconstruction of their historical contexts. The importance of Peirce ’ s work as the driving force for current interdisciplinary scientific research is here established as valid. Triadic logic determines the core structure of Iconography, the new science of studying artworks, which, together with the Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, still defines the curriculum of the research policy of the renowned Warburg Institute in London. The University of London has launched a nearly 20 million dollar expansion of the institute to revive the original spirit of discovery and debate of Aby Warburg ’ s “ science of culture. ” The use of the term in its original coining is remarkable; it is a contemporary verification of Peirce ’ s theory of how documents in humanities, just like instruments in natural sciences, are testimonies of both highly historical and scientific value. The significance of Peirce ’ s Semeiotic for Culture Science lies in its multidimensional theoretical layout that was able to capture both the study of the constitutive elements of symbolic sign and, most importantly, the laws of their relations, which determine the overall identity of the sign. Hence, on a meta-level, the science of culture studies the various modi of the cultural manifestations and the different processes in which they occur. With Semeiotic, Peirce gives us a practical tool for a scientific study of culture ’ s evolutionary logic. References Bisanz, Elize (ed.) 2009: Charles S. Peirce, The Logic of Interdisciplinarity. The Monist Series, Berlin: Akademie-Verlag Panofsky, Erwin 2012: “ On the Problem of Describing and Interpreting Works of the Visual Arts ” , in: Critical Inquiry 38. 3 (2012): 467 - 482 Panofsky, Erwin 1955: Meaning in the Visual Arts, New York: Doubleday 4 Translated from the original talk given by Panofsky in German, in 1931. Peirce ’ s Semeiotic and its Relevance for a Science of Culture 173 Peirce, Charles S. 1923: Chance, Love and Logic, New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co. Peirce, Charles S. 1901: On the Logic of Drawing History from Ancient Documents especially from Testimonies, MS 690 Wind, Edgar 2001: Experiment and Metaphysics. Towards a Resolution of Cosmological Antinomies, Legenda Series, Oxford: Routledge Edgar Wind 1927: “ Experiment and Metaphysics ” , in: Edgar S. Brightman (ed.): Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy (Harvard University 1926), New York: Longmans, 217 - 224 Wind, Edgar 1936: “ Some points of contact between History and Natural Sciences ” , in: Raymond Klibansky & Herbert R. Paton (eds.): Philosophy and History. Essays Presented to Ernst Cassirer, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 255 - 264 174 Elize Bisanz (Lubbock, Texas)