K O D I K A S / C O D E 44 (2021) · No. 1 - 3 Gunter Narr Verlag Tübingen Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory. Charles W. Morris ’ dreidimensionale Semiotik & die Textheorie (1975) Abstract: In its essay, Eschbach describes the collection of essays of the great American philosopher and psychologist C. W. Morris on pragmatically oriented semiotics and aesthetics, in conjunction with the ‘ third part ’ of the major work. This collection provides for the first time a well-rounded impression of his extensive studies on semiotics and axiology. He describes in detail the main assumptions and development in Morris ’ work. Eschbach presents it as much more appropriate to Morris ’ s approach to a threedimensional semiotics to value the characterization of certain artworks by iconic features as an additional justification; other components of three-dimensional semiotics, mentioned in the essay are pushed into the background by the concept of iconicity, are thereby more satisfactorily taken into account, so that the actual, further-reaching contributions of Morris ’ s semiotics come to the fore. Regardless of individual difficulties and necessary clarifications, however, it has become clear that the comprehensive Morris approach and the constant effort to verify obtained results against reality have had great theoretical and practical significance for a variety of scientific disciplines and, with more careful study of the writings that are only now slowly becoming known, will continue to have so in the future. 1.1 Characterization of the writings of C. W. Morris already available in German language This collection of essays on pragmatically oriented semiotics and aesthetics, in conjunction with the ‘ third part ’ of the major work of the great American philosopher and psychologist C. W. Morris, provides for the first time a well-rounded impression of his extensive studies on semiotics and axiology. Although S. Ceccato ’ s Italian translation of Signs, Language, and Behavior (Morris 1949) appeared as early as 1949, and F. Rossi-Landi ’ s translation and commentary of Foundations of the Theory of Signs (Morris 1963) appeared in 1963, it is only today that the importance of Morris ’ s work is generally recognized in the international philosophical and social science literature. As K. O. Apel states in his introduction to the German edition of Signs, Language, and Behavior (Morris 1973), one reason why Morris ’ semiotic considerations did not find an immediate entry into the contemporary discussion is primarily to be found in the “ program of a synthesis of the logical empiricism spread by the emigrants of the ‘ Vienna Circle ’ in America, which he himself temporarily brought to the fore, with the native pragmatism represented by G. H. Mead and J. Dewey in Chicago ” (ibid.: 9). Moreover, with his three-dimensional semiotics, inaugurated in 1938, Morris primarily intended to complete the “ empirical ” aspects of the syntactically and semantically oriented analysis of scientific language, which had been neglected by the logical positivists. Only the hierarchization of the three semiotic dimensions syntactics, semantics and pragmatics and thus the turning away from the restriction of a merely descriptive analysis of scientific language led in 1946 to the expansion of the semiotic field of investigation and to the construction of a pragmatically integrated semiotics. Today, Morris ’ s position as the most important representative of twentieth-century semiotics is widely recognized, as reflected in the increasing interest in comprehensive analyses of signs in a variety of studies across a wide range of disciplines. Here, linguistic and communication studies are to be mentioned above all; Morris ’ s considerations, however, also found their way into film, radio, propaganda, advertising, and architectural analyses and strongly influenced the discussion about a semiotic aesthetics (cf. Eschbach 1974). In 1972, Foundations of Sign Theory appeared together with the essay Aesthetics and Sign Theory (Morris 1972). This first programmatic writing of only 70 pages, in which Morris for the first time presented his ideas about the structure of a general sign theory in a systematic form, established Morris ’ s reputation as an outstanding sign theorist. As before, the foundations of sign theory form the starting point of all semiotic work. Morris introduces in this paper, besides the processual definition of the sign influenced by the Chicago pragmatists, the division of semiotics into the three dimensions syntactics, semantics and pragmatics, which has since become indispensable from the semiotic discussion. He writes: On the one hand, one can investigate the relation between signs and the objects to which they are applicable. This relation we call the semantic dimension of the sign process, [ … ] Or one makes the relation between sign and interpreter the object of investigation. This relation we call the pragmatic dimension of the sign process [ … ]. One important sign relation is still to be mentioned: the formal relation of signs to each other. [ … ] We call this third dimension the syntactic dimension of the sign process (ibid 24 f.). Morris conceives these three dimensions of semiotics merely as aspects of equal importance in a unified sign process, which, however, he subordinates in praxi to the primacy of semantic relation by abstracting the pragmatic aspect. This reduction of the more comprehensively conceived scheme to the syntactic and semantic analysis of scientific language, which has long been pursued by scientific logicians, and which is considered the starting and reference point of later, only limitedly relevant applications to “ psychological ” empirical problems, falls behind already gained insights of early pragmatism, which are only caught up in 1946 in Signs, Language and Behavior by the pragmatic foundation in behavior (action; cf. below section 2.3.). The conception of semiotics represented in this first formulation of his theory of signs is determined by its relation to the encyclopedia initiated under the decisive influence of the Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) 157 logical positivists. Semiotics is conceived both as a single science among other sciences and as a means of all other sciences. The most important function of semiotics as a science would be to provide a suitable basis for the integration of the sciences via the concept of signs. As a means of the other sciences, semiotics would become an organon. As already mentioned, Morris subscribes here to Carnap ’ s notions “ that the study of science can be completely absorbed in the study of the language of science ” (ibid.: 19). Certainly, it should be noted here by way of explanation that Morris, in making this statement, assumes a communicatively conceived concept of language, which not only addresses formal structures, but by definition also addresses the relationship to the designated objects and the language users; this conception of the three irreducible and equally important perspectives of semiotics to be taken into account in the respective research process, whose integrating moment would be a more comprehensive pure and descriptive semiotics, however, does not allow for a “ concrete notion that, for instance, the syntactic and semantic rules of theory languages point back to a pragmatic foundation in the actions of the community of scientists through the underlying conventions and the possible empirical interpretations ” . In the essay Aesthetics and Sign Theory, published together with the Foundations of Sign Theory, Morris argues that a semiotics conceived in terms of the Foundations of Sign Theory is significant for art and aesthetics in the same way as for other sciences, for the signtheoretical conception of aesthetics, which as a subfield of general semiotics itself consists of the three dimensions of aesthetic syntactics, aesthetic semantics, and aesthetic pragmatics, conceives of the work of art as an aesthetic sign whose analysis is merely a special case of general sign analysis. 1 As is also evident in this understanding of semiotic aesthetics, ultimately the unified science envisioned in the Encyclopedia should result from the study of linguistic relations between the scientific languages of the various individual sciences and their integration, and not from the discovery of universally valid regularities in reality, to the validity of which all sciences are subject. In his 1946 book Signs, Language, and Behaviour (which went through four editions in America alone by 1950), Morris revisits the discussion of signs begun in Foundations of the Theory of Signs and systematically examines how a science of both linguistic and nonlinguistic signs can be developed and the function of semiotics in relation to other sciences. In his effort to provide a unified language for discussing sign phenomena from a wide variety of fields, Morris takes a more strongly behavioral approach than in Foundations of Sign Theory. Signs, Language, and Behavior, however, represents not only a more careful elaboration and realization of various program points formulated earlier. In this work Morris makes some essential modifications to his first conception, which K. O. Apel points out in his introduction to the German edition. The connection between semiotics and axiology addressed in the Fundamentals of Sign Theory and especially in Aesthetics and Sign Theory in connection with the discussion of the 1 For a more detailed discussion of the problems of iconicity, the aesthetic sign, and the understanding of semiotic aesthetics, see section 2.7 below.) 158 Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) aesthetic sign undergoes a more detailed elaboration. In 1939 Morris had determined the aesthetic sign as an iconic sign whose designatum is a value. It must be particularly emphasized in this conception that in a complex aesthetic sign, which is by definition iconic, “ at least some individual sign carriers must be iconic signs and at least partly of the same character as the complex sign itself ” (Morris 1972: 100). Morris modifies this conception in Signs, Language, and Behavior to remove the previous restriction of the iconic sign to the appraisive mode of signification. Morris still describes a work of art primarily as an icon composed of iconic signs, but these partial signs can also signify in the designative, prescriptive, and formative modes of signification (Morris 1973: 295). The stronger emphasis on value theory - which, however, finds its actual version in his explicitly value-theoretical writings and in Signification and Significance - and the differentiation in designation mode and application form of signs leads him to abandon iconicity as an absolute criterion of the arts (ibid.: 297) and to seek the common characteristic of the arts of different linguistic media primarily “ in their valuative use of signs ” (ibid.), “ designating their target objects with the additional requirement that the manner of sign use must awaken its own positive evaluation of the target objects ” (ibid.). In this context, no sign is aesthetic per se, as Morris had assumed in Aesthetics and the Theory of Signs, but it is determined by its particular use. 2 In addition to this change in the functioning and place of iconic signs within the framework of semiotic aesthetics, which will be discussed below in the larger context of his further pronouncements on aesthetics, Morris undertakes a far-reaching revision of his three-dimensional semiotics in Signs, Language, and Behaviour. On the one hand, Morris wishes to distance himself from some of the uses of these subdivisions that he believes obscure rather than illuminate problems; on the other hand, he wishes to clarify his own definitions based on later analyses. Most importantly, Morris lifted the restriction of semiotics to studies of language; “ the study of the structure of languages other than scientific ones must be made possible, modes of signification other than designative ones must be treated in semiotics and this in turn requires certain modifications in the formulation of pragmatics ” (Morris 1973: 327). Since Morris sets the stage for a pragmatically oriented semiotics with this reformulation of the three dimensions of semiotics, it will be quoted at length: Pragmatics is that part of semiotics which deals with the origin, uses, and effects of signs in particular behavior; semantics deals with the denotation of signs in all denotations; syntactics deals with combinations of signs without considering their specific denotations or their relation to the particular behavior (ibid.: 326). This new conception emphasizes the unity of semiotics to a much greater extent than the first formulation in the Fundamentals of the Theory of Signs and deliberately places the abstraction of individual aspects for the purpose of special investigations in the background (cf. also Resnikow 1963: 105). 2 (Cf. note 5 on p. 297 of Signs, Language, and Behavior, where Morris is critical of his stance taken in Aesthetics and Sign Theory. Among other things, he writes: “ My present stance is more general, since the determination of the arts by valuative sign use does not require that signs in the arts be iconic or belong to the appraisitive mode of signification. Iconic and appraisative sign are still of primordial importancs in arts. ” Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) 159 Parallel to this reorientation of his semiotics runs the increasingly communicationtheoretical orientation, which - in addition to an explicitly interdisciplinary working method, which was only taken up again in this form many years later - leads to a definition of “ language ” supported by five criteria: 1) a language consists of a multiplicity of sign types; 2) language participants have common sign designations; 3) language participants must be able to produce the signs, with the same designation for speaker and hearer; 4) the signs of a language must be applicable in a multiplicity of situations, and 5) the signs of a language must be organized by a combination system (cf. ibid.: 113 ff.). In addition to this far-reaching definition of language, which will be examined elsewhere, it remains to mention the increased emphasis on the concept of discourse. Morris arrives at his proposal of classifying different language specializations by combining the modes of signification and forms of sign application. According to him, one of the four modes of signification (designative, appraisative, prescriptive, and formative) turns out to be dominant in every text; likewise, a text is characterized by the primary use of one of the four possible forms of sign application (informative, valuative, incisive, and systemic). The union of these two coordinates leads to his well-known scheme of the 16 main types of discourse, which he by no means understands as definitions, but as attempts and suggestions for problem-solving (cf. ibid.: 215 ff.). 3 1.2 Some remarks on the selection of texts in this volume present volume For an easier overview of Morris ’ s extensive work, it is best to divide it into semiotic and axiological writings. The semiotic works as a whole, show a high degree of coherence; nevertheless, it must not be overlooked that Morris emphasized different aspects to different degrees in the course of his long research work, that there are not only gradual differences between the early statements on semiotics and the “ third part ” of his semiotic main work Signification and Significance, and that Morris also uses different terminologies in his various writings. Here it will be suggested that the semiotic studies be divided into three main sections: 1. the writings up to the formulation of the foundations of sign theory 2. the writings up to Signs, Language, and Behavior and 3. the writings after Signs, Language, and Behavior: up to The Pragmatic Movement in American Philosophy (cf. also Geckeler 1971). To the first part belong some reviews, such as that of G. Lanoe-Villène: Le Livre des Symboles (1927), or of A. Spaier: La Pensée Concrète: Essai sur le symbolisme intellectuel (1929); besides the essay The Concept of the Symbol of 1927, reprinted in the present volume, some essays on the theory of mind and especially the monograph Six Theories of Mind (1932) are to be mentioned. In 1935, the essay Semiotic and Scientific Empiricism appeared in the 3 This classification and extraction of possible text types entails a multitude of problems, which will be addressed in section 2.6. G. Klaus has made several attempts to use this Morrisian description model for the analysis of agitation and propaganda (cf. Klaus 1969a and Klaus 1971; cf. also Breuer 1971). Resnikov overlooks the fact that Morris ’ s conception of the types of discourse is not concerned with a typology of signs, but with the mode of action and use of signs in specific contextual situations (cf. Resnikow 1963: 115)). 160 Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) Congress Acts of the International Congress of Scientific Philosophy, and was reprinted in 1937 in the collection of essays Logical Positivism, Pragmatism and Scientific Empiricism. Prior to the publication of The Foundation of the Theory of Signs (1938), Morris wrote the introduction to G. H. Mead ’ s Mind, Self and Society. From the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist (1934) as well as an extensive introduction to G. H. Mead ’ s The Philosophy of the Act (1938). This first phase is further marked by the essay Aesthetics and the Theory of Signs (1939), already available in German, and the widely disregarded Science, Art and Technology. Most of these essays and reviews only marginally address the semiotic question that later became the focus of interest. They are interesting, however, because they already reflect the wide circle of later research work, these early works provide the closest insight into Morris ’ s efforts to synthesize the work of the Chicago pragmatists and the European empiricists, and finally they provide information about which influences (e. g. the editions of Mead ’ s lectures) were applied. Between the years 1939 and the first edition of Signs, Language and Behavior in 1946, Morris dealt with a variety of problems and engaged in extensive research that led, as far as semiotics was concerned, to the essays Semiotic, the Socio-Humanistic Sciences, and the Unity of Science (1940), an appreciation of the American painter Raymond Jonson and a discussion of the relationship between painting and semiotics in the essay The Search for a Life of Significance (1941), a discussion of content analysis in the commentary on A. Kaplan ’ s essay Content Analysis and the Theory of Signs (1943), and a discussion paper on the relation of linguistics and semiotics in Linguistics and the Theory of Signs (1946). This second phase finds its mark in the highly successful work Signs, Language, and Behavior. In the third section of his work, Morris is primarily concerned with the application of his proposed procedures. In a number of smaller essays, Morris primarily examines the relationship between painting and semiotics and reviews his proposed analyses of the “ aesthetic sign. ” Likewise, he attempts to clarify his descriptive model of the 16 possible major types of discourse proposed in Signs, Language, and Behavior. The third aspect of his work during this period is the intensified effort to arrive at a more adequate version of the problem of aesthetics in a synthesis of axiology and semiotics, following a more mature formulation of his ideas of axiology in Varieties of Human Value. The conclusion of this phase, supported by increased empirical research, is his book Signification and Significance and the essay Aesthetics, Signs and Icons (1965). This chronological overview of Morris ’ s semiotic works, which can be completed by a look at the bibliography, was primarily intended to illuminate, in a flashlight-like manner, the periphery of Morris ’ s three main semiotic works. As has already been indicated several times, his work is by no means limited to semiotic investigations. Much space is taken up by philosophical works on pragmatism, logical and scientific empiricism, efforts for a unified science and aesthetic studies, which in turn are directed towards semiotic and axiological studies or are based on them. The present collection of selections endeavors to achieve three main goals: 1) to give an impression of Morrisian development through the essays drawn from all three phases; 2) the essays have been selected from the perspective of showing the most essential components of the third major semiotic work in their interrelatedness; and 3) the present selection intends to make some corrections to previous Morris reception, which has all too often been limited to the basics of sign theory or signs, language, and behavior, neglecting denotation and Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) 161 meaning as well as the multiplicity of essays, and thus very often producing a distorted picture. The essays and Designation and Meaning printed in the present volume have been arranged in chronological order. In the essay The Symbol Concept, ten years before the foundations of sign theory, Morris discusses the sign problem for the first time in largely behaviorist terms. After a detailed critique of the older behaviorist position, he defines the symbol from the standpoint of a pragmatically determined radical empiricism as follows: “ A symbol is some given or experienced vicarious stimulus which leads to a reinstatement of the original stimulus in a form observable only from the self-inclusive view ” (Morris 1975: 89 f.), i. e., a symbol is “ some set of experiences which has become a proxy or memory of some other set of experiences. ” Thus, by overcoming the introspectionism verdict of the older behaviorism, the goal of this symbol definition is, on the one hand, to capture the dynamic character of the symbol in a processual definition and, on the other hand, to retain observable consequences, i. e., symbols are tied to social interaction but need not necessarily result in observable responses by the individuals using the symbol. The treatment of the symbol is very closely related to the discussion of ‘ sense ’ . Morris gives an impression of his view on the connection of ‘ sense ’ , ‘ designation ’ and ‘ meaning ’ in the fifth section of the concept of symbol. In doing so, he determines the stimulus object, of which the symbol is a proxy, to be the sense of the symbol. Morris substantiates and extends this notion in the following paper, The Concept of Meaning in Pragmatism and Logical Positivism. Here he endeavors to seek out the historical sources of pragmatism and empiricism, in order to explore their complementary aspects. Using the concept of meaning, which he understands only in the sense of designation and not of meaning, he directs attention to the questions of the extent to which ‘ meaning ’ is determined by individual or social factors, and what relations exist between the formal and empirical aspects of ‘ meaning ’ . In his view, the formal and biological-empirical aspects are essentially correlative and complementary explanations. Meaning is then conceived not as an event but, in the tradition of the Chicago pragmatists, as a functional process. In the essay Semiotics and Scientific Empiricism, Morris attempts to demonstrate that a semiotically based empiricism, which he elsewhere calls scientific empiricism, can unite the essential merits from formalism, traditional empiricism, and pragmatism. After a detailed review of the history of older empiricism, which finds a pragmatic counterpart in the work of Peirce, James, Mead, and Dewey, and is complemented by the formal sciences, Morris concludes that grounding these three historical components of empiricism in a behavioral semiotics will lead to interesting results. Morris elaborates this notion in the following section, where he follows up on his earlier reflections on the concept of symbol and meaning and determines the “ total ” meaning of a sign as the sum of the three dimensions of meaning (existential dimension, pragmatic dimension, and formal dimension). Only the exploration of all three dimensions of sense constitutes semiotic science, which Morris calls in this essay “ the novum organon of the special sciences and the philosophy of scientific empiricism. ” In Peirce, Mead, and Pragmatism, Morris pursues three main interests. In a detailed discussion, he attempts to arrive at the formulation of his characteristic understanding of ‘ pragmatism ’ by comparing Peirce ’ s views with those of his teacher G. H. Mead. In doing so, 162 Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) Morris emphasizes 1) the sign-theoretical foundation of his understanding of pragmatism; 2) the relation of sign and thought; and 3) the relation of thought and social action. These three significant features lead to his broader understanding of empiricism formulated elsewhere. Morris clarifies in Signs about Signs about Signs some terminological issues that arose in the reception of his work Signs, Language, and Behavior. (These issues will be taken up in the following point.) Furthermore, in this essay Morris takes the opportunity to include various critical contributions to the discussion of his book Signs, Language, and Behavior, or to clear up some ambiguities and apparent misunderstandings. As the subtitle to Morris ’ s third major semiotic work, “ An Inquiry into the Relations of Signs and Values, ” indicates, after years of study of semiotics and axiology, an attempt is made here to combine these two areas of research from the perspective of Mead ’ s theory of action. The concept of meaning, which has already been dealt with in detail in earlier writings, undergoes the final explanation under the semiotic-axiological approach that the bipolar concept of meaning is differentiated into a (semiotic) designation aspect and an (axiological) meaning or value aspect of what is designated. The clarification of designation and meaning and their mutual dependencies in the overall context of human behavior takes up large parts of this book. The reason why designation and meaning is referred to here as the third and with the foundations of sign theory and sign, language and behavior equal independent tell of the semiotic research work of C. W. Morris is to be sought in the fact that again some farreaching changes or pointings are made to the existing model. The sign process is again more closely tied to the philosophy of action of G. H. Mead, latent in the earliest conception but relegated to the background in Signs, Language, and Behavior. This reorientation leads to changes in the terms ‘ designation ’ and ‘ sign behavior ’ and takes up the objections to the formative mode of designation expressed in some reviews of Signs, Language, and Behavior. The extensive axiological studies lead to some changes or reweightings to the earlier conception of semiotic aesthetics. The differentiation of the various forms of values, the emphasis on the involvement of art in the process of social, human behavior, and the demonstration of some experimental analytical procedures make this new conception possible. Finally, it should be noted that Morris, in addition to his considerations of sign and value theory, also examines the question of what role signs play in personality disorders. Already in Signs, Language, and Behavior he devoted a separate section to this question. In the following years, a number of interesting research reports appeared, which Morris takes up and deepens in Designation and Meaning. The essay Aesthetics, Sign, and Icon concludes the present collection. This essay is of special interest because it takes up the considerations of 1938 - 39 (with the inclusion of Science, Art, and Technology) and resumes the discussion of the iconicity of the “ aesthetic sign ” against the background of the discussion of art that has since passed. Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) 163 1.3 The Morris Terminology Certainly, G. Klaus is right when he writes that the translation of Morris ’ s terminology into German must necessarily contain elements of conventional fixing (Klaus 1969a: 64). The translation work is further complicated by the fact that the terminology varies in the different works. The present edition largely follows the terminology chosen in the translation of Signs, Speech, and Behavior. However, this consistency is abandoned in three main places. Undoubtedly, Morris strove to build a consistent language of science whose terminology leaves the existing language of science behind in order to arrive at a more adequate and unambiguous description of the subject matter by means of a variety of neologisms. As R. Posner points out in the preface to Grundlagen der Zeichentheorie and W. Altenhoff to the German translation of Zeichen, Sprache und Verhalten, there are often no corresponding terms in the existing German language of science. On the other hand, however, it should be pointed out that Morris ’ main aim with his terminology was to organize his own thoughts and only secondarily thought of opening research perspectives with his neologisms. 4 But where there are common expressions in the semiotic discussion, it is not clear why the creation of difficult-to-understand equivalents modeled on the English terms should unnecessarily complicate the reception. Therefore, in the present work we speak of ‘ signification ’ , ‘ to signify ’ , ‘ significance ’ , ‘ meaning ’ , ‘ denotation ’ , ‘ importance ’ and ‘ sense ’ . 5 The choice of the term ‘ social science ’ instead of the term ‘ behaviorism ’ used in Signs, Language and Behavior was based on the fact that the latter term is too close to 4 Rossi-Landi writes about this “ A critiche del genere Morris risponde the non è possibile classificare con i termini vaghi del linguaggio quotidiano ogni nova tecnica deve pur crearsi una sua terminologia. Il principo è sano; ma la terminologia di Morris è scarsamente entrata nell ’ uso, the anzi l ’ autore stesso sembra averla lasciata perdere: ciò sembra confermare the essa rispondesse più al bisogno di mettere ordine che a scoperte, nuove e destinate a rimanere, nel senso della profondità. Aggiungiamo però che essa può servire tuttora come utile base di discussione e raffinamento ” (Rossi-Landi 1953a: 28 f.). 5 The decision for this terminology, which does not correspond in every point with the common usage, is based on the term ‘ significance ’ , which also implies the concept of being valuable in German and thus seems to be a suitable term for describing a state of affairs axiologically intended by Morris (cf. Stiehl 1970: 71). The parallel semiotic term ‘ Bezeichnung ’ , which indicates the relation of the (linguistic) sign to reality, is preferred to the term ‘ Signifikation ’ chosen in Zeichen, Sprache und Verhalten. On the background of these decisions, which can be based on Bochenski 1956: 25 ff. and e. g. the Habermasian terminology in Erkenntnis und Interesse, we speak of ‘ meaning ’ when both designation and the resulting interpretant are the subject of discussion. Morris writes in a July 29, 1974 letter to the author “ If used technically terms such as Sinn and Bedeutung need clarification. To me ,meaning is as questionable a term as ,meaning - which I do not use as a primitive term for semiotic. ” In the same letter, he refers to pages 2 to 11 of Bezeichnung und Bedeutung for clarification of terminological problems (cf. such Eco 1972: 70 ff.). In the second volume of this Morris edition, which is expected to be presented in the summer of 1976 and will essentially deal with Morris ’ works on pragmatism, we want to discuss these terminological questions also in connection with the scholastic , Tractatus de modis significandi, whereby we do not aim at finding Morris ’ semiotics ,again in the works of the scholastic modists, but we want to record the largely unknown fact that - with almost entirely different intentions - a strikingly similar terminological structure has developed. The comparison turns out to be not only illuminating for Morris ’ s theory, but also an interesting indication for the history of semiotics, which is still to be written in (cf. Schnelle 1962: 20). 164 Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) ‘ behaviorism ’ , and it would be a serious misunderstanding of Morris to label him as a behaviorist. As will be discussed in 2.4. below, Morris ’ s position is much more accurately captured by the broader conception of a behavioral science inaugurated by Tolman and Hull and by Mead ’ s social philosophy of action. Thus, the term ‘ behavioristics ’ used by Morris should be oriented towards practice, human activity in general. The term “ social sciences ” used here seems to correspond more to these demands (cf. Rossi-Landi 1973: 18). In fixing his terminology, Morris has deliberately chosen the endings on ‘ um ’ , ‘ or ’ and ‘ is ’ , which are prominent in the English language. These endings in, for example, ‘ denotatum ’ , ‘ formator ’ and ‘ semiosis ’ have often been overlooked or neglected. In Signs about Signs about Signs Morris explains his decision by pointing out that the ‘ or ’ and ‘ um ’ endings are used to distinguish what is signified from what is signified. The ‘ is ’ ending in ‘ Semiosis ’ chosen by Morris in Signs, Language, and Behavior overlooks the German translation; the Germanization ‘ Semiose ’ undercuts the explicitly processual aspect that the ending is intended to suggest already in the linguistic form. Thus, it is by no means only a matter of “ cumbersome endings ” , which W. Altenhoff thinks he can omit without further ado, while he writes elsewhere: “ In the choice of suitable German terms, therefore, some considerations must be taken into account which have led to the German text appearing at first glance perhaps more difficult to read than it should ” (Morris 1973, Preface: 67). Obviously, this statement refers only to the neologisms he suggests, such as ‘ Behavioristik ’ / ‘ behaviorism ’ or ‘ Appreziation ’ / ’ appreciation ’ , while elsewhere, as indicated above, he proceeds very inconsistently and discards aids offered by Morris. 2.1 Semiotics, Axiology and Scientific Empiricism In his more than fifty years of research, C. W. Morris has been concerned mainly with two questions: the construction of a general semiotics and the elaboration of a comprehensive axiology. These two areas of research, which Morris strove to integrate early on, however, represent only the culmination of psychological, philosophical, sociological, biological, psychopathological, aesthetic, anthropological, religious considerations. From these manifold interests results a semiotic-axiological model of description, which, due to its broad approach, wants to claim to become an instrument of all sciences. Morris can be considered today as the most important representative of semiotics of the twentieth century. This comprehensive signand value-theoretical research approach has made Morris known “ far beyond the borders of his subject and country ” (Morris 1972, epilogue: 128), which cannot mean, however, that his considerations could be accepted in the desired way. Rossi-Landi hints at these difficulties in his latest essay: “ Morris surpassed the environment in which he happened to live; he was ahead of his time. Precisely because of this he was so much attacked and disturbed in his work - especially by philosophers, who by their ontological nature are quarrelsome, intolerant, and above all always terrified by new and creative ideas ” (Rossi-Landi 1973: 30). Certainly, however, not all criticism against Morris ’ s system can be dismissed as unjustified. The later passages of the introduction will take up some specific problems; at this point, some of the sources that influenced Morris ’ s philosophy or were taken up, modified, and developed by him will be visited. Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) 165 After years of study at the University of Wisconsin and Northwestern University, where Morris began studying engineering and later turned to biology, psychology, and philosophy, he studied at the University of Chicago from 1922 to 1925, when A. W. Moore, J. H. Tufts, E. S. Ames, and especially G. H. Mead and J. Dewey formed the “ Chicago Pragmatist School, ” as W. James and C. S. Peirce called these social-psychological-philosophical thinkers. This name suggests a homogeneity of interests, which actually consisted only in the general orientation towards the broad field of cultural phenomena; the processual analysis of social interaction pursued in many respects represented the actual basis of integration. J. Dewey is considered the real leader of the pragmatic movement. Morris, however, was influenced to a much greater extent by his teacher G. H. Mead, whose philosophical version of social psychology he later compiled, annotated and edited from lecture notes in collaboration with some Chicago colleagues (Mead 1968 as well as Mead 1938). If the Chicago pragmatists were oriented to the general trend of Dewey ’ s way of thinking, their independent, constructive work should not be overlooked. In his extensive philosophical work, Dewey had dealt primarily with ethical questions; Moore examined primarily logical problems; Tufts was specifically interested in ethical and aesthetic problems; and Ames is best described as a philosopher of religion. Morris attended lectures and seminars by all four philosophers, but focused his studies on Mead ’ s philosophy of action, the importance of which is only now generally recognized. It has often been overlooked in the literature that Morris did not become acquainted with Peirce ’ s philosophy until later in life. His actual starting point is Meadian philosophy, besides which the influence of the other Chicago philosophers and C.L Lewis became especially valid; in the following years Morris dealt with C. S. Peirce and. R Carnap. Mead, who had studied with W. James and in Berlin, among others, taught psychology and philosophy in Chicago, with his social psychology as the central focus. Mead ’ s comprehensive cosmological orientation had a lasting effect on Morris ’ s later attitude. Without being able to go into the philosophical-psychological implications of Mead ’ s social philosophy more intensively at this point, however, it can be stated that Morris gained his pragmatic orientation during these Chicago years, which is to be characterized by its comprehensive sociological interest, its processual interaction analysis, and its cosmologically oriented semiotics and axiology. 6 The particular Morrisian philosophy, scientific empiricism, is based on another philosophical current, namely, the ‘ philosophy of language ’ in the broadest sense, developed in the thirties of the twentieth century. The analytic philosophy of the Cambridge school, the Vienna circle, but also the Lviv and Warsaw schools of logic can be characterized on the basis of their common interest in logical analysis of language and the common endeavor to formulate all problems in (natural) scientific language (or to declassify them to ‘ pseudo-problems ’ in case of failure of this method). In the Vienna Circle, which was under the particular influence of M. Schlick and R. Carnap, three main tendencies can be distinguished: a) early empiricism, as advocated by Hume, Mill, and Mach; b) symbolic logic; and c) the logical analysis of language, pursued especially by G. Frege, B. Russell, A. N. Whitehead, and L. Wittgenstein (Kraft 1968). 6 Cf. for a more detailed account of the “ Chicago Pragmatist School ” Morris 1970 and SMITH 1952. 166 Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) Characteristic of the Vienna Circle is thus the connection of (natural) scientific-experimental research with the construction of a scientific language conceived according to logical rules, which should serve as an instrument of linguistic integration of the sciences in the direction of a unified science. In addition to this movement toward the ‘ unity of science ’ , A. Tarski ’ s semantic studies and L Wittgenstein ’ s linguistic analyses must be mentioned in order to understand Morris ’ s attempt to fuse American, pragmatic philosophy with European, logical empiricism in a unified doctrine, scientific empiricism. The goal of this scientific empiricism, too, is to arrive at a unified science based on the language of science, but tied to and verified in reality through sociological and biological investigations and controls of pragmatism. Morris ’ s contribution to the construction of scientific empiricism, which wants to become a new science of man, is to be found above all in his fundamental work on sign theory and value theory and in his active efforts at the philosophers ’ congresses of the 1930s or his collaboration as editor of the “ International Encyclopedia of Unified Science ” and vice-presidency of the Institute for “ Unified Science ” . His behavioral semiotics is therefore based on a theory of language that he drew from logical positivism in his early writings Morris, however, did not limit his work to a descriptive account of the language of science, but established a general theory of signs in use. His behavioral approach lets him understand the communicative situation from the functional context of linguistic signs and the sign behavior motivated (but not determined) by them. Habermas points out that. In his early writings Morris turns against G. H. Mead ’ s theory of language insofar as “ the equality of meaning of symbols presupposed for linguistic communication is not already fulfilled by the uniformity of the reactions per se, but only by the mutual anticipation of the same response behavior ” (cf. Habermas 1970: 150 ff.). Morris overcomes this weakness of the foundations of sign theory and also still of sign, language and behavior in his third, and in this respect most important, semiotic major work Denotation and Meaning where he states that sign theory and value theory are to be investigated in the terms of action or behavior theory as it has essentially been developed by G. H. Mead (Morris 1975: 195 f.). The comprehensive behavioral approach has often led to the misunderstanding that Morris wants to use the instrument of his sign theory “ to judge forms of society on the basis of their mode of communication. The control of the means of communication is thus declared to be the criterion in the assessment of a form of government. Morris wants to read off the democratic content of a community from the degree of private opinion formation ” (Neubert 1962: 75; cf. also Albrecht 1959: 135) 7 . Neubert ’ s criticism of the global claim of the Vienna Circle and the exaggerations and misjudgements of the “ General Semantics ” is certainly justified. However, he overlooks the fact that the relation of language and society is a dialectical relation. Words, once created, develop a relative autonomy and in turn influence the future actions of people. The ,General Semanticist confines his attention exclusively to the empirical relation between words and things, and can therefore grasp only a fragment of the broader relations and more fundamental laws; but it was Morris who determined this word-thing relation as one part of 7 Resnikow also argues that Morris ’ s “ fetishization of signs ” shows his strong influence by general semantics (cf. Resnikow 1963: 114). Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) 167 the three integral elements of the signifying process. Moreover, in his opinion, sign behavior is only one form of human behavior; sign difficulties Morris mentions, in his opinion, arise much more from man ’ s other (social) problems than they cause them (cf. Morris 1973: 288 - 324 as well as Morris 1975: 304 ff.; cf. also Klaus 1969a: 30 ff.). 2.2 Basic lines of Morris ’ s research work Morris has devoted years of research to a critical analysis of logical positivism, traditional empiricism, and pragmatism; pointing out the essential defects of these specific directions and positions led him to a view he calls scientific empiricism. In his view, traditional empiricism suffers from 1) a lack of consideration of the formal sciences (logic and mathematics); 2) an inability to epistemologically combine an empirical theory of meaning with a naturalistic cosmology; and 3) a clear tendency toward individualistic subjectivism. As will be addressed below, these deficiencies run parallel to the neglect of one of the three dimensions of meaning required for a comprehensive analysis of meaning. Pragmatism, in the course of its development, became particularly receptive to the biological sciences, while logical positivism concentrated its efforts mainly on the logical analysis of language, making use of mathematical logic and physics. The scientific empiricism envisaged by Morris was to fulfill the function of clarifying convincingly for the first time the relation between the logical and the biological. 8 Despite apparent divergences and real differences between pragmatism and logical positivism, Morris sees in an empirical analysis of meaning a possibility of integration that would “ include the results of socially cooperative science and do justice to the logical, biological, and empirical aspects of the symbolic process ” (Morris 1975: 112). His conception of scientific empiricism is thus based on expanding the two tendencies ‘ logical analysis of language ’ and ‘ empirical theory of meaning ’ and orienting them to scientific methods and results. 9 This scientific empiricism is based on a three-dimensional semiotics, which unites the most important results from formalism, traditional empiricism 8 In this context, it should also be noted that Morris does not seek to identify semiotics and philosophy. Although Carnap vigorously asserted that “ all philosophy is ‘ linguistic criticism, ’” Morris distances himself from this view in note 11 on page 344 of Signs, Language, and Behaviour ” . In the Grounds of the Theory of Signs I spoke on p. 88 of the ‘ identification of philosophy with the theory of signs and the integration of science by its orientation to the more general and systematic points of view of pure and descriptive semiotics-an identification which now seems to me doubtful on the grounds here given. ” Storer suggests that the reason Morris wanted to reject the identification of philosophy and semiotics is to be found in the realization that his characteristic semiotics can be developed and formulated in behavioral terms and therefore falls entirely within the realm of scientific discourse. This identification had to be rejected already because Morris does not want to see philosophy constricted by an empiricist criterion of meaning. Cf. such: designation and meaning, chap. 3, § 6: Semiotics, Axiology, and Philosophy: it need only be pointed out here that these various conceptions of philosophy can be expressed in semiotic and axiological terms, and that philosophical inquiry is itself to be the source (though not the only source) of semiotic and axiological development. ” 9 The integration of the formal sciences into a. scientific empiricism by no means implies the abolition of the distinction between formal and natural sciences. The formal sciences founded by semiotics are understood as specializations in the general context of the study of meaning, their special function being the demonstration of possible accepted symbol combinations (cf. Morris 1975: 122). 168 Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) and pragmatism; 10 semiotics understood in this way endeavors to correct the errors of traditional empiricism by the other two subfields, without breaking with the empirical tradition. Only a comprehensive sign science will be able to provide the general frame of reference to systematize the various detailed investigations and research perspectives and to subject them to a unified concept. Based on this conviction, Morris, after identifying the three possible types of relations that a sign can maintain, formulated the scope of work of the three sub-disciplines: the study of the relation of signs to objects (the analysis of semantic languages) he assigns to the natural sciences and traditional empiricism; the relation of signs to their producers and users (the analysis of colloquial language) is studied by pragmatists, i. e. psychologists, biologists and social scientists; the third type of relation between signs and other signs (the analysis of formal languages) represents the scope of work of logicians, mathematicians and linguists.The third possible relation between signs and other signs (the analysis of formal languages) is the domain of logicians, mathematicians and linguists (cf. Morris 1975: 127). It should be emphasized that none of the three fields of research can describe “ the ” meaning of signs in its totality, but each group of relations covers only one dimension of meaning. The meaning of a sign is only encompassed by a sum of the three dimensions of meaning formed in the sense of scientific empiricism. Semiotics conceived in the perspective of scientific empiricism has two essential functions. On the one hand, as an autonomous science, it provides insight into the variety of possible sign processes. From the perspective of the unified science program, semiotics as a basis of integration enables the systematization of scientific knowledge (Morris 1973: 332 f.). For its part, this integration process has two aspects: semiotics takes on the task of unifying separate fields under a comprehensive perspective in the course of the research process; in the second insight, decisively influenced by the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle, integration between the terms of the individual sciences and the laws of these sciences is pursued. Semiotics is supposed to consider the following four main points: “ the relation of the ‘ formal sciences ’ to the ‘ natural sciences ’ , the relation of psychology to the biological and physical sciences, the relation of humanistic studies to science, and the relation of philosophy to systematized knowledge ” (ibid.: 334). 11 However, if one takes into account the criticisms expressed by N. Chomsky in his Skinner review, which Morris largely endorses in his commentary on Skinner ’ s Verbal Behavior, the frequently quoted passage on the relation of semiotics and philosophy in the context of the possibility of a unified science appears in a different light: Semiotics (which includes logic), in its extended form, becomes the essential organon of philosophy, for if philosophy is to adequately perform its task of comprehensive systematization, it needs the most adequate knowledge of signs that it can obtain. Semiotics is therefore 10 In his essay Science, Art and Technology, Morris had attempted to describe these three domains through the three primary types of discourse (scientific, aesthetic, and technological discourse), which stand in correspondence to the three functions of signs: 1) relation of the sign to denoted objects; 2) emphasis on the structure of the sign itself; and 3) investigation of the efficacy of signs in the practice of users, 11 Cf. also the criticism of the idea of a unity of science promoted via language structure expressed by K. O. Apel in the preface to the German edition, as well as: Albrecht o. J. Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) 169 fundamentally important material for philosophy, but philosophy is not limited to semiotics, since its discourse is not limited to scientific discourse. And semiotics, for its part, is not a subdivision of philosophy but of science, philosophical language itself being only a part of the subject area it explores. Since semiotic terms are applicable to philosophical language, scientific knowledge about philosophy can be incorporated into a system of unified science (Morris 1973: 349). 12 In his preface to Signs, Language and Behavior, K. O. Apel referred to the program of a “ pragmatically integrated semiotics ” first developed by Morris in 1946. This program, first intended as a complement to Tarski ’ s and Carnap ’ s ideas, starts from the basic social structure of the language situation, which shapes the syntax and semantics of an utterance. While R. Carnap or R. M. Martin relates pure and descriptive pragmatics to language systems and natural languages, respectively, for Morris the distinction seems to stem more from the language or language system itself in which the pragmatic theory is embedded. He conceives descriptive pragmatics as pragmatic metalanguage over a specific language system, and pure pragmatics in the more general reference to all object languages (Martin 1959). This Morrisian differentiation accounts for the two basic semiotic functions, the communicative function and the autonomous function, i. e., as Morris points out by emphasizing the pragmatic aspect in particular, language serves not only to transmit information, but language serves equally to “ direct, in a very direct sense, the whole social behavior of man ” (Hartung 1969: 488). The recognition of the social nature of the linguistic sign demands the transgression of the narrow limits drawn by the logical positivists of the merely syntactically or, in later times, also semantically oriented language analysis in the direction of the investigation of the “ relation between social consciousness, individual consciousness and language ” (ibid.: 493). Recent (text) linguistics has arrived at a similar descriptive model via the detour of communication theory, so that M. Scherner can write: “ we recognize the informationtheoretical-linguistic model of communication between sender (speaker) and receiver (listener/ reader) L.]. Thus the dimension of pragmatics [ … ] becomes foundational for any text analysis ” (Scherner 1972: 61). The significance of three-dimensional semiotics and Morris ’ s conception of discourse types for textual analysis will be addressed below; here attention is directed to two further problems. Habermas reproaches the empirical pragmatics developed by Morris in the context of his behavioral semiotics for being characterized by “ the fact that it introduces the general structures of speech without reference to pragmatic universals, although it must 12 Resnikow denies that a semiotics conceived in the Morrisian sense has this possibility. He writes: “ From this [from the understanding of semiotics as a general science of signs - A. E] Morris concludes that semiotics is a superior science in, which sees above philosophy. Conceited that he has brought about a radical turnaround in the world ’ s outlook, Morris pretentiously declares that semiotics represents a challenge to all previous philosophies and is the introduction to every future philosophy. But it is quite obvious that, for all the importance of the doctrine of sign systems, the doctrine itself can be developed scientifically only on the basis of a true gnoseology, such as the dialectical-materialist epistemology is ” (Resnikow 1963: 114). Cf. also Morris, C. W.: Science, Art and Technology, section 8; Morris, C. W.: Semiotic, The Socio-Humanistic Sciences, and the Unity of Science. Morris sees in the meta-linguistic semiotic approach the possibility to cover all fields of scientific research without narrowing the special character and scope of these disciplines. 170 Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) presuppose the non-objectified sense of these expressions at the level of theory formation ” (Habermas/ Luhmann 1971: 110). 13 The second problem arises from the conception of three-dimensional semiotics, already mentioned several times, that the full meaning of a text can only be elucidated from the analysis of all three dimensions and their mutual relations. Morris has not made a sufficiently clear hierarchization of these three dimensions, even though he repeatedly stresses the importance of the pragmatic dimension. However, if one takes into account the effect and function of language in social life, a hierarchization of the relations of the linguistic sign is necessary, whereby the relation between the sign and its users is the most comprehensive and has a decisive influence on the other two relations of signs (cf. Klaus 1969a: 16 ff.). One cannot even fully understand Morris ’ own semiotics if one does not at the same time take into account his theory of values. This demand becomes especially clear in connection with Morris ’ statements on aesthetics since he holds the opinion that the denotata of aesthetic signs are values or denote value properties. A value, following Perry and Mead, is conceived as a property of an object in relation to an individual interested in it. This formulation of ‘ value ’ takes into account the social embeddedness or pragmatic orientation of values, because values do not exist prior to any human experience, but develop and change in society. The tendency of a value to complete an action by achieving the required object emphasizes the close relation of values and reality. Morris by no means wishes to discuss any abstract problems of value, but his behavioral approach directs him to practical contexts in which valuations are made. Thus, using a semiotic approach, he can state that values are organized by behavioral families that direct a common preference behavior toward specific objects, i. e., that the sign user assigns or denies values to a property or object in the evaluation process. F. Rossi-Landi shows that the approach chosen by Morris also raises some serious problems, because the value-theoretical investigation understood in this way must, in his opinion, be limited to what people utter; what is not uttered cannot be investigated. Rossi-Landi believes that from this restriction to actual utterances it must ultimately follow that the value domain remains essentially unexplored, because with the help of this approach it is not possible to fully get at what was going on in people before they said anything (Rossi-Landi 1953b: 107). These four essential aspects of Morris ’ s theory experienced a very different reception. It is significant that Knilli, in his afterword to. the Foundations of the Theory of Signs, refers to Morris as the first sign theorist “ who has become known as such far beyond the boundaries of his discipline and country ” (Morris 1972: 128). As emphasized in the present section, however, Morris ’ s theory cannot be accurately described without his extensive work on value theory (cf. Bense 1971: 68 ff. as well as Schulz 1972: 70 ff.). The direct or indirect references to his theory of signs mentioned by Knilli all too often refer exclusively to the first two main works or even consider only the basics of the theory of signs An adequate assessment of his extensive work on the theory of signs, however, can 13 Habermas is obviously referring to the two earlier semiotic works in making this statement, but he overlooks (that the notion of a relationless empirical pragmatics in denotation and meaning has been largely abandoned in favor of a more general sign reference system. Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) 171 only be made if, in addition to the in many respects modified and more far-reaching writing Bezeichnung und Bedeutung, his essays and reviews are also included in the discussion. Only in more recent times, apart from three-dimensional semiotics, to which, in our opinion, the consideration of Morris ’ s work is largely limited, other aspects find their way into the discussion. Here we should mention G. Klaus ’ analyses of the language of politics, in which he makes a special effort to specify the types of political and propagandistic discourse, following Morris ’ proposed division into 16 possible main discourse types; A. Müller ’ s dissertation, which is mentioned in the following section, deals with some serious ‘ problems of behaviorist semiotics ’ . As a glance at the bibliography shows, the Italian reception of Morris ’ s work differs substantially from the German one. Besides the early translations, there are a number of informative essays by S. Ceccato, F. Fano, A. Galimberti, and others, as well as F. Rossi- Landi ’ s extensive studies on Morrisian axiology and semiotics and, above all, his monograph Charles Morris, which set the trend for the reception of Morris. 2.3 Problems of behaviorist semiotics All pragmatic inquiry is behaviorist in some sense. Reiwald thinks that behaviorism, which has been so successful in America, is rejected in Europe because of a misunderstanding: “ There has not been a sufficient distinction between behaviorism as a scientific method of inquiry and behaviorism as a scientific insight or even a worldview ” (Segerstedt 1947, editor ’ s preface). This view is taken up by the thesis that something is communicated with every behavior, or conversely, that nothing can be communicated without some behavior (Rossi-Landi 1973: 24). However, a theory of signs or a theory of values is usually a theory for someone. Therefore, it is certainly impossible to build a sign theory or a value theory under complete abstraction of psychology. The great importance of Morris ’ s research work is therefore to be sought in the fact that it has awakened interest in anthropological and sociological moments in the speech process and has emphasized the action side of language in addition to the recognition side ” (Schmidt 1969: 27). In examining the factors involved in the communication process, i. e., in emphasizing the aspects observable in the communication situation, behaviorism overlooks the fact that only certain parts of human behavior can be explained in terms of stimulus and response; other aspects cannot be interpreted in these terms. Rossi-Landi, for example, points out that the processes by means of which, for example, human values are produced are not observable, or that no necessary relation can be established between them and the subsequent observable behavior of the producing creature (Rossi-Landi 1953b: 109). Only the results of these processes are observable. Insofar as the manifestations of these processes are of a linguistic nature, Morris is certainly right to emphasize the influx of certain wolters on behavioral control, because in contrast to R Römer (1972: 25) 14 we assume that the words we hear exert certain effects on us (cf. Klaus 1969n 36 ff. as well as 52). 14 She concludes her essay with the sentence: “ On closer inspection, all linguistic effects (sic! ) dissolve into nothing. ” 172 Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) On the other hand, the tendency of behaviorism to reduce thinking to language cannot be denied. From the behaviorist point of view this reduction must seem reasonable, because he considers consciousness to be a fiction or wants to replace statements about consciousness by statements about observable behavior. Some kinds of signs are certainly explainable within the framework of this theory - e. g. signals and so-called signs which often lead to a direct, certain behavior. Language signs, however, cannot be adequately described by the simple stimulusresponse model, because every intentional act, every information storage, and especially every more abstract thought process and conceptual generalization are based on generalization patterns that ensure the relation between reality and human consciousness. This orthodox behaviorist position, such as that taken by L. Bloomfield, 15 criticizes Morris. In his view, it is wrong to identify a sign with a stimulus that elicits the same response as something else. Likewise, Morris distances himself from the view that a sign is something that affects the response to a stimulus that is not present at the moment. This would make the concept of sign so indeterminate that one could also call a drug a sign (cf. Spang Hanssen1954: 80 ff.). The critique of the early behaviorist position, as well as the recognition that there can be meaningful utterances that do not elicit observable responses in the hearer, and that observable responses can take on a wide range of variation without changing meaning, motivated Morris to refine and develop the behaviorist theory of meaning. In his view, the sign must be conceived as a preparatory stimulus that provides in the living being the conditions necessary for a specific action; manifest behavior, however, will occur only when further conditions are added in the form of need tension and additional stimulus properties. A. Müller mentions some difficulties that even this improved theory cannot resolve. A closer examination of the signifying process would reveal that the conception which regards the interpreter merely as something latent neglects the fact that the signifying process is not a mere construction of a potentiality; the living being can fall back on developed patterns which allow it to use signs in a meaningful way without resulting in later observable reactions. Alston asks himself which semantically relevant dispositions are evoked by historical statements. He is of the opinion that the criteria of “ firstness ” and “ credibility of the source ” must also be included in the canon of conditions, because only if the listener receives information for the first time and also believes that his informant is giving him correct information, he will show the willingness to behave in the way intended by the listener (Alston 1964: 29 ff.). Understanding the interpretant in terms of muscular or glandular activity also obstructs the possibility of subsuming perceptions to the interpretant concept that do not entail motor activity. Likewise, considerable difficulties arise when the behavioral scientist tries to determine the meaning of signs as dispositions to certain reactions. A. Müller points out that a disposition to certain reaction sequences constituted by a sign S confronts a group of 15 Bloomfield writes that “ the meaning of a linguistic form … is … the situation in which the speaker utters it and the response which it calls forth in the hearer ” (Bloomfield 1962: 237). Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) 173 controlling observers with the insoluble problem of ascribing to S a meaning “ which is binding for all of them and which they accept ” (Müller 1970: 20 ff.). An additional problem would be to determine the living being ’ s behavior as a meaningful action and to distinguish it from drug-influenced and reflex behavior. “ The enumeration of adequate conditions for the existence of a corresponding disposition that gives S meaning ” (ibid.: 29) is endless. But if one wants to provide a valid list of the necessary criteria for meaning, the meaning of the sign S must be known in advance to the observers. Now, however, the utterances accessible to communicative experience are products generated on the background of more general speech structures, which can be determined as meaningful only by recourse to the linguistic competence of the behavioral scientist (cf. Habermas/ Luhmann 1971: 102 ff.). Now it hardly happens by chance that the interpretant concept has met with such vehement rejection by so many scholars who try to twist it by misunderstanding (interpretant = interpreter or message receiver) 16 . This interpretant concept, in fact, implies a view that fixes semiotics to the study of cultural phenomena and detaches it from the metaphysics of the referent (cf. Eco 1971: 25 ff.). Certainly, the behaviorist view that meaning can be identified with the behavior of a living being is valid only in very limited, pre-linguistic situations. Social interactions, which can no longer be interpreted on the basis of the simple stimulus-response scheme, require more differentiated procedures, which must be based on a comprehensive analysis of the linguistic situation (cf. Schaff 1969: 241 ff.). In Denotation and Meaning, Morris addresses some - though not all - of the above criticisms by extending the basic semiotic conceptuality to include the context in which signs occur. This context, which has relevance as a reference quantity of every designation process, imposes in this third semiotic major work the condition that every specific action must be examined in a specific situation in order to be able to determine the specific designation dimensions of the signs occurring in this action (Morris 1975: 200). K. O. Apel, in his preface to Signs, Language and Behavior, addresses the “ principal impossibility ” of resolving “ on the basis of methodological behaviorism the problem of understanding (or misunderstanding) action-intentions and sign-meanings ” (Morris 1973, Editor ’ s Preface: 27). At this point it is necessary to quote a somewhat lengthy passage from The Pragmatic Movement in American Philosophy, which should clarify Morris ’ s concept of behavior: There are problems in the relations of the terms ‘ action ’ , ‘ behavior ’ and ‘ conduce ’ . Currently the term “ behavior ” is widely employed (as in the phrase “ the behavioral sciences ” ), but a growing number of psychologists object to its application to man. The early pragmatists more often used the terms ‘ action ’ or ‘ conduce ’ . Where a distinction is not important, ‘ behavior ’ and ‘ action ’ will be here employed interchangeably. But it must be carefully noted that use of the term ‘ behavior ’ does not involve a commitment to the ‘ behaviorism ’ of John B. Watson. [ … ] The behavioral (or actional) emphasis long antedated Watsonian behaviorism. [ … ] As a student of Mead I came to employ the term ‘ behavior ’ in his sense, and to use it freely. If the present-day reader is bothered by the terms 16 Cf. for example Dewey 1946: 85 - 95). 174 Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) ‘ behavior ’ and ‘ behavioral ’ he can substitute in what follows the terms ‘ action ’ and ‘ action ’ (Morris 1970: 43). Certainly it has to be emphasized that a behaviorist reduction of the pragmatic interpretation and language theories of C. S. Peirce and G. H. Mead falls short. The basic deficiencies of the behaviorist position, however, are definitively left behind by Morris when he interprets his term ‘ reaction disposition ’ , introduced in Signs, Language and Behavior, in terms of expectation or change (Morris 1975: 280 f.). In his earlier statements on sign theory, Morris did not discuss how the linguistic sign differs essentially from those sign varieties of those living beings that do not have language. His earlier sign theory was content with generalizing non-linguistic sign situations and pointing to the conventional character of linguistic symbols labeled as lan signs. This concept of conventionality, which Morris deliberately avoids because of possible errors concerning the origin of language, is, however, included in Morris ’ s concept of sign in the broadest possible interpretation. A differentiation criterion could be developed via the five constitutional conditions of language, which separates signals and symbols sufficiently clearly; this - applied - sign reference system, to which Morris must necessarily refer in signs, language and behavior, finds a clear expression in designation and meaning. Having sufficiently clarified the notion of signal, Morris can state that the lower limit of linguistic sign behavior “ becomes an empirical problem after one has decided on the criterion for sign behavior ” (ibid.). However, what A. Schaff calls “ fetishization of the sign ” (Schaff 1969: 240) is not abolished. This problem will be dealt with in point 2.6. 2.4 Problems of the designation and meaning process Morris has refined his conception of the signifying situation over the course of his three major semiotic works. In the Foundations of the Theory of Signs, the signifier, 17 the interpreter, the interpretant, and the designatum constitute the sign process Sign, Language, and Behavior replaces the term ‘ designatum ’ and differentiates into designation and denotation. Finally, in denotation and denotation the context is introduced as a general reference quantity and the term ‘ sense ’ , which has deliberately remained unconsidered so far, is made more precise to the extent that it includes both denotation and the interpretant resulting from it. Whereas traditional semantics focused its attention only on the empirical relation between word and thing, three-dimensional semiotics allows for an approach that recognizes this word-thing relation as only one of the three integrating elements of the overall signifying process; i. e. in the meta-linguistic conception of semiotics, it is impossible to talk about the object language in the meta-language without considering all three semiotic dimensions at the same time. The distinction between significatum and denotatum is intended to do justice to the difference between object and object property. The signifier is determined as a “ class ” of conditions, properties or characteristics or as a “ kind ” of object. However, what is meant by ‘ class ’ or ‘ kind ’ is functional or symbolic object or functional or symbolic situation with 17 Cf. for the definition of this and the following terms the glossary in Morris 1973. Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) 175 object properties. If one does not interpret the concept of class used by Morris in terms of complex symbolic functions, difficulties arise in distinguishing it from Platonic ideas (cf. Gentry 1944: 376 - 384). In Designation and Meaning, Morris takes up this objection: Designations are not “ entities in any erroneous understanding, but [they are] certain describable aspects of complex behavioral processes in the natural world ” (Morris 1975: 201). Morris therefore starts his differentiation of designation (extension) and denotation (intension) from the following premise: These two aspects are not equivalent, but the denotation carries the final determination. Therefore, denotation must precede designation, but is thereby determined by denotation. Denotation then turns out to be the sign process directed towards the object to be denoted, 18 while denotation 19 can be described as interpretation (cf. Stiehl 1970: 37) 20 of a sign that has previously fulfilled its denotation function (cf. Bense/ Walther 1973: 18 ff. as well as 89). From this assumption follows that every sign must have a designation, but not every sign has a denotatum. The decision whether a sign merely designates or also denotes can only be verified in practice, because what a sign designates is not given by a ‘ referent ’ , but acquires its validity only in the concrete interpretation process of the sign user. Any attempt to determine the “ referent ” of a sign requires the definition of the “ referent ” in terms of a cultural convention. Accordingly, denotation could be understood as the modality of designation freed from the ‘ referent ’ . 21 Therefore, the comparison between designation and designated reality “ gives the meaning to the linguistic sign in the last instance, practice verifies the meaning, practice changes the meaning of linguistic expressions according to scientific, cultural, production, etc. needs ” (Klaus 1969b: 110). 18 If the empirical conditions necessary for the prediction of a signified object are known to the interpreter, one can say that the denotation of this object is known to the sign interpreter. The denotation process thus establishes the relation between the particular sign carrier with the action tendency of the sign interpreter (cf. Habermas 1970: 151 ff.). 19 Besides the property of the object and the contextual conditions, which together influence the sign interpreter, the meaning. however, is also constituted by “ the internal mental conditions they encounter and which “ refract ” the stimulus properties on the background of pre-existing individual and sociocultural experiences (cf Rubinstein 1968). One could extend Morris ’ s concept of designation and meaning in this respect without thereby abandoning its characteristic features. 20 In determining the denotation of a sign as a two-digit relation, Stiehl overlooks the fact that the sign interpretation must be carried out by an interpreter, i. e. it must be at least a three-digit relation: Z denotes 0 for M (cf. Klaus 1969a: 13). 21 A. Nehring argues that “ the sign receiver does not need to ‘ interpret ’ the sign. For if it is to fulfill its purpose, the sign-recipient must know its meaning as well as the sign-giver ” (Nehring 1963: 27) It is certainly true that sign-makers as well as sign-recipients must be members of a communication community; but now by no means all signs are interpersonal signs or com-signs, but receive their current communicative valence only in the respective communication process, which must prove through communication whether the physical signals can assume sign character for the sign-user or not. The meaning of a sign is not an identifiable, objective thing that can be isolated from the sign in any way. Only the interpreter has the sense in his interpretation, but not the isolated sign, i. e. the sign-interpreter decides whether to regard an object as a sign or not. This decision proceeds independently of whether a sign denotes or not. 176 Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) Denotation is therefore not a fixed, unchanging basic meaning. The denotation of a sign can only be inferred from the dynamics of the current speech situation, because any notion that assumes a rigid word meaning overlooks (that it is a special case when the noun assumes denotation function. A third component must be added to the designation and denotation process in the form of character usage rules, which must be assigned to each character A character usage rule, which can also be called a meaning criterion, must be present in each character in addition to its designation. Being “ meaningful ” and “ denoting ” are not identical. According to this understanding, ‘ sign ’ , ‘ semiosis ’ and ‘ sense ’ each illuminate one of the three dimensions of sense; however, ‘ sense ’ also includes the relations of the special sign carriers, interpreters and interpreters in the discussion, in addition to ‘ designation and denotation aspects ’ (cf. Rossi-Landi 1973: 41 f.). Eco proposes that the meaning of a sign be conceived as the interpreter of a sign carrier, understood as a cultural entity identified in the context of other entities expressed by other sign carriers. He writes: Actually a cultural unit is not isolated merely by the running of the interpretants. It is defined in as much as it is ‘ placed ’ in a system of other cultural units which are opposed to it or circumscribe it. A cultural unit subsists and is recognized to the extent to which there exists another one which bears a differential value. It is the relationship between the various terms of a system of cultural units which takes from each one of the terms what is conveyed by the others (Eco 1971: 27). Accordingly, the range of variation and changeability illuminates from the linguistic context in which the linguistic sign fulfills its sign function; this ‘ linguistic context ’ , which is determined by factual factors, but always also by individual, emotional experiential values, must not be isolated from the social context which determines the word meaning in each case for a specific behavior in relation to a real, social situation. Therefore, denotation must be determined as the position that a sign occupies in a system on the basis of contextual conditions. The concretization of this paradigmatic understanding of denotation is done on the background of the specific sign usage rules in order to determine the respective position in the semantic field with the help of the denotation. 2.5 Sign concept and semiosis Semiotics deals with signs in a social context. According to their content, signs are already historically conditioned, “ i. e. they carry a social, societal character ” (Albrecht 1961: 365). Linguistic signs are furthermore distinguished by the fact that they are not bound in their effect to the circumstances in which they originated (Denk 19: 126). In Signs, Language, and Behavior, the following conditions are listed for something to be called a sign: If anything, A, is a preparatory stimulus that, in the absence of stimulus objects that tend to initiate response sequences of a particular behavioral family, causes a disposition in an organism to respond under certain conditions by response sequences of that behavioral family, then A is a sign (Morris 1973: 84). Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) 177 Morris emphasizes that this formulation of conditions is not a sign definition, 22 and he also leaves open the question of whether there are signs that do not meet these conditions. Any communication that transports messages from a sender to a receiver must use certain characters to convey them. A sign must be represented at least as a four-digit relation: A denotes an object B to an interpreter C in a context D ’ , because signs do not refer to isolated objects in reality; signs exist only in relation to people who are members of a social group, and who use signs in an unbounded sign process. 23 This sign functions in the sign process determined as a five-digit relation: ‘ v, w, x, y, z - in which v evokes in w the disposition to respond in a certain way x to a certain kind of object y (which then does not act as a stimulus) under certain conditions z. ’ In the cases where this relation holds, the v ’ s are signs, the w ’ s are interpreters, the x ’ s are interpretants, the y ’ s are designations, and the z ’ s are the contexts in which the signs occur ” (Morris 1975: 200). Morris recognizes two different types of signs: signals and symbols. Signals and symbols are signs because they both have the function of representing a state of affairs to a sign user. Symbols can be understood as ‘ signals of signals ’ . Signals are mainly linked to animal behavior, while symbols are essentially human performances. Signals and symbols also differ in the degree of reliability. While signals are often an empirical relation between objects, the conventional (where conventional is used here in the sense of ‘ based on rules of formation and transformation ’ ) symbol has a much higher reliability, which is bound to the existence of the sign function. A symbol 24 must fulfill the additional requirement of being a sign producible by its interpreter, acting as a substitute for other signs with which it is synonymous (ibid.: 101). Now, the condition of being producible by its interpreter by no means establishes that it is a “ linguistic ” sign, for this also requires the relation to the context in which this sign operates to be established. Finally, linguistic signs must be interpersonal 25 in order to fulfill their communicative function. The division 22 Cf. ibid.: 31; Apel there calls this formulation of the sign process a ‘ quasi-definition ’ because Morris allegedly claims to have “ formulated the sufficient conditions for establishing a sign-function and to that extent to have fulfilled the basic requirement of a behaviorist semiotics. ” Cf. also Black (1949: 175), who acknowledges that. Morris specifies only the sufficient conditions, he nevertheless expresses the assumption that, “ in practice, Morris does use his defining criteria as both necessary and sufficient. ” In Signs about Signs about Signs, Morris again explains his intention; it is only the mention of necessary as well as sufficient conditions that Morris understands as definition; Morris calls the specification of sufficient, but not necessary, conditions partial analysis of a term. He particularly emphasizes that ‘ sign ’ was only partially analyzed, but not defined (Morris 1975: 164; cf. also Morris 1973: 86, note 7). 23 E. Walther is of the opinion that also “ an arbitrary single sign, selected as a means from a repertoire, denotes something and means something to someone (Walther 1971: 423). Cf. also George (1964: 85); he writes: “ in fact this very confusion may well be the result of -thinking of word signs ( … 1 as being prior to sentence signs, since there is a great deal to be said for the view that sentences in behavior are prior to words, and that sense and meaning really apply to senores rather than wads (emphasis mine - A. E.). This means that in so far as words lace ‘ fire ’ or ,help , for example are meaningful in isolation, they are so merely because they are shorthand for sentences. ” Cf. on this such: Klaus 1969b: 83; Klaus determines the term sign as a three-digit relation: ,x into a sign for y in the language system Z. 24 Nehring finds it surprising that Morris cannot detect any difference between his and the traditional conception of a symbol (Nehring 1963: 79). Morris, however, speaks of symbols in the passage cited by Nehring, but of iconic signs, which form a subclass of symbols (cf. Morris 1973: 103). 25 Certainly Nehring is mistaken in assuming that in principle every sign must be “ interpersonal ” because its task is precisely to “ establish a contact between two or more persons ” . Mostly it is possible to determine the designation of a special sign for a certain interpreter, and in this respect there are hardly any completely 178 Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) of the existing signs into linguistic and non-linguistic signs is already important because communication is also carried by non-linguistic signs and not all non-linguistic, communicative signs (gestural, mimic signs etc.) can be formulated with the help of linguistic signs (cf. Stiehl 1970: 35). In a further differentiation Morris distinguishes between sign carrier and sign family, which is introduced following Peirce ’ s distinction of ‘ type ’ and ‘ token ’ : “ A single physical event - such as a particular sound, point, or motion - that is a sign is called a sign carrier. A group of similar sign carriers that have the same signifiers for a given interpreter is called a sign family ” (Morris 1973: 96). Spang-Hanssen sees in the differentiation into ‘ sign-bearer ’ and ‘ sign-family ’ the reason why this sign-classification, which determines signs in relation to their denotata, only leads to the “ irrelevant and misleading question of empirical truth ” (Spang-Hanssen 1954: 88f). In his opinion, the sign should be determined in relation to its signifiers, which would allow a differentiation into natural and arbitrary signs. However, the differentiation into ‘ natural signs and arbitrary signs ’ exists only for the respective interpreter, because in order to be able to speak of natural signs, they must also be social; they can be called natural only because their sign bearers occur in nature and have not been produced by man. Spang-Hanssen also overlooks the fact that there are two uses of ‘ sign ’ , the confusion of which is based on an epistemological error. First, it is used to designate physical entities - sound waves, printer ’ s ink on paper, chalk mounds on the blackboard - and second, it is used to designate the abstraction class of such physical signals. Morris corresponds to these two meanings of ‘ sign ’ with his differentiation. 2.6 Text concept and communication The traditional notion of sign, which focuses on the relation of a single sign to the object it designates and is also essentially limited to the study of so-called conventional signs, proves to be useless in clarifying the function of the use of signs by sign interpreters in a socially 26 determined sign process, because the demonstration that a linguistic expression refers to some state of affairs captures only one function of this linguistic expression (cf. Alston 1964: 15). But since language, by its very nature, was created by and for communication, which strives to cope more adequately with reality, communication analysis has to start from this relation of language to reality, i. e., the communicator ’ s communicated knowledge of the world and the overarching, objective structures (cf. Oller 1972: 45). Therefore, one must “ primarily place signs and sign use in the framework of a strategy pursued by sign users in a society. And such goals link to roles of producers and recipients or roles of different kinds of recipients in processing processes of signs and sign agglomerates. Accordingly, such a dynamic or strategic notion of sign will be more able to address communication via text [ … ] ” (Wienold 1972: 204). An analysis of the complex process of communication is thus subject to at least six conditions, which Morris largely mentions in personal signs. But every note written in a private secret writing, every “ unchangeable ” sign of a mentally ill person, or every sign in the process of language acquisition should not necessarily be called interpersonal. 26 Neubert states that “ the language of the community first creates the conditions for the thinking and feeling of the individual ” (Neubert 1962: 78 f.). Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) 179 his definition of language mentioned earlier. 1) there must be a speaker and a listener 27 involved in the communication process who 2) use objective, physical signs; 3) the physical signals must be repeatedly realizable by the members of the communication community (cf. Schmidt 1966: 19 as well as Habermas 1970: 150 ff.); 4) the signs must refer to the sign object (denotatum); 5) there must be rules in the social communication situation that establish a relation between sign and denotatum. The relations between the sign and the denotatum are largely the result of social actions. Now, by no means all rules of constitution have been socially established, and there are elements that are not yet socially determined (cf. La Drière 1957: 94). This latter aspect, that the realization of meaning is essentially based on a rule, i. e., the regulation of the uses of signs, has been elaborated especially in Signs, Language, and Behavior (cf. Antal 1963: 26). 6) language is a system of signs that has emerged in and with the history of individual and social consciousness (cf. Schmidt 1966: 12). 28 The constitution of meaning by the text user is based on the assumption that a text is not a 29 completed, once given, meaning-bearing game, but it only becomes active in the respective realization by the recipient, so that ‘ text ’ is always to be understood in the sense of ‘ text realization ’ (cf. Scherner 1972: 53 f.). This understanding of the text is firstly determined by the insight mentioned above that a single sign is meaningless 30 and only attains meaning in the context of the overarching sign structure; 31 the communicative situation as the second essential criterion for the constitution of the text does not assume a rigid basic meaning of a single word that can only be received by the respective communicant, but determines the function and the value of the single sign from the overall structure of the communicative act, i. e. from the non-linguistic surrounding features that Morris addresses by the attributes ‘ pre-linguistic ’ and ‘ postlinguistic ’ 32 , the addressed object characteristics, the specific interests of the sign user and the expectations of the recipient (cf. Morris 1975: 104). 27 The inclusion of a ‘ sign ’ -analysis and the consideration of the intentions of the sign-giver, which A. Nehring demands for an adequate description of sign-processes and sign-behavior, both of which he misses in Morris, are explicitly mentioned in Morris ’ definition of language: ‘ language ’ wind defined in terms of lanagram systems, which are distinguished by the fact that they are built up of com sign families, which the members of the interpreter community can produce and determine with common signifiers, whereby in linguistic communication the produced signs, com symbols (a special class of interpersonal signs) directed from a communicator to a communicant, meet specific expectancies and evoke certain action tendencies (cf. Morris 1973, Glossary: s. v. com sign, sign use, interpersonal sign, interpreter, communication, communicator, communicant, lan sign system, semiosis; and Morris 1975: 219 ff. and 283 ff.). 28 This language constitution condition mentioned under point 6) is largely neglected by the Morris definition. However, since language is also understood by Morris as a social, dynamic system, it is necessary to explicitly include this historical component in the definition (cf. also Neubert 1962: 78f). 29 For a contrary view, cf. Pos 1947/ 48: 284. 30 If only isolated words with rigid meanings were available to the communicating individual, language could not be considered an instrument of interpersonal relations. 31 P. Hartmann has therefore proposed a new definition of the concept of sign, which determines as “ original linguistic sign ” not the individual word, but the text. (cf. Hartmann 1968: 205 - 222). 32 Morris only hesitantly takes note of the fact that signs are not only used in an actual communication situation, but furthermore activate subvocal side effects in human consciousness, which need not necessarily be reflected in observable behavior (cf. Wiener 1970: 10). A more comprehensive theory of signs would have to develop this hitherto largely neglected component. 180 Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) This pragmatic, processual definition of text, which is reflected in Morris ’ s concept of discourse, does justice to the twofold orientation of any expectation, which is precisely not only directed at an object, but also includes the social and individual-emotional attitudes in the consideration. Only this second, individual-socio cultural aspect of the current piece of speech, which abandons the static, merely object-related concept of text in favor of a dynamic understanding of text integrated into the communication situation, enables a more adequate analysis of understanding and interpretation (cf. Morris 1973, editor ’ s preface: 27 ff.). On the basis of this processual understanding of text, Morris proposes his differentiation, already mentioned above, of the various specializations of language into sixteen possible main types of discourse. This text type classification, which assumes that language not only has an informative character, but also addresses emotions, wants to initiate valuations, determines social behavior, in short covers the entire field of social behavior (cf. Hartung 1969: 488), takes place on the basis of a categorization according to the sign usage prevailing in this text process and the primary designation dimension of the signs represented in it. From the principle twofoldness of the signification process and the orientation of the semiotic process to superordinate patterns of reference it becomes clear that a specific sign already because of the subjective component in the process of understanding cannot condition a causal, unambiguously predictable effect, but “ the words trigger a whole series of programs which overlie the process of understanding, which modify it, slow it down, speed it up or steer it in a certain direction. These programs take the form of attitudes, evaluation systems, judgment systems, and also prejudice systems ” (ibid.). In summary, the pragmatically conceived concept of discourse in Morrisian semiotics, which has been taken up and extended in modern text linguistics, represents a significant contribution to a more precise analysis of sign behavior. 33 2.7 The conception of a semiotic aesthetics We have seen that the analysis of any semiotic process necessarily implies recourse to the existence of an integrating system (Mayenowa 1967: 61). However, the consideration of the structural core of a work of art, fixed in the manifest piece of text, the dramaturgical instruction, the specific composition of colors, surfaces, figures, etc. in painting or in related phenomena, constitutes only one essential component in the process of analysis. With a broad understanding of the concept of text, which, abstracting from the respective materiality, also includes the picture, the film, the sculpture, etc., the analysis of art also has to answer the question of the constitution of the work of art via the actualization of the characteristics of meaning and designation (cf. Schmidt 1971). The art analysis, which is 33 Rossi-Landi suggests abandoning the term sign-hooking, because it suggests that there must be something like non-sign-behavior (cf. above, section 2.3.). “ An examination of the situation convinces us instead that all behavior is, in different ways, sign-behavior; so that what Morris was really trying to do was to individuate a particular type of sign-behavior ” (Rossi-Landi 1973: 44). If one then understands this more localized signbehavior in terms of language-behavior in general, whereby this latter term encompasses both interpreters and sign-relations established on the basis of conventions, one arrives at an understanding of the sign-process that corresponds to the maxims mentioned by Wienold (cf. also such Wienpahl 1949: 253). Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) 181 oriented towards the understanding of the work of art and which proves to be a communicative problem with regard to the mediation aspect, places the contemporary art theory in the larger context of a more comprehensively conceived communication analysis (cf. Bense 1967: 18). The far-reaching Morrisian approach can do justice to these two integrating components of art analysis because this theory is fundamentally discursively oriented and not, like e. g. Saussure, on the basis of a statistical concept of language structure, has to understand concrete texts (als ‘ parole ’ ) as a mere emanation of the pre-ordered system Furthermore, with his interpretation of the work of art in terms of a supericon, Morris has created an instrument - albeit not unproblematic - that can look back on a certain success, since it is “ one of the most convenient and obviously satisfactory attempts to define an image semantically ” (Eco 1972: 200). Morris ’ s conception of semiotic aesthetics has provoked extensive discussion, 34 highlighting some difficulties in this understanding that will be addressed below. In his 1939 essays (Aesthetics and Sign Theory and Science, Art and Technology), Morris conceived of the work of art as an iconic sign that also denotes value. Morris abandoned this extreme position in Sign, Language, and Behavior (230 ff. and 194 ff.), where he states that iconicity is not an absolute criterion of the arts, although some works of art are particularly distinguished by a high proportion of iconic features. The earlier position is also abandoned insofar as the signs of the work of art need not belong exclusively to the appraisitive mode of designation, but can also designate designatively, prescriptively, and formatively. This extension takes into account the insight that no type of sign is aesthetic per se; the common characteristic of the arts formulated in Sign, Language, and Behavior is accordingly based on the valuative use of signs (Wimsatt 1946: 180 - 185). 35 Designation and meaning revisits the discussion of art that was only marginally addressed in Zeichen, Sprache und Verhalten and inquires into the part that semiotics and axiology can play in the analysis of art. The signification aspect is explored through an analysis of the designative, appraisitive, and prescriptive dimensions of signification. The differences between operational, imagined, and object values are relevant to the meaning of an artwork. Furthermore, Bezeichnung und Bedeutung retracts the statement that an iconic sign occupies a special position insofar as the sign carrier exhibits those properties that are designated. 36 Extending and specifying the earlier position, Bezeichnung und Bedeutung strives above all to clarify the relation of the artwork to values. In this context, a differentiation is to be made between a mediated representation or embodiment of the value by the sign and an unmediated one by the sign bearer. Furthermore, in this context, an attempt could be made to grasp “ aesthetic perception ” 34 Cf. the bibliography in Morris 1975. 35 Wimsatt considers this emphasis on the intentions of the sign user to be a step backward from the earlier formulation. This seems an unfortunate step away from whatever was objective in the earlier formulation. The earlier view of art signs as iconic appraisers would seem to have done more justice to the fact that art signs are esteemed as signs successful in some general way, not in the limited and personal way that somebody ’ s intention is accomplished upon somebody else, but in some way related to the properties of the world of denoted objects ” (Wimsatt 1946: 184). 36 For a detailed discussion of the iconic sign cf. Eco 1972: 200 ff. 182 Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) in the categories of Mead ’ s philosophy of action; the relation of sign and values then proves to be an open question; semiotics and axiology could assume a mediating function in this investigation. Aesthetics, Signs, and Icons takes up again the discussion of art begun in 1939 and examines above all the question of whether a work of art can be conceived as a sign at all. The possibility, already mentioned in Bezeichnung und Bedeutung, of linking the indirect and immediate aspects of aesthetic experience by means of the distinction between signs and sign carriers already made in Grundlagen der Zeichentheorie finally leads to the discussion of the problematic concept of iconicity, which will be taken up below. The concept of iconicity is undoubtedly useful in aesthetics, but it must be subjected to extensive analysis and specification, just as the specific objects of study in aesthetic syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics must be more precisely defined. Thus, the topic of semiotic research must remain to investigate the place and possibilities of sign-theoretic-valuetheoretic analysis for a more adequate grasp of aesthetics. In his work on aesthetics, Morris has always endeavored to design a model of description that does not merely capture isolated aspects of a specific work of art, or that attempted to claim the entire realm of aesthetic phenomena as the domain of semiotics, but rather the meta-linguistic approach of his semiotics aims at a three-dimensional analysis, which for methodological reasons can be subdivided into aesthetic syntactics, aesthetic semantics, and aesthetic pragmatics, and which is aesthetic insofar as it is applicable to the domain of aesthetics. Most accurately, his work could be described as ‘ semiotic aesthetics ’ , since the attempt is made to apply general research results of sign science to the specific field of aesthetics (cf. Rossi-Landi 1973: 12 f.). This sign analysis, understood in this way, can start from the premise that the art object in modern aesthetics is primarily conceived as the conscious generation of artistic forms over a repertoire of material elements. The elements used in this production process, such as the artistic form achieved, are to be regarded as signs open to sign analysis (cf. Bense 1971: 49 f.), whereby in a semiotic approach it is by no means material elements, but rather qualitative, content-related features of the physical sign carriers pointing beyond them that form the object of investigation. The specifically aesthetic aspect of such an approach to the art object does not follow from any kind of elemental quality, but is determined as a textual function (Schmidt 1971: 23). From these first determinations of the aesthetic, it is not yet completely clear what makes the respective message a work of art. Undoubtedly, further factors are involved here: the recipient of the artistically intended message, which already stands out from other messages by, among other things, a greater degree of freedom, i. e. greater unpredictability or the possibility of ‘ also being able to be different ’ (Schmidt 1966: 43), must show the willingness to expect a work of art and to place it in an ordering context, which influences this particular message by its typical, media-related characteristics. This special form of communication between artist and art recipient, which can be called ‘ aesthetic communication ’ , and which is especially studied by aesthetic pragmatics, thus stands next to the ‘ autonomous ’ (cf. Mukarovsk ỳ 1936: 1069) sign functions. Like any communication process, the particular ‘ aesthetic communication ’ is involved in the context of social phenomena reflected in the work of art. Not only does the social community have an effect on the respective communicative expression, but this aesthetic message also has an effect on the community. The socio- Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) 183 cultural aspects of aesthetic communication institutionalize and sanction particular modes of representation and insist on the consideration of specific interests, which find their expression in modes of production, habits of seeing, patterns of interpretation, object preferences, etc. (cf. Metz 1968: 207). The close connection between semiotic and axiological factors already results from the iconic side of the artwork, for all icons take on value characteristics in the process of aesthetic communication insofar as the value 37 of the iconic sign is given by its similarity to the object represented. When we perform an evaluation, we assign or deny a value to a particular piece of text on the background of socially mediated value categories. Values ’ are therefore not objective properties of the evaluated objects, but exist only in relation to the evaluator (are objectiverelative), are directed at an object, and require suitable instruments for the evaluation process, which have the character of signs. The possibility of being able to evaluate artistic objects at all - like all other objects of reality - is based on the principally comparative character of each value, which can constitute axiological relations between objects depending on the respective evaluator (cf. Hartung 1969: 489 f.). 38 The emphasis on the axiological side of art analysis, however, does not want to reduce art to the mediation of any values. 39 If we had been able to state above in general that the text only reaches actuality in the respective realization by the recipient, then in the special case of art production the aesthetic text is based on the “ aesthetic reading ” (cf. Trabant 1970: 16) or, more generally, the “ aesthetic reception ” . It follows that outside and independent of this aesthetic reception or generation, there can be no elementary and interpreter-independent aesthetic signs, just as there is no ‘ text ’ , but only ‘ textual realisates ’ . The aesthetic text realisate, which in this understanding presents itself as the interpretive result of the aesthetic reception of the respective text user (cf. Schmidt 1971: 12 f.), 40 arrives at historical validity and valence in this creative constitution of meaning of the object by historical individuals. 41 37 It remains to be clarified what value is to be accorded to the ambiguity of the concept of value (value in the sense of ‘ valuable ’ ‘ significant ’ and value as a quality of positional difference). 38 Hartung writes that positive or negative attributes that people have made in their individual experiences with the signified are applied to a certain state of affairs, so that this state of affairs receives positive or negative evaluation. 39 Kondratov fears that Morris ignores the gnoseological function of art as well as the actual aesthetic side, “ i. e., what actually distinguishes art from science, ordinary language, etc. ” (Kondratow 1964: 524). In his opinion, the language of art becomes aesthetic in the proper sense only “ when to all this is added the orientation of the representation of art to the communication itself ” (ibid.). This position seems to fall short due to considerations already mentioned, which do not want to see the work of art limited to the autonomous aspect. 40 The radicalization of this position, however, which ties the aesthetic completely to the respective mode of reception, renounces in consequence the possibility of an art analysis. 41 Segal represents the static concept of the text, especially when it is restricted by the one-dimensional relation of the work of art to the object, when he writes: “ At this level, the meaning of the object consists in the fact that it exists par excellence and possesses the property of ‘ meaning ’ . This property is far more comprehensive than the object itself; it is in principle infinite. At the same time, this meaning is exclusively and solely [emphasis mine A. E.] oriented to the object itself ” (Segal 1968: 844; on this, see Schmidt 1972: 95 - 127). 184 Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) The constitution of meaning of the art product for the text user, determined by the process of aesthetic text realization, finds an analytical instrument in the “ aesthetic function of use ” of signs, to which Bense (cf. on this and the following Bense 1971: 109 f.) draws attention. While Morris no longer holds, as he did in his earlier essays on semiotic aesthetics, that all works of art can be called iconic signs, iconic signs still perform such an eminently important function that the concept of iconicity must be subjected to more detailed consideration. For something to become an icon for a sign user, the interpreter must know that it represents this depicted object. Furthermore, the interpreter must know in what respect this sign represents the object (cf. Burks 1948/ 49: 676). But since every sign represents a certain number of qualities and relations, it must be stated in what way the iconic sign differs from the ordinary signifying process. The similarity relation between object and icon presents itself rather as an empirical and therefore not a priori sustainable relation; the character of the sign is thus not established on the basis of a conditional similarity to the object, but because this partial similarity does not fully secure the relation. The iconic sign cannot already designate on the basis of similarity to anything else, but an object that resembles another in certain respects fulfills a designating function only with respect to a specific interest of an interpreter of the sign (cf. Amyx 1947: 55 ff.). Thus, it is at least necessary to state the parameters of similarity, since without this naming a relation of similarity can be asserted or denied between any object- ‘ pair ’ . Moreover, similarity is a symmetrical relation. If an icon I resembles its denotatum D, then D resembles I in the same way, which is why without additional criteria the decision becomes impossible what is to be sign and what is to be denoted object. However, one can establish similarity between two objects without having to claim that this similarity relationship forms the appropriate basis for declaring one of the two similar objects to be the sign of the other. Moreover, some guidelines must already be in place in order to make the determination that two objects are in some sense alike. This recourse to general, indirect patterns of reference, however, bursts the concept of iconicity, which is supposed to be supported, among other things, by its immediacy. An obvious similarity between the sign and the depicted reality is a valuable additional clue which has proven its high practical value in art analysis. However, the task of art cannot be (or only on the background of a special, limitedly valid art programmatic) to achieve a reproduction of reality as faithful as possible. In addition to the problems mentioned above, the concept of iconicity, which has been successful in many respects, has a number of other problematic aspects that make it questionable whether this term can continue to be considered a basic semiotic concept. It would be much more appropriate to Morris ’ s approach to a three-dimensional semiotics to value the characterization of certain artworks by iconic features as an additional justification; other components of three-dimensional semiotics, mentioned above but pushed into the background by the concept of iconicity, are thereby more satisfactorily taken into account, so that the actual, further-reaching contributions of Morris ’ s semiotics come to the fore. Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) 185 Regardless of individual difficulties and necessary clarifications, however, it has become clear that the comprehensive Morris approach and the constant effort to verify obtained results against reality have had great theoretical and practical significance for a variety of scientific disciplines and, with more careful study of the writings that are only now slowly becoming known, will continue to have so in the future. References Albrecht, E. 1959: Contributions to epistemology and the relation of language and thought, Halle/ S. Albrecht, E. 1961: “ The epistemological problem of the linguistic sign. Zur Auseinandersetzung mit der idealistischen Sprachwissenschaft ” , in: Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 9. Albrecht, E. o. J.: Darstellung und Kritik der erkenntnistheoretischen Grundlagen, der Kausalitätsauffassung und der Ethik des Neopositivismus, Diss. Rostock. Alston, W. P. 1964: Philosophy of Language, Englewood Cliffs. Amyx, C. 1947: “ The Iconic Sign in Aesthetics ” , in: Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 6. Antal, L. 1963: Questions of Meaning, The Hague. Bense, M. 1962: Theory of texts. An introduction to recent views and methods, Cologne. Bense, M. 1967: Semiotik Allgemeine Theorie der Zeichen, Baden-Baden. Bense, M. 1971: Zeichen und Design, Baden-Baden. Bense, M. u. Walther, E. 1973: Dictionary of semiotics, Cologne. Black, M. 1949: “ The Semiotic of Charles Morris ” , in: Language and Philosophy. Ed. by M. Black New York. Bloomfield, L 1962: “ Linguistic Aspects of Science ” , in: International Encyclopedia of Unified Science 1, 2nd ed. Chicago. Bochenski, Lid. 1956: Formal logic, Freiburg/ Munich. Breuer, D. 1971: Vorüberlegungen zu einer pragmatischen Textanalyse, Munich. Burks, A. 1948/ 49: “ Icon, Index, Symbol ” , in: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 9. Denk, F. ? : The sign. Attempt at an Anthropomorphism-Free Definition. Dewey, J. 1946: “ Peirce ’ s Theory of Linguistic Signs, Thought and Meaning ” , in: Journal of Philosophy 43. Eco, U. 1971: A Semiotic Approach to Semantics. Li: Versus. Quaderi di Studi Semiotici 1. Eco, U. 1972: Introduction to Semiotics, Munich. Eschbach, A. 1974: Zeichen Text Bedeutung. A Bibliography on Semiotics. Geckeler, H. 1971: Strukturelle Semantik, München. Gentry, G. 1944: “ Some Comments on C. W. Morris ’ s Class Conception of the Designatum ” , in: Journal of Philosophy 41. George, F. H. 1964: Semantics, London. Habermas, J. 1970: Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften, Frankfurt a. M. Habermas, J. and Luhmann, N. 1971: Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie, Frankfurt a. M. Hartmann, P. 1968: “ On the concept of the linguistic sign ” , in: Journal of Phonetics 21. Hartung, W. 1969: «The effect of language as part of the pragmatic aspect ” , in: Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Pädagogischen Hochschule Potsdam, Gesellschafts- und sprachwissenschaftliche Reihe 13. Klaus, G. 1969a: The power of the word. An epistemological-pragmatic treatise, 5th ed., Berlin. Klaus, G. 1969b: Semiotics and epistemology. Klaus, G. 1971: Sprache der Politik, Berlin 1971. Kondratow, A. 1964: “ Semiotics and Art Theory ” , in: Art and Literature. 186 Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) Kraft, V. 1968: The Vienna Circle. The origin of neopositivism. Vienna. La Drière, C. 1957: “ Structure, Sound, and Meaning ” , in: Frye, N. (ed.): Sound and Poetry, New York. Martin, R. M. 1959: Toward a Systematic Pragmatics, Amsterdam. Mayenowa, M. R. 1967: “ Semiotics Today: Reflections on the second international conference on semiotics “ , in: Informations sue les sciences sociales 6. Mead, G. H. 1938: The philosophy of the act, Chicago. Mead, G. H. 1968: Mind, identity, and society. Ed. by C. W. Morris. Frankfurt a. M. Metz, C. 1968: “ Problems of denotation in the feature film ” , in: Language in the Technical Age 27. Morris, C. W. 1949: Segni, Linguaggio e Comportamento. Translated by S. Ceccato. Milan. Morris, C. W. 1963: Lineamenti di una teoria dei segni. Introduced, translated and commented by F. Rossi-Landi. Turin/ Milan/ Padua Morris C. W. 1970: The Pragmatic Movement in American Philosophy, New York. Morris, C. W. 1972: Foundations of sign theory. Aesthetics and the theory of signs. Translated by R. Posner with the collaboration of J. Rehbein. With an afterword by F. Knilli. Munich. Morris; C. W. 1973: Signs, language and behavior. Edited and with an introduction by K. O. Apel. Translated by A. Eschbach and G. Kopsch. Düsseldorf. Morris, C. W. 1975: Sign value aesthetics. Edited and translated by A. Eschbach. Frankfurt a. M. Mukarovsk ỳ . 1936: L ’ Art Comme Fait Semiologique. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie 8. Müller, A. 1970: Problems of behaviorist semiotics, Diss. Frankfurta. M. Nehring, A. 1963: Sprachzeichen und Sprechakte, Heidelberg. Neubert, A. 1962: Semantic positivism in the USA, Halle/ S. Oller, J. W. Jr. 1972: “ On the Relation between Syntax, Semantics, and Pragmatics ” , in: Linguistics 83. Peirce, C. S. 1931 - 34: Collected Papers, Cambridge, Mass. Pos, H. J. 1947/ 48: “ The Foundation of Word-Meanings. Different Approaches ” , in: Lingua. Charles W. Morris ’ three-dimensional semiotics and the text theory (1975) 187