m arlon l ieBer Art and Economic Objecthood: Preliminary Remarks on ‘Sensuous Supra-Sensuous’ Things I In an oft-quoted passage Andy Warhol insists on the egalitarian nature of American society: What’s great about this country is that America started the tradition where the richest customers buy essentially the same things as the poorest� You can be watching TV and see Coca-Cola, and you can know that the President drinks Coke, Liz Taylor drinks Coke, and just think, you can drink Coke, too� A Coke is a Coke and no amount of money can get you a better Coke than the one the bum on the corner is drinking� All the Cokes are the same and all the Cokes are good� Liz Taylor knows it, the President knows it, the bum knows it, and you know it� (The Philosophy 100-01) This distinguishes the United States from European states still informed by feudal relations of inequality—and in the following paragraph Warhol refers to the different eating habits of “aristocracy” and “peasants”� Yet, the artist has no need to rely on an argument based on natural law, according to which all human beings were created equal� In Warhol’s America equality is a function of access to identical commodities—it is an equality of consumers� 1 Coca-Cola is, thus, “good”—and everybody knows it� And yet, is a common adjective such as “good” able to provide a sense of the affection felt for the beverage by Benji Cooper, the novelist Colson Whitehead’s fifteen year old alter ego? This “love” went beyond mere buzz, however� How could one not be charmed by the effervescent joviality of a tall glass of the stuff—the manic activity of the bubbles, popping, reforming, popping anew, sliding up the inside of the glass to freedom, as if the beverage were actually, miraculously, caffeinated on itself. That tart first sip, preferably with ice knocking against the lips for an added sensory flourish, that stunned the brain into total recall of pleasure, of all the Cokes consumed before and all those impending Cokes […]� What forgiveness for the supreme disappointment of a fountain Coke that turned out to be fizless and dead, or a lukewarm Coke that had been sitting for a while, falling away from its ideal temperature of 46�5 1 Nonetheless, it would be wrong to assert that Warhol denies actually existing inequalities� “America is really The Beautiful,” he writes� “But it would be more beautiful if everybody had enough money to live” (The Philosophy 71)� 62 m arlon l ieBer degrees Fahrenheit/ 8 degrees Celsius, all the bubbles fled, so that it had become a useless mud of sugar� Which is what New Coke tasted like, actually� (103-04; original emphasis) With these words the narrator renounces the Warholian tautology: a Coke is not a Coke and, hence, “good” under any and all circumstances; a New Coke most definitely is not. 2 But a “good” Coke is, from Benji’s perspective, not merely “good,” but serves as the occasion for a hymn of praise drafted in prose that seems to be as intoxicated by its own inventiveness as a Coke caffeinated on itself� Two things follow: On the one hand, Coke for some is not just “good,” but provides an experience of pleasure surpassing “mere buzz” by far. On the other, there remains the possibility that a Coke is not judged to be “good” at all, but rather as a “useless mud�” The essential goodness of Coca-Cola is, thus, contingent on a number of factors, the correct temperature being just one� More pertinently, however, for no matter how many persons Warhol enumerates—politicians, celebrities, indigents, and what have you—the claim that they all deem Coke to be “good” can never be more than conjecture, however well-founded it might seem to be� That is to say, as sensual beings humans are (more or less) unequal, for they have varying preferences regarding the objects they use to satisfy their desires. To be sure, Warhol remains exactly right about the fact that “no amount of money” can get anyone a better Coke� In their role as owners of money the President, the movie star, and the “bum” are indeed, if only formally, equals� To be sure, Warhol might have been fascinated by the Coke bottle and its role as an “icon[] of consumer society,” possessing a “special emotional charge” (Joselit 77)� Yet it is rather money and its leveling function that produces the community of—formal—equals he celebrates� In his Philosophy he notes that he tends to buy “STUPID THINGS,” not because he needs them, but because he feels the urge to “spend” money� Yet, at the same time he is “not happy” when he does not “have it,” presumably because this would limit his purchasing power (130; original capitalization)� The relationship of individual and money implies not a concrete person with specific preferences, but remains purely abstract, so that the money-owner’s individuality becomes arbitrary� When it comes to money, Warhol is not interested in “where it’s been” or “who’s touched it,” for everything that would tie money to a particular individual and a specific history is erased by “a certain kind of amnesty” (137)� From this perspective, the point about Coca-Cola—and the same holds true for each and every commodity—is not its taste, provided it is “good” enough that anyone would want to spend money on it� What is more significant is the fact that Coca-Cola—like each and every commodity— can immediately be purchased with money, regardless of the social status or identity of the buyer� But that is to say that the equality Warhol perceives is 2 Warhol himself would agree, however� In his diary, he notes: “Wednesday April 24, 1985� The big news on TV is that Coke is changing their formula� Why would they do that? It doesn’t make sense” (The Andy Warhol Diaries 644)� Art and Economic Objecthood 63 not one of consumers affected by the same commodities (say, a “good” Coke), but rather one of individuals involved in relations of exchange that are mediated by money� Interestingly, Warhol models his notion of the ideal work of art on Coca-Cola: You see, I think every painting should be the same size and the same color so they’re all interchangeable and nobody thinks they have a better painting or a worse painting� And if the one “master painting” is good, they’re all good� Besides, even when the subject is different, people always paint the same painting� (149) Again, equality is not constituted by a particular content—or artistic “subject”—but rather formally� The art historian Sebastian Egenhofer, who notes that these passages dealing with classes of “good” objects should be read in conjunction, concludes that it is “the homogenizing function of exchangevalue” that finds an “emblematic expression” in the “equality of all Cokes” (120; translations mine). Exchange-value, however, is but the “form of expression” of value. As we shall see, it is only a “universal equivalent” (Marx, Capital 1 159) to which all particular commodities can be related, that makes possible an adequate expression of value. In practice this universal equivalent is identical with the “money-form” (139)� Warhol’s ambition, then, would seem to involve creating works of art that do not merely articulate the (unquestionably existing) fascination exerted by particular commodities, but are rather analogous to the form that makes universal commodity exchange possible in the first place; that is, to money. 3 In what follows, I will offer some meditations on this analogy of art and money, drawing on Karl Marx’s critique of political economy, Michael Fried’s art criticism, and a recent attempt by Nicholas Brown to unite the two� The latter argues that their autonomy is what saves works of art from falling victim to the universalizing logic of the market. Brown, thus, suggests that “Marxism has something to teach aesthetics” (Autonomy 39), and, as will become obvious, I am very sympathetic to this approach� However, I will offer some critical remarks on Brown’s reading of Marx in a comradely spirit that might, accordingly, have some bearing on his argument about aesthetics� In short, I believe that Brown’s argument regarding commodities, objects, and works of art remains incomplete so long as the commodity’s determination as a value—and the appearance of value in the form of money—is ignored� The money-form, I will argue, is ultimately not antithetical but analogous to aesthetic form� 3 Warhol’s paintings of actual banknotes would, then, actually constitute a red herring, for the fact that the visible appearance of money becomes thematic diverts critical attention from his interest in the formal quality of money as ‘master commodity’� More generally, Fredric Jameson gets both Warhol and Marx wrong when he writes that Warhol’s Diamond Dust Shoes were “clearly fetishes” on “the level of the content” (8), for Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism has absolutely nothing to do with the veneration of individual commodities and their “content”� In a follow-up article I will discuss the relation of Warhol’s art to the fetish-like character of capitalist social forms in more detail� 64 m arlon l ieBer II The following remarks follow in the wake of several recent attempts to make sense of art from a perspective informed by Marxian value theory. 4 The art critic Isabelle Graw, for instance, goes so far as to suggest that Marx could have based his analysis of the commodity “on the ideal of the autonomous work of art,” as both are “sensible-supersensible” things (“The Value” 50)� 5 Without offering any speculations as to what Marx had in mind when penning his famed analysis of the commodity, I will offer further thoughts on this strange form of objectivity shared by both works of art and commodities� Another brief example might begin to make the issue in question more tangible� Haim Steinbach’s works, like Warhol’s, take their cues from that “immense collection of commodities” whose production, exchange, distribution, and consumption undergird the accumulation of capital� Characteristically, his ultra red #2 (1986), consists of everyday objects exhibited on formica-clad shelves. Except for their occurrence in the household, an alarm clock, a pot, and a lava lamp are objects that have completely different functions� If a shopper discovered all three objects in a department store, the three would hardly solicit the same interest; perhaps she already owns an alarm clock and thinks that lava lamps are tacky, but needs a new pot; consequently, she might purchase the latter� Yet, if she subsequently visited The Guggenheim to look at Steinbach’s work, her interest in the object’s function is all but irrelevant� If she grabbed one of the pots that are part of ultra red #2 she would obviously have acted in an improper—and potentially litigable—manner visà-vis the work of art� In an interview Steinbach made the following remark: “I think there are hierarchical judgments implicit in objects, and I think there is an equality between objects that goes across these hierarchies” (qtd� in Joselit 207)� It might appear counterintuitive to suggest that the distinctions between objects are constituted not by the objects themselves—certainly an alarm clock is not a lava lamp—but by the judgments implicitly contained in the objects; after all, we tend to locate judgments in subjects� Where is the “equality between objects” to be found, then? According to David Joselit it is the color red that prominently appears in all three objects that produces a “formal equivalence” (208)� Fair enough� But what about basketball shoes and candle holders? They lack a shared sensually perceptible quality that could be attributed to them before they are brought into a relation that bestows a “formal equivalence” upon them as parts of Steinbach’s related yet different (1985)� We can deem shoes or candle holders to be “good” based on their function and our needs; 4 See, for instance, Beech; Haiven; Lütticken; Mansoor; Spaulding; Stakemeier and Vishmidt; Vishmidt� 5 However, Graw’s use of Marxian concepts is flawed at times, when she identifies Marx’s point about value being a social property with the importance of “networking and social activities” as means of increasing aesthetic value (“The Value” 40), thus conflating levels of analysis. But see the chapter on “The Value of Painting” (including a conversation with Kerstin Stakemeier) in The Love (316-50)� Art and Economic Objecthood 65 but it is only as elements of a work of art that they possess an “equality” which is not a result of their physical properties or our personal preferences� Strangely, then, the objects that make up Steinbach’s works are sensuous things, but they have non-sensuous qualities; they are manifestly different, yet they are also somehow equivalent. Now, when turning to Marx’s Capital, we will see that much the same can be said of commodities� III Let us briefly return to the Coke. If it is not “fizless” or “dead” or “lukewarm” it will have some kind of utility for a potential consumer, whether it is its simple ability to quench her thirst or the additional quality to produce great “pleasure.” It is a use-value. This is the first determination Marx attributes to the commodity, with which he begins his critique of political economy� A commodity is “a thing which through its qualities satisfies human needs of whatever kind” (Capital 1 125) and this “usefulness” is what “makes it a usevalue�” The latter “does not dangle in mid-air,” however, but is identical with the “physical body of the commodity itself; ” accordingly, it is “realized” in “consumption,” regardless of whether this occurs instantaneously (I drink a glass of Coca-Cola) or over an extended stretch of time (I use a refrigerator to maintain the ideal drinking temperature of a beverage)� Yet, use-values constitute “the material content of wealth” in any human society, which is why Marx loses no time to turn to the analysis of its “social form” (126). The object of Marx’s analysis, the capitalist mode of production, rests on the exchange of “the products of isolated and mutually independent private labours” (Capital 1 132; revised translation) on the market� If two products of labor are equated in exchange, there occurs an abstraction from their material properties which turn them into use-values and, thus, Marx claims, also from the concrete labors that have produced them. In Marx’s words: “There is nothing left of [the products of labour] but the same spectral objectivity [gespenstige Gegenständlichkeit]; they are merely congealed quantities of homogeneous human labour” (128; revised translation)� But if use-value is immediately tangible in the commodity’s “physical body,” it turns out to be remarkably difficult to catch hold of the specter of value. The first chapter of the first volume of Capital, then, can be read as a detective story of sorts� As Todorov notes, this genre in fact contains a “duality,” that is to say, the story both of an “investigation” and a “crime” and its cover-up (44). Marx, the great solver of the enigmas of political economy, similarly makes it his business to detect value’s “spectral objectivity.” But the first chapter also contains an explanation for the difficulties encountered in this task—a “theory of the selfmystification of the social” (Ellmers 32; translation mine)—in the section on fetishism� The “physical body of the commodity” cannot be of assistance, as it is but an ordinary, sensuous thing, whereas Marx is interested in “sensuous suprasensuous or social things” (Capital 1 165; revised translation)� The isolated 66 m arlon l ieBer can of Coke leaves the detective clueless—even if an aura of mystery might adhere to it because of its producers’ refusal to publish the exact contents of the drink, the referent here remain physical rather than social properties� Marx writes: Not an atom of matter enters into the objectivity of commodities as values [ihre Wertgegenständlichkeit]; in this it is the direct opposite of the coarsely sensuous objectivity of commodities as physical objects� We may twist and turn a single commodity as we wish; it remains impossible to grasp it as a thing possessing value [als Wertding]� (138) Yet, he also finds a solution: if the objectivity of value is a “purely social” quality, it can only be discovered by way of looking at “the social relation between commodity and commodity” (139); in other words, in the exchange relation� Thus, Marx subsequently turns to the analysis of the value-form, where one commodity (linen) expresses its value in another commodity (a coat): the latter’s “body,” then, provides the “material” for the expression of the former’s value (139)� “As a use-value,” so much remains trivial, “the linen is something palpably different from the coat�” Yet, “as value, it is identical with the coat [ist sie “Rockgleiches”]” and, thus, “acquires a value-form different from its natural form” (143). This way, Marx has already solved the “whole mystery of the form of value” in principle, and analyzed the curious inversion which he will designate some pages later as the “fetish-like character of the commodity�” (163; translation revised) Through the equation that occurs in the act of exchange, a material object, the product of labor in its “natural form,” becomes the medium of expression of the “supra-natural property” (149) to possess value—a property that appears to be natural, however, because common sense is not used to thinking relationally and, instead, tends to (mis)recognize qualities that derive from an entity’s position in a field of relations as substantial ones (see Bourdieu 3-13)� 6 Now, it remains fairly simple to figure out that value is not a natural property of the coat as long as we are dealing with the value-relation of only two commodities; it becomes more tricky when Marx’s analysis of the value-form results in the “general form of value,” where the entire “world of commodities” expresses its value “through one single kind of commodity” (Capital 1 158)� This commodity, which becomes the “universal equivalent” (159), seems to always-already possess value immediately (or, what amounts to the same, substantially), as it can be used to purchase each and every commodity, thus promising its owner “a general power over society” and “the whole world of gratifications” (Marx, Grundrisse 222), which is precisely what Warhol 6 In Michael Heinrich’s characteristically lucid summary: “The objectivity of value is only assigned to the body of the commodity […] under particular social relations […] and is, thus, a social property which, however, appears as an objective property” (Die Wissenschaft 216; original emphasis; translation mine)� Art and Economic Objecthood 67 appreciated, spending money for “STUPID THINGS” to assure himself of this power� 7 That this quality appears to be the most natural thing in the world constitutes, according to Marx, the “magic of money” (Capital 1 187)� In conclusion, Marx’s search for the objectivity of value leads him to the money-form, in which the “supra-sensuous part of the commodity” obtains “a sensuous existence.” (Heinrich, Die Wissenschaft 235; original emphases; translations mine) The commodity’s dual form-determination as both usevalue and value cannot be made to appear at a single commodity and, hence, requires an actual “doubling” (Postone 173)� On the one hand, there is a multitude of commodities that are qualitatively distinct as material objects; on the other, there is money, which only needs to possess the one quality to be immediately exchangeable. “The exchangeability of the commodity,” Marx writes in the Grundrisse, “exists as a thing beside it” in the form of the one commodity that is unlike any other: money (147)� The objectivity of value expresses a social relation, even the entire capitalist “relation of production itself” (Marx, Capital 3 965), that needs to “take[] the form of a thing” (953) without being identical with the material properties of the thing� IV There is more to economic objects than their mere material existence gives away, then� To be sure, it is anything but surprising to claim that the same goes for works of art� You can “twist and turn” a urinal as you wish, but its porcelain body will never yield its status as a work of art� Like Duchamp, Andy Warhol repeatedly produced works of art that put everyday objects into the context of the art world. The possibility to do so already implies that it is not their materiality alone that constitutes their status as works of art� For the philosopher Arthur Danto, the Brillo Boxes (1964), which were “[e]xternally” identical to the commercially available cartons of soap pads, were instrumental in his recognition that “invisible differences”—supra-sensuous ones, that is—distinguished works of art (37; original emphasis)� While Duchamp’s Readymades or Warhol’s Brillo Boxes draw our attention to the institutional practices of designating objects as art, there exist also other attempts to think the artistic surplus that transcends the material properties of objects� A particularly influential one insists on the distinction between works of art and other objects in its title already: Michael Fried’s much-discussed article “Art and Objecthood,” which was originally published in a 1967 issue of Artforum� The text offers a critique of Minimal Art, although the art critic prefers to speak of “literalism,” as the works of artists such as Donald Judd, Robert Morris, Carl Andre, or Tony Smith in his view fail to transcend their physical “objecthood: ” they remain reduced to their “literal” shape, which leads Fried to 7 As we have seen, Warhol believes a “kind of amnesty” that erases any connection to a particular individual to be an effect of money; in the passage from the Grundrisse just quoted, Marx similarly argues that the relation between money and the individual is “a purely accidental one” (222)� 68 m arlon l ieBer conclude that they lack “pictorial” form (151). The latter is defined relationally. In a sculpture by Anthony Caro, a British artist greatly appreciated by Fried, it is the “mutual inflection of one element by another, rather than the identity of each” that constitutes the totality of the work� The “individual elements bestow significance on one another by virtue of their juxtaposition,” a significance that they do not possess in isolation as a substantial property (161)� 8 It is precisely this moment of a structural—or structured—whole constituted by the relationships of individual elements without being reducible to the immediately existing parts that Fried misses in the literalist artworks— the latter instead reject the “relational character” (149) of art� Admittedly, this is hardly the critic’s discovery; the eloquent representatives of Minimal Art are very upfront about this, and Fried is able to liberally make use of Donald Judd’s and Robert Morris’ own pronouncements� Already in 1965, Judd wrote that “[m]ost sculpture is made part by part,” whereas the “new three-dimensional work” rather has “something of an object, a single thing” (812)� Ultimately, Judd argues, the “thing as a whole” is more “interesting” than the relations between individual elements (813)� In Robert Morris, we find an even more explicit rejection of the relational. While he acknowledges that “art objects have clearly divisible parts” between which relationships are set up, he poses the question whether a work “that has only one property” could exist. He proceeds to answer in the negative, but notes that there are “simpler forms” which cannot be disassembled into “parts” as easily (815)� In the second part of his “Notes on Sculpture,” Morris demands to speak of “[s]tructural divisions” in works of art in a “negative sense,” precisely because this forces “specific elements to separate from the whole, thus setting up relationships within the work�” In the kind of object he prefers relationships vanish, and the beholder subsequently recognizes that she is the one who is actually “establishing relationships” (818)� Whereas the internally structured works rejected by Morris insist on the relations between its parts that constitute a whole which transcends the physical literality of the elements, in his “simpler forms” an entirely different kind of relationship is emphasized: the one between beholder and (art) object� Fried, however, does not care for this transformation of the beholder’s role at all, going so far as to write that “[a]rt degenerates” when it becomes constitutively dependent on its audience (164; original emphasis)� 9 More than that, without a beholder whose “interest” is aroused by an object—by the “sheer specificity of the materials of which it is made” (165; original emphases)—the minimalist works remain “incomplete” (163)� Even though he does not use the term, it would seem to follow that these objects are lacking autonomy� 8 Fried is well aware that all works of art are objects at the same time, writing that modern art has become conscious of the fact (“since Manet”), which is what produces the necessity to “defeat[] or suspend[] objecthood through the medium of shape” (160)� 9 Whether I agree with Fried’s art critical judgment about Minimal Art is neither here nor there� What is relevant for my purposes is how he establishes the structural distinction between art and objecthood� Fried himself likes to point out that the critics of his essay—and there have been many—usually take issue with his “evaluation” of Minimal Art rather than “the terms of his argument” (“An Introduction” 43; original emphasis)� Art and Economic Objecthood 69 V Now, what does all of this have to do with Marx’s analysis of the commodity? Michael Fried is hardly known for being a Marxist, let alone for being interested in the social context of art. Anthony Grudin points to a little known text published in 1962, in which Fried rather emphatically demands a political analysis of artistic phenomena, but in his subsequent writings explicit references to political issues are scarce (35)� 10 Yet, in Fried one finds affirmative references to the Marxist philosopher Georg Lukács, whose book History and Class Consciousness he discovered in the 1960s (see “An Introduction” 18)� 11 If one looks at the structure of Fried’s argument in “Art and Objecthood” rather than searching for explicit political statements, one has to conclude that there are overlaps between his critique of “objecthood” and Lukács’ account of “reification” [Verdinglichung]� 12 The Hungarian philosopher famously perceives the commodity-form as “a model of all forms of objectivity” in capitalist societies (83; revised translation)—and, hence, by implication for the issue of aesthetic objectivity as well. Lukács describes the implementation of capitalist commodity production and exchange as a process in the course of which the individuals subjected to it tend to lose the idea of a structured whole in all spheres of the social world� The transformation of the labor-process, which is divided up into specialized tasks only “arbitrarily connected with each other” (88), serves as the basis for universal fragmentation� Ultimately, “every image of the whole” is lost (103)� In the face of the reifying dismantling of a structural unity into seemingly isolated facts, Lukács defends the ambition to strive for “knowledge of the world as a totality” (112)� The latter is a “nonempirical constellation of empirical phenomena that is more than the sum of its parts” and can only be grasped, as Ingo Elbe puts it, when the “parts” are related to the “whole” (448; translation mine)� Similarities to Fried’s critique of theatricality are apparent� The art critic, too, is worried over works that 10 Grudin himself suggests that the “anxiety regarding the effects of capitalism on art constitutes the disavowed kernel of Fried’s theory of theatricality” (37) and shows that this idea can be found in Denis Diderot, Fried’s antitheatrical authority: the “economic subordination” of the model who poses for money is identified as the basis for “theatricality”� Fried, however, presents this issue as a purely aesthetic one, thus dismissing the social question (41)� 11 In the 1964 article “Modernist Painting and Formal Criticism,” for instance, Fried praises Lukács’—as well as Merleau-Ponty’s—use of “the dialectic,” which serves as a model for “perpetual radical criticism of the existing state of affairs”. At the same time, he argues (in a gesture reminiscent of Schiller) that this “ideal” could not be realized politically, but only in the realm of “modernist painting” (646)� Hence, the potential political (or marxisantes) implications of Fried’s reference to Lukács can easily be overlooked since it seems to reduce the dialectic to a method that can be applied to any object of study—which Lukács himself, admittedly, argues in “What is Orthodox Marxism? ” (History 1). Walter Benn Michaels reminded me of the possible significance of Lukács for Fried’s art criticism in personal conversation. 12 Juliane Rebentisch notes that Minimal Art amounts to “a regression of the work of art to the literal, a novel form of reification,” in Fried’s account, but does not mention Lukács in this context (47). 70 m arlon l ieBer no longer appear as structured wholes that are more than an aggregation of empirical—or sensuously perceptible—parts� The turn to undifferentiated wholes found in Judd or Morris, then, would constitute another iteration of the phenomenon of reification so ubiquitous in capitalist modernity. On the other hand, this may give rise to the belief that Friedian art would not be merely antitheatrical, but would, at least implicitly, side against reification and, hence, capitalism� Read through the prism of Lukács’ account of reification, Fried’s argument begins to sound vaguely western Marxist. One could point to intersections between Fried and Theodor W� Adorno, another defender of modernist works of art at the historical moment of their seeming demise, for whom the reduction of the work of art to a “thing among things” amounts to an act of “deaestheticization” [Entkunstung] (Aesthetic Theory 25)� It is particularly in his 1958/ 59 lectures on aesthetics, published only recently, that the critical theorist repeatedly explains what it means to recognize the work of art as a “context of meaning” [Sinnzusammenhang], in which “the relationship between its sensual aspects” form a totality in such a way that their status as mere “material aspects” [Stoffmomente] is transcended (139)� Here, Adorno also sketches an early critique of literalism when he writes that “specific aesthetic experience” must not approach the work’s “sensual stimuli […] in isolation, literally as such [buchstäblich als solche],” but rather relate them to its “unity” (110; revised translation)� For both authors, then, works of art must be autonomous from the beholder: “No painting is there for the viewer,” Adorno argues; instead, they exist primarily “for their own sake” (119). But unlike Fried, he explicitly blames the “total exchange society in which everything only exists for others [für anderes]” (Aesthetic Theory 308; revised translation) for presenting the greatest threat to art� Hence, the “useless” alone can serve as the “plenipotentiary of things that are no longer distorted by exchange” (310). Unlike a commodity—and unlike the Friedian object—the genuine work art is not for others, but insists on its autonomy� But what does it mean to say that a commodity is for others? If this issue is ignored by Fried and merely asserted by Adorno, it is a great merit of Nicholas Brown to have produced a rigorous account of the analogy between (Friedian) object and (Marxian) commodity. 13 To this end he turns to the Marxian analysis of the exchange-process in the second chapter of Capital, which stages an encounter between two commodity-owners� Here, “non-owning need” meets with “not-needing ownership,” as Wolfgang Fritz Haug puts it (13)� Brown poses the question what kind of meaning a product 13 Brown first presented his argument in the 2012 article “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Real Subsumption Under Capital” published on nonsite� It reappears—minus the allusion to Benjamin and slightly refined, but substantially identical in general—in the introduction (“On Art and the Commodity Form”) to his 2019 monograph Autonomy� Here, Brown suggests that a work of art “can, within itself, suspend the logic of the commodity, legibly assert a moment of autonomy from the market” (34) in a sophisticated theoretical argument drawing on Hegel, Marx, Lukács, Adorno, Bourdieu, and Jameson. In the book’s chapters he provides exemplary readings of works in various media in order to show how they make this assertion� Art and Economic Objecthood 71 of labor can have for its direct producer when its single purpose is to be exchanged. In this case the producer can only hope that her product meets a demand, yet the “concrete attributes” that might raise a demand are not determined by herself, which would only be the case if she immediately produced for her own use: “If I make a bowl for myself, it is a bowl because I wanted to make a bowl […]� Intention will be inscribed in the thing itself […]� If I make a bowl for the market, I am primarily concerned with one attribute, its exchangeability—that is, the demand for bowls.” Thus, what she needs to do is to correctly anticipate “other people’s desires” (Autonomy 7)� This way Brown arrives at a distinction between an object whose use (or purpose or meaning) is normatively inscribed in the object itself—a meaning that is universal […], available for everyone and not therefore a private matter—and an object whose use is a matter of indifference from one standpoint and a matter of possibly intense but necessarily private concern from another� (6) The first object is a work of art; the second one is a commodity. And while the former is a materialization of its producer’s intention, the latter must merely attract the interest of a solvent buyer� A Coke might be the matter of the most intense concern—think Benji Cooper’s paean quoted above—but this remains a private whim� From the standpoint of the Coca-Cola Company all the buyers are the same and all the buyers are good; what is on their minds when they buy a bottle, however, remains a “matter of indifference�” And if we remember that Fried charges the literalists’ objects with merely arousing the “interest” of a beholder, it will not surprise us that this distinction works analogously to the one between art and objecthood in Brown’s account� Confronting the (mere) object, the “customer is king” (Brown, “What We Worry”): “judgments” are replaced by mere “preferences�” Brown draws on Kant, for whom “[a]esthetic judgments […] are made without reference to external uses,” that is to say, without reference to the utility that an object might possess� An aesthetic judgment in the Kantian sense would, thus, have to refer to some dimension of the work irreducible to its usefulness to potential consumers and, thus, Brown argues, opposed to its “commodity character” (Autonomy 8)—and that is the work’s autonomy or “immanent purposiveness” (13)� 14 Provided that the capitalist mode of production prevails, it is “perfectly legitimate” that commodities which fail to attract the interest of a potential consumer are as “incomplete” as a Friedian object without a beholder (7); yet, as far as works of art are concerned, this has grave consequences, for “interpretation” becomes a matter of impossibility when the purpose an artcommodity is meant to serve is determined by potential consumers via the mediation of the market (8)� 14 In the next section, I will go on to argue, however, that this identification of an object’s “commodity character” with its use-value dimension fails to take into account the capitalist commodity’s determination as possessing value, which appears in the form of its exchange-value, that is to say, in its relationship to another commodity rather than to a potential buyer� 72 m arlon l ieBer Think of Warhol’s Brillo Boxes� Arthur Danto remarks that the original cartons were designed by the Abstract Expressionist painter James Harvey. As a “visual celebration” of the brand they are not a mere “container” for soap pads (41); instead, they are a “masterpiece of visual rhetoric,” which, however, has “nothing” to do with the success of Warhol’s boxes. The commercially available cartons are, after all, made with the intention “to move the minds” of consumers “to the act of purchase and then of application” (42)� According to Brown, any attempt to interpret the meaning of Harvey’s design—like the one that Danto himself engages in—would be a hopeless endeavor, since the boxes’ design merely materializes the intention to arouse a buyer’s interest in any way possible� Perhaps it was Warhol’s intention—that is to say, that which can be an object of interpretation—to insist on the “invisible differences” between works of art and everyday objects� Danto correctly points out that this “philosophical” point is independent of Harvey’s design (42; original emphasis)� 15 Now, if the production of art is entirely subsumed by the market, if all creative activity was reduced to the design of the bodies of commodities, this would constitute the death of autonomy� 16 For Brown this would amount to a realization of the neoliberal fantasy of a complete universalization of the market� This is also why the commitment to “aesthetic autonomy” gains a certain—if perhaps “minimal”—political meaning. Autonomy can only exist in opposition to the market, which merely knows the “personal” autonomy of the consumer (Autonomy 34)� Pure autonomy is an impossibility, but the work of art, according to Brown, could at least remind us that the principle of “universal heteronomy” of the market does not rule unchallenged (21)� Eventually, Brown arrives at a position fairly similar to Adorno’s—works of art that do not exist for others is a “plenipotentiary” of the negation of the exchange-principle—but argues closer along Marx’s text and, thus, circumvents imprecise claims such as the Adornian suggestion that “the principle of exchange value destroys use value for human beings” (“On the Fetish” 39). 15 It is entirely possible to argue that it had never been Warhol’s point to highlight the differences—invisible or otherwise—between works of art and commodities, but rather to insist on their “similarity,” as Paul Mattick suggests (139)� For Brown there can only be “disagreement” when we make reference to something like intention normatively inscribed in the work of art (Autonomy 31)� Consumers who have different preferences do not disagree; art critics who have different interpretations do� 16 In their critical remarks on Brown’s original 2012 article, Jasper Bernes and Daniel Spaulding correctly point out that Brown misunderstands the concept of “real subsumption,” because the latter does not refer to the integration of a practice into the capitalist world market, but to the transformation of the production-process on the basis of capitalist imperatives� To be sure, works of art can be traded like commodities, but artistic production is not continually revolutionized under competitive constraints: Andy Warhol, that is to say, did not need to worry that a competing “Factory” would produce silkscreened paintings more efficiently (Bernes and Spaulding 52; see also Beech 24)� In his 2019 book, Brown still uses the concept of real subsumption, though it seems to play a minor role compared to the earlier text. I do not think that Brown has successfully addressed Bernes and Spaulding’s critique, but the good news—for Brown—is that on the whole this does not matter too much, as I believe that his argument does not actually require an account of art’s real subsumption� Art and Economic Objecthood 73 Dirk Braunstein notes that “a commodity without use-value” is an impossibility (114)� Brown, on the other hand, focuses on use-value as constitutive for exchange, as it is only the promise of being useful—the promise that a commodity can be consumed—that arouses an interest� This way, Brown also tacitly rejects what Kornelia Hafner once termed “use-value fetishism,” which is to say, the belief that there is “a dimension of innocent usefulness” that needs to be saved from the corrupting influence of exchange-value (61; translation mine). Indeed, this position characterizes many reflections on aesthetics from a Marxist perspective. In Haug’s critique of “commodity aesthetics,” for instance, we read that under conditions of commodity production a “double reality” [ein Doppeltes] has to be produced, namely “first the use-value; second, and additionally, the appearance of use-value,” so that the “aesthetics of the commodity in its widest meaning—the sensual appearance and the conception of its use-value—become detached from the object itself” (16-17; original emphasis; revised translation)� This, however, implies that there is a normatively determined use-value that inheres in “the object” that can be obscured, mystified, or destroyed by a mere appearance. By contrast, Brown reminds us that a use-value by definition is “use-value for others” (Marx, Capital 1 179) and, hence, determined by “consumer sovereignty” (Brown, Autonomy 17). Marx already argued that the particular “nature” of the “needs” satisfied by a use-value is irrelevant (Capital 1 125); that is to say, they can be entirely imaginary, but as long as a product of labor is believed by someone to satisfy some need it has a use-value—as long as that someone is able to pay for it. In the first draft of his critique of political economy, Marx rejects the idea that needs are simply given; instead, they are “created by the perception” of the products in question (Grundrisse 92), which suggests that, pace Haug, the “appearance of use-value” does not need to be “additionally” [extra] produced with manipulative intentions (though that can and does happen)� 17 The “physical body” of the commodity always already possesses an aesthetic dimension (in the sense of aisthesis), and addresses the “five and more senses” of the potential buyer (Marx, Capital 1 179)� According to Brown, this means that commodities—as well as Friedian objects—bear a “deeply egalitarian promise” (Autonomy 20), as the promise of being useful (in whatever way) is a purely subjective category� Yet, if this was to be regarded as a victory over the implicit elitism of modernist art, it would well be pyrrhic, for they contain nothing that would oppose the “universality of the market as the sole organ of social metabolism” (17)� 17 See also the distinction between “desire-value” and use-value in Roberts (40)� From the Marxian perspective outlined here, use-value is always already based on human desires, if potentially very basic ones arising “from the stomach” (Marx, Capital 1 125)� 74 m arlon l ieBer VI What remains odd is that Brown’s account makes it appear as if the use-value dependent on potential consumers and their desires is the only form-determination that defines the capitalist commodity—this, paradoxically, would bring him into line with the position of neoclassical economics� The latter approach rejects value theory in both its Marxian and its classical version and, thus, the question how universal commodity exchange is possible in the first place� Instead, “value” is derived, as Ingo Stützle puts it, “from the individual perspective, from the individual in need or an individual’s relation to an object” (183; translation mine)� My point is not that Brown is committed to neoclassical economics; yet, he does move the relation between individuals (consumers) to objects (use-values) center stage. Marx, however, does not spend much time with use-value which is only relevant “as the material bearer of exchange-value” (Hafner 64) from the perspective of the critique of political economy. If the exchange-process is analyzed, use-value falls “outside of the economic form-determination” as it merely indexes “the natural particularity of the commodity and the natural need of the exchanging subjects” (65; emphases in the original; translations mine). As we have seen, Marx is not interested in the materiality of products of labor but in the strangely “sensuous suprasensuous” objectivity of value, which leads him to the money-form� It is money that makes all commodities exchangeable, for they can all represent their value in and through it. Thus, Marx conceptualizes commodity exchange not—like classical and neoclassical economic theory—as “an act between two individual commodity-owners,” but rather begins the first chapter of Capital with an analysis of the relationship that the money-form establishes between the private labors performed independently under capitalist conditions� This, however, is a structural condition that exists independently of “what the exchanging subjects think” or “which interests they pursue” (Heinrich, Die Wissenschaft 206; translations mine), which is why, methodologically, Marx’s analysis “cannot proceed from the perspective of individuals” (207)� Yet, this is what Brown is doing� Opening his book with the question what a commodity is, he, reasonably, suggests that we look for an answer in Marx, but, paradoxically, does not turn to chapter 1 of Capital (“The Commodity”), but chapter 2 (“The Process of Exchange”). In the latter chapter, the thoughts and desires of individuals do matter; but in Marx the analysis of the exchangeprocess firmly rests on the conceptual clarification of the necessary relationship between commodity and money, whereas Brown seems to think that the former can be grasped before the “appearance of money” (“The Work”)� 18 18 This formulation from the original article no longer appears in the 2019 book� Yet, Brown continues to call money a “nonmarket institution” (Autonomy 187, n� 32), which implies that capitalist markets are, in principle, based on the direct exchange of commodities (barter). Marx’s “monetary theory of value,” (Heinrich, Die Wissenschaft 250; original emphasis; translation mine) on the other hand, holds that “[o]nly by relating commodities to money a coherent social relationship between different private labors can be established” (251; original emphasis)� Art and Economic Objecthood 75 If this merely meant that Brown got the methodological implications of the relationship between the first two chapters of Capital wrong, it would not greatly affect his argument about aesthetic autonomy� But, since he goes so far as to claim that the “point of this book is […] that Marxism has something to teach aesthetics” (Autonomy 39), getting Marx right seems relevant. And, indeed, I would like to make some suggestions about why my disagreement with Brown might matter—all the while acknowledging that my reflections on art and economic objecthood are greatly indebted to Brown� Indeed, I believe that he is correct in drawing the analogy between the Marxian commodity—in its form-determination as a use-value—and the Friedian object� Both are “incomplete” without arousing the interest of buyer and beholder, respectively� They do not offer resistance to the consuming attitude that appropriates objects as “culinary elements” (Adorno, Aesthetics 111), thus “turn[ing] the work into a plate of pork rib and sauerkraut,” to quote again from Adorno’s lectures (120)� To oppose this attitude, which reigns in the sphere of the market, works of art would have to be autonomous. In Marx, too, there is an account of autonomy (Verselbstständigung), but it does not play the role of a “positive concept” (Stakemeier and Vishmidt 16); instead, he criticizes that the “social relation of individuals to one another” becomes “a power over the individuals which has become autonomous” (Grundrisse 197)� Here, the existence of a structure independent of individual thoughts and preferences does not emerge as a solution to the “heteronomy” of the market, but, on the contrary, as the problem itself� Now, first of all value becomes autonomous in the form of money. The sociality of the private producers exists as “a singular, tangible object” (Grundrisse 221); the “bond with society” can be carried in an individual’s “pocket” (157), but this social function of money as the “god among commodities” (222) is not a product of its material properties� The money-form emerges as the “joint contribution of the whole world of commodities,” which are materially different, without being identical with one of them (Marx, Capital 1 159)—and in this it is analogous to the work of art as conceptualized by Fried� The objectivity of value is a relational property, and so is the objectivity of the work of art� Brown argues that works of art certainly are commodities—they are bought and sold, after all—but, still, have to be commodities that are not “like any other” for them to “be art in any substantial sense” (Autonomy 21). For Marx, money similarly is a commodity—there might be a money-commodity such as gold or silver—but one unlike any other: in a memorable formulation that only appeared in the first edition of Capital, he suggests that “[i]t is as if alongside and external to lions, tigers, rabbits, and all other actual animals […] there existed also in addition the animal, the individual incarnation of the entire animal kingdom” (“The Commodity” 27; original emphasis)� That is to say, it cannot be any object merely physically present in the world—that “immense collection of commodities”—but to assume the social form of money it must be more than—must “defeat,” as Fried might put it—its literal objecthood� The analogy between commodity and object, thus, would have to be supplemented by the one between money and 76 m arlon l ieBer work of art� Juliane Rebentisch suggests that we need not choose between art and objecthood, arguing instead that the “dual presence as things and signs” is a defining feature of all art (163). In short, works of art are always also objects that, however, due to their aesthetic form, possess a structural meaning—and objectivity as works of art—that is not reducible to an affective reaction to their materiality. Commodities, too, we can add with Marx, are objects whose “physical body” affects individuals� At the same time, money represents the objectivity of value as such in a manner that is irreducible to any individual’s will� Value, that is, is a social form� The work of art differs only insofar as the dual structure appears in and through one object, whereas the “internal opposition between use-value and value” must express itself in the “external opposition” of commodity and money (Marx, Capital 1 153)� 19 VII Let me note in closing that we might be in a better position now to understand why Haim Steinbach could claim that “hierarchical judgments” were “implicit in objects.” As use-values that, by definition, exist “for others,” commodities are formally determined to be dependent on the judgments of potential users—or, Brown might interject, their preferences� But in the realm of commodities there exists, just as in art, a form of “equality” that stands in a certain kind of opposition to these preferences, a “formal equivalence,” as Joselit puts it� Yet, a sensually perceptible property (such as the color red) does not suffice to produce this equivalence. If I am wearing a red shirt and walk up to Steinbach’s ultra red #2 in a museum, this item of clothing does not become formally equivalent to alarm clock, pot, or lava lamp� The equality between these objects only emerges when they are considered as parts of the work that can be related to a whole, as Robert Morris also recognizes when he notes that in works structured by internal relations, “different kinds of things” are “becoming equivalent�” (818) Michael Heinrich similarly notes that the objectivity of value cannot be attributed to the commodities in themselves, “in the way […] that both a fire truck and an apple have the color red in common�” It is instead only constituted when “they are set into relation with one another in exchange” (An Introduction 53)—and this only becomes possible when they are related to the money-form as an actually existing universal, a representative of “general wealth” (Marx, Grundrisse 222) or “itself the community [Gemeinwesen]” (223). This structural affinity between money and art might call into question the political power of aesthetic autonomy as 19 This tacitly presupposes that both commodity and work of art possess a material “body”� In how far immaterial commodities (services) and works would transform the argument would have to be further analyzed� More pertinently, since the end of the Bretton Woods system gold no longer plays the role of money commodity� Michael Heinrich defends Marx’s (monetary) value despite the absence of a particular commodity that serves as a “bearer” of the value-form (Die Wissenschaft 233; original emphasis; translation mine)� Interestingly, this corresponds historically with the turn to ‘immaterial’ works of art in, for instance, conceptualism� Art and Economic Objecthood 77 an alternative to the market—though it might, as Walter Benn Michaels proposes, still be worthwhile politically to understand a work of art as a structured “whole” irreducible to individual “feelings” (330)� Or perhaps I should rather say that Brown’s argument about the politics of autonomy is sound, but only from a perspective that focuses on the use-value of commodities� If this was not such a clichéd expression often serving to replace an actual argument, we might be tempted to conclude that, since works of art are and are not in opposition to the principle of commodity exchange, the work of art under capitalist conditions is an inherently dialectical object� Better, perhaps, to begin the work of actually analyzing particular works, as Brown does in Autonomy, to see how the relationship between social form and aesthetic form actually plays out� My remarks remain preliminary suggestions about this relationship in the abstract� The actual work remains to be done� Works Cited Adorno, Theodor W� Aesthetic Theory� Trans� Robert Hullot-Kentor� London: Bloomsbury, 2013� ---� Aesthetics 1958/ 59� Trans� Eberhard Ortland� Cambridge: Polity, 2018� ---� “On the Fetish Character in Music and the Regression of Listening�” The Culture Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture� Ed� J� M� Bernstein� London: Routledge, 2001� 29-60� Beech, Dave� Art and Value: Art’s Economic Exceptionalism in Classical, Neoclassical and Marxist Economics. 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